Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty to the SC on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentations in

the Supreme Court

AM No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.

FACTS:

Shortly after the promulgation of the Supreme Court decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, the counsel
for the petitioners Atty. Harry Roque and Atty. Rommel Bagares therein filed,

1) a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating the fundamental responsibility of states in protecting

its citizens’ human rights specifically pertaining to jus cogens norms; and,

2) a supplement thereto asserting that the Vinuya decision was plagiarized from different sources
and that the true intents of the plagiarized sources were twisted by the ponente to suit the
arguments laid down in said decision.

Thereafter, an ethics committee tasked to investigate the veracity of the alleged plagiarism, the authors
who were purportedly plagiarized sent their respective letters to the Supreme Court. Due to this, the
faculty of UP College of Law came up with a statement (Restoring Integrity Statement), which alleged
plagiarism against Justice del Castillo, treating the same not only as an established fact, but as a truth.
Said statement was posted online and at the College’s bulletin board and was submitted to the Supreme
Court. Thus, the Supreme Court issued a Show Cause Resolution directing respondents to show cause why
they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

ISSUE:

WON respondents as Members of the Bar should be disciplined.

RULING:

Yes.

It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad definition of Cayetano vs
Monsod, lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in
other disciplines and more that lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to
uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be
measured against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar
as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact they are lawyers. Even if the
court was willing to accept respondents’ proposition in the common compliance that their issuance of
the statement was in keeping with their duty to participate in the development of the legal system by
initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice under
Canon 4, the SC cannot agree that they have fulfilled the same in keeping with the demands of Canon 1,
11, and 13 to give due respect to legal processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to
influence the courts.

As members of the Bar, they cannot be selective regarding which canons to abide by given particular
situations. With more reason that law professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they are expected
to provide their students exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole and not just
their preferred portions thereof.

No matter how firm a lawyer’s conviction in the righteousness of his cause there is simply no excuse for
denigrating the courts and engaging in public behavior that tends to put the courts and the legal
profession into disrepute.
 Al C. Argosino, BM No. 712, July 13, 1995

FACTS:

A Criminal information was filed against Argosino and 13 others for the crime of homicide in connection
with the death of Camaligan in the course of hazing. Argosino and co-accused entered into plea bargaining
to a lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence which the court accepted.

Argosino and colleagues filed and granted with probation. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take
the 1993 Bar Examination disclosing the fact of his criminal conviction and his probation status.

He was allowed to take the bar and passed. However, he was no allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

ISSUE:

WON Argosino should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

Ruling:

No.

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special
educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.

The requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so far as the general public and the
proper administration of justice is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to
the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be proper broader than inquiry into the moral
character of a lawyer in proceedings for disbarment.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar
must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from the members of the general
public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is
open to individuals with inadequate moral qualification. The growth of such perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people’s confidence in the courts of law and in our legal system as we know
it.

Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Camaligan constituted evident
rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that
the participant was possessed of good moral character.
 FAROLLY PENTECOSTES v. ATTY. HERMENEGILDO

529 SCRA 146 (2007)

FACTS:

Atty. Hermenegildo Marasigan, Clerk of Court was administratively charged with grave misconduct and
conduct unbecoming a public officer for the loss of a motorcycle-subject matter of a criminal case which
was placed under his care and custody.

The administrative case against Atty. Hermenegildo stemmed from a sworn affidavit complaint filed by
Rolly Pentecostes, the owner of a Kawasaki motorcycle, which was recovered by members of the
Philippine National Police from suspected carnappers.

The release order for the motorcycle was issued but Pentecostes refused to receive it because it was
already ―cannibalized and unserviceable. The RTC referred the case to the Executive Judge of RTC for
investigation, report and recommendation. Judge Rabang recommended that the administrative
complaint against Atty. Hermenegildo be dismissed because there was no proof of Pentecostes’ claim that
the vehicle was cannibalized from the time that it was under Atty. Hermenegildo’s custody until its
transfer to Philippine National Police. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) affirmed the dismissal
of the complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Atty. Hermenegildo is guilty of misconduct

RULING:

Yes.

It is the duty of the clerk of court to keep safely all record, papers, files, exhibits and public property
committed to his charge. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are essential
and ranking officers of our judicial system who perform delicate functions vital to the prompt and proper
administration of justice. Their duties include the efficient recording, filing and management of court
records and the safekeeping of exhibits and public property committed to their charge. Clearly, they play
a key role in the complement of the court and cannot be permitted to slacken on their jobs under one
pretext or another. They cannot err without affecting the integrity of the court or the efficient
administration of justice.

A clerk of court, by transferring a motorcycle in his custody without authority, failed to give premium to
his avowed duty of keeping it under his care and possession – he must therefore, suffer the consequences
of his act or omission, which is akin to misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some established or
definite rule of action. More particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer, and the
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the
law or to disregard established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence.