Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Types of Company
Public Company
Can choose to be listed on the stock exchange
No limit on the number of SH’s
Greater statutory protections for SH’s
o Restrictions on self-dealing (Ch 2E)
o SH’s can remove management
Proprietary Company
Must have more than 50 SH’s (s 45A)
S 45A(2) Small proprietary company – satisfies at least 2 of the following
o Consolidated revenue < $50mill
o Consolidated gross assets < $25mill
o < 100 employees
S 45A(3) Large proprietary company – satisfies at least 2 of the following
o Consolidated revenue is $50mill
o Consolidated gross assets is $25mill
o Has 100 employees
Less onerous obligations, but cannot raise funds from the public
Public Companies (Ltd) Proprietary Companies (Pty Ltd)
S 112 S 112
Limited by shares Limited by shares
Unlimited with share capital Unlimited with share capital
Limited by guarantee
No liability company
S 201A(2): 3 directors. At least 2 must reside in AU S 201A: Minimum 1 director, who must reside in AU
S 203D(1): Shareholders have a statutory right to S 203C RR: Shareholders can remove directors but
remove directors by resolution in GM this right can be excluded by constitution
S 203E: Directors cannot be removed by other Directors can be removed by other directors
directors
S 195(1): Directors cannot attend or vote on matters S 194RR: Directors can attend meetings and vote on
in which they have a personal interest matters in which they have a material personal
interest (after disclosure)
Related party transactions must comply with Ch 2E No formal restrictions on related party transactions
s 254W: Dividends must be equal for each class of S 254W: Dividends may be paid as directors see fit
share
s 292: Must prepare annual financial and directors S 45A: Only large Pty Ltd companies must prepare
reports annual financial/directors reports
Ch 6D: Public fundraising using disclosure document S 113(3): Public fundraising using disclosure
permitted document not permitted
Consequences of Incorporation
Replaceable Rules
S 141 table of replaceable rules – see print out.
S 134: a company’s internal management rules are governed by the the RRs, a consti, or a combination of
both
S 135(1)(b): RRs are replaceable only for proprietary companies. They are mandatory for public
companies
o Apply only to companies that was registered after 1 July 1998; or a company that was registered
before 1 July 1998 that repeals its Consti after that date (s 135(1)(a))
S 135: RRs do not apply to a proprietary company with a sole SH who is a sole director
S 135(2): a company’s constitution can displace or modify RRs
S 135(3): failure to comply with a RR is not a contravention
Corporate Constitution
A constitution is adopted when (S 136(1):
(a) Members agree in writing to the Consti before registering with ASIC; or
(b) Members pass a special resolution to that effect thereafter
Rule: public companies must lodge an adopted Consti with ASIC within 14 days (s 136(5))
Rule: all companies must send the Consti to a member if requested (s 139)
How is a constitution MODIFIED?
o By special resolution (75% of eligible voters at the GM) (s 136(2); (s 9))
o Subject to any further constitutional requirements (s 136(3)-(4))
o Limitations
Cannot bind a member to take up more shares, increase liability, increased restrictions
on share transfer – unless agreed in writing (s 140(2))
The change cannot be ‘oppressive’ (Part 2F.1)
Where important membership rights are involved
How is a constitution ENFORCED?
o Rule: to enforce compliance with the Consti, the party must establish that the breach would
adversely affect them in their capacity as members (Hickman v Kent)
Rights of members include the right to: vote, attend meetings, receive info and
dividends
o Remedy is usually general law injunction or declaration (not damages)
How is a constitution INTERPRETED? Objectively, as a commercial document designed to promote
business efficacy (i.e. like a contract) (Lion Nathan Australia v Coopers Brewery)
Decision-Making Organs
Division of power
Rule: Members in a GM cannot issue binding directions to the board of directors. The majority of members
cannot usurp the management power given exclusively to directors by the terms of the constitution.
(Automatic Self-Cleaning)
NRMA v Parker: ‘a power vested by the Consti of a company exclusively in the directors cannot be
effectively exercised, not can its exercise by the directors be effectively controlled or interfered with by a
resolution of members in the GM.’
Re Winlyn Developments: ‘unless a contrary intention is shown, functions assigned to the company in GM
are not exercisable by the board of directors and likewise those given to the board of directors are not
exercisable by the company in GM
Capricornia Credit Union v ASIC: proposal to change Consti to require directors to take directions from
members regarding a proposed takeover held invalid because this could involve following directions that
constitute a breach of directors’ duties if not in the best interests of the company.
Rule: members cannot use the statutory powers to requisition member’s meetings or demand that a motion
be put to a member’s meeting if the subject is a matter of management exclusively vested in the directors
(NRMA v Parker) (s 249Q)
Directors owe director’s duties. Binding directions from SH’s could interfere with the proper discharge of
these duties.
Management decisions
S 198A: (1) the business of a company is to be managed by or under the direction of the directors (2) they
exercise all powers except any required to be exercised in a GM by the Consti / this Act.
Scope: day-to-day running + business operations
Staffing, finance, trading
How to use surplus funds e.g. purchasing new assets, investing, dividends
Control decisions
Members in GMs have power to appoint and remove directors from position on the board
Can be given control decisions by the Consti or CA or listing rules of a financial market
o E.g. Consti could require member approval for particular decisions (CA already does this)
Given the division of powers, when can SH’s in a GM intervene in the management of the company?
Deadlock: where the directors are in conflict and incapable of exercising power, at least where SH’s have
the ordinary powers of appointing directors (Barron v Potter)
o Massey v Wales: suggests that the deadlocks should not confer general management powers on
SH’s. It should be resolved by appointing/removing directors instead.
Where there are not enough directors to form a quorum
o Rule: where the no. of directors has fallen below the number for a quorum and the power of
appointing new directors is given by the Consti to the board, the GM can act in place of the board
(Isle of Wight Railway)
Reserve power of GM to commence and prosecute legal proceedings
o General rule: the board begins proceedings for the company and SH’s cannot interfere (Shaw)
o However: if the board neglects its power under the Consti to initiate proceedings, members can
bring derivative proceedings in certain circumstances although the company is the proper
plaintiff (Foss v Harbottle)
The court allows a suit on the company’s behalf to ensure the director’s wrongdoing is
addressed
o Rule: members in a GM can condone a breach of duty by directors as long as their decision does
not constitute fraud or oppression of the minority
o Rule: members in a GM can conclusively decide not to sue (Pavlides)
Decision-Making
COMPANY MEETINGS
Ordinary meetings: usually scheduled at a regular time and is held to keep participants informed and
make decisions on particular matters. May be member or director meetings
Extraordinary meetings: held to consider some urgent matter that cannot wait until the next ordinary
meeting. May be member or director meetings.
General principles
o Meeting invalid unless called for proper purpose
o Meetings must only be held for proper purpose
o Chair must be unbiased and professional (e.g. failure to allow sufficient time for debate /
participants to vote on resolutions may constitute a breach of duty or minority oppression)
o Only property constituted if a quorum is present at all times (common minimum = 2)
o Resolutions can be passed via a circulating resolution
Directors Meetings
Notice
o Formal notice is not required – standing notice sufficient
o S 248C(RR): a director’s meeting may be called by any director giving reasonable notice
individually to each other
o Not necessary for notice to specify the business to be dealt with, as D’s expected to attend all
meetings that they reasonable can (Dhami v Martin)
S 248D: director’s meetings may be held using technology provided all directors agree
S 248B: where a prop company has only 1 director, that director cannot hold a meeting and may make
decisions by signing resolutions
S 248G: each director will usually have one vote with resolutions passed by a majority
o Chair may have a casting vote depending on constitution (s 248G)
Decision-Making By The Board Of Directors
S 248 Circulating resolutions of companies with more than 1 director: (1) the directors of a company may
pass a resolution without a directors’ meeting being held if all the directors entitled to vote on the
resolution sign a document containing a statement that they are in favour of the resolution (3) the
resolution s passed when the last director signs
S 248G passing of director’s resolutions: (1) a resolution of the directors must be passed by a majority of
votes cast by directors entitled to vote on the resolution (2) chair has a casting vote if necessary
DECISION-MAKING BY SH’S IN GM
Notice Requirements
Rule: a meeting that has not been properly notified is invalid
S 249J notice of members’ meetings must be given to each member and director individually and may be
sent by post or email
S 249H minimum period of notice for a members’ meeting is 21 days, though the Consti may provide for a
longer period
o Shorter notice may be permitted, but this must be approved by member constituting 95% of
votes that may be cast in that meeting
S 249HA Public companies must provide at least 28 days’ notice prior to a members meeting
AGMs may only be called on less than 21 days’ notice if all eligible members agree in advance
S 249H(3)-(4) shorter notice is not available for meetings to remove a director or auditor
S 249L Contents
o (1) requirements for the contents of the notice of meeting
time and location
general nature of the business to be conducted
special resolutions that will be voted on and copies of them
details on proxy voting
o (3) the content of the notice must be worded and presented in a clear and concise and effective
manner
o Rule: director’s have a duty to ensure that notice fully and fairly informs and instructs SH about
the matter on which they will have to vote (Devereaux Holdings). But must not be a burden of
information – balance (Killen’s case)
Sunraysia: D’s not obliged to give SH’s every piece of information that might conceivably
affect voting. Practical and realistic approach.
RESOLUTIONS
Ordinary resolution: passed by the majority of those present and voting at a meeting
Special resolution s 9: (a) a resolution
(i) Of which notice as set out in s 249L(1)(c) has been given; and
(ii) That has been passed by at least 75% of the votes cast by members entitled to vote on the
resolution
Director
Is the person a de facto director? they act in the position of a director (s 9(b)(i))
Depends on the nature and extent of functions and constraints imposed. Summary of factors considered
(BCI Finances v Binetter)
o The duties that would be expected to be performed by a director in the relevant company - this
will vary according to size of company and allocation of responsibilities. Subject to the
requirement that the person performs 'top level management functions' (Deputy Commissioner
of Taxation v Austin).
o The duties actually performed by the person (Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining; Chameleon Mining
v Murchison; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Austin)
o Whether others in the company considered the person a director (Smithton v Naggar)
o Whether the company held out the person as a director (Grimaldi)
o Whether the person held themselves out as a director (Forkserve v Jack and Aussie Forklift
Reparis)
o Whether those outside the company considered the person to be a director (Grimaldi;
Chameleon Mining)
Objective test: person’s honest belief that they aren’t acting as director will not prevent
an interpretation that they are where the objective evidence supports this (Smithton)
Rule: the exercise of ‘top level management functions’ = necessary condition (Austin)
Is the person a shadow director? the directors of the company or body are accustomed to act in
accordance with the person’s instructions or wishes (s 9(b)(ii)
o Buzzle test: must establish:
Who the directors are
That the D directed those directors how to act in relation to the company
That those directors acted in accordance with such directions; and
That they were accustomed so to act
o Rule: There must be a causal connection between shadow director instructions and other
director acting on them (Buzzle)
o Rule: being accustomed to act in accordance with insturctions requires a pattern of behaviour
and habitual compliance over a period of time (Buzzle)
Not sufficient that they use their own judgement to decide to do the act regardless of
advice
The fact that the board tend to act on advice of someone with a genuine interest in
giving advice doesn’t make them a shadow director
o Rule: must have potential to control and this must be put into practice (Buzzle)
o Sufficient to show that director cast themselves in a subservient role / surrendered discretions
(Deverell)
o Antico: Had effective control due to size of SHs, imposed conditions demonstrated a willingness
and ability to exercise control. Actuality of control over management and finance
Officer
S 9 Definitions - officer
a) a partner in a partnership (b) an office holder of an unincorporated association or
(c) a person
i. who makes, or participates in making, decisions that affect the whole, or a substantial part, of the
business of the entity; or
ii. who has the capacity to affect significantly the entity’s financial standing
Has the capacity to affect significantly the corporation’s financial standing (s 9(c)(ii))
o Citigroup: Insufficient to substantially affect financial standing – propotional to company’s overall
finances.
o Buzzle: apple had capacity to significantly affect financial standing, but was a 3 rd party not part of
company management
o Hodgson v Amcor: officer – reported to upper tier management but he was the senior manager
of the largest division, oversaw high level GMs, direct control over own budget etc.
o Adler: director of HC = officer of subsidiary because he had the capacity to affect significantly its
financial standing
Employee
If they use their position / info to gain an advantage or cause detriment to the company (ss 182-3)
2. CONSEQUENCES OF BREACH
Where there has been a contravention of a civil penalty provision, ASIC may seek (per s 1317J):
Declaration of contravention (DC): s 1317E: declaration of contravention can be made by Court upon ASIC
application. (1) Court must make DC if satisfied of contravention of civil penalty provision.
Criminal penalties
S 184 A director/officer commits an offence if reckless/intentionally dishonest and fails to exercise
powers/discharge duties
S 209(3) a person commits an offence if they are involved in a contravention of s 208 (related party benefit)
dishonestly
WHICH INTERESTS?
General principle: duties are owed to the company as a whole
Individual SH’s: while duties are owed to the collective body of SH’s, duties are not owed to particular SH’s
individually (Percival v Wright)
o Exceptions: relate to whether there was a FD between director and individual SH based on their
particular relationship (but largely irrelevant bc Pt 2F.1A allows stat derivative actions)
Employees: no duty to consider employees ahead of SH interests
o Parke v Daily News: bonuses to employees as compensation for dismissal was not a proper use of
company funds.
Corporate groups: directors of subsidiaries are required to act in the best interests of those companies, and not
merely for the benefit of the larger corporation (Walker v Wimborne)
o Objective test: directors will not be in breach if an intelligent and honest person in the position of the
directors could have reasonably believed that the transaction was for the benefit of the entity –
applied in some courts(Charterbridge Corp v Lloyds Bank)
o Subjective test: directors must consider the interests of the separate entity and must consider its
interests alone – also applied in some courts (Wimborne)
o S 187: directors of wholly owned subsidiaries may act in the best interests of the HC where
The subs constitution expressly authorises this
The director acts in good faith
The director acts in the best interest sof the HC; and
The subsidiary remains solvent
Creditors: the duty on directors to consider creditor interests arises when the company is insolvent or
approaching insolvency (Kinsela)
o But this doesn’t confer any general/independent enforceable duty. Outside of insolvent trading,
directors’ duties are owed to the company and not to the creditors (Spies v R)
o Rule: this duty is owed to the company as a whole, not to the creditors independently (Spies, Bell
Group)
o Rule: if directors of an insolvent company preference creditors whose debts they have guaranteed,
they are in breach of their duty to the company (West mercia)
o Kinsela: liquidator challenged the transfer of a lease on the basis that directors breached their FDs in
failing to consider creditor interests when transferring the lease to themselves at undervalue
Principle: As the company approaches liquidation, the company assets are in a practical
sense the creditor’s assets
Interests of existing members: directors must consider the interests of existing members because they are
proprietors of the company who have risked capital (Pilmer v Duke Group). Recognised by Pt 2F.1
Interests of future members: Provident International Corp v International Leasing Corp suggested that the
duty of directors is more to act for the benefit of existing members having regard to their future interests as
well as existing interests
Corporate social responsibility: to what extent is there a legal obligation on companies to act according to
subjective notions of responsible behaviour?
o Whether Australian businesses comply with their duty by being socially responsible is up to them
o Cf English CA – can take into account impact of operations on community and environment
o James Hardie: company agreed to provide further funds for claimants after public outcry and a special
judicial commission
6. DUTY TO ACT FOR A PROPER PURPOSE
1. ASCERTAIN THE NATURE OF THE POWER AND ITS PURPOSE (Howards Smith v Ampol)
What to consider
Important factor: size and nature of the company. Directors of smaller companies may have more
extensive powers
A) Look to the constitution: it may demonstrate the purpose of the power (Falkingham)
o Consti provision allowed the board to serve a notice inquiring into interests in shares and to
impose restrictions on voting and share transfer where that information was not provided or the
response was known to be false/incorrect. Use 2 days before AGM to prevent people from
voting.
o Held: using the power to influence the outcome of an AGM was an improper purpose. Its
purpose was to provide a sanction or incentive to remedy a failure to comply.
B) Where the constitution does not provide guidance: court must make inferences from the type of
company, its activities, and its particular constitutional structure
o Australian Metropolitan Life Assurance: purpose of power to refuse registration of transfer of
shares was to ensure that insolvents / others whose business reps would damage the companies
should not be admitted as members
Rule: this is a question of fact and the court should give credit to the bona fide opinion of the directors
and respect their judgment as to matters of management (Howard Smith)
o It is the perception of the directors that determines their purpose (subjective), and each
directors’ position must be analysed separately (Re Southern Resources)
Rule: where there are dissenting directors, must find the substantial purpose of the majority
Have regard to all surrounding circumstances (Hindle v John Cotton)
Howard Smith: rejected the reason given by all majority directors in the face of evidence to the contrary.
Was there a mixed purpose?
o Rule: a merely incidental effect following from pursuit of a permissible purpose doesn’t vitiate
the decision
o Rule: directors are not reduced to inertia when their SH’s have received a takeover offer, but
must consider whether undertaking a new commercial project will be in their interests
o Rule: must show that the substantial purpose was improper and that ‘but for’ the improper
purpose the directors would not have performed the act (Darvall, Haselhurst)
7. DIRECTORS DUTY OF CARE
Standard of skill
Test: the standard of skill expected of a D is an objective standard measured by what a reasonable person
with the knowledge and experience of the director would do (Adler)
Rule: D’s are required to take reasonable steps to place themselves in a position to guide and monitor the
management of the company
o Should become familiar with fundamentals of the business and financial status, keep informed
about activities, monitor affairs by regularly attending board meetings
o Relevant accounting principles and be able to make inquiries (ASIC v Healey)
Rule: alleged breaches are tested by reference to an objective body of knowledge/expertise possessed by
persons in the same recognised calling (South Aus Marcus Clark)
Financial competence: courts have inferred an objective standard of financial competence –
Raised standard?
Is the standard raised?
o Rule: where a director/officer has a potential conflict between a personal interest and a duty in a
transaction, then the exercise of the duty of care requires special vigilance, calling for scrupulous
concern (ASIC v Adler)
o Chairperson: higher standard unless evidence to contrary (see below)
S 180(2)(a) In good faith and for a proper purpose: must demonstrate that they acted with personal
honesty because they subjectively believed that they were acting in the interests of the company (Adler)
S 180(2)(b) Must not have a material interest: must be nothing preventing an impartial decision from
being made (Adler)
S 180(2)(c) Rationally believe that the judgement is in the best interests of the corp: this depends on
o The significance of the decision: the greater the significance, the greater effort required
o The practicality of gathering information: time and money etc (see below (Rich))
Was the director’s belief that they are properly informed reasonable?
ASIC v Rich
Significance of decision
Time available for obtaining info
Costs related to obtaining info
Director’s / officer’s confidence in those exploring the matter
State of company’s business at the time
Whether or not material info reasonably available
o ‘reasonably believe to be appropriate’: indicates that protection may be available even if D
wasn’t aware of info material to the judgment provided they reasonably believed they informed
themselves
6. CONSEQUENCES
S 180(1) is a civil penalty provision. A court must make a declaration of contravention if satisfied that a person
has contravened a civil penalty provision (s 1317E(1). Under this provision, ASIC may approach the court and
seek a PPO, CO or DO. Under s 1317(2), the company may apply for a CO (s 1317(2)). No criminal penalties.
8. DISCLOSURE OF MATERIAL PERSONAL INTERESTS
1. STATUTE
D. Consequences: contravention does not affect validity (S 191(4); s 192(7)). Civil penalty provision. A court
must make a declaration of contravention if satisfied that a person has contravened a civil penalty
provision (s 1317E(1). Under this provision, ASIC may approach the court and seek a PPO, CO or DO. Under
s 1317(2), the company may apply for a CO (s 1317(2)
2. IF DISCLOSURE HAS OCCURRED, WERE VOTING RESTRICTIONS COMPLIED WITH?
A. Proprietary companies
S 194 (RR) If a director has a material personal interest and discloses it they can (a) vote on those matters
(b) proceed with transactions (ce retain benefit and (f) the company cannot avoid transactions merely
because of the interest
B. Public companies
S 195 (strict liability)
(1) a D must not (a) be present while the matter is being considered; or (b) vote on the matter
The director may vote if:
o S 195(2): D’s who do not have a material personal interest passed a resolution that (a) identifies the
D, nature and extent of the interest, relation to affairs of the company; (b) states that those Ds are
satisfied that the interest should not disqualify the D from voting or being present
o S 195(3) ASIC makes a declaration/order
o S 195(4) there is not enough for a quorum – D may call a GM to pass a resolution
C. Effect of contravention: does not affect validity. civil penalty provision. A court must make a declaration
of contravention if satisfied that a person has contravened a civil penalty provision (s 1317E(1). Under
this provision, ASIC may approach the court and seek a PPO, CO or DO. Under s 1317(2), the company
may apply for a CO (s 1317(2)).
3. GENERAL LAW
WHAT is required?
o Advise SH’s of risks and transactions
o Advise board of how to address conflict
o Positive actions to mitigate any harm to company you owe obligations to
o Resign
o Leave meeting during deliberation
o Not vote on decision
E.g. PBS v McGee: positive duty to protect company’s interests by taking steps to prevent transaction
E.g. PBS v Wheeler: D should have ensured other D’s appreciated potential harm in situation
Conflict of duty: D must avoid an actual or substantial possibility of a conflict between the D’s duty to the
company and the D’s duty to someone else (South Australia v Marcus Clark)
Factors
o Nature of interest (pecuniary? Expectant or contingent? Direct or indirect? Grimaldi
An indirect interest is not enough (Baker)
o Extent of interest: whether a reasonable person would think there was a real/substantial possibility to
sway the director (Bell Group)
o Nature of company, type of transaction
Canberra Residential Development: former director not in breach as current company was
not in the same business as previous company
o Is the interest greater than that of a member of the public?
o Is there capacity to influence the decision?
Rule: not necessary for there to be loss in order for the duty to be breached (Boardman v Phipps, Gemstone)
but cases usually involve loss caused by conflict
Rule: doesn’t matter that the transaction is fair to the company or benefits the company (s 184(2A); s 184(4)
– benefit is not a defence)
3. CONSEQUENCES
Statutory
o Failure to comply with s 191(1) is a strict liability offence, attracts a fine of up to 10 penalty units
or 3 months’ imprisonment. Not a civil penalty provision but it permits ASIC to disqualify the
person from being a director
o Contravention of s 191 does not affect validity
General law
o Fiduciary must account for a profit/benefit if it was obtained when such a conflict existed or by
reason of the fiduciary taking advantage of an opportunity or knowledge derived from that
position
o The objective of these principles is to preclude fiduciaries from being swayed by consideration of
personal interest and from actually misusing their position for personal advantage
10. NO PROFIT RULE
1. DID THE PERSON BREACH THE DUTY NOT TO MAKE IMPROPER USE OF POSITION?
2. DID THE PERSON BREACH THE DUTY NOT TO MAKE IMPROPER USE OF INFORMATION?
3. CONSEQUENCES
Civil penalty provision. A court must make a declaration of contravention if satisfied that a person has
contravened a civil penalty provision (s 1317E(1). Under this provision, ASIC may approach the court and seek
a PPO, CO or DO. Under s 1317(2), the company may apply for a CO (s 1317(2)).