[A model of it ind. 1 cons i ives he relevant fats, and it hat 90 ‘ollie thesia see. The book tan vababe ad oan understanding tthe weld of today — The Timer “A very excellent book... A masterpiece of balanced exposition’ — Sir Huscid Neston, Daily Telegraph ‘May well come tobe repmded atthe standard short history of wor ‘Stars Toe sry ctl blanced, adequate, and po ore eustwrthy Sido a understanding of present foreign pics cold be nized The Times Literary Supplement ‘An understanding of lterational affairs between the te word war it ecesy forever hiking man and woman. EH. Car's best sein bok Provides a concise and readable secout of the couse of international Felatlons fom th peace of 1919 tothe Second World War of 1939. "The bok Is divided ino four part: the period the Verses Tre fy enforcement, ending athe asco of Reparations andthe Rehr i {he period of pace and opts following the Loarao Treaty, dng ‘shichthe League of Nation sine the summit ofits presage: the ood ‘ssi belong with the economic reakdowa and clesnaig inthe Sapanese adventure in Manchuria and the flue of the Disarmament Conference the eid ofthe open ropa ote Verses Treaty and the Covenant, ening up tothe renewal wa. E.H.Car, who died in 1982 ot he age of ninety, was hora i 1892 and Scvested ae Merchant Taylor’ School, Londot, and Tent” College amide Ater several years atthe Foreign ices fiat academe fostion mas a1 Wilson Profesor of Inematonal Poti, Univer Cilege of Wales, Atersveyth and atthe same time, fom 194111986, be ‘vas Assistant ator of The Tima. Prom 1983 to 1958 he wae Toto Pos at Batol Colege, Oxford nd in 1955 he moved o Cambie on WM olraussstsaysss INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS,Al by EH. Care INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS 1919-1939 E. H, CARR MACMILLANAlea ened. No edo. copy oan JsBV 0-38-4410 fananer) CONTENTS ‘Tom Price Serrumier “The European Setemen. ‘The Near bart and Af, ‘vei tnd the Fat PART INTHE PERIOD OF ENFORCEMENT: ‘THE ALLIANCES (1930-24) Puayee 000 em Asses “The System of Guscantees. ‘The Sytem of Alco. ‘The Lite Boone, ‘CHAPTER 2 Graver re Derr Wor Gui and War Crna Dissent and Demueacason, Reparation. CHAPTER 5 (Omen SromeCevens 5 Eunoes "The Danabian Stats Italy ‘The Soviet Union. ®PART I—THE PERIOD OF PACIFICATION. ‘THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (192-9) (CHAPTER “Tam Fouvoariows oF Pence aan Tnvercalied Debs ‘The Geneva Drool CHAPTER 5 “Tow Lenoun ae es Zou * ‘The League a Fl Sreagth ‘The League os Pescemacer Other Activites ofthe Lesue cuapren 6 “Toe Carson acamer Wan ss Leneve Coneniont PART IIL~THE PERIOD OF CRISIS: THE RETURN OF POWER POLITICS (1930-35) CHAPTER 7 “Tas Econoute Bnaneoo¥n cs ‘The Your of Dwr ‘The End of Repaston ‘The Wort Eeoneme Conference, ‘The Law Phase cuarrer & The Cisse ee Fan ast . 5 China afer the Washington Conference, Japan Conquers Manchu The Consequence othe Lense CHAPTER 6 “Toe Desnsuene Cosrenncr sos ‘The Diurmament Prete ‘The Diurmament Conferne, ‘The PourPower Pact PART IV—THE RE-EMERGENCE OF GERMANY ‘THE END OF THE TREATIES (1933-39) CHAPTER 10 ‘Tue Nats Revouwnion on Poland and the Soviet Union. France, Tal wd the Lite Een ‘The taikan Bene CHAPTER 15 “Toe Reroonriow op Treats sats ‘The German Repudition, ‘The Bed of Lacy CHAPTER 12 ‘Twe NowEomoreay Wond .. ‘The Mile Ear ‘The Brian Commons of Nations,contents (CHAPTER 13 Reuret nme Wan. "The Spanish Cie Wer, ‘Revel Grouping ofthe Pome. Germany bein Maression Arrow 1: The Montoe Doctrine» Arroeoie 2: Wile’s Fourteen Points Arrmson 3+ tests frm the Covenant of the ‘Lene of Nations CCumonovocte Tuas oF roxas LIST OF MAPS The Toeey ofVeriles P Be Beeps ATMO) The BR oe eee The Middle at pect a 86 2 » INTRODUCTION ‘THE PEACE SETTLEMENT‘PRODUCTION: THE PEACE SETTLEMENT “Twe duration of the fist world war was rather more than four years and three months-—from July 2th, gta, when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, to November 11h, 1918, when the Allee granted Germany an armistice, After the armistice, fire more years were required to complete the general peace Rclement. In 1919 the Allied and Associated Powers Concluded the Treaty of Versailles with Germany (une 28th), the Treaty of St. Germain with Austria (Geptember soth) and. the Treaty of Neuilly with Balgeria (November 27th), and in 1920 the Treaty of ‘Trianon with Hungary (June ath). Te was not Casi July 23rd, 1923, Ut the final treaty of peace tvth ‘Turkey sta signed at Lausanne; aad with the Coming into fore ofthis treaty on August 6th, 1924, peace was at last formally re-established throughout fhe world. In the meanvtile the Posters interested in the Poific had assembled at Washington inthe winter fof 1gat-23 and concladed a series of treaties designed to estalish on 2 frm basis the status qu in the Fat East, All these tcatis, together witha host of minor treaties and agreements artng out of them, may be Suid to constitute the peace setlement. Almost every important plitial event ofan international character in the peiod between the frst and second world wars 3tas the direct of inditeet product of this settlement and it is therefore necesaty to begin ovr study with 1 brit aurvey of te most outstanding features, ‘Tue Eenorean Serrumcest ‘The Treaty of Versilles had certain special charac- teristics which determined much of its subsequent istry Tn the fst place it was, na phrase made frie bby German propaganda, dictated peace”. It was imposed by the victors on the vanquished, not negoti- sted by 2 process of giveand-take between them, [early every tweaty which brings a war to an end i, in fone sense, a dictated peace; for a defeated Power Seldom accept willingly the consequences ofits defeat. Dut in the Treaty of Versailles the element of dictation, ‘was more apparent than in any previous peice tety of imodeen times. The German’ Delegation at Versilles ‘were alloved to submit one set of written comments on the draft treaty presented to them. Some of thoee comments were faken into account ; and the revised text was then handed to them withthe treat that war ‘would be resumed if were not signed within fve days [No member ofthe German Delegation met the Allied elegates face to face except on the to formal occa tions ofthe presentation of the draft and the signature of the treaty. Even on these ocesions the ordinary ‘courtesies of social intercourne ere not observed AE the ceremony of signature, the two German signstores vere not allowed to it with the Allied delegates atthe table, but were escorted in and out of the hal in the ‘ ‘THE PEACE SETTLEMENT ‘manner of erminals conducted to and from the dock, ‘These unnecessary humiliations, which could only be exphined by the intense bitterness of feeling stil let lover from the war, had far-reaching psychological con= Sequences, both in Germany and eliwhere. They fixed in the consciousness of the German people the conception of a “dictated peace"; and they helped to ‘reate the belie, which became universal in Germany sand was tacily accepted by a large body of opinion in ‘other counties, that the signature extorted from Ger- ‘manyin thes conditions was not morllybinding oa her Secondly, the Treaty of Versilles, unlie any previous treaty of peace, was professedly based on & fhumber of gencral principles enunciated during the war, the most famous of these, President Wilon's Fourteen Points, having been formally accepted by Germany before the armtion athe base ofthe settee sent. ‘Thanks mainly to Wilkons insistence on these Principles, the treaty was founded on a substructure of ‘Fenuine idealism. It provided for the ereation of = League of Nations, whose primary purpose was to censure the maintenance of peace of an International Labour Orpanisation for the regulation of labour con- ditions; and of a mandatory ystem of government for the colznis to be ceded by Germany. These init tions became after 1919 a regular and easential part of the mew world order.” Other results of the attempt of the treaty-makers to blend idealism with the ek igencies of the victorious Powers were, however, less fortunate. Te was not dificult for erties to discredit certain parts of the treaty by comparing them with the text of the Fourteen Point. It was perhaps 5erropucrion ‘open to question whether the territories ceded by Ger- many to Poland included only those " inhabited. by indisputably Polish populations”, or whether the taling {ray of all Germany's overseas pontessions was" re ‘open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment ofall, clonal claims"; and the prohibition of a union between Germany and Austia was indefensible once the Allie had announced the self-determination of sete peoples asthe guiding principe of the eit rent. ‘These and other diserepancies between principle tnd practice gave an exey handle to those who wished to argue thatthe Versilles Treaty was a tinted docu- ‘ment and that the Als had violated the conditions on ‘which the armistice was concluded "The servitudes imposed on Germany inthe Treaty cf Verses were eventually, with few exceptions, sbrogated either by agreement, o by lapse of time, oF ion on the part of Germany. ‘The most of them (penltes, reparation, demilitarised in ater chaptes Here itis only nesesstry to summarise the European territorial provisions. In the west, Germany restored Aluce and Loraine to France, ceded two tiny frag- ‘nents of territory a Eopen and Malmédy to Belgium, land renounced her former eustoms union with Luxem= burg. The ensl-smining area of the Saar was placed ‘under the administration of a Leagve of Nations Com- Ission for fifteen yeas, atthe end of which time ite fate wes to be decided by a plebiscite. The mines were transferred to French ownership by way of com= pensation for French cosl-felds devastated during the War In the south, Germany ceded a small sinp of ‘ La | Stovaxia | a at ans The Treaty of VERSAILLESINTRODUCTION territory to the new sate of Czechoslovakia, nd was ebarced from uniting with Austria except with the ‘unanimous consent ofthe Council ofthe League. In the north, part ofthe former Grand-Duchy of Schles- wig, which had been seized by Prussia from Denmark in 1864, was made the subject of a plebiscite. The plebiscite was held in February and March 1920 and {ested in a satisfactorily clear-cut decision. In the northern sector, 75 per cent ofthe votes were cast for Denmark; the southern sector voted by an even larget majority for Germany. ‘In the east, Germany ceded tothe Principal Allied and Associated Powers, for eventual transfer to Lith ‘nia, the port of Memel and its hinterland, To Poland the ceded the province of Posen and the greater part of the province of West Prusia with a serboard of some forty miles—the sowalled "corridor ” which divides East Prussia from the rest of Germany. Danzig, German town, but the natural port of Poland (which had been promise, inthe Fourteen Points,“ free and secure access to the sea"), became a Fre City in eeaty relations with Poland, entering the Polish customs area and entrusting the conduct of its foreign relations 9 Poland. In addition, plebsctes were to take place in the Marenwerder district of West Pras, inthe Allen- stein distit of Eat Praia and in the whole of Upper Silesia. ‘The Marieawerder and Allenateinplebisctes vere held in July 1920, and resulted in overwhelming German majorities, «few villages only in each cave showing a Polish majority and being transferred to Poland. ‘The plebiscite in Upper Silesia was postponed ‘unt the foloming year, and provoked intense feeling ’ ‘THE PEACE SETTLEMENT nd serious outbreaks of violence on both sides, Un- like the other plebiscite dntricts, Upper Silesia was rich ineoal and iron and contained a large, densely populated industrial area, ‘The vote proved inconclusive. About Go percent of the votes were cast for Germany, about 49 percent for Poland, But apart from certain clearly ‘edned rural areas the result was a patchwork which fendered a decision extremely dificult. The British tnd Talian Commissioners on one side, and the French Commissioner on the other, submitted widely divergent recommendations. The Supreme Council of the Allied Powers failed to agree and, by an unhappy inspiration, referred the matter to the Council of the League. ‘The Council, ater another threatened dead- lock made an approximately equal compromise between the line proposed bythe French Commisioner and tht proposed by the British and Italian Commissioner, Since the Brtsh-Ialian line had been a carefl attempt ta reproduce a closely as was practicable the results of the vote, whereas the French line showed a marked partiality for Polish claims, the destin ofthe Council ‘was not defensible on grounds of strict equity. Te wan received with indignation in Germany, and did much to prejudice German opinion agsingt the League dosing Ss early years The territorial clauses of the Versailles ‘Treaty involved the loss by Germany in Burope of more than asjo00aquare miles of terstory and nearly seven rillion inhabitant, "The other European peace testes can be more brety deal with “The eallape ofthe Avsto-Hungsrian Monarchy ia November 1918 left German Austria an isolated and ill ° 7proportioned remnant. Of its 7,000,009 inhabitants fore than 2,000(00 were congregated in. Vienaa Hotemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia had broken say to form the nucleus of Casshoslovakia. Slovenia had joined Serbia and Croatia to form the Yugoslav state. Italy had occupied Triste and its immediate hinterland.” The Treaty of St Germain id litle Dut register these accomplished fact. It only wo provisions which conspicuously contadiced the principle of self-dctermination were the probibition, epested fromthe Treaty of Versilles,on union between ‘Atsvia and Germany, and the cession t Italy of the purely. German-speaking South Tyrol, hich sa ‘esigned to ive Ttaly the strategic frontier of the renner, But Austria’ economic plight was eo dite (Gor many months Vienna was literally starving) that the political humiliations of the peace were scarcely fel. "The Allies, fearing that the movement for union with Germany ‘would assume uncontrollable dimensions, ‘made no serious tempt to apply the non-territoral provisions of the weaty; and the Austrian Reparation ‘Commission transformed itself into a rele organisation. “The ancient kingdom of Hungary, of whose 1700,000 inhabitants litle more than half were Hane futlan, bad also disolved into is ethnic components. ‘The Treaty of Trianon confirmed the transer of Slo- vakia to Caechosloraia, of Croatia to Yugoslaia and ‘of ‘Transylvania to. Roumania. In the main these Gecisions were just, But the frontiers of Hungary, ven more markedly than the eastern frontier of Get= ‘many, Dear witness to a certain eagerness onthe part of the taty-makers to stretch their principles wherever ‘THE PEACE SETTLEMENT ibe to the advantage ofthe Aled andthe dei Itent ofthe enemy cy. The cumulative eet of thin clay wm amide ad fall eae ha Been trade by Hungarian propagandists of thee mine the losses of Bulgaria were almost as severe as those of Hungry. Dut tet of them date, nt Tem he Pesce stent of 191, bot from that of 1919 which fide the second Bala War ne fit Blan Wat af sor, Dolgria had combined with Seti, Gree Sd ‘Reumanis to enpelTerkey from the Ballany ted {tive her Back to line some iy ne from Con Staminple” But the victor fell ot over the dvon of the apo. In the scond Balan War, Daria wa Siatanouty tached by ber hc fore Ales and bp Turkey, ann the ein tet wan complied ede terry to lle of them. "The Testy of Nevill in 919 confirmed Dulgwin's Ines. Ie modi fd tl fash to her dadvatage the nts with Serbs an Grese, antl oched the ppp nj op fener wih Roumanin, "The mon hen {Gof all Bugerin’sqcvances war the ow of Mace dein whith ed bee the prc promised to befor her fartcpaton in the fiat Balan Wart and here we {ouch on # trtral problem dierent in cheacer from any hitherto dicted. Te might be dia to xan equiuble fronts between Germany and Puan, tr becween Hungry and Resin; bu here wr a ieee no dsbe about the rac curcter of the pola tions uelved. In Macedon the prema) pin trav te nbject of biter contovery. The Macedon: iit eves people of Sav sock, whose naa coneneraopUcTioN sciousness was weak ot nonexistent and whose dinlect Shaded off into Serbian on one side and into Bulgarian ‘onthe other. In time they could be made inditferently into good Serbs or good Bulgarians. ‘The tetlement of 1913, confirmed in 1919, had given the greater part ‘of Macedonia to Serbia, and most ofthe remainder to Greece. But the Macedonian were a primitive people among whom brigandage was held in honour.” The ftalwart among them fed to Dulgara and formed there | Macedonian Revolationary Organisation, which con- ‘acted periodical rads in Vagoaay or Grech territory, terrorised the population on both sides ofthe frontier, and embittered el neighbours for more than ten years after the ws During this period, lif and property were probably lst secure in Macedonia than in any other part of Europe ‘The only other provision of the Treaty of Neullly which requires mention here is the clause by which the Allies undertook "to ensure the economic outlets of Bulgaria tothe Aegean Sea". ‘The Bulgarians inter- preted this to mean, a8 in the cate of Poland, a terri- fori corridoe.” ‘The Alli offered a free tone for Bulgaria in one of the Greek ports. ‘The Bulgarians preferred no bread to half loaf; and nothing was ever done to carry thie dispated clase into eet. “Lat, shouldbe mentioned thatthe newly created stater—Poland and Czechoslovakia—as well as other tats which had received large necessions of territory— Yopeslavia, Roumania and Greece —were required to conclude with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers treaties under which they guaranteed to the “racial, religious and linguistic minorities” residing their testis political right, religious freedom, the provision of schools, and the use of ther language before the court and in their dealings with the authorities, Similar provisions were inched in the testes f peace with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. Ger- masy wat not asked to avberibe to any minority ‘obligations. "Tronically enough, thie wae almost the ‘only respect in which the peace-makers of Verales recognised Germany's equality of status with the other Grest Powers, ‘Thon Nean Ease ano Arnica “The Treaty of Lausanne, conchided with Trey in July 1923 isthe only one ofthe peace treaties which, Tor thirteen years, was accepted as valid and applicable byallits signatorien and which ven in 1936 ep 24), ‘vas modified ony by voluntary agreement and in one particular. Historically i owed thi advantage to several factors which distinguished # from the other peace tweatien.” Tt came into being nearly five years after the fend of hostilities when bitter panions had had time to tate; it was not imposed, But negotiated by a long proces of barpaining between the parties; and it w ‘Signed, notin an Allied capital, but on neutral territory. Tmay be wel to recapitulate ere the long and com plicated series of events by which tis happy conclsion ‘eas reached "Tn May 1919, while the Peace Conference, in the intervals ofits more pressing preoccupation with Ger= ‘many, was discussing the future of Turkey, Venizelos, ‘the Greek Prime Minister, persuaded the Allis tallow eyGreek troops to oosupy Smyrna in Asis Minor, The ‘Turks bitterly eesented thie violation oftheir territory, long after the armistie, by the most implacable and most despised of ther enemies. From this resentment 2 widespread movement of national revolt wa born, ‘nd found a capable and powerfl leader in Mestapa Kemal. Within a year the Kemalists had sept the whole county, and only the presence of an Allied {rison kept a puppet Turkish Government in being St Constantinople. Undetrred by this wiring, the ‘Allied Powers signed at Sivres in August 1930 4 treaty of peace with the Constantinople Government. Te wat constructed onthe Versailles model, and provided inter ‘aa that Smyena should remain in Greck cccuption for five years, is fate thereafter being determined by & plebiscie. ‘Any faint chance which remained of the enforce- sent ofthe Treaty of Sevres was, however, destroyed by events in Greece. In October 1920 King Alexander died of the bite oa pet monkey. In the ensuing general election Venizelos was swept from power ; and ex-King Constantine, who had been expelled ffom Greece during the war for his pro-German leasing, aa re= talled othe throne. This sep alienated the sympathy Of the Allie—a sympathy ligely due to Venizelos? magnetic personality. In the folowing year, rt the French, and then the Italians, made private agree: rents with the Kemalit Government which had now tetablished itself in Angora. In Great Britain Lloyd George's Greck policy came in for severe criticism | and though the Greck srmy had boldly advanced from Smyrna int the interior of Asia Minor it became lear that it could no longer count onthe effective support of the Alles. In these conditions, a dele was invit- tle The Grecks were slowly driven back; and in September 19a, after aome particularly savage Siting, Kemal drove the last Greek troops fom the sol of Asi Floshed with victory, the Kemalist now tured their attention to Constantinople. "The French and Taian Governments hurriedly withdrew their contingent ‘The situation wae critical.” resumption of hostilities between Great Britin and ‘Turkey seemed for a ‘moment inevitable. But Mustapha Kemal stopped in time, An armistice was concluded, andthe way paved for the peace congress of Lausanne, where the treaty ‘wat signed inthe fllowing summer. "The armistice of 1918 had found the Oxtoman Empire, like the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, in a state of disolution, is vast Arab dominions being in the occupation of British and French forces. Fortune ately, however, the Kemalist movement had from the tutet rejected the ancien Islamic bai of the Ortoman Empire, and proclaimed the modern seelar principle of rational self-determination, ‘The new Turkish sate fxplicitly renounced all claim to territories containing ‘Arab majorities; and the conclusion of peace therefore presented no insuperable difcutes.. The frontier of ‘Turkey in Europe was pushed forward beyond Adrian- pleat the expense of Greece; and no more was heard of a plebiscite at Smyrna. The clauses ofthe Sévres ‘Treaty regarding penalties, reparation and disarmament disppeared. But the ‘Tushish Government rather furprsingly accepted the establishment on Turkish territory of two demilitarized zones, in Thrace and 5eTRODUCTION the area of the Suits. The National Asembly at Angora, well pleased with what it had secured, pro= elnimed Turkey a republic with Kemal ats president, embarked on a vigorous programme of secilarsation and, in the spring of 1924, abolished the office ofthe Ouaman Caliph, the religions head of Islam, who for four and half centuries had had his sent at Con= stantinople. "The fate of the Arab provinces ofthe old Ottoman Empire may serve as an introduction tothe mandatory system, ‘The Covenant of the League provided that those territories, ceded bythe defeated Powers," which sre inhabited by peoples not yet abl to standby them= felves under the strenuous conditions of the modern ‘world, should be placed under the ttelage of ade anced nations", and that" this tutelage should be ‘exercised by them as Mandstories on behalf of the League of Nations". The extent to mhich the Man- datory Powerscouldbesud tacton behalfaftheL-eague vs, indeed, doubtful. ‘The testrisin question were Cedod by Germany and Turkey tothe Principal Allied tnd Associated Power, who were responsible for the telecon of the Mandatory Powers, The. League spproved the terms ofthe mandstesandreccivedannval ‘reports from the Mandstoris on the territories under ‘ther tutelage. Butite function was limited to fendly citcsm. “Sinceit did not grant the mandate, teary ould not revoke them. Where the averegnty ove the mandated teritorie resided was an iaolale legal conundrum ‘The Covenant proved for three clases of mandates (commonly known a2" A","" Band" C” mandate) % araded according to the stage of development of the ‘opultins to which they are applied Tn "A" mandates, under which the ex-Turkish province were placed, the role of the Mandatory was fefined an” the rendering of administrative advice tnd assistance... until such time as they are able to snd alone"; and it was explicitly laid down that "dhe wishes ofthese communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory "It ‘annotbe eid that the lat condition was fly complied bith. The destination ofthe Arab territories had been teiled during the war by a secret agreement beewees Great Brin and France; and though, after the Wat, there wat much haggling over the application of this agreement, the argument did not tum on the wishes of the inhabitants The mandate for Syria wa assigned to France, the mandates for Ing and for Palestine and ‘Transjordania to Great Britain, the mandate for Paes- tine being conditioned by an undertaking given by the British Government in 1917 to establish in Palestine tational home forthe Jewish people". ‘The maining ‘Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire eecured thet independence. ‘The coastal strip of Arabia bordering fon the Red Sea—an important territory in the eyes of ail Moslems, since it contains the holy place of Mecea ‘and Medina became the independent kingdom ofthe Hedjas, Inthe rest of Arabia Turkish sovereignty had never been more than nominal; and in so fara these regions wer inhabited by setled populations, authority was exercised by a number of autonomous Sultans, ‘Sheik and Imam. Tn" B” mandates, which were applied othe grealar anernopucrion part of Germanys African possessions the population twas recognised tobe uni for any form of administra: tive autonomy. But the Mandatory Power was under sn obligation, not only to prohibit the slave trade and fms trafic and to retain from recrting natives "for ther than police purpoes or the defence af terstory™ (a-somewhat equivocal phate), but to give equal rights to the trade and commerce of other members of the League. In East Africa the whole of the former Ger- rman colony of Tanganyika was mandated to. Great Briain, except forthe two western provinces which, adjoining the Belgian Congo, were mandated to Belgium, and the port of Kionga in the south, which was ceded outright to Portugal. In West Ain the Cameroons and Togoland were both divided between Brith and French mandates, "The category of "C" mandates was crested for German South-West Africa, which was mandated tothe ‘Union of South Africa, and the German Pacific lands, Which were mandated to Australi, New Zealand and Jnpan, Terstories under " C™ mandates wee ad- ‘ministered under the laws ofthe mandatory " and the ‘isential practical dilerence between "and" C” ‘mandates was that holders of the latter were under no ‘bligaton to grant equal rights inthe mandated terre tory tothe trade and commerce of other states. Avonen avo ip Fan East In ta atiude to the settlement made after the war the people of the United States awajed, in s manner ‘which appeared. to be characteristic at this time of ‘THE PEACE SETTLEMENT ity attitude towards foreign athirs, between extreme idealism and extreme cavtion. At fist, theough the ‘mouth of ts President insted on the insertion ofthe Covenant of the League in the Teeaty of Verses and then, through the mouth of Congress, it rejected the treaty on account ofthe cligaion impated by the Covenant. "The ultimate consequences of this with- drawal of American -eperation were incalculable and far-reaching. But it had no immediate effect on the European settlement. Separate treaties, mainly of a formal character, were conched by the United States sith Germany, Astra and Hungary (the United States had not been at war with Bulgaria or Turkey): and peace was thus reetored without involving Americ in tinvelcome European obizations Tn the Far Fast the United States could not afford to preserve the same attitude of serene detachment. ‘The close ofthe warhad eft Japan, whose own itary ‘exertions had heen litle more than nominal, the dom fant Power in the Pacific. By the Treaty of Veruiles ‘head acquired from Germany the leased territory” ‘of Kisochow in the Shantung province of Chinas ‘ecision which caused China to refs her signature to the tent, She had atthe stme time obtained the mandate for Germany's former ialand posession: in the Northern Pacific, By the eclipse of Rusia, she had become the only Great Power on the borders of China and by the simultaneous destruction of the Russian and German navies, se had been lef, not only the greatest naval Power in the Far East, but the third naval Power in the world. ‘The Japanese threat t9 ‘China andthe Japanese bid for naval supremacy in the 9meTRoDUCTION Pacific were highly daguiting to American observe tnd in the later par of 1921 the United States Governe tment invited the other Great Powers (the Bitish Em ite, Japan, France and Isly), together with the three father Powers having teritaral interest ia the Pace (China, the Netheriands and Portugal) and Belgium (hos claim to inclusion wax purely sentimental," #2 participate in conference on the limitation of arma ‘ments in connexion with which Pacific and Far Eastern ‘questions would also he discussed". The Conference assembled at Washington in November 1924 The Washington Conference resulted inthe signa- ture of theee treaties, The frst, known asthe Foure Power Treaty, was concluded between the United States, the British Empire, France and Japan, who agreed to respect each other's rights in relation to chit insular possessions in the Paci and to consult to- tether in the event of any controversy between them Feqarding these rights, or any threat to them through the aggressive action of anyother Power. ‘The import= ance ofthis simple document was twofold, Ie drew the United States forthe fist time (since their rejection of the Covenant of the League) into a limited system of consultation with other Great Powers on maters of ‘common concen ; and it provided a decent pretext for bringing to an end the now superiuous Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which had become highly unpopular in the United Sates, in the Dominions, and among a large section of publicopinion in Great Britain. ‘The second, ‘or Five-Power, ‘Treaty provided for an extensive measure of naval disarmament, its essential features being the establishment of naval party beoween the ‘TUE PEACE SETTLEMENT: [rtsh Empire and the United States and the fixing of the strength of Japan in capital ships at 60 per cent of the Britah and American figures.” The French and Taalian quotas were 35 per cent. No limitation was placed on light cruisers, destroyer, submatines or other Suxilary cra. ‘The sigastaree further agreed maintain the sfatar quo, in respect of foreations and aval bees, in aepecified area ofthe Pacific. By the third, o Nine-Power, Treaty all the Powers presented at the Coaference pledged themselves to respect the Independence and integrity of China, and "to refain from taking advantage of conditians in China to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the Fight of subjects and citizen of friendly tates. In ‘Adiion to these treties, yet another document wat Signed at Washington ; and though it formed no part ofthe oficial proceedings ofthe conference, agreement twas certainly not reached without strong pressure fom the British and American Delegations. Under this agreement, conchided between Japan and China alone, Japan undertook to return to China the Kiaochow teei= tory which had been ceded to her by Germany in the Veruales Treaty. "The Washington Coaference was hailed, not without reason, as an outstanding success. Ithad toallappear~ ances restored the preswar balance in the Pacific. Tntimidated by a fem Anglo-American font and by the moral pressure of world opinion, Japan had accepted, ifrnot am open defeat at any rate a serious check to her ambitions. She had been persuaded to abandon her sole war gain on the mainland of China. She had not ‘entured to cai naval party with the Bish Empirenyrropuction and the United States; and her demand for 70 percent {of British and American naval tonnage had been eut down to Go per cent. The Japanese menace to the integrity of China and to Angio-American naval supre- ‘macy in the Pacific had been removed. Yet the star tion created by the Washington tratice was insecure to far a it depended on the unwilling renunciation by Japan of her forward poicy on the Asiatic mainland, Sooner or ater, Japan, conscious of her strength, would resent the loss of prestige involved inthe Washington ‘settlement. The fundamental question whether the dominant iflueae in the Far Bact was to be Anglo: Saxon or Japanese wa sll undecided. But shanks to the Washington Conference it remained in abeyance for almost exactly ten years PART ‘THE PERIOD OF ENFORCEMENT: ‘THE ALLIANCES (1930-1934)CHAPTER 4: FRANCE AND HER ALLIES ‘Tw most important and persistent single factor in European affairs in the yeas following 1919 was the French demand for security. In the sevententh and jghteenth centuries France rightly regarded here at thestrongest military Powerin Europe; andthis tradition survived the Napoleonic wars, when she succumbed nly to# general European coalition agningt her. In 1870 the ilsion of her strength was abruptly shattered by the Franco-Prussian war. A new Power had arisen in Cental Europe whore national feeling wat a8 strong and united as thet of France herself and whose naturel resources were far greatet. The mineral wealth of Germany gave her an industrial development and a capacity for the production of war material which France could not hope to rival. The population of France was almost stationary at something under forty rillions. The population of Germany wat incresing by five millions a decade, and by 1905 had exceeded sixty millions, Moreover, the Germans displayed a feniusformiltary organisation, "The German miliary ‘machine was aot only better equipped and better ‘manned, bu beter run than the French. In 1914 the French, ae they were well avare, would once more have been beaten ation in ix weeks bu for prompe British intervention ; and that intervention had hung on « 35 ©thread, The jubilation of 1919 was short-lived. ‘neath the eejocings a deep note of anxiety soon made itself heard, "Since 1870-and stil more since 1934— France had been morbily conscious of her weaknea i face of Germany. ‘She had turned the tables on the vitor of 187, What could be contrived to prevent Gi ‘many one day turing the tables onthe victor of 1918? France's fist answer to this question was clear and cmphatc. She wanted hat se called a physical fuarantee "—the possenson in perpetuity of the Rhine nd ite bridges, across which any invader of France from the east mist pass." The danger comes", ran a Frenchmemorandutm presented tothe Peace Conference in February 1919, "from the possesion by Germany of the Left bank and of the Rhine bridges... The fafey ofthe Westera and Overseas Democracies makes it iesperative, in present circumstances, for them to fuard the bridges of the Rhine.” To her keen die Appointment, her Allie refused to give France the fccurity of the Rhine frontier, on the ground that this arrangement would have involved. the separation from Germany of more than five milion Germans Tiving oa the left bank of the Rhine. After a bitter struggle, France was obliged to abandon her claim, ‘She secre in exchange— (2) the inclusion in the Verses Treaty of clases providing forthe occupation of the left bank of the Khine for Bilton years by Allied fores, and for its permanent demilitarisation (Ze proibition to maintain troops or construct fortesses West of the Rhine) and {2) the conclusion, simultaneously with the Ver= sales Treaty, of trates with the Brith Empire tnd the United State, under which these Powers Undertook to come immesatly to the assistance of France "inthe event of any unprovoked moveret of agaresion against er being male by Germany" ‘The flue ofthe United States to rat the treaties signed at Versilles rendered both the Drtsh and the ‘American undertakings void. race felt herself cheated. She had abandoned he claim onthe strength fof a promise which was not honoured; and this gree nee wat an underlying factor throughout the subse- ‘quent dscusions between France and Great Britain on the question of security ‘Having thus been compelled to abandon ber hope ‘of 2 physical guarantee, France worked feverishly ding the next four years t ind compensation for her natural inferiority to Germany, and t allay he Fae of German vengeance. She falowed two separate and parallel methods a system of weaty guarantees, and 3 system of alliances. "The Svstest oF Guananrens ‘When i became clear, about the beginning of 1920, thatthe Anglo-American guarantee aguinst unprovoked tggresion would never come int fore, France was left Without any treaty protection against Germany other than that contained in the Covenant of the League of Nations. France had decided from the fist that this vs insufcent, Ie was true that, under Article 20 of 7the Covenant, members of the Leagve undertook 0 tespect and preserve as gains external aggression the teritoral integrity and exiting politcal independence ofall memisers of the League", and that Articles 15 and 17 provided for sanctions’ or penales agunst fny state which resorted to war in disegurd of ite obligations. But Article to had been acepted by Grest Britain the Power which counted for most) with reluc- tance; and the French proposal to eeate an intr rational army, which alone eould make sanctions elect- ive, had been emphatically nepatived by Great Britain tnd the United States, Under Article +6 members of the League were bound to break off financial and economic telations with an agyresoe. But military {tion and nothing lees would stop Germany) depended fon a" recommendition ” of the Councl, which ro- (uited 2 unanimous vote, and which, when Voted, could bbe accepted or rejected by individual states a8 they pleted; and the American defection cart serie outta on the eficacy, oF even the posibilty, of a financial and economic blockade. ‘French scepticism about the eficacy ofthe Cove- nant wat enhanced when the League actully came into being. When the frst Assembly met in Geneva in December 1930, Articles 19 and 16 were the subject ‘of an immediate stack Canada wanted to supprest [Anil 1 altogether; and the Scandinavian deleations desired to provide for exceptions to the automatic ‘pplication of economie sanctions under Article 16, oth these proposals gave rset long deliberations. I the following Year, the Assembly voted a resolution which prescribed inter alia that the Council would, 8 when need arose, recommend the date on which the enforcement of ceonomie presure under Article 16 is to be begun the efec being to give the Counc lavude to postpone and modify the application of eonomic sanctions. In 1g23 a resolution was poe posed dechiring tat the decision what measures were hecesuty to curry ou the obligations of Article 10 must rest with "the constitutional authorities ofeach mem= ber”. ‘The effect of this resolution was to leave the rater of military atstance tothe discretion of ‘and its adoption was Blocked only by the adverse vote of ene minor state Although neither Ante 10 nor Article 16 had been focally Amended, i wae clear from these discussions that theit practical application in time of crisis would lag cone Siderably behind the strict lewe of the Covenant. The Imachinery of Geneva was evidently not likly to set in ‘mation that prompt military action which alone eould save France from tavasin, Tn these circumstances it is not surprising that France continued to press Great Britain for some ditional guarantee of asntance aginst Getman Sggresion. The conclusion ofthese efforts wis, how fever,paradoxical. Tn January 192, the British Govern- rent at length plucked up courage to offer France 4 ‘guarantee in approximately the same terms at thore of the abortive treaty of 1919. It so happened that the [French Prime Minster ofthe day waste obtinate and shortsighted Poincaré, who belived ia policy ofall fr nothing. Poincaré demanded that the guarantee ‘hould be tupplemented by a military convention de- Sing the precie nature of the asintance tobe rendered 9boy the Brish aemy, and declared that, ling this, a sere guarantee Weaty was worthless t9 France. ‘The British Government was not prepared to commit itself to far. Ted dacharged its debt of honour and it ‘now abandoned for some time to come the apparently hopeless tak of satisfying the French appetite for security, ‘Tue Srorent of Atasavens Poincar": high-handed attude was explained in part by the success which France had meanwhile Achieved in the other aspect of her quest for security the building up of system of alances. A policy of rilitay allnces was more congenial to French tem= perament and Prench tradition than the more abstract curity of guaraneceapuint aggression. Te was this policy which had gained for France her supremacy in Europe inthe eighteenth century, when she contained Austria by alliances with Austria's smaller neighbours, Te was ths policy by which she now sought to encizcle Germany. Tn the west, the postion was made secure in September roao bya military alliance with Belgium, heethere fresh ground had tobe broken. Russia had ‘ceased to exist as 2 military power. But in her pace the new republic of Pland had appeared on Germany's tastern frontier. To the south there had arisen, thanks to the victory of the Allies, the thee new or much enlarged states of Coechowovakia, Yugoslavia and Roumania, who were France's natural friends and clients, Out of this material France Bult up, ia the thre years after the war, an effective and closely knit sjsten of alliances. » [FRANCE AND HER ALLIES Poisso ‘The Polish republic which came into being at the tend ofthe war vas not anew site, but the revival of an ‘ld one, From the tenth t the eighteenth century, Poland bad teen a large and powerful Kingdom. In the Inter half of the eighteenth century, she incurred the joine enmity of Rusia, Prossia and Avsria and aftr three" partitions", i Which Lager and larger tlices of territory were taken from her she lout her independence in 791. The simoltancos eclipse in 1918 of the Russian, German and Austrian Empires seas stroke of lock which made hr re-buth certain, But the frst years were a period of prest dificult. ‘The Russian, German and Austrian Poles, who now united to form a single state, ad for a century and a quarter lived under uiterent ie and iferent systems ff admiistration, had served in difrent armies and fought on oppusite sides, and had acquired diferent traditions and different lvates, It rquiced no small stock of common patrstiem to ovecrde these diver- {gence of outlook, "Moreover Poland, set in the midst fof the great European plain, had no clearly marked ‘geographical frontiers except on the touth, where the (Carpathian Mountains divided her from Slovakia, Het ‘western and northern frontiers with Germany were feted, inthe manner already described, by the Verses Treaty. Everywhere ele, the limits of the new Poland were the subject of acrimonious debate vith her neighbours In the southewest the litle district of Austrian ”g § 2 5 a z & a 5 lia, an important coalfield inhabited by « mixed CCzzch-Polsh population, provided an apple of discord between Poland and the new state of Czechoslovaki, Enrly in 1919 Polish and Caech forces came to blows in the disputed area: anda pitched battle was ony averted by the mediation of French and Dritsh officers. Temas decided to settle the dispute bya plebiscite. Duta the time for the wote drew near, passions ran 80 high that the plan was dropped and under strong French pres ‘ure, both sides agreed toa settlement. By this stl. ment, Ceechoslovakia obtsined the coal mines and Poland the principal town of Teschen (though not is nilway station which remained in Czechoslovakia) Te ‘was compromise which had no vrtue except that of being a compromise ; and beth sides continued to regard themselves as deeply injured parte. Tn Asstrian Poland a diferent problem arose. Of the two provinces of West and East Galicia into which Austrian Poland was divided, the former was purely Polish in character. In East Gali the landed gentry and myst of the intellectuals (ther than the Jews, who ‘were eve particularly aurserous) were Poles. But the peasantry belonged to the same stock which peopled the whole of southwestern Rusia — being variously escrbed as Litde Russians, Ukrainians or Ruthenes. Teis probable thatthe landless Ruthene peasant of East Galicia hated the Polish landowner rather because he was a landowner than because he wat a Pole. Dut of the depth of the hatred there was no doubt. Ia the carly months of 1919 East Galicia was the scene of Stubloon civil war between the ruling Polish minority And the subject Ruthene majority, Polish reinforce Fy‘THE PERIOD OF ENFORCEMENT ‘ments were soon broughtin ; and in May the resistance of the Ruthenes, supported by nothing more effective than mild protests fem the Allis Pare guinst Polish high-handedness, ame oan end. ‘The Allie, helpless to alter the accomplished fact, oered Poland 2 mandate over East Galicia fr twenty-fve years after which time the fate ofthe eritory was tobe decided hy the League of Nations. ‘The Poles rejected the propos and re- ‘mained in posession. In 1925 the Allies at ast formally ‘recognised Polish sovereignty over East Gali inretuen for & promise (which was never earried out) to st up an rutonomous régime thee, ‘On the easter frontier of Poland the same problem presented itself on fr larger scale. Inthe days of ta sreatness the kingdom of Poland had not been confined to lands where the indigenous population was Polish Thad embraced the whole of Lithoania, most of White Russia, and the whole of the Ukraine as far asthe Black Sea, In these territories, wae rats of county were in the posession of Polish andowners—s sate of affairs ‘which continued right down to the Russian revolution of 1917. After the revolution, these landowners took refuge ia Poland. They not unnaturally pot strong pressure on the Pash Government to recanguer thelr ands for them and perfervid patriots dreamed of a restored Plish empire stretching from the Dalit the Black Sea. A proposal fom the Allis in Paris that the exstern frontier of Poland shouldbe so drawn a8 to include only teritores where the Polish population was ina majority was received a a biter inaule Te was in such 2 mood that Marshal Pilsudsk, the bead ofthe Polish state and the commandersin-chie of ” the aemy, set out in the sping of 1920 to conquer the Urraine for Poland. The Sovict army, diseased by the civil war, made fecble resistance; and Polish {woop quickly reached Kiev. In June, however, the Sovkt force were able to launch a mass countere offensive, which not only drove the Pols helter-skeler fut of the Usine, but brought Soviet toops within a fev miles of Ware. Here the fortunes of war under went another sudden reveral.. The Soviet offensive, like the Polish efensive before it, was exhausted. The Polish army advanced once more.This time, avoiding the Ukraine, they marched due est nto White Rassia fand when the armistice was at last sounded, the ine ‘wat some 150 miles east ofthe so-called "Curzon ine” proposed by the Allis. But the Soviet Goverament ‘wat prodigal of territory and needed peace. Tn 193t the Treaty of Riza confirmed the armistice line a the permanent frontier between Poland and Soviet Rus Poland abandoned ber claim othe Ukraine, but received large, though sparsely populated tract of White Rusia ‘Next came the turn of Lithuania, Here the chief bone of contention wat the city and datct of Vilna Vilna had been the capital of the mediaeval empire of Litheania («hich in the stceath century bid been ‘united with Poland by a convenient royal marriage): and when in 1918 an independent Lithuania was re- ‘ived, it promptly precaimed Vilna as its capital. ‘Une happily, Vilna had an equally strong sentimental ateac- tion for Poland. Tt wan the seat of famous Polish ‘university andan ancient homect Polish earning. Feim the ednographical standpoint, neither the Lithuanian ‘or the Polish claim was strong. ‘The population of s‘THE PERIOD OF ENFORCEMENT the city was Jewish the Jews bad an absolute majority), Polish and White Russian; of the surrounding dee, Whice Russian and Lithuanian, But where so many passions were excited, the wishes of the popelations Concerned (if indeed they had any) were vaikcly to be decisive, Tn July 1920, during the Soviet advance towards ‘Warsa, Lithuania had signed a treaty with the Soviet Government by which the litter recognised her claim to Vilna. But the subsequent Polish advance cut off Lithuania altogether from her Soviet finds, and she vas left to face the Poles alone. Fighting scon began inthe neighbourhood of Suvalk. It went less well for the Poles than might have been expected ; and in ‘October an armistice was signed which lft Vilna and district in Lithuanian hands, ‘Three days later, an independent Polish general named Zeligowski collected fome toops and, taking the Lithuanians completly by ‘surprise, ccupied Vil, Oficial, the Polish Governe ‘ment deplored thi fgrant breach of faith. But i “unbluchingy atuck tothe prize; and Plsudsi admitted, ‘some years later, tht the coup had been carried ut with is knowledge and approval. Long negotiations conducted by the League of Nations filed to dislodge the Pole; and in’ 1923, when the Lithuanians had ‘put themselves out of court by their seizure of Meme! (brhich had been occupied by the Allies since the Ver. sles ‘Treaty, the Allie formally recognised Vilna part of Pland, ‘The Polish state, thus constituted, had! a population of over thiry millons—a figure which almost entitled ito the rank ofa Gres Power. Tt was rich in natural 6 FRANCE AND HER ALLIES resources, posesing an abundance of coal and ion in the south-west, olin East Galicia, extensive frets in the east, and good agricultural land almost every- ‘where. But it aio had conepicuous weaknesses, Not less than 25 percent ofits population was non- Polish, inctodng four million Jews | and most ofthe minorities ‘were actually or potentially hore. Furthermore, Poland was, in these early dayn, on bad terms with al hher neighbours without exception. “There wat con- stant friction with Germany over the tretment ofthe German minovty and over Danzig; and it seemed oubsfl whether any German ‘Government would ‘stomach indefinitely the separation of Fast Prussia fom the rest of Germany by the Polish corridor. Soviet Rossa might some day regret er generosity. Cvecho- vakin was sullenly resentful, Lithuania noisily in- Gignant; and there might be' trouble again in East Galicia.’ Poland was the strongest Power in eastern Europe. But she could scarcely face the world alone, In these circumstances, the Freneh policy of alliance with the neighbours of Germany coincided perfectly With Poland's own needs. ‘The Franco-Polth treaty Of alliance of February 1921 wat an inateument of clase political co-operation. Tea accompanied by a secret military convention, and wat followed by the supply from France on easy terms of large supplies of wat material for the equipment of the Polish army. Some cautious Frenchmen complained that so quarrel. tome anally was more of a iblty than an asset, and that no French soldier would be willing to div for Poland. Some Poles grumbled at the. patronising attitude of their French associates, and atthe number vand cvcliness ofthe French Military Mission ia War- fh, But the alliance was founded on ato slid basis of common interest to be shaken by any tevial diet contents. In every important ine of international politics, France and Poland eanged themselves side by fide. “At Geneva, the French and Polish delegates were hand-in-slove in every private negtation, and spoke and voted together in every public debate "Tae Lirrur Eeresre ‘The Little Bntente was the unoficial name forthe alliance between the thre sates which profited moxt by the break up of the Austro-Hlungarian monarchy Caachoslovakia, Roumania and Yugosavia, Czechoslovakia, as the name (a recent coinage) indiates, was formed bythe union of two neighbouring peoples." The Czechs and Slovaks are to branches of the same Slav stock, speaking closely related dialects of the same language. "The history ofthe tr peoples is however quite diferent. The Ctechs, who formed in the Middle Ages the nucleus ofan independent King- dom of Bohemia, passed from 1620 onwards under the Germanie influence of the Austrian Empire, ‘The ‘old Coch aristocracy was completely Germansed and the modem Czech ae thrifty, hard-working, well ‘educated middle-class and working-class people. Slo ‘aki, onthe other land, had for a thousand years prior to 1918 been par of Hungary. ‘The Slovaks were an illterate peaant race; and Slovak eulture was repre sented by a handful of intellectuals living abroad, ‘mainly inthe United Suites. These conditions madeit ¥ inevitable that the army officers, the civil servants and the teachers of the new Czechoslovak state shoud be ‘raw principally from the Czech. But this inequality ‘wae resented in Slovaecrcles; and the most representa tive Slovak party persistently demanded” national asto- omy ” for Slovshis, “The greater part of the sil of Czechoslovakia was agricultural; and the new state strengthened itself by an extensive agrarian reform, involving the exproprae tion of the lezer landowners, mainly German or Hugaren, andthe distibtion of ther land to Caech for Slovak small farmers and peasanta. But Ceecho- slovakia was also a highly developed industrial state, and 4 large manufacturer of war materia. Her former ‘Avstran provinces contained some So per cent of the production of co and iron and the heavy industy of the prewar Austrian Empire. These advantages were in part set off by the weahness of her geographical postion and the mised character of her population. Of her population of more than fourteen millions the Czechs, who formed the ruling cls, accounted for six snd a Tall millions and the Slovaks for two millions ‘more. ‘The balance was made up ofa compact and ine colonial ‘questions disappeared altogether, ‘The revised text could hurt nobody. Ie was so harmless that, at the last moment, Germany almost refused to accept it 92 ‘THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE But in the end it es safelynitalld in Rome by repee> sentatives of the four Person June 7hy 1933. ‘The Lite Entente had declared itself sated with the innocence of the final text But an unpleasant feeling remained in Little Entente circles that Taly hha attacked thee ital interests and that France had been unduly lukewarm in their defence, Polish amour- propre was more gravely wounded. Poland the greatest of the leser Powers, bitterly resented the succes of Tealy, the least of the Great Powers in excluding bet from the seleet company of the leaders of European policy. Her anger vented itelf on France, who bad faerifced Polish dignity to the vanity of Mussolini ‘The Four-Power Pact, though it never came into force (both France and Germany filed to ratify i), did therefore achieve one of its objects by sowing resentment between France and her allie and loosens lng the bonds between them. In s0 doing, it paved the way for that new alignment of Powers which was to result from the new direction of German policy.PART IV ‘THE RE-EMERGENCE OF GERMANY: ‘THE END OF THE TREATIES (1933-1939)‘THE NAZI REVOLUTION Ow January 3oth, 1933, Hitler became German Chan- cellar ina government componed of three Nazis and eight Nationalists; and the Reichstag was di- solved for a fresh. general election. AE the election af the previous July, the Nazi party, with 230 seat, had become the largest single partyin the Reichrag. Te now hoped to secure an absolute majority, On February 27th, while the lection was. pending, the Reichstag building was burned down in mysterious circumstances; and this act was made the pretext for 4 general round-up of alleged communists and com- ‘nunist sympathise, conducted partly by the police, ‘but mainly by iregular forces wearing the brown Nasi ‘uniform. The eleton increased the number of Nazi deputies by ga; and from this point all pretence of Jews, Social-Democras and Communists were, in effet, ouwed. Large numbers of them were driven from their homes, confined in concentration camps of subjected to great physical brutality. Many aesssna- tions took place without any atempe being made to bring the perpetrators to justice, Similar teatinent vas meted out to member of other parties who resisted or eiltciaed the new dictatorship andy the middle of 1933 all non-Nazi parties and party orgenisations had 7‘THE RE-EMERGENCE OF GERMANY been forcibly dissolved. ‘The Reichstig had hence- forth no function butt meet at rare intervals for the purpose of applauding the Chancellors declarations OF policy. When Hindenburg died in August 1934, Hitler was elected by an overwinelming vete tothe Presidency, combining this office with the Chancelloe- ship. Tn the sphere of foreign policy, the frst pronounce ments of the new régime were reasuringly pacific. Hitler emphatically diselaimed any deste to revise the treaty setlement By force. But it was not forgtten shat his epirtual autobiography, Mein Kampf. which had been written i 1924, and which now circulated rillions of copies, denounced France as Germany's irreconcilable foe, claimed to incorporate in All the scattered German minorities living beyond her present borders, and treated Eastern Europe asa auit- Able field for German colonisation, Moreover, the ‘secret reatmament of Germany, which had been going fn for some years, now procteded at an acclerated pace, and Tess care was ‘taken to conceal ian i force being openly established in defiance of the ‘ueaty proibition. In one respect only Hitler showed consistent self-restraint. Conscious of the funda- ‘mental errr of Geran policy which had made Great Britain the enemy of Germany, he fray posed any repetition ofthe atempt to compete with British naval power. ‘The Nezi revolution made a deep impression ‘throughout the eivilised world, The impression was of two Kinds, In some countries, the predominant feeling was one of mor indignation atthe erveies and 198 ‘THE NAZI REVOLUTION excesses of the dictatorship ; in thers, not less pro found anxiety a this open challenge tothe peace sette- tment of 1919.. The second kind of reaction seemed fore efiectie than the fist, In Great Britain and the United States, where the prevailing emotion was one of indignation, not of fea, there was no marked change of policy towards Germany. In Taly and the Soviet Union, whose governments had themselves risen to ppomer’ by violence, there was less room for moral Eenvure,” But these countries, moved by keen ap- prehension of the international consequences of Fitler's assumption of power, exceuted an abropt revel of policy. "The present chapter will deal with the striking changes brought about by the Nazi revala- tion inthe polite orientation of several of the more Important European Powers. Po.ano AND Tue Sovier UNION “The fist of tet changes wa surprising recon sion. "Nowhere in Europe sace 1919 had animosity teen more biter than betneen Germany and Poland. "The Plc coor to the sea, separating East Prssia ffom the rest af Gerinany, bad supplied Germans with thett most dramatic givance against the Versi ‘Treanor fad een wore pent i Appeals to the League of Nations aguint the jt of 12RSerment thant German miro in Poland No {gestion had been more frequently on the agenda ofthe Gotha thn coputes between Polind and Danzig Oa the morrow of the Nex revaation, one ofthe most seriou of thee disputes cored’ when 200 Polah »"THE RE-ENERGENCE OF GERMANY folders were landed without authoration ata pont in the port of Dania." Yt within» fon month ofthis incident the fist step towards a rapprochement had teen taken; and in January 1934. om the eve of the fint anniversary of Hider Chanctilrship, a Geman: Polish pact was signed which complctely earcformed Polish foreign pley and the diplomatic conSgurston of Fasten Europe, Among the most conpievous can Sequences ofthe pact were the cevstion of the came Fain of mutual vitoperation conducted by the Geran and Polish pres Yor the pas fiten yas and the da appearance rom the agen ofthe League of complaints tthe German minority in Pland and doputes about Dana. ‘The motives which ed on both sides tothe signature ofthis pact require some explanation. er ad shocked and antagonsed. Western Europes and in view of his persecution of the communists he could 0 lke his predecessors at Rapall oe p. 73), callin the Soviet Union to redress the balance.” Hewat in danger of complete isolation. Moreover, be hed some 1 the concluiona conlsion which muy have been influenced by his own Attrianorign~tha Germany's frst advance shouldbe. southwarde Everything pointed f0 truce with hi easter neighbour, He Durchated Polish friendship ‘by an undertaking to ‘nin rom any acon asin Poland, whet by Bropaganda or otherwise for a period offen yeas ‘The motives of Poland were equally cogent” For fiteen years she had lived uncomfortably bern two hole Powers. ‘Her one ally, France, as ar amy France had already shown, inthe Locarno Treas inctiation to subordinate Polish interests to her oma fecurty; and abe had reeatly wounded Poland tothe ick by signing the Four-Power Pact (cep. 93) ‘The rest of Germany a3 Grent Powerade Feteh Ap in time of trouble more uncertain than ever Poland could no longer afd to incu the en of both er big neighbours. She must choose between them tnd she chore the one which se judged tobe the srongerand more rele way tre tha the CGerman-Falh pact only promised her ten Yor” Feit, But station which xn be sable fren eas have sway of lsting.- Te wae worth making the *N ‘more detailed account must be given of reactions in the Soviet Union. BY 1927 offend relations had teen etablghed by the Sovet-Government. wih sil the principal Powers exept the United tte Sn in that year Soviet delegates appeared for the fat tne at Geneva (ce p10) "The sme year ssw the eiumph of Sains policy of * socialism n'a Single state" (se p. 77) The adoption of the fist Five-Year Pla, whlch came nt operation on October 24 15a, meant the iniaon of avant proces of indosritiston in which the prota interest ofthe state must tke precedence over the thers print ‘Spleaof revlon. ‘The recatablohment of offal ‘cations between the Soviet Union and Grest Brin in gag woes father sep towards normal condons, Toni samaned forthe Bove subsites to comet terme withthe United Staten and with the League of Nadone "No fuer progres was made fr three years But"THE RE-EMERGENCE OF GERMANY in the autumn of 1932, the Soviet Union concluded nnon-egeresson pacts mith Italy and France; and inthe fist quarter of the following Year two events occurred ‘hich ave an entiely new turn to Soviet policy. Hitler came to power in Germany, and Japan, con- demned by the Assembly, left the League. These trent produced their appropriate reactions in Moscow. ‘The summer of 1933 witnessed 9 rapid rapprochement, bse on common fear of Germany, between the Soviet Union and France; and a teries of pronouncements against treaty revision appeared in the Soviet pres. ‘Simultaneously, the two Powers which had most to fear from Japan-—the Soviet Union and the United Sates ew closer together. In November 1933, Litvinov Visited Washington, and gave suitable pledges on behalf Of the Soviet Government to refrain from propaganda in the United States, and to accord religious freedom to American residents in the Soviet Union: and the ‘American Government oficilly recognised the Soviet Government, Soviet diplomacy had thus secured two potential allie—on the one side against Germany and fn the other against Japan. One further retraction of ts ancient prejudices was required of the Soviet Government; its entry into the League of Nations, France insisted on this step. A Franco-Soviet alliance would have savaured too much ‘of pre-war diplomacy, and might have been disagree- thle to|Grest Britain, Common interest in defence ‘gainst German aggression must be exprewed. by fcommon membership of the League. In July 1936 France induced Great Britain and Tay to jin with het in canvassing the other members of the League for the scimission of the Soviet Union ; and at the Assembly in September, the admision duly took place, only three fMater—Switterland, Holland and. Portogal—voting tganst it Poland took two precautions. She obtained 1 private cndertaking from the Soviet Government that the latter Would not promote or suppor any petitions to the League by the Russian minority in Poland, and she publicly decared atthe Assembly that she no longer recognised the right of the League t9 Concern teelf with Polish minority questions—a vital ‘enunciation ofthe minorities weaty. "The recuity afforded by membership ofthe League was inadequate to allay Sovit apprehensions of Hitler; and the Soviet Government continued to press fora direct agreement with Prance. France wat n= willing to eejct the request. She ascertained that Great Britain would not object to a guarantee pact between France and the Soviet Union, provided Ger- ‘many were invited to join t, and the guarantee made "pplicable, on the Locarno precedent, ia both divee- tions, The French and Soviet Governments accord- ‘nly prepared the daft of an Eastern Pact under which France and the Soviet Union would not only guarantee each other against aggression by Germany, but would tach pusrantee Germany agsinat aggression by the ther. The plan seemed somewhat artifical ; for it tras dieu fo imagine any circumstances ia which Germany would obtain the help of France against the Soviet Union or of the Soviet Union against France ‘The draft. was, however, approved by the Baish Government in February 1935 and submitted, with other proposals which wil be mentioned late, to the 25"THE RE-EMERGENCE OF GERMANY German Government. Germany mised. objections which were tantamount t0 refusal, ‘This was the result which the French and Soviet Governments had fxpected and pethape desired. ‘They took advantage ‘oft to sign, in May 2935, 2 Franco-Soviet Pact under ‘which each undertook to come to the assistance of the Uther if attacked by any European Power. The result fof the Nexi revolution had been to reconstitute the pre-war Franco-Rusian Alliance ‘Ausra. ano Traty Hitler's decision to make Austria the fst object of his foreign policy proved in many reapecta unfor- tunate. Never from 1919 to 1933 had there been any oubs that the vast majority of the Austrian people desired union with Germany ; and no article of the teeaties could be more legitimately criticised than the eto on this union, Hut the Nazi revolution had Slienated large sections of Austrian opinion. Nether the Social-Democrats, who were the largest party inthe ‘Austrian Parliament, aor the Jews, who were numerous tnd influential in Vienna, wished to abate the fate of their comrades in Nasi Germany; and the Catholic (Church, which played a considerable role in Austrian politics, had botn antagonised by its treument at the Finds of the German Navi, Besides these particular fausee of mistrust, the taditionaly easy-going Austrian Tooked askance € the brutal and ruthless efbceney of the new régime in Germany. It is probable that, at fany time since Hitler's accession to power, a free vote in Austria would still have given & majority for 24 "THE NAZI REVOLUTION nin with Germany. Bat the majority would have teen by no means at overuelning ind incontestable 25 por Januny 193. Fhe fat Ausian oicton to the Nasi revelie tin was, however, one of iat. in Match 1933, Davy the Austin Chancellor overiled Sot Damocrt opposition inthe Charber by suspen the conttiton, Henceforth, the Austin Govern treat relied largely on the support of a private miltary crrannaton, tre Fletmwchr, which had ome int beng tome yar eter an a takewelght to the ated {eres the Socal Democrats ‘The German Govern- trent then entered the field. Broadcast attacking the [Noctsan Coverment besame constant ature of ihe Munich programme, German aeroplanes dropped ‘Nii propane on Attra eriory, Money {nd ana were mogied sr the one to Abstan Nas A prohibitive vin fee was. mpoted on fi tending German vitor to Auta June 1933, the Aven Government replied By suppresng the Moston Nal pay. Navwitnanding the revtnce of the Heimwehr and eta sections th popuision, Aura might ‘sn ane led to German pee bt forthe inter ‘cation ofthe Grst Powers. The general indignation Iain he ences ofthe Nan eee was now as ‘ight, and wat intensfed by the German eampugn Sint Ausra Bish piton became ware le iisent han French option on the importance of training Austrian independence. Diplomatic re- frventtions were made a Beri without mh ec Te August, Aue obtained a fartber nterntonal 5“THE REEMERGENCE OF GERMANY Joan guaranteed by Grest Britain, France, Italy and several smaller Powers. From this poine onwards, Ttaly became Austria's principal patton. For some years past Italy had been S discontented and “revisionist” power (ste p. 190 find recently she had ranged herself on the German ‘Se on nearly all imporeant iaues. Now, under the Simolus of the Nazi revolution, the foreign policy of Ttaly changed as dramatically a4 that of the Soviet Union. Ttly might want teaty evsion in Africa or in Eastern Europe, But if Germany were allowed to fcquite Austria, she might be a dangerous neighbour fora Power which had annexed the German-Austian province of South Tyrol During the winter of 1933~ Jp the Halla Government began to pay secret aubsidies othe Heimvehe, which i regarded a the bulwark of ‘Austrian independence. As the price of these subs sities, Mussolini demanded the’ overthrow of the ‘fostrian Social-Democrats, who still controlled the ‘unicipality of Vienna, and the establishment in [Austria of gime on Favcist ines. ‘This demand was omplied with n February 1934. There was no serious eastance. Several hundred leding Social- Democrats ‘Nete imprisoned, and all socialist institutions. sup- pressed. Austrian policy, both domestic and foreign, pssed under the control of Il "The result of there proceedings was to deprive Austra of much of the sympathy she had hitherto Enjoyed in Great Britain, though the Brish Govern- tment continued to declare is saterest in Austrian iar dependence, The Nazis were spurred to fresh effort, (On Jaly 25, 2934, band of Austrian Nazis occupied 6 [THE NAZI REVOLUTION the Federal Chancery and fatally wounded Dolfss a8 he ted to escapes The rebels ld, however, o win nee the troops or the bulk ofthe population; and by the end of the day the goveroment sak once more it contrlof Vienna,’ Elsewhere there were ony sporadic tures, vas generally fel tht the rebellion ould fot have been orgunined without German support: fnd_many regarded Hitler ax_morallyrespouible forthe dexh of Dolls. Telia einforcerments were hurd to the frontier, “There wis snuch speculation trhther they would have marched into Austria the Insurrection had succeeded ‘The evens of July 1954 proved to be another turn ing-poin in Austrian afta Hider became serouly impresed with the discredit which hie Austran Puliy ad frooght on him, and was perhaps afraid af Frain mitary reins were proved. Germany changed her ities, No further encouragement wa {Gren to Austrian Nazis to comait acto of Vleosey Sed German. stacks one. Austin Government ‘Sere virtaly suspended, Hier more than once die ‘Some any tention of ttcatenng the independence Sf Aussi interfering i her domes afi. Thin policy ras maintained fortwo year. In July 1936, Shes flys Abyssinian venture had weakenod er held Se Cental Eueupe, Austin conchae a pact of recone ‘lation with Germany: and shorty afterwards the Ticimwchr nich Tel could no longer afford to ab side, wa disbanded. The rl of thee event aa to extablah a sort of German-tliancondoniion ort ‘Austin Bata this as atompanid by aa improve: mneat of relions between Germany and Italy, 50 Ey“THE RE-EMERGENCE OF GERMANY cccasion arose for some time to test which was the pre- Sominant partner FFrasce, Hany axp tue Livre Ester “The alienation of aly from Germany in the winter of ag3g-34. and the establishment ofan Telia qu protectorate over Austria, had important repercussions fn Central and Southern Europe “The fist ofthese was x rapid improvement in relax tions between France and Tay. Franeo-tlian rivalry tha flared up soon after the war asthe result of French Support of Yugoslav claims, Since then, it had spread tomany other epheres. I Aftica, France had failed to ttn Ialys cam under the London Treaty of 1913 {Gee ps 70), and there was constant friction over the Status of Hallas inthe French dependency of Tunis In naval matters aly was mortified by France's refusal to concede her elim to party (ee p- 181) In genera European questions, Taly consistently supported the srcvances of the exenemy Powers and maiatained het frosty to France’ ally, Yugoslvia. Relations con tinued to deteriorate down to 4933. But Hitler’ de Signs on Austria were a menace to which France and aly ‘were equally sensible, Common interest in ‘Austrian independence drew them quickly together; dnd in September 1934, the possibilty was canvassed ‘fan olfil_ vist by Barthou, the French Foreign Minster, to Rome for the purpose of seting out- standing dificlties ‘Dut the solution was les simple than it appeared. Both patties had their clients in Catal Europe 28 Czechoslovakia, Yugostvia and Roumanis were France’ alls. aly had long supported. Hungey and in March 1934 # series of agecements ofa semi politial,semi-economic character ad been signed Rome between Italy, Austrian and Hungary. Unless, therefor, either France or Taly was prepared to abane don ber clients, it was necessary to effect areconliation ‘between the rival groups in Central Europe before the Franco-alin rapprochement would be consummated. Italy was in a position to put pressure on Austria and Hungary. Te remained to be sen what France could do with the Litle Entente. ‘The Little Entent had resented, though less keenly than Poland, French participation in the Four-Power Pact; and the present French move towards Ttaly was also regarded with suspicion. But the suspicion was fot shared equally by all Uuree members ofthe Enente. In fect, Hider’ threat to Austria had caused the fiat serious rift in the partnership. Ceechoslovakia ‘would be dangerously enctcled if Germany annexed ‘Austria; and she welcomed eny steps which Tay and France might take to ward off that event. Yugoslavia had Tite to fear from the absorption of Austria by Germany, But if Tely were mistress of Austria, ‘Yugeslava would feel herself encircled by Tay; and she disliked a reconciliation between "France and Italy which was evidently designed to strengthen the Iivters hold over Austria, Roviania was too far off to be directly affected, and wan concerned only to preserve the solidarity of the Lite Entente against Hungary. In shor, all three members of the Lite Entente could do lip-service to the maintenance of 9‘Austria's independence, But once that independence had ceased to be real, and Austria passed nder the dzecting influence of some other Power, Czecho- slovakia prefered that that Power shouldbe Ialy, and ‘Yogoelavia that i should be Germany. Tn Octaber 1934, while the issue ng inthe balance, King Alexander of Yugoslavia paid an oficial visit to France to lay his views before the French Government. He was met at Marcille by Barthou ; and as they drove away together from the ship, both men were Killed by the revolver of a Croat terrorist. Tt was notorious that both Ttly and Hungary had harboured, And even subsidised, dinfected Yugoaavs, who might feme day be useful in fomenting a rebellion. It was Aiicule to exablsh dice Tealan or Hungarian com= plicit inthe Marseilles crime. But Yugodiavia decided to protest tothe League of Nations; andthe situation might have been dangerous but fr the firm resolve of the to Great Powers concerned~France and Tey not tallow this tragedy to impede the incipient rap- brochement between them. A tacit bargin was struck Yogoslavia was persuaded to direct her charges ex- clusively agsinnt Hungary, 2nd to make no mention of Italy in her protest at Geneva. In return, Iealy would induce Hungary, who was helpless without Ttalian support, to accept such measure of censure a8 could tufice to appease Yugoslav indignation. The proceed~ ngs at Geneva were conducted on thie plan; and after arduous negotiations, the Council was able to declare Unanimously that" certain Hungarian authorities may Ihave assumed, at any rate through negligence, certain responublites relative to acts having connexion with the preparation ofthe erime of Marseilles", and that ina the duty ofthe Hungarian Government to punish tay of its ofa whore guilt might be esuabished. “The assasination of King Alexander on French si had thee main consequences, Tt increased Yugo- flay suspicions of Taly; it produced a certain cool. reas between Yugoslavia and France ; and it hastened the reconciliation between France and Tels. Ta the fist days of January 1035 Laval, Barthou's suc fessor, visited Rome, and signed with Mussolini a Series of agrecinenta which marked the end of the long Franco-ltalian feud.” As regards Germany, the two Powers agzeed to " concert upon the attitude to be ‘udopted in the event of Germany pursuing a policy of Tearmancnt. \s rogarda Central Europe, they agreed to recommend to Austria and all her neighbours (other than Switerland) eo enter into a. pact undertaking hot to intervene in one another's afars and not to support aterpta to destroy the independence, ot tverthrow the "politcal or socal rime”, of their fespective countries, (No attempt was, in fact, ever fade to negotiate the proposed pact) athe faean- ‘hile they undertook to conaue together with Avsti, ind wth such of her neighbours as might be wiling, in the event of threat wo Austria's independence. "Ax regards Afric, France ceded to Taly, in settlement of her claim under the London Teeaty, a strip of French Ejqatorial Africa adjacent to the Talian province of Libya, and a mall tangle of French Somaliland ad joining Eritea the sstus of Italians in Tunis was Fegulated; and Laval gave Mussolini to understand that France disinterested herself in any concesions‘THE RE-EMERGENCE OF GERMANY Which Isly might obtain in Abyssinia, It was after- ‘wards stated ffom the French side that this under Standing, the terms of which were kept sere, related ‘only to economic concessions. "The reconciliation between France and Italy wa the ast important diplomatic wlefacedrety inspired by Hliter's advent to power and the results of the ‘whole proces may now be biely summarised. Poland had drawn away from France (though the Franco- Polish alliance was not formally. denounced), and centered into a close asocation with Germany.” The Soviet Union had abandoned ita traditional revisionist stitude, and wholeheartedly embraced the French Pulley of upholding the Versailles settlement. aly Tad also joined the anti-German front, though she continued to use Avstria and Hungary as her outposts in Central Europe. In the Lite Entets, Ctecho- slovakia shared the Franeo-Ialian postion, and had raw neater to Austria (though not to Hungary, whose revisionist claims ad not been dropped); Yugoalavi, on the other hand, moving in the opposite direction to Taaly, had drawn away from France and vas coming rapidly near to Germany. Tn May 1935 this re- grouping of the Powers wat completed by the conchae fon of 4 pact between Ceechoelovakis and the Soviet Union inthe same terma at the Branco-Soviet Pact signed 2 fortnight eaier. "This pact emphasised the in the ranks of the Litle Entente fo RRoumania declined an invitation to conclude a simile agreement, and Yugoslavia was one ofthe few European fates which stl refused even to recognise the Soviet Government. Tue Bauew Exresre “Te yar 1934 slo witeed new grouping inthe Batans though here the Nash rroiton was not dicenining factor. Jost a Caecoloakia, Yosoe SKviand Houmania ad been de topter ster the fr by common fest of Hungary, m0 Yoga, Rose Iban and Gresce were united by common ost 1 Bulgaia, ‘Turkey, the orth beneticary ofthe pat Sina Dlg ashe Blan Warof sor, bade fel been deesed Power in 3918) and for many Year abe ramined stool from her former Balan Fartnet, culating clo rations oly with the Soviet Udon But in 1930 he bored. the Datcet wih rect, er mest imps f Tn 193 she joined the League of NtionsTn 1936, Takes, Yogi Rourmaniaand Greece signed «pact mutilly guarantee inganeanaber® Dalkan enter Baan refsed 0 fetode to pect confirming frontier gainat whore inj the fad never ceed to protest” Albani, fn Tay cominwed to fay a dominan rae ras nt invited tj ‘tthe "Daan Entent esaishe by this pace pra ingen, For Vogler Sujece af the pact was to acre her agent Talan tmerewnce a Benes Gese he het and ube tks once wth the ein navy, tecorpaned ber atifestion ofthe Pct wih dela thn tat she recognised no obligation to engege 0 istics witha nen-falkan Power and this ea 04 toolnes between Greece and Yogev, Maple, reyrelations between Yogosavia and Bulgaria took a turn for the better. A new Bulgarian Government with Vugoslaw sympathies freed itself from the Talian influence which had hitherto been paramount at Sofa And, for the Brst time since the war, dealt firmly with the Macedonian terrorists who infested the Yugoslav frontier (see p- 12). The situation in the Balkans remained thereafter Aid and undefined. ‘The Balkan Entente survived. But Yugoslavia stood closer to Bulgaria, who was outside i, than to Greece, who was amerber of it. A civil war ia Greece in March 1935, followed by a restoration of the monarchy, did not disturb the general tranquility Tn June 1935, at # conference at Montreux, the principal signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne agreed, Zr Turkeys request, to alter the articles ofthe ety providing for the demitarsaion of the Stats (sce P.1g), Turvy obtained freedom to fortify the Stet Ed regulations were lad down for the passage of war ‘hips through the Straits in time of peace and war 4 (CHAPTER 14; THE REPUDIATION OF TREATIES ‘Tur sory unfolded in the lst chapter shows how promptly the world at large realised that the Nae Fevalton meant the return of Germany after an elie if fteen years, tothe ania of the Great Powers. ‘The ‘hort butdramstic period of fifteen months which began in March 1g was marhed by the open vation, ot scale yet unknown in postwar Risto, of international ngagements Hitherto provision of he peace eatet, had een st aside by mtu agreement, by tact con- sent, or by silent evasion. Now Germany vas trong ovgh tape the method of formal repudiation snd tended this repaiton not nly tothe dctated peace of Veraile, But t0 the fiely negotiated Locarno ‘Treaty. Meanwhile, another European Great Power, with an absence of ‘excuse which ditingushed tha Operation even from the Japanese action of #93, in ded and annexed the testry of another etaber Di the Leng of Nations. Staggering blows wee ths deat simultaneously fom two quarter both a the peace setlement fax and at the ‘Covenant which Formed part oft. ‘Thee fifteen months demonstrated that he teen of 19 had eros overtime ‘he pom of imposing penal estictins fora longed period ona defestd Power, and of constricting 2 new word order on the base of common acon ia defence ofthe stat. as[THE RE-EMERGENCE OF GERMANY ‘Twn Gens Reruosanos Before launching his attack on the Verslls Treas, Litler had to wait forthe eetlement of one oustand= ing question. Filten yeas afer the coming into force tthe treaty the fate of the Saar was to he decided by plebiscite (ce p. 6); and the fiteen years elapsed fav January 1935" The plebiscite was duly held, an Ftxermational force under Britsh command. being tioned in the aca to maintain order and guarantee fice vote. ‘The inhabitants were invited t0 choose ‘benneenteturn to Germany, union with France and the Continuance of the League administration. Of the foo.o00 votes cat, go pet cent were for Germany and Aes andce 9 per cea for League administration, The {exura of the territory to Germany took place on March ts Germany bad sow, a8 Hitler more than once Acclaeds ao further territorial ambitions inthe West. Germany had slo nothing farther to hope for from the Vernailles Treaty. TAe the beginning of February, British and French ininters met in London and sewed a statement of policy forthe information ofthe German Government End the other governments concerned. They expressed the hope that the German Government would co- ‘perate inthe proposed Eastern and Central European, Pacts (exe pp 293 and 213); and they suggested that the Locarno testy should be supplemented by an Air Pac under which the Locarno Powers would agree to fBve the askance of their airforce to any one of fieie number which was attacked by another from the a6 tir, The principal novelty of this suggestion wat that Gres Bstain would not appear, a in the Locarno ‘Treaty, only as guarantor, but would be guaranteed by France and Belgum agenat air attack by Germany, and bby Germany against France and Belgium. ‘The German Government welcomed the Air Pact, promised nen-commivally to examine the other pro” posal, and suggested a meeting with the Betsh Government to discuss the whole matter. Somembat to the alarm of the French Government, the British Government fell in with this surgestion; and Simon, the Foreign Secretary, and Eden, the Minster far League of Nations afr, accepted an invitation t0 visit Derlin, But before the vist could take place, much happened, ‘The Brith Government had occa sion to sue a memorandum explsining to Parliament the reasons for ther rearmament progeamme; and in thin memorandum stress wat lsd, to the com pla exclusion of other factors on etre of jerman armaments. Great indigation was expresed in Germany at this attack, Hitler, on the plea of a ‘minor indisposition, cancelled the date fixed for the British ministers" visit. ‘The French Chamber was at ‘theame time debating an inreas in the French army. Hiller decided on a dramatic counterstoke, On March r6th, 1935 he announced that Germany no longer cosidered herslf bound bythe military clauses ofthe Versailles Treaty thatthe peae strength of het trmy would be fxed in future at thirty-six divisions for §5o.000 men, and that it would be tuted by conscription. ‘This announcement caused considerable consterna- 27 '“THE RE-EMERGENCE OF GERMANY ton in Frans ret Brin, public opto bad ten “iacoutea German examen ste fe OE ef te fale of te Daemanent Con EOS otatet go reeves ito 0 Sie sein and be Bold Gorermert so remon etn "The amy cued by th decom in Pe ia en Save cies was by aye Engh iS hae Ede we'd to van Wana, Rate ea Mage "The vit olin dly tak Nisan ccf But pail rts were es ett he welome of he A Pat wth te ote Boner sn eer depen iM Cone Eoopean Pace He rested is seiko Seenios Pie ste of the Coman army mate ately fae Bat Germany wold eset, THURS) tao of ara sxepd by the sie towes” Im tr a abe cned party th See scot the oad prom of the Soret a Cenk Sige her w fcr thn On the gE ets be teat wh 35 pr cent of Bish ‘Saltire inal eens op in he ee, Fane fad ended «apc sett sie Lape Cone in Ap 9 come See Sn a yay of preparation fo Scorers ech and Tan setenmen met SSAA R Sica The, Ste, Conoence re Sect ape of the propel Eater and See puoptn Pact teat ie Ct fe que wheter the luc excnemy Sect ben oma prin rary TEE (hated ty us an Hang) bel seseeae eprand Fan Gnspe by te ae = ments) puns it. Bu the pinipal busines of te conference was to daft a reoltion for submis t9 the Lengoe Council condemning Germany's roped on of her obligations under the Versles “Treaty. ‘The revolution was duly presented tothe Couecl by the thee Poners and. carried unanimously, only Denmark recording, by her abstention from the vote her opinion that Germany waa ented to hate the Same for wbat had happened with er accusers. The resolution was an empty gesture, since no ation fol Towed or was intended to follow. uti provoted set anger in Germany. In particular, Germany wat Purse that Great Beit, having appeared to condone {he German action by sending the Foreign Secretary {0 Beri, should now have taken the lead at Genera in propoing eo unqualified vee of ceavue. ut asl eater surprne wan instore, Scrcly tad the League Council dipered when. an intima: tion was sent to Bern tat the Beteh Government tras prepared to accep Hitler's ofr to mit German ‘aval srength i al eateries of ships to 35 percent of Brtish svength, and would welcome sn agreement 98 is basis. German delegates duly came to London, Sand in June an Anglo-German naval agreement wat tigned. "Thus the Briiah Covernment, having cone Asined in strong terms Getmany’s repudiation ofthe Gaarmament provisions of Verses, now expicly feoagnived bet right to ignore up to 35 per czat of Fria seogt) the nav resrcone imposed bythe seayand pn cater ste ncn ah tharien altgecer pelubted by it The agreement {2 in sccmed a tbute to Beth common seme 2For while France, by refasing every compromisg, had provoked unlimited German rearmament on land, Great Briain, by er reatines to come to terms, had scoured an important limitation of German naval Strength. But the agreement scemed so inconsistent tvth what had gone before that st caused in France, Tialy andthe Soviet Union a bewilderment even greater than that provoked in Germany by Uris sponsorship, ofthe Geneva relation ‘The vacllations of Brish policy towards Germany in the frst half of 1935 were indeed 0 conspicuous a0 tallfor comment. ‘The explanation sem to have been that two conflicting policies were at work. During the first two yearafter the Navi revolution, British opinion 4a whole was too deeply moved by Nati excestes to {el much sympathy for German grievances and saps tions; and the British Government, though wnwiling itself to undertake any commitments, had encovraged the French, the Italian and the Soviet Governments ia their efforts to build up a system of defensive aliances for the maintenance of the status quo, partculatly in Central Europe where it seemed most directly menaced, But by January 1935, when this system of alliances had been virtually completed by the Franco-Talian recon= ‘listio, indignation in Great Britain aginst the Nazi régime began to subside. A growing body of opinion fame round to the view that the only effect of the reach understandings with Tealy and the Soviet Union trast iolate and encircle Germany and to perpetuate the inequalities of the Versailles Treaty—in shot, t0 maintain those very conditions which had been largely ‘eapomnible forthe Nazi revolution. Those who held ‘THE REPUDIATION OF TaEATIES {his opinion, while at denying that Germany might bers danger to pence bleed at Frenchy aan and Soviet policy merely aggravated hat danger, and that the Drih Governments ft am should be fo beak the rng reand Germany, to engage in endl acre Sion of er grievances, and fo ring her back to the Leng of Nation. Snon’s wnt to Bern wan 8 concession to thn tend of thought. Bot the ater pinion, Hes that the right way for Great Bain to meet the German danger nos to give all owe Sppore to oer Powers whith fot themselves Chremened; was sll strongly eld in many quarter tnd this opinion prevaled ine attitude of the Beta Delegations at Stem and Geneva, ‘Then the policy of easing to terme with Germany agin ame upper. tot wih the conlstn ofthe Anglo-German eval fgreement. ‘The rauking uncertainty not only made France and he ascites gravely nnpcous of Bch intention, but enenuragel Germany 10 hope fr 8 reveal of Bish policy which dd ot materalie ‘Tue Frauias RupvowTION ‘The final setlement of Italy's claims under the London ‘Treaty lef her with ail unsatisfied colonial ambitions. Nothing more waa to be expected from Great Britain or France. But Mussolini hud for some time contemplated the posbiity of aly fending for herself. He had hitherto always reckoned om the jealousy and opposition of France. Indeed his policy ‘of enenuraging and siting Germany may have een parlyinspised by the dsie tht France should have“THE RE-EMEROENCE OF GERMANY toomany anes in Europe to bean obstacle to Tealian tdexign elrwhere. But events turned ovt otherwise By the beginning of 1935, France stood so much in need Of Ttalian friendship in Europe that she wae prepared to make almost any concession in Ais. Mussolini tras quick to seize the opportunity and, atthe Rome Ineeting, secured Laval's acquiescence in a forward Tiana policy (the scope of which was perhaps not precisely defined at tis stage) in Abyssinia, “The choice of Abyssinia was dicated by several considerations, Abyssinia sas the only independent ative sate itn Africa, except Libera t lay be- tween the existns Tallan colonies of Somaliland and area; and twas repoted to possess mineral wealth in the hitherto undeveloped interior. Moreover, a recent Fneident, which may of may not have been due to Aalberate Talan provocation, gave a pretext for Taian ston in that quarter, In December 1934. 4 lash ‘Seeured hetwcen Abyssinian frees and a detachment of troops from Taian Somaliland near the village of Walwel A few Ttalins were killed in the skirmish and the [alin Government demanded an apology and 2 ubsuntial indemnity feom Abyssinia. Abyssinia “appealed to the League of Nations, and requested that the dispute should be placed on the agenda of the Council under Article 11 ofthe Covenant "Apart fom the Cavenan and the Pact f Paris, two other treaties stood im the way of warlike action by Teal, In 1996 Great Britsin, France and Taly had teonluded an agreement in which they declared it to ter in their common interest to “maintain intact the incegityof Abyssinia "and in 1928 aly concluded a tray with Ayia in which tht pats promi ‘cheer conan pete and perp reedlip ‘theme one mutoirunderang om adi tutes ton price font and arn Tey bad alto bon one of he pricpl suppor of Sheddmiaann Abana tomer ofthe Laue ings, When theo he Abin appeal coe cfr the Coun in aay 936 teas Doge Scpreated coo othe Waal inet weer ‘Atle ofthe Covenan ete" dn ert Aiki toatlet the prc cations between he ims and pened lings tose the de fate by cnt td abit under eye Seay” Onthsandcrmnting, the Cuma agjeaned the queen Fe the we thee moms Tt Goverment tye the apposnnent of ines td invent fen and aed fom Tay 0 ‘oop in Eten snd Taian Semaand showed hat ‘com mary operations were incepta Oo Marc ‘ithe Abystan ‘Govenment invoked [Asie ryote Geman ‘Tse esate, shy French nian mint mer a Sra ep 8) ince fe py oh Aan sae {en son wad ot yay ofthe ee Tae “a Getrton™ ofthe Coreen essed ther opposton 0 any nists ep trench may ede he pce of Eure" tthe sion of the two onda en fa Ssny te se Moning yor cose fry Ellen "The Briah dlp, peoropied nik EErope, wre bw caving ts ound cts ™note by mentioning the unwelcome Abyssinian prob- fem, Hut their slenoe in face of undispuied Tali preparations for war was interpreted by Mussolini to feta that Great Britain, like France, was content 19 regard his African venture with a benevolent oF at Tens an indifferent, eye. ‘At the session which followed the Stesa Confer- ‘nce, the Council ofthe League was oace more deterzed from examining the Abyesnian appeal by a forther assurance from the Italitn Government ofits readiness to proceed to arbitration on the Walval incident. This time the arktrators were, in fact, appointed; and at Tength, om September 3rd, the arbitrators reached a ‘unaniious conclusion, Te was to the elect that neither fgovernment cook be held responsible for the incident St Waal. ‘The incident was in fact, of no intrinsic importance. Te had served its purpose by providing the pretext for an extensive concentration of Italian troope, and it could now be dismissed. Tthe meanvtil,attemptshad been made elsewhere to discuss the real issue, de, Tty's mlitary cheat to Abyssinia, In June 1935 Eden visited Rome, and sade. proposal that Great Britain should cede to ‘Abyssinia the port of Zeil in British Somaliland, and that Abyssinia should in exchange cede her southern province of Ogeden to Italy. Mustolini rejected {hs offer on the double ground that the proposed cosion to Taly was totally inadequate and that Abys- finia would be strengthened by obtaining access tothe fet. In August, delegates of Great Britain, Fence and Tiny, in their pacity as partis tothe 1996 agreement, inet in Paris, The result of the meeting was a Francor a4 Bit propos that Abyatins should be invited to aly tthe League fr enlabration a promatig the eonomic development and administrative reoran- fston of the country "and that in according such fallabraton, the League sould take" parclr count” of the" specal interests of Tay” This foo, was rejected bythe Kalan Government. When, therfore, on September 4th—the dy ater the Walval ibis ised aie repor™dhe Coun of Oe League at lst began to examine the Abysinian appeal ‘of March ath, things had one to far for any peoeed tngn at Geneva to ect the ane. The new Brith Foreign Secretary, Sir Samvel Hoare, made at the [Asemity an unexpectedly emplatie declaration ofthe Btish Governments intention to cary out obliga tions under the Covenant. A Covnil-commitee dre up proposal, which were endorsed by the Coun fora "ache of wists "for Abysinin and ter tora adjustments" between Abyainia and Tal On October and the Tein invasion of Abysinia been "The Forcign Secretary's Asembly spech, and the enthisnie reception given to it by the shaler Satesat Geneva and by public opinion in Great Briain, trae plan that Molin hed been wrong in an tSdpuing Ga the League would remain quent ‘The prompt action of the Counc, once hosties had begun, contrasted with ity previous evasion of the ‘eal ive and ith i reluctance to pase an adverse ‘ericton Japan in te Marchuran cae. On October Jia commitee of the Council drafted a report pro Touncing that Rly had resored w war in diegard of as‘THE RE-EMERGENCE OF GERMANY its covenants under Article 13 ofthe Covenant”; and next day ths report Was adopted by the members of the Council Tay alone dissenting from it. Two daya later, the Aisembly, having reminded members of the League of their obligations under Article 16, come mended them to set up a committee forthe purpose of ‘covoedinting the measures to be taken by therm. By ‘October 1gth the co-ordinating committe had invited all members of the League (1) to prohibit ll loans oF redits from their respective countries to Italy, (2) to place an embargo on export to Telyof wer material of very hind and of certain commodities especialy neces sary for war purposes, and (3) to place an embargo on sllimport from Kaly. ‘These measures were approved by all European members of the League except Aust Hungary and Albania an, with insignificant exceptions, by members of the League outside Europe. France vas in the unhappy position of having to employ sanc- tions agenst the new ally whom she hed gained exe than a year ago. But abe had ao long protested her loyalty tothe Lesgue and her desire to make Article 18 4 fealty that she could not now resist. On November 1th, 1935, forthe firs time in the history of the League, sanctions~though only of an economie character, and these far from completo—came into operation, “The fit three months of the war went ise well than had been expected for Ttaly. elian forces pene= trated fr into Abysinia and, supported by bombing scroplans, broke Abyssinian resistance wherever it was encountered. But the main Abyssinian armies re- ‘ined intact; and military experts doubted whether the two Taian forces advancing from Even and 26 Italian Somaliland respectively could reach the one railway in Abyssinia (the lie fom Addis Ababa to the frat), and effect a junction there, before the euiny ‘season came on in June Tn December France became apprehensive that an Italian fare in Abysinia might react om the station in Central Europe. The Betsh Government seems to have shared his far and, furthermore, to have been afraid lest Musolini, in‘ moment of desperation, thould launch an attack on Great Britain ab the prin- Cipal author of sanctions. Hoare visited Laval ia Paris; and terms of peace were worked out between them for submission to the ltalian and Abyssinian ‘Governments, ‘The negotiators were principally con cemed to make the terms suficienty atvactive 10 Mussolini to induce him to abandon the campaign. It was proposed to cede to Italy considerably more Abyssinian territory than had yet been invaded by Teaian troops the pill being gilded for Abysinia by the offer of 4 corridor to the sea throvgh British Somaliland, The disclosure of these proposals caused 4 etorm of indignation i Great Tritaia. Public opinion believed thatthe pln Had been designed to help Italy to extract herself with credit from a hazardous pos. tion; and it wat flt to be no part of the duty of ‘Great Brit, at a member ofthe League, to belp an faggressor reap the fruits of his aggression. Hoare resigned, and was succeeded by Eden and no more twas heard of "the Hoare-Laval Plan". TE was not until March 1936 thatthe Italian advance in Abyssinia became percepsbly more rapid. Before the end of Apri the Eritrean army was within strikingdistance ofthe eallway nd the eapital, Internal order broke down ; and on May isthe Emperor of Abyssinia left the country. His fight meant the end of organised resistance. Addi Ababa was occupied a few days later by Taian troops. On May ot, the King of Taly was proclaimed Emperor, and the whole country ofilly fnexed to Italy. “The Italian victory was a grave blow tothe League and an acute embarrasment for Great. Deitain Although ‘economic sanctions had paralysed Italy's ‘rade and caused drain on her gold reserve they had fot sufficed to hamper her military operations. Te wat ‘lear that nothing short of war would compel her to telease her prize; and Great Beitain wat not lat firm than France inher resolve not to be drawn into war with Italy. Ata special meeting of the League ‘Assembly in July the Drish Government proposed the ‘withdraval of sanctions. In spite of a personal appeal by the Emperor, this was unanimously agreed tos and «a teslution ws patted inviting members ofthe League to submit tothe next Assembly thee views onthe best means of" empeoving the application of te principles ofthe Covenant” ‘Tue Exo oF Locanso ‘The apparently pusillanimous sttude of the other Great Powers toward Ttaly was partly explained by another German repudiation which coincided with the Inter stages ofthe Abyssinian war..The Franco-Sovet Pact of May 1935 (sce p. 204) had from the first been regarded by Germany a0 2 military alliance directed ‘at ‘exclusively against her and therefore incompatible with the Locatno Teeaty—a view aot shared by the French land lictsh Governments, Germany protested against ie with inereased vehemence ; and when, early in 1936, inwas presented tothe French Chamber for ratfiaton, Hitler once more decided ona bold counter-troke. ‘Under the Vernilles Treaty, Germany wat pro= Aibted from maintaining armed forces or constructing forticaonsin the Rhineland ; and under the Locarao ‘Treaty, the signatories “cllesively and severally guaranteed ” the observance ofthese provisions. In ‘March 1935, Hitler had repodiated the dictated Ver- sales ‘Treaty, but had reafirmed his loyalty o the freely ngotinted Treaty of Locarno. On March 78h, 1936, the German Government informed the Brith, French and Delgian Governments that the Franco Soviet Pact, involving ait did obligations incompatible with thove undertaken by France under the Locarno ‘Treaty, had deprived that weaty of its" inner mean ing.” Germany, therefore, no longer considered herself bound by it, and as, on that very day, r= ‘cceupying the Rhineland with German troop. ‘The ‘memorandum conveying this information also contained ‘Dhumber of proposals. Germany offered to agree to the establishment of anew demiltarsed one extending for aneqial distance on both sides ofthe frontier since France aod Belgium were known to be uawiling t0 emiltarse any part of thei territory, this was Sebating-point rather than a proposal) to negotiate 1 new pact on the same lines asthe Locarno Treaty, Dut omitting the clauses relating to the Rhineland; to csnclude non-aggression pacts with her eastern neighe 25‘THE RE-EMERCENCE OF GERMANY bours (and, at Hitler subsequent added, with Austria and. Cechoeovaki); and to return to the League of Nations. In France, although alarm was expressed, no serious proposals were made for sanctions or reprisals, Tn Great Heitsin public opinion was shocked by this repudiation of freely negotiated treaty, but was, on the whole, more interested ia considering Hitler's pro- pouls for the future than in condemning his part ction, Negotiations between the Brish, French and Began Governments took place in. March. ‘The Coun of the League, specially summoned in London, pronounced that Germany had violated the Versailles ‘Treaty by eausing » military forces to enter and ‘establish themselves in the demilitarised zone ". In fonder to allay French and Belgian anxieties, the British Government consented to conversations between the General Stats on the steps to be taken inthe event of 4 German attack on France and Helgium. Germany tnd France drew up" peace plant”. But both these ‘documents were 40 vague and so comprehensive that they were of litt practical use.” Early in May, after ‘consultation with the French Government, the British ‘Government addressed a questionnaire to the German Gonernient inthe hope of forther elucidating its pro- pomals. The tone ofthis communication seems to have Sispleased Hitler, who eft it unanswered. Through ‘out the summer the political world’ was preoccupied fvith the Abyssinian dibdle to the excision of the Locarno negotiations; and when, in September, an attempe war made to reopen theie negotiations, the Aiicultic seemed insuperable. Germany, while ready ae ‘THE REPUDIATION OF TREATIES to carci fresh guaran pct forthe west, would eter into no agreement with the Sovict Union. A ‘Western Pat, raceorpied by some Kind of Easter Pact, mas unacoepable fo France ‘ean, ther wis a. reh_ complication eg, tke most ofthe amar Powern, was despy impress bythe flue of eallectve security and the agrovth of Germanys pone. She fl that her come fatment o France under the Frunco-elgan allan {Gee p- 30) tnd under the Locarno ‘resty might be wore o's danger than a safeguard, paticuary if France were invaved ina war wilh Germany a rest, sf the France Soviet Pact. On October 14h 93644 declaration was ved wating tat Belg wood in fiture pore an exclnely Delian plicy, would fnter no aliances and woud, lie Switetnd. and ‘ollnd, ade an atu of complete nearly ithe disputes of her neighbours The renewal of Loar {nthe old form was therfore prude. Blgiam nas, ‘eady to recive, but would we longer ive, goanees, In Rowember, Eden pubiy sated ha Belgian could count on our hep wert ake cver the victim of proved spgrsion and afew day later he gave Similar ssurinee to France. ‘The Pench Miniter for Foreign Aue replied by stating in the French Chater tat Franz would nthe same excmatances, come to the sistance of ether Great Britain. of Tigum, These declarations cond be rgared at {aking the pic ofthe now unreliable Western Pact.By the end of 1936 it was clear that the general ‘ettlement imposed after the fint world wat had no Tonger any accepted basis; and we shall have to con- sider how the repudiation of tecatis was followed by startling action to upset the order which the treaties tvere designed to establish, But since thi book, ike most every other book on the subject, devotes what may seem a disproportionate amount of atention to European alfsits, the present chapter may help to redress the balance, before we come back to what ia ll the Focal centre; for in international politics more than in any other sphere the leadership remained for good oF evil in European hands. Some of the counties now to be discussed have not yet received nore than a passing mention in these pages. Others fave already Been dealt with st greater length and in the ease of thee, i wll only be necessary to bring the ory up t dat ‘Tue Mioote East ‘The complex of countries stretching. from the Easiem Mediterrnean to the northwest frontier of India, and conveniently known as "the Middle East", becate alter 1919 the scene of constant effervescence a ‘and. some. striking changes. OF these countries, Turkey deliberately discarded the religion and tdi tion of Islam and, by separating. herell from the Moslem world, realied her ambition of becoming a Near Easter and European instead of « Middle Easter and Asiatic Power. Tran, fortunate in poe sessing one of the richest oil deposits in the extern 233 @“THE RE-EMENGENCE OF GERMANY hemiephere, prospered under the rule of her masterful Shah, Risa Khan, who usurped the throne ia ‘Afghanistan, devold of natural wealth and sandwiched in betwocn Soviet Central Asia and Brith India, enjoyed a somewhat precarious independence, which tvas, however, strengthened by her admission to the Teague of Nations in 1936 “The other Middle Eastern counties were the former ‘Arab provinces of the Turkish Empire, whose fate hus already been desribed (se p. r7). In all these ‘countries Arab nationaliem was the principal problem of the years between the wars. ‘The division of the principal Arab terstris between British and French fnandates was a heen disappointment to those Arab Ieaders who bad looked forard to the establishment of a vrited Arab kingdom. ‘The British Government did fomathing to mitigate thie disappointment. One of the sons of King Hossein ofthe Hedjaz became King of Irag, and another Emir of Transjordania. But the problem wae complicated by the wide divergence in {radition and development between dierent sections ofthe Arabs who ranged from civilised town-dwvellersto Primitive nomads. Ara political unity was sila dream fof the future. But Arab nationalism, deliberately fostered by the Allis duting the war forthe discom fiure of the Tw, on many occasions after the wat brought the Arab peoples into confit both with the Mandatory Powers and with non-Arab minorities living in ther midst. "The status of the Srt Brith mandated tersitory, ‘Iraq was from the outset anomalous. No formal maa” dite watever granted, is place being taken by a treaty Ba ‘THE NON-EUROPEAN WORLD betwoen Great Britain and fragywhich was approved by the Leng, and under which Great Britain promised to afford Iraq "such advice and asistance a8 iy be required =. without prejudice to: her national sovereignty". “The importance of Iraq. to” Grest Britain resided par is er rich eilells and partyin her favourable position onthe diet sirroute betwen Ege ad aA conse econ of ith pinion was, however, opposed to an indtrite Tingaton of tah rile over an almost land-octed terntory in Asia; and Iraq wan encouraged fo look forard tothe time when she would be, in the word of the Covenant, "able to standalone”. Thin rent wan Achieved in 1932. ‘The mandate was terminated, and Tran, having concluded a treaty of allane with Great rin for twenyrfive years, became a member ofthe League of Nations. "The most dificult problem raised by Iraq’ independence sea that of her ‘om-Arsb rinotites, of whom the Kurds and Assyrians were the {ost important.” Unhappy, within + year of Tag's Acimisson to the League iturbances occured among the Aupriaa, which retulted in the massacre of ire hundred of them by Iragi tops, "The continued sabilty. of this new recrt to the. fury of Independent xatesthe fiat Arab member of the Leagueappeated to depend in large messure onthe retention of the experienced itsh advisers who Continued to asst the Teagl Government ia masy branches ofthe administration "The scond Bris snandated tercitry in Asa was divides, geographically and administratively, by the iver Jorn, Palestine Ing to the wet of that river 235and Transordania to the east. ‘Transjordania was a purely Arab states and its international history was Fimited to occasional fontiee disputes with its neigh hours. Palestine, on the other hand, preseated a raver problem than that rised by anyother man- ‘he, "The terms of the Palestine mandate (which were the fulfilment of 4 promise made by the British Govern- sent tothe Jews in 1917) laid on the Mandatory Power theobligation to place the country under such political, Administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, while at che same time safeguarding the civil and religious rights of ll the inhabitants of Palestine". Thisobliga tion might have been dificult to catry out even i€ the Allied Governments hid not during the war encouraged Arab aspirations for national independence. But the contradiction between the promise given to the Jews And the vaguer undertaking given to the Arab (whieh twas, rightly or wrongly asuied to include Palestine) laid’ up serious trouble for the future, In 1939 the population of Palestine was almost entirely Arab, and frat catimated at something under 7e0/00. “The ‘nablshmen of the mandate made Palestine the oficial cxntre of world Jewry, and opened the country to Jewish immigration. The inlux of Jews, compara Lively modest during the first yeas, increased rapidly ‘shen the economic erss broke over Europe, and sill more when the exodus of Jews from Geemany began ater the Nazi revolution. By the end of 1934 the umber of Jews in Palestine had reached 320,000, tnd would fave been greater if immigetion bad aot a6 ‘en sigorously Himited by the authorities. ‘The Jewish ‘immigrant brought Western civilisation to a backward Oriental and. The cultivation of eitrus-frut became a ‘ourshing lege-seale industry organised on modern lines; and Palestine bade ie to become the commercial centre ofthe Middle East. "The eration ofthe Jewish {ty of Tel-Aviv and the development of the port of Haifa were among the wonders ofthe modern’ world Peletine was the one country whose trade,” both domestic and foreign, increased by les and hounds during the whole course ofthe economic criss, In this wave of prosperity the non-Jewish population also shared. Between 1919 and 1934 i8 numbers rose to gonece, so thatthe Jews were still outnumbered by three to one. But the Arab cultivator, untrained improvident and devoid of eapital, was no match for ‘the Jew, and found himself reduce, in his own country, to a poston of galling inferiority. Leaving aside minor incidents, grave disturbances of the pease, ost- ing several hundred lives, occured in 192%, in 1920, and in 1936, the Arabs in ech ease attaching fst the Jews, and then the Bish police and troops engaged in ‘maintaining order, ‘The most serious fact bout these iserbances was that they were directed, not against incidental hardships inflicted on Arab iterert by Jewish immigration, but against the whole principle of the Jewish national home in Palestine [At the end of 1936 4 Royal Commission was set up to investigate the causes forthe Arab outbreak and to make recommendations. ‘Their Report, sued in July 1937, proposed a tripartite division ofthe country, under ‘which the Holy Places were to remain per” oysmanently under British control, while Galilee and the oatal plains were to form a Jewish sovereign state the remainder being joined to Transjordania in. an Amb state. ‘The scheme wat attacked from all «garters, and found no favour with the Mandates Com= mission of the League, to which it was submitted. Meanwhile outrages continued ; not only Jews and Brith but Arabe were murdered, i they were thought to be in favour of compromise. A further Com- mission vas appointed to enquire into the practic. tility of the schemes but this in the caure Gf 1938 reported so decisively against patton thatthe project twas abandoned, and a Conference was summoned t9 meet in London. Representative Jews and Arabs tere invited to state their ete separately to the British Government later, it seemed possible, a setlement should be worked out in a joint assembly. But no fereement wat reached, and the Dish Government ‘decided to impose its own aslution, which aid. the foundations of compromise by providing Jewish ine 1igration should be limited to 10,000 annualy for five years. Meanvbile more vigorous military contol wat Successful in restoring onder and the Moslem world in general was to some extent concilated. ‘To them, Palestine wan essentially part of the Arab fatherland, Yet_many inthe westem world, and specially in the Protestant English-speaking nations, familiar swith Old Testament and New Testament history, but Tile informed on the course of events in Asin Minor since the days of Pontus Pilate, were equally sure that Palestine naturally belonged tothe Jews. Further, ‘the fierce and increasing persecution ofthat rae seemed 28 ‘THE NON-EUROPEAN WORLD to make some plase of fg for them an international oon “The French mandated territory wat divided bythe saat itself ito two, Syria and the Lebanon, Tn the Lebanon, coat sripon the cones of Syiand Palestine, 2 group of Arab Chratare formed the maori ofthe popalaton and th estoy enjoyed 1 republican form of goverment which, sported iy geod interventos of the Mandaiory Foren, continued to fancion. ‘The Lebancte Christine, Sseranged. hy their tlgon fom the Ars atonal ‘movement, scmed content, in mpite of inner ces wth the secirty mired to them by French ® In Syria, on the other hand, Arab nationalism proved an pnt a force amin rag and Palestine. Th Iraq, Gres Dri creeds wife tates the expense of the ‘inoritinIn Sy, France poraed te “ppone ply, snd ecaded from Spi pope three srenhdbted nainy By non-Arbs. "Two of these Teta on te eoust andthe Jebel Dru tery fn the south~wvere pled ender direct French ni teaion, ‘The thind—the Turish ditt of Alecan- rea in the north—became tn autonomous province der the nominal sreinty ofthe Sian Gover sents and ue so, ae partite pone! Med terancan poy, France ned an ateement by which the greater pr of thi dats, he Sank of Axe nde, wat ste to Turkey” om condom tht the ‘Pars tool sbandon all or china on Sti and cease frm propaania in the country. ‘This pig ff dimemterment ar stony Trnted by the a9‘THE RE-EMERCENCE OF GERMANY Syrian Arabs. Serious rebellions occured from time to time, notably ia 1925, when Damascus was botne buatded by French troops: and from 1933 the Syrian ‘constitution was completely suspended. During 1936 fresh negotiations took place between the French Government and the Syrian leaders, and resulted in November in the signature ofa treaty onthe model of the Anglo-Lragi Treaty. Ratfiaton ofthis was t be followed by Syria’ application with French support for admission tothe League of Nations. But rtifica: tion was delayed so long that inthe begining of 2939 rationalist disturbances broke out at Darnascs, and the High Commissioner decreed the dissolution ofthe Syrian parliament and placed the executive power in the hands of a Counell of five Directors military defence being controled from France. Tn Arbia, the most striking event of the period veas the rise of Tha Saud, formerly the Sultan of Nej During the frst world war, hn Saud assisted the Allies against Turkey, and was subsidised by them. He was fot recognised in the peace settlement, But in this ‘region of nomadic populations and undefined frontier, he extended his domain by a proces of gradual en- croachment and vigorous administration; and in 1926, having defeated and expelled King Husicin of the Hrdjaz, he annexed the testory and proclaimed hime self King of the Hedjaz and Ne, the tte of the whole Country being subsequently changed to Saudi Arabia Tn Siud clearly established his claim to be regarded 48 the most powerful independent Arab ruler. “Saudi ‘Arabia did not apply for admission to the League of Nations. “But duting 1936 she consolidated het 38. ener mam eee international situation by concluding treaties with Tea, with Transjordania and with Egypt. ‘These demon: stration of Arab solidarity appear to have been inspired in part by fear of Italian ambitions following Haly’s success in Abyssinia; and the same circumstance Increased the cordality of relations between Great Britain and the Arab states, Egypt, though ‘not usually included in the tenm “ Midle East",requites mention in this brief survey of Arabspeaking countries, The construction of the Suez Canal made Egypt. vital point in Brieh Imperial ‘communications ; and for thirty years before the war Egypt, though nominally under ‘Turkish sizerinty, was in British occupation. "When ‘Turkey entered the swat in December 1914, Turkish suzerainty was abro- fated and a British protectorate proclaimed. After the twat the rising tide’ of nationalism made i difficult to ‘maintain the protectorate; and in 1922, after a vin effort each an agrernent wit the Egyptian naional- the defence ofthe county, the protection of foreigners and of the minorities, and joint sovereignty with Egypt over the Sudan, This declaration was foloned by a communication to foreign Powers intmating that interference in the afirs of Feypt by any forign Power would be regarded by Great Britain ata menace to her own security. ‘The anomalous situation resting from the declares sion was fll of embarrassment for bath sides. On more than one occasion afempts were mide 10 regulars the position by a treaty. But not wat 1935, ut[TIE RE-EMERGENCE OF GERMANY when the Talia auesees in Abyeinia inspired both Great Britain and Fgype with a strong dsite to improve their mutual relations, were these attempts succesful Under the testy signed sn August 1936, Great Briain undertook, under certain conditions, 10 withdraw Tits troops fom the interior ofthe contr, maine taining them only in the Canal 2one to help Fgype 10 secure the abolition ofthe Captulations, ce the extra territorial sights enjoyed by nationals of the principal foreign Powers in the country; to support Egype' claim to membership of the League; and to give Feyp- tian ofcialea share inthe administration of the Suda, "These promiaes were fulled when, at a Conven sion eld st Montreux on May Sth 1937, the interested Powers renovneed ther rights under the Capitulation and on May 26th Epype was admitted asa sovereign tate to the League of Nations. In 1938 an agreement tvith Great Britain was negotiated. concerning. the 2ccommodation of British troops which under previous agreements were stationed to protect the Suez Canal tind Egypt, while upholding her independent position, ‘emained fully loyal to her obligations to Great Britain, ‘Tue Faw East Japan's withdeaval fom the League in March 1933, created in the Far East a situation of growing tension, span soon consolidated her conquest of Manchuria 1d aserted her position as the dominant power in East Asia "The frst important declaration of he policy ‘was contained ina statement inued to the pres by the Japanese Foreign Office in April 1934. This state- rent, after seferring to Japan's special responsible ties in East Asia", declated explicitly that" ther eno ‘country bit China which i n'a position to share with Japan the responsibility for the maintenance of peace in Bast Asia", and that Japan " objected” t) any ‘operations undertaken ingly or jointly by foreign Powers to atsist China, “The objection applied to ‘operations undertaken "in the mame of technical or financial stitance " (such ax ad recently been accorded to China by the League of Nations) a well ax to military seistance in the form of the supply of war material or the Ioan of instructors or advisers. Thit eclaration, which came to be hnown as "Japan's ‘Monroe Doctrine", was repeated on several sub- sequent occasions.” Th the summer of 1935 an tempt to separate from the rest of China several of her porthern provinces broke down in face ofthe pesive resistance of the Chinese. But in the strip of Chinese territory adjacent to Manchuria, the Tocal Japanese nnilitery authorities succeeded in setting wp a puppet fidministration under the name of the East Hopei ‘Autonomous Government ; further they subsequent, bay deliberate interference with the operations of the Chinese custome authors, encouraged an extensive smuggling trafic through this important area—a clever imanceurre designed t put ili profit eto the pockets of Japanese taders and to sap the resources and the prestige of the Chinese administration, During 1936 sporadic murders of Japanese in several pats of China bore testimony to dhe biter felings which had been sous, Tn China itself, fear of Japan acted a8 a unifying 3force, though its efects were slower and more par- tial than might have begn hoped. In Central China ‘numerous local Soviets continued, long after Borodin’: departure, to be a thorn in the side of the Nanking Government, and extensive areas remained under the control of a so-called Chinese Soviet Government, After 1933 most ofthese areas were reabeorbed By the Nanking Government. Organised Chinese communist forces sill existed in North-West China but in atcordance with the pli lid down atthe 1935 eon {res of the Communist International these forces now ought, not to overthrow the Nanking Government, but to sitien and suppor its resistance to Japan in North China. In South Ching, military rebellion aginat the Nanking Goverament in the summer of 936 met with no support, and ended in the suppression of the Sern-independent Canton Government.” Co-operation between Nanking and Canton appeared to be closer ‘than at any time in recent years." Thus atthe end of 1936, the Chinese Government at Nanking, ably Ted by General Chiang Kai-shek, was slowly strengthening ity hold in Central and South China, and tenaciously maintaining ita influence in North China. against Japan, In Deceraber there was a short-lived rebel- lion on the north-westem frontier; and Chiang Kai-shek himself was eld prisoner for several days by rutinous troops. The submission of his captor, how ‘ever, strengihened his postion, and China appeared fon the way t9 be united, and United in resistance to Japanese aggression. ‘But in. July 1937 a clash between Japanese and (Chinese troops not far from Peking led to further or incidents; and, without declaration of war, war began, Peking was evacuated and the Chines, stl resisting, ‘were gradually driven back to the line of the Yellow River, while naval and air forces attacked. Shanghal By the end of the year the Japanese had captured rot only this city bue the eaptal, Nanking. Aerial Bombardment inflicted great slaughter on defenclss rmulticudes, and, incidentally, whether by accident ot ‘mistaken zeal, wounded the British Ambaseador to China and damaged am American and a lritish vested on the Upper Vangtse. Dut the course of events in Europe forced Great Britsn eo limit resentment to diplomatic protest, while the United States accepted at apology.” Meanwhile the Leave of Nations, before ‘which the facts were laid by Chinese representatives, formally condemned Japan’s ation as an unjustifiable breach of treaty obligations, and members of the League were invited to consider how fr they could individually help the vit of aggression. China's spire of resistance remained unbroken, though the Japanese armies, superior oh in equip” ‘ment and discipline, everywhere suceeded in forcing their way. First Hankow wth its satelite cites, ‘which had become the temporary capital, fll in July 1938, and in October Canton as ten with unexpected cease. Gradually Japan mastered sll the ports and et the Chinese armies dependent for supplcs on what they ‘nul obtain overland from the Soviet Union, or import by rl from French Indo-China, or, by a newly crested ‘motor road, from British sourees in Burma, ‘Towards the end of 1999 the Japanese cut the rail to Tndor China; ‘the ‘motor road was overburdened; and osSoviet ad could no longer be counted on. But China continved to rest ‘Oa the Soviet side, Japan's conquest of Manchukuo had caused serious apprehension and provoked various coustermensures. ‘These were of several kinds. In the first place, the Soviet Government sought and abtained the oficial recognition of the United States Government (see p. 202). Secondly, it sought to lessen the occasion of fiction by elling to Japan (ot, ‘nominally, to Manchuko) the Russian interest in the hinese ‘Eastern Railway which croses Manchuria hidly, i extended Soviet in fence in Central Asia, ‘The westernmost provinceof China, Sinkiangor Chinese ‘Tutestan, inhabited by a mited poptlation of many races, had’ for long been virtually independent of the Nanking Government, and had been the scene of peodical civil wars betwen rival authorities. In 1933 Soviet troops and aeroplanes intervened in one of these Toca tuggles, and enabled the local Chinese Governor recopnised by the Nanking Goverament to restore ‘order and re-establish his authority. For some time, Soviet influence, politcal and econamic, became para mount in Sinkiang. In March 1936 Outer Mongolia Which, though nominally under Chinese sovercignty, Id been in effect Soviet republic since 1921, con sladed with the Soviet Union a treaty of alliance under Which each party promised to come to the other's “sistance inthe event of foreign aggression; and about the same time Stalin pointedly informed an American journalist that any Japanese interference in Outer Mongolia would mean war with the Soviet Union, ‘Thus the Soviet Union possessed in Sinkiang and in 46 Outer Mongolia outposts similar to that established by Japan in Manchukuo, though Soviet contol of the local edministrations wat len direct than that of Japan in Manchu Asenies ao Wonto Pourrics In many counties the economic crisis of 1950-33 produced more disistrous results than in the United States, Dut nowhere did it cause a more direct and ‘dial change in the prevalent conception ofthe fane- tions ofthe sate. Before the criss, the United States had maintained almost undilted, escept forthe single item of anil protection, the principles of lases-faie fand unrestricted. individual enterprise, State inter ference in industry and commerce was still widely segarded as something undesirable, un-American and ven immoral. The eis showed upin plating colours the fallacy ofthe view. When the whole structure of Industry end finance totere and one-tenth of the population were unemployed, both capital and labour Tooked to the mate for aavation j and the history of President Roosevelt's administration was one long effort to rebuild American economic life on a. new basi When recovery began, the forces of reaction tied to reassert themselves against what had come tobe known fs the."New Deal”. The American. Constittion fzve Congress power “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States”. Tt ‘was only by asomewht strained interpretation that this {ould be made to cover such matters a8 price-contol and the fixing of labour conditions. Some of the 7sudministration’s more radical measures forthe contol ofindustry and ageiulture and the protection of bour were ruled by the Supreme Court to be unconstity tonal, and had tobe withdrawn, Dut the overwhelm= ing majority by which President Roosevelt was te- lected in November 1936 showed how whole-heartedly ‘the mass ofthe American people had accepted the new Principle of state reulation. ‘This peaceful domestic revolution engrowed the main energies ofthe American Government during the years after 1933, and foreign affairs took second place ‘The hist eect of Japan's Manchurian venture had been to stimulate American co-operation with the League (Gee p.163). Inthe summer of 1932 both Republican and Democetic partis declared themselves in favour ‘of consultation between the American Government land other governments in. the event of a breach, of threatened breach ofthe Pact of Paris and. in May 1933 the American delegate atthe Disarmament Con- ference sated that, if disarmament convention were ‘cncluded, the American Government mould agree, in future emergencies, to consult with other governments and not to obstruct any action which might be decided fon by them. But when the Conference broke down, and the situation in Europe and in the Pacific grew darker and more menacing, American opinion moved rapidly in the dieetion of isolation, In. December 1938 naval conference met ia London to conser the situation which would arise when the London naval treaty (step. 182) lapsed at the end ofthe year, At the end of 1934, Japan had given the prescribed two years? ‘ote to tertinate the Washington Five-Povrer Treaty “8 of 1921; and it proved impossible to secure Japan's continued acceptance ofthe Washington rato ora any other ratio which limited er fleet a a lower level than, the British and American Beets, ‘The only result of the London conference wat an agreement between Great Britain, the United States and France to give one another advance information regarding shipa of wat ‘constructed or acquired by them, and to limit the maxi= mun tonnage of diferent eatogrie of war veel In other respects, all partes teguined their liberty at the end of 1936. Since the beginning of 1938 the principal aim of the American Government in iterntional affairs had een to avoid any possibility of becoming involved in war In that year, in pursuance ofthe policy of reducing its commitments, it decided to withdraw from the Pllip= pines, the only American base in the western Pacie, nd to grant full independence to the islands ater probationary period often years.” Equally significant ‘eas the passage in the summer of 1935 of a Neutrality Act whith authorised the President, in the event of an ‘outbreak of war, to place an embargo on the export of ‘war material and hey products to both belligrens ‘This authority was exercised by the President in the Italo-Abyssinan War; and an amendment tothe Act February 1936 made such an embargo not merely ptionl, but obligatory, in future wars. It added an femmbargo on loans o belligerent and, significantly, ‘exempted the American republics from the operition of the Act ‘This atempt on the part of the United States to laoate themselves from the politial troubles of Europe 8 "and the Far East was accompanied by an equally trrted dete to dow nar tothe other Arercah countries, ‘There had been for many years tad ‘ional mistrust ofthe United Stites mong the counties of Cenraland South Ameren ‘The Monroe Docting tras dey interpreted as implying thatthe United ‘Sites had the right and duty to intersene in Central td South Amerta where nefery inorder t main- tain ordrand protec foreignvesand proper. Ths the teay between Clow andthe United States of 1903 explicly ave the ter he right of interenton foeinese purpote. United States marines had een treed in Newragwn, wih one short ira, ever finee otay and in Hai sine aongy and there bad {cen lea permanent interventions ia other counties. Period Pan-American congrete of whish the ist Inet in 188 dil pot semove te il-wil| produced by thu as ft decribed m the peg of the Big Sick "and of © Dole lope About 1930, pata rest ofthe economic cri, American opinion began to set aay from a pai of intrventon in Cental and South America At the beginning of 1935 the United States marines were withdrawn form Nicaragua and when. nis inaupral Ildvss in March of that year, President Roosevet dicated thie Nation to the policy of the Good Neighbour" the nerds were thong to herald a {kite reverall of he tao! stad. Inthe same year, te Argentine Republic promoted a fesh ct providing for the renuneation of aggresive wat Ind he nonrecopiin of stations creed bythe we force. "This waa welcomed bythe United Sates and 3 signed by many American, aswel a by some European, States. "The Seventh Pan-American “Congress at ‘Montevideo at the end of 1933 as the ocasion of @ concliatory utterance by the United States Secretary fof Sute. ‘The next year saw the final withdraal fom Haiti and th abrogation of the 1905 treaty with Cuba. In December 1936, immediately after his re-election, President Roosevelt paid Latin America the signal ‘compliment of attending in person the opening meting ofthe Eighth Pan-American Congres t Duenos Aires and the Congress adopted a teeaty providing tha, in the event of threat tothe peace ofan ofthe American republics, the signatories would consult among themselves forthe adoption of measures of peaceful co-operation". Tn spite of the two wars which dis- figured South America during the nincteen-thires (ee . 174), international relations within the American Continents beeame more sincerely friendly than at any previous time. Tn the meanwhile, the double tendency to draw the American republic into closer accord and to prevent their involvement in the ware of ther ations continued under the leadership of the United States, where legislation designed to preserve neutrality had been farther developed. “The provisions of the Act of 1935 and its Inter amendments were adopted only for two years and in 1937 8 fresh Neutelty Act wat passed, Tt renewed the embargo on export of sas and on lous, Te forbade American mefchat men to be armed, and American citizens to travel on the vessel of any belligerent—since injury to them might involve the United States, It give. the a1President discretion to prohibit the export of goods in American vessels to belligerent State, lesving i to be conducted, on the “cash and carry” prineple, by nationals of such States as could transport the rateials after paying for them. He was also authorised to permit the transport of goods to Inde bordering on the United States "—in other words, to Canada-snce no cause of conflict could arise from interruption enroute. Determination to avoid poliesl commitments in Europe didnot, however, involve complete isolation American opinion gave almost unanimous awent to 4 policy of economic collaboration with Europe ax ‘with other continents, Secretary Cordell Hull took Full advantage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, first passed in 1934, renewed for a further three years in 1937, 10 negotiate with twenty-two ‘countries, covering the larger part of America’s forcign trade, rade agreements on the most-favoured ton bass involving reciprocal reduction of tafe and limitation of other restitions upon trade, He believed that economic nationalism had been a major factor in the development of the political isis ‘hich led ultimately to wat, and that the zestorstion of multilateral trade, on the freest posible basis com- patible with reasonable trf protection, would do more to prevent a reeurence of dictatorship, agaresion and ‘wars, than mere political and territorial rearrangements Tn the Far East, moreover, the United States shoved signs of a reaction against the 1934-37 policy ‘of reduced commitments, The President. deliber. ately refrained from recognising that the Japanese 22 ‘THE NON-EUROPEAN WORLD operations in China conte a stat of war, since ‘ch engniton would ave brought int operation the Provisirs of the Netzality Ac and ct off American id to China. Maed preference was Giplyed for the “Chinese in ther srg, and hn were ‘rade avaiable to them through the Import Export Bank, "The United States Coremment reel r= fused to serner any of tn traionl igh Chin, and mating! uly ts naval. and ulary fore in Chinese treaty porta and waters tn July 1939 t faved notice of denunciation of he Jape: ‘American commercial treaty, which therfore. was finally terminated in Janay 190. Commerc ‘ation Beeneen the United Sates and Japan com Tnued” ons dy-to-day ba and the thest of an embargo of of disriminstory duties on Japanese ine rors, eongy ued by powetul groupe in Congress din the country remalncd a a tert vo funbet Japanese encoacnent ypon American righ, "Tere Yar abo a growing movement in the Pilipne Inlnds ad in the United Sats spit she compete independence Igly de to tke cfc toy, The peri during wich preferential advantages far Pipe Fine trade vill continue wat extended and seen: Inent of the Act calling for polite snd) ma ihc wa frequently ete md ‘Toe Barris Coneoxweairn oF Nations Relations between Great Britain and the self- governing Dominions are not interational relations in the fll sense ofthe term, and fll outside the scope of 253{his book. Bus since the Dominions are members of the League of Nations (as it also India) and have independent foreign polices, some mention must be sade here of their position “The fest appearance of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Afca and India as members of the international commonity asin 1919, sehen they signed the Veralles Treaty inthis own right. The fact that they did mot figure in their proper alphabetical place ‘mong the other signatories, but were grouped together lander the rubric of the" ritish Empire”, showed that they were not regarded as independent aovereign states; and Article 1 ofthe Covenant, which throws the League open to“ any fully self-governing State, Dominion oF Colony" wat evidently designed to take account of their special status. When the Irish Free State applied for membership in 1923, ts application was approved by the Atsembly onthe ground that" the Irah Free State is « Dominion forming part ofthe British Empire upon the same conditions a the other Dominions which te already members of the League". No further Attempt war made to elucidate the status of the Dominion til 1926. In that year the Imperial Con- ference defined Great Britain and the self-governing Dominions as aitonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status... though united by common allegiance tothe Crown, and frely associated {i members of the British Commenvealts of Nations"; fnd in 1o31 the Statue of Westminster, in which this Status vas given a legal and constitutional basis, was ‘voted by the British Parliament and accepted By the Dominions, a4 ‘The international situation resuking, from this definition was not free from ambiguities, ‘The British Government (whose official ttle, after 1926, was Tit Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Nocthern Ireland") always ‘maintained that neither the Covenant itself or aay International agreement conluded between members of the League of Nations was applicable to the relations of members of the British Commonwealth with one another. This view was, however, consistentyatacked by Inch polieians; and the other Dominions for the most part avoided any pronouncement on the ‘queation of principle, The divergence was cealy tharked when, in 1920, all the members of We Beish Commonwealth signed the Optional Clause of the Sutute af the Permanent Court Gee p- #13), ‘Great Britain, followed by Austalia and ‘New Zealand, made a reservation excluding from its acceptance Aisputes between members of the British Common wweilth, Canada and South Aftica made the same reservation, but accompanied it with statements imply ing that Uhey did not subscribe t the vow that such disputes were ipso facto outside the competence of the Court. The trish delegate made no reservation of such disputes at all. Another aspect of the same problem twas the question (happily destined to remain academic) ‘whether, in the event of a member of the Betsh Commonsealth resorting to var in voltion of the Covenant, the other members of the Commonwealth ‘would be bound by the obligations of Article x6. ‘While thewe theoretical dificultce existed, there were few important divergencis of opinion on andar 355rental issues. ‘The fears of those foreigners who howzhe thatthe constitution of the Lesgue gave the British Government six votes had, indeed, not been jstied; for on points of dtal—the ony pints which tweredecided at Geneva byamajorityyote—themembers ofthe British Commensealth were rarely alto be found ‘onthe same side. Tn financial and economic matters, the Dominions and India fully aserted their national interests even agsinst those of Great Dritain, In the pital spre fadia was prechuded fom indepen ent action : and differences between other members of the stsh Commonwealth proved to bedlferences of temphasis rather than of substance. Canada, secure Ierself snd inluenced by the proximity of the United States, displayed a. strung deste to restrict to 4 minimum the obligation to defend the security of ether rmemivers of the League, Australia and New Zealand fcemed too remote to take a sustained interest in inter- rational afars. But they from time to time were pprchenaive of Japan, and they were shways eceitive to any eritiiam of their policy of excluding coloured immigrants. South Aficn exhibited perhaps a keener interest in the problems of security, and san one of the few countries which expressed disapproval of the withdrawal of sanctions against Taly in Joly” 1936 (Gor p. 338). The Tesh seemed more concerned t0 fstablsh the principle of their independence than to pursue an international policy of their own. ‘Three Dominions Australia, New Zealand and South Aftica administered mandated territories (sce p. 18) on Which they reported annually to the League. After 1927 non-permanent seat_on the Council was 36 always held by one of the Dominions. “The outbreak of war in 1939 finaly showed thatthe Dominions did ot fel themselves bound automaticaly to follow the lead of Great Britain and that each of ther, acted in its own right, in obedience to a sense ofits own prestige and interest 7tr has been scen that by the end of 1936 the states which were dacontented with the settlement of 1919 had anerted their freedom from obligations under they were now asserting claims to stisfation, with swat implied at the alternative. Under this menace, the Briush Government finally abandoned thee attempt to produce disarmament by example. In March 19)7 Neville Chamberlain, x Chancellor ofthe Exchequer, announced that expenditure on defence would. a0 longer be financed solely by taxation. He pro- posed loan of four hundred milion for ghe pur Dose, and projected a total outlay af one thousand five undred millions in a space of five yeas Baldwin, the Prime Minister, defended these proponale by saying that thee purpose was to deter agresion, and that the county, after some years of limited texpenditare, could nov Fnance defence without afect- ing the standard of living ot the social sevice. Both hhe and Eden, the Foreign Secretary, declined to admit that Great Britain had abandoned the League OF Nationa, But while Baldwin expresed. a hope that ite action might be supplemented by regional pacts”, offering 4 guarantee ffom cetin Powers for certsin spheres, Eden had to allow that lide ‘progress was made in this direction; and he defended a8 British armament asthe best guarantee of peace. ‘At the moment, the threat of war wat indefinite Germanys energies wer fully occupied in constructing defences opposite the French Maginot Line. This * Sicfted Line ", when completed, would enable her to bold the western front with a united force and Concentrate her effort to the Eat. But Europe at lange, and more specially France and Great Briain, felt uncertain what might come ut of x new theatre of wae ‘Tue Space Cron. Wan By far the most important event ofthe latter half of 1936 occurred ina country which had, for many years pst, played an inconsiderabe réle in international Mura The dictatorship set up in Spain in 1933 (ce 71) was overthrown in 1930. In the next year, King Alfono XIII abdicated anda democratic republic ‘wat etablished. But the democratitradition has never been strong in Spain ; and from 1931 to 1936 demo- cracymtintained itelfby asomewhat precarious balance between royalists and ather reactionaries on the Right, sand anarchists and communists on the Left, State finances were chaotic, and public order was frequently threatened. In July 1936, General Franco, the com- ‘mander of the troops in Spanish Morocco, proclaimed ‘military rebellion and crossed into Spain with an army ‘composed largely of Moorish troops. He overran ‘without mach opposition the extreme south and grade Illy conquered the whole of western Spain. In the ‘middle of Novernber the insurgents were in the suburbs 29‘THE RE-EMERGENCE OF GERMANY of Madsid, the government withdrew to Valencia, and the fal of the capital seemed imminent, From that point, the resistance of the government forces stilfened jad atthe end ofthe year the thre possible lasues—a victory of the Left, 4 victory of the Right, for a stalemate between them™seemed almort equally Tiel. ‘The Spanish Civil War might not, in other circum stances, have been an international event. The causes ‘which made i one were of two kinds. Ta the rst place Ttly, fresh from her Abyssinian victory, which had thovin into rele the strategic importance ofthe Med= terranean, welcomed an opportunity to strengthen her position in western Meditersinean waters. Secondly, {he notion had grown up since the rst world war that ‘country whose internal organisation was based on a cer- tain political theory was expected to encourage and asst the Giumph of that theory in other countrie, This policy wat pursued by the Soviet Union prior to 1927, tnd was adopted later by other countries. In 1933-34 Germany supplied the Austrian Nazis with money and arma and aly, more suecesfully, insisted on the ‘establishment ofa Fascist rigime in Ausra (ep. 206). In 1936 Ttaly and Germany treated the Spanish Civil War, on somewhat unconvincing grounds, as 4 strugele between Communism and Fascism, and fought it appropriate that they should suppore the insurgents. “In neaey all such cases, i seems dificult to distinguish between the supposed interests of a poli= tical theory and the national terest ofthe intervening ‘country. "There canbe ite doubt that Tay, at any rate, was to privy to General Franco's rebellion ; forthe belp of Italian seroplanes was forthcoming a the very outset to transport his toope from Morocco. Within a few week the Spanish Civil War threstened to divide all Europe ito to camps, Italy, Germany and Portugal ‘openly sympathising. with the insurgents, and the Soviet Union with the government. On August 15th the British Government, anxious at all costs to remain peur, placed an embargo on the shipment of war ‘material rom Great Britsin to. Spin, and France followed the British example, ‘These two countries then invited ll European countries to enter into an agreement not to supply war material to citer side, and to form 1 non-intervention committee in London t0 supervise the working of the agreement, After some delay, mainly due to Portugal's reluctance, the agree- ment was concluded. Fora few week it sems to have Checked the supply of arms to Spain. Dut soon the Spanih and Soviet Governments began to denounce iolations of the agreement by Tis, Germany and Portugal and these charges were answered by ac- ‘cusations, which soon became equally well-founded, against the Soviet Government. From October on” wards, uly and Germany were more of less openly sending arma to the insurgents, and the Soviet Union tothe government; and in Novernber, when the fll of Madsid seemed imminent, Taly and Germany officially recognised the government ect up by General Franco, Considerable numbers of Italian and German troops ‘were fighting inthe insurgent ranks, and contingents of [Rotsian,anti-Fascat Taian end ant-Nazi Germans, 8 well a volunteers from other counties, on the side 361‘THE RE-EMERGENCE OF GERMANY of the goverment, ‘The Spanish Civil War assumed ‘many of the aspects of a European civil war fought on Spanish territory Rwvat. Grovriva oF tHe Powess ‘The second most striking event of the last months ‘of 1936 was an agreement between Germany and Japan. Polically, this apreement was the consequence and the counterpart of the Franco-Soviet Pact and the only cause for surprise is that it should not have been resched sooner. ut it was character ofthe petiod thatthe understanding should take the frm, ot (Of a pact of alliance, but of an agreement for mutual support in combating Communism "The end of 1936 sb therefore «considerable pat of the world divided ito two groups, one led by Germany, Italy and Japan, the other by' France and the Soviet Union. The fist group were sometimes alld the Fascist Powers; though the term war of doubtful pplication to Japan. The second group cannot be ‘easily labelled. For though the Soviet Union in 1936 adopted a constitution in which some of the ex- teral forme of democracy were observed, it remained in essence as alien to western democracy as France to communism. The eurent abit of elsifying coune tries by the type of political theory professed by thelr government became misleading. ‘The rival groupe were Linked not so much by a common politcal faith a by the fact thatthe ist group was, for varying reasons, take such action as they sll cosider neces forthe ‘maitenace of right and juice the diate between the partic is claimed by one of ‘hen, ad is foued by the Counel to arse aut of ater ‘which by iteroationl nw i solely within the domestie jriadiction ofthat party, te Coun thal 0 report, and ‘hall make no recommerstion a ot setlemeat "The Cousel may in any ewe under this Arte refer the dispute to the Assembly. ‘The diupite shal be se relerred atthe request of either party tothe dispute, poe ‘ied tha such request be made within fourteen day ater the submsion of the dispute othe Counc» 9Artie 16 Should any Member ofthe League rar to wat di tegard of ita covenaots under Ace 12,13, ot 1g, shall ‘pu fcto be dered ta have commited a tt af wat eat all ther Members of the League, which hereby undertake fmedinely to subject It to the severance ofall ade ot Snancal elaons, the prolibition ofl intercourse between thelr nationals andthe nationals ofthe eovenant-bresking State and the prevestion of all facial emmercal ot personal intercourse between the nationale of the covent- breaking State and the national of anyother Stat, whether 1 Mensber of the League o nt. Te shll be the duty of the Council in auch ease 22 recimmend tothe sever Governments concerned what tfective mltary, naval of ai force the Members f the enue shal severly contribute to the armed forces to be ed to protet the Covenants ofthe League. - «= Artie 14 In the event of a dispute between 4 Member of the League and Sate which s nota Member of te League, between States not Meher ofthe League, the State tr States not Menbere of the League sal be invited to tecept the ablations of Membership ia the Leave for the purpose of such dispute, upon such conditions a the (Council may em just = rice 19 “The Assembly may rom time to time aie thereon sideration by Members of the League of testis hich fave become inapplicable and the cosiderition of iter: onal conditions whove continuance might endaager the peace ofthe word oe Arie a8 Nothing ia the Covenant shall be demed vo affet the sald of interstonal engagement such atresia of Ebisstn or regional understandings ie the Monroe Alsen, for securing the maintenance of peace, Avie 22 “To thove colonics nd tertitrie which tx consequence of the late war have eas to Be under the eoverigty of the States which formerly governed them aod which ae inhabited by peoples not yt able to stand by themselves Under the tenuous conto ofthe modern med thee Should be apie the principle that the well-being and ‘evelopment of ouch ecpls fem sacred tae of elon tion and that secures forthe perormance of ths ust thud be embodied inthis Covenant. "The test method of giving practical effect e> thin principle at the tutelage of such peoples shold be frre to advanced nations who by tenon of their resources, their experience o thei geographical postin ra, ‘best undertake this responsibilty, and who ae wing to cept it and that this tutelage should be exercised by them ‘ Mandatoie on behalf ofthe League ‘The character of the mandate must difer scoring to the stage ofthe development of he people, the geagraphial tiation ofthe tertory, is exnoue conditions ted thet iar Creanstances, ‘Cetin communities formerly belonging to the Turkish [Empire have reached stage of development where th cesence aa independent nations cam be provisiooaliy {engane wbjet fo the rendering of administrative aioe ‘snd asistance by a Mandatory until sch tine a they are ble to wand alone, ‘The wht of thee commuaiion asnust be a principal consideration inthe selection of the Mandate ‘Other peoples, epecilly howe of Cetra Attia, ave ac such sae tthe Mandatory must be responsible ft the administration ofthe testy ander conditions which wil guarantee freedom of conscience and elgon, subject ‘nly the intenance of plc ander an mul, the Prohibiion of abuse such tthe slave tray the arms fea and the liquor trafic, and the prevention of the fstablshment of frieations or nla ind naval bases nd of malay ting ofthe native for ther than police Purposes and the defence of teritory, and wil sla scare ‘ual opportunities forthe trade and commerce of thet Member ofthe League “There ae tecitre, such an South-Wett Aven and certain of the South PaieIelands, which owing to the ‘spursencs oftheir population, or thir sl ste oe thee remoteness from the center of clisaon, of thle gen ea contiguity othe tertiary ofthe Mandatory, nd ther circumstances, can be best administered nde the laws of the Mandatory a inegal portions of trsitory, subject tothe anfegusdn above mentioned in the eres oF the indigenous population In every cate of mandate, the Mandatory shal render ta the Counc! an anal repr, in rleence to the terry ‘commited to charge, "The degree of athority, contol ot adminintetion tobe txercsed by the Mandatory hall i ot pees aveed ‘pon by the Members of the League, be explicly dened in each ease by the Counc ‘A permanent Commision shal be constituted to receive and etamine the annual reports ofthe Mandate and to ‘vise the Council om all mater relating tothe becrvance ofthe mandir (CHRONOLOGICAL TARLE OF IMPORTANT President Wions Forteen Poin Armisice peated t Germany “Treaty of Vers with Germany “Treaty of Sa-German th tin Treaty of Nelly wih gain Ian'to Exchange of Raisins of Vertes Treaty League of Nutone ino ete Mirch 26. Trade agreement between Great Bri 1s Treaty of Riga between Poland and Soviet Ron Dec. 15 PourPomer Paige Treaty signed at Weng Feb Naval Treaty and Nine-Power ‘Treaty concer 1 28 ecomitn by Gr iano independence ot Expt April 6 ‘Tren of RpaloBerween Germany and Soviet Jan! Occupation ofthe Rube by French nd Belgian Joly 24 ‘Treaty of Lavenne with Turkey 2one art v2 Dre. oe Ace 27 Recognition of Soviet Government by Gret Dawes Agreements signed in London Gences Pree! sloped by Leave Recently Rejection of Geneva Protas by Great csrno Testi signed in London Admision of Germany tthe League of Nevont tent Hark g Expulsion o Trotsy from Rusan Communist Pac of Pai (Briand Kelogs Pat) signed Appronal of Young Plan bythe Hesse Ciairence Cg Un Aare enc Goan apr begins itary operations in Manchara Nbundonnen gel standard by Gren Beta Pt (CURONOLOGICAL TABLE OF IMPORTANT EVENTS tose Fant kar ones pening of Disarmament Conference [Reparation Agreement signed Laan ‘Trade Apres tote Great Dat and Demiions signed x Oran ‘Termination a ish mandate ove rag Here Hier becomes German Chane League Aseibly Reselson om Manchin; Japan Decpaton witht ‘Opening of Wed Eooomie Conference ‘Germany announces mide fans Darna tment Conference and Langue of Nation German-Polsh Agreement signed Soviet Union edited othe League of Nations [King Aleanee of Vogertaia saeuinated st Franco-telin Agremens signe by Signor “Muna and Sf Laval i Rerne Germany repudies itary cae of Vers ‘Trey Fri Sort Pc sine iam toupee Abyarins Stone Sots apd agi aly Germany reoccupes the demiarsed roe Aneeation of Abin by ely38 Match 2 Anneratin of Auta by Germany Sept-a9” ‘Munich Agvement reading Ceechonlovaia Mirch Germ occupation of Babemia und Moravia Apel" End of Spanish Gil Wer vey aan accpaton of Albania Miy 2 Gone sloped in Great Bitia ‘German Soviet fact ged ‘German ivasion of Foard War delved on Germany by Geet Britain and France INDEX Anite atmieh | be pon mes, ee | sEaec’ ‘Reyes Se 4 | tain, Stanley 93238, tod Grecaht | Ban ae Potty 2 f z : BASE connect, | SESE Gott 2d gh si cnet uno | pat dy Si ee | mid Vnaai Conference Bear ees RES | paw, 6 eyFave nt su at, | agnmens Conn, 8p Ba Bitte "Beat, isms 5 tse Amembly | Ladende, Marta, 49 ‘0 yon Cotminion, 26-70 tat ‘Ean | Rap, Tray, 98 18 yFetiones a,sani srpeimen 4 18 Rois "| Se dbge SRS oases | Serine Shen igi ts ‘Seer. “A Eres... |Eae= Byron Orne a | Eee se Rena ie Pithh ony Tee ea So | Heiter ices Soret Viton, vers | Hin” ERE. naan mee | Mach ada Tt Fesen'sofazza, 207 | Ta at Ace, | sen eta Oa oy | WAM, NMGAES, Sa 18 | vaya Omen, 16 Fe Tata, a8 Seo. 8h eo, B oe, Fotos Sec tae ee Linoview lets", 76-7, 93