ASS NO.
8
Del Val v Del Val G.R. No. L-9374 February 16, 1915
J. Moreland
Fatcs:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila dismissing the complaint with costs.
The parties are siblings who were the only heirs at law and next of
kin of Gregorio del Val, who passed away intestate. An administrator
was appointed for the estate of the deceased, and, after a partial
administration, it was closed. During the lifetime of the deceased he
took out insurance on his life for the sum of P40,000 and made it
payable to Andres del Val as sole beneficiary. After his death,
the defendant Andres collected the face of the policy. He paid the
sum of P18,365.20 to redeem certain real estate which the decedent
had sold to third persons with a right to repurchase. The redemption
of said premises was made by the attorney of the defendant in the
name of the plaintiff and the defendant as heirs of the deceased
vendor. Andres, on death of the deceased, took possession of most of
his personal property and that he has also the balance on the
insurance policy amounting to P21,634.80.
Plaintiffs contend that the amount of the insurance policy belonged
to the estate of the deceased and not to the defendant personally,
hence they are entitled to a partition not only of the real and personal
property, but also of the P40,000 life insurance. The complaint prays
a partition of all the property, both real and personal, left by the
deceased, and that the defendant account for P21,634.80. They also
wanted to divide this equally among the plaintiffs
and defendant along with the other property of deceased.
The defendant’s claim was that redemption of the real estate sold by
his father was made in the name of the plaintiffs and himself instead
of in his name alone without his knowledge or consent. He also
averred that it was not his intention to use the proceeds of the
insurance policy for the benefit of any person but himself, he alleging
that he was and is the sole owner thereof and that it is his individual
property
The trial court refused to give relief to either party and dismissed the
action due to the argument that the action for partition failed to
comply with the Civil Procedure Code sec. 183, in that it does not
'contain an adequate description of the real property of which
partition is demanded.'
Issue: Can the proceeds of the policy be divided among the heirs?
Held: No. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
The proceeds of the life-insurance policy belong exclusively to
the defendant as his individual and separate property. That the
proceeds of an insurance policy belong exclusively to
the beneficiary and not to the estate of the person whose life was
insured, and that such proceeds are the separate and individual
property of the beneficiary, and not of the heirs of the person whose
life was insured, is the doctrine in America. The doctrine is
embedded in the Code of Commerce where:
“The amount which the underwriter must deliver to the person
insured, in fulfillment of the contract, shall be the property of the
latter, even against the claims of the legitimate heirs or creditors of
any kind whatsoever of the person who effected the insurance
in favor of the former.”
The plaintiffs invoked Article 1035 of the Civil Code, where it reads:
“An heir by force of law surviving with others of the same character
to a succession must bring into the hereditary estate the property or
securities he may have received from the deceased during the life of
the same, by way of dowry, gift, or for any good consideration, in
order to compute it in fixing the legal portions and in the account of
the division.”
They also invoked Article 819. This article provides that "gifts made
to children which are not betterments shall be considered as part of
their legal portion."
The court didn’t agree because the contract of life insurance is a
special contract and the destination of the proceeds is determined by
special laws which deal exclusively with that subject. The Civil Code
has no provisions which relate directly and specifically to life-
insurance contracts or to the destination of life insurance proceeds.
That was under the Code of Commerce.
The plaintiffs claim that the property repurchased with the insurance
proceeds belongs to the heirs in common and not to
the defendant alone. This wasn’t agreed upon by the court unless the
facts appeared that Andres acted as he did with the intention that the
other heirs should enjoy with him the ownership of the estate.
1

Rodriguez vs Rodriguez (Group 12)
G.R. No. L-23002
Doctrine: Property Relations/ Prohibition of Donation Between
Husband and Wife
Facts: Concepcion Felix, widow of the late Don Felipe Calderon and
with whom she had one living child, Concepcion Calderon,
contracted a second marriage on June 20, 1929, with Domingo
Rodriguez, widower with four children by a previous marriage,
named Geronimo, Esmeragdo, Jose and Mauricio, all surnamed
Rodriguez.Prior to her marriage to Rodriguez, Concepcion Felix was
the registered owner of 2 fishponds located in the barrio of
Babañgad, Bulacan which she consequently sold to her daughter
Concepcion Calderon for P2,500. The properties were then donated
back to her and Rodriguez thus, having the properties registered
under the names of the spouses.
On March 6, 1953, Domingo Rodriguez died intestate, survived by
the widow, Concepcion Felix, his children Geronimo Esmeragdo and
Mauricio and grandchildren Oscar, Juan and Ana, surnamed
Rodriguez, children of a son, Jose, who had predeceased him.The
heirs of Domingo entered into an extra-judicial settlement of his
estate. Among the properties listed as conjugal were the two parcels
of land in Bulacan, which, together with another piece of property,
were divided as follows: ½ to Concepcion Feix as her share to the
conjugal property; ¾ of the remaining ½ to his children and ¼ of
the remaining ½ to his grandchildren. Corresponding new TCTs
were issued.
On March 23, 1953, in a power of attorney executed by the children
and grandchildren of Domingo Rodriguez, Concepcion Felix was
named their attorney in-fact, authorized to manage their shares in
the fishponds. On October 12, 1954, the Rodriguez children executed
another document granting unto the widow lifetime usufruct over
one-third of the fishpond which they received as hereditary share in
the estate of Domingo, which grant was accepted by Concepcion
Felix. Then, in a contract dated December 15, 1961, the widow
appeared to have leased from the Rodriguez children and
grandchildren the fishpond for a period of 5 years commencing
August 16, 1962, for an annual rental of P7,161.37. At this time, the
relationship between Concepcion Felix and her step children turned
sour and the widow subsequently failed to deliver the balance of the
earnings of the fishpond. A demand letter was sent to her to claim
such, but her answer was the present case seeking the annulment of
the transfer to the conjugal partnership of the two fishponds on the
ground that the conveyances in issue were obtained through duress,
and were inexistent, being simulated and without consideration.
Issue: WON the transfer of the two fishponds to the conjugal
property were valid
Ruling: The charge of simulation is untenable, for the characteristic
of simulation is the fact that the apparent contract is not really
desired or intended to produce legal effects or in way alter the
juridical situation of the parties. Thus, where a person, in order to
place his property beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a
transfer of it to another, he does not really intend to divest himself of
his title and control of the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but
a sham. But appellant contends that the sale by her to her daughter,
and the subsequent sale by the latter to appellant and her husband,
the late Domingo Rodriguez, were done for the purpose of converting
the property from paraphernal to conjugal, thereby vesting a half
interest in Rodriguez, and evading the prohibition against donations
from one spouse to another during coverture. If this is true, then the
appellant and her daughter must have intended the two conveyance
to be real and effective; for appellant could not intend to keep the
ownership of the fishponds and at the same time vest half of them in
her husband. The two contracts of sale then could not have been
simulated, but were real and intended to be fully operative, being the
means to achieve the result desired. Nor does the intention of the
parties to circumvent by these contracts the law against donations
between spouses make them simulated ones.
What would invalidate the conveyances now under scrutiny is the
fact that they were resorted to in order to circumvent the legal
prohibition against donations between spouses. The illicit purpose
then becomes illegal causa within the terms of the old Civil Code.
Unfortunately for herein appellant, in contracts invalidated by illegal
subject matter or illegal causa, apply rigorously the rule in pari
delicto non oritur action, denying all recovery to the guilty parties
inter se. And appellant is clearly as guilty as her husband in the
attempt to evade the legal interdiction of Article 1334. Wherefore, her
present action to reivindicate the, conveyed properties was correctly
repulsed by the Court. In view of the foregoing, the decision
appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellant Concepcion Felix
Vda. de Rodriguez.
2
Notes:
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or
indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void,
except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the
occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to
persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage.
Art. 1306. If the act which constitutes the illicit consideration is
neither a crime nor a misdemeanor, the following rules shall be
observed:
1. When both parties are guilty, neither of them can recover what he
may have given by virtue of the contract, or enforce the performance
of the undertaking of the other party; (not sure what article is this in
the NCC)
Ayala Investments vs CA
GR No. 118305, February 12, 1998
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan
from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation
(AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security
agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly
and severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. PBM
failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and
Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to
jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with
interests. Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of
execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff, caused the
issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff
sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent
spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the ground that
subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal
partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing
its order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent
spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC,
being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the
husband alone is considered “for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership” and is it chargeable.
HELD:
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit
of PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the
debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a
personality distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the
fact that they happened to be stockholders of said corporate
entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to
Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, “if the
money or services are given to another person or entity, and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by
itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership”. The contract of loan or
services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for
the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan
contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is
certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession, it is not
embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should not
be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the
benefit of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a
benefit for the family may have resulted when the guarantee was in
favor of Ching’s employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of
shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated
in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must be one directly resulting from the
loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off of the loan
itself.
3
Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v Mijares, 410 SCRA 97
(2003)
FACTS:
 Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960 but had been
separated de facto since 1974.
 In 1984, Ignacia learned that Vicente sold a property (lot) to
spouses Mijares for P40,000 on 1983.
 She also found out that Vicente misrepresented her in the
MTC declaring that she died on March 22, 1982 and that the
heirs left are him and the 5 minor children.
 On September 1983, the court granted guardianship over the
minor children to Vicente and authorized the latter to sell the
estate of Ignacia on October 1983.
 On August 9, 1984, Ignacia, through her counsel, sent a letter
to respondent spouses demanding the return of her ½ share
in the lot.
 Failing to settle the matter amicably, Ignacia filed on June 4,
1996 a complaint for annulment of sale against respondent
spouses.
 In their answer, respondent spouses claimed that they are
purchasers in good faith and that the sale was valid because it
was duly approved by the court.
 Vicente Reyes, on the other hand, contended that what he sold
to the spouses was only his share.
 On February 15, 1990, the court a quo rendered a decision
declaring the sale of lot void with respect to the share of
Ignacia. It held that the purchase price of the lot was
P110,000.00 and ordered Vicente to return ½ thereof or
P55,000.00 to respondent spouses.
 Ignacia filed a motion for modification of the decision praying
that the sale be declared void in its entirety and that the
respondents be ordered to reimburse to her the rentals they
collected on the apartments built on Lot No. 4349-B-2
computed from March 1, 1983.
 Both Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes and respondent spouses appealed
the decision to the Court of Appeals. Pending the appeal,
Ignacia died and she was substituted by her compulsory heirs.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale is valid, void or merely voidable?
HELD:
Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code, the governing laws at the time
the assailed sale was contracted, provide:
Art.166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a
leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. If she
refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to
grant the same…
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from
the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends
to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs
4

after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of
property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
In the case at bar, it is clear that the lot is a conjugal property of Ignacia
and Vicente. Therefore, the sale of said lot to the Mijares spouses,
without the knowledge and consent of Ignacia Reyes, is voidable. The
action to annul the sale made on 1983 was filed on 1986 which is
within the prescriptive period under Article 173.
The Court finds that respondent spouses are not purchasers in good
faith. They already know about the discrepancies and irregularities in
the death certificate presented by Vicente. The said errors should have
prompted them to question the sale and pertaining documents.
In this case, the Supreme Court held that the Deed of Sale executed by
Vicente and respondents was annulled. The guilty husband is asked to
pay damages to Mijares spouses and to his children (petitioners).
Abalos vs Macatangay, Jr.
G.R. No. 155043 September 30 2004
FACTS:
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners of a
parcel of land with improvements. Arturo made a Receipt and
Memorandum of Agreement in favor of Macatangay, binding himself
to sell to latter the subject property and not to offer the same to any
other party within 30 days from date. Full payment would also be
effected as soon as possession of the property shall have been turned
over to Macatangay. Macatangay gave an earnest money amounting
to P5,000.00 to be deducted from the purchase price of
P1,300,000.00 in favor of the spouses.
Subsequently, Arturo and Esther had a marital squabble brewing at
that time and Macatangay, to protect his interest, made an
annotation in the title of the property. He then sent a letter
informing them of his readiness to pay the full amount of the
purchase price. Esther, through her SPA, executed in favor of
Macatangay, a Contract to sell the property to the extent of her
conjugal interest for the sum of P650,000 less the sum already
received by her and Arturo. She agreed to surrender the property to
Macatangay within 20 days along with the deed of absolute sale upon
full payment, while he promised to pay the balance of the purchase
price for P1, 290,000.00 after being placed in possession of the
property. Macatangay informed them that he was ready to pay the
amount in full. The couple failed to deliver the property so he sued
the spouses.
RTC dismissed the complaint, because the SPA could not have
authorized Arturo to sell the property to Macatangay as it was
falsified. CA reversed the decision, ruling the SPA in favor of Arturo,
assuming it was void, cannot affect the transaction between Esther
and Macatangay. On the other hand, the CA considered the RMOA
executed by Arturo valid to effect the sale of his conjugal share in the
property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of property is valid.
RULING:
No. Arturo and Esther appear to have been married before the
effectivity of the Family Code. There being no indication that they
have adopted a different property regime, their property relations
would automatically be governed by the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains. The subject land which had been admittedly
acquired during the marriage of the spouses forms part of their
conjugal partnership.
Under the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the
conjugal partnership. This right is clearly granted to him by law.
More, the husband is the sole administrator. The wife is not entitled
as of right to joint administration.
5
 still void for as previously stated, the right of the husband or the wife
The husband, even if he is statutorily designated as administrator of to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership, cannot validly alienate or encumber any the conjugal partnership. Nemo dat qui non habet. No one can give
real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. what he has not.
Similarly, the wife cannot dispose of any property belonging to the
conjugal partnership without the conformity of the husband. The law
is explicit that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without
the husband’s consent, except in cases provided by law.

More significantly, it has been held that prior to the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal
assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a
legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it
appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the
liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to
the net remainder or “remanente liquido” (haber ganancial)
resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after
its dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of
the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation
of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage,
when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal
obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the
spouses or their respective heirs.

The Family Code has introduced some changes particularly on the

aspect of the administration of the conjugal partnership. The new law
provides that the administration of the conjugal partnership is now a
joint undertaking of the husband and the wife. In the event that one
spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal partnership, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. However, the power of
administration does not include the power to dispose or encumber
property belonging to the conjugal partnership. In all instances, the
present law specifically requires the written consent of the other
spouse, or authority of the court for the disposition or encumbrance
of conjugal partnership property without which, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void.

Inescapably, herein Arturo’s action for specific performance must

fail. Even on the supposition that the parties only disposed of their
respective shares in the property, the sale, assuming that it exists, is

6
ASS. NO. 9
FRANCISCO VS CA
Facts:
Private respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and
Antonio Francisco are children of Eusebio by his first marriage.
Issues:
the crucial issue in this petition is whether or not the appellate court
committed reversible error in affirming the trial court's ruling that
the properties, subject matter of controversy, are not conjugal but the
capital properties of Eusebio exclusively.
Ruling:
Articles 158[5] and 160[6] of the New Civil Code have been repealed
by the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3,
1988. The aforecited articles fall under Title VI, Book I of the New
Civil Code which was... expressly repealed by Article 254[7] (not
Article 253 as alleged by petitioner in her petition and reply) of the
Family Code. Nonetheless, we cannot invoke the new law in this case
without impairing prior vested rights pursuant to Article 256[8] in
relation to Article 105[9] (second paragraph) of the Family Code.
the repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code does not
operate to prejudice or otherwise affect rights which have become
vested or accrued while the... said provisions were in force.[10]
Hence, the rights accrued and vested while the cited articles were in
effect survive their repeal.
Principles:
the repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code does not
operate to prejudice or otherwise affect rights which have become
vested or accrued while the... said provisions were in force.[10]
Hence, the rights accrued and vested while the cited articles were in
effect survive their repeal
CHING V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124642, 23 February 2004
FACTS:
The Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a
loan of P9,000,000 from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). As
an added security for the said loan, Alfredo Ching, together with
Emilio Tadeo and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing guaranty
with the ABC binding them to jointly and severally guarantee the
payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing to the ABC. The PBMCI
defaulted in the payment of all its loans.
Hence, the ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a
writ of preliminary attachment. Citing as one of the grounds for the
writ was the fraud defendants employed in incurring the obligations
by representing themselves as having the financial capacity to pay the
loan when in fact they did not have such capacity. In the meantime,
on July 26, 1983, the deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on
attachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks in the
name of Alfredo Ching.
On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her
husband Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on
attachment. She alleged inter alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks
levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during
their marriage out of conjugal funds after the Citycorp Investment
Philippines was established in 1974. She, likewise, alleged that being
the wife of Alfredo Ching, she was a third-party claimant entitled to
file a motion for the release of the properties. She attached therewith
a copy of her marriage contract with Alfredo Ching.
ISSUE:
Is the conjugal partnership liable for the payment of the liability?
RULING:
7
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties
acquired during the marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership; unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband, or to the wife. In Tan v. Court of Appeals, the court held
that it is not even necessary to prove that the properties were
acquired with funds of the partnership. As long as the properties
were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they are presumed
to be conjugal in nature. In fact, even when the manner in which the
properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still
apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal. The
presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties acquired during
the marriage subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence to overcome the same.
In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is
that the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment
Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate books in
the name of the petitioner-husband when the said corporation was
incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was done during the subsistence
of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are,
thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the
petitioners. The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the
petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money.
The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the
corporate books of Citycorp Investment Philippines solely in the
name of the petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that the
petitioner-husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should
appertain to the husband alone there must be a showing that some
advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal
partnership responsible for a liability that should appertain alone to
one of the spouses is to frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code
to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well being of the
family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to
assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability
of the conjugal partnership.
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal
partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-
husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI.
The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the
PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be
inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into
an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal
partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was
burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal
partnership.
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he
directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own
business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term “…
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Here, no
actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the
family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the
very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to
benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the
business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end,
his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated,
where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In this case, the
petitioner-husband acted merely as a surety for the loan contracted
by the PBMCI from the private respondent. The petition is
GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. The assailed orders of the RTC are
AFFIRMED.
8
JOCSON v. COURT OF APPEALS
February 16, 1989 (G.R. No. L-55322)
FACTS:
Emilio Jocon and Alejandra Jocson were husband and wife. The wife
died first intestate then the husband followed. Moises and Agustina
are their children. Ernesto Vasquesz is the husband of Agustina.
The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents
executed by Emilio Jocson during his lifetime. These documents
purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what
apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third
(1/3) share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails
these documents and prays that they be declared null and void and
the properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him and
Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents.
Petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4
are the unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and
Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore, cannot validly sell.
They say it is conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra
Poblete, because they were registered in the name of “Emilio Jocson,
married to Alejandra Poblete”.
ISSUE: WON the property registered under the name of “Emilio
Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete” is conjugal property or
exclusive property.
HELD:
Exclusive. Article 60 of the CC proveides that All property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
The party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the
property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. In other
words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine
qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership.
It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the
presumption under Article 160 he must first present proof that the
disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of Emilio
Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon
which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the
properties were registered in the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to
Alejandra Poblete” is no proof that the properties were acquired
during the spouses’ coverture. Acquisition of title and registration
thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does
not confer title but merely confirms one already existing (See Torela
vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under dispute were
acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were
registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which
explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to
the latter.
Contrary to petitioner’s position, the certificates of title show, on
their face, that the properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson’s, the
registered owner. This is so because the words “married to’ preceding
“Alejandra Poblete’ are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio
Jocson. In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that
Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same having been
registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra
Poblete.
9
 Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals case where the SC ruled on the conjugal nature of the 30 parcels of
G.R. No. L-57757
31 August 1987 land.

FACTS: Donata Montemayor is the administrator of 30

ISSUES: (1) Can the PNB rely merely on the Torrens Certificate
parcels of land of her late husband Clodualdo Vitug who died intestate.
of Title covering Donata’s properties for the processing of the
Several portions of such land (TCT-2289, TCT-2887, and TCT-2888)
respective mortgage loan applications?
were mortgaged to PNB as security for certain loans availed by
(2) Is the earlier action for reconveyance and partition
Salvador Vitug, Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani, respectively.
concerning the 30 lots real actions and binding upon the PNB by virtue
The loans were never paid so the bank foreclosed all the mortgaged
of the Vitug vs. Montemayor decision?
properties. PNB as the highest bidder, purchased the lots, and

subsequently sold the same to the Vitugs and the Fajardos.

RULING: (1) Yes. The PNB had sufficient reason to rely on the
Meanwhile, Donata executed a contract of lease for a lot
Torrens Certificate of Title of the mortgaged properties. The SC ruled
covered by TCT-2887-R to her sons Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug.
that in processing the loan applications, the PNB had the right to rely
After a few years, the same brothers filed an action for partition and
upon the face of the certificate of title. Clearly, it appears that Donata
reconveyance with damages in the CFI Pampanga against the PNB, the
(a widow) owns the properties and the PNB had no reason to doubt
Vitugs, the Fajardos, and Marcelo Mendiola, the special administrator
her status and ownership. The PNB also found no liens or
of Donata’s intestate estate. They claimed that the 30 parcels of land
encumbrances covering the properties. The clean facts reasonably
form part of the conjugal property of the spouses Donata and
cancel the need to make further inquiry.
Clodualdo and they claim a share interest of 2/11 of 1/2 thereof. They

assailed the mortgage of said properties to the PNB and the The Court applied the well-known rule in jurisdiction that a

subsequent public auction. They invoked the Vitug vs. Montemayor person has a right to rely upon the face of the Torrens Certificate of

10
Title when dealing with a registered land. It is not necessary to inquire
beyond its face, except when such person has an actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that would prompt him to inquire further.
The Court ruled that a Torrens title “concludes all controversy over
ownership of the land covered by a final degree of registration” and
upon such registration, the person is assured of ownership without
going to court or sitting “at the veranda of his house” to avoid the fear
of losing his land.
(2) No. The SC maintained that although actions for recovery
of real property and for partition are real actions, they are actions in
personam which are binding only upon the persons who are parties
thereto. The PNB is not a party in the cited case and is therefore not
bound by the decision. In addition, there is no showing that the PNB
was aware of the case decision when it extended the mortgage loan
involving the subject properties. The court settled that if the PNB
knew that said properties were conjugal, it would not have approved
the mortgage application without securing the consent of the its co-
owners. Therefore, the PNB is considered as a purchaser for value in
good faith when it sold the foreclosed properties at a public auction.
The complaint is dismissed.
TESTATE ESTATE OF NARCISO A. PADILLA v.
CONCEPCION PATERNO, GR No. L-8748, 1961-12-26
Facts:
"Narciso A. Padilla died February 12, 1934, leaving a childless widow,
Concepcion Paterno, Whom he had married in 1912. His last will,
which was probated in due course, instituted his mother, Ysabel
Bibby Vda. de padilla, as universal heiress.
After hearing evidence on both sides, the Court rendered on January
15, 1940, a decision which, as amended by its resolution of April 24,
1940, declared as paraphernal certain personal and real properties,
Other realties, although originally paraphernal, were considered
part... of the conjugal assets because of buildings erected thereon
during coverture, but reimbursement of their value was directed. The
main bulk was adjudged conjugal property.
A day before the filing of this petition, however, the trial court had
issued an order, upon motion of the administratrix of the estate of
the widow Concepcion Paterno,... for a final accounting of the 1951,
1952, and 1953 credit balances of the estate, and to determine the
rentals or income of those properties found to be paraphernal assets
of the widow, so that the undelivered portions of said rentals could
be turned over to the widow's estate.
The administratrix of the widow's estate likewise sought an
amendment of the court's order of March 2, 1954, so as to require the
executrix to account for the undelivered... rentals or fruits of the
widow's paraphernal properties from October 5, 1938, when the
executrix started her administration, until December 7, 1953, when
they were finally turned over to the widow's estate.
On March 15, 1954, the executrix submitted an accounting of the
credit balances of the estate for the years 1951, 1952, and 1953, but in
subsequent pleadings objected to the accounting of the fruits of the
properties declared to be paraphernal on the theory that (1) said...
properties were actually held conjugal subject only to paraphernal
claims; and that (2) consequently, their income belonged to the
11
conjugal estate and had been periodically divided equally between
the executrix as the universal heir of the deceased and the widow's
estate. As for... the R. Hidalgo property, the executrix also objected to
any further determination of an additional share of the widow on the
improvements thereon, claiming that the widow's estate was bound
by the value of P189,240 given to this property by the Rufino report
from which the... administratrix of the Widow's estate did not appeal.
Issues:
Should the herein executrix be made to account for the income of the
paraphernal properties... belonging to Concepcion Paterno as prayed
for by said administratrix?
Is it necessary to determine the additional value of the R. Hidalgo
property as sought by said administratrix?
That the lower court erred in holding that some of the properties
included in the estate are paraphernal in character and that all their
income belonged to the widow Concepcion Paterno;
As to the R. Hidalgo property of the estate, the lower court erred in
sustaining the additional claim of the widow's estate over the
improvements thereon.
Ruling:
The answer to the first question is in the affirmative.
It is contended by the executrix herein that the properties under
administration in this proceeding are conjugal subject to the
paraphernal claims of the widow, Concepcion Paterno and that the
rentals from one or the other property cannot be excluded 'for such
exclusions... cannot be justified, as the definite character of the
properties as adjudicated in favour of the wife or of the husband
became absolute and definite only after the decision of the Hon.
Supreme Court late in 1953.'... the executrix herein is directed to
submit within ten (10) days from receipt of this order an accounting
of the income of the paraphernal properties in question covering the
period from August 29, 1938 to December 7, 1953.
Wherefore, the
The executrix herein is hereby authorized and directed to deliver
immediately to the estate of Concepcion Paterno the one-half portion
of the credit balance on the 1953 annual accounting.
'As already stated, the conjugal improvements on the lots on Arquiza
and Juan Luna have been destroyed by fire, and the Supreme Court
having held that the lands on which said improvements were erected
remained paraphernal until the value of said lands were paid to the
widow
Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla, said lands must be returned to
the Testate Estate of Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla.
The rentals of property declared paraphernal, after deducting
administration expenses, must be delivered to the estate of
Concepcion Paterno; while the rentals from conjugal property, after
deducting administration expenses, should be divided equally
between the heir of the... husband and those of the wife. * * * "
"When the R. Hidalgo property was appraised by the Rufino Report
on July 9, 1948, at P189,240,00 and under such appraisement
awarded to the estate of the widow, we respectfully submit that the
value as appraised included not only the land but also the
improvement which was... then already existing, the same having
been built in 1947."
"The R. Hidalgo property is partly conjugal and partly paraphernal.
Nine-twenty-ninths thereof belongs to the Testate Estate of
Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla as paraphernal property, ten-
twenty-ninths thereof belongs to it as share in the conjugal
partnership, while the... remaining ten-twenty-ninths should belong
to Doña Isabel B. Vda. de Padilla as her inheritance from the
decedent herein. It has a total area of 946.2 square meters. At the
rate of P200 per square meter, it has a total value of P189,240.00.
The lot shall become conjugal property... and divided accordingly
after the Testate Estate of Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla shall
have been reimbursed in the sum of P58,729.67." (Record on Appeal
in L-4130, pp. 182-183)
Considering that the improvements on the R. Hidalgo property
accrued to the owner of the land only after the, expiration of the
seven-year lease entered into by the executrix-appellant with the
tenant on February 2, 1946, the lower court did not err in ordering
12
 the appraisal... of said improvement with the view of determining the
additional share therein of the widow Concepcion Paterno.
Wherefore, with the clarification that the accounting of the income of
the paraphernal properties to be made by the executrix-appellant
should refer only to the Arquiza, Juan Luna, and Callejon de la Fe
properties, to Lot No. 6-A of the Camba property, and to the outer...
portion of the Martin Ocampo property, the order appealed from is
affirmed. Without special pronouncement as to costs.
Principles:
The Civil Code of I889 provided that upon dissolution of marriage
the husband or his heirs may be compelled to make immediate
restitution of the paraphernal property which has been turned over
to the husband for... administration (Art. 1391 in connection with
Art. 1369).
G.R. No. L-21533 June 29, 1967
HERMOGENES MARAMBA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
NIEVES DE LOZANO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Facts:
 ÑOn November 3, 1948, the plaintiff filed an action against the
defendant Nieves de Lozano and her husband Pascual Lozano for the
collection of a sum of money.
 On June 23, 1959, the court rendered a judgment in favor of Maramba
and ordered Lozanos to pay the total sum of Three Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos and Seven Centavos (P3,500.07), with legal interest
thereon from date of the filing of the instant complaint until fully paid.
 On August 18, 1960 levy was made upon a parcel of land in the name
of Nieves de Lozano. The notice of sale at public auction was published
in accordance with law and scheduled for September 16, 1960.
 On that date, however, defendant Nieves de Lozano made a partial
satisfaction of the judgment in the amount P2,000.00, and requested
for an adjournment of the sale to October 26, 1960. On October 17,
1960, she filed amended motion, dated October 14, alleging that on
November 11, 1952, during the pendency of the case, defendant
Pascual Lozano died.
 She ruled that the property levied upon was her paraphernal property,
and praying that her liability be fixed at one-half (½) of the amount
awarded in the judgment and that pending the resolution of the issue
an order be issued restraining the Sheriff from carrying out the auction
sale scheduled on October 26, 1960.
 On that date, the sale proceeded anyway, and the property of Nieves
de Lozano which has been levied upon was sold to the judgment
creditor, as the highest bidder, for the amount of P4,175.12, the
balance of the judgment debt.
Issue:
Whether or not the judgment debt could be satisfied from the proceeds
of the properties sold at public auction in view of the presumption that
it is conjugal in character although in the of only one of the spouses.
Held:
The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to property
acquired during the marriage. But in the instant case there is no
showing as to when the property in question was acquired and hence
the fact that the title is in the wife’s name alone is determinative.
Furthermore, appellant himself admits in his brief that the property in
question is paraphernal.
The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to property
acquired during the marriage. But in the instant case there is no
showing as to when the property in question was acquired and hence
the fact that the title is in the wife’s name alone is determinative.
Furthermore, appellant himself admits in his brief that the property in
question is paraphernal.
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BUADO V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 145222, 24 April 2009
FACTS:
On April 30 1984, Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado, petitioners,
filed a complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol for her civil
liability arising from criminal offense of slander filed by petitioners.
Trial court rendered a decision to let Erlinda Nicol pay for damages.
Finding Erlinda Nicol‘s personal properties insufficient to satisfy the
judgment. The sheriff levied and auctioned the property of Erlinda.
An auction sale was held with the petitioners as the highest bidder. A
certificate of sale was issued in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Buado. After
almost one year, the husband of Erlinda, Romulo Nicol, filed a
complaint for the annulment of certificate of sale and damages with
preliminary injunction against petitioners and deputy sheriff. He
argued that there was no proper publication and posting for the
auction sale. He also claimed that the judgment obligation of Erlinda
Nicol amounted to P40,000 only. The spouses Buado obtained the
P500, 000 worth of property for only P51,685. The Regional Trial
Court dismissed the petition of Romulo Nicol.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and held that
Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by the
respondent in this case. The petitioners filed a petition where they
said that the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion
for reversing the decision given by the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda Nicol arising from her
criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
RULING:
NO. Erlinda Nicol‟s liability is not chargeable to the conjugal
partnership.
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature.
Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of
personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or
during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership
except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.Unlike
in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by
either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the
absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of
the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is
not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The
conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments
for the liability of the debtor-spouse.
Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her
criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership. In
Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court held that the car which was claimed
by the third party complainant to be conjugal property was being
levied upon to enforce “a judgment for support” filed by a third
person, the third-party claim of the wife is proper since the obligation
which is personal to the husband is chargeable not on the conjugal
property but on his separate property. Hence, the filing of a separate
action by Romulo Nicol was proper. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed.
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