Ansay V. National Development Company, GR L-13667, April 29,1960 [Per J. C.J.

Paras,
En Banc]

FACTS: On July 25, 1956, appellants filed against appellees in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, they complaint praying for a 20% Christmas bonus for the years 1954 and
1955. However the trial court dismissed the complaint stating that a bonus is an act of liberality
and the court takes it that it is not within its judicial powers to command respondents to be liberal
and that Ansay et al. admitted that NDC is not under legal duty to give such bonus and that the
court has no power to compel a party to comply with a moral obligation (Art. 142, New Civil
Code.). A motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted order was denied. Hence this appeal.
Appellants contend that there exists a cause of action in their complaint because their claim rests
on moral grounds or what in brief is defined by law as a natural obligation.

ISSUE: Does the contention of the appellants that there exists a cause of action in their complaint
because their claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is defined by law as a natural
obligation?

HELD: No. Appellants admit that appellees are not under legal obligation to give such claimed
bonus; that the grant arises only from a moral obligation or the natural obligation that they
discussed in their brief, this Court feels it urgent to reproduce at this point, the definition and
meaning of natural obligation. Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into
civil or natural. "Civil obligations are a right of action to compel their performance. Natural
obligations, not being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of
action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize
the retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof". It is thus readily seen
that an element of natural obligation before it can be cognizable by the court is voluntary
fulfillment by the obligor. Certainly retention can be ordered but only after there has been
voluntary performance. In this case there has been no voluntary performance; so the court cannot
order the performance.
Heirs of Gilberto Roldan V Heirs of Silvela Roldan, GR 202578, September 17, 2017 [Per J.
Sereno, C. J, First Division]

FACTS: Natalia Magtulis owned Lot No. 4696, an agricultural land in Kalibo, Aklan, which had
an area of 21,739 square meters, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-7711. Her heirs
included Gilberto Roldan and Silvela Roldan, her two children by her first marriage; and,
allegedly, Leopolda Magtulis her child with another man named Juan Aguirre.8 After her death
in 1961, Natalia left the lot to her children. However, Gilberto and his heirs took possession of
the property to the exclusion of respondents. On May 19, 2003 the respondents filed a complaint
for partition and damages against petitioners. The petitioners did not yield the property because
of the following grounds: 1.) Respondents heirs of Silvela had already sold her share to Gilberto.
2.) Respondent heirs of Leopoldo had no cause of action, given that he was not a child of
Natalia. Petitioners failed to show document evidencing the sale of Silvela’s share to Gilberto.
RTC ruled that the heirs of Silvela remained co-owners of the property they have inherited from
Natalia, and Leopoldo Magtulis was a son of Natalia based on his Certificate of Baptism and
Marriage Contract, each of their respective heirs have one-third share of the property. Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling of RTC. Hence they appealed to the SC but in addition, contended
that prescription and laches already preclude the heirs of Silvela and heirs of Leopoldo from
claiming ownership of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not prescription and laches bar respondents from claiming co-ownership
over lot 4696.

HELD: No. Prescription cannot be appreciated against the co-owners of a property, absent any
conclusive act of repudiation made clearly known to the other co-owners. First as demanded by
the repudiation requisite for prescription to be appreciated, there is a need to determine the
veracity of factual matters such as the date when the period to bring the action commenced to
run. In Macabbabad, Jr. v. Masirag, we considered the determination as factual in nature. Second
raising a new ground for the first time on appeal contravenes due process, as that act deprives the
adverse party of the opportunity to contest the assertion of the claimant. Since respondents were
not able to refute the issue of prescription and laches, this Court denies the newly raised
contention of petitioners.

The Baptismal Certificate and the Marriage Contract of Leopoldo, which merely stated that
Natalia is his mother, are inadequate to prove his filiation with the property owner. Moreover, by
virtue of these documents alone, the RTC and the CA could not have justly concluded that
Leopoldo and his successors-in-interest were entitled to a one-third share of the property left by
Natalia, equal to that of each of her undisputed legitimate children Gilberto and Silvela. As held
in Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa, a baptismal certificate is certainly not proof of the
status of legitimacy or illegitimacy of the claimant.
 Hermanos V. Orense, GR 9188, December 14, 1914 [Per J. Torres, En Banc]

FACTS: On February 14, 1907, Jose Duran, a nephew of Orense, sold the property for P1,500 to
Gutierrez Hermanos, with Orense’s knowledge and consent, executed before a notary a public
instrument. The said public instrument contained a provision giving Duran the right to
repurchase it for the same price within a period of four years from the date of the said
instrument. However Orense continued to occupy the said property, even after the lapse of four
years. He even refused to pay the rentals for the use of the property. He claimed that the sale was
void because it was done without his authority and he did not authorized his nephew to enter into
such contract of sale. During the trial of his nephew Duran in a case of estafa against him,
Orense was presented as witness of the defense. He stated that the sale was indeed done with his
knowledge and consent. Hence it was ascertained that he did give his nephew , Duran the
authority to convey the land. Because of this Duran was acquitted of the criminal charges of
estafa against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orense is bound by Duran’s act of conveying the property.

HELD: Yes. The defendant acknowledged and admitted under oath that he had consented to
Duran’s selling the said property to Gutierrez Hermanos. The record discloses conclusive proof
that the defendant Orense gave his consent to the contract of sale which was executed in a public
instrument by his nephew Duran. Furthermore his stated under oath to the judge that he himself
consented to his nephew Duran’s making the said sale. Moreover Article 1259 of the Civil code
states that “A contract executed in the name of another by one who has neither his authorization
nor legal representation shall be void, unless it should be ratified by the person in whose name it
was executed before being revoked by the other contracting party. Therefore by ratification of
the defendant to the said sale, proves that the contract of sale became legally from the moment
the contract was validly confirmed and ratified.
 Andres V Manufacturers Hanover, GR 82670, September 15, 1989 [Per J. Cortes, Third
Division]

FACTS: The petitioner using the business name “Irene’s Wearing Apparel” was engaged in the
manufacture of ladies garments, children’s wear, men’s apparel and linens for local and foreign
buyers. Among its foreign buyers was Facts of the United States. One of its foreign buyers was
Facets Funwear, Inc. hereinafter referred to as FACETS. Facets instructed the First National
State Bank (FNSB) to transfer $10,000.00 to Irene’s Wearing Apparel via Philippine National
Bank (PNB), FNSB instructed Manufacturers Hanover and Trust Corporation to effect the
transfer, the payment was not effected immediately because the payee designated was only
“Wearing Apparel” On August 28, 1980, the petitioner received the remittance of $10,000.00.
However FACETS upon learning about the delay, and unaware that the petitioner had already
received the said remittance, informed FNSB to amend and effect the payment to Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) instead of PNB. FNSB is also unaware that the
petitioner had already received the remittance. Hence on September 11, 1980 petitioner received
another remittance of $10,000.00. After discovering that there has been duplication of remittance
private respondent Manufacturers asked petitioner to return the second remittance, but the latter
refused, contending that the doctrine of solutio indebti does not apply because there was
negligence on the part of the respondents, and that they are not unjustly enriched.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of solutio indebti is applicable to this case.

HELD: Yes. In order that Article 2154 of the New Civil Code is applicable. The following
requisites must concur. First That the one who paid was not under obligation to do so; and
second that the payment was made by reason of an essential mistake of fact. In the case at bar
there was mistake not negligence in the second remittance, it was evident by the fact that both
remittances has the same reference invoice number 263 80. Petitioner invokes that the equitable
principle that when one of two innocent persons must suffer by the wrongful act of a third
person, the loss must be borne by the one whose negligence was the proximate cause of the loss.
The common law principle that where one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud
perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced
confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in a case which is covered
by an express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559. Between a common law
principle and a statutory provision, the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction.
 Puyat & Sons V. Manila GR L-17447, April 30, 1963 [Per J. Paredes, En Banc]

FACTS: Puyat & Sons Inc., the plaintiff is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling
all kinds of furniture. All assessments were paid by plaintiff without protest in the erroneous
belief that it was liable thereof not knowing that pursuant to an ordinance, it is exempt from the
payment of taxes being a manufacturer of various kinds of furniture. Upon learning about the
ordinance plaintiff filed with defendant City Treasurer of Manila a formal request for refund of
the retail dealer’s taxes, however the City Treasurer denied the said request for refund. On
August 11, 1958, the plaintiff filed an action for refund of Retail Taxes paid by it, corresponding
to the first Quarter of 1950 up to the third Quarter of 1956, amounting to P33,785.00, against the
City of Manila and its City Treasurer. Defendants-appellants contend that the taxes in question
were voluntarily paid by appellee company and since, in this jurisdiction, in order that a legal
basis arise for claim of refund of taxes erroneously assessed, payment thereof must be made
under protest, and this being a condition sine qua non, and no protest having been made, verbally
or in writing, there by indicating that the payment was voluntary, the action must fail.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled of refund from the retail taxes paid by it.

HELD: Yes. Appellants do not dispute the fact that plaintiff is exempted from the payment of the
tax in question. This is manifest from the reply of appellant City Treasurer stating that sales of
manufactured products at the factory site are not taxable either under the Wholesalers Ordinance
or under the Retailers' Ordinance. With this admission, it would seem clear that the taxes
collected from appellee were paid, thru an error or mistake, which places said act of payment
within the pale of the new Civil Code provision on solutio indebiti. Furthermore Article 2154 of
the New Civil Code expressly states that If something is received when there is no right to
demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises. The
taxpayer has no voice in the imposition of the burden. He has the right to presume that the taxing
power has been lawfully exercised. He should not be required to know more than those in
authority over him, nor should he suffer loss by complying with what he bona fide believe to be
his duty as a good citizen. In the case of Medina et al., V. City of Baguio it was held that protest
is not necessary for the recovery of retail dealer's taxes, like the present, because they are not
directly imposed by the charter. Moreover Article 2156 of the New Civil Code is also applicable
which states that the plaintiff was in doubt whether the debt was due, he may recover if he
proves that it was not due. The plaintiff has duly proved that the taxes were not due. Hence there
is no doubt that the doctrine of Solutio Indebti is applicable in the case at bar.
Metrobank V Rosales, GR 183204, January 13, 2014 [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division]

FACTS: Respondent Ana Grace Rosales, an owner of a travel agency, and her mother Yo Yuk
To opened a Joint Peso Account10 with petitioner bank. In May 2002, respondent Rosales
accompanied her client Liu Chiu Fang, a Taiwanese National applying for a retiree’s visa from
the Philippine Leisure and Retirement Authority (PLRA), to petitioner’s branch in Escolta to
open a savings account. On 31 July 2003, petitioner issued a "Hold Out" order against
respondents’ accounts. On 3 Sept 2003, petitioner filed a criminal case for Estafa through False
Pretences, Misrepresentation, Deceit and Use of Falsified Documents against the respondent. It
was alleged that the respondents are the one responsible for the unauthorized withdrawal fo
$75,000 from Liu Chiu Fang’s account. Petitioner alleged that on 5 Feb 2003, it received from
the PLRA a Withdrawal Clearance for the account of Liu Chiu Fang, that in the afternoon of the
same day, respondents went to inform the branch head Gutierrez that Liu Chiu Fang was going
to withdraw her deposits in cash. On 6 Feb, respondents accompanied an unidentified impostor
to the bank with enabled them to withdraw Liu Chiu Fang’s dollar deposit. On 3 Mar 2003,
respondents opened a Joint Dollar Account with petitioner bank with an initial deposit of
$14,000. The bank later discovered that the serial numbers of the dollar notes deposited by
respondents were the same as those withdrawn by the impostor. Hence respondents filed before
the RTC of Manila a Complaint for Breach of Obligation and Contract with Damages, against
petitioner. Respondents alleged that they attempted several times to withdraw their deposits but
were unable to because petitioner had placed their accounts under "Hold Out" status. No
explanation, however, was given by petitioner as to why it issued the "Hold Out"
order. Petitioner alleged that respondents have no cause of action because it has a valid reason
for issuing the "Hold Out" order.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Metrobank breached its contract with respondents
Rosales.

HELD: Yes. The Court held that Metrobank’s contention on the “Hold Out” clause in the
Application and Agreement for Deposit Account is misplaced. Bank deposits, which are in the
nature of a simple loan, must be paid upon demand by the depositor. The “Hold Out” clause
applies only if there is a valid and existing obligation arising from any of the sources of
obligation enumerated in Article 1157 of the Civil Code, to wit: law, contracts, quasi-contracts,
delict, and quasi-delict. In this case, petitioner failed to show that respondents have an obligation
to it under any law, contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict. And although a criminal case
was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosales, this is not enough reason for petitioner to
issue a “Hold Out” order as the case is still pending and no final judgment of conviction has been
rendered against respondent Rosales.
People’s Car V Commando Security, GR 36840, May 22, 1973 [Per J. Teehankee. En Banc]

FACTS: Plaintiff People’s Car entered into a contract with defendant Commando Security to
safeguard and protect the business premises of the plaintiff from theft, pilferage, robbery,
vandalism, and all other unlawful acts of any person/s prejudicial to the interest of the plaintiff.
On April 5, 1970, around 1:00am, defendant’s security guard on duty at plaintiff’s premises,
without any authority, consent, approval, or orders of the plaintiff and/or defendant brought out
the compound of the plaintiff a car belonging to its customer and drove said car to a place or
places unknown, abandoning his post and while driving the car lost control of it causing it to fall
into a ditch. As a result, the car of plaintiff’s customer Joseph Luy, which had been left with
plaintiff for servicing and maintenance, suffered extensive damage in the total amount of Php
7,079.10 and that plaintiff had to rent and make available to its said customer to enable him to
pursue his business and occupation for the period of forty-seven (47) days (from April 25 to June
10, 1970) that it took plaintiff to repair the damaged car, 7 or total actual damages incurred by
plaintiff in the sum of P8,489.10. Plaintiff instituted a claim against defendant for the actual
damages it incurred due to the unlawful act of defendant’s personnel citing paragraph 5 of the
contract wherein defendant accepts sole responsibility for the acts done during their watch hours.
Defendant claimed that they may be liable but its liability is limited under paragraph 4 of the
contract which provides that its liability shall not exceed P1,000 per guard post for loss or
damage through the negligence of its guards during the watch hours provided that it is reported
within 24 hours of the incident.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is obliged to indemnify the plaintiff for the entire costs
because of the incident.

HELD: Yes. Plaintiff was in law liable to its customer for the damages caused the customer’s
car, which had been entrusted into its custody. Plaintiff therefore was in law justified in making
good such damages and relying in turn on defendant to honor its contract and indemnify it for
such undisputed damages, which had been caused directly by the unlawful and wrongful acts of
defendant’s security guard in breach of their contract. Article 1159 states that “obligations
arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be
complied with in good faith.” Hence Paragraph 4 of their contract is inapplicable, because it
involves neither property of the plaintiff that has been lost or damaged at its premises nor mere
negligence of defendant’s security guard who is on duty. Moreover the wrongful act of their
security guard justifies that the defendant is liable to indemnity for damages to the plaintiff.