Pormento vs Esterada

Facts:
Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 1998 elections. He sought the presidency
again in the May 2010 elections. Pormento opposed Estrada’s candidacy and filed a petition for disqualification.
COMELEC (Division) denied his petition as well as his subsequent Motion for Reconsideration (En
Banc). Pormento then filed the present petition for certiorari before the Court. In the meantime, Estrada was able to
participate as a candidate for President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number
of votes.

Issue:
Is Estrada disqualified to run for presidency in the May 2010 elections in view of the prohibition in the Constitution which
states that: "[t]he President shall not be eligible for any reelection?

Held:
Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of
the phrase any reelection will be premised on a persons second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there
is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no
definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties
herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual
case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not empowered to decide moot
questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing
in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.

An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have
become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to
judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to
resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.

Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in
the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that elections, private respondent
was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his reelection will simply be hypothetical and
speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.

G.R. No. 191988 August 31, 2010

ATTY. EVILLO C. PORMENTO, Petitioner, vs.

JOSEPH "ERAP" EJERCITO ESTRADA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.

RESOLUTION CORONA, C.J.:

What is the proper interpretation of the following provision of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution: "[t]he
President shall not be eligible for any reelection?"

The novelty and complexity of the constitutional issue involved in this case present a temptation that
magistrates, lawyers, legal scholars and law students alike would find hard to resist. However, prudence dictates
that this Court exercise judicial restraint where the issue before it has already been mooted by subsequent
events. More importantly, the constitutional requirement of the existence of a "case" or an "actual controversy"
for the proper exercise of the power of judicial review constrains us to refuse the allure of making a grand
pronouncement that, in the end, will amount to nothing but a non-binding opinion.

The petition asks whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the ban on the President
from "any reelection." Private respondent was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the general
elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010.
Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private respondent’s candidacy and filed a petition for
disqualification. However, his petition was denied by the Second Division of public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC).1 His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.2

Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari3 on May 7, 2010. However, under the Rules of Court, the filing of
such petition would not stay the execution of the judgment, final order or resolution of the COMELEC that is
sought to be reviewed.4 Besides, petitioner did not even pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or
writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, private respondent was able to participate as a candidate for the position of
President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number of votes.5 1avv phi1

Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. Since the issue on the proper
interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will be premised on a person’s second (whether immediate or not)
election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights
exists.6 There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests.7 No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this
Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein.8 As such, one of the essential requisites for the
exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this
case.

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.9 The Court is not empowered to decide
moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as
to the thing in issue in the case before it.10 In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.11

An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved
have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not
entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing
for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.12

Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly
elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that elections,
private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his "reelection" will
simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.

Accordingly, the petition is denied due course and is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 178831-32 July 30, 2009

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N. CAMERO and RENALD F. VILLANDO, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179120 July 30, 2009

LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines, and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 179132-33 July 30, 2009

OLIVIA P. PARAS, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON.
ROBERTO NAZARENO, in his capacity as Secretary General of the House of Representatives; HON.
RHODORA SEVILLA, in her capacity as Deputy Secretary General for Finance of the House of
Representatives; THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 179240-41 July 30, 2009

RENALD F. VILLANDO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:

The instant motion with prayer for oral argument filed by Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in G.R. No. 179120, seeks
a reconsideration of the Court’s April 1, 2009 Decision, which granted Jocelyn D. Sy Limkaichong’s petition
for certiorari in G.R. Nos. 178831-32. The Court dismissed all the other petitions, including Biraogo’s petition,
and reversed the Joint Resolution of the Commission on Election’s (COMELEC) Second Division dated May 17,
2007 in SPA Nos. 07-247 and 07-248 disqualifying Limkaichong from running as a congressional candidate in
the First District of Negros Oriental due to lack of citizenship requirement.

Biraogo prefaced his motion by stating that justice and constitutionalism must remain entrenched in Philippine
case law. To achieve this end, he maintained that the Court should reconsider its April 1, 2009 Decision. He also
prayed for an oral argument, which he posited, would help the Court in the just and proper disposition of the
pending incident.

After an assiduous review of the motion for reconsideration, we resolve that the same should be denied for lack
of merit.

Most of the arguments advanced by Biraogo are a mere rehash of his previous arguments, which we have all
considered and found without merit in the Decision dated April 1, 2009. Nonetheless, in order to lay to rest once
and for all Biraogo's misgivings, we shall discuss only the relevant issues and revalidate our Decision by ruling
on his motion as follows:

The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualification of Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and
assume and discharge, the position of Representative for the First District of Negros Oriental. The contention of
the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the
citizenship requirement in Section 6,1 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was
voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed
as the winner and has since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of
Representatives.

Indeed, the citizenship requirement was enshrined in our Constitution in order to ensure that our people and
country do not end up being governed by aliens.2 With this principle in mind, we have said in Aquino v.
COMELEC3 that if one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives
is lacking, then not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters would substitute for a requirement
mandated by the fundamental law itself. Hence assuming, time constraints notwithstanding, and after proper
proceedings before the proper tribunal be had, that Limkaichong would prove to be an alien, the court of justice
would tilt against her favor and would not sanction such an imperfection in her qualification to hold office. But,
first things first.

The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen because her
parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the
naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.

In our Decision, We held that:

However, in assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in accordance with Section
18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 which provides that:

Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. - Upon motion made in the proper proceedings by
the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge may
cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the Civil Register:

1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;

 2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the issuance of said naturalization
certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign country and establish his permanent residence
there: Provided, That the fact of the person naturalized remaining more than one year in his native
country or the country of his former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall be
considered as prima facie evidence of his intention of taking up his permanent residence in the same:

3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;

4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a public or
private high school recognized by the Office of Private Education [now Bureau of Private Schools] of the
Philippines, where Philippine history, government or civics are taught as part of the school curriculum,
through the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another
school or schools. A certified copy of the decree canceling the naturalization certificate shall be
forwarded by the Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior [now Office of the President] and the
Bureau of Justice [now Office of the Solicitor General];

5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of the
constitutional or legal provisions requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise, use or
enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege. (Emphasis supplied)

As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico, where the Court of First Instance judge motu propio and not in the
proper denaturalization proceedings called to court various grantees of certificates of naturalization (who had
already taken their oaths of allegiance) and cancelled their certificates of naturalization due to procedural
infirmities, the Court held that:

x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings for naturalization were
tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of
the court to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be properly invoked in accordance with the
procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is the cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5),
Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore
quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or
by the proper provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably
after previous investigation in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may
question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization
proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the
naturalized citizen’s descendant.

Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or lack of it, to hold an office requiring one to be a natural-
born citizen, be attacked and questioned before any tribunal or government institution. Proper proceedings must
be strictly followed by the proper officers under the law. Hence, in seeking Limkaichong's disqualification on
account of her citizenship, the rudiments of fair play and due process must be observed, for in doing so, she is
not only deprived of the right to hold office as a Member of the House of Representative but her constituents
would also be deprived of a leader in whom they have put their trust on through their votes. The obvious
rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final
judgment during the election day, the people voted for her bona fide, without any intention to misapply their
franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would
entrust the exercise of the powers of government.4 lavvphil

These precepts, notwithstanding, Biraogo remained firm in his belief that this Court erred in its Decision and that
the COMELEC Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007 disqualifying Limkaichong should have been affirmed. He
even went to a great extent of giving a dichotomy of the said Joint Resolution by stating that it was composed of
two parts, the first part of which is the substantive part, and the second, pertains to the injunctive part. For this
purpose, the dispositive portion of the said COMELEC Joint Resolution is reproduced below:

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are GRANTED and Jocelyn D. Sy-Limkaichong is declared as DISQUALIFIED from
her candidacy for Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.

The Provincial Supervisor of the Commission on Elections of Negros Oriental is hereby directed to strike out the
name JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG from the list of eligible candidates for the said position, and the concerned
Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to hold and/or suspend the proclamation of JOCELYN SY-
LIMKAICHONG as winning candidate, if any, until this decision has become final.

SO ORDERED.5

Biraogo maintained that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Limkaichong suspended only the execution of
the substantive relief or the first part of the above-quoted COMELEC Joint Resolution. However, it did not
suspend the execution of the injunctive part and, accordingly, the Provincial Supervisor of the COMELEC should
not have proceeded with Limkaichong's proclamation as the winning candidate in the elections.

His argument has no leg to stand on. We cannot take a decision or resolution on a piece-meal basis and apply
only that part which is seemingly beneficial to one's cause and discard the prejudicial part which, obviously,
would just be a hindrance in advancing one's stance or interests. Besides, the COMELEC Joint Resolution which
Biraogo dichotomized was effectively suspended when Limkaichong timely filed her Motion for Reconsideration
pursuant to Section 13(c),6 Rule 18 and Section 2,7 Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Hence, it
cannot as yet be implemented for not having attained its finality.

Nevertheless, events have already transpired after the COMELEC has rendered its Joint Resolution.
Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of office, and she
was allowed to officially assume the office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, we ruled in our April 1, 2009 Decision
that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and no longer the COMELEC, should now assume
jurisdiction over the disqualification cases. Pertinently, we held:

x x x The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own
jurisdiction begins.8 It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its
jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification
should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to
hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election,
returns and qualifications. The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section
2509 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating
to its members.10

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

xxxx

Petitioners (in G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41) steadfastly maintained that Limkaichong’s
proclamation was tainted with irregularity, which will effectively prevent the HRET from acquiring jurisdiction.

The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to have been tainted with
irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.11 The Court has shed light on this in the case of Vinzons-
Chato,12 to the effect that:

In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of
office as a Member of the House of Representatives (Thirteenth Congress); hence, the COMELEC correctly
ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato's petition. The issues raised by petitioner Chato
essentially relate to the canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of respondent Unico's proclamation. These
are matters that are best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the HRET. Significantly, the
allegation that respondent Unico's proclamation is null and void does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction:
x x x [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his
oath of office and assumed his post as congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The
reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between
constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people's mandate.

Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chato's election protest against respondent Unico would
be to usurp the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.

In fine, any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamation will not prevent the HRET from assuming
jurisdiction over all matters essential to a member’s qualification to sit in the House of Representatives.

The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing either an election protest or a petition
for quo warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives. In our Decision, we ruled that the ten-day
prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification based on citizenship, because
qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.13 Accordingly, the 1987 Constitution requires that
Members of the House of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of their election but
during their entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it
may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding. lavvphi 1

In fine, we hold that Biraogo had not successfully convinced us to reconsider our Decision and grant his motion
for reconsideration.

In a last-ditched attempt to muddle the issues, Biraogo observed that the Decision dated April 1, 2009 is a
complete turn-around from the ruling embodied in the Decision written by Justice Ruben T. Reyes which,
although unpromulgated, was nonetheless signed by fourteen (14) Associate Justices and approved by the
Court en banc on July 15, 2008. He decried the absence of an explanation in the Decision dated April 1, 2009
for the said departure or turn-around.

Such a position deserves scant consideration.

The Court in Belac v. Commision on Elections,14 held that a decision must not only be signed by the Justices
who took part in the deliberation, but must also be promulgated to be considered a Decision, to wit:

[A] true decision of the Court is the decision signed by the Justices and duly promulgated. Before that
decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no decision of the Court to speak of. The vote cast by a
member of the Court after the deliberation is always understood to be subject to confirmation at the time he has
to sign the decision that is to be promulgated. The vote is of no value if it is not thus confirmed by the Justice
casting it. The purpose of this practice is apparent. Members of this Court, even after they have cast their votes,
wish to preserve their freedom of action till the last moment when they have to sign the decision, so that they
may take full advantage of what they may believe to be the best fruit of their most mature reflection and
deliberation. In consonance with this practice, before a decision is signed and promulgated, all opinions
and conclusions stated during and after the deliberation of the Court, remain in the breasts of the
Justices, binding upon no one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they may serve for
determining what the opinion of the majority provisionally is and for designating a member to prepare the
decision of the Court, but in no way is that decision binding unless and until signed and promulgated.

We add that at any time before promulgation, the ponencia may be changed by the ponente. Indeed, if any
member of the court who may have already signed it so desires, he may still withdraw his concurrence and
register a qualification or dissent as long as the decision has not yet been promulgated. A promulgation
signifies that on the date it was made the judge or judges who signed the decision continued to support
it.

Thus, an unpromulgated decision is no decision at all. At the very least, they are part of the confidential internal
deliberations of the Court which must not be released to the public. A decision becomes binding only after it is
validly promulgated.15 Until such operative act occurs, there is really no decision to speak of, even if some or all
of the Justices have already affixed their signatures thereto. During the intervening period from the time of
signing until the promulgation of the decision, any one who took part in the deliberation and had signed the
decision may, for a reason, validly withdraw one's vote, thereby preserving one's freedom of action.
In sum, we hold that Biraogo’s Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument must be denied. This
Court did not err in ruling that the proper remedy of those who may assail Limkaichong's disqualification based
on citizenship is to file before the HRET the proper petition at any time during her incumbency.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument filed by petitioner Louis C. Biraogo
in G.R. No. 179120 is DENIED with FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

Sec 17, Article VI of the Constitution- Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
electoral tribunal which shall be the “sole” judge of all contests relating to the election returns, and
qualifications of their respective members. Each electoral tribunals shall be composed of 9
members……
Facts: Limkaichong ran as a Representative in the first district of Negros Oriental. Her rival Olivia
Paras, and some other concerned citizens filed a disqualification case against Limkaichong. The latter
allegedly not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born, her father was still
a Chinese and that her mom, though Filipino, lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to
Limkaichong’s dad. During the pendency of the case, election day came, and votes were cast. Results
came in and Limkaichong won over Paras. Comelec after due hearing, declared Limkaichong as
disqualified. Notwithstanding their proclamation of disqualification, Comelec issued a proclamation
declaring Limkaichong as the winner. This is in compliance with Resolution no. 8062 adopting the
disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution
of the involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation, filed a petition before the Comelec.
Issue: WON the proclamation done by the Comelec is valid, and WON Comelec should still exercise
jurisdiction over the matter.
Held: The proclamation of Limkaichong is valid. the HRET must exercise jurisdiction after
Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has invariably held once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office as a member of the House of Rep., the Comelec’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and disqualification ends and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the
Comelec of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of proclamation. The party
questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET. The
use of the word “sole” in Sec.17 Art. VI of the Constitution and in Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election
Code underscores the exclusivity of the electoral tribunal’s jurisdiction over election contest relating to
its members.

FACTS:
Two petitions were consolidated on the issue about the qualifications of Jocelyn Limkaichong to run for, be elected to,
and assume and discharge the position as Representative of the 1st District of Negros Oriental. The contention of the
parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship
requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was voted for by the
constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has
since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.

The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen because her parents
were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio
Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be questioned in an election case.
2) Whether or not the HRET should assume jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
3) Whether or not the 10-day prescriptive period under 1998 HRET Rules apply to disqualification based on
citizenship.

RULINGS:
1) No. The proper proceeding in cancelling the naturalization certificate of one person should be in accordance with
Section 18 of CA No. 473. Clearly under the law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through the Solicitor General or the
representative designated by statute, that may question in the appropriate denaturalization proceeding.

2) Yes. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of office, and she
was allowed to officially assume office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
and no longer the COMELEC, should now assume the jurisdiction over the disqualification case. Section 17, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution and in Section 2509 of the OEC underscore the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal's
jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

3) No. The ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification based on
citizenship, because qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the
time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure.

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995

JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE
MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995

JOHN R. OSMEÑA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY,
MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No.
7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati."1

G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito
Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang,
Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a
resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they
assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:

1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of
Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;

2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for
local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution.

3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:

(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in
violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to
be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every
census;

(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and

(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmeña as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen.
Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.

We find no merit in the petitions.

 I

Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus:

Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly
urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall
comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over
which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of
Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros
and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the
northwest, by the City of Manila.

The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate agency or
forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between
the City of Makati and the adjoining local government units. (Emphasis supplied)

In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government
Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be made by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions.2

The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires.
Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the
exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to
avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be
spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.

Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description
made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of
the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not
change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add,
subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2
stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality."

The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City
of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of
R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was
under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt
that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a
legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of
the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.3 We take judicial notice of the fact
that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local
government units with unsettled boundary disputes.4

We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will
prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In
the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of
fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances,
we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the
Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:

Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the
requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities
should be described by meted and bounds, with technical descriptions" — was made in order to
provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words,
the requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment of local
government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may
be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring
municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law
has been sufficiently served.
 Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed
technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply.
To require such description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its validity would be to
defeat the very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest
intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due. It
seeks to make local governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the
same time serving as a vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the
mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the law would serve the letter but
defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of
the other way around. This could not be the intendment of the law.

Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be
consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when to
do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Tañada v.
Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument
of government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and
statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes
(Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar.

II

Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section
51 states:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective officials of the Municipality of
Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and
functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have
already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate
existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising
their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the
City of Makati.

They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution which
provide:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years
which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House of
Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than
three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate
existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and
disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the
incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms.
They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming
elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since his
previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that
said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant can
challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional
question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.5

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many
contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-
elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections.
Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue
which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano)
are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

III

Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. No.
7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:

Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. — Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall
thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2)
existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the
Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held after the
effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmariñas and Forbes shall be with
the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district.
(emphasis supplied)

They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1)
reapportionment6 cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the
title of the bill7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000).

These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos.8 In said case, we ruled that
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city.
The Constitution9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250)
members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from
increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly
what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative
district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a
review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an
inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation
for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a
particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be
forever whole or it is not sovereignty.

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3),
Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only
four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of
Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be
increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact,
section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to
more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14

Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in Makati
should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we
reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to
impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror,
fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the
title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject."

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995, 242 SCRA 211

FACTS:

This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista,
Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino
Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The
others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51, and
52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of the questioned
sections of R.A. No. 7854.

HELD:

The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1)
there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper
party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on
the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many
contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-
elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections.
Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue
which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano)
are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

Facts: Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act
Converting The Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the
City of Makati, as unconstitutional.

Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district

of Makati only by special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring
a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congresswithin 3 years following the
return of every census. Also, the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not
in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the
population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

Issue: Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is

unconstitutional
Held: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law,
such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall
be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus
worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by
passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done
by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati’s legislative
district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through
a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each
local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city
or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an
indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new
city or province a particle of their sovereignty.

Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not
in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the
population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides that a city with a
population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting that
the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district
may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000.

G.R. No. L-25024 March 30, 1970

TEODORO C. SANTIAGO, JR. Minor, Represented by his Mother, Mrs. Angelita C. Santiago, petitioner-
appellant,
vs.
MISS JUANITA BAUTISTA, ROSALINDA ALPAS, REBECCA MATUGAS, MILKITA INAMAC, ROMEO
AGUSTIN, AIDA CAMINO, LUNA SARMAGO, AURORA LORENA, SOLEDAD FRANCISCO and MR. FLOR
MARCELO, respondents-appellees.

Teodoro M. Santiago for petitioner-appellant.

Ramon C. Carag for respondent-apellees.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato dismissing, on a motion to dismiss, its Civil Case
No. 2012 — for certiorari, injunction and damages — on the ground that the complaint therein states no cause of
action, and from the subsequent order of the court a quo denying the motion for the reconsideration of the said
order of dismissal.

The record shows that at the time Civil Case No. 2012 was commenced in the court below, appellant Teodoro
Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the public school named Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City. As
the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end, the "Committee On The Rating Of Students For Honor" was
constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its
graduating class. With the school Principal, Mrs. Aurora Lorena, as chairman, and Juanita Bautista, Rosalinda
Alpas, Rebecca Matugas, Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin, Aida Camino and Luna Sarmago, as members, the
above-named committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Liñgat and Teodoro C.
Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors, respectively. The school's graduation exercises were thereafter
set for May 21, 1965; but three days before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by
his mother, and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students" thus made,
by instituting the above-mentioned civil case in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, against the above-named
committee members along with the District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the place.
The corresponding complaint filed alleged, inter alia: that plaintiff-petitioner Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. is a sixth
grader at the Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City scheduled to be graduated on May 21st, 1965 with
the honor rank of third place, which is disputed; that the teachers of the school had been made respondents as
they compose the "Committee on the Rating of Student for Honor", whose grave abuse of official discretion is
the subject of suit, while the other defendants were included as Principal, District Supervisor and Academic
Supervisor of the school; that Teodoro Santiago, Jr. had been a consistent honor pupil from Grade I to Grade V
of the Sero Elementary School, while Patricia Liñgat (second placer in the disputed ranking in Grade VI) had
never been a close rival of petitioner before, except in Grade V wherein she ranked third; that Santiago, Jr. had
been prejudiced, while his closest rival had been so much benefited, by the circumstance that the latter, Socorro
Medina, was coached and tutored during the summer vacation of 1964 by Mrs. Alpas who became the teacher
of both pupils in English in Grade VI, resulting in the far lead Medina obtained over the other pupil; that the
committee referred to in this case had been illegally constituted as the same was composed of all the Grade VI
teachers only, in violation of the Service Manual for Teachers of the Bureau of Public Schools which provides
that the committee to select the honor students should be composed of all teachers in Grades V and VI; that
there are direct and circumstantial matters, which shall be proven during the trial, wherein respondents have
exercised grave abuse of discretion and irregularities, such as the changing of the final ratings on the grading
sheets of Socorro Medina and Patricia Liñgat from 80% to 85%, and some teachers giving petitioner a starting
grade of 75% in Grade VI, which proves that there has already an intention to pull him to a much lower rank at
the end of the school year; that several district examinations outside of teachers' daily units and other than
periodical tests were given, ratings in which were heavily considered in the determination of periodical ratings,
whereas according to the Academic Supervisor and Acting Division Superintendent of schools of the place such
district examinations were not advisable; that there was a unanimous agreement and understanding among the
respondent teachers to insult and prejudice the second and third honors by rating Socorro Medina with a perfect
score, which is very unnatural; that the words "first place" in petitioner's certificate in Grade I was erased and
replaced with the words "second place", which is an instance of the unjust and discriminating abuses committed
by the respondent teachers in the disputed selection of honor pupils they made; that petitioner personally
appealed the matter to the School Principal, to the District Supervisor, and to the Academic Supervisor, but said
officials "passed the buck to each other" to delay his grievances, and as to appeal to higher authorities will be
too late, there is no other speedy and adequate remedy under the circumstances; and, that petitioner and his
parents suffered mental and moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00. They prayed the court, among others,
to set aside the final list of honor students in Grade VI of the Sero Elementary School for that school year 1964-
1965, and, during the pendency of the suit, to enjoin the respondent teachers from officially and formally
publishing and proclaiming the said honor pupils in Grade VI in the graduation exercises the school was
scheduled to hold on the 21st of May of that year 1965. The injunction prayed for was denied by the lower court
in its order of May 20, 1965, the said court reasoning out that the graduation exercises were then already set on
the following day, May 21, 1965, and the restraining of the same would be shocking to the school authorities,
parents, and the community who had eagerly looked forward to the coming of that yearly happy event. As
scheduled, the graduation exercises of the Sero Elementary School for the school year 1964-1965 was held on
May 21, with the same protested list of honor students.

Having been required by the above-mentioned order to answer the petition within ten (10) days, respondents
moved for the dismissal of the case instead. Under date of May 24, 1965, they filed a motion to dismiss, on the
grounds (1) that the action for certiorari was improper, and (2) that even assuming the propriety of the action, the
question brought before the court had already become academic. This was opposed by petitioner.

In an order dated June 4, 1965, the motion to dismiss of respondents was granted, the court reasoning thus:

The respondents now move to dismiss the petition for being improper and for being academic. In
order to resolve the motion to dismiss, the Court has carefully examined the petition to determine
the sufficiency of the alleged cause of action constituting the special civil action of certiorari.

The pertinent portions of the petition alleging 'grave abuse of discretion' are found in paragraphs
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. These allegations may be substantially summarized as follows:
Paragraph 3 alleges that since grades one to six, the students closely contending for class
honors were Socorro Medina, Teodoro Santiago, Jr., Dolores Dalican and Patricia Liñgat.

Socorro Medina obtained first honor thrice (grades I, V and VI); once second honor (grade IV),
and twice third place (grades II and III).

Teodoro Santiago, Jr. obtained first place once (grade IV); four times second place (grades I, II,
III, and V) and once third place (grade VI).
 Dolores Dalican obtained twice first place (grades II, III); once third place (grade I).

Patricia Liñgat once third place (grade V); and once second place (grade VI).

That as now ranked in the graduation Liñgat is given second place while Teodoro Santiago, Jr.,
is given the third place only. This is the ranking now disputed by petitioner, Teodoro Santiago, Jr.

Paragraph 4 alleges that Socorro Medina was tutored in the summer of 1964 by Mrs. Rosalinda
Alpas who became her English teacher in the sixth grade; that as such, Mrs. Alpas unjustly
favored Socorro against her rivals.

Paragraph 5 alleges that the teachers who composed the committee on honor students are all
grade six teachers while the Service Manual For Teachers provides that the committee shall be
composed of the teachers from the fifth and sixth grades.

Paragraph 6 alleges that there are direct and circumstantial evidence showing the change of
ratings of Socorro Medina and Patricia Liñgat from 80% to 85% and the intention to junk
petitioner to a lower rank.

Paragraph 7 alleges that the giving of district examinations upon which ratings were partly based
were not advisable.

Paragraph 8 alleges that the teachers rated Socorro Medina a perfect pupil which is unnatural.

Paragraph 9 alleges that on the first grade certificate of the petitioner the word "First Place" was
erased and changed to "Second Place".

Paragraph 10 alleges that petitioner personally appealed to the school authorities but they only
'passed the buck to each other.'

SECOND PARAGRAPH VIOLATED

Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:

'Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the
law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer.'

'The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or

order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto.'

It is striking, indeed, that this petition has not been accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment or order complained of, together with all pleadings and documents which are relevant
thereto, as required by the second, paragraph of the aforequoted rule. This violation renders the
petition extremely indefinite and uncertain. There is no written formal judgment or order of
respondents that is submitted for revision or correction of this Court. This violation is fatal to the
petition.

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES NEGLECTED

All that the petition alleges is that the petitioner personally appealed to the school authorities who
only 'passed the buck to each other.' This allegation does not show that petitioner formally
availed of and exhausted the administrative remedies of the Department of Education. The
petition implies that this is the first formal complaint of petitioner against his teachers. The
administrative agencies of the Department of Education could have investigated the grievances
 of the petitioner with dispatch and give effective remedies, but petitioner negligently abandoned
them. Petitioner cannot now claim that he lacked any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.

NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on the part of teachers refer to
errors, mistakes, or irregularities rather than to real grave abuse of discretion that would amount
to lack of jurisdiction. Mere commission of errors in the exercise of jurisdiction may not be
corrected by means of certiorari.

In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the petition states no
cause of action and should be, as it is hereby dismissed.

Upon receipt of a copy of the above-quoted order, the petitioner moved for the reconsideration thereof, but the
same proved to be futile, hence, this appeal.

Appellant here assails the holding of the lower court that his petition states no cause of action on the grounds —
discussed by the court a quo in the appealed order above-quoted — (1) that the petition does not comply with
the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 65 because it has not been accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto; (2) that administrative remedies were not first exhausted; and (3) that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the teachers who constituted the committee referred to. On the other hand, appellees
maintain that the court below did not err in dismissing the case on said grounds. Further, they argue in favor of
the questioned order of dismissal upon the additional ground that the "committee on the ratings of students for
honor" whose actions are here condemned by appellant is not the "tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
functions" against which an action for certiorari may lie under Section 1 of Rule 65.

The last point raised by appellees deserves first consideration, for if really the said committee of teachers does
not fall within the category of the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions contemplated by Rule 65,
further discussion of the issues raised by appellant may no longer be necessary. To resolve this problem the
following tests may be employed:

In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action instituted against 'any tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial functions.' (Section 1, Rule 67.) A judicial function is an act performed by virtue
of judicial powers; the exercise of a judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the
action of the court (34 C.J. 1182). In order that a special civil action of certiorari may be invoked
in this jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist: (1) that there must be a specific
controversy involving rights of persons or property and said controversy is brought before a
tribunal, board or officer for hearing and determination of their respective rights and obligations.

'Judicial action is an adjudication upon the rights of parties who in general appear
or are brought before the tribunal by notice or process, and upon whose claims
some decision or judgment is rendered. It implies impartiality, disinterestedness,
a weighing of adverse claims, and is inconsistent with discretion on the one hand
— for the tribunal must decide according to law and the rights of the parties — or
with dictation on the other; for in the first instance it must exercise its own
judgment under the law, and not act under a mandate from another power. ... The
character of its action in a given case must decide whether that action is judicial,
ministerial, or legislative, or whether it be simply that of a public agent of the
country or State, as in its varied jurisdictions it may by turns be each.' (In Re
Saline County Subscription, 100 Am. Dec. 337, 338, cited in Southeastern
Greyhound Lines v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 181 S. E. 836-837.)

'It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what
the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in
controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and
undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.' (State ex rel. Board
of Commissioners of St. Louis County, et al. v. Dunn, 90 N. W. 772-773.)

(2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have the power
and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the controversy construing and
applying the laws to that end.
 'The phrase "judicial power" is not capable of a precise definition which would be
applicable to all cases. The term has been variously defined as the authority to
determine the rights of persons or property by arbitrating between adversaries in
specific controversies at the instance of a party thereto; the authority exercised
by that department of government which is charged with the declaration of what
the law is and its construction so far as it is written law; the authority or power
vested in the judges or in the courts; the authority vested in some court, officer, or
persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or property or the
propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication; the power
belonging to or emanating from a judge as such; the power conferred upon a
public officer, involving the exercise of judgment and discretion in the
determination of questions of right in specific cases affecting the interest of
persons or property, as distinguished from ministerial power or authority to carry
out the mandates of judicial power or the law; the power exercised by courts in
hearing and determining cases before them, or some matter incidental thereto,
and of which they have jurisdiction; the power of a court to decide and pronounce
a judgment; the power which adjudicates upon and protects the rights and
interests of individual citizens, and to that end construes and applies the law.
"Judicial power" implies the construction of laws and the adjudication of legal
rights. It includes the power to hear and determine but not everyone who may
hear and determine has judicial power. The term "judicial power" does not
necessarily include the power to hear and determine a matter that is not in the
nature of a suit or action between the parties.' (34 C.J. 1183-1184.) .

(3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which belongs
to the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive department.

... the distinction between legislative or ministerial functions and judicial functions
is difficult to point out. What is a judicial function does not depend solely upon the
mental operation by which it is performed or the importance of the act. In solving
this question, due regard must be had to the organic law of the state and the
division of power of government. In the discharge of executive and legislative
duties, the exercise of discretion and judgment of the highest order is necessary,
and matters of the greatest weight and importance are dealt with. It is not enough
to make a function judicial that it requires discretion, deliberation, thought, and
judgment. It must be the exercise of discretion and judgment within that
subdivision of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or, at least,
which does not belong to the legislative or executive department. If the matter, in
respect to which it is exercised, belongs to either of the two last-named
departments of government, it is not judicial. As to what is judicial and what is not
seems to be better indicated by the nature of a thing, than its definition.'
(Whealing & Elm Grove Railroad Co. Appt. v. Town of Triadelphia, et al., 4 L.R.A.
(N. S.) pp. 321, 328-329.) [Emphasis supplied]1

'WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is difficult, if not

impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial acts, and there is
considerable conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in connection with the law
as to the right to the writ of certiorari. It is clear, however, that it is the nature of
the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which performs
it, that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial
function. It is not essential that the proceedings should be strictly and technically
judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when applied to the courts of
justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act
judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their public character. ...'
"In State ex rel. Board of Commrs. vs. Dunn (86 Minn. 301, 304), the following
statements were made:

'The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are
administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to determine. The exercise
of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or administrative
duties, and the performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a
measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that
the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the
 legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever
an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those
questions, he acts judicially.'2

It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called committee on the rating of students for honor whose
actions are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in the performance of its
assigned task. From the above-quoted portions of the decision cited, it will be gleaned that before tribunal board, or
officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that give rise to some specific
rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing
therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to determine what
that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. As pointed out by
appellees,3 however, there is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to
assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves the
determination of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial
functions. Worse still, this Court has not even been appraised by appellant of the pertinent provisions of the Service
Manual of Teachers for Public Schools appellees allegedly violated in the composition of the committee they
constituted thereunder, and, in the performance of that committee's duties.

At any rate, the situation brought before Us in this case, the seemingly one of first impression, is not without
substantial parallel. In the case of Felipe vs. Leuterio, etc., et al.,4 the issue presented for determination was
whether or not the courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest, and
this Court declared that the judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of that contest and, for
that matter, it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and similar competitions. It was reasoned out
thus:

For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been held periodically by schools and colleges in
this islands. Inter-collegiate oratorical competitions are of more recent origin. Members of this
court have taken part in them either as contestants in their school days (In the College of Law,
U.P. annual oratorical contest, first prize was awarded to Justice Montemayor in 1914 and to
Justice Labrador in 1916), or as members of the board of judges afterwards. They know some
few verdicts did not reflect the audience's preference and that errors have sometimes been
ascribed to the award of the judges. Yet no party ever presumed to invoke judicial intervention;
for it is unwritten law in such contests that the board's decision is final and unappealable.

Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments of the Word apply the highest
tenets of sportsmanship: finality of referee's verdict. No alibis, no murmurs of protest. The
participants are supposed to join the competition to contribute to its success by striving their
utmost: the prizes are secondary.

No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants, because theirs was merely the
privilege to compete for the prize, and that privilege did not ripen into a demandable right unless
and until they were proclaimed winners of the competition by the appointed arbiters or referees
or judges.

Incidentally, these school activities have been imported from the United States. We found in
American jurisprudence no litigation questioning the determination of the board of judges.

Now, the fact that a particular action has had no precedent during a long period affords some
reason for doubting the existence of the right sought to be enforced, especially where occasion
for its assertion must have often arisen; and courts are cautious before allowing it, being loath to
establish a new legal principle not in harmony with the generally accepted views thereon. (See
C.J.S. Vol. 1, p. 1012.)

We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the respondent judge reasoned out that
where there is a wrong there is a remedy and that courts of first instance are courts of general
jurisdiction.

The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered some wrong at the hands
of the board of judges. If at all, there was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong
do not mean the same thing. 'Wrong' as used in the aforesaid principle is the deprivation or
violation of a right. As stated before, a contestant has no right to the prize unless and until he or
she is declared winner by the board of referees or judges.
 Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of 'damnum
absque injuria'. This is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a different
proposition. But then her action should be directed against the individual judge or judges who
fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges.

But even were We to assume for the moment, as the court below apparently did, that judicial intervention might
be sought in cases of this nature, still, We are inclined to sustain the order of dismissal appealed from for failure
on the part of appellant to comply with the requirements of Section 1 of Rule 65. To be sure, the lower court's
holding that appellant's failure to accompany his petition with a copy of the judgment or order subject thereof
together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto "is fatal to his cause" is
supported not only by the provision of that Rule but by precedents as well. In the case of Alajar, et al. vs. Court
of Industrial Relations,5 where it was claimed by therein petitioners that the respondent court had acted with grave
abuse of discretion in estimating certain rice harvests involved in the case in terms of cavans instead of cans,
allegedly in complete disregard of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Expropriation Proceedings
No. 84 and of this Court in G.R. No.
L-6191,6 and in ordering thereafter the division of the said rice harvests on the ratio of 70-30 in favor of the tenants,
this Court denied the petition for certiorari on the ground, among others, of failure on the part of said petitioners to
attach to their petition copies of the decisions allegedly violated. Speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes then, this
Court held:

The petition is patently without merit. In the first place, it is not even sufficient in form and
substance to justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari prayed for. It charges that the Court of
Industrial Relations abused its discretion in disregarding the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas in Expropriation Proceedings No. 84 and of this Court in G.R. No. L-6191;
yet it does not attach to the petition the decisions allegedly violated by the Court below and point
out which particular portion or portions thereof have been disregarded by the respondent Court.

The same principle was applied in the more recent case of NAWASA vs. Municipality of Libmanan, et
al.,7 wherein this Court dismissed (by Resolution) the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority against the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, and the municipality of
Libmanan. In the following language, this Court emphasized the importance of complying with the said requirement of
Rule 65:

While paragraph 3 of the petition speaks of the complaint filed by the respondent municipality
with the respondent court for recovery of property with damages (Civil Case No. L-161) no copy
thereof is attached to the petition.

Similarly, paragraph 4 of the petition mentions the decision rendered by the respondent court on
December 10, 1965, but no copy thereof is attached to the petition.

Again, paragraph 5 of the petition speaks of the order of default entered by the respondent court
and of the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the case above-mentioned, but no copy
of the order of default is attached to its petition.

Bearing in mind that the petition under consideration was filed for the purpose of enjoining the
respondent court from executing the decision rendered in Civil Case No. L-161, the importance
of the missing pleadings is obvious.

Moreover, the petition is also for the purpose of securing an order commanding the respondent
court to approve either the original or the amended record on appeal filed petition, but no copy of
either is attached to its petition.

In view of the foregoing, the petition under consideration is dismissed.

It might be true, as pointed out by appellant, that he received a copy of the programme of the graduation
exercises held by the Sero Elementary School in the morning of the very day of that graduation exercises,
implying that he could not have attached then a copy thereof (to show the decision of the committee of teachers
in the ranking of students complained of) to his petition. The stubborn fact remains, however, that appellant had
known of such decision of the said committee of teachers much earlier, as shown by the circumstance that
according to him, even before the filing of his petition with the lower court on the 19th of May, 1965, he had
personally appealed the said committee's decision with various higher authorities of the above-named school,
who merely passed the buck to each other. Moreover, appellant mentions in his petition various other
 documents or papers — as the Service Manual for Teachers allegedly violated by appellees in the constitution of
their committee; altered grading sheets; and erasures in his Grade I certificate — which appellant never
bothered to attach to his petition. There could be no doubt then that he miserably failed to comply with the
requirement of Rule 65 above-mentioned. With this conclusion, it is no longer necessary to pass upon the other
two errors assigned by appellant.

FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellant.

SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA

judicial power and judicial function

Teodoro Santiago was a Grade 6 pupil at Sero Elem. School. He was adjudged 3rd Honors (3rd placer). 3
days before graduation, Teodoro and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of honor
students. They filed a CERTIORARI case against the principal and teachers who composed the
committee on rating honors.

They contend that the committee acted with grave abuse of official discretion because they claim that
o the 1st and 2nd placers had never been a close rival of Santiago before, except in Grade 5 only.
o That Santiago was a consistent honor student from Grade 1 to 5
o that the 1st placer was coached and tutored by grade 6 teachers during the summer (gaining unfair
advantage)
o The committee was composed only of Grade 6 teachers.
o That some teachers gave Santos a 75% with an intention to pull him to a much lower rank
o That in the Honors Certificate in Grade 1, the word “first place” was erased and replaced with “second
place”
o That the Principal and district supervisors merely passed the buck to each other to delay his grievances.
The respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was improper, and that even assuming it was proper,
the question has become academic (because the graduation already proceeded).

Respondents also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since the Committee on
Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions. (under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy
against judicial functions)

ISSUE: may judicial function be exercised in this case? What is judicial power?

SC:
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial function is
the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to
exist, (TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A TRIBUNAL OR BOARD EXERCISES JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS)

1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing
and determination. , and

2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision.

3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at least
the not the legislative nor the executive)

It maybe said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the legal
rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy.

The phrase judicial power is defined:

 as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.
 authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the rights of
persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication.
 The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them.
 The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.
The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the
performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific
rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy
ensuring therefrom is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to
determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of contending parties.

There is nothing about any rule of law that provides for when teachers sit down to assess individual
merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors. Worse still, the petitioners have not
presented the pertinent provisions of the Service Manual for Teachers which was allegedly violated by
the Committee.

The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges.
And for that matter, it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests, and similar
competitions.