CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise
MARCH 30, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the
City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as
Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the
City Council of Manila, et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S.
LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE
TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development
Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business
of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It
built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed
as a motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel.
On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court
impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila,
Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the
members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC
prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and
inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared
invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City
Mayor, the said Ordinance is entitled–
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR
OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN
THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of
respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition,
alleging that the following errors were committed by the
lower court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra
vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive
exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance
contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of all kinds of
commercial establishments, except those specified therein;
and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and
unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the
lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did,
ultra vires and therefore null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line
of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must
not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to
the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
of its police power, an enactment of the City Council acting as
agent of Congress. This delegated police power is found in
Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of
the exercise of such delegated power.
A. The Ordinance contravenes
the Constitution
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of
delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to
general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised
with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due
process and equal protection of the law. Due process requires
the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of
the person to his life, liberty and property.
Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the
rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it
from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must
it appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It
must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights
can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the police measure and the means employed for
its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting
the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to
private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police
measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights a violation of the due process clause.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion
and protection of the social and moral values of the
community. Granting for the sake of argument that the
objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City
Council’s police powers, the means employed for the
accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly
oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication
of the community’s social ills can be achieved through means
less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by
reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute
prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or
their conversion into businesses “allowed” under the
Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the
accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the
prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se
protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the
community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills
of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the
spread of sexual disease in Manila.
The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are
not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual
activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot
be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on
a mere likelihood or a naked assumption.
If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution,
fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose
reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the
establishments for any violation of the conditions of their
licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or
revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may even
impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other
means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the
Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the
governmental interference itself, infringes on the
constitutional guarantees of a person’s fundamental right to
liberty and property.
Modality employed is
unlawful taking
It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of
property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose
goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of
the property without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and
violative of the private property rights of individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified.
A “possessory” taking occurs when the government
confiscates or physically occupies property. A “regulatory”
taking occurs when the government’s regulation leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of the property.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings
is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner
that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. When
the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice
all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common
good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has
suffered a taking.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the
“prohibited” establishments three (3) months from its
approval within which to “wind up business operations or to
transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or
convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable
within the area.” The directive to “wind up business
operations” amounts to a closure of the establishment, a
permanent deprivation of property, and is practically
confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to
accommodate an “allowed” business, the structure which
housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering
dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of property in a manner that
interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place
outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed
businessesare confiscatory as well. The penalty of
permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in
Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a “taking” of
private property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a
zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid
exercise of police power, which limits a “wholesome”
property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it
constitutes the taking of such property without just
compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor
intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be
destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no
support in the principles of justice as we know them. The
police powers of local government units which have always
received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched
to cover this particular taking.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances
such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution,
depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever
other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city
authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be
tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should
have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement
could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify
the standards to ascertain which establishments “tend to
disturb the community,” “annoy the inhabitants,” and
“adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community.”
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for
lack of comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers
in carrying out its provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the
enumerated establishments without infringing the due
process clause. These lawful establishments may be
regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal
Protection Clause
In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinctions
between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses
or other similar establishments. By definition, all are
commercial establishments providing lodging and usually
meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for
prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. The
classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects
are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on
substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the
purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the
business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area
but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does
not become any less noxious if located outside the area.
The standard “where women are used as tools for
entertainment” is also discriminatory as prostitutionone of
the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banishis not a
profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have
an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the
discrimination is invalid.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant
to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as
the latter merely empowers local government units to
regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in
Section 1 thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels,
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other
similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to
legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the
general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the
power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment,
operation and maintenance of such establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover
under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement
of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies
to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate
safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated
under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that
motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or
comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a
nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing
conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance
warranting its summary abatement without judicial
intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise
runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly
argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the
residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The
decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds
of commercial establishments except warehouse or open
storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline
service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral
establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid
and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the
powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in
conflict with or repugnant to the general law.
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal
and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is
constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it
is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not
sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the
City Council under the Code had no power to enact the
Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Petition Denied.
BINAY vs DOMINGO
Facts:
The Burial Assistance Program (Resolution No. 60 – assisting
those who only earn less than P2,000/month of burial
assistance in the amount of P500.00) made by Makati Mayor
Jejomar Binay, in the exercise of the police power granted to
him by the municipal charter, was referred to the
Commission on Audit after the municipal secretary certified
the disbursement of four hundred thousand pesos for its
implementation was disallowed by said commission of such
disbursements because there cannot be seen any perceptible
connection or relation between the objective sought to be
attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of
its inhabitants. Hence, this petition revolving around the
pivotal issue on whether or not Resolution No. 60 of
the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power
under the general welfare clause.
Held:
Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid
exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.
The police power is a governmental function, an inherent
attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized
government. It is founded largely on the maxims, “Sic utere
tuo et ahenum non laedas” (use your property so as not to
impair others) and “Salus populi est suprema lex” (the
welfare of the people is the supreme law). Its fundamental
purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and
convenience of the people. Police power is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of
powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful
attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be
responsive to various social conditions. The care for the poor
is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the
poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in
the promotion of the common good
BATANGAS CATV, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD and
BATANGAS CITY MAYOR [G.R. No. 138810. September 29,
2004]
FACTS:
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod
enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to
construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas
City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is
authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates
specified therein, “provided, however, that any increase of
rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod.
Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its
subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a
result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter
threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval
of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to
Resolution No. 210.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a
petition for injunction alleging that respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates
charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order
No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the
Philippines.
ISSUE :
may a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber
rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial
jurisdiction?
HELD: No.
xxx
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above
laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC exercises regulatory power
over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies.
xxx
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated
by LGUs under the general welfare clause. This is primarily
because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of
crossing public properties. (It uses public properties in order
to reach subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing
CATV system – the use of public streets, rights of ways, the
founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions –
allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV
operators.
xxx
But, while we recognize the LGUs’ power under the general
welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No. 210. We are
convinced that respondents strayed from the well recognized
limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it
violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the
State’s deregulation policy over the CATV industry.
LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV
operation are within the exclusive regulatory power of the
NTC.
DACANAY v. ASISTIO, JR.
FACTS:
This is a petition for mandamus to the non-action of the city
registered being a public road intended for public use is
considered part of the public domain and therefore outside
the commerce of man. After hearing the parties, on 11
October 1914 the trial court issued an order dismissing the
petitioner's application for registration of title. Hence, the
instant petition for review.
The Supreme Court set aside the order of the lower court,
and the ordered said court to proceed with the hearing of the
petitioner's application for registration of title.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale is valid
RULING: Yes it is.
1. City is empowered to close city road or street and
withdraw the same from public use. Section 31 of the Revised
Charter of Cebu City (Legislative Powers) provides that “any
provision of law and executive order to the contrary
notwithstanding, the City Council shall have the following
legislative powers xxx to close any city road, street or alley,
boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn
from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the City
may be lawfully used or conveyed." It is undoubtedly clear
that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or
street.
2. Discretion of the city council cannot ordinarily be
interfered with by the court. The city council is the authority
competent to determine whether or not a certain property is
still necessary for public use. The power to vacate a street or
alley is discretionary, and the discretion will not ordinarily be
controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain
case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public
trust will he presumed. So the fact that some private interests
may be served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation
ordinance.
3. Street withdrawn from public use becomes patrimonial
property; Subsequent sale valid. When a portion of the city
street was withdrawn from public use, such withdrawn
portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the
object of an ordinary contract. As expressly provided by
Article 422 of the Civil Code, "property of public dominion,
when no longer intended for public use or for public service,
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
Further, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu, in very clear
and unequivocal terms, states that "property thus withdrawn
from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the City
may be lawfully used or conveyed." Thus, the withdrawal of
the property in question from public use and its subsequent
sale to the petitioner is valid.
CASE DIGEST: AMPATUAN, ET AL. V. SECRETARY RONALDO
PUNO
G.R. No. 190259 : June 7, 2011
DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ANSARUDDIN ADIONG, REGIE
SAHALI-GENERALE, Petitioners, v. HON. RONALDO PUNO, in
his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and
Local Government and alter-ego of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and on
behalf of the President of the Philippines, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of their units operating in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, or any of their units operating
in ARMM, Respondents.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre
of 57 men and women, including some news reporters, then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation
1946, placing "the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of
emergency." She directed the AFP and the PNP "to undertake
such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by
law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence"
in the named places.
Three days later or on November 27, President Arroyo also
issued AO 273 "transferring" supervision of the ARMM from
the Office of the President to the DILG. But, due to issues
raised over the terminology used in AO 273, the President
issued Administrative Order 273-A (AO 273-A) amending the
former, by "delegating" instead of "transferring" supervision
of the ARMM to the DILG.
Claiming that the President's issuances encroached on the
ARMM's autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan,
Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM
officials, filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65. They
alleged that the proclamation and the orders empowered the
DILG Secretary to take over ARMMs operations and seize the
regional government's powers, in violation of the principle of
local autonomy under Republic Act 9054 (also known as the
Expanded ARMM Act) and the Constitution. The President
gave the DILG Secretary the power to exercise, not merely
administrative supervision, but control over the ARMM since
the latter could suspend ARMM officials and replace them.
Petitioners alleged that the deployment of troops and the
taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of
the Presidents emergency powers. Hence, petitioners prayed
the nullity of Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A
and respondents, DILG Secretary, the AFP, and the PNP be
enjoined from implementing them.
In its comment for the respondents, the (OSG) insisted that
the President issued Proclamation 1946, not to deprive the
ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and order in
subject places. She issued the proclamation pursuant to her
"calling out" power as Commander-in-Chief under the first
sentence of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The
determination of the need to exercise this power rests solely
on her wisdom.10 She must use her judgment based on
intelligence reports and such best information as are
available to her to call out the armed forces to suppress and
prevent lawless violence wherever and whenever these
reared their ugly heads.
On the other hand, the President merely delegated through
AOs 273 and 273-A her supervisory powers over the ARMM
to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. These
orders did not authorize a take over of the ARMM. They did
not give him blanket authority to suspend or replace ARMM
officials. The delegation was necessary to facilitate the
investigation of the mass killings. Further, the assailed
proclamation and administrative orders did not provide for
the exercise of emergency powers.
ISSUES:
[1] Whether the aforementioned issuances are constitutional
[2] Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised
emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP
to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
HELD: The AO Nos 273 and 273-A are constitutional.
POLITICAL LAW emergency powers
The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency
powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions
as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper
to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall
cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a
state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she
did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that
authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling
out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence in such places is a power that the Constitution
directly vests in the President. She did not need a
congressional authority to exercise the same.
The President's call on the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in
her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which
provides -
SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief
of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x
xx
On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has
a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of
which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the
security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-
the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and
mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out
the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be
done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all.
Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state
of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the President's exercise
of the "calling out" power had no factual basis. They simply
alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed
under a state of emergency, it follows that the takeover of
the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.
Considering the fact that the principal victims of the brutal
bloodshed are members of the Mangudadatu family and the
main perpetrators of the brutal killings are members and
followers of the Ampatuan family, both the military and
police had to prepare for and prevent reported retaliatory
actions from the Mangudadatu clan and additional offensive
measures from the Ampatuan clan.
In other words, the imminence of violence and anarchy at the
time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave
to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed
and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also
indicated that there was movement in these places of both
high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the
two clans. Thus, to pacify the peoples fears and stabilize the
situation, the President had to take preventive action. She
called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of
loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that
continuously threatened the peace and security in the
affected places.
The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Fernando vs St. Scholastica’s College
GR 1611107, 12 March 2013
Facts: Respondent SSC’s property is enclosed by a tall
concrete perimeter fence. Marikina City enacted an
ordinance which provides that walls and fences shall not be
built within a five-meter allowance between the front
monument line and the building line of an establishment.
The City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the
respondents ordering them to demolish, replace, and move
back the fence. As a response, the respondents filed a
petition for prohibition with an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
before the Regional Trial Court of Marikina. The RTC granted
the petition and the CA affirmed. Hence, this certiorari.

Issue: Is Marikina Ordinance No. 192, imposing a five-meter
setback, a valid exercise of police power?
Ruling: No. “Police power is the plenary power vested in the
legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people.” Two tests have been used by
the Court – the rational relationship test and the strict
scrutiny test:
Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance
must pass the following requisites:
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require its exercise; and (2) the
means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.
The real intent of the setback requirement was to
make the parking space free for use by the public and not for
the exclusive use of respondents. This would be tantamount
to a taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. Anent the objectives of prevention of
concealment of unlawful acts and “un-neighborliness” due to
the walls and fences, the parking area is not reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of these goals. The Court,
thus, finds Section 5 of the Ordinance to be unreasonable and
oppressive. Hence, the exercise of police power is not valid.
Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr
., February 13,2008, Corona, J.
The Supreme Court denied the motions for reconsideration
filed by the Department of Energy and oil giants Chevron,
Petron, and Shell; and reiterated its March 7, 2007
decisionordering the Manila City mayor to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027 directing the removal of theterminals from
Pandacan by the said oil companies. The said Ordinance
reclassified portionsof the Manila districts of Pandacan and
Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial and directedcertain
business owners and operators, including the three oil giants
to cease and desistfrom operating their businesses there.
Ordinance No. 8027, approved by Manila City Council on
November 28, 2001 and effective December 28, 2001,
reclassifies portions of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from
industrial to commercial and directs the owners and
operators of businesses to cease and desist from operating
their businesses within 6 months from the ordinance’s
effectivity. Among the businesses in the area are the so-
called Pandacan Terminals of Chevron, Petron, and Shell.
Chevron, Petron and Shell, questioned the validity of the
said ordinance. They argued that they are fighting for their
right to property alleging that they stand to lose billions of
pesos if forced [to] relocate. Are the contentions of the oil
companies tenable?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The Court described Ordinance No. 8027 as a measure
enacted pursuant to the delegated police power of local
government units “to promote the order, safety, and health,
morals, and general welfare of the society.” It explained that
“based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights,
the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property.
The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not.
When the state or [local government unit] LGU’s exercise of
police power clashes with a few individuals’ right to property,
the former should prevail.” (GR No. 156052, Social Justice
Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., February 13, 2008)
Ordinance No. 8027 visit fellester.blogspot.com was enacted
right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world,
witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on
the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City.
The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of
Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely
occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
No reason exists why such a protective measure should be
delayed.
NOTES:
In 2007, the SC ruled that the Local Government Code
imposes upon Mayor Atienza, to “enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the governance of the city.” One of
these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the
city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as
it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by
the courts. He has no other choice. (GR No. 156052, Social
Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., March 7, 2007)
In 2008, The Supreme Court denied the motions for
reconsideration filed by Chevron, Petron, and Shell, and
instead reiterated its March 7, 2007 decision. (GR No.
156052, Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., February
13, 2008)
In 2009, the SC recently denied with finality the second
motion for reconsideration of the three big oil players. The
Court stressed that the second motion for reconsideration is
a prohibited pleading pursuant to sec. 2, Rule 52 of the Rules
of Court. It said that it already passed upon the basic issues in
its February 13, 2008 resolution and noted that the
arguments of the oil firms were a mere rehash of their
arguments raised in the first motion for reconsideration.
(Min. Res., GR No. 156052, Social Justice Society, et al. v.
Atienza, Jr., April 28, 2009)
FACTS
(Just the other day, the Supreme Court affirmed the authority
of Manila City to issue — and enforce — an Ordinance
reclassifying certain areas within the city. The reclassification
adversely affected the oil companies, which are now forced
to relocate their oil terminals in Pandacan. This is a digest of
Social Justice Society vs. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, 13
February 2008. Other procedural issues are not discussed.)
Facts:
The Social Justice Society sought to compel respondent Hon.
Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 that was enacted by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in 2001. Ordinance No.
8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of
businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and
desist from operating their businesses within six months from
the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the
businesses situated in the area are the so-called
“Pandacan Terminals― of the oil companies.
In 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy
(DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
with the oil companies. They agreed that “the scaling
down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and
practicable option.― The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified
the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the
Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a
period of six months starting 25 July 2002, which period was
extended up to 30 April 2003.
This is the factual backdrop of the Supreme Court’s 7 March
2007 Decision. The SC ruled that respondent had the
ministerial duty under the Local Government Code (LGC) to
“enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city,― including Ordinance No. 8027.
After the SC promulgated its Decision, Chevron Philippines
Inc. (Chevron), Petron Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation (Shell) (the “oil companies―)
and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DOE,
sought to intervene and ask for a reconsideration of the
decision.
Intervention of the oil companies and the DOE allowed in the
interest of justice
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally
impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to
enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest
which may be affected by such proceedings. The allowance or
disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court. While the motions to intervene
respectively filed by the oil companies and the DOE were filed
out of time, these motions were granted because they
presented novel issues and arguments. DOE’s intervention
was also allowed considering the transcendental importance
of this case.
Ordinance No. 8119 did not impliedly repeal Ordinance No.
8027
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a
statute of later date clearly reveals the intention of the
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that
intention must be given effect. Implied repeals are not
favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the
legislators is manifest.
There are two kinds of implied repeal. The first is: where the
provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are
irreconcilably contradictory, the latter act, to the extent of
the conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one.
The second is: if the later act covers the whole subject of the
earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will
operate to repeal the earlier law. The oil companies argue
that the situation here falls under the first category.
For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an
irreconcilable conflict between the two ordinances. However,
there was no legislative purpose to repeal Ordinance No.
8027. There is no conflict since both ordinances actually have
a common objective, i.e., to shift the zoning classification
from industrial to commercial (Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed
residential/commercial (Ordinance No. 8119). While it is true
that both ordinances relate to the same subject matter, i.e.,
classification of the land use of the area where Pandacan oil
depot is located, if there is no intent to repeal the earlier
enactment, every effort at reasonable construction must be
made to reconcile the ordinances so that both can be given
effect.
Moreover, it is a well-settled rule in statutory construction
that a subsequent general law does not repeal a prior special
law on the same subject unless it clearly appears that the
legislature has intended by the latter general act to modify or
repeal the earlier special law. The special law must be taken
as intended to constitute an exception to, or a qualification
of, the general act or provision. Ordinance No. 8027 is a
special law since it deals specifically with a certain area
described therein (the Pandacan oil depot area) whereas
Ordinance No. 8119 can be considered a general law as it
covers the entire city of Manila.
Mandamus lies to compel respondent Mayor to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027
The oil companies insist that mandamus does not lie against
respondent in consideration of the separation of powers of
the executive and judiciary. However, while it is true that
Courts will not interfere by mandamus proceedings with the
legislative or executive departments of the government in the
legitimate exercise of its powers, there is an exception – to
enforce mere ministerial acts required by law to be
performed by some officer thereof. A writ of mandamus is
the power to compel “the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office,
trust or station.―
The oil companies also argue that petitioners had a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy to compel respondent to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027, which was to seek relief from
the President of the Philippines through the Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) by
virtue of the President’s power of supervision over local
government units. This suggested process, however, would
be unreasonably long, tedious and consequently injurious to
the interests of the local government unit (LGU) and its
constituents whose welfare is sought to be protected. A party
need not go first to the DILG in order to compel the
enforcement of an ordinance. Besides, the resort to an
original action for mandamus before the SC is undeniably
allowed by the Constitution.
Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and valid
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the LGU to enact and be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not
be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy and (6)
must not be unreasonable. There is no showing that the
Ordinance is unconstitutional.
The City of Manila has the power to enact Ordinance No.
8027
Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its police power.
Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to
make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of
the people. This power flows from the recognition that salus
populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the
supreme law).
While police power rests primarily with the national
legislature, such power may be delegated. Section 16 of the
LGC, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the
delegated police power to local governments. LGUs like the
City of Manila exercise police power through their respective
legislative bodies, in this case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
the city council. Specifically, the Sanggunian can enact
ordinances for the general welfare of the city.
This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila. Specifically, the
Sanggunian has the power to “reclassify land within the
jurisdiction of the city.―
The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is a legitimate exercise
of police power
As with the State, local governments may be considered as
having properly exercised their police power only if the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require its exercise; and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there
must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful
method.
Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure because
there is a concurrence of lawful subject and lawful method. It
was enacted “for the purpose of promoting sound urban
planning, ensuring health, public safety and general
welfare― of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was
impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila
from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on
the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the
Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance
from industrial to commercial.
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life,
security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not
just of a particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or
wrongly, as a representation of western interests which
means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it there is such a
target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It
therefore became necessary to remove these terminals to
dissipate the threat. Wide discretion is vested on the
legislative authority to determine not only what the interests
of the public require but also what measures are necessary
for the protection of such interests. Clearly, the Sanggunian
was in the best position to determine the needs of its
constituents.
In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals
may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill
the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the
government may enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations
to promote the general welfare. However, the interference
must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to forestall
arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public
health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable
relation to the end in view.
The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of
a zoning ordinance which reclassified the area where the
depot is situated from industrial to commercial. A zoning
ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation
which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a
given political subdivision into specific land uses as present
and future projection of needs. As a result of the zoning, the
continued operation of the businesses of the oil companies in
their present location will no longer be permitted. The power
to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential
uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised
for the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality.
Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within
the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of
Manila and any resulting burden on those affected cannot be
said to be unjust.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not unfair, oppressive or confiscatory
which amounts to taking without compensation
According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8027 is unfair
and oppressive as it does not only regulate but also
absolutely prohibits them from conducting operations in the
City of Manila. However, the oil companies are not prohibited
from doing business in other appropriate zones in Manila.
The City of Manila merely exercised its power to regulate the
businesses and industries in the zones it established.
The oil companies also argue that the ordinance is unfair and
oppressive because they have invested billions of pesos in the
depot, and the forced closure will result in huge losses in
income and tremendous costs in constructing new facilities.
This argument has no merit. In the exercise of police power,
there is a limitation on or restriction of property interests to
promote public welfare which involves no compensable
taking. Compensation is necessary only when the state’s
power of eminent domain is exercised. In eminent domain,
property is appropriated and applied to some public purpose.
Property condemned under the exercise of police power, on
the other hand, is noxious or intended for a noxious or
forbidden purpose and, consequently, is not compensable.
The restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and
safety from danger is not a taking. It is merely the prohibition
or abatement of a noxious use which interferes with
paramount rights of the public. In the regulation of the use of
the property, nobody else acquires the use or interest
therein, hence there is no compensable taking.
In this case, the properties of the oil companies and other
businesses situated in the affected area remain theirs. Only
their use is restricted although they can be applied to other
profitable uses permitted in the commercial zone.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not partial and discriminatory
The oil companies take the position that the ordinance has
discriminated against and singled out the Pandacan Terminals
despite the fact that the Pandacan area is congested with
buildings and residences that do not comply with the
National Building Code, Fire Code and Health and Sanitation
Code.
An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not
violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of
the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable
classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must
not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must
apply equally to all members of the same class. The law may
treat and regulate one class differently from another class
provided there are real and substantial differences to
distinguish one class from another.
Here, there is a reasonable classification. What the ordinance
seeks to prevent is a catastrophic devastation that will result
from a terrorist attack. Unlike the depot, the surrounding
community is not a high-value terrorist target. Any damage
caused by fire or explosion occurring in those areas would be
nothing compared to the damage caused by a fire or
explosion in the depot itself. Accordingly, there is a
substantial distinction. The enactment of the ordinance which
provides for the cessation of the operations of these
terminals removes the threat they pose. Therefore it is
germane to the purpose of the ordinance. The classification is
not limited to the conditions existing when the ordinance was
enacted but to future conditions as well. Finally, the
ordinance is applicable to all businesses and industries in the
area it delineated.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not inconsistent with RA 7638 and RA
8479
The oil companies and the DOE assert that Ordinance No.
8027 is unconstitutional because it contravenes RA 7638
(DOE Act of 1992) and RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry
Deregulation Law of 1998).
It is true that ordinances should not contravene existing
statutes enacted by Congress. However, a brief survey of
decisions where the police power measure of the LGU
clashed with national laws shows that the common
dominator is that the national laws were clearly and expressly
in conflict with the ordinances/resolutions of the LGUs. The
inconsistencies were so patent that there was no room for
doubt. This is not the case here. The laws cited merely gave
DOE general powers to “establish and administer
programs for the exploration, transportation, marketing,
distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and storage
of energy resources― and “to encourage certain
practices in the [oil] industry which serve the public interest
and are intended to achieve efficiency and cost reduction,
ensure continuous supply of petroleum products.― These
powers can be exercised without emasculating the LGUs of
the powers granted them. When these ambiguous powers
are pitted against the unequivocal power of the LGU to enact
police power and zoning ordinances for the general welfare
of its constituents, it is not difficult to rule in favor of the
latter. Considering that the powers of the DOE regarding the
Pandacan Terminals are not categorical, the doubt must be
resolved in favor of the City of Manila.
The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and zealously
protected under the Constitution. An entire article (Article X)
of the Constitution has been devoted to guaranteeing and
promoting the autonomy of LGUs. The LGC was specially
promulgated by Congress to ensure the autonomy of local
governments as mandated by the Constitution. There is no
showing how the laws relied upon by the oil companies and
DOE stripped the City of Manila of its power to enact
ordinances in the exercise of its police power and to reclassify
the land uses within its jurisdiction.
The DOE cannot exercise the power of control over LGUs
Another reason that militates against the DOE’s assertions
is that Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the
President’s power over LGUs to one of general
supervision. Consequently, the Chief Executive or his or her
alter egos, cannot exercise the power of control over them.
The President and his or her alter egos, the department
heads, cannot interfere with the activities of local
governments, so long as they act within the scope of their
authority. Accordingly, the DOE cannot substitute its own
discretion for the discretion exercised by the sanggunian of
the City of Manila. In local affairs, the wisdom of local officials
must prevail as long as they are acting within the parameters
of the Constitution and the law.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not invalid for failure to comply with
RA 7924 and EO 72
The oil companies argue that zoning ordinances of LGUs are
required to be submitted to the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) for review and if found to be
in compliance with its metropolitan physical framework plan
and regulations, it shall endorse the same to the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Their basis is Section 3
(e) of RA 7924 and Section 1 of E.O. 72. They argue that
because Ordinance No. 8027 did not go through this review
process, it is invalid.
The argument is flawed. RA 7942 does not give MMDA the
authority to review land use plans and zoning ordinances of
cities and municipalities. This was only found in its
implementing rules which made a reference to EO 72. EO 72
expressly refers to comprehensive land use plans (CLUPs)
only. Ordinance No. 8027 is admittedly not a CLUP nor
intended to be one. Instead, it is a very specific ordinance
which reclassified the land use of a defined area in order to
prevent the massive effects of a possible terrorist attack. It is
Ordinance No. 8119 which was explicitly formulated as the
“Manila [CLUP] and Zoning Ordinance of 2006.― CLUPs
are the ordinances which should be submitted to the MMDA
for integration in its metropolitan physical framework plan
and approved by the HLURB to ensure that they conform with
national guidelines and policies. Moreover, even assuming
that the MMDA review and HLURB ratification are necessary,
the oil companies did not present any evidence to show that
these were not complied with. In accordance with the
presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, its
constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence
of proof showing that the procedure prescribed by law was
not observed.
Conclusion
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to
property. They allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos
if forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys
precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious:
life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or
LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a few
individuals’ right to property, the former should prevail.
Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and
validity of Ordinance No. 8027. Without a doubt, there are no
impediments to its enforcement and implementation. Any
delay is unfair to the inhabitants of the City of Manila and its
leaders who have categorically expressed their desire for the
relocation of the terminals. Their power to chart and control
their own destiny and preserve their lives and safety should
not be curtailed by the intervenors’ warnings of
doomsday scenarios and threats of economic disorder if the
ordinance is enforced.
Just the same, the Court noted that it is not about to provoke
a crisis by ordering the immediate relocation of the Pandacan
Terminals out of its present site. The enforcement of a
decision, specially one with far-reaching consequences,
should always be within the bounds of reason, in accordance
with a comprehensive and well-coordinated plan, and within
a time-frame that complies with the letter and spirit of our
resolution. To this end, the oil companies have no choice but
to obey the law.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121215. November 13, 1997.]
MAYOR OSCAR DE LOS REYES, Petitioner, v.
SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Cruz and Cruz Law Offices for Petitioner.
Solicitor General for Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; LOCAL
CHIEF EXECUTIVE; VETO POWER; CONFERS AUTHORITY
BEYOND MECHANICAL ACT OF SIGNING AN ORDINANCE OR
RESOLUTION. — Petitioner would like to impress upon this
Court that the final step in the approval of an ordinance or
resolution, where the local chief executive affixes his
signature, is purely a ministerial act. This view is erroneous.
Article 109(b) of the Local Government Code outlines the
veto power of the Local Chief Executive. Contrary to
petitioner’s belief, the grant of the veto power confers
authority beyond the simple mechanical act of signing an
ordinance or resolution, as a requisite to its enforceability.
Such power accords the local chief executive the discretion to
sustain a resolution or ordinance in the first instance or to
veto it and return it with his objections to the Sanggunian,
which may proceed to reconsider the same. The Sanggunian
concerned, however, may override the veto by a two-thirds
(2/3) vote of all its members thereby making the ordinance or
resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes. It is
clear, therefore, that the concurrence of a local chief
executive in the enactment of an ordinance or resolution
requires, not only a flourish of the pen, but the application of
judgment after meticulous analysis and intelligence as well.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DOUBLE
JEOPARDY; WILL NOT APPLY WHERE THE FORMER CASE WAS
SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE COMPLAINT AND HAS NO RELATION
WITH THE ONE IN QUESTION. — Petitioner’s other contention
that the Ombudsman should have dismissed the present case
in view of a previous dismissal of a similar complaint involving
the same factual context is likewise misplaced. As explained
by Deputy Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo in his
comment, the other case relied upon by petitioner has no
relation whatsoever with the one in question. Notably, the
former case was subject of a separate complaint and
preliminary investigation, hence, the findings and records
therein could not be "made part of the case under
consideration."cralaw virtua1aw library
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; COURT ACCORDS FULL
RECOGNITION TO THE MINUTES AS THE OFFICIAL
REPOSITORY OF WHAT ACTUALLY TRANSPIRES IN EVERY
PROCEEDING; CASE AT BAR. — It must be stressed that the
Ombudsman correctly relied on the minutes taken during the
session of the Sangguniang Bayan held last July 27, 1992,
which petitioner regards as inconclusive evidence of what
actually transpired therein. In a long line of cases, the Court,
in resolving conflicting assertions of the protagonists in a
case, has placed reliance on the minutes of the transcribed
stenographic notes to ascertain the truth of the proceedings
therein. In the case at bar, the minutes of the session reveal
that petitioner attended the session of the Sangguniang
Bayan on on July 27, 1992. It is evident, therefore, that
petitioner approved the subject resolution knowing fully well
that "the subject matter treated therein was neither taken up
and discussed nor passed upon by the Sangguniang Bayan
during the legislative session." Thus, the Court accords full
recognition to the minutes as the official repository of what
actually transpires in every proceeding. It has happened that
the minutes may be corrected to reflect the true account of a
proceeding, thus, giving the Court more reason to accord
them great weight for such subsequent corrections, if any,
are made precisely to preserve the accuracy of the records. In
light of the conflicting claims of the parties in the case at bar,
the Court, without resorting to the minutes, will encounter
difficulty in resolving the dispute at hand.
4. ID.; ID.; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; LATE SUBMISSION OF
JOINT AFFIDAVIT TO BOLSTER PETITIONER’S POSITION,
CANNOT AID CAUSE. — With regard to the joint affidavit of
some members of the Sangguniang Bayan attesting to the
actual passage and approval of Resolution No. 57-8-92, the
Court finds the same to have been belatedly submitted as a
last minute attempt to bolster petitioner’s position, and,
therefore, could not in any way aid the latter’s cause.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The significance of the minutes taken during the session of a
local legislative assembly is the determinant issue in this
present petition.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
Petitioner, along with the two others, was charged with the
crime of falsification of a public document, specifically
Resolution No. 57-S-92 dated July 27, 1992 of the Municipal
Council of Mariveles, Bataan. The complaint 1 alleged that
the resolution, appropriating the amount of P8,500.00 for the
payment of the terminal leave of two municipal employees,
was anomalous for not having been approved by the said
Council, as the minutes of the proceedings therein made no
reference to the supposed approval thereof. It contended
that its seeming passage was carried out by petitioner in
connivance with Sangguniang Bayan (SB) Member Jesse
Concepcion and SB Secretary Antonio Zurita.
After preliminary investigation, the deputized prosecutor of
Balanga, Bataan recommended the filing of an information 2
for Falsification of Public Document against petitioner and
Concepcion, excluding Zurita who died during the pendency
hereof.
On September 21, 1994, the information filed before the
Sandiganbayan reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about July 27, 1992 or sometimes (sic) prior or
subsequent thereto, in Mariveles, Bataan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, OSCAR DELOS
REYES and JESSE CONCEPCION, both public officers, being
Municipal Mayor of Mariveles, Bataan and Member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Mariveles, Bataan, passed and
approved the said resolution appropriating the amount of
P8,500.00 for payment of the terminal leave of two (2)
employees of the municipality, when in truth and in fact as
both accused knew well the same is false and incorrect as the
said resolution was not approved by the aforesaid
Sangguniang Bayan for which both accused has the obligation
to disclose the truth.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
On October 14, 1994, prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed
a Motion for Reinvestigation arguing, among other things,
"that the Ombudsman previously dismissed a similar
complaint against him involving the same factual setting." 4
Likewise adduced in the motion is the joint affidavit of the
other members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mariveles
attesting to the actual passage and approval of Resolution
No. 57-S-92.
In a resolution dated December 29, 1994, respondent
Sandiganbayan denied the Motion for Reinvestigation, the
pertinent portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Acting on accused Mayor Oscar delos Reyes’ Motion for
Reinvestigation and accused Jesse Concepcion’s
Manifestation, the same are hereby DENIED, being without
merit and the prosecution having vigorously opposed the
Motion. The allegations of fact and the arguments of counsel
are best taken up in the trial on the merits. As found by the
prosecution, a prima facie case exists.
Consequently, let the arraignment of the above entitled case
be set on March 03, 1995, at 8:30 A.M." 5
After the motion for reconsideration was denied on May 24,
1995, petitioner filed this instant petition for certiorari. On
September 18, 1995, the Court resolved to issue the
temporary restraining order prayed for by petitioner.
The order of respondent Sandiganbayan must be sustained.
In an effort to exonerate himself from the charge, petitioner
argues that the deliberations undertaken and the consequent
passage of Resolution No. 57-S-92 are legislative in nature. He
adds that as local chief executive, he could not have taken
advantage of his official position in committing the crime of
falsification as defined and punished under Article 171 6 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner would like to impress upon this Court that the final
step in the approval of an ordinance or resolution, where the
local chief executive affixes his signature, is purely a
ministerial act. This view is erroneous. Article 109(b) of the
Local Government Code outlines the veto power of the Local
Chief Executive which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Article 109 (b). The local chief executive, except the punong
barangay shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or
resolution adopting a local development plan and public
investment program or an ordinance directing the payment
of money or creating liability. . . ." (Emphasis
supplied)chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Contrary to petitioner’s belief, the grant of the veto power
confers authority beyond the simple mechanical act of signing
an ordinance or resolution, as a requisite to its enforceability.
Such power accords the local chief executive the discretion to
sustain a resolution or ordinance in the first instance or to
veto it and return it with his objections to the Sanggunian,
which may proceed to reconsider the same. The Sanggunian
concerned, however, may override the veto by a two-thirds
(2/3) vote of all its members thereby making the ordinance or
resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes. It is
clear, therefore, that the concurrence of a local chief
executive in the enactment of an ordinance or resolution
requires, not only a flourish of the pen, but the application of
judgment after meticulous analysis and intelligence as well.
Petitioner’s other contention that the Ombudsman should
have dismissed the present case in view of a previous
dismissal of a similar complaint involving the same factual
context is likewise misplaced.
As explained by Deputy Special Prosecutor Leonardo P.
Tamayo in his comment, the other case relied upon by
petitioner has no relation whatsoever with the one in
question. Notably, the former case was subject of a separate
complaint and preliminary investigation, hence, the findings
and records therein could not be "made part of the case
under consideration." 7
It must be stressed that the Ombudsman correctly relied on
the minutes taken during the session of the Sangguniang
Bayan held last July 27, 1992, which petitioner regards as
inconclusive evidence of what actually transpired therein. In a
long line of cases, the Court, in resolving conflicting assertions
of the protagonists in a case, has placed reliance on the
minutes or the transcribed stenographic notes to ascertain
the truth of the proceedings therein.
The following cases illustrate the importance of the
minutes:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
It was held that "contrary to petitioner’s claim, what the
minutes only show is that on August 12, 1994 the Sanggunian
took a vote on the administrative case of respondent Mayor
and not that it then rendered a decision as required by
Section 66(a) of the Local Government Code." 8
With the same factual context as in the case at bar,
petitioners herein were "accused of having falsified or caused
the falsification of the excerpts of the minutes of the regular
session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quirino province
on August 15, 1988 and September 19, 1988. . . ." 9
"In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were
no written notices of public hearings on the proposed Manila
Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as
required by Article 276(b) of the Implementing Rules of the
Local Government Code nor were copies of the proposed
ordinance published in three successive issues of a
newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Article 276(a).
No minutes were submitted to show that the obligatory
public hearings had been held." 10
"It appears from the minutes of the board meeting of
February 28, 1958 that the names of the members present as
well those who were absent have been recorded, and that all
those present took active part in the debates and
deliberations. At the end of the session, when the presiding
officer asked the members if there were any objections to the
approval of the proposed budget, only one councilor raised
an objection. The minutes, therefore, could readily show who
of the members present in the deliberations voted pro and
who voted con." 11
"The certification of the election registrar relied upon by the
petitioner is correct as far as it goes. Only 80 votes appear to
have voted according to the precinct book in the sense that
only 80 voters affixed their signatures thereon after voting.
But this does not necessarily mean that no other voters cast
their ballots in the questioned precinct: there were 279 in all,
according to the minutes of voting, although only 80 of them
signed the precinct book." 12
"As found by the trial court, the said minutes of the meeting
of the Sangguniang Bayan do not mention the execution of
any deed to perfect the agreement. An engineer was
appointed to survey the old abandoned road, but this act
does not in any manner convey title over the abandoned road
to the Pansacola spouses nor extinguishes their ownership
over the land traversed by the new provincial highway." 13
In the case at bar, the minutes of the session reveal that
petitioner attended the session of the Sangguniang Bayan on
July 27, 1992. It is evident, therefore, that petitioner
approved the subject resolution knowing fully well that "the
subject matter treated therein was neither taken up and
discussed nor passed upon by the Sangguniang Bayan during
the legislative session." 14
Thus, the Court accords full recognition to the minutes as the
official repository of what actually transpires in every
proceeding. It has happened that the minutes may be
corrected to reflect the true account of a proceeding, thus
giving the Court more reason to accord them great weight for
such subsequent corrections, if any, are made precisely to
preserve the accuracy of the records. In light of the
conflicting claims of the parties in the case at bar, the Court,
without resorting to the minutes, will encounter difficulty in
resolving the dispute at hand.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
With regard to the joint affidavit of some members of the
Sangguniang Bayan attesting to the actual passage and
approval of Resolution No. 57-S-92, the Court finds the same
to have been belatedly submitted as a last minute attempt to
bolster petitioner’s position, and, therefore, could not in any
way aid the latter’s cause.
Indeed, the arguments raised by petitioner’s counsel are best
taken up in the trial on the merits.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
DISMISSED. The assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
dated December 29, 1994, and May 24, 1995, are hereby
AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued by this
Court on September 18, 1995, is hereby LIFTED.
The Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to set Criminal Case No.
21073 for arraignment and trial.
Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.