G.R. No.

179987 September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan),

Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties
who both assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the
ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the
registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground
that they had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in
accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree).

Antecedents

The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D,
with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario
Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an
application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation
of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of
his title.1

To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:

This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang
Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite
containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-
00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification
Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-
1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s
application for land registration, disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus
places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as
Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A
and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324)
Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record
of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN,
who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang,
Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of
registration shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.3

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had
been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by
law for confirmation of imperfect title.

On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and
dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic
v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification
stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15,
1982, Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of
computing Malabanan’s period of possession.

Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated
the CA’s decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on
certiorari.

The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon
Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is
agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land
prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of
the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act
No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in
Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for
registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier,
was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings therein
were in fact found and declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of
initial hearing.

The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support
their argument that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by
reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their
predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30
years. According to them, what was essential was that the property had been
"converted" into private property through prescription at the time of the application
without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was previously
classified as agricultural land of the public domain.

As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan
failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on
his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration

In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of
the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into
patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v.
Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that
the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive
prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest
had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and
ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of
the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied
in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration on
February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years
reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by
the State.

The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration

The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with
reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.

Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by
implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
through judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to
registration only when the land subject of the application had been declared alienable
and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Ruling

We deny the motions for reconsideration.

In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different

classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the
Philippines.

Classifications of land according to ownership

Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion

or of private ownership.11 Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is
intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. 12 Land
belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no
longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial
property of the State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the
State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a
private individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into
the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the State.15 This means that the State
is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.16

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain
unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17

Classifications of public lands

according to alienability

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on
the classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935
Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely,
agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with
the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution
adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber,
and mineral, but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by
law according to the uses to which they may be devoted.21 The identification of lands
according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act
of the Executive Department.22

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that
may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural
lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a)
patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under
Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or
the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands
must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or
national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are
reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable
such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under
existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. 26 If, however,
public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national
park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the
ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of
a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive
Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or
the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public
service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

Disposition of alienable public lands

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to
wit:

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as
follows, and not otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease; and

 (4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in
relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by
a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)

Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public
domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that
lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of
patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act.
What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable
and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural
lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy
the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has

been in possession and occupation of the property subject of the
application;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive,

and notorious;
 3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership;

4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12,
1945, or earlier; and

5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of

the public domain.

Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to
classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of
the application for registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of
the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land
is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine
applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as
laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the
requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.

The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and
disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier,
because any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification
produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be
minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy
concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.

We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite
possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of
which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date
qualified the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to
be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should
interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.

Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that
Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should
have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the
applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of
the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain
determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed
statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the
period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the
public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by
operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed
by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the application
of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable
and disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is
necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.

The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point
at which prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being
confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason
of the applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant
by the Government are complied with through actual physical, open, continuous,
exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right
to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of
title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31

If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and
quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their
occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law 32 will be
defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a
fairly recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation
(Republic Act No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures
in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly
residential lands, subject to area limitations.34

On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or
for the development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President,
thereby converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the
applicable provision concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run against the State.

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public
land or lands of the public domain, namely:
 (1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are
not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the
State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:

(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable

and disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated
under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs
only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the
application, provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of
the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a
conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant arises,36 and the
applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect
or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to
be part of the public domain and has become private property.37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared

as no longer intended for public use or for the development of
national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion
and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of
private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any
of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the
mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or
extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to
private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive
period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article
1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that
they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12,
1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession
and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or
earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even
upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never
began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to
be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring
the land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the
respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
G.R. No. 175746 March 12, 2008

CHARLES L. ONG, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the April 25, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76085, which reversed and set aside the January 16, 2002
Decision2 of the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan in Land Registration
Case No. 99-023, and the November 20, 2006 Resolution3 which denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

On July 1, 1999, petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner) in his behalf and as duly
authorized representative of his brothers, namely, Roberto, Alberto and Cesar, filed an
Application for Registration of Title4 over Lot 15911 (subject lot) situated in Barangay
Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan with an area of five hundred seventy four (574) square
meters, more or less. They alleged that they are the co-owners of the subject lot; that the
subject lot is their exclusive property having acquired the same by purchase from
spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998; that the subject lot is
presently unoccupied; and that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of owners for
more than thirty (30) years.

After due notice and publication, only respondent Republic of the Philippines
(respondent), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the application
for registration of title. Respondent asserted that neither applicants nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1073; that applicants failed to adduce any muniment of title to prove their claims;
that the tax declaration appended to the application does not appear genuine and
merely shows pretended possession of recent vintage; that the application was filed
beyond the period allowed under P.D. No. 892; and that the subject lot is part of the
public domain which cannot be the subject of private appropriation.

On January 16, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner and his
brothers, viz:
The foregoing evidences presented by the applicant indubitably established sufficient
basis to grant the applicant (sic) for registration. Originally, the whole parcel of land
was owned by spouses Teofilo Abellara and Abella Charmine who acquired the same
by virtue of a Deed of Sale from Cynthia Cacho, Agustin Cacho, Jr., Jasmin Cacho, Jover
Cacho and Lauro Cacho. Later, they sold the same parcel of land to spouses Tony C.
Villamil and Alicia Bautista, who in turn sold the same land to herein applicants.

The same parcel of land has been declared in the name of the applicant and her
predecessors-in-interest and its taxes has (sic) been religiously paid.

The said circumstances further show that the possession and ownership of the applicant
and her (sic) predecessors-in-interest over the same parcel of land has (sic) been
continuous and peaceful under bona fide claim of ownership before the filing of the
instant application for registration on [July 1, 1999].

WHEREFORE, after confirming the Order of General Default, the Court hereby orders
and decrees the registration of a parcel of land as shown on plan ap-01-004897
approved by the Bureau of Land(s) situated in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan,
Pangasinan, containing an area of Five Hundred Seventy Four (574) square meters,
subject of the application for registration of title, in accordance with Presidential Decree
No. 1529, in favor of CHARLIE L. ONG in his behalf and as representative of his
brothers namely, ROBERTO L. ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG and CESAR L. ONG.

Furnish copies of this Decision to the Office of the Solicitor General, Makati City, Metro
Manila, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Dagupan City, Atty. Celestino Domingo
Jr., the Office of the Land Registration Authority, Quezon City, as well as the applicant.

SO ORDERED.5

Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision of the court a
quo granting the application for registration of title of applicants-appellees is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.6

In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals found that the subject
lot is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Thus, it was
incumbent upon petitioner to prove that they possessed the subject lot in the nature and
for the duration required by law. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his
predecessors-in-interest have been in adverse possession of the subject lot in the
concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by Section 14(1) of P.D.
1529. It noted that the earliest tax declaration which petitioner presented is dated 1971.
Consequently, petitioner could not fairly claim possession of the land prior to 1971.
Neither was petitioner able to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest actually
occupied the subject lot prior to the filing of the application. Thus, the trial court erred
in granting the application for registration of title over the subject lot.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, TOGETHER WITH HIS BROTHERS,

NAMELY, ROBERTO L. ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG AND CEZAR L. ONG, HAVE
REGISTRABLE OWNERSHIP OVER THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER
OF LAND REGISTRATION CASE NO. 99-023, AND

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION OF THE

FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT
THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY IS A PUBLIC LAND IS CORRECT.7

The petition lacks merit.

Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 ("Property Registration Decree"), as amended, provides —

SEC. 14. Who may apply. –The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.

Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for registration of title
must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of
the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.8 These requisites involve questions of fact which are not
proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Factual findings of the court a quo are
generally binding on this Court except for certain recognized exceptions, as is the case
here, where the trial court and the Court of Appeals arrived at conflicting
findings.9 After a careful review of the records, we sustain the findings and conclusions
of the Court of Appeals.

There is no dispute that the subject lot is classified as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain. The Report10 dated January 17, 2000 of the Bureau of Lands stated
that the subject lot is "within the alienable and disposable zone as classified under
Project 50 L.C. Map No. 698 and released and classified as such on November 21,
1927."11 This finding is, likewise, embodied in the Report12 dated January 7, 1999 of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) and the blue print Copy13 of the plan
covering the subject lot. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

The records show that petitioner and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses
Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998,14 who in turn purchased the same
from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen on January 16, 1997.15 The latter
bought the subject lot from Cynthia, Agustin Jr., Jasmin, Omir and Lauro, all surnamed
Cacho, on July 10, 1979.16 The earliest tax declaration which was submitted in evidence
was Tax Declaration No. 2560617 issued in 1971 in the names of spouses Agustin Cacho
and Eufrosinia Baustista. While tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership,
they constitute good indicia of possession in the concept of owner and a claim of title
over the subject property.18 Even if we were to tack petitioner’s claim of ownership over
the subject lot to that of their alleged predecessors-in-interest, spouses Agustin Cacho
and Eufrosinia Baustista in 1971, still this would fall short of the required possession
from June 12, 1945 or earlier.1avvphi1

Further, as correctly pointed by the Court of Appeals, possession alone is not sufficient
to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires
possession and occupation. As held in Republic v. Alconaba:19

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the
other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the
all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact
that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual
possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.20

Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses
Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil in 1998, neither he nor his brothers actually occupied
the subject lot.21 No improvements were made thereon and the most that they did was
to visit the lot on several occasions.22 Petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Tony Bautista
testified that he and his wife never actually occupied the subject lot from the time they
bought the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen in 1997.23 Aside
from these two testimonies, no other evidence was presented to establish the character
of the possession of the subject lot by petitioner’s other alleged predecessors-in-interest.
Clearly, petitioner’s evidence failed to establish specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied
the subject lot in the nature and duration required by law.

The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who must show by
clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and occupation of
the land is of the nature and duration required by law.24 Unfortunately, petitioner’s
evidence do not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary in cases
of this nature.25 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the Decision
of the trial court and in denying his application for registration of title over the subject
lot.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The April 25, 2006
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76085 which reversed and set aside
the January 16, 2002 Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan in
Land Registration Case No. 99-023, and the November 20, 2006 Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 154080 January 22, 2008

NELSIE B. CAÑETE, RONA ANAS, MILAGROSA APUAN, ERLINDA AQUINO,

GODOFREDO AQUINO, CORITA BARREDO, TESSIE BARREDO, JESUS
BATRINA, ALBERTO BUENAVENTURA, BONIFACIO BUENAVENTURA,
EUSEBIO CAPIRAL, MARIO CAPIRAL, LOLITA CAPIRAL, ELENA CAPIRAL,
LETICIA CAPIRAL, RENATO CAPIRAL, ELY CABANGON, ERWIN CATALUNA,
JESSIE CONRADO, JOEL CONRADO, NARCISIO CONRADO, RICARDO
CALAMPIANO, ALUMNIO CORSANES, NILO COLATOY, MARJETO DAYAN,
HENRY DIAZ, SALVACION ESMANDE, REYNALDO FUENTEBELLA, GERRY
GEQUILLANA, DELSIE GARCIA, NERISSA GONZALES, VISITACION JUNSAY,
ESTELA JOVEN, JOSE LANZUELA, MARLON MALANGAYON, RENATO
MARCELO, ANITA MARZONIA, MARCELINO MONTALBO, AMADO MULI, JR.,
LEONITA MULI, EDUARDO OLVIDO, ALMARIO PACON, ASUNCION PACON,
SALVACION PAGAYUNAN, ESTER PANTALEON, SHERLITA RABE, ANITA
REYES, MEDELYN RIOS, BERTITO RIVAS, ENGRACIA RIVERA, GERALYN
RIVERA, ARMANDO RIVERA, MA. MERCY SHERVA, ALEXANDER
SANGALAN, ERNESTO SANTIAGO, JOY SANTIAGO, ELENA TALION, JOE
RANDY TRESVALLES, ELIAS VALENZUELA, GERRY VALENZUELA, LILIBETH
VALENZUELA, JOSEPHINE VICTORINO, JOJO VICTORINO, MAXIMINO
VICTORINO, NOEL VICTORINO, REYNANTE VICTORINO, ROBERTO
VICTORINO and JOVITO VILLAREAL, represented by NELSIE B.
CAÑETE, petitioners,
vs.
GENUINO ICE COMPANY, INC., respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals dated January 9, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64337 entitled "Genuino Ice Company,
Inc. vs. Hon. Victorino P. Evangelista, Nelsie B. Cañete, et al.," and its Resolution2 dated
June 26, 2002, dismissing petitioners’ "Second Amended Complaint" in Civil Case No.
Q-99-36483 filed in Branch 223 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

Records show that on January 11, 1999, petitioners filed a complaint for cancellation of
title to property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. N-
140441;3 14399;4 RT-94384 (292245);5 RT-94794 (292246);6 and 292247.7 Petitioners alleged
that said titles are spurious, fictitious and were issued "under mysterious
circumstances," considering that the holders thereof – including their predecessors-in-
interest – were never in actual, adverse and physical possession of the property,
rendering them ineligible to acquire title to the said property under the Friar Lands
Act.8 Petitioners also sought to nullify Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 614 from
which the foregoing titles sought to be cancelled originated or were derived.

Respondent Genuino Ice Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss9 on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action because petitioners are not real parties-in-interest;
that no relief may be granted as a matter of law; and that petitioners failed to exhaust
administrative remedies, but it was denied by the trial court. Respondent moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied.

On November 4, 1999, petitioners filed a "Second Amended Complaint"10 which sought

to annul, in addition to the titles already alleged in the original complaint, TCT Nos.
274095 and 274096;11 274097 and 274098;12 and 274099.13

The Second Amended Complaint alleged the following causes of action, as well as the
remedy sought to be obtained, thus:

4. That plaintiffs (petitioners) and their predecessors-in-interest are among those

who have been in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession in concept
of owners of unregistered parcels of land situated at Sitio Mabilog, Barangay
Culiat, Quezon City, Metro Manila, which parcels of land are more particularly
described as follows:

(1) "A parcel of unregistered land known as Lot 668, situated at Barangay
Culiat, Quezon City x x x."

(2) "A parcel of unregistered land known as Lot 669, situated at Barangay
Culiat, Quezon City x x x."

5. That the above-described real property is a portion of a friar land known as

"Piedad Estate," which property is intended for distribution among the bona fide
occupants thereof pursuant to the Friar Lands Act.

6. That transfer certificates of title allegedly having originated or derived from

Original Certificate of Title No. 614 were issued by the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, which transfer certificates of title are in truth and in fact fictitious,
spurious and null and void, for the following reasons: (a) that no record of any
agency of the government shows as to how and in what manner was OCT 614
issued; (b) that no record of any proceedings whatsoever, whether judicial or
administrative, can support defendants’ claim that the above-described property
originated from OCT 614; and (c) that the transfer certificates of title over the
above-described property were issued under mysterious circumstances for the
above-named defendants and their so-called predecessors-in-interest never had
 any actual, adverse, physical possession of the said property, thus, not allowed to
acquire title over the property in litigation pursuant to the Friar Lands Act.

7. That defendants are holders of transfer certificates of title of the above-

described property, which transfer certificates of title are null and void, for
reasons specifically mentioned in Paragraph 6 hereof x x x;

8. That the acts in acquiring and keeping the said transfer certificates of title in
violation of the Friar Lands Act and other existing laws are prejudicial to
plaintiffs’ rights over the above-described property.

9. That equity demands that defendants’ transfer certificates of title as specified

in Paragraph 7 hereof be declared fictitious, spurious and null and void ab initio.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this

Honorable Court that judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against
defendants:

(1) Declaring as null and void ab initio OCT 614 and all transfer certificates of
title derived therefrom;

(2) Declaring as null and void defendants’ transfer certificates of title over the
property in litigation;

(3) Ordering defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel defendants’

transfer certificates of title and all transfer certificates of title derived therefrom;

(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of the property in litigation
pursuant to the provisions of the Friar Lands Act and other existing laws.14

Respondent moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on the following

grounds:

a) The complaint states no cause of action because: (1) on the allegations alone,
plaintiffs (petitioners) are not real parties in interest who may bring suit to cancel
defendants’ (including respondent) titles; (2) based on the allegations and prayer
of the complaint, no relief, as a matter of law, may be granted;

b) Prescription has set in;

c) There are earlier similar complaints (Civil Case Nos. Q-95-22834 and Q-95-
23111) filed by a different set of plaintiffs against a different set of defendants but
 which involve the same subject matter, cause of action and allegations of the
plaintiffs, with respect to the cancellation of OCT 614 and succeeding titles
derived from it. Said complaints have since been dismissed by Branch 93 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, the dismissal of which is the subject of a
pending certiorari proceeding in the appellate court.15

On January 3, 2001,16 the trial court denied respondent’s motion to dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint. Its motion for reconsideration was likewise denied hence
respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court granted respondent’s petition for certiorari and dismissed
petitioners’ Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Hence, the
instant petition raising the following issues:

A. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE

COMPLAINT FILED BY THE PETITIONERS WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF QUEZON CITY IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-99-36483 DOES NOT STATE
A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION;

B. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE

PETITIONERS ARE NOT REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST;

C. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE

OF "EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES"; and,

D. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AND DENIED PETITIONERS’ RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN
IT DISMISSED THEIR COMPLAINT.17

We deny the petition.

The subject lots are part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, a Friar Land acquired on
December 23, 1903 by the Philippine Government from the Philippine Sugar Estates
Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila
Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands, as indicated in
Public Act No. 1120 (Friar Lands Act) enacted on April 26, 1904.18

After the Piedad Estate was registered in OCT No. 614 in the name of the Philippine
Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act 496, the area was subdivided originally
into 874 lots. As a result of subsequent surveys executed in the course of disposition, the
number of lots increased to 1,305. Disposition of these lots was made by the Bureau of
Lands thru sales, under the Friar Lands Act, as early as 1910 and records show that
even before the Second World War, all lots in the Piedad Estate have been disposed
of.19 The Piedad Estate has long been segregated from the mass of the public domain
and has become private land duly registered under the Torrens system following the
procedure for the confirmation of private lands prescribed in Act 496. Thus the lands
inside the Piedad Estate are no longer lands of the public domain.20

One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his successors-in-interest,
may not claim successional rights to purchase by reason of occupation from time
immemorial, as this contravenes the historical fact that friar lands were bought by the
Government of the Philippine Islands, pursuant to an Act of Congress of the United
States, approved on July 1, 1902, not from individual persons but from certain
companies, a society and a religious order. Under the Friar Lands Act, only "actual
settlers and occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the Government" were
given preference to lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings, in disregard of the
settlement and occupation of persons before the government acquired the lands. 21

The basic rules of proper pleading and procedure require that every pleading shall
contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the
ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case
may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts.22 And in all averments of
fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with
particularity.23

It is axiomatic that the averments of the complaint determine the nature of the
action, and consequently, the jurisdiction of the courts. This is because the
complaint must contain a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff's cause of action and must specify the relief sought. No rule is better
established than that which requires the complaint to contain a statement of all
the facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. Additionally, Section 5, Rule 8
of the Rules of Court provides that in all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. In
the case at bar, while there are allegations of fraud in the above quoted
complaints, the same are not particular enough to bring the controversy within
the SEC's jurisdiction. The said allegations are not statements of ultimate facts
but are mere conclusions of law.

A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or
defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions of fact, or conclusions
of law. General allegations that a contract is valid or legal, or is just, fair and
reasonable, are mere conclusions of law. Likewise, allegations that a contract is
void, voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy, without
stating facts showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law.24

"Ultimate facts" means the essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action, or
such facts as are so essential that they cannot be stricken out without leaving the
statement of the cause of action inadequate.25 "Cause of action" has been defined as an
act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; 26 and its
essential elements are: 1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; 2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant
to respect or not to violate such right; and 3) an act or omission on the part of the named
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation
of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages. If these elements are not extant, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a
motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.27 In the resolution
of a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, only the facts alleged
in the complaint as well as its annexes must be considered.28 The test in such case is
whether a court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based upon the facts
alleged and pursuant to the prayer therein.29

Corollarily, the question of whether or not a complaint states a cause of action against a
defendant or the action is premature is one of law. The trial court can consider all the
pleadings filed, including annexes, motions and the evidence on record. However in so
doing, the trial court does not rule on the truth or falsity of such documents. It merely
includes such documents in the hypothetical admission. Any review of a finding of lack
of cause of action based on these documents would not involve a calibration of the
probative value of such pieces of evidence but would only limit itself to the inquiry of
whether the law was properly applied given the facts and these supporting documents.
Therefore, what would inevitably arise from such a review are pure questions of law,
and not questions of fact.

The trial court must likewise apply relevant statutes and jurisprudence in determining
whether the allegations in a complaint establish a cause of action. While it focuses on
the complaint, a court clearly cannot disregard decisions material to the proper
appreciation of the questions before it. In resolving a motion to dismiss, every court
must take cognizance of decisions this Court has rendered because they are proper
subjects of mandatory judicial notice. The said decisions, more importantly, form part of
the legal system, and failure of any court to apply them shall constitute an abdication of
its duty to resolve a dispute in accordance with law, and shall be a ground for
administrative action against an inferior court magistrate.30

Considering the foregoing, it is not difficult to see the need for particularity and
incipient substantiation in the petitioners’ Second Amended Complaint.

First, their initial claim that OCT 614 – of which all the other subject titles are
derivatives – is null and void, has been proven wrong. As has been held in Pinlac and
other cases, OCT 614 did legally exist and was previously issued in the name of the
Philippine Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act 496.
Second, the Ad Hoc Committee of the then Ministry of Natural Resources, which was
specifically tasked to investigate the historical background of the Piedad Estate, found
that as early as the period prior to the Second World War, all lots in the Piedad Estate
had already been disposed of.

Third, the Piedad Estate has been placed under the Torrens system of land registration,
which means that all lots therein are titled.

Fourth, as held in the Balicudiong case, one who acquires land under the Friar Lands
Act, as well as his successors-in-interest, may not claim successional rights to purchase
by reason of occupation from time immemorial, which means that petitioners’ claimed
actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the subject property is really of
no moment unless it is shown that their predecessors-in-interest were actual settlers and
occupants at the time said lands were acquired by the Government, and whose rights
were not disregarded even though they were in occupation of the same before the
government acquired the land; yet, no period of time in relation to adverse possession is
alleged.

Petitioners’ Second Amended Complaint betrays no more than an incomplete narration

of facts unsupported by documentary or other exhibits; the allegations therein partake
of conclusions of law unsupported by a particular averment of circumstances that will
show why or how such inferences or conclusions were arrived at. It is replete with
sweeping generalizations and inferences derived from facts that are not found therein.
While there are allegations of fraud upon the claim that the subject titles were fictitious,
spurious and obtained under "mysterious circumstances," the same are not specific to
bring the controversy within the trial court’s jurisdiction. There is no explanation or
narration of facts as would show why said titles are claimed to be fictitious or spurious,
contrary to the requirement of the Rules that the circumstances constituting fraud must
be stated with particularity; otherwise, the allegation of fraud would simply be an
unfounded conclusion of law. In the absence of specific averments, the complaint is
defective, for it presents no basis upon which the court should act, or for the defendant
to meet it with an intelligent answer.

As to the second issue raised, petitioners claim that they are bona fide occupants of the
subject property within the contemplation of the Friar Lands Act, having allegedly been
in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the property, although it is
not stated for how long and since when. In their second amended complaint, they seek
judgment –

(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of the property in litigation
pursuant to the provisions of the Friar Lands Act and other existing laws.
(Emphasis supplied)
They do not pray to be declared owners of the subject property – despite their alleged
adverse possession – but only to be adjudged as the "bona fide occupants" thereof. In
other words, petitioners concede the State’s ownership of the property.

Being so, petitioners may not be considered the real parties in interest for the purpose of
maintaining the suit for cancellation of the subject titles. The Court of Appeals is correct
in declaring that only the State, through the Solicitor General, may institute such suit.
Jurisprudence on the matter has been settled and the issue need not be belabored. Thus
–

The Court also holds that private respondents are not the proper parties to
initiate the present suit. The complaint, praying as it did for the cancellation of
the transfer certificates of title of petitioners on the ground that they were
derived from a "spurious" OCT No. 4216, assailed in effect the validity of said
title. While private respondents did not pray for the reversion of the land to the
government, we agree with the petitioners that the prayer in the complaint will
have the same result of reverting the land to the government under the Regalian
doctrine. Gabila vs. Barriga ruled that only the government is entitled to this relief.
The Court in that case held:

"The present motion to dismiss is actually predicated on Section 1(g), Rule

16 of the Revised Rules of Court, i.e., failure of the complaint to state a
cause of action, for it alleges in paragraph 12 thereof that the plaintiff
admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or amendment of
the defendant’s title, because, even if the said title were canceled or
amended, the ownership of the land embraced therein, or of the portion
thereof affected by the amendment, would revert to the public domain. In
his amended complaint the plaintiff makes no pretense at all that any part
of the land covered by the defendant’s title was privately owned by him
or by his predecessors-in-interest. Indeed, it is admitted therein that the said
land was at all times a part of the public domain until December 18, 1964, when
the government issued a title thereon in favor of defendant. Thus, if there is any
person or entity to relief, it can only be the government.

In the case at bar, the plaintiff’s own averments negate the existence of such
right, for it would appear therefrom that whatever right might have been
violated by the defendant belonged to the government, not to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff-appellant argues that although his complaint is captioned as one for
cancellation of title, he has nevertheless stated therein several causes of action
based on his alleged rights of possession and ownership over the improvements,
on defendant-appellees alleged fraudulent acquisition of the land, and on the
damages allegedly incurred by him (plaintiff-appellant) in relation to the
improvements. These matters are merely ancillary to the central issue of whether
 or not defendant-appellee’s title should be canceled or amended, and they may
not be leaned upon in an effort to make out a cause of action in relation to the
said focal issue. Indeed, the principal relief prayed for in the amended complaint
is the cancellation or amendment of defendant-appellee’s title."31

Under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a real party in interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an
interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in
the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The interest of the party must also
be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some
third and unrelated party. Real interest, on the other hand, means a present substantial
interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate,
or consequential interest.32

If petitioners are to be believed, they would possess a mere inchoate interest in the
properties covered by the subject titles, a mere expectancy conditioned upon the fact
that if the questioned titles are cancelled and the property is reverted to the State, they
would probably or possibly be given preferential treatment as qualified buyers or lessees
of the property under the Friar Lands Act. But this certainly is not the "interest"
required by law that grants them license or the personality to prosecute their case. Only
to the State does the privilege belong.

On the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, suffice it to state that since

petitioners do not possess the necessary interest to prosecute the case for cancellation of
title in the courts, neither do they have the right to pursue administrative remedies
outside thereof. They are not the owners; nor are they qualified applicants therefor. It
has not been shown by their complaint that they have previously taken steps to avail of
the benefits under the Friar Lands Act, since all they seek, should the questioned titles
be nullified, is to be declared bona fide occupants of the property covered by the
questioned titles. Neither is there any indication that they possess the qualifications
necessary to enable them to avail of the preference granted under the Act.

Finally, there is no merit in petitioners’ contention that respondent belatedly filed the
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and that the appellate court gravely
abused its discretion when it entertained and resolved the same.

The Order of the trial court dated January 3, 2001 denying respondent’s motion to
dismiss the Second Amended Complaint was received by the respondent on January 16,
2001. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration on January 18, 2001 which was
denied on February 28, 2001. Respondent received the order denying its motion for
reconsideration on March 27, 2001. On the same day, it filed a Notice to File Petition for
Certiorari. On April 2, 2001, the petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of
Appeals. Clearly, the same was timely filed hence, the appellate court correctly
entertained the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
January 9, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64337 dismissing petitioners’ "Second Amended
Complaint" in Civil Case No. Q-99-36483 and the Resolution dated June 26, 2002
denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-39248 May 7, 1976

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF

LANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HEIRS OF LUISA VILLA ABRILLE, defendant-appellant, LAND REGISTRATION
COMMISSIONER and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY, defendants.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Atty.
Baltazar Llamas plaintiff-appellee.

Jose R. Madrazo, Jr. for defendant-appellant.

Gregorio Bilog, Jr. for defendant Land Registration Commissioner.

ESGUERRA, J.:

This case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-
G.R. No. 47438-R. The Court of Appeals certified it to this Court for final consideration
and resolution of the pure question of law involved.

The factual background of the case is as follows:

On May 9, 1969, a Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Title was filed by the
Republic of the Philippines (represented by the Director of Lands), with the Court of
First Instance of Davao, Branch 1, alleging, among others, the following:

3. That defendant Commissioner of Land Registration and defendant

Register of Deeds of Davao City whose Offices are at España Extension,
Quezon City and Davao City, respectively. "(are included in this
complaint, the first being the public Official charged under the law with
the approval )." subdivision surveys of private lands while the second is
the Official vested with the authority to issue certificates of titles, pursuant
to the provisions of Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Law;

4. That defendant Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille (now Heirs of Luisa Villa
Abrille) is the owner of a parcel of land in the City of Davao containing an
area of FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
FIFTY TWO SQUARE METERS (525.652), more or less, under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-1439 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City,
issued in her name;
5. That deceased Luisa Villa Abrille during her lifetime caused the
subdivision of the aforesaid parcel of land into two lots designated as Lots
Nos. 379-B-2-B-1 and 379-B-2-B-2 under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-69322
which was approved by the Land Registration Commissioner on March
17,1967;

6. That under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, Lot No. 379- B-2-B-1
contains an area of 30,100 Square Meters while Lot No. 379-B-2B-2
contains an area of 577,679 Square Meters or a total area of 607,779 Square
Meters, which is 82,127 Square Meters more than the original area covered
in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 in the name of said defendant
Luisa Villa Abrille;

7. That on March 27, 1967 or ten days after the approval by the Land
Registration Commissioner, said Luisa Villa Abrille was able to secure an
order from the Court of First Instance of Davao in LRC (GLRO) Doc. No.
9969, directing the Register of Deeds for the City of Davao and Province of
Davao, to correct the area of Certificate of Title No. T-1439 and thereafter
to cancel the same and issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887;

8. That on March 30, 1967, the Register of Deeds concerned registered Lot
379-B-2-B-1 and issued TCT No. 18886 therefor, in the name of Luisa Villa
Abrille and on the same date registered Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 and issued
TCT No. 18887 in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille;

9. That the registration of Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2, which includes the

aforementioned excess area of 82,127 Square Meters, was not in
accordance with law for lack of the required notice and publication as
prescribed in Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Law;

10. That the excess or enlarged area of 82,127 Square Meters as a result of
the approval of the subdivision survey (LRC) Psd-69322 was formerly a
portion of the Davao River which dried up by reason of the change of
course of the said Davao River; hence a land belonging to the public
domain; and

11. That as a consequence thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18887

which covers Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 of Subdivision Survey (LRC) Psd-69322,
wherein the excess area of land belong to the public domain (not private
land) is null and void ab initio.
On June 10, 1969, defendant Register of Deeds of Davao- City filed her answer averring
that she, "in the performance of her ministerial duty, honestly and in good faith effected
the registration of Subdivision Lot No. 379-B-2-B-1 and Lot No. 379B-2-B-2 and the
issuance of corresponding TCT No. 18886 and TCT No. 18887 therefor, respectively, in
view of the approval of the Land Registration Commissioner of Subdivision Plan (LRC)
Psd-69322, and in view of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Davao to correct
the area in Certificate of Title No. T-1439, to cancel the same and to issue in lieu thereof
TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887".

On July 2, 1969, herein defendant-appellants filed their answer admitting the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the complaint; that they admit the increase in
area of the land of their predecessor but that the increase in area of the land was
acceded to and concurred in by the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, and
the same was duly noted and approved by the Court of First Instance of Davao; that
they admit the issuance of TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887 out of Certificate of Title No.
T- 1439 in the name of their predecessor-in-interest Luisa Villa Abrille but that TCT No.
T-18886 had been cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-19077 was issued in favor of
Gaudencio Consunji, and, TCT No. T-18887 had likewise been cancelled and several
Transfer Certificates of Title were issued thereunder; that the subject increase of area
was made in accordance with law and existing jurisprudence; and that Luisa Villa
Abrille, predecessor-in-interest of herein defendant-appellant, as riparian owner was
entitled under the law to claim, as she did, the increase or excess in area of her original
land as her own.

On August 12, 1969, defendant Commissioner of Land Registration prays for a

judgment on the pleadings and avers in his answer that he has no knowledge of the
subject matter of the complaint since the subdivision plan involved therein was
approved by the then Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio Noblejas; and that
on February 19, 1968, the then Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio Noblejas,
issued LRC Circular No. 167 directing the Register of Deeds throughout the Philippines
to, among others, deny the registration of subdivision plans with increased or expanded
areas and to withhold the issuance of the corresponding titles, or if the plans have
already been registered and the titles issued, to recall the titles and to take appropriate
steps for their cancellation.

Some private persons, as actual possessors and occupants, tried to intervene in the case
as movant-intervenors but they were denied standing in court by the trial court in its
order of August 16,1969.

On January 6, 1970, the parties litigants submitted in court their "Agreed Stipulation of
Facts" and pray that judgment be rendered by the trial court on their case based on their
stipulation of facts. The "Agreed Stipulation of Facts" of the parties reads as follows:
COME NOW the parties assisted by their respective attorneys, and unto
the Honorable Court, most respectfully submit the following stipulation of
facts and allege:

1. That Lot 379-B-2-B was originally registered on June 28, 1916 in the
Registry Book of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga as Vol. A27, Page 40
under Original Certificate of Title No. 5609, Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Rec. No.
317, in the name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna, father of Luisa Villa
Abrille;

2. That upon the death of the original owner, the said property was
inherited by Luisa Villa Abrille and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439
was issued in the name of said Luisa Villa Abrille;

3. That subsequently, by virtue of an approved subdivision plan Psd-

69322 by the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-18886 and 18887 were issued by the defendant,
Register of Deeds of Davao, copy of which subdivision plan is hereto
attached as Annex "A", and made integral part hereof;

4. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18886 was subsequently

cancelled by virtue of deed of sale, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
19077 was issued in the name of Gaudencio Consunji a purchaser in good
faith and for value;

5. That the said subdivision plan Annex "A" was also approved by the
Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, through an Order dated
March 27, 1967, copy of which order is hereto attached as Annex "B" and
made part hereof;

6. That the said Order Annex "B" was issued by the Court of First Instance
of Davao, Branch IV, on the strength of the Report of the defendant, Land
Registration Commissioner, copy of which report is hereto attached as
Annex "C" and made integral part hereof;

7. That much later on, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18887 was by
virtue of an Order of the Court of First Instance, Branch 1, in Special
Proceedings No. 1357, entitled: In the Matter of the Testate Estate of Luisa
Villa Abrille, approving a project of partition cancelled, and in lieu
thereof, the following Transfer Certificates of Title were issued to the
following named persons, to wit:

(a) T-20690 - Huang Siu Sin;

 (b) T-20692 - Huang Siu Sin;

(c) T-20701 - Josefino Huang;

(d) T-20702 - Josefino Huang;

(e) T-20703 - Josefino Huang;

(f) T-20732 Huang Siu Sin, et al.;

(g) T-20733 - Huang Siu Sin, et al.;

(h) T-20713 - Miguel Huang;

(i) T-23015 - Miguel Huang;

(j) T-20725 - Milagros Huang;

(k) T-20726 - Milagros Huang;

which certificates of title were issued on the basis of a subdivision plan

LRC Psd-71236 duly approved by the defendant, Land Registration
Commissioner, copy of which subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236 is hereto
attached as Annex "D" and made integral part hereof;

8. That the parties admit that there was an increase in the area of Lot 379-
B-2-B, but the same was with the knowledge of the defendant, Land
Registration Commissioner and the court of First Instance of Davao,
Branch IV;

9. That the parties admit that no registered owner has been affected or
prejudiced in the increase in area as only Luisa Villa Abrille as the
registered owner holds property adjacent to the parcel of land in question;

10. That the portion of land subject of the increase adjoins Lot 379-B-2-B
and abuts the Davao River;

11. That the parcel of land subject of the increase is fully planted with
coconuts, bananas and other seasonal crops by the defendants, through
their predecessor-in-interest;

12. That the increase in area could have taken place very long time ago as
the coconuts planted thereon had long been fruit bearing;
13. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18886 does not contain any
portion of the increase in area;

14. That of the certificates of title issued based under subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-71236, only Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T- 20725; T-20701;
T-20713; and T-20690 contain the increase in area; while all the other
certificates of title issued under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236 do not
contain any increase in area;

15. That the parties agree that the issuance of the Order Annex "B" was
without notice to the Director of Lands.

The trial court thereafter rendered its decision dated January 27, 1970,
which reads as follows:

This is an ordinary civil action for annulment of certificate of title

instituted by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director
of Lands, against the Estate of Luisa Abrille, represented by Huang Siu
Sin, Administrator, the Land Registration Commissioner and the Register
of Deeds of the City of Davao. Because the residue of the intestate estate of
Luisa Villa Abrille had been divided among Huang Siu Sin, Josefino
Huang, Milagros Huang, Miguel Huang and lap Tong Ha, heirs, they
were directed to appear and to substitute for the intestate estate and they
did.

The parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:

xxx xxx xxx

The increase in area of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
5609 of the Register of Deeds of Davao in the name of Francisco Villa
Abrille Lim Juna and subsequently by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T.
1439 in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille and finally, based on subdivision
plan (LRC) Psd-71236, by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725 in the
name of Milagros Huang, T20701 in the name of Josefino Huang, T-20713
in the name of Miguel Huang and T-20690 in the name of Huang Siu Sin,
is from 525,652 square meters to 607,779 square meters, or 82,127 square
meters.

The remedy sought by defendant heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille in order to

include the increase in area was a petition for approval of Subdivision
Plan (LRC) Psd-79322 recommended by the Commissioner of Land
Registration in his Report, and for issuance of new title under Section 44,
Act 496, as amended, filed with this court, which was assigned to Branch
IV.

Even pursuant to Section 44 of Act 496 under which the aforesaid remedy
was sought, notice before the hearing is required. The parties admit that
there was no notice to the persons interested, including the Director of
Lands, before the petition was heard.

Worse, the increase in area could not have been included in Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 even
assuming arguendo that the same belonged to the owner of the land to
which it is adjacent by the simple expediency of a petition for approval of
subdivision plan and issuance of new titles, because a subdivision of a
registered land under Section 44 of Act 496 does not authorize the
inclusion of land or area not embraced in the titled or in excess of what is
stated in the title. And the approval by the Court of such subdivision plan
does not lend validity to it. The subdivision must be limited to the area
stated in the title. Neither amendment of the title under Section 112 of Act
496 would be a valid remedy 1.

The heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille.. owners of the adjacent estate, might have
acquired a registrable title to the land in question but to bring it under the
operation of the Land Registration Act, a petition for registration under
Act 496 should have been filed. More so when the title acquired is by
continuous possession for at least 30 years under a claim of ownership
And even assuming that the land is an accretion, the fact that the riparian
estate is registered does not bring ipso facto effect its accretion thereto
under the operation of the Land Registration Act. No decree of
registration of the land based upon final judgment promulgated by a court
of competent jurisdiction after due publication, notice and hearing, has
been issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration and transcribed by
the Register of Deeds of Davao in the registry, for the reason that no initial
or original registration proceedings have been instituted by the owner.
And the only way by which a title to the land in question can be issued for
the first time is for the Land Registration Commissioner to issue a decree
of registration based upon final judgment rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction after trial.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered cancelling Transfer

Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 and
directing the Register of Deeds of Davao to issue new certificates of title in
lieu thereof after the portions consisting of 82,127 square meters, the land
involved, shall have been segregated therefrom in accordance with law.
Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, defendant Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille
brought the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, in
its Resolution dated July 22, 1974, certified the case (CA-G.R. No. 47438-R) to this Court
for consideration and final disposition.

Defendant-appellant maintains that the lower court erred in holding the approval of
Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 of no legal effect merely on ground of lack of notice
to interested persons, and in ordering the cancellation of Certificates of Title Nos. T-
20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690. It is the contention of the defendant-appellant that
since the government agencies having to do with lands know all the time the increase in
area in subdivision plan Psd-69322, and the government agencies concerned tolerated if
not abetted the ultimate inclusion of the involved increase in area, defendant-appellant
should not be made to suffer the effect of the allegedly wrong procedure or step taken
in the approval of the aforementioned subdivision plan. Besides, defendant-appellant
claims that it is their honest belief that the legal remedy taken by them in seeking the
approval of their subdivision plan concerned was well within the law, particularly the
provision of Section 44 of Act 496, as amended.

Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, maintains that the approval of the subdivision
plan, with the increase in area, by the defendant-appellant Land Registration
Commission does not lend validity to the said subdivision plan; and that the issuance of
the four transfer certificates of title (Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690) over
the increased area in question is improper and invalid notwithstanding the conformity
of the Land Registration Commissioner and the subsequent order of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Branch IV, approving the subdivision plan concerned, as the
required giving of notice to all parties interested in defendant-appellant's petition for
approval of subdivision plan was not at all followed,

Before Us, therefore, for consideration and final resolution, in order to arrive at a
judicious disposition of the case at bar, is whether or not the lower court erred in
ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713
and T-20690 which cover the increased area in question totalling 82,127 square meters.

After a careful and thorough deliberation of the matter in controversy, We are of the
opinion and so hold that the lower court acted correctly in ordering the cancellation of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 which
admittedly covered the increased area of 82,127 square meters under Subdivision Plan
(LRC) Psd-71236 (and formerly under Psd-69322) for the City of Davao.

Certainly, the step taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the court for the
approval of their Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 and then Psd-71236 to include the
questioned increased area of 82,127 square meters is, to say the least, unwarranted and
irregular. This is so, for the increased area in question, which is not a registered land but
formerly a river bed, is so big as to give allowance for a mere mistake in area of the
original registration of the tracts of land of the defendant-appellant formerly belonging
to and registered in the name of their grandfather, Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna. In
order to bring this increase in area, which the parties admitted to have been a former
river bed of the Davao River, under the operation and coverage of the Land
Registration Law, Act 496, proceedings in registrations of land title should have been
filed Instead of an ordinary approval of subdivision plan.

It should be remembered that recourse under Section 44 of Act 496, which the
predecessor-in-interest (Luisa Villa Abrille) of the herein defendant-appellant took, is
good only insofar as it covers previously registered lands. In the instant case, part of the
tracts of land, particularly the area of 82,127 square meters, has not yet been brought
under the operation of the Torrens System. Worse still, the approval of Subdivision
Plans (LRC) Psd-69322 and Psd-71236 was without notice to all parties in interest, more
particularly the Director of Lands. For an applicant to have his imperfect or incomplete
title or claim to a land to be originally registered under Act 496, the following requisites
should all be satisfied:

1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private

surveyor;

2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant;

3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court;

4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing together

with all the documents or other evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of
Court to the Land Registration Commission;

5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and place
of the hearing in the Official Gazette;

6. Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those known

to have interests in the property by the sheriff;

7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the

notice or not;

8. Hearing of the case by the Court;

9. Promulgation of judgment by the Court;

 10. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final and
instructing the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree of
confirmation and registration;

11. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration

Commission;

12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding

Register of Deeds, and

13. Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration book and

the issuance of the owner's duplicate original certificate of title to the
applicant by the Register of Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees.

Hence, with the foregoing requisites not having been complied with, the lower court
committed no error in its appealed decision dated January 27, 1970.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.

No special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925

VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR
OF LANDS, appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.

Monico R. Mercado for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a complaint
filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands, praying for
judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land
described in the second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by the
Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that the land is a private
property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said Angela
Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with
the costs.

For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every allegation
contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that the land in question was a
property of the Government of the United States under the administration and control
of the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance
with law.

After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the
land, annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and
ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs against
Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took this appeal, assigning
thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The holding that the judgment rendered in a
prior case between the plaintiff and defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in
question is controlling in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover
the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of the sale made by the Director of
Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the
register of deeds of the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be
cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for new trial filed by the Director of Lands.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in
question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of
P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After having been in
possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed,
Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi for
the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before the execution of
the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said
land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of
which he had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of the land
in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi
has been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except during
the revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913,
commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the
possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after considering the evidence introduced
at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela
Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E). Having failed in her attempt to obtain
possession of the land in question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the
Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having
learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto on December 6,
1915, asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five years (Exhibit P). After making
the proper administrative investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition
of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the register
of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to
Angela Razon. Armed with said document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to
vacate the land in question, and as he refused to do so, she brought and action for
forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua, Pampanga,
which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real property
(Exhibit F and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.

With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by the
appellant in his assignments of error.lawphi1.net

It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the
land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through
his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the
forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela
Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in possession thereof. When on August
15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already
been in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four
years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a
fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he
began to possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the
reach of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of Cariño vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (212 U.
S., 449 1), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession,
personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain
openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that
when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already
acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that
said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under
the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had
acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be the
public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin
Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in
question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had
no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and
Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.

The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain,
the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession
thereof.lawphi1.net

If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become,
by operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial
sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover possession
thereof and hold it.

For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed from, the
same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, without special pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO.
INC., ETC., respondents.

D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five
parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from
Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of

Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed
judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:

1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is
a corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
December 23, 1959;

2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario
can acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of
Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph
(9), Exhibit 'M-l');

3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally
acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from
Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such
are cultural minorities;

4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as

the sale took place on October 29, 1962;

5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by
Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land
 from generation to generation until the same came into the possession of
Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;

6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is
continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the
possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said
land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time
immemorial.

7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the

provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of
the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands,
whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public
domain;

8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than
Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said
improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land
sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;

9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the
applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials
of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the
Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part
of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of
Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was
accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'),
during their special session on November 22, 1979.

The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the
applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts
that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long
after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law;
and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations
from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000
hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962
when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to
decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
 whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been

in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through

their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for
at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.

The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the
trial court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no
longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom
Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national
cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors, possessed
and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year
period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of
the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension
that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and
register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other
than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.

Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the
Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in
proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect,
having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the
public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.

The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of
institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the
public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were
then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by
private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.

In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome,
et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a
domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned,
had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had
been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest,
Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1,
1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for
confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land,
dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not
qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which
allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld
the dismissal. It was held that:

..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon
the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under
section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person,
is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's
application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.

Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no

distinction between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to
which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands
of the public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to
judicial confirmation.

Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any
distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to
which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under
section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of
Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).

The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning
with Carino in 1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed,
affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby
the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of
judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That
said dissent expressed what is the better — and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes
evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the
Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied
by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may
prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument
that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English
conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing
decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot
chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read
every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of
the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any
litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...

That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical
language, in Susi:

.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de
jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No.
926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were
complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and
through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly,
continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So
that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that
said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under
the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi
had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be
of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of
Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in
selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a
land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made
was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6

Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of
Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of
Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have
firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11

.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the
respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's
proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself
and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to
segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable
under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....

xxx xxx xxx

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing

provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public
domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The
application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent. 12

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering

possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as
the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute
itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption,
confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most
limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and
length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize
a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public
to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law
from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well
put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but
none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it,
as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels
had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it
from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such
acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that
matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations
from acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite
immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was
actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be
no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being
nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from
purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already
acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then
extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in
excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation
proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids
corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already
vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid
and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the
Constitution cannot impair vested rights.

We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application

to the sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already
acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution
took effect.

That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new
Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private
corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand
and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine
of vested rights in constitutional law.

xxx xxx xxx

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may
not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the
subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of
the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).

xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had
become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of
a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The
corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be
 deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil.
919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its
own name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a
defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of
the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no
doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the
undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have
had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter
of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid
conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority
ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent.
The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable
public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years
under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere
lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the
undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the
time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title,
there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning
private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for
judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical,
rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:

6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the

technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who
are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical
and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was
a technical error not having filed the application for registration in the name of
the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that
there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and
neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with
retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural
persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their
indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive
presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go
through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their
names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all
these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
 The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the
applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed
in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to
apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive
presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold
to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified
to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of
title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.

There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the
latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the
certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be
merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and
speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on
amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.

While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage,
in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were,
doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and
inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well
as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos,
in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical
person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public
land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and
its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main
opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short,
decided no constitutional question.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the

Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this
instance.

SO ORDERED.

Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June,

1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is the
better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909
case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to
the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an open,
continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period
provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894
in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by
a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title
on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and
becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake.
But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents
and discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristocases which departed therefrom in the
recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views
and ratio decidendi.

Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. "

The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in
the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period
"already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order that
said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by
a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquiredthe land in question by a grant of the State, it had
already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond
his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6

The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who
would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his application
for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by
the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and regulations
of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the
other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There
are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that,
for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever
made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not
by earlier law."

The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases
subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating
back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when
the Meralco decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the established doctrine that such
acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of
law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso
jure ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property, which may be
lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation.
(As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack
of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")

Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so
expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private property, qualified
corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the
1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands
of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no
public lands are involved.

It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on
October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no
prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares)
unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the
erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open
possession thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful
purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding
presumably to the welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality
of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a
vested right which could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later.
But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted
into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the
conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in
confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title)
which they lawfully and validly transferred to respondent corporation.

In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and
disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the
State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered
lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and
cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been
converted into private property and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish
and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would
have originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to
December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968,
further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7

The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for
confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance. My
submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice would
best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended
to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as
natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they
had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations
duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for
confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed,
then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the
majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would
characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person
rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this
case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy,
although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v.
City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly
taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the exercise of our
equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if
the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume
suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while
concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein
majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which
are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they
were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of
acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the
confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is
inapplicable. " 10

To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural
citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession of public lands for the
required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest
possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as
corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the
required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is
obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of
possession, the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is
preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of
their title, although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But
such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as
stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands because
of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution
would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-
transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their title to the private lands
so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the corporation.
The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to
the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the
corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand),
was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose
of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the
application for confirmation of title to the private land.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

(a) ...

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed are the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
 (c) ...

Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:

SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor
may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....

It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a
corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates
of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome,
114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my
opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.

The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:

(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land
involved in the case.

(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.

(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly
apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal"
requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles, and
afterwards transfer the title to ACME.

The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila
Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).

To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality

that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural
persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would
just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical
error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the
Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,

still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the
applicant Meralco

and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with
retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural
persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their
 indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive
presumption therein provided in their favor.

It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all
such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when
the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now." (Paragraphing supplied)

The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only
citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which
prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That
interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A
construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of
the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d
688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73
Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).

It has also been said that:

In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the
legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be
presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a
general principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret
the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation
and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under
which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or
rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly
susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect to the act, while
the other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred. One part of a statute
may not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect.
Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of extension
of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond
the precise words used in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or
supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity.
Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to
make such provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois
Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-
423)

The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The
proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus
laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-
Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June,

1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is the
better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909
case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to
the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an open,
continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period
provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894
in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by
a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title
on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and
becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake.
But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents
and discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristocases which departed therefrom in the
recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views
and ratio decidendi.

Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. "

The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in
the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period
"already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order that
said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by
a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquiredthe land in question by a grant of the State, it had
already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond
his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6

The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who
would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his application
for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by
the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and regulations
of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the
other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There
are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that,
for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever
made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not
by earlier law."

The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases
subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating
back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when
the Meralco decision was promulgated).<äre||anº•1àw> We reaffirm the established
doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure
or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title.
The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property,
which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as
respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is
a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")

Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so
expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private property, qualified
corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the
1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands
of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no
public lands are involved.

It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on
October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no
prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares)
unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the
erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open
possession thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful
purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding
presumably to the welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality
of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a
vested right which could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later.
But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted
into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the
conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in
confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title)
which they lawfully and validly transferred to respondent corporation.

In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and
disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the
State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered
lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and
cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been
converted into private property and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish
and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would
have originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to
December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968,
further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7

The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for
confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance. My
submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice would
best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended
to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as
natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they
had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations
duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for
confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed,
then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the
majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would
characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person
rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this
case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy,
although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v.
City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly
taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the exercise of our
equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if
the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume
suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while
concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein
majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which
are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they
were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of
acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the
confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is
inapplicable. " 10

To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural
citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession of public lands for the
required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest
possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as
corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the
required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is
obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of
possession, the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is
preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of
their title, although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But
such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as
stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands because
of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution
would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-
transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their title to the private lands
so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the corporation.
The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to
the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the
corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand),
was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose
of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the
application for confirmation of title to the private land.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
 claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

(a) ...

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed are the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) ...

Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:

SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor
may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....

It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a
corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates
of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome,
114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my
opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.

The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:

(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land
involved in the case.

(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.

(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly
apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal"
requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles, and
afterwards transfer the title to ACME.

The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila
Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).
 To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality
that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural
persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would
just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical
error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the
Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,

still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the
applicant Meralco

and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with
retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural
persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their
indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive
presumption therein provided in their favor.

It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all
such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when
the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now." (Emphasis supplied)

The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only
citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which
prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That
interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A
construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of
the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d
688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73
Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).

It has also been said that:

In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the
legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be
presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a
general principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret
the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation
and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under
which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or
rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly
susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect to the act, while
the other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred. One part of a statute
 may not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect.
Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of extension
of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond
the precise words used in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or
supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity.
Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to
make such provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois
Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-
423)

The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The
proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus
laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy.

In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-
Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.
G.R. No. 144057 January 17, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking to review the Decision1 of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals
dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate court affirmed the decisions
of both the Regional Trial Court (RTC),2 Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26,
1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)3 of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated
February 18, 1998, which granted the application for registration of a parcel of land of
Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent herein.

The facts are as follows:

On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito S.
Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of
a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is designated
as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP – 060414-014779, and contains an
area of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks judicial confirmation of
respondent’s imperfect title over the aforesaid land.

On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The public
prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of
Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of Rustico
Angeles filed a formal opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court
issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to the heirs of
Rustico Angeles and the government.

The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally declared
for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax
Declaration No. 3888 until 1991.4 On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim
in favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his
rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming
sometime in 1955 or 1956.5Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of
absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same.
She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The
administrator introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut and
gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old,
and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present, there are parcels
of land surrounding the subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial
decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in
the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the
government until she filed her application for registration.

After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested that the
government did not intend to present any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as
representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite
notice. On September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject
parcel be brought under the operation of the Property Registration Decree or
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed in
the name of Naguit.6

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied for
was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the certification
from Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI.7 However, the court denied the motion
for reconsideration in an order dated February 18, 1998.81awphi1.nét

Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to the RTC,
Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision,
dismissing the appeal.9

Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered a decision
dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and affirmed in toto the assailed decision of
the RTC.

Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was filed by the
Republic on September 4, 2000.10

The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the appellate
court gravely erred in holding that there is no need for the government’s prior release of
the subject lot from the public domain before it can be considered alienable or
disposable within the meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in possession
of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the required period.11

Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and
disposable before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could
even start.

The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court12 in
arguing that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must
first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980,
Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as
required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land
was not alienable or disposable, the OSG argues.

Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration

proceedings, bears close examination. It expressly provides:

SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been

in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws.

....

There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title
under Section 14(1) – that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier.

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the
land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not
borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the
provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership."
Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to
which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely
located.13 Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.

Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner’s
position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG’s view,
that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable
before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the
length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders
paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government
from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated
considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.

Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is
made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition,
the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the
property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the
length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already
been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an
intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of

Appeals .14 Therein, the Court noted that "to prove that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of
the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute."15 In that case, the subject land had been certified by the
DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the alienable
status of the land, compounded by the established fact that therein respondents had
occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of
the said property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property
was released and certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the
DENR.16

This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,17 wherein the Court noted
that while the claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the
lands in question were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at
registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application
in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was declared alienable and
disposable.1awphi1.nét Thus, in this case, where the application was made years after
the property had been certified as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does
not apply.

A different rule obtains for forest lands,18 such as those which form part of a reservation
for provincial park purposes19 the possession of which cannot ripen into ownership.20 It
is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned
by private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals,21 forest land is not registrable
and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property,
unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.22 In the case
at bar, the property in question was undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable;
hence, the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals.23

It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the basis of
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which pertains to original registration
through ordinary registration proceedings. The right to file the application for
registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or
earlier, by reason of the claimant’s open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which reads:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but those titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession
deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the
public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by
R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for
at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again
amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945.
This new starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree.

Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the
Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of the public domain," while the
Property Registration Decree uses the term "alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain." It must be noted though that the Constitution declares that "alienable lands of
the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands."24 Clearly, the subject lands
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree are of the same type.

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No.
1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain,
possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the
application of "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws."

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.25 There is
a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may
be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive
possession of at least thirty (30) years.26 With such conversion, such property may now
fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus
susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription.
Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than
June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the
possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.

The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with
coconut trees now over fifty years old.27 The inherent nature of the land but confirms its
certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the
application of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, as correctly
accomplished by the lower courts.l^vvphi1.net

The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had been in
possession in the concept of owner for the required period. The argument begs the
question. It is again hinged on the assertion—shown earlier to be unfounded—that
there could have been no bona fide claim of ownership prior to 1980, when the subject
land was declared alienable or disposable.

We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
that Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession
by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945. The basis of such
conclusion is primarily factual, and the Court generally respects the factual findings
made by lower courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was established through proof of
the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time Naguit purchased the property as
well as tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax declarations and
realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless,
they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested
parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such
an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.28

Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent can be
traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest which commenced since 1945 or for
almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired title
thereto which may be properly brought under the operation of the Torrens system. That
she has been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open, continuous,
peaceful and without any opposition from any private person and the government itself
makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection under the law.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
G.R. No. 156117 May 26, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002,1 which affirmed the Judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999,2granting
the application for land registration of the respondents.

Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who
filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application for registration of two
parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu
(Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they
purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June
1976.3 Together with their application for registration, respondents submitted the
following set of documents:

(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent Jeremias;
and Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of respondent David;4

(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;5

(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources

(DENR) dispensing with the need for Surveyor's Certificates for the Subject Lots;6

(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of

certificates of title covering the Subject Lots;7

(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office

(CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that the Subject Lots are alienable and
disposable, by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June
1963;8

(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No.

941800301831, in the name of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994; and
ARP No. 941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No. 8423, also issued
in 1994;9 and
 (g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio Herbieto
and Isabel Owatan selling the Subject Lots and the improvements thereon to
their sons and respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No. 8422
was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to David.10

On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an

Opposition to the respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing
that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse possession of the
Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents' muniments of title were not genuine and
did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the
Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the
Republic and were not subject to private appropriation.11

The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m.12 All owners of the
land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing. 13 A
copy of the Notice was also posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject
Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu,
where the Subject Lots were located.14 Finally, the Notice was also published in the
Official Gazette on 02 August 199915 and The Freeman Banat News on 19 December
1999.16

During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of Special
Default,17 with only petitioner Republic opposing the application for registration of the
Subject Lots. The respondents, through their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark
documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk
of Court to receive further evidence from the respondents and to submit a Report to the
MTC after 30 days.

On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration
and confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of
respondent David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an Order on 02 February
2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, final and executory, and
directing the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree
of registration for the Subject Lots.18

Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, to the Court
of Appeals.19 The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22 November 2002, affirmed
the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus:

In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be registered
has been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone since June 25,
1963. Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively
provides that "All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible
 of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions of patrimonial character shall not be the object of prescription" and
that "Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or
of good faith."

As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already

acquired the subject parcels of lands, subject matter of this application, since 1950
and that they cultivated the same and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos,
coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is
undisputed that herein appellees or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied
and possessed the subject land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely
since 1950. Consequently, even assuming arguendo that appellees' possession
can be reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or from the time the subject lots had
been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone, still the argument of
the appellant does not hold water.

As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by
CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus
susceptible of private ownership. By express provision of Article 1137, appellees
are, with much greater right, entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by
Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in any manner
provided by law. Again, even considering that possession of appelless should
only be reckoned from 1963, the year when CENRO declared the subject lands
alienable, herein appellees have been possessing the subject parcels of land in
open, continuous, and in the concept of an owner, for 35 years already when they
filed the instant application for registration of title to the land in 1998. As such,
this court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the court a quo.20

The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of the following arguments:

First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of
owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic, possession of
the Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot be considered in determining compliance
with the periods of possession required by law. The Subject Lots were classified as
alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, per CENRO's certification. It also alleges
that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year acquisitive prescription period, had
overlooked the ruling in Republic v. Doldol,21 where this Court declared that
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended and
as it is presently phrased, requires that possession of land of the public domain must be
from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation
of imperfect title.

Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the
application consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned by two
applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is implicit in the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as
amended, that the application for registration of title to land shall be filed by a single
applicant; multiple applicants may file a single application only in case they are co-
owners. While an application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when
the subject parcels of land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in case the subject
parcels of land are co-owned) and are situated within the same province. Where the
authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of
obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with or the proceedings
will be utterly void. Since the respondents failed to comply with the procedure for land
registration under the Property Registration Decree, the proceedings held before the
MTC is void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over it.

Jurisdiction

Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had no
jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for registration filed by the
respondents but for reasons different from those presented by petitioner Republic.

A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to
hear and proceed with respondents' application for registration.

Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots even though
they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David were actually seeking the
individual and separate registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.

Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by the

respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with
and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots, based on this Court's
pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,22 to wit:

. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with

the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested
the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the
manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is
mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings
utterly null and void.
This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This procedural
lapse committed by the respondents should not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to
proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots.

The Property Registration Decree23 recognizes and expressly allows the following
situations: (1) the filing of a single application by several applicants for as long as they
are co-owners of the parcel of land sought to be registered;24and (2) the filing of a single
application for registration of several parcels of land provided that the same are located
within the same province.25 The Property Registration Decree is silent, however, as to
the present situation wherein two applicants filed a single application for two parcels of
land, but are seeking the separate and individual registration of the parcels of land in
their respective names.

Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation, then this
Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the proper course of action. Section 34 of
the Property Registration Decree itself provides that, "[t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar
as not inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, be applicable to land registration
and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable
and convenient."

Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance with the
Property Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the defect in the joint
application for registration filed by the respondents with the MTC constitutes a
misjoinder of causes of action and parties. Instead of a single or joint application for
registration, respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately, should have filed
separate applications for registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.

Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of

the court to hear and proceed with the case.26 They are not even accepted grounds for
dismissal thereof.27 Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action
and parties involve an implied admission of the court's jurisdiction. It acknowledges the
power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative,
to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately
(in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party and the
severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with
separately (in case of misjoinder of parties).

The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may have been
corrected by the MTC motu propio or on motion of the petitioner Republic. It is
regrettable, however, that the MTC failed to detect the misjoinder when the application
for registration was still pending before it; and more regrettable that the petitioner
Republic did not call the attention of the MTC to the fact by filing a motion for
severance of the causes of action and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before
this Court.

B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements mandated by the
Property Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a land
registration court.

Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition did not
affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration proceeding, this Court,
nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing,
which bars the MTC from assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents'
application for registration.

A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,28 and jurisdiction in rem cannot be

acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and
service of notice.29

Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given Notice
of the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication;
(2) mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in
the following manner:

1. By publication. –

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be
published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the
Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said
notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land
involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all whom it
may concern." Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in
court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application
shall not be granted.

Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property
Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the Official Gazette shall be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still affirms its
declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals30 that publication in a newspaper of
general circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to validly confirm and
register the title of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the Property
Registration Decree enumerated and described in detail the requirements of
publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such
requirements, including publication of the Notice in a newspaper of general circulation,
is essential and imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the same case, this
Court expounded on the reason behind the compulsory publication of the Notice of
Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, thus –

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be

deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the
Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been
complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that
the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspaper and is
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may
not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may
not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real
estate. In sum, the all encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective
of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory
construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.31

In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact held, on
03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the
Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was
published in The Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and
circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas and Mindanao,
only on 19 December 1999, more than three months after the initial hearing.

Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing,
would already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was
published in The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived
of due process for it was already too late for him to appear before the MTC on the day
of the initial hearing to oppose respondents' application for registration, and to present
his claim and evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states,
should the claimant-oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date of initial
hearing, he would be in default and would forever be barred from contesting
respondents' application for registration and even the registration decree that may be
issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order of Special Default on 03
September 1999.

The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general
circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the same ultimate result.
Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively
seize the Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents' application for
registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering
the registration and confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David over
Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February 2000,
declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory, and directing the LRA
Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and
void for having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.

II

Period of Possession

Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots for the
judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title.

While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to hear and
proceed with respondents' application for registration, this Court nevertheless deems it
necessary to resolve the legal issue on the required period of possession for acquiring
title to public land.

Respondents' application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis for their
title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained title to the Subject
Lots by purchase from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on
25 June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his parents had been
in possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner since 1950.32

Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents

themselves, the Subject Lots are "within Alienable and Disposable, Block I, Project No.
28 per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under Forestry Administrative
Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963. Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga
Watershed Forest Reservation per Presidential Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29,
1992."33 The Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as
alienable and disposable as of 25 June 1963.

As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private

persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government;34 and it is
indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was
acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.35

The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except timber
and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands which reverted to the
State.36 It explicitly enumerates the means by which public lands may be disposed, as
follows:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;
 (3) By lease;

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).37

Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public

Land Act because there are specific requirements and application procedure for every
mode.38 Since respondents herein filed their application before the MTC,39 then it can be
reasonably inferred that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of
their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Lots.

Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not

exceeding 144 hectares,40 may be availed of by persons identified under Section 48 of
the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which reads –

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands

of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or

through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be entitled to the rights
granted in subsection (b) hereof.
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be
entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now
requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present
Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any
period of possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable
and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the
land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title shall not apply thereto.41 It is very apparent then that respondents could
not have complied with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that
may be judicially confirmed or legalized.

The confirmation of respondents' title by the Court of Appeals was based on the
erroneous supposition that respondents were claiming title to the Subject Lots under the
Property Registration Decree. According to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
22 November 2002, Section 14(4) of the Property Registration Decree allows individuals
to own land in any other manner provided by law. It then ruled that the respondents,
having possessed the Subject Lots, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-
interest, since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed their application, have
acquired title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary prescription under Article 1113, in
relation to Article 1137, both of the Civil Code.42

The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property Registration
Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the Property Registration Decree, there already
exists a title which is confirmed by the court; while under the Public Land Act, the
presumption always is that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the
occupants and possessors only claim an interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect
title or continuous, open, and notorious possession.43 As established by this Court in the
preceding paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and respondents may have
acquired title thereto only under the provisions of the Public Land Act.

However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may acquire
imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their
application for judicial confirmation or legalization thereof must be in accordance with
the Property Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the Public Land Act reads –

SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or successors in

right, claiming any lands or interest in lands under the provisions of this chapter,
must in every case present an application to the proper Court of First Instance,
praying that the validity of the alleged title or claim be inquired into and that a
 certificate of title be issued to them under the provisions of the Land Registration
Act.44

Hence, respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots must have complied
with the substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the
procedural requirements under the Property Registration Decree.

Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other real
rights apply in general to all types of land, while the Public Land Act specifically
governs lands of the public domain. Relative to one another, the Public Land Act may
be considered a special law45 that must take precedence over the Civil Code, a general
law. It is an established rule of statutory construction that between a general law and a
special law, the special law prevails – Generalia specialibus non derogant.46

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, is
REVERSED. The Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75,
dated 21 December 1999, and its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are declared NULL
AND VOID. Respondents' application for registration is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 181502 February 2, 2010

FLORENCIA G. DIAZ, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration (for the third time) of the June 16,
2008 resolution of this Court denying the petition for review filed by petitioner
Florencia G. Diaz.

Petitioner’s late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an application for registration of a
vast tract of land1 located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and Palayan City in the then Court of
First Instance (CFI), Branch 1, Nueva Ecija on August 12, 1976.2 She alleged that she
possessed the land as owner and worked, developed and harvested the agricultural
products and benefits of the same continuously, publicly and adversely for more or less
26 years.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed the application because the land in question was within the Fort
Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR), established by virtue of Proclamation No. 237
(Proclamation 237)3 in 1955. Thus, it was inalienable as it formed part of the public
domain.

Significantly, on November 28, 1975, this Court already ruled in Director of Lands v.
Reyes4 that the property subject of Garcia’s application was inalienable as it formed part
of a military reservation. Moreover, the existence of Possessory Information Title No.
216 (allegedly registered in the name of a certain Melecio Padilla on March 5, 1895), on
which therein respondent Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation
anchored its claim on the land, was not proven. Accordingly, the decree of registration
issued in its favor was declared null and void.

Reyes notwithstanding, the CFI ruled in Garcia’s favor in a decision5 dated July 1, 1981.

The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the Court of Appeals (CA).
In its decision6 dated February 26, 1992, penned by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
(Mendoza decision),7 the appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the CFI.
The CA found that Reyes was applicable to petitioner’s case as it involved the same
property.
The CA observed that Garcia also traced her ownership of the land in question to
Possessory Information Title No. 216. As Garcia’s right to the property was largely
dependent on the existence and validity of the possessory information title the
probative value of which had already been passed upon by this Court in Reyes, and
inasmuch as the land was situated inside a military reservation, the CA concluded that
she did not validly acquire title thereto.

During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away and was substituted by
her heirs, one of whom was petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.81avvphi1

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Mendoza decision. While the motion
was pending in the CA, petitioner also filed a motion for recall of the records from the
former CFI. Without acting on the motion for reconsideration, the appellate court, with
Justice Mendoza as ponente, issued a resolution9 upholding petitioner’s right to recall
the records of the case.

Subsequently, however, the CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable settlement

on the matter and even gave the parties sufficient time to draft and finalize the same.

The parties ultimately entered into a compromise agreement with the Republic
withdrawing its claim on the more or less 4,689 hectares supposedly outside the FMMR.
For her part, petitioner withdrew her application for the portion of the property inside
the military reservation. They filed a motion for approval of the amicable settlement in
the CA.10

On June 30, 1999, the appellate court approved the compromise agreement.11 On
January 12, 2000, it directed the Land Registration Administration to issue the
corresponding decree of registration in petitioner’s favor.12

However, acting on a letter written by a certain Atty. Restituto S. Lazaro, the OSG filed
a motion for reconsideration of the CA resolution ordering the issuance of the decree of
registration. The OSG informed the appellate court that the tract of land subject of the
amicable settlement was still within the military reservation.

On April 16, 2007, the CA issued an amended resolution (amended

resolution)13 annulling the compromise agreement entered into between the parties. The
relevant part of the dispositive portion of the resolution read:

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to:

(1) x x x x x x

(2) x x x x x x
 (3) x x x x x x

(4) x x x x x x

(5) x x x x x x

(6) REVERSE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 of this Court approving the
Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of the
Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz[;]

(7) ANNUL and SET ASIDE the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999
executed between the Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz;
the said Amicable Settlement is hereby DECLARED to be without force and
effect;

(8) GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General and, consequently, SET ASIDE the Resolution dated January 12, 2000
which ordered, among other matters, that a certificate of title be issued in the
name of plaintiff-appellee Florencia Garcia Diaz over the portion of the subject
property in consonance with the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999
approved by the Court in its Resolution dated June 30, 1999;

(9) SET ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 approving the May 18, 1999
Amicable Settlement and the Resolution dated September 20, 1999 amending the
aforesaid June 30, 1999 Resolution; and

(10) REINSTATE the Decision dated February 26, 1992 dismissing applicant-
appellee Diaz’ registration herein.

SO ORDERED.
(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. For the first time, she assailed the validity of the
Mendoza decision – the February 26, 1992 decision adverted to in the CA’s amended
resolution. She alleged that Justice Mendoza was the assistant solicitor general during
the initial stages of the land registration proceedings in the trial court and therefore
should have inhibited himself when the case reached the CA. His failure to do so, she
laments, worked an injustice against her constitutional right to due process. Thus, the
Mendoza decision should be declared null and void. The motion was denied.14

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari15 in this Court. It was
denied for raising factual issues.16She moved for reconsideration.17 This motion was
denied with finality on the ground that there was no substantial argument warranting a
modification of the Court’s resolution. The Court then ordered that no further pleadings
would be entertained. Accordingly, we ordered entry of judgment to be made in due
course.18

Petitioner, however, insisted on filing a motion to lift entry of judgment and motion for
leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and to refer the case to the Supreme
Court en banc.19 The Court denied20 it considering that a second motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.21 Furthermore, the motion to refer the case to
the bancwas likewise denied as the banc is not an appellate court to which decisions or
resolutions of the divisions may be appealed.22 We reiterated our directive that no
further pleadings would be entertained and that entry of judgment be made in due
course.

Not one to be easily deterred, petitioner wrote identical letters, first addressed to Justice
Leonardo A. Quisumbing (then Acting Chief Justice) and then to Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno himself.23 The body of the letter, undoubtedly in the nature of a third motion
for reconsideration, is hereby reproduced in its entirety:

This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in order to "redirect the destiny of our
country which is suffering from moral decadence," that to your mind, is the problem
which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]

I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and my lawyer has
done all that is humanly possible to convince the court to take a second look at the
miscarriage of justice that will result from the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a
MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review.

Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice so that the case
may be elevated to the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the Court exercises utmost
prudence in resolving the last plea. For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is
hereto attached as Annex "A".

The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves the Decision
of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is NULL and VOID, ab
initio.

It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in a position in
which it became possible for him to discharge the minimum requirement of due
process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to render "impartial justice," because Mr. Justice
Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of
the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor General, was the
very person who appeared on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very same
land registration proceedings in which he lost.

In other words, he discharged the duties of prosecutor and judge in the very same case.
In the case of the "Alabang Boys[,]" the public was outraged by the actions of Atty.
Verano who admitted having prepared a simple resolution to be signed by the Secretary
of Justice.

In my case, the act complained of is the worst kind of violation of my constitutional

right. It is simply immoral, illegal and unconstitutional, for the prosecutor to eventually
act as the judge, and reverse the very decision in which he had lost.

If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite from the
public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light. I must confess that I was tempted to
pursue such course of action. I however believe that such an action will do more harm
than good, and even destroy the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.

I fully support your call for "moral force" that will slowly and eventually lead our
country to redirect its destiny and escape from this moral decadence, in which we all
find ourselves.

I am content with the fact that at least, the Chief Justice continues to fight the dark
forces that surround us everyday.

I only ask that the Supreme Court endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not
happen again, so that the next person who seeks justice will not experience the pain and
frustration that I suffered under our judicial system.

Thank you, and more power to you, SIR. (Emphasis in the original).

The language of petitioner’s letter/motion is unmistakable. It is a thinly veiled threat

precisely worded and calculated to intimidate this Court into giving in to her demands
to honor an otherwise legally infirm compromise agreement, at the risk of being vilified
in the media and by the public.

This Court will not be cowed into submission. We deny petitioner’s letter/third motion
for reconsideration.

APPLICABILITY OF REYES

The Court agrees with the Republic’s position that Reyes is applicable to this case.

To constitute res judicata, the following elements must concur:

(1) the former judgment or order must be final;

(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;

 (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and parties; and

(4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of
subject matter, and of causes of action. 24

The first three requisites have undoubtedly been complied with. However, petitioner
takes exception to the fourth requisite, particularly on the issue of identity of parties. In
her petition for review filed in this Court, she contends that since the applicants in the
two cases are different, the merits of the two cases should, accordingly, be determined
independently of each other.25

This contention is erroneous.

The facts obtaining in this case closely resemble those in Aquino v. Director of Lands.26 In
that case, Quintin Tañedo endeavored to secure title to a considerable tract of land by
virtue of his possession thereof under CA 141. When the case eventually reached this
Court, we affirmed the trial court’s decision to dismiss the proceedings as the property
in question was part of the public domain. Quintin’s successor-in-interest, Florencia
Tañedo, who despite knowledge of the proceedings did not participate therein,
thereafter sold the same property to Benigno S. Aquino. The latter sought to have it
registered in his name. The question in that case, as well as in this one, was whether our
decision in the case in which another person was the applicant constituted res judicata as
against his successors-in-interest.

We ruled there, and we so rule now, that in registration cases filed under the provisions
of the Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title,
an order dismissing an application for registration and declaring the land as part of the
public domain constitutes res judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also
against all persons.27

We also declared in Aquino that:

From another point of view, the decision in the first action has become the "law of the
case" or at least falls within the rule of stare decisis. That adjudication should be followed
unless manifestly erroneous. It was taken and should be taken as the authoritative view
of the highest tribunal in the Philippines. It is indispensable to the due administration of
justice especially by a court of last resort that a question once deliberately examined and
decided should be considered as settled and closed to further argument. x x x28

Be that as it may, the fact is that, even before the CFI came out with its decision in favor
of petitioner on July 1, 1981, this Court, in Reyes, already made an earlier ruling on
November 28, 1975 that the disputed realty was inalienable as it formed part of a
military reservation. Thus, petitioner’s argument that the findings of fact of the trial
court on her registrable title are binding on us – on the principle that findings of fact of
lower courts are accorded great respect and bind even this Court – is untenable. Rather,
it was incumbent upon the court a quo to respect this Court’s ruling in Reyes, and not the
other way around.

However, despite having been apprised of the Court's findings in Reyes (which should
have been a matter of judicial notice in the first place), the trial court still insisted on its
divergent finding and disregarded the Court's decision in Reyes, declaring the subject
land as forming part of a military reservation, and thus outside the commerce of man.

By not applying our ruling in Reyes, the trial judge virtually nullified the decision of this
Court and therefore acted with grave abuse of discretion.29 Notably, a judgment
rendered with grave abuse of discretion is void and does not exist in legal
contemplation.30

All lower courts, especially the trial court concerned in this case, ought to be reminded
that it is their duty to obey the decisions of the Supreme Court. A conduct becoming of
inferior courts demands a conscious awareness of the position they occupy in the
interrelation and operation of our judicial system. As eloquently declared by Justice J.B.
L. Reyes, "There is only one Supreme Court from whose decision all other courts should
take their bearings."31

ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE RIGHTS

Petitioner, however, argues that Proclamation 237 itself recognizes that its effectivity is
"subject to private rights, if any there be."

By way of a background, we recognized in Reyes that the property where the military
reservation is situated is forest land. Thus:

Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to

possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is largely
mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was
conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public forest. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)32

Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind petitioner now, that forest lands are
not registrable under CA 141.

[E]ven more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to
public agricultural land. Forest lands or area covered with forest are excluded. It is
well-settled that forest land is incapable of registration; and its inclusion in a title,
whether such title be one issued using the Spanish sovereignty or under the present
Torrens system of registration, nullifies the title. (Emphasis supplied).33

However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have been reclassified
as alienable by the President in a clear and categorical manner (upon the
recommendation of the proper department head who has the authority to classify the
lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral
lands)34 coupled with possession by the claimant as well as that of her predecessors-in-
interest. Unfortunately for petitioner, she was not able to produce such evidence.
Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and that of her predecessors-in-interest, could not
have ripened into ownership of the subject land. This is because prior to the conversion
of forest land as alienable land, any occupation or possession thereof cannot be counted
in reckoning compliance with the thirty-year possession requirement under
Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public Land Act.35 This was our ruling
in Almeda v. CA.36 The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless
and until the land classified as forest land is released through an official proclamation
to that effect. Then and only then will it form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain.37

Coming now to petitioner’s contention that her "private rights" to the property,
meaning her and her predecessors’ possession thereof prior to the establishment of the
FMMR, must be respected, the same is untenable. As earlier stated, we had already
recognized the same land to be public forest even before the FMMR was established. To
reiterate:

Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to

possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is largely
mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was
conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public forest. x x x

Therefore, even if possession was for more than 30 years, it could never ripen to
ownership.

But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it was
established as a military reservation, there was nevertheless still a dearth of evidence
with respect to its occupation by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest for more
than 30 years. In Reyes, we noted:

Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900, barely five (5) years after
the inscription of the informacion possessoria, could not have converted the same into a
record of ownership twenty (20) years after such inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of
the Spanish Mortgage Law.
xxx

During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small portion thereof was cleared and
cultivated under the ‘kaingin’ system, while some portions were used as grazing land.
After his death, his daughter, Maria Padilla, caused the planting of vegetables and had
about forty (40) tenants for the purpose. During the Japanese occupation, Maria Padilla
died. x x x

xxx

A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising
thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense,
possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the
State. While grazing livestock over land is of course to be considered with other acts of
dominion to show possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it,
without substantial inclosures, or other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to
support a claim of title thru acquisitive prescription. The possession of public land,
however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate
against the State unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same
under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from
the State.38

xxx

Furthermore, the fact that the possessory information title on which petitioner also
bases her claim of ownership was found to be inexistent in Reyes,39 thus rendering its
probative value suspect, further militates against granting her application for
registration.

NULLITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT

On the compromise agreement between the parties, we agree with the CA that the same
was null and void.

An amicable settlement or a compromise agreement is in the nature of a contract and

must necessarily comply with the provisions of Article 1318 of the New Civil Code
which provides:

Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:

(1) Consent of the contracting parties;

(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;

 (3) Cause of the obligation which is established.

Petitioner was not able to provide any proof that the consent of the Republic, through
the appropriate government agencies, i.e. the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, Land Management Bureau, Land Registration Authority, and the Office of
the President, was secured by the OSG when it executed the agreement with her. 40 The
lack of authority on the part of the OSG rendered the compromise agreement between
the parties null and void because although it is the duty of the OSG to represent the
State in cases involving land registration proceedings, it must do so only within the
scope of the authority granted to it by its principal, the Republic of the Philippines.41

In this case, although the OSG was authorized to appear as counsel for respondent, it
was never given the specific or special authority to enter into a compromise agreement
with petitioner. This is in violation of the provisions of Rule 138 Section 23, of the Rules
of Court which requires "special authority" for attorneys to bind their clients.

Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. – Attorneys have authority to bind their
clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking
appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without
special authority, compromise their client’s litigation, or receive anything in discharge
of a client’s claim but the full amount in cash. (Emphasis supplied).

Moreover, the land in question could not have been a valid subject matter of a contract
because, being forest land, it was inalienable. Article 1347 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future
things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may
also be the object of contracts.

No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly
authorized by law.

All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy may likewise be the object of a contract. (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, the Court finds the cause or consideration of the obligation contrary to law and
against public policy. The agreement provided that, in consideration of petitioner’s
withdrawal of her application for registration of title from that portion of the property
located within the military reservation, respondent was withdrawing its claim on that
part of the land situated outside said reservation. The Republic could not validly enter
into such undertaking as the subject matter of the agreement was outside the commerce
of man.
PETITIONER’S CONTEMPT OF COURT

This Court, being the very institution that dispenses justice, cannot reasonably be
expected to just sit by and do nothing when it comes under attack.

That petitioner’s letter-motion constitutes an attack against the integrity of this Court
cannot be denied. Petitioner started her letter innocently enough by stating:

This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in order to "redirect the destiny of our
country which is suffering from moral decadence," that to your mind, is the problem
which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]

It, however, quickly progressed into a barely concealed resentment for what she
perceived as this Court’s failure to exercise "utmost prudence" in rendering "impartial
justice" in deciding her case. Petitioner recounted:

I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and my lawyer has
done all that is humanly possible to convince the court to take a second look at
the miscarriage of justice that will result from the implementation of the
DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review.

Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice so that the case
may be elevated to the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the Court exercises utmost
prudence in resolving the last plea. For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto
attached as Annex "A".

The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves the Decision
of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is NULL and VOID, ab
initio.

It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in a position in
which it became possible for him to discharge the minimum requirement of due
process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to render "impartial justice," because Mr. Justice
Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of
the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor General, was the
very person who appeared on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very same
land registration proceedings in which he lost. (Emphasis supplied).

Petitioner then indirectly hints that, when push comes to shove, she has no choice but to
expose the irregularity concerning the Mendoza decision to the media. This is evident in
her arrogant declaration that:

If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite from the
public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light.
But she hastens to add in the same breath that:

I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I however believe
that such an action will do more harm than good, and even destroy the good name of
Hon. Justice Mendoza.

Petitioner ends her letter by taking this Court to task:

. . . endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happen again, so that the next
person who seeks justice will not experience the pain and frustration that I suffered
under our judicial system.

When required to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt for her baseless
charges and veiled threats, petitioner answered:

xxx

The Letter of January 26, 2009 is not a "veiled threat[.] It was written in response to the
call of the Chief Justice for a moral revolution. Juxtaposed against the factual backdrop
of the "Alabang Boys" case and the Meralco [c]ase, involving Mr. Justice Jose L. Sabio
which also enjoyed wide publicity over the tri-media, petitioner felt that the facts of the
said cases pale in comparison to the facts of her case where the lawyer of her opponent
eventually became justice of the appellate court and ended up reversing the very
decision in which he lost, in clear violation of her [c]onstitutional [r]ight to fundamental
fair play – for no contestant in any litigation can ever serve as a judge without
transgression of the due process clause. This is basic.

Petitioner confesses that she may have been emotional in the delivery of her piece,
because correctly or incorrectly[,] she believes they are irrefutable. If in the course of
that emotional delivery, she has offended your honors’ sensibilities, she is ready for the
punishment, and only prays that his Court temper its strike with compassion – as her
letter to the Chief Justice was never written with a view of threatening the Court.

xxx

Petitioner wrote the Chief Justice in order to obtain redress and correction of the
inequity bestowed upon her by destiny. It was never meant as a threat.

The Court now puts an end to petitioner’s irresponsible insinuations and threats of
"going public" with this case. We are not blind to petitioner’s clever and foxy interplay
of threats alternating with false concern for the reputation of this Court.

It is well to remind petitioner that the Court has consistently rendered justice with
neither fear nor favor. The disposition in this case was arrived at after a careful and
thorough deliberation of the facts of this case and all the matters pertaining thereto. The
records of the case, in fact, show that all the pertinent issues raised by petitioner were
passed upon and sufficiently addressed by the appellate court and this Court in their
respective resolutions.

As to petitioner’s complaint regarding this Court’s denial of her petition through a mere
minute resolution (which allegedly deprived her of due process as the Court did not
issue a full-blown decision stating the facts and applicable jurisprudence), suffice it to
say that the Court is not duty-bound to issue decisions or resolutions signed by the
justices all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate ponencias, extended resolutions
or even minute resolutions issued by or upon its authority, depending on its evaluation
of a case, as long as a legal basis exists. When a minute resolution (signed by the Clerk
of Court upon orders of the Court) denies or dismisses a petition or motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit, it is understood that the assailed decision or order,
together with all its findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained.42

Furthermore, petitioner has doggedly pursued her case in this Court by filing three
successive motions for reconsideration, including the letter-motion subject of this
resolution. This, despite our repeated warnings that "no further pleadings shall be
entertained in this case." Her unreasonable persistence constitutes utter defiance of this
Court’s orders and an abuse of the rules of procedure. This, alongside her thinly veiled
threats to leak her case to the media to gain public sympathy – although the tone of
petitioner’s compliance with our show-cause resolution was decidedly subdued
compared to her earlier letters – constitutes contempt of court.

In Republic v. Unimex,43 we held:

A statement of this Court that no further pleadings would be entertained is a

declaration that the Court has already considered all issues presented by the parties and
that it has adjudicated the case with finality. It is a directive to the parties to desist from
filing any further pleadings or motions. Like all orders of this Court, it must be strictly
observed by the parties. It should not be circumvented by filing motions ill-disguised as
requests for clarification.

A FEW OBSERVATIONS

If petitioner was, as she adamantly insists, only guarding her constitutional right to due
process, then why did she question the validity of the Mendoza decision late in the
proceedings, that is, only after her motion for reconsideration in the CA (for its
subsequent annulment of the compromise agreement) was denied? It is obvious that it
was only when her case became hopeless that her present counsel frantically searched
for some ground, any ground to resuscitate his client’s lost cause, subsequently raising
the issue. This is evident from a statement in her petition to this Court that:
It is this fresh discovery by the undersigned counsel of the nullity of the proceedings
of the Court of Appeals that places in doubt the entire proceedings it previously
conducted, which led to the rendition of the February 26, 1992 Decision, a fact that
escaped the scrutiny of applicant for registration Flora L. Garcia, as well as her
lawyer, Atty. Cayetano Dante Diaz, who died in 1993, and the late Justice Fernando A.
Santiago, who stood as counsel for Flora L. Garcia’s successor-in-interest, herein
petitioner, Florencia G. Garcia.44(Emphasis supplied).

The above cited statement does not help petitioner’s cause at all. If anything, it only
proves how desperate the case has become for petitioner and her counsel.

WHEREFORE, the letter-motion dated January 26, 2009 of petitioner is NOTED and is
hereby treated as a third motion for reconsideration. The motion
is DENIED considering that a third motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading
and the plea utterly lacks merit.

Petitioner is found GUILTY of contempt of court. Accordingly, a FINE of Five

Thousand Pesos is hereby imposed on her, payable within ten days from receipt of this
resolution. She is hereby WARNED that any repetition hereof shall be dealt with more
severely.

Treble costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 173423 March 5, 2014

SPS. ANTONIO FORTUNA and ERLINDA FORTUNA, Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by the petitioners, spouses
Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna, assailing the decision dated May 16, 20052 and the
resolution dated June 27, 20063 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71143.
The CA reversed and set aside the decision dated May 7, 20014 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 66, in Land Registration Case (LRC)
No. 2372.

THE BACKGROUND FACTS

In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application for registration of a 2,597-
square meter land identified as Lot No. 4457, situated in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando, La
Union. The application was filed with the RTC and docketed as LRC No. 2372.

The spouses Fortuna stated that Lot No. 4457 was originally owned by Pastora
Vendiola, upon whose death was succeeded by her children, Clemente and Emeteria
Nones. Through an affidavit of adjudication dated August 3, 1972, Emeteria renounced
all her interest in Lot No. 4457 in favor of Clemente. Clemente later sold the lot in favor
of Rodolfo Cuenca on May 23, 1975. Rodolfo sold the same lot to the spouses Fortuna
through a deed of absolute sale dated May 4, 1984.

The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their predecessors-in-
interest, have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of Lot No.
4457 for more than 50 years, and submitted as evidence the lot’s survey plan, technical
description, and certificate of assessment.

Although the respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Republic), opposed the

application,5 it did not present any evidence in support of its opposition. Since no
private opposition to the registration was filed, the RTC issued an order of general
default on November 11, 1996 against the whole world, except the Republic.6

In its Decision dated May 7, 2001,7 the RTC granted the application for registration in
favor of the spouses Fortuna. The RTC declared that "[the spouses Fortuna] have
established [their] possession, including that of their predecessors-in-interest of the land
sought to be registered, has been open, continuous, peaceful, adverse against the whole
world and in the concept of an owner since 1948, or for a period of over fifty (50)
years."8

The Republic appealed the RTC decision with the CA, arguing that the spouses Fortuna
did not present an official proclamation from the government that the lot has been
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land. It also claimed that the spouses
Fortuna’s evidence – Tax Declaration No. 8366 – showed that possession over the lot
dates back only to 1948, thus, failing to meet the June 12, 1945 cut-off period provided
under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree (PRD).

In its decision dated May 16, 2005,9 the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision.
Although it found that the spouses Fortuna were able to establish the alienable and
disposable nature of the land,10 they failed to show that they complied with the length
of possession that the law requires, i.e., since June 12, 1945. It agreed with the Republic’s
argument that Tax Declaration No. 8366 only showed that the spouses Fortuna’s
predecessor-in-interest, Pastora, proved that she had been in possession of the land only
since 1948.

The CA denied the spouses Fortuna’s motion for reconsideration of its decision in its
resolution dated June 27, 2006.11

THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

Through the present petition, the spouses Fortuna seek a review of the CA rulings.

They contend that the applicable law is Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or
the Public Land Act (PLA), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942. RA No. 1942
amended the PLA by requiring 30 years of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession to acquire imperfect title over an agricultural land of the public domain. This
30-year period, however, was removed by PD No. 1073 and instead required that the
possession should be since June 12, 1945. The amendment introduced by PD No. 1073
was carried in Section 14(1) of the PRD.12

The spouses Fortuna point out that PD No. 1073 was issued on January 25, 1977 and
published on May 9, 1977; and the PRD was issued on June 11, 1978 and published on
January 2, 1979. On the basis of the Court’s ruling in Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc.,
et al.,13 they allege that PD No. 1073 and the PRD should be deemed effective only on
May 24, 1977 and January 17, 1979, respectively. By these dates, they claim to have
already satisfied the 30-year requirement under the RA No. 1942 amendment because
Pastora’s possession dates back, at the latest, to 1947.
They allege that although Tax Declaration No. 8366 was made in 1948, this does not
contradict that fact that Pastora possessed Lot No. 4457 before 1948. The failure to
present documentary evidence proving possession earlier than 1948 was explained by
Filma Salazar, Records Officer of the Provincial Assessor’s Office, who testified that the
records were lost beyond recovery due to the outbreak of World War II.

Notwithstanding the absence of documents executed earlier than 1948, the spouses
Fortuna contend that evidence exists indicating that Pastora possessed the lot even
before 1948. First, Tax Declaration No. 8366 does not contain a statement that it is a new
tax declaration. Second, the annotation found at the back of Tax Declaration No. 8366
states that "this declaration cancels Tax Nos. 10543[.]"14 Since Tax Declaration No. 8366
was issued in 1948, the cancelled Tax Declaration No. 10543 was issued, at the latest, in
1947, indicating that there was already an owner and possessor of the lot before 1948.
Third, they rely on the testimony of one Macaria Flores in LRC No. 2373. LRC No. 2373
was also commenced by the spouses Fortuna to register Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and
27098,15 which were also originally owned by Pastora and are adjacent to the subject Lot
No. 4457. Macaria testified that she was born in 1926 and resided in a place a few meters
from the three lots. She stated that she regularly passed by these lots on her way to
school since 1938. She knew the property was owned by Pastora because the latter’s
family had constructed a house and planted fruit-bearing trees thereon; they also
cleaned the area. On the basis of Macaria’s testimony and the other evidence presented
in LRC No. 2373, the RTC granted the spouses Fortuna’s application for registration of
Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098 in its decision of January 3, 2005.16 The RTC’s decision
has lapsed into finality unappealed.

The spouses Fortuna claim that Macaria’s testimony in LRC No. 2373 should be
considered to prove Pastora’s possession prior to 1948. Although LRC No. 2373 is a
separate registration proceeding, it pertained to lots adjacent to the subject property,
Lot No. 4457, and belonged to the same predecessor-in-interest. Explaining their failure
to present Macaria in the proceedings before the RTC in LRC No. 2372, the spouses
Fortuna said "it was only after the reception of evidence x x x that [they] were able to
trace and establish the identity and competency of Macaria[.]"17

Commenting on the spouses Fortuna’s petition, the Republic relied mostly on the CA’s
ruling which denied the registration of title and prayed for the dismissal of the petition.

THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the petition for failure of the spouses Fortuna to sufficiently prove their
compliance with the requisites for the acquisition of title to alienable lands of the public
domain.
The nature of Lot No. 4457 as alienable and
disposable public land has not been sufficiently
established

The Constitution declares that all lands of the public domain are owned by the
State.18 Of the four classes of public land, i.e., agricultural lands, forest or timber lands,
mineral lands, and national parks, only agricultural lands may be alienated.19 Public
land that has not been classified as alienable agricultural land remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Thus, it is essential for any applicant for registration of title
to land derived through a public grant to establish foremost the alienable and
disposable nature of the land. The PLA provisions on the grant and disposition of
alienable public lands, specifically, Sections 11 and 48(b), will find application only
from the time that a public land has been classified as agricultural and declared as
alienable and disposable.

Under Section 6 of the PLA,20 the classification and the reclassification of public lands
are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The President, through a presidential
proclamation or executive order, can classify or reclassify a land to be included or
excluded from the public domain. The Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Secretary is likewise empowered by law to approve a land
classification and declare such land as alienable and disposable.21

Accordingly, jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration of title

acquired through a public land grant must present incontrovertible evidence that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable by establishing the existence of
a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators;
and a legislative act or a statute.

In this case, the CA declared that the alienable nature of the land was established by the
notation in the survey plan,22 which states:

This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 13 L.C. Map No.
1395 certified August 7, 1940. It is outside any civil or military reservation.23

It also relied on the Certification dated July 19, 1999 from the DENR Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that "there is, per record, neither
any public land application filed nor title previously issued for the subject
parcel[.]"24 However, we find that neither of the above documents is evidence of a
positive act from the government reclassifying the lot as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain.
Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered
properties’ alienable and disposable character.25 These notations, at the very least, only
establish that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved alienable and disposable area per verification through survey by the proper
government office. The applicant, however, must also present a copy of the original
classification of the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared by the DENR
Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.26 In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,27 the
Court ruled that [t]he applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the
PENRO28 or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of the original
classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR
Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President.

The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the President or
the DENR Secretary has reclassified and released the public land as alienable and
disposable. The offices that prepared these documents are not the official repositories or
legal custodian of the issuances of the President or the DENR Secretary declaring the
public land as alienable and disposable.29

For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has been reclassified
as alienable and disposable land of the public domain though a positive act of the
Executive Department, the spouses Fortuna’s claim of title through a public land grant
under the PLA should be denied.

In judicial confirmation of imperfect

or incomplete title, the period of
possession should commence, at the
latest, as of May 9, 1947

Although the above finding that the spouses Fortuna failed to establish the alienable
and disposable character of Lot No. 4457 serves as sufficient ground to deny the petition
and terminate the case, we deem it proper to continue to address the other important
legal issues raised in the petition.

As mentioned, the PLA is the law that governs the grant and disposition of alienable
agricultural lands. Under Section 11 of the PLA, alienable lands of the public domain
may be disposed of, among others, by judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
title. This mode of acquisition of title is governed by Section 48(b) of the PLA, the
original version of which states:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except
as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety- four,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. [emphasis supplied]

On June 22, 1957, the cut-off date of July 26, 1894 was replaced by a 30-year period of
possession under RA No. 1942. Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by RA No. 1942,
read:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. [emphasis and underscore ours]

On January 25, 1977, PD No. 1073 replaced the 30-year period of possession by
requiring possession since June 12, 1945. Section 4 of PD No. 1073 reads:

SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public
Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself
or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945. [emphasis supplied]

Under the PD No. 1073 amendment, possession of at least 32 years – from 1945 up to its
enactment in 1977 – is required. This effectively impairs the vested rights of applicants
who had complied with the 30-year possession required under the RA No. 1942
amendment, but whose possession commenced only after the cut-off date of June 12,
1945 was established by the PD No. 1073 amendment. To remedy this, the Court ruled
in Abejaron v. Nabasa30that "Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-
in-interest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30
years, or at least since January 24, 1947 may apply for judicial confirmation of their
imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the [PLA]." January 24, 1947 was
considered as the cut-off date as this was exactly 30 years counted backward from
January 25, 1977 – the effectivity date of PD No. 1073.

It appears, however, that January 25, 1977 was the date PD No. 1073 was enacted; based
on the certification from the National Printing Office,31 PD No. 1073 was published in
Vol. 73, No. 19 of the Official Gazette, months later than its enactment or on May 9,
1977. This uncontroverted fact materially affects the cut-off date for applications for
judicial confirmation of incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the PLA.

Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that "[the] Decree shall take effect upon its
promulgation," the Court has declared in Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al.32 that
the publication of laws is an indispensable requirement for its effectivity. "[A]ll statutes,
including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature."33 Accordingly, Section 6 of PD No. 1073
should be understood to mean that the decree took effect only upon its publication, or
on May 9, 1977. This, therefore, moves the cut-off date for applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the PLA to May 8,
1947. In other words, applicants must prove that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at
least since May 8, 1947.

The spouses Fortuna were unable to prove

that they possessed Lot No. 4457 since May 8, 1947

Even if the Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and disposable agricultural
land of the public domain, the spouses Fortuna’s application for registration of title
would still not prosper for failure to sufficiently prove that they possessed the land
since May 8, 1947.

The spouses Fortuna’s allegation that: (1) the absence of a notation that Tax Declaration
No. 8366 was a new tax declaration and (2) the notation stating that Tax Declaration No.
8366 cancels the earlier Tax Declaration No. 10543 both indicate that Pastora possessed
the land prior to 1948 or, at the earliest, in 1947. We also observe that Tax Declaration
No. 8366 contains a sworn statement of the owner that was subscribed on October 23,
1947.34 While these circumstances may indeed indicate possession as of 1947, none
proves that it commenced as of the cut-off date of May 8, 1947. Even if the tax
declaration indicates possession since 1947, it does not show the nature of Pastora’s
possession. Notably, Section 48(b) of the PLA speaks of possession and occupation.
"Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is
not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation
because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession.
Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession
must not be a mere fiction."35 Nothing in Tax Declaration No. 8366 shows that Pastora
exercised acts of possession and occupation such as cultivation of or fencing off the
land. Indeed, the lot was described as "cogonal."36

The spouses Fortuna seeks to remedy the defects of Tax Declaration No. 8366 by relying
on Macaria’s testimony in a separate land registration proceeding, LRC No. 2373.
Macaria alleged that she passed by Pastora’s lots on her way to school, and she saw
Pastora’s family construct a house, plant fruit-bearing trees, and clean the area.
However, the Court is not convinced that Macaria’s testimony constituted as the "well-
nigh incontrovertible evidence" required in cases of this nature.

The records disclose that the spouses Fortuna acquired adjoining parcels of land, all of
which are claimed to have previously belonged to Pastora. These parcels of land were
covered by three separate applications for registration, to wit:

a. LRC No. N-1278, involving Lot Nos. 1 and 2, with a total area of 2,961 sq. m.,
commenced by Emeteria;

b. LRC No. 2373, involving Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098, with a total area of
4,006 sq. m., commenced by the spouses Fortuna; and

c. LRC No. 2372 (the subject case), involving Lot No. 4457, with a total area of
2,597 sq. m.

As these cases involved different but adjoining lots that belonged to the same
predecessor-in-interest, the spouses Fortuna alleged that the final rulings in LRC Nos.
N-1278 and 2373,37 upholding Pastora’s ownership, be taken into account in resolving
the present case.

Notably, the total land area of the adjoining lots that are claimed to have previously
belonged to Pastora is 9,564 sq. m. This is too big an area for the Court to consider that
Pastora’s claimed acts of possession and occupation (as testified to by Macaria)
encompassed the entirety of the lots. Given the size of the lots, it is unlikely that
Macaria (age 21 in 1947) could competently assess and declare that its entirety belonged
to Pastora because she saw acts of possession and occupation in what must have been
but a limited area. As mentioned, Tax Declaration No. 8366 described Lot No. 4457 as
"cogonal," thus, Macaria could not have also been referring to Lot No. 4457 when she
said that Pastora planted fruit-bearing trees on her properties.

The lower courts' final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373, upholding Pastora's
possession, do not tie this Court's hands into ruling in favor of the spouses Fortuna.
Much to our dismay, the rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373 do not even show that
the lots have been officially reclassified as alienable lands of the public domain or that
the nature and duration of Pastora's occupation met the requirements of the PLA, thus,
failing to convince us to either disregard the rules of evidence or consider their merits.
In this regard, we reiterate our directive in Santiago v. De las Santos:38

Both under the 193 5 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the
utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its
command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private
ownership of real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming,
there is no justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our
polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the state. Unless alienated in
accordance with law, it retains its rights over the same as do minus.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated May 16, 2005 and the
resolution dated June 27, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71143 are
AFFIRMED insofar as these dismissed the spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna's
application of registration of title on the basis of the grounds discussed above. Costs
against the spouses Fortuna.
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A.

Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

SEPARATE OPINION

BRION, J.:

Prefatory Statement

This Separate Opinion maintains my view that, on the merits, the petition should be
denied, as the petitioners, Heirs of Mario Malabanan, failed to establish that they and
their predecessors-in-interest have a right to the property applied for through either
ordinary or extraordinary prescription. I share this view with the majority; hence, the
Court is unanimous in the result in resolving the issue presented to us for our
resolution.

As lawyers and Court watchers know, "unanimity in the result" carries a technical
meaning and implication in the lawyers' world; the term denotes that differing views
exist within the Court to support the conclusion they commonly reached. The
differences may be in the modality of reaching the unanimous result, or there may just
be differences in views on matters discussed within the majority opinion. A little of
both exists in arriving at the Court's present result, although the latter type of
disagreement predominates.

This Separate Opinion is submitted to state for the record my own (and of those
agreeing with me) view on the question of how Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act
and Section 14(1) and (2) of the PRD should operate, particularly in relation with one
another, with the Constitution and with the Civil Code provisions on property and
prescription.

A critical point I make relates to what I call the majority's "absurdity argument" that
played a major part in our actual deliberations. The argument, to me, points to
insufficiencies in our laws that the Court wishes to rectify in its perennial quest "to do
justice." I firmly believe though that any insufficiency there may be - particularly one
that relates to the continuing wisdom of the law - is for the Legislature, not for this
Court, to correct in light of our separate and mutually exclusive roles under the
Constitution. The Court may be all-powerful within its own sphere, but the rule of law,
specifically, the supremacy of the Constitution, dictates that we recognize our own
limitations and that we desist when a problem already relates to the wisdom of the law
before us. All we can do is point out the insufficiency, if any, for possible legislative or
executive action. It is largely in this sense that I believe our differing views on the grant
and disposition of lands of the public domain should be written and given the widest
circulation.

I wrap up this Prefatory Statement with a cautionary note on how the discussions in
this Resolution should be read and appreciated. Many of the divergent views
expressed, both the majority’s and mine, are not completely necessary for the resolution
of the direct issues submitted to us; thus, they are, under the given facts of the case and
the presented and resolved issues, mostly obiter dicta. On my part, I nevertheless
present them for the reason I have given above, and as helpful aid for the law
practitioners and the law students venturing into the complex topic of public land
grants, acquisitions, and ownership.

Preliminary Considerations

As a preliminary matter, I submit that:

1. the hierarchy of applicable laws must be given full application in considering

lands of the public domain. Foremost in the hierarchy is the Philippine
Constitution (particularly its Article XII), followed by the applicable special laws
— Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act (PLA) and Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree (PRD) The Civil Code
and other general laws apply suppletorily and to the extent called for by the
primary laws; and

2. the ponencia’s ruling that the classification of public lands as alienable and
disposable does not need to date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier is incorrect
because:

a. under the Constitution's Regalian Doctrine,1 classification is a required

step whose full import should be given full effect and recognition. The
legal recognition of possession prior to classification runs counter to, and
effectively weakens, the Regalian Doctrine;

b. the terms of the PLA only find full application from the time a land of
the public domain is classified as agricultural and declared alienable and
disposable. Thus, the possession required under Section 48(b) of this law
cannot be recognized prior to the required classification and declaration;

c. under the Civil Code, "only things and rights which are susceptible of
being appropriated may be the object of possession."2 Prior to the
classification of a public land as alienable and disposable, a land of the
 public domain cannot be appropriated, hence, any claimed possession
prior to classification cannot have legal effects;

d. there are other modes of acquiring alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under the PLA. This legal reality renders the ponencia's
absurdity argument misplaced; and

e. the alleged absurdity of the law addresses the wisdom of the law and is
a matter for the Legislature, not for this Court, to address.

In these lights, I submit that all previous contrary rulings (particularly, Republic of the
Phils. v. Court of Appeals [Naguit]3) should – in the proper case – be abandoned and
rejected for being based on legally-flawed premises and as aberrations in land
registration jurisprudence.

I. THE LAWS AFFECTING PUBLIC LANDS

I likewise submit the following short overview as an aide memoire in understanding

our basic public land laws.

A. The Overall Scheme at a Glance

1. The Philippine Constitution

The Philippine Constitution is the fountainhead of the laws and rules relating to
lands of the public domain in the Philippines. It starts with the postulate that all
lands of the public domain – classified into agricultural, forests or timber,
mineral lands and national parks – are owned by the State.4 This principle states
the Regalian Doctrine, and classifies land according to its nature and alienability.

By way of exception to the Regalian Doctrine, the Constitution also expressly

states that "with the exception of agricultural lands which may be further
classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted,5 all other
natural resources shall not be alienated."6 Alienable lands of the public domain
shall be limited to agricultural lands.7

2. The Public Land Act

How and to what extent agricultural lands of the public domain may be
alienated and may pass into private or non-State hands are determined under the
PLA, which governs the classification, grant, and disposition of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain and, other than the Constitution, is the
country's primary substantive law on the matter.
 As a rule, alienation and disposition of lands of the public domain are exercises
in determining:

a. whether a public land is or has been classified as agricultural (in order

to take the land out of the mass of lands of the public domain that, by the
terms of the Constitution, is inalienable);

b. once classified as agricultural, whether it has been declared by the State

to be alienable and disposable. To reiterate, even agricultural lands, prior
to their declaration as alienable, are part of the inalienable lands of the
public domain; and

c. whether the terms of classification, alienation or disposition have been

complied with. In a confirmation of imperfect title, there must be
possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier, in an open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious manner, by the applicant himself or by his predecessor-in-
interest, of public agricultural land that since that time has been declared
alienable and disposable, as clearly provided under PD No. 1073.

The Civil Code provides that "only things and rights which are susceptible
of being appropriated may be the object of possession."8 Prior to the
classification of a public land as alienable and disposable, a land of the
public domain cannot be appropriated, hence, any claimed possession
cannot have legal effects;

d. upon compliance with the required period and character of possession

of alienable public agricultural land, the possessor acquires ownership,
thus converting the land to one of private ownership and entitling the
applicant-possessor to confirmation of title under Section 48(b) of the PLA
and registration under Section 14(1) of the PRD.

3. Classification under the Civil Code

Separately from the classification according to the nature of land under the
Constitution, another system of classification of property is provided under the Civil
Code.

The Civil Code classifies property (as a general term, compared to land which is only a
species of property, labeled under the Civil Code as immovable property9) in relation
with the person to whom it belongs.10

Property under the Civil Code may belong to the public dominion (or property
pertaining to the State for public use, for public service or for the development of the
national wealth)11 or it may be of private ownership (which classification includes
patrimonial property or property held in private ownership by the
State).12 Significantly, the Civil Code expressly provides that "property of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part
of the patrimonial property of the State."13

What is otherwise a simple classification from the point of view of the person owning it,
assumes a measure of complexity when the property is land of the public domain, as
the Constitution, in unequivocal terms, requires classification and declarations on the
means and manner of granting, alienating, disposing, and acquiring lands of the public
domain that all originally belong to the State under the Regalian Doctrine.

In a reconciled consideration of the Constitution and the Civil Code classifications,

made necessary because they have their respective independent focuses and purposes,
certain realities will have to be recognized or deduced:

First. As a first principle, in case of any conflict, the terms of the Constitution prevail.
No ifs and buts can be admitted with respect to this recognition, as the Constitution is
supreme over any other law or legal instrument in the land.

Second. A necessary corollary to the first principle is that all substantive considerations
of land ownership, alienation, or disposition must always take into account the
constitutional requirements.

Third. The classification and the requirements under the Constitution and under the
Civil Code may overlap without any resulting violation of the Constitution.

A piece of land may fall under both classifications (i.e., under the constitutional
classification based on the legal nature of the land and alienability, and under the civil
law classification based on the ownership of the land). This can best be appreciated in
the discussion below, under the topic "The PLA, the Civil Code and Prescription."14

4. Prescription under the Civil Code

Prescription is essentially a civil law term and is a mode of acquiring ownership

provided under the Civil Code,15 but is not mentioned as one of the modes of acquiring
ownership of alienable public lands of the public domain under the PLA.16

A point of distinction that should be noted is that the PLA, under its Section 48(b),
provides for a system that allows possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier to ripen into
ownership. The PLA, however, does not refer to this mode as acquisitive prescription
but as basis for confirmation of title, and requires a specified period of possession of
alienable agricultural land, not the periods for ordinary or extraordinary prescription
required under the Civil Code. Ownership that vests under Section 48(b) of the PLA can
be registered under Section 14(1) of the PRD.
The PRD, under its Section 14(2), recognizes that registration of title can take place as
soon as ownership over private land has vested due to prescription – "those who have
acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws." Thus, prescription was introduced into the PRD land registration scheme but not
into the special law governing the grant and alienation of lands of the public domain,
i.e., the PLA.

An important provision that should not be missed in considering prescription is Article

1108 of the Civil Code, which states that prescription does not run against the State and
its subdivisions. Article 1113 of the Civil Code is a companion provision stating that "all
things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless
otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription."

The above-cited rules express civil law concepts, but their results are effectively
replicated in the scheme governing lands of the public domain since these lands, by
constitutional fiat, cannot be alienated and are thus outside the commerce of man,
except under the rigid terms of the Constitution and the PLA. For example,
confirmation of imperfect title – the possession-based rule under the PLA – can only
take place with respect to agricultural lands already declared alienable and possessed
for the required period (since June 12, 1945 or earlier).

5. The PRD

The PRD was issued in 1978 to update the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) and
relates solely to the registration of property. The law does not provide the means for
acquiring title to land; it refers solely to the means or procedure of registering and
rendering indefeasible title already acquired.

The PRD mainly governs the registration of lands and places them under the Torrens
System. It does not, by itself, create title nor vest one. It simply confirms a title already
created and already vested, rendering it forever indeafeasible.17

In a side by side comparison, the PLA is the substantive law that classifies and provides
for the disposition of alienable lands of the public domain. On the other hand, the PRD
refers to the manner of bringing registerable title to lands, among them, alienable public
lands, within the coverage of the Torrens system; in terms of substantive content, the
PLA must prevail.18 On this consideration, only land of the public domain that has
passed into private ownership under the terms of the PLA can be registered under the
PRD.
II. THE CASE AND THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

The Case.

Before the Court are the motions separately filed by the petitioners and by the
respondent Republic of the Philippines, both of them seeking reconsideration of the
Court’s Decision dated April 29, 2009 which denied the petitioners’ petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Underlying Facts

The present case traces its roots to the land registration case instituted by the
petitioners’ predecessor, Mario Malabanan (Malabanan). On February 20, 1998,
Malabanan filed an application for the registration of a 71,324-square meter land,
located in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite
– Tagaytay City, Branch 18.19 Malabanan alleged that he purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco. The property was originally part of a 22-hectare land owned by Lino
Velazco (Velazco), who was succeeded by his four sons, among them, Eduardo
Velazco.20

Apart from his purchase of the property, Malabanan anchored his registration petition
on his and his predecessors-in-interest’s open, notorious, continuous, adverse and
peaceful possession of the land for more than 30 years. Malabanan claimed that the land
is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, presenting as proof the
Certification dated June 11, 2001 of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The
Certification stated that the land was "verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable
land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982."21

The Issue Before the Court.

In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of
the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into
patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses de Ocampo v.
Arlos,22 Menguito v. Republic,23 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,24 they argue
that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive
prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from
Velazco, believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been
the real owners of the land, with the right to validly transmit title and ownership
thereof; that consequently, the 10-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil
Code, in relation with Section 14(2) of the PRD, applied in their favor; and that when
Malabanan filed his application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had already
been in possession of the land for almost 16 years, reckoned from 1982, the time when
the land was declared inalienable and disposable by the State.

The respondent seeks the partial reconsideration in order to seek clarification with
reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and Republic of the Phils. v.
Herbieto.25 It reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when
the land subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable since
June 12, 1945.

As presented in the petition and the subsequent motion for reconsideration, the direct
issue before the Court is whether there had been acquisition of title, based on ordinary
or extraordinary prescription, over a land of the public domain declared alienable as of
March 15, 1982. The issue was not about confirmation of an imperfect title where
possession started on or before June 12, 1945 since possession had not been proven to
have dated back to or before that date.

The Antecedents and the Ruling under Review

On December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment favoring Malabanan, approving his
application for registration of the land "under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or
PD 1529."26

The respondent, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the
RTC decision with the Court of Appeals (CA). The OSG contended that Malabanan
failed to prove: (1) that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain, and (2) that he had not been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
During the pendency of the appeal before the CA, Malabanan died and was substituted
by the petitioners.

In its decision dated February 23, 2007, the CA reversed the RTC decision and
dismissed Malabanan’s application for registration. Applying the Court’s ruling in
Herbieto, the CA held that "under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any
period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable
was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession."27 Since the land was classified as alienable and disposable only on March
15, 1982, any possession prior to this date cannot be considered.

The petitioners assailed the CA decision before this Court through a petition for review
on certiorari. On April 29, 2009, the Court denied the petition. The Court’s majority
(through Justice Dante Tinga) summarized its ruling as follows:
 (1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the PRD, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act recognizes and confirms that "those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945"
have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the
length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and
does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable
and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the
Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider
that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property.

However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of
the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person

acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code
is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person's uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of
good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.28
Based on this ruling, the majority denied the petition, but established the above rules
which embody principles contrary to Section 48(b) of the PLA and which are not fully in
accord with the concept of prescription under Section 14(2) of the PRD, in relation with
the Civil Code provisions on property and prescription.

In its ruling on the present motions for reconsideration, the ponencia essentially affirms
the above ruling, rendering this Separate Opinion and its conclusions necessary.

III. DISCUSSION OF THE PRESENTED ISSUES

A. Section 48(b) of the PLA: Confirmation of Imperfect Title

Section 48(b) of the PLA is the core provision on the confirmation of imperfect title and
must be read with its related provision in order to fully be appreciated.

Section 7 of the PLA delegates to the President the authority to administer and dispose
of alienable public lands. Section 8 sets out the public lands open to disposition or
concession, and the requirement that they should be officially delimited and classified
and, when practicable, surveyed. Section 11, a very significant provision, states that —

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as
follows, and not otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement

(2) By sale

(3) By lease

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title:

(a) By judicial legalization

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent). [emphases ours]

Finally, Section 48 of the PLA, on confirmation of imperfect title, embodies a grant of

title to the qualified occupant or possessor of an alienable public land, under the
following terms:

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
 (a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the x x x United
States have applied for the purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands
of the public domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force and have
instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but have,
with or without default upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title
therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and
cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their applications.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through

their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for
at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof.
[emphasis ours]

Subsection (a) has now been deleted, while subsection (b) has been amended by PD No.
1073 as follows:

Section 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public
Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself
or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945.

Based on these provisions and a narrow reading of the "since June 12, 1945" timeline,
the ponencia now rules that the declaration that the land is agricultural and alienable
can be made at the time of application for registration and need not be from June 12,
1945 or earlier.29 This conclusion follows the ruling in Naguit (likewise penned by
Justice Tinga) that additionally argued that reckoning the declarations from June 12,
1945 leads to absurdity.

For the reasons outlined below, I cannot agree with these positions and with the Naguit
ruling on which it is based:
First. The constitutional and statutory reasons. The Constitution classifies public lands
into agricultural, mineral, timber lands and national parks. Of these, only agricultural
lands can be alienated.30 Without the requisite classification, there can be no basis to
determine which lands of the public domain are alienable and which are not. Hence,
classification is a constitutionally-required step whose importance should be given full
legal recognition and effect.

Otherwise stated, without classification into disposable agricultural land, the land
continues to form part of the mass of the public domain that, not being agricultural,
must be mineral, timber land or national parks that are completely inalienable and, as
such, cannot be possessed with legal effects. To recognize possession prior to any
classification is to do violence to the Regalian Doctrine; the ownership and control that
the Regalian Doctrine embodies will be less than full if the possession – that should be
with the State as owner, but is also elsewhere without any solid legal basis – can
anyway be recognized.

Note in this regard that the terms of the PLA do not find full application until a
classification into alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain is
made. In this situation, possession cannot be claimed under Section 48(b) of the PLA.

Likewise, no imperfect title can be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable
or alienable because, in the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified
public land that fully belongs to the State. This is fully supported by Sections 6, 7, 8, 9,
and 10 of the PLA.31 If the land is either mineral, timber or national parks that cannot be
alienated, it defies legal logic to recognize that possession of these unclassified lands
can produce legal effects.

Parenthetically, PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code states that "Those lands of
public domain still to be classified under the present system shall continue to remain as
part of the public forest."32 It further declares that public forest covers "the mass of lands
of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purposes and
which are not."33

Thus, PD No. 705 confirms that all lands of the public domain that remain unclassified
are considered as forest land.34 As forest land, these lands of the public domain cannot
be alienated until they have been reclassified as agricultural lands. For purposes of the
present case, these terms confirm the position that re/classification is essential at the
time possession is acquired under Section 48(b) of the PLA.

From these perspectives, the legal linkage between (1) the classification of public land as
alienable and disposable and (2) effective possession that can ripen into a claim under
Section 48(b) of the PLA can readily be appreciated.
The Leonen Opinion

Incidentally, Justice Marvic F. Leonen opines in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
that the Regalian Doctrine was not incorporated in our Constitution and that "there
could be land, considered as property, where ownership has vested as a result of either
possession or prescription but still, as yet undocumented."35

I will respond to this observation that, although relating to the nature of the land
applied for (land of the public domain) and to the Regalian Doctrine, still raises aspects
of these matters that are not exactly material to the direct issues presented in the present
case. I respond to correct for the record and at the earliest opportunity what I consider
to be an erroneous view.

The Regalian Doctrine was incorporated in all the Constitutions of the Philippines
(1935, 1973 and 1987) and the statutes governing private individuals’ land acquisition
and registration. In his Separate Opinion in Cruz v. Sec. of Environment and Natural
Resources,36 former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno made a brief yet informative
historical discussion on how the Regalian Doctrine was incorporated in our legal
system, especially in all our past and present organic laws. His historical disquisition
was quoted in La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Sec. Ramos37 and the
consolidated cases of The Secretary of the DENR et al. v. Yap and Sacay et al. v. The
Secretary of the DENR,38which were also quoted in Justice Lucas P. Bersamin’s Separate
Opinion in his very brief discussion on how the doctrine was carried over from our
Spanish and American colonization up until our present legal system.

Insofar as our organic laws are concerned, La Bugal-B’laan confirms that:

one of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was
the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the country.

There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of

state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State
ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure
recognition of the state's power to control their disposition, exploitation, development,
or utilization. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the
concept of State ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the
Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was continued and applied by the
Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in the
Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.

xxxx
On January 17, 1973, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos proclaimed the ratification of
a new Constitution. Article XIV on the National Economy and Patrimony contained
provisions similar to the 1935 Constitution with regard to Filipino participation in the
nation’s natural resources. Section, 8, Article XIV thereof.

xxxx

The 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian doctrine. The first sentence of Section 2,
Article XII states: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State."39

In these lights, I believe that, at this point in our legal history, there can be no question
that the Regalian Doctrine remains in the pure form interpreted by this Court; it has
resiliently endured throughout our colonial history, was continually confirmed in all
our organic laws, and is presently embodied in Section 2, Article XII of our present
Constitution. Short of a constitutional amendment duly ratified by the people, the views
and conclusions of this Court on the Regalian Doctrine should not and cannot be
changed.

Second. The Civil Code reason. Possession is essentially a civil law term that can best be
understood in terms of the Civil Code in the absence of any specific definition in the
PLA, other than in terms of time of possession.40

Article 530 of the Civil Code provides that "only things and rights which are susceptible
of being appropriated may be the object of possession." Prior to the declaration of
alienability, a land of the public domain cannot be appropriated; hence, any claimed
possession cannot have legal effects. In fact, whether an application for registration is
filed before or after the declaration of alienability becomes immaterial if, in one as in the
other, no effective possession can be recognized prior to and within the proper period
for the declaration of alienability.

To express this position in the form of a direct question: How can possession before the
declaration of alienability be effective when the land then belonged to the State against
whom prescription does not run?

Third. Statutory construction and the cut-off date — June 12, 1945. The ponencia
concludes – based on its statutory construction reasoning and reading of Section 48(b)
of the PLA – that the June 12, 1945 cut-off is only required for purposes of possession
and that it suffices if the land has been classified as alienable agricultural land at the
time of application for registration.41
This cut-off date was painstakingly set by law and its full import appears from PD No.
1073 that amended Section 48(b) of the PLA. While the resulting Section 48(b) of the
PLA did not expressly state what PD No. 1073 introduced in terms of exact wording,
PD No. 1073 itself, as formulated, shows the intent to count the alienability from June
12, 1945. To quote the exact terms of PD No. 1073:

Section 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public
Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself
or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945. [emphases and underscores ours]

In reading this provision, it has been claimed that June 12, 1945 refers only to the
required possession and not to the declaration of alienability of the land applied for.
The terms of PD No. 1073, however, are plain and clear even from the grammatical
perspective alone. The term "since June 12, 1945" is unmistakably separated by a comma
from the conditions of both alienability and possession, thus, plainly showing that it
refers to both alienability and possession. This construction – showing the direct,
continuous and seamless linking of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain to June 12, 1945 under the wording of the Decree – is clear and should be
respected, particularly if read with the substantive provisions on ownership of lands of
the public domain and the limitations that the law imposes on possession.

Fourth. Other modes of acquisition of lands under the PLA. The cited Naguit’s
absurdity argument that the ponencia effectively adopted is more apparent than real,
since the use of June 12, 1945 as cut-off date for the declaration of alienability will not
render the grant of alienable public lands out of reach.

The acquisition of ownership and title may still be obtained by other modes under the
PLA. Among other laws, Republic Act (RA) No. 6940 allowed the use of free
patents.42 It was approved on March 28, 1990; hence, counting 30 years backwards,
possession since April 1960 or thereabouts qualified a possessor to apply for a free
patent.43Additionally, the other administrative modes provided under Section 11 of the
PLA are still open, particularly, homestead settlement, sales and lease.

Incidentally, the ponencia mentions RA No. 10023, entitled "An Act Authorizing the
Issuance of Free Patents to Residential Lands," in its discussions. 44 This statute,
however, has no relevance to the present case because its terms apply to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain (necessarily agricultural lands under the
Constitution) that have been reclassified as residential under Section 9(b) of the PLA.45
Fifth. Addressing the wisdom — or the absurdity — of the law. This Court acts beyond
the limits of the constitutionally-mandated separation of powers in giving Section 48(b)
of the PLA, as amended by PD No. 1073, an interpretation beyond its plain wording.
Even this Court cannot read into the law an intent that is not there even if the purpose is
to avoid an absurd situation.

If the Court believes that a law already has absurd effects because of the passage of
time, its role under the principle of separation of powers is not to give the law an
interpretation that is not there in order to avoid the perceived absurdity. If the Court
does, it thereby intrudes into the realm of policy — a role delegated by the Constitution
to the Legislature. If only for this reason, the Court should avoid expanding — through
the present ponencia and its cited cases — the plain meaning of Section 48(b) of the
PLA, as amended by PD No. 1073.

In the United States where the governing constitutional rule is likewise the separation
of powers between the Legislative and the Judiciary, Justice Antonin Scalia (in the book
Reading Law co-authored with Bryan A. Garner) made the pithy observation that:

To the extent that people give this view any credence, the notion that judges may (even
should) improvise on constitutional and statutory text enfeebles the democratic polity.
As Justice John Marshall Harlan warned in the 1960s, an invitation to judicial
lawmaking results inevitably in "a lessening, on the one hand, of judicial independence
and, on the other, of legislative responsibility, thus polluting the bloodstream of our
system of government." Why these alarming outcomes? First, when judges fashion law
rather than fairly derive it from governing texts, they subject themselves to intensified
political pressures – in the appointment process, in their retention, and in the arguments
made to them. Second, every time a court constitutionalizes a new sliver of law – as by
finding a "new constitutional right" to do this, that, or the other – that sliver becomes
thenceforth untouchable by the political branches. In the American system, a legislature
has no power to abridge a right that has been authoritatively held to be part of the
Constitution – even if that newfound right does not appear in the text. Over the past 50
years especially, we have seen the judiciary incrementally take control of larger and
larger swaths of territory that ought to be settled legislatively.

It used to be said that judges do not "make" law – they simply apply it. In the 20th
century, the legal realists convinced everyone that judges do indeed make law. To the
extent that this was true, it was knowledge that the wise already possessed and the
foolish could not be trusted with. It was true, that is, that judges did not really "find" the
common law but invented it over time. Yet this notion has been stretched into a belief
that judges "make" law through judicial interpretation of democratically enacted
statutes. Consider the following statement by John P. Dawson, intended to apply to
statutory law:
It seems to us inescapable that judges should have a part in creating law – creating it as
they apply it. In deciding the multifarious disputes that are brought before them, we
believe that judges in any legal system invariably adapt legal doctrines to new
situations and thus give them new content.

Now it is true that in a system such as ours, in which judicial decisions have a stare
decisis effect, a court’s application of a statute to a "new situation" can be said to
establish the law applicable to that situation – that is, to pronounce definitively whether
and how the statute applies to that situation. But establishing this retail application of
the statute is probably not what Dawson meant by "creating law," "adapting legal
doctrines," and "giving them new content." Yet beyond that retail application, good
judges dealing with statutes do not make law. They do not "give new content" to the
statute, but merely apply the content that has been there all along, awaiting application
to myriad factual scenarios. To say that they "make law" without this necessary
qualification is to invite the taffy-like stretching of words – or the ignoring of words
altogether.46

In the Philippines, a civil law country where the Constitution is very clear on the
separation of powers and the assignment of constitutional duties, I believe that this
Court should be very careful in delineating the line between the constitutionally-
allowed interpretation and the prohibited judicial legislation, given the powers that the
1987 Constitution has entrusted to this Court. As a Court, we are given more powers
than the U.S. Supreme Court; under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, we
are supposed to act, as a matter of duty, on any grave abuse of discretion that occurs
anywhere in government. While broad, this power should nevertheless be exercised
with due respect for the separation of powers doctrine that underlies our Constitution.

B. Registration under Section 14(1) and (2) of the PRD

Complementing the substance that the PLA provides are the provisions of the PRD that
set out the registration of the title that has accrued under the PLA. Section 14 of the PRD
provides:

SEC. 14. Who May Apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been

in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
 (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river
beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided
for by law. [emphasis and italics ours]

As mentioned earlier, the PLA is the substantive law on the grant and disposition of
alienable lands of the public domain. The PRD, on the other hand, sets out the manner
of bringing registrable lands, among them alienable public lands, within the coverage of
the Torrens system. In this situation, in terms of substantive content, the PLA should
prevail.

1. Section 14(1) of the PRD is practically a reiteration of Section 48(b) of the PLA,
with the difference that they govern two different aspects of confirmation of
imperfect title relating to alienable lands of the public domain. The PLA has its
own substantive focus, while Section 14(1) of the PRD, bearing on the same
matter, defines what title may be registered. For this reason, the discussions of
Section 48(b) apply with equal force, mutatis mutandis, to Section 14(1) of the
PRD.

2. Section 14(2) of the PRD is another matter. By its express terms, the
prescription that it speaks of applies only to private lands. Thus, on plain
reading, Section 14(2) should not apply to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain that Section 14(1) covers. This is the significant difference between
Sections 14(1) and 14(2). The former – Section 14(1) – is relevant when the
ownership of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain vests in the
occupant or possessor under the terms of Section 48(b) of the PLA, even without
the registration of a confirmed title since the land ipso jure becomes a private
land. Section 14(2), on the other hand, applies to situations when ownership of
private lands vests on the basis of prescription.

The prescription that Section 14(2) of the PRD speaks of finds no application to alienable
lands of the public domain – specifically, to Section 48(b) of the PLA since this
provision, as revised by PD No. 1073 in January 1977, simply requires possession and
occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier, regardless of the period the property was
occupied (although when PD No. 1073 was enacted in 1977, the property would have
been possessed for at least 32 years by the claimant if his possession commenced exactly
on June 12, 1945, or longer if possession took place earlier).
Parenthetically, my original April 29, 2009 Opinion stated that the cut-off date of June
12, 1945 appeared to be devoid of legal significance as far as the PLA was concerned.
This statement notwithstanding, it should be appreciated that prior to PD No. 1073,
Section 48(b) of the PLA required a 30-year period of possession. This 30-year period
was a requirement imposed under RA No. 1942 in June 1957, under the following
provision:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.

When PD No. 1073 was enacted in 1977, it was recognized that a claimant who had
possessed the property for at least 30 years (in compliance with RA No. 1942) might not
be entitled to confirmation of title under PD No. 1073 because his possession
commenced only after June 12, 1945. This possibility constituted a violation of his
vested rights that should be avoided. To resolve this dilemma, the Court, in Abejaron v.
Nabasa,47 opined that where an application has satisfied the requirements of Section
48(b) of the PLA, as amended by RA No. 1942 (prior to the effectivity of PD No. 1073),
the applicant is entitled to perfect his or her title even if possession and occupation do
not date back to June 12, 1945.

What this leads up to is that possession of land "for the required statutory period"
becomes significant only when the claim of title is based on the amendment introduced
by RA No. 1942. The 30-year period introduced by RA No. 1942 "did not refer or call
into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription."48 In fact, in The Director of
Lands v. IAC49 and the opinion of Justice Claudio Teehankee in Manila Electric Co. v.
Judge Castro-Bartolome, etc., et al.,50 cited by the ponencia,51 both pertained to the RA
No. 1942 amendment; it was in this sense that both rulings stated that mere lapse or
completion of the required period converts alienable land to private property.

In sum, if the claimant is asserting his vested right under the RA No. 1942 amendment,
then it would be correct to declare that the lapse of the required statutory period
converts alienable land to private property ipso jure. Otherwise, if the claimant is
asserting a right under the PD No. 1073 amendment, then he needs to prove possession
of alienable public land as of June 12, 1945 or earlier. Although a claimant may have
possessed the property for 30 years or more, if his possession commenced after January
24, 1947 (the adjusted date based on Abejaron), the property would not be converted
into private property by the mere lapse of time.

3. As a last point, the ponencia effectively claims52 that the classification of property as
agricultural land is only necessary at the time of application for registration of title.
This is completely erroneous. The act of registration merely confirms that title already
exists in favor of the applicant. To require classification of the property only on
application for registration point would imply that during the process of acquisition of
title (specifically, during the period of possession prior to the application for
registration), the property might not have been alienable for being unclassified land (or
a forest land under PD No. 705) of the public domain. This claim totally contravenes the
constitutional rule that only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated.

To translate all these arguments to the facts of the present case, the land applied for was
not classified as alienable on or before June 12, 1945 and was indisputably only
classified as alienable only on March 15, 1982. Under these facts, the ponencia still
asserts that following the Naguit ruling, possession of the non-classified land during the
material period would still comply with Section 48(b) of the PLA, provided that there is
already a classification at the time of application for registration.

This claim involves essential contradiction in terms as only a land that can already be
registered under Section 48(b) of the PLA can be registered under Section 14(1) of the
PRD. Additionally, the ponencia, in effect, confirmed that possession prior to
declaration of alienability can ripen into private ownership of a land that, under the
Constitution, the PLA, and even the Civil Code, is not legally allowed.

The ponencia’s position all the more becomes legally preposterous if PD No. 705 is
considered. To recall, this Decree states that all lands of the public domain that remain
unclassified are considered forest lands that cannot be alienated until they have been
reclassified as agricultural lands and declared alienable.53 Applying this law to the facts
of the present case, the land applied for, prior to March 15, 1982, must have still been
forest land that, under the Constitution, cannot be alienated.

The deeper hole that the ponencia digs for itself in recognizing possession prior to
declaration of alienability becomes apparent when it now cites Naguit as its authority.
Unnoticed perhaps by the ponencia, Naguit itself explicitly noted PD No. 705 and
expressly and unabashedly pronounced that "a different rule obtains for forest lands,
such as those which form part of a reservation for provincial park purposes the
possession of which cannot ripen into ownership. It is elementary in the law governing
natural resources that forestland cannot be owned by private persons. As held in
Palomo v. Court of Appeals, forest land is not registrable and possession thereof, no
matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable."54

How the ponencia would square this Naguit statement with the realities of PD No. 705
and its present ruling would be an interesting exercise to watch. It would, to say the
least, be in a very confused position as it previously confirmed in Naguit the very same
basic precept of law that it now debunks in its present ruling, citing the same Naguit
ruling.

C. The PLA, the Civil Code and Prescription

In reading all the provisions of Book II of the Civil Code on the classification of
property based on the person to whom it belongs, it should not be overlooked that these
provisions refer to properties in general, i.e., to both movable and immovable
properties.55 Thus, the Civil Code provisions on property do not refer to land alone,
much less do they refer solely to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
For this latter specie of property, the PLA is the special governing law and, under the
Civil Code itself, the Civil Code provisions shall apply only in case of deficiency.56

Whether, as in the present case, land of the public domain can be granted and registered
on the basis of extraordinary prescription (i.e., possession by the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest for a period of at least 30 years), the obvious answer is that the
application can only effectively be allowed upon compliance with the PLA’s terms.
Classification as agricultural land must first take place to remove the land from its
status as a land of the public domain and a declaration of alienability must likewise be
made to render the land available or susceptible to alienation; the required possession,
of course, has to follow and only upon completion does the land pass to "private"
hands.

Whether land classified as "agricultural" and declared "alienable and disposable" can
already be considered "patrimonial" property does not yield to an easy answer as these
concepts involve different classification systems as discussed above. To be sure, the
classification and declaration of a public land as alienable public agricultural land do
not transfer the land into private hands nor divest it of the character of being State
property that can only be acquired pursuant to the terms of the PLA. Separate from this
requirement, a property – although already declared alienable and disposable – may
conceivably still be held by the State or by any of its political subdivisions or agencies
for public use or public service under the terms of the Civil Code. In this latter case, the
property cannot be considered patrimonial that is subject to acquisitive prescription.

Based on these considerations, the two concepts of "disposable land of the public
domain" and "patrimonial property" cannot directly be equated with one another. The
requirements for their acquisition, however, must both be satisfied before they can pass
to private hands.

An inevitable related question is the manner of enforcing Article 422 of the Civil Code
that "property of the public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State," in light of the
implication that patrimonial property may be acquired through prescription under
Article 1113 of the Civil Code ("Property of the State or any of its subdivision not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription"). This position,
incidentally, is what the original decision in this case claims.

A first simple answer is that the Civil Code provisions must yield when considered in
relation with the PLA and its requirements. In other words, when the property involved
is a land of the public domain, the consideration that it is not for public use or for public
service, or its patrimonial character, initially becomes immaterial; any grant or
alienation must first comply with the mandates of the Constitution on lands of the
public domain and with the requirements of the PLA as a priority requirement.

Thus, if the question is whether such land, considered patrimonial solely under the
terms of Article 422 of the Civil Code, can be acquired through prescription, the prior
questions of whether the land is already alienable under the terms of the Constitution
and the PLA and whether these terms have been complied with must first be answered.
If the response is negative, then any characterization under Article 422 of the Civil Code
is immaterial; only upon compliance with the terms of the Constitution and the PLA
can Article 422 of the Civil Code be given full force. If the land is already alienable,
Article 422 of the Civil Code, when invoked, can only be complied with on the showing
that the property is no longer intended for public use or public service.

For all these reasons, alienable and disposable agricultural land cannot be registered
under Section 14(2) of the PRD solely because it is already alienable and disposable. The
alienability must be coupled with the required declaration under Article 422 of the Civil
Code if the land is claimed to be patrimonial and possession under Section 14(2) of the
PRD is invoked as basis for registration.

As an incidental matter, note that this PRD provision is no longer necessary for the
applicant who has complied with the required possession under Section 48(b) of the
PLA (i.e., that there had been possession since June 12, 1945); he or she does not need to
invoke Section 14(2) of the PRD as registration is available under Section 14(1) of the
PRD. On the other hand, if the required period for possession under Section 48(b) of the
PLA (or Section 14[1] of the PRD) did not take place, then the applicant’s recourse
would still be under the PLA through its other available modes (because a land of the
public domain is involved), but not under its Section 48(b).1âwphi1

Section 14(2) of the PRD will apply only after the land is deemed to be "private" or has
passed through one of the modes of grant and acquisition under the PLA, and after the
requisite time of possession has passed, counted from the time the land is deemed or
recognized to be private. In short, Section 14(2) of the PLA only becomes available to a
possessor of land already held or deemed to be in private ownership and only after
such possessor complies with the requisite terms of ordinary or extraordinary
prescription. In considering compliance with the required possession, possession prior
to the declaration of alienability cannot of course be recognized or given legal effect, as
already extensively discussed above.

To go back and directly answer now the issue that the petitioners directly pose in this
case, no extraordinary prescription can be recognized in their favor as their effective
possession could have started only after March 15, 1982. Based on the reasons and
conclusions in the above discussion, they have not complied with the legal
requirements, either from the point of view of the PLA or the Civil Code. Hence, the
denial of their petition must hold.