Final paper

The Islamic Republic of Iran

Transnational organised crime threat assessment in the context of drug
trafficking from Afghanistan

Raphael J. Spoetta

53rd Diploma Programme 2016/17

Diplomatic Academy of Vienna

Transnational Organized Crime

Dr Walter Kemp

Vienna, April 2017

 1. Introduction

The Islamic Republic of Iran is of paramount importance for global drug trafficking. Iran’s
geographical position makes it an ideal transit route for opiates that are being trafficked from
its neighbour, Afghanistan, to Europe. In fact, to understand the situation in Iran, it is essential
to take into account the role of drugs being produced in and trafficked from the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is the world’s largest opiate supplier, its poppy production allegedly provides for
approximately 90% of globally circulating heroin. 1 This, of course, has a negative impact on
Afghanistan’s neighbours, Iran, and Pakistan. This negative impact is estimated to become even
more crucial as the “southern route” will grow in importance, according to the latest available
annual UNODC report.

“The report also warns on how Iran and Pakistan face a tremendous challenge in dealing with the large
flows of opiates originating from Afghanistan […]. The location of these neighbouring countries also
makes them a major transit point for the trafficking of Afghan opiates along the southern route.”2

This assessment, in the light of Iran’s important geopolitical role and geographical position,
highlights the need for an organised crime threat assessment of Iran. This rather short assess-
ment will be composed of three parts. The first part will deal with the supply side of the problem
in concentrating on the drug markets and transit routes from Afghanistan to Iran. The goal of
this part is to show the composition of the Iranian drug market and its origins. The second part
will, then, analyse the situation within Iran. The object of analysis will be groups that conduct
the trafficking itself as well as groups that foster trafficking, such as government officials who
turn a blind eye to the situation. Furthermore, due attention will be paid to drug consumption
in Iran. Lastly, to complete the picture, the demand side and the eventual destinations of the
drugs will be analysed. This last part aims at validating or completing the previous findings.

Due to accessibility problems and a lack of resources, this threat assessment will be conducted
mainly by examining open sources. This, of course, has the great disadvantage that practical

Bowman, Tom (2016): Afghan Governor Wants Government To Control Poppy Crop, National Public Radio,
http://www.npr.org/2016/07/06/484894669/afghan-governor-wants-government-to-control-poppy-crop
UNODC (2016): UNODC Annual Report Covering activities during 2015, https://www.unodc.org/docu-
ments/AnnualReport2015/Annual_Report_2016_WEB.pdf, p. 31

3
experience from the field cannot be taken into account directly. Furthermore, Afghanistan and
Iran are not the only countries in Central Asia that are important for analysing the global opium
trade. The last country that forms part of the “Golden Crescent”, the main opiate production
region in the world, is Pakistan. A complete picture of the opiate trade in the region should
always include Pakistan. However, the goal of this threat assessment is to chiefly analyse the
effects of opium trade on Iran. These limitations, nevertheless, negatively affect the scope and,
thus, the scientific significance of this threat assessment.

2. The supply side: Drugs before they enter Iran

According to UNODC, the main drugs being trafficked through the Islamic Republic of Iran
are opiates, but also cannabis. Furthermore, Iran also faces an increasing amount of metham-
phetamine abuse.3,4 The main drug in Iran, however, is opiates such as heroin or morphine. It
seems clear that the main supplier of opiates for Iran is Afghanistan, which is known as the
largest opiate supplier of the world. UNODC estimates that it “accounted for almost two thirds
of the global area under illicit opium poppy cultivation”5. This assumption is even more con-
vincing when taking into account the sharp drop of opium supply after the decrease in Afghan
production:

“Primarily carried out in South-West Asia and, to a lesser extent, in South-East Asia and Latin America,
global opium production in 2015 fell by 38 per cent from the previous year to some 4,770 tons, i.e., to
the levels of the late 1990s. The decrease was primarily a consequence of a decline in opium production
in Afghanistan (a decrease of 48 per cent from the previous year), mainly as a result of poor yields in
the country’s southern provinces.”6

UNODC estimates that the net value of Afghan opiates destined for exports still amounts to
US$ 1.41bn. Compared to this figure, domestic consumption and costs of factor goods for

UNODC (2016): World Drug Report 2016, https://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_RE-
PORT_2016_web.pdf, p. 44, p. 7
4
UNODC (s.a.): Islamic Republic of Iran: Drug trafficking and border control. Situation analysis,
https://www.unodc.org/islamicrepublicofiran/drug-trafficking-and-border-control.html
5
UNODC (2016): World Drug Report 2016, https://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_RE-
PORT_2016_web.pdf, p. xii
6
UNODC (2016): World Drug Report 2016, https://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_RE-
PORT_2016_web.pdf, p. xii

4
opium production are insignificant (the former being US$0.08bn and the latter US$0.07bn).7
According to the same report,

“Afghan traffickers seem to be heavily involved in shipping opiates over the border, most notably to
Iran and Pakistan, but much less so in subsequent trafficking. Thus, the far greater income generated
on international trafficking routes does not normally find its way into the pockets of Afghan traffickers
and into the Afghan economy.”8

It is not hard to imagine that the Afghan community in Iran participates to a certain extent in
the drug trafficking from Afghanistan. However, further research into this topic could neither
confirm nor refute such a claim with the exception of Baluch people. This ethnic group lives in
the eastern provinces of Iran, the south-western province of Pakistan, and the south of Afghan-
istan. The trafficking, according to other evidence that will be dealt with later, seems to be
controlled by local groups. Leaving aside the composition of the drug trafficking groups for a
moment, these seem to have rather impressive creativity when it comes to smuggling such as
tossing contraband with catapults over the Iranian border.9 As a consequence of the trafficking
of illicit drugs towards and through its territory, Iran has been engaged in a war-like border
conflict with drug traffickers.10

3. The situation within Iran

The following part is perhaps the most important part of the threat assessment. In order to obtain
a meaningful picture of the situation of transnational organised crime in Iran in the context of
Afghan drug trafficking, the available resources have been evaluated carefully and analysed in
three larger parts. First of all, the situation of drug abuse and prices within Iran has been ana-

7
UNODC/Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Counter Narcotics (2016): Afghanistan Opium Survey
2015. Socio-economic analysis, https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghani-
stan_opium_survey_2015_socioeconomic.pdf, p. 14
8
UNODC/Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Counter Narcotics (2016): Afghanistan Opium Survey
2015. Socio-economic analysis, https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghani-
stan_opium_survey_2015_socioeconomic.pdf, p. 14
9
Aman, Fatemeh (2016): Traffickers Find Novel Ways of Smuggling Drugs into Iran from Afghanistan,
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iraninsight/traffickers-find-novel-ways-of-smuggling-drugs-into-iran-from-
afghanistan
10
The National (2014): Iran steps up war on drugs as neighbouring Afghanistan’s opium trade booms,
http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/iran-steps-up-war-on-drugs-as-neighbouring-afghanistans-opium-
trade-booms

5
lysed in order to obtain an overview of the size and structure of the Iranian drug market. Sec-
ondly, the trafficking itself, its routes and the groups that transport the illicit contraband, have
been looked into. Lastly, the situation of the Iranian law enforcement agencies and the groups
that profit from and therefore foster drug trafficking has been assessed.

The situation of drug abuse in Iran is as interesting and revealing as it is alarming. Drugs ac-
count for major problems in the Iranian society, including health risks and violence. Health
risks include the unsafe nature of the injection of drugs which contribute to the spread of infec-
tious diseases such as HIV, tuberculosis, and hepatitis C. Violence occurs primarily in the con-
text of drug trafficking in the regions of Sistan and Baluchistan. Furthermore, drug trafficking
is a highly risky business as the state institutions often impose the death penalty for drug-related
offences. According to Amnesty International, the majority of the more than 567 executions in
Iran in 2016 was carried out because of drug-related offences. This concerned “at least 328”
executions.11

The majority of drug trafficking, furthermore, seems to be going on in the Eastern provinces of
Sistan and Baluchistan, bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan:

“Sistan and Baluchistan province, which borders Afghanistan and Pakistan in the country’s south-east
has seen conflict between armed drug cartels and smugglers since 200 [sic], resulting in thousands of
deaths.”12

Size of the Iranian drug market

According to various sources13,14,15, including the UNODC World Drug Report 2005, between
2.6 and 2.8% of the Iranian population is addicted to drugs. This figure is likely to be bigger as
the number of drug abusers may have grown over time. However, the general picture seems to
confirm the Iranian figure of approximately 2.8%. According to UNODC, despite the existence

11
Amnesty International (2017): Amnesty International Global Report. Death Sentences and Executions 2016,
https://www.amnesty.at/de/view/files/download/showDownload/?tool=12&feld=download&sprach_con-
nect=560, p. 32
12
Dearden, Lizzie (2016): Every man in Iranian village ‘executed on drugs charges’, http://www.independ-
ent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/every-man-in-iran-village-executed-on-drugs-charges-death-penalty-capital-
punishment-human-rights-a6898036.html
13
Vick, Karl (2005): Opiates of the Iranian People, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-
cle/2005/09/22/AR2005092202287.html
14
The Economist (2013): The other religion. Why so many young Iranians are hooked on hard drugs,
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21583717-why-so-many-young-iranians-are-hooked-
hard-drugs-other-religion
15
Mostaghim, Ramin/Bengali, Shashank (2016) http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-iran-drug-addiction-2016-
story.html

6
of large data gaps potentially masking changes, the “prevalence of the use of opiates has not
changed in more than a decade”.16

According to a threat assessment by UNODC concerning the global Afghan opium trade,

“an estimated 145 tons of heroin was trafficked to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Of this amount, 16 tons
was consumed and 23 tons was seized. The majority of heroin that enters the Islamic Republic of Iran
is trafficked onwards along the ‘Balkan Route’ to Western and Central Europe.” 17

More recent figures18 indicate the importance of the illicit opiate trade for the specific Balkan
route countries. Iranian trafficker’s profits, as can be seen below, range somewhere between
$6,093m. and $9,108m.
Low estimate Best estimate High estimate
Albania 255 320 392
Austria 801 1,007 1,235
Belgium 98 123 151
Bosnia and Herzegovina 32 40 49
Bulgaria 493 616 752
Croatia 177 223 273
Czech Republic 127 160 196
Denmark 387 486 597
France 4,041 5,079 6,233
Germany 2,089 2,625 3,220
Greece 174 218 267
Hungary 41 51 63
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 6,093 7,521 9,108
Ireland 534 672 824
Italy 1,208 1,518 1,862
Kosovo 20 25 31
Luxembourg 33 42 51
fYR of Macedonia 31 39 47
Montenegro 9 11 14
Netherlands 148 183 223

Table 1: UNODC (2015): Drug Money: the illicit proceeds of opiates trafficked on the Balkan
route, p. 43

16
UNODC (2016): World Drug Report 2016, https://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_RE-
PORT_2016_web.pdf, p. 27
17
UNODC (2011): The Global Afghan Opium Trade. A Threat Assessment, https://www.unodc.org/docu-
ments/data-and-analysis/Studies/Global_Afghan_Opium_Trade_2011-web.pdf, p. 39
18
UNODC (2015): Drug Money: the illicit proceeds of opiates trafficked on the Balkan route,
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/IFF_report_2015_final_web.pdf, p. 43

7
In comparison to the figures of 2009, it seems that there was an increase in the overall revenue
from approximately $3bn. to $7bn. Taking into account the share of the profits for drug traf-
fickers, this figure would approximately lie at $770m.

“In 2009, Iranian drug traffickers paid US$725 million to Pakistani and Afghan drug traffickers for
145 tons of high-purity heroin. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the same amount of heroin at wholesale
price was $1.3 billion. Of the 145 tons, 82 tons were sold to Turkish and Kurdish drug traffickers for
$750 million. With 1 kg of pure heroin sold for $5,000 at the […] Iran-Afghanistan and the […] Iran-
Pakistan borders and $9,000 at the Turkish border, the Iranian drug trafficking groups pocketed some
$330 million for facilitating heroin trafficking into Turkey in 2009.” (Emphasis by the author)

Furthermore, an additional $2.7 bn. was paid by drug users in 2009. This made and very likely
makes drug trafficking through Iran an extraordinarily profitable business of which primarily
Iranian criminal groups profit.19

Groups that conduct the trafficking

It seems to be the case that the majority of drug trafficking, not only in Iran but also in Afghan-
istan and Turkey, is conducted by local groups.20 In the case of Eastern Iran, the question of
who conducts the drug trafficking is highly political, closely related with the conflict in the
border regions of Sistan and Baluchistan. The local population in these Eastern provinces con-
sists mostly of Baluch people, which form an ethnic minority in Iran of approximately
1,500,000 people. This ethnic minority also lives in the west of Pakistan and the south of Af-
ghanistan.

The region itself seems to be “poor and underdeveloped. Made up of rugged, mountainous
terrain, it has become a haven for heroin and opium-smuggling from across the border with
neighbouring Pakistan and Afghanistan”.21 The conclusion that Baluch people, instead of rely-
ing on a virtually non-existent economy, often engage in drug trafficking from across the border
is convincing. Even more so, as the Baluch networks between Afghanistan and Pakistan work

19
UNODC (2011): The Global Afghan Opium Trade. A Threat Assessment, https://www.unodc.org/docu-
ments/data-and-analysis/Studies/Global_Afghan_Opium_Trade_2011-web.pdf, p. 40
20
UNODC (2011): The Global Afghan Opium Trade. A Threat Assessment, https://www.unodc.org/docu-
ments/data-and-analysis/Studies/Global_Afghan_Opium_Trade_2011-web.pdf, p. 41
21
Al Jazeera English (2009): In depth: Sistan-Baluchestan, http://www.aljazeera.com/fo-
cus/2009/10/20091018135453355456.html

8
in a similar manner: “Difficult terrain […] as well as strong tribal connections, make the border
[between Afghanistan and Pakistan, editor’s note] extremely vulnerable to drug trafficking”.22

In addition to this speculation, there is often violence in the very same regions, Sistan and Ba-
luchistan, related to drug trafficking but also to potential Baluch independence:

“A series of bombings were reported in the region in October 2000 and in Zahedan, the provincial
capital, in June 2005. Analysts say the drugs trade and kidnappings for ransom in Sistan-Baluchestan
are a major worry for Tehran, which often seeks to blame the criminal activity on organisations such
as the Baluchistan United Front. The Baluch organisations deny these allegations. Instead, there have
been suggestions that elements in Iran’s Revolutionary Guards has links to the drugs trade.”23

It is clear that this claim by Baluch insurgents cannot be taken at face value. Nevertheless, these
allegations do not seem to be entirely unfounded. Indeed, analyses suggest that the Revolution-
ary Guards Corps (IRGC) is very much involved in an Iranian parallel economy, including the
proceeding of illicit drugs.24,25 This does not come unexpectedly as the Revolutionary Guards
control many transit points and transportation routes within Iran. Furthermore, the Quds bri-
gades, the foreign military branch of the IRGC, is said to maintain relations to international
organised crime actors, such as South American drug cartels. 26

Data collected by UNODC allows the drawing of the conclusion that the organisational level
of the Iranian drug trade is different than may be expected. Instead of bigger cartels just as in
Latin America, the drug trafficking is seemingly conducted by smaller groups which makes it
more difficult to counter drug trafficking effectively.

“In 2009, more than 1,900 drug trafficking groups were dismantled and more than 170,000 persons
arrested in Iran. This suggests that either heroin is trafficked by a few small groups or individuals

22
UNODC (2011): The Global Afghan Opium Trade. A Threat Assessment, https://www.unodc.org/docu-
ments/data-and-analysis/Studies/Global_Afghan_Opium_Trade_2011-web.pdf, p. 78
23
Al Jazeera English (2009): In depth: Sistan-Baluchestan, http://www.aljazeera.com/fo-
cus/2009/10/20091018135453355456.html
24
Ghasseminejad, Saeed (2015): How Iran’s mafia-like Revolutionary Guard rules the country’s black market,
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-irans-mafia-like-revolutionary-guard-rules-the-countrys-black-market-
2015-12
25
Kronenfeld, Sami/Guzansky, Yoel (2013): The Revolutionary Guards and the International Drug Trade. Mili-
tary and Strategic Affairs, Vol. 5, No 2, http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/MASA5-
2Eng6_KronenfeldGuzansky.pdf
26
Ghasseminejad, Saeed (2015): How Iran’s mafia-like Revolutionary Guard rules the country’s black market,
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-irans-mafia-like-revolutionary-guard-rules-the-countrys-black-market-
2015-12

9
 rather than cartels, or that traffickers prefer to use several persons as couriers rather than large ship-
ments – a practice known as ‘ant trafficking’.”27

The open data available and examined does neither support nor refute the theory that the insur-
gency in Baluchistan is inherently linked with drug trafficking in the region. Whereas the in-
tensity of violence in the region seems to fluctuate quite significantly, the level of drug traffick-
ing seems to remain more or less on the same level.

Iranian law enforcement and fostering of drug trafficking

As described above, the IRGC seems to be heavily involved in the Iranian parallel economy.
Therefore, it is a legitimate question to ask whether other state institutions are involved in drug
trafficking. It is virtually impossible to assess the involvement of individual state officials with-
out a significant expansion of the scope of the data collection. However, it seems as if corrup-
tion would be rather widespread.28 According to Transparency International’s Corruption Per-
ceptions Index, Iran is the 131st country out of 176.29 Unfortunately, TI does not provide any
information whatsoever about the different kinds of corruption. Therefore, it is not too far-
fetched to assume that corrupt officials within the state institutions function as “promoters” of
drug trafficking, thus, fostering illicit drug trade.

In contrast to this assessment, Iran is accounting for the majority of drug seizures concerning
opiates:

“Accounting for 75 per cent of global opium seizures, 61 per cent of global morphine seizures and 17
per cent of global heroin seizures, the largest aggregated opiate seizures worldwide in 2014 were re-
ported by the Islamic Republic of Iran.”30

It seems that Iranian law enforcement works rather effectively when it comes to opiate seizures.
In comparison to the amount of opium production in Afghanistan, opium seizures in Iran in-
creased steadily but remained relatively close to the production levels in Afghanistan, according
to the figures contained in the UNODC World Drug Report 2016. Other figures further confirm

27
UNODC (2011): The Global Afghan Opium Trade. A Threat Assessment, https://www.unodc.org/docu-
ments/data-and-analysis/Studies/Global_Afghan_Opium_Trade_2011-web.pdf, p. 41
28
Shahidsaless, Shahir (2016): Corruption a way of life in Iran, http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/corrup-
tion-has-become-way-life-iran-1127296548
29
Transparency International (s.a.): Iran, http://www.transparency.org/country/IRN
30
UNODC (2016): World Drug Report 2016, https://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_RE-
PORT_2016_web.pdf, p. xiii

10
the firm stance of Iranian law enforcement vis-à-vis drug trafficking relative to the Afghan
opium production.31

Illustration: Afghan opium seizures per country32

Drugs, therefore, seem to play a significant role in Iran. It has adopted a strict approach towards
drug trafficking and often punishes drug-related offences with capital punishment but does treat
the health issues arising from the very same drug problem with restraint.33 After the revolution
in 1979, Iran had adopted a very restrictive drug policy but since the early 2000s, Iran’s policy
has shifted.

“Instead of focusing on punishing addicts and trying to stop the drug supply, Iran decided to try to
reduce the harm of narcotics and the demand for them. By 2002, over 50 percent of the country’s drug-
control budget was dedicated to preventive public health campaigns, such as advertisements and edu-
cation. Iran’s conservative and previously intransigent leadership opened narcotics outpatient treat-
ment centers and abstinence-based residential centers in Tehran and the provinces.”34

31
UNODC (2015): Afghan opiate trafficking through the Southern route, https://www.unodc.org/docu-
ments/data-and-analysis/Studies/Afghan_opiate_trafficking_southern_route_web.pdf, p. 47, p. 50
32
UNODC (2016): World Drug Report 2016, https://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_RE-
PORT_2016_web.pdf, p. 30
33
Mostaghim, Ramin/Bengali, Shashank (2016) http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-iran-drug-addiction-2016-
story.html
34
Afkhami, Amir A. (2013): How Iran Won the War on Drugs. Lessons for Fighting the Afghan Narcotics
Trade, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2013-04-02/how-iran-won-war-drugs

11
As a consequence, it can be said that certain groups such as the Revolutionary Guards Corps
may profit from the drug trafficking, thus cementing their powerful political positions. At the
same time, Iran is clamping down on trans-border drug trafficking from Afghanistan.

4. The demand side: drugs after they have left Iran

Iran serves both as market and as transit route for Afghanistan’s opium products, such as heroin.
If heroin is taken as an example, UNODC estimates that 145 tons of this opiate are being traf-
ficked annually to Iran. 16 tons would then be consumed domestically, the rest is being traf-
ficked internationally: “82 tons to Turkey, 6 tons to African countries, 3 tons to Caucasus coun-
tries and small quantities to Europe”.35 Taken into consideration the amount of Afghan opium
that is trafficked to Europe, approximately 150 tons, it is possible to assess the importance of
Iran as a point of transit.

However, it is difficult to realistically assess the quantity of drugs being trafficked through Iran.
Not even the number of seizures is suitable for allowing conclusions to be drawn upon the
quantities being trafficked. That is to say that an increase in the number of seizures could mean
either an increase in the quantity of drugs being trafficked or an increase in the effectiveness of
law enforcement. Furthermore, drug use may also vary: Health measures could lead to a de-
crease of demand or, on the other hand, more drug abusers would lead to an increase of demand
for illicit drugs. As a consequence, all of these numbers are to be treated extremely carefully
and can only give an impression over the actual situation.

5. Conclusion

The drug situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran is serious: not only does Tehran wage an
outright border war in the regions of Sistan and Baluchistan but it also faces serious health
problems. In general, opium trafficking seems rather consolidated as there is not much accen-
tuated drug-related violence apart from the attempts by state institutions and law enforcement
to stop drug trafficking. Furthermore, the alleged involvement of the Revolutionary Guards

35
UNODC (2011): The Global Afghan Opium Trade. A Threat Assessment, https://www.unodc.org/docu-
ments/data-and-analysis/Studies/Global_Afghan_Opium_Trade_2011-web.pdf, p. 41

12
Corps in drug trafficking is a serious problem as they form part of state institutions, which are
actually supposed to form part of the solution. The corruption within other state institutions
plays its part, too. Nevertheless, its heroin seizures are regularly the highest worldwide, cer-
tainly its heroin seizures are the highest among the Balkan route countries.36

Drugs, therefore, can be considered as a double-edged sword for Iran. The Iranian political
economy would certainly be influenced by a change in the amount of drugs being trafficked
through Iranian territory in the sense that powerful political players would perhaps lose an im-
portant source of revenue. Nevertheless, the demand side, despite certain measures to ease the
addiction of the Iranian population, would certainly remain at a similar level up to now. At the
moment, drugs are more of a “valve” for Iranians because of the easier accessibility than, for
instance, alcohol. To contain the drug flow to Europe from Afghanistan, the cooperation with
the Islamic Republic of Iran is essential.

6. Annex

Table 1: UNODC (2015): Drug Money: the illicit proceeds of opiates trafficked on the Balkan
route, p. 43: “Table 4. Total gross profit made from the trafficking of illicit opiates on the
Balkan route (millions of United States dollars), by country/territory, 2009 – 2012 average”
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/IFF_report_2015_final_web.pdf

Low estimate Best estimate High estimate

Albania 255 320 392
Austria 801 1,007 1,235
Belgium 98 123 151
Bosnia and Herzegovina 32 40 49
Bulgaria 493 616 752
Croatia 177 223 273
Czech Republic 127 160 196
Denmark 387 486 597
France 4,041 5,079 6,233
Germany 2,089 2,625 3,220
Greece 174 218 267
Hungary 41 51 63

36
UNODC (2015): Drug Money: the illicit proceeds of opiates trafficked on the Balkan route,
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/IFF_report_2015_final_web.pdf, p. 31

13
 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 6,093 7,521 9,108
Ireland 534 672 824
Italy 1,208 1,518 1,862
Kosovo 20 25 31
Luxembourg 33 42 51
fYR of Macedonia 31 39 47
Montenegro 9 11 14
Netherlands 148 183 223

Illustration 1 – Afghan opium seizures per country: UNODC (2016): World Drug Report 2016,
p. 30: “Fig. 30. Opium production in Afghanistan and heroin and morphine seizures in key
countries along the Balkan route, 1998-2015”
https://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_REPORT_2016_web.pdf

14