Tamayo v. Huang, G.R. No.

164136, January 25, 2006

ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; P.D. 957 SEC. 23, THE CONTROLLING LAW, ONLY REQUIRES DUE
NOTICE TO OWNER AS DEVELOPER TO SUSPEND PAYMENT. — As for
respondents' position that before petitioner could lawfully withhold his monthly
payments, he needed to secure previous clearance from the HLURB following Section
23 of Rule VI of the Rules implementing the SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM
BUYERS' PROTECTIVE DECREE, law and jurisprudence are not on their side. Section
23 of PD 957 — the law upon which the Implementing Rule cited was based — requires
only due notice to the owner or developer for stopping further payments by reason of
the latter's failure to develop the subdivision according to the approved plans and
within the time limit. . . . To be valid, an administrative rule or regulation must
conform, not contradict, the provisions of the enabling law. An implementing rule or
regulation cannot modify, expand, or subtract from the law it is intended to implement.
Any rule that is not consistent with the statute itself is null and void. . . . Section 23 of
Rule VI of the Implementing Rules cannot rise higher than Section 23 of PD 957, which
is the source of its authority. For that matter, PD 957 would have expressly required the
written approval of the HLURB before any stoppage of amortization payments if it so
intended, in the same manner that the decree specifically mandates written consent or
approval by the NHA (now the HLURB) in Section 18. . . . Apropos, to require clearance
from the HLURB before stopping payment would not be in keeping with the intent of
the law to protect innocent buyers of lots or homes from scheming subdivision
developers. To give full effect to such intent, it would be fitting to treat the right to stop
payment to be immediately effective upon giving due notice to the owner or developer
or upon filing a complaint before the HLURB against the erring developer. Such course
of action would be without prejudice to the subsequent determination of its propriety
and consequences, should the suspension of payment subsequently be found improper.
cEHSIC

CIR v. CA, G.R. No. 119761, August 29, 1996

POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES; RULE

MAKING POWERS; LEGISLATIVE RULE AND INTERPRETATIVE RULE;
DISTINGUISHED. — Let us distinguish between two kinds of administrative issuances
— a legislative rule and an interpretative rule. In Misamis Oriental Association of Coco
Traders, Inc., vs. Department of Finance Secretary, (238 SCRA 63) the Court expressed:
". . . a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a
primary legislation by providing the details thereof. In the same way that laws must
have the benefit of public hearing, it is generally required that before a legislative rule is
adopted there must be hearing. In this connection, the Administrative Code of 1987
provides: "Public Participation. — If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as
far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested
parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. "(2) In
the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall
have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before
the first hearing thereon. "(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be
observed. "In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative
rules are designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is
in charge of enforcing." It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is
merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare
issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely
providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increase the burden of those
governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to
be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force
and effect of law.

Fort Bonifacio Development v. CIR, G.R. Nos 158885 & 170680, October 2, 2009

To be valid, an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict, the

provisions of the enabling law. An implementing rule or regulation cannot modify,
expand, or subtract from the law it is intended to implement. Any rule that is not
consistent with the statute itself is null and void. 4 DTcHaA

While administrative agencies, such as the Bureau of Internal Revenue, may issue
regulations to implement statutes, they are without authority to limit the scope of the
statute to less than what it provides, or extend or expand the statute beyond its terms,
or in any way modify explicit provisions of the law. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an
administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case
of a discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling,
the basic law prevails. 5

To recapitulate, RR 7-95, insofar as it restricts the definition of "goods" as basis of

transitional input tax credit under Section 105 is a nullity.
BPI v. CA, G.R. No. 102383, November 26, 1992

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS; MUST

CONFORM TO AND NOT GO BEYOND TERMS AND PROVISIONS OF BASIC LAW;
CASE AT BAR. — petitioner BPI's theory that the present clearing guarantee
requirement imposed on the representing or collecting bank under the PCHC rules and
regulations is independent of the Negotiable Instruments Law is not in order. Another
reason why the petitioner's theory is uncalled for is the fact that the Negotiable
Instruments Law (Act No. 2031) applies to negotiable instruments as defined under
section one thereof. Undeniably, the present case involves checks as defined by and
under the coverage of the Negotiable Instruments Law. To affirm the theory of the
petitioner would, therefore, violate the rule that rules and regulations implementing the
law should conform to the law, otherwise the rules and regulations are null and void.
Thus, we held in Shell Philippines, Inc. v. Central Bank of the Philippines (162 SCRA
628 [1988]): ". . . while it is true that under the same law the Central Bank was given the
authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement the statutory provision in
question, we reiterate the principle that this authority is limited only to carrying into
effect what the law being implemented provides. "In People v. Maceren (79 SCRA 450,
458 and 460), this Court ruled that: Administrative regulations adopted under
legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended.
(U.S. v. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of
Congress (Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon v. Members of the Board of
Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing
Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29,
1969, 29 SCRA 350). The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating
the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power
cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace
matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
(University of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-
46. As to invalid regulations, see Collector of Internal Revenue v. Villaflor, 69 Phil. 319;
Wise & Co v. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676, Del Mar v. Phil. Veterans Administration, L-27299,
June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349). . . . ". . . The rule or regulation should be within the
scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency
(Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social
Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558). In case of discrepancy between the basic law
and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law the basic law prevails because
said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law
(People v. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091)." (at pp. 633-634).

Marquez v. Comelec, G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995

Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon a law by the officials
in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181). The Court
certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an
enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative
rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent
to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the
ponente (expressed during the Court's en banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent
that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive)
"who has been convicted by final judgment," is an inordinate and undue
circumscription of the law.