a0 Zensar The Future of Vision Communities (A) 30.70 model, introcluced in 2005, with 30% work onsite and 70% offshore. These percentages differed from those traditionally used by competitors, whose onsite compone Zensar relied on a robust, proprietary development methodology, automated software tools, ond rich, fegquent communication. One result was that much of the project management work typically done onsite ata higher cost could be carried out by Zensar less expensively offshore nt was considerably larger. The company prided itself on people and process innovation, which occurred conti targeted three “horizons of growth.” ‘The management of existing core busines finuously and first horizon was short term and focused on the sses for enhanced profitability. The second horizon was intermediate ferm and focused on customer acquisition and growth. It involved developing, new Services such as infrastructure management and testing and acquiring additional customers w th the Boal of greater market share, To that end, Zensar had entered new geographies like South Africa and sahande into new verticals ike government and education, The third horizon was long, term and focused on the development of new business models, which would provide differentiation for the {oture: One such innovation was the Global Delivery Platform, a methodology that enabled fone, employees in far-flung locations to work together collaboratively with a customer on » Project. it was tase on the internally developed Solution Biueprint (SBP), a framework that allowed eee ero build sual representations of applications and then automatically generated. the underlying software development process. SBP ensured that developers spent more time at the front ancl ar the design ooce collaborating with the customer; they were then able to create a model once ant redeploy it spultiple times. The result was a 15% to 25% productivity improvement and speeding up of the development cycle, Nitin Parab, who headed Zensar’s Enterprise Application Services division, described the cumulative result of the company’s. innovation! strategy implementation or upgrade where we have had to compete with the likes off have not lost a single deal.” “In any iarge Infosys or Wipro, we Turnaround, Transformation, and Growth Zensar was founded in Pune in 1922 as a tabulating machine manufacturer and eventually became a subsidiary of International Computers Limited (ICL), a Uk. firm specializing in mainframe comments: Fujitsu later took over ICL. In the 1980s, the RPG Group, a $35 billion Indies Sopelomerate, acquired a stake in the company, and in the late 1980s, established s woffa Subsidiary. In 2000, the hardware business was sold off, and the software subsidiary, after receiving ‘addtional private equity fanding, was listed on the Indian stock exchange. RPG, withite 0s cua the company, retained management control. Unfortunately, the shift to sotware wae poorly timed. Natarajan explained, “At the time we were listed, the industry inflexion point, which come with he CBRottunity to fix the millennium bug, was over. Customers already had their dance partners lined up." ‘The reincarnated company was nameal Zensar, meanin Cimecentric™ firm quickly began to suffer severe financial problems. The company's CEO! cro, CTO, and head of delivery soon quit—all on a single clay. Kalive recalled, “The culture back in 200% and carly 2001 was complacent, People were confused by the rapid turnover in senior management and lacked a sense of purpose and direction, since the mission at the time—"Nothing short of everything’ was vague.” Although Zensar managed to retain a few good customers and even acquired several new ones, by 2001 utilization had! fallen to 51% and revenues and profits had both fallen significantly. Financial performance was plummeting every quarter, and the company had not issued a dividend to shareholders for 16 years, “essence of knowledge.” The 850-person