DAVID vs.
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued
G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006
[Doctrine: Legislative Department - Power to
Declare War and Delegate Emergency Power]
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP
No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, President of the Republic of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out
power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution
which states that: “The President. . . whenever
it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed
forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,â€
and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief,
do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout
the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction; and [power to take over] as
provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5
implementing PP1017, directing the members of
the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the
necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless
violence."
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that
(1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of
Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the
constitutional requirements for the imposition of
martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and
of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting
from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search”
committed by police operatives pursuant to PP
1017.
that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual
basis, and contended that the intent of the
Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to
the President in determining the necessity of calling
out the armed forces. The petitioners did not
contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is
constitutional.
RULING:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided
into three important provisions, thus:
First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon
me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines,
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well any act of insurrection or rebellion”
Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to
all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article
XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of
National Emergency.”
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as
provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out
power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the
President may call the armed forces “to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.”
(Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of
rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, a
declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II
of the Revised Administration Code. Such
declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless,
without legal significance, and deemed not
written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than
that. In declaring a state of national emergency,
President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling
on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section
17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s
extraordinary power to take over privately-owned
public utility and business affected with public
interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of
an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation
cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial
Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s
calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her
in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.
The second provision pertains to the power of the
President to ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII
which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants President
Arroyo the authority to promulgate
“decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the
province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall
be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law
nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can
justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the President’s
authority to declare“a state of national emergency”
and to exercise emergency powers. To the first,
Section 18, Article VII grants the President such
power, hence, no legitimate constitutional
objection can be raised. But to the second,
manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency
powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23
(2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such
powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot
delegate a power not reposed upon it. However,
knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not
be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and
exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution
deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant
emergency powers to the President, subject to
certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period
only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such
restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to
carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an
aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking
over of private business affected with public interest
is just another facet of the emergency powers
generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when
Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed
by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation
of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress,
not the President. Now, whether or not the
President may exercise such power is dependent on
whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant
to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article
XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP
1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does
not authorize her during the emergency to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest without authority from
Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone
can declare a state of national emergency,
however, without legislation, he has no power to
take over privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest. Nor can he determine
when such exceptional circumstances have
ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President
has no power to point out the types of businesses
affected with public interest that should be taken
over. In short, the President has no absolute
authority to exercise all the powers of the State
under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an
emergency powers act passed by Congress.

As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it

provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP
should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is
“necessary and appropriate actions and measures
to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism”
have not yet been defined and made punishable by
the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared unconstitutional.
IMBONG vs. OCHOA 4. Locus Standi
G.R. No. 204819 5. Declaratory Relief
April 8, 2014 6. One Subject/One Title Rule

[Doctrine:
ISSUE/S:
Substantial: Right to Life; Health; Religion; Free
Speech; Privacy; Due Process Clause; Equal SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Protection Clause
Procedural: Actual Case; Facial Challenge; Locus Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive
Standi; Declaratory Relief; One Subject One Title Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating
Rule] the:
1. Right to life
2. Right to health
FACTS: 3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known 4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and
as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive autonomy)
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by 5. Freedom of expression and academic
Congress on December 21, 2012. freedom
6. Due process clause
Challengers from various sectors of society are 7. Equal protection clause
questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. 8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of
RH Law on the following grounds: PROCEDURAL ISSUES:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: Whether the Court can exercise its power of

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the judicial review over the controversy.
unborn. 1. Actual Case or Controversy
2. The RH Law violates the right to health and 2. Facial Challenge
the right to protection against hazardous products. 3. Locus Standi
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious 4. Declaratory Relief
freedom. 5. One Subject/One Title Rule
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional
provision on involuntary servitude. DISCUSSIONS:
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal
protection of the law. PROCEDURAL
6. The RH Law violates the right to free
speech. Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in rule that the power of judicial review is limited by
violation of the due process clause of the four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual
Constitution. case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality
privacy of one’s family protected by the must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d)
Constitution the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of
the case.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES: Whether the Court
may exercise its power of judicial review over the Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy
controversy. means an existing case or controversy that is
1. Power of Judicial Review appropriate or ripe for determination, not
2. Actual Case or Controversy conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the
3. Facial Challenge court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must
concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical
question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law
would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite
that something has then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must
allege the existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to himself as a result of the challenged action.
He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of the act complained of.
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as
a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning
not only protected speech, but also all other rights
in the First Amendment. These include religious
freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the
people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. After all,
the fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but
component rights of the right to one’s freedom of
expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts
are externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is
defined as a personal and substantial interest in a
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure the
concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the
doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest
so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.”
One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject”
rule does not require the Congress to employ in the
title of the enactment language of such precision as
to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents
and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general
object which the statute seeks to effect, and where,
as here, the persons interested are informed of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has
invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical
construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or
impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule
expresses the principle that the title of a law must
not be “so uncertain that the average person
reading it would not be informed of the purpose of
the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents,
or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different
one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope
of the act.”
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox
view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers
no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had
never been passed. Modern view: Under this view,
the court in passing upon the question of
constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute
if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It
simply refuses to recognize it and determines the
rights of the parties just as if such statute had no
existence. But certain legal effects of the statute
prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be
recognized. Requisites for partial
unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be
willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown
by the presence of a separability clause in the law;
and (2) The valid portion can stand independently
as law.
RULING/S:
SUBSTANTIAL
1. Majority of the Members of the Court
believe that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be
decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. However, they agreed that individual
Members could express their own views on this
matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states:
“The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in
statutory construction), the traditional meaning of
“conception” according to reputable dictionaries
cited by the ponente is that life begins at
fertilization. Medical sources also support the view
that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for
(a) “conception” to refer to the moment of
“fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn
child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not
intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the
fertilized ovum would be prohibited.
Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of
the male sperm and female ovum, and those that
similarly take action before fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally
permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for
protecting the life of the unborn child was to
prevent the Legislature from passing a measure
prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this
otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent
and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word
“or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH
Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that
prevent implantation but also those that induce
abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes
that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the
State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused
their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term “primarily”.
Recognizing as abortifacients only those that
“primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention
of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR)
would pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of
the unborn from conception/fertilization. This
violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
For the same reason, the definition of
contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which
also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck
down.
2. The RH Law does not intend to do away
with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the
Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure
that only safe contraceptives are made available to
the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of
the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the
provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual
distribution of these contraceptive drugs and
devices will be done following a prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH
Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after
these devices and materials have been tested,
evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress
cannot determine that contraceptives are “safe,
legal, non-abortificient and effective”.
3. The Court cannot determine whether or not
the use of contraceptives or participation in support
of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a
religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong
according to one’s dogma or belief. However, the
Court has the authority to determine whether or
not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular
objectives without being dictated upon the policies
of any one religion. To allow religious sects to
dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate
Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the
Establishment Clause. This would cause the State
to adhere to a particular religion, and thus,
establishes a state religion. Thus, the State
can enhance its population control program
through the RH Law even if the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs
of e.g. the petitioners.
4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which
permits RH procedures even with only the consent
of the spouse undergoing the provision
(disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial
privacy and autonomy and goes against the
constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic
social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV
of the Constitution mandates the State to defend:
(a) the right of spouses to found a family in
accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the
right of families or family associations to participate
in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot
infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and
endanger the institutions of marriage and the
family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a
minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent
or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH
Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government.” In addition, the
portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case
of minors, the written consent of parents or legal
guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising
parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required
only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it
denies the right of parental authority in cases where
what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as
opposed to procedures) about family planning
services. Parents are not deprived of parental
guidance and control over their minor child in this
situation and may assist her in deciding whether to
accept or reject the information received. In
addition, an exception may be made in life-
threatening procedures.
5. The Court declined to rule on the
constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law,
which mandates the State to provide Age-and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health
Education. Although educators might raise their
objection to their participation in the RH education
program, the Court reserves its judgment should an
actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature
because the Department of Education has not yet
formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate
reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places
more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of the
term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing
their youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and
corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement
(rather than supplant) the right and duties of the
parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community
associations, school officials, and other interest
groups in developing the mandatory RH program,
it could very well be said that the program will be in
line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6. The RH Law does not violate the due
process clause of the Constitution as the definitions
of several terms as observed by the petitioners are
not vague.
The definition of “private health care service
provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n)
of the RH Law which defines a “public health
service provider”. The “private health care
institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as
synonymous to “private health care service
provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad
enough to include providing of information and
rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals
operated by religious groups are exempted from
rendering RH service and modern family planning
methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH
Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”.
Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the
terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense
of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent
the public as to the nature and effect of programs
and services on reproductive health.
7. To provide that the poor are to be given
priority in the government’s RH program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is
pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution, which states that the State shall
prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick
elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it
shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor
to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH
Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who
are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. In addition, the RH Law does not
prescribe the number of children a couple may
have and does not impose conditions upon couples
who intend to have children. The RH Law only
seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions
from the mandatory RH education program under
Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the
academic freedom of private educational
institutions especially with respect to religious
instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards
the teaching of reproductive health education
8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH
Law for private and non-government health care
service providers to render 48 hours of pro
bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary
servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of
medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest
that it is both the power and a duty of the State to
control and regulate it in order to protect and
promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17
only encourages private and non-government RH
service providers to render pro bono Besides the
PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed
should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from
Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow
them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise
PROCEDURAL
1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an
actual case or controversy exists and that the same
is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that
the RH Law and its implementing rules have
already taken effect and that budgetary measures to
carry out the law have already been passed, it is
evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it not only
becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to
settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case
is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally
prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations
thereof, particularly public health officers who are
threatened to be dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They
must, at least, be heard on the matter now.
2. In this jurisdiction, the application of
doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While the Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal
statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes
not only regulating free speech, but also those
involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights. The underlying reason for this modification
is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this
Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated
by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive
Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing
petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and
religion and other fundamental rights mentioned
above have been violated by the assailed legislation,
the Court has authority to take cognizance of these
kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law
can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss
these petitions on the simple expedient that there
exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish
this Court as a reactive branch of government,
acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino
people.
3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law
may not be assailed through an “as-applied
challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted
liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has
accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not
otherwise directly injured or with material interest
affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental importance is
invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a
procedural technicality which the Court has, on
more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus
allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as
concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators,
to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not
have been directly injured by the operation of a law
or any other government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a
petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case
warrants that the Court set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the
petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues
raised herein have potentially pervasive influence
on the social and moral well-being of this nation,
specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle that
rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed
to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed.
4. Most of the petitions are praying for
injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just
consider them as petitions for prohibition under
Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction.
Where the case has far-reaching implications and
prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
5. The RH Law does not violate the one
subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis
of the various provisions of the law shows that both
“reproductive health” and “responsible
parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the
overriding objective to control the population
growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of
Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State
recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health
which includes reproductive health, the right to
education and information, and the right to choose
and make decisions for themselves in accordance
with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural
beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between
“reproductive health” and “responsible
parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the
goal of achieving “sustainable human
development” as stated under its terms, the Court
finds no reason to believe that Congress
intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the
contents of the assailed legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as
NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with
respect to the following provisions which are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health
facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group
to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents
or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access
to modem methods of family planning without
written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision
in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service
provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate
information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health regardless of his or her
religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a
married individual, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health
procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective
surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case,
as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health care service provider within the
same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision
in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any public officer who
refuses to support reproductive health programs or
shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program,
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in
the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect
the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-
IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily” in
defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they
are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for
contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and
violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
Additional:
WON the delegation of authority to the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) to determine WON a
supply or product is to be included in the Essential
Drugs List is valid;
NO. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the
power to determine whether or not a supply or
product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List
is valid, as the FDA not only has the power but also
the competency to evaluate, register and cover
health services and methods (under RA 3720 as
amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of 2009).
C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers
devolved to Local Governments and the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM)
NO. The RH Law does not infringe upon the
autonomy of local governments. Paragraph (c) of
Section 17 provides a categorical exception of cases
involving nationally-funded projects, facilities,
programs and services. Unless a local government
unit (LGU) is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a
program for which funding has been provided by
the national government under the annual general
appropriations act, even if the program involves the
delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of
the LGU.
In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide
RH services. Provision of these services are not
mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to
an undue encroachment by the national government
upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.
Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the
Organic Act of the ARMM merely delineates the powers
that may be exercised by the regional government.
These provisions cannot be seen as an abdication by the
State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit
the general welfare.
TOLENTINO vs. SEC. OF FINANCE initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo
G.R. No. 115455 extensive changes in the Senate.
October 30, 1995
SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by
[Doctrine: Bicameralism] the President need not meet the requirement not
only of printing but also of reading the bill on
FACTS: separate days.

RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-

Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen the
tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance
its administration by amending the National
Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits
questioning and challenging the constitutionality of
RA 7716 on various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate
exclusively from the House of Representatives but
is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB.
No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on
separate days on the Senate thus violating Article
VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution,
respectively.

Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or

tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall
originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.

Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either

House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies
thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section
24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.

HELD:
No. The phrase “originate exclusively” refers to the
revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is
sufficient that the House of Representatives
CHAVEZ vs. JBC
G.R. No. 202242
April 16, 2013
[Doctrine: Bicameralism]
FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an
eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the
JBC – one from the House of Representatives and
one from the Senate, with each having one-half
(1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate
meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow
the representatives from the Senate and the House
of Representatives one full vote each.
Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents)
simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of
the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has
questioned in this petition. it should mean one
representative each from both Houses which
comprise the entire Congress.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a
bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the
Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role
of each house in the process. The same holds true
in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play
between the two houses is necessary in the
realization of these powers causing a vivid
dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount.
This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC
representation because no liaison between the two
houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence,
the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the
entire legislative department. The Constitution
mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only.

Respondent contends that the phrase “ a

representative of congress” refers that both houses
of congress should have one representative each,
and that these two houses are permanent and
mandatory components of “congress” as part of the
bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have
their respective powers in performance of their
duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides
for the component of the JBC to be 7 members
only with only one representative from congress.

ISSUE:
Whether the JBC’s practice of having members
from the Senate and the House of Representatives
making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be
unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of
the constitution.

HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the

court held that the phrase “a representative of
congress” should be construed as to having only
one representative that would come from either
house, not both. That the framers of the
constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC
to be allotted for the legislative.
IN RE: CUNANAN 1. The law itself admits that the candidates for
94 PHIL 534 admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952
March 18, 1954 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this
was very close to the end of World War II;
[Doctrine: Extent of and Limitations on Legislative 2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the
Power] resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates;
FACTS: 3. The law is an encroachment on the Court’s
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is primary prerogative to determine who may be
known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess
of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement
for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by
including 1955.” Congress under this power are only minimum
Section 1 provided the following passing marks: norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of
the court on who can practice law; and
1946-1951 70% 4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and
1952 71% amounts to class legislation.
1953 72%
1954 73% As to the portion declared in force and effect, the
1955 74% Court could not muster enough votes to declare it
void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing
grade lower than 50%. Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to
the bar of an petitioner. The same may also
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter,
who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be supplement or modify rules of admission to the
deemed to have already passed that subject and the practice of law.
grade/grades shall be included in the computation
of the general average in subsequent bar
examinations.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

HELD:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the
fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the
Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the
bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar
examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent
system for an indefinite time. It was also struck
down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to
take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence
are not stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was

declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to
1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion
that was stricken down was based under the
following reasons:
ABAKADA vs. PURISIMA
G.R. No. 166715
August 14, 2018
[Doctrine: Extent of and Limitations on Legislative
Power]
FACTS:
RA 9335 or Attrition Act of 2005 was enacted to
optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC. The law
intends to encourage their officials and employees
to exceed their revenue targets by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund and
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.
The Boards in the BIR and BOC to be composed
by their respective Commissioners, DOF, DBM,
and NEDA, were tasked to prescribe the rules and
guidelines for the allocation, distribution and
release of the fund, to set criteria and procedures
for removing service officials and employees whose
revenue collection fall short of the target; and
further, to issue rules and regulations. Also, the law
tasked the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and
the CSC to promulgate and issue the IRR of RA
9335, subject to the approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created solely
for the purpose of approving the formulated IRR.
Later, the JCOO having approved a formulated
IRR by the agencies, JCOO became functus officio
and ceased to exist.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed
this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA
9335 and sought to prevent herein respondents
from implementing and enforcing said law.
Petitioners assail, among others, the creation of a
congressional oversight committee on the ground
that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers,
as it permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law, when
legislative function should have been deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment
of the law. Respondents, through the OSG, counter
this by asserting that the creation of the
congressional oversight committee under the law
enhances rather than violates separation of powers,
as it ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy.
ISSUE: Whether the creation of the congressional
oversight committee violates the doctrine of
separation of powers under the Constitution
HELD: YES.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in
RA 9335 having approved the IRR formulated by
the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC on
May 22, 2006, it became functus officio and ceased
to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged
encroachment on the executive function of
implementing and enforcing the law may be
considered moot and academic.
This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time
as any for the Court to confront the issue of the
constitutionality of the Joint Congressional.
Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per
se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power to
implement laws nor undermines the constitutional
separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the
checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. It may in fact even enhance
the separation of powers as it prevents the over-
accumulation of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional
encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,” the
Constitution imposes two basic and related
constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any
of its committees or its members with either
executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises
its legislative power, it must follow the “single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures”
specified under the Constitution, including the
procedure for enactment of laws and presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure
such as this should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation. In particular, congressional oversight
must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of
appropriation and the budget hearings conducted
in connection with it, its power to ask heads of
departments to appear before and be heard by
either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to
their departments and its power of confirmation
and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
Under this principle, a provision that requires
Congress or its members to approve the
implementing rules of a law after it has already
taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a
provision that allows Congress or its members to
overturn any directive or ruling made by the
members of the executive branch charged with the
implementation of the law.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the Wherefore, the petition is hereby partially granted.
separation of powers guaranteed by the Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint
Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class. Congressional Oversight Committee to approve
the implementing rules and regulations of the law
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and
President or an administrative agency to present the therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is upheld.
law to Congress which, by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a “right” or
“power” to approve or disapprove such regulations
before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in
the form of a congressional oversight committee is
in the form of an inward-turning delegation
designed to attach a congressional leash (other than
through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to
which Congress has by law initially delegated broad
powers. It radically changes the design or structure
of the Constitution‘s diagram of power as it entrusts
to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or
implementing its own laws.

Administrative regulations enacted by

administrative agencies to implement and interpret
the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the
force of law and are entitled to respect. Congress,
in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer,
may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them
to its stamp of approval without disturbing the
calculated balance of powers established by the
Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or
disapprove the IRR based on a determination of
whether or not they conformed with the provisions
of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power
unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court
by the Constitution.

From the moment the law becomes effective, any

provision of law that empowers Congress or any of
its members to play any role in the implementation
or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
DATU MICHAEL vs. SENATE
G.R. No. 19671
October 18, 2011
[Doctrine: Formalities]
FACTS:
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted
by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the
organic act that established the ARMM and
scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the
ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for
the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday
of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the
first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA
No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM
regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005
and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM
regional elections should have been held on August
8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for
these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was
enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections
to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national
and local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with
the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
ISSUES:
1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the
synchronization of elections [including the ARMM
elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the
three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section
26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to
appoint OICs constitutional?
RULING:
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions
and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No.
10153 in toto.]
1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that
Congress has to synchronize national and local
elections, the clear intent towards this objective can
be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent
to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the
incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections. The Constitutional
Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of
the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all
serve as patent indicators of the constitutional
mandate to hold synchronized national and local
elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992
and for all the following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called
“regional” elections, should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a “local”
election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987
Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections, including the ARMM elections.
2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES
NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days
requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either
the House or the Senate can become laws they
must pass through three readings on separate days,
is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President
certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate
enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, explained the effect of the President’s
certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. The phrase
"except when the President certifies to the necessity
of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section
26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a
bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and [ii] it has been
printed in its final form and distributed three days
before it is finally approved.
In the present case, the records show that the
President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the
immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the
President’s certification exempted both the House
and the Senate from having to comply with the
three separate readings requirement.
3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power
to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified
the three options open to Congress in order to
resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM
officials in the interim [in order to achieve
synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the
[incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to
remain in office in a hold over capacity until those
elected in the synchronized elections assume office;
(2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the
terms of those elected to expire when those elected
in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office;
or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs,
[their respective terms to last also until those
elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume
office.]
3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since
it would extend the terms of office of the incumbent
ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This
provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials,
they are covered and bound by the three-year term
limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot
extend their term through a holdover. xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is
effectively another term mandated by Congress, the
net result is for Congress to create a new term and
to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view
– like the extension of the elective term – is
constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do
indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a
way that would effectively extend the term of the
incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally
done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws
would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a
new term and effectively appoint the occupant of
the position for the new term. This is effectively an
act of appointment by Congress and an
unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional
appointment power of the President. Hence,
holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a
constitutionally infirm option that Congress could
not have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally
permissible, and there had been statutory basis for
it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054)
in the past, we have to remember that the rule of
holdover can only apply as an available option
where no express or implied legislative intent to the
contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary
intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it
explicitly clear that it had the intention of
suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under
RA No. 9054 by completely removing this
provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is
wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in
the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this
Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation, except where an
attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.
3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is
unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has
no authority to order special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially
legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be held on
any other date for the positions of President, Vice
President, Members of Congress and local officials,
except when so provided by another Act of
Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to
whom Congress may have delegated either the
power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the
details in the execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM
elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011
elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011
– for regional elections synchronized with the
presidential, congressional and other local
elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a
policy decision in the exercise of its legislative
wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an
adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive
nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering
special elections instead at the call of the
COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make
this call without thereby supplanting the legislative
decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the
Court is not without the power to declare an act of
Congress null and void for being unconstitutional
or for having been exercised in grave abuse of
discretion. But our power rests on very narrow
ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of
Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of
Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself
should have done in the exercise of its legislative
powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective
ARMM officials cannot be extended through a
holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting
an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years
that the Constitution itself commands. This is what
will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call
for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while
synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost
of a violation of an express provision of the
Constitution.
3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the
power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is
valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress’
chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the
appointment by the President of OICs to govern
the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the
only measure that Congress can make. This choice
itself, however, should be examined for any
attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially
executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should
be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized. The appointing power is embodied in
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which
states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone,
in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the
officers that the President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments;
ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls;
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the
President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law;

Third, those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments
the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.
based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from
its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply
an interim measure responding to the adjustments
that the synchronization requires.

Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs

emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the
third group of officials that the President can
appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on
clear constitutional basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions

to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of
RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution
requires that the ARMM executive and legislative
officials to be “elective and representative of the
constituent political units.” This requirement
indeed is an express limitation whose non-
observance in the assailed law leaves the
appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this

alleged constitutional problem is more apparent
than real and becomes very real only if RA No.
10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that
changes the elective and representative character of
ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does
not in any way amend what the organic law of the
ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of
structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in
fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for
the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly
elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office.” This power is far
different from appointing elective ARMM officials
for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption
to office of the officials elected in the May 2013
elections.

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not

amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact,
provides only for synchronization of elections and
for the interim measures that must in the
meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153
should be read – in the manner it was written and
PHILJA vs. PRADO
G.R. No. 105371
November 11, 1993
[Doctrine: Formalities]
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No.
7354 which withdraw the franking privilege from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional
Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration
Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with
certain other government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No.
7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more
than one subject and does not express its purposes;
(2) it did not pass the required readings in both
Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in
its final form were not distributed among the
members before its passage; and (3) it is
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence
of the Judiciary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
RULING:
No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is
unconstitutional.
1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution
providing that "Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to
the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to
cover every single detail of the measure. It has been
held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject,
and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act,
and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the
people, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking
privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A.
No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient
and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that,
by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section
35 did not have to be expressly included in the title
of the said law.
2. The petitioners maintain that the second
paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the
franking privilege from the petitioners and this
Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was
not included in the original version of Senate Bill
No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this
paragraph appeared only in the Conference
Committee Report, its addition, violates Article
VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The
petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, requiring that
amendment to any bill when the House and the
Senate shall have differences thereon may be
settled by a conference committee of both
chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the
rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary
(except in matters that have to be entered in the journals
like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The
journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme
Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the
petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon
the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No.
7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not
distributed among the members of each House. Both the
enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the
measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article
VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such
official assurances from a coordinate department of the
government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming
courtesy.
3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of
Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing
that no person shall "be deprived of the equal
protection of laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal
Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was
created and is expected to operate for the purpose of
promoting the public service. While it may have been
established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse
itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of
the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by
the government and the many advantages it enjoys under
its charter. 14 Among the services it should be prepared
to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the
government that need the franking privilege in the
discharge of their own public functions.
MABANAG vs. LOPEZ VITO
G.R. No. L-1223
March 5, 1947
[Doctrine: Enrolled Bill Theory]
FACTS:
Three senators and eight representatives had been
proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on
Elections as having been elected senators and
representatives in the elections held on 23 April
1946.
The three senators were suspended by the Senate
shortly after the opening of the first session of
Congress following the elections, on account of
alleged irregularities in their election. The eight
representatives since their election had not been
allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part
in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason,
although they had not been formally suspended. A
resolution for their suspension had been introduced
in the House of Representatives, but that resolution
had not been acted upon definitely by the House
when the petition for prohibition was filed.
As a consequence these three senators and eight
representatives did not take part in the passage of the
congressional resolution, designated "Resolution of
both houses proposing an amendment to the
Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
ordinance thereto," nor was their membership
reckoned within the computation of the necessary
three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an
amendment to the Constitution.
If these members of Congress had been counted, the
affirmative votes in favor of the proposed
amendment would have been short of the necessary
three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. The
petition for prohibition sought to prevent the
enforcement of said congressional resolution, as it is
allegedly contrary to the Constitution. The members
of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of
the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the
Director of the Bureau of Printing are made
defendants. Eight senators, 17 representatives, and
the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the
Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court may inquire upon the
irregularities in the approval of the resolution
proposing an amendment to the Constitution.
HELD:
It is a doctrine too well established to need citation
of authorities that political questions are not within
the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that
power to deal with such questions has been
conferred upon the courts by express constitutional
or statutory provision.
This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the
separation of powers, a principle also too well known
to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The
difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within
the meaning of political question. The term is not
susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and
authorities are not always in full harmony as to the
scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the
courts to meddle with the actions of the political
departments of the government. If a political
question conclusively binds the judges out of respect
to the political departments, a duly certified law or
resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled
bill rule" born of that respect.
If ratification of an amendment is a political question,
a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a
political question. The two steps complement each
other in a scheme intended to achieve a single
objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory
process as provided in section I of Article XV of the
Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two
distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no
logic in attaching political character to one and
withholding that character from the other.
Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly
political function performed by the Congress in its
sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its
charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this
power is even in dependent of any intervention by
the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency
scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to
safeguard public interest, there is less reason for
judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then
into that of ratification.
CASCO PHIL. vs. GIMENEZ
G.R. No. L-17931
February 28, 1963

[Doctrine: Enrolled Bill Theory]

FACTS:

Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the

manufacture of synthetic resin glues used in bonding
lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood
producers, bought foreign exchange for the
importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the
main raw materials in the production of the said
glues. They paid P33,765.42 in November and
December 1949 and P6345.72 in May 1960. Prior
thereto, the petitioner sought the refund of the first
and second sum relying upon Resolution No. 1529
of the Monetary Board of said bank, dated
November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate
importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt
from said fee. The Auditor of the Bank, Pedro
Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and approve the
said refund on the ground that the exemption
granted by the board in not in accord with the
provision of section 2 of RA 2609.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt

by law from the payment of the margin fee.

HELD:

No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal

fee. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product
which is distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The
petitioner’s contends that the bill approved in
Congress contained the conjunction “and” between
the terms “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as
essential elements in the manufacture of “urea
formaldehyde” and not the latter. But this is not
reflective of the view of the Senate and the intent of
the House of Representatives in passing the bill. If
there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill
before it was passed the only remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree.
ARROYO vs. DE VENECIA
G.R. No. 127255
August 14, 1997
[Doctrine: Enrolled Bill Theory]
FACTS:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA
8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who
are members of the House of Representatives,
charged that there is violation of the rules of the
House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-
mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives.
The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A
bicameral conference committee was formed to
reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House
and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral
committee submitted its report to the House. During
the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an
interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of
quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the
presence of a quorum. The interpellation then
proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the
sponsor of the committee report, Majority
Leader Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The
Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then
the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.”
At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep.
Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?”
The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo
subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s
motion, the approval of the conference committee
report had by then already been declared by the
Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker
of the House of Representatives and the President of
the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries
of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Ramos.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void
because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House
HELD:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly
permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with
their observance. They may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body. Consequently,
mere failure to conform to them does not have the
effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite
number of members has agreed to a particular
measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where
the construction to be given to a rule affects person
other than members of the legislative body, the
question presented is necessarily judicial in
character. Even its validity is open to question in a
case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are
involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the
dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of
internal procedure of the House with which the
Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that
there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence
of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to
adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of
a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised
repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously
present for the purpose of delaying the business of
the House.
 LIDASAN vs. COMELEC
21 SCRA 496
October 25, 1967
[Doctrine: Title of Bills]
FACTS:
1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached
portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for
the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA
4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions
implementing the same for electoral purposes be
nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two
municipalities in the province of Cotabato are
transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This
brought about a change in the boundaries of the two
provinces.
2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the
municipality of Buldon in the Province of Cotabato,
and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan
and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another
municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in
theProvince of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
3. Apprised of this development, the Office of the
President, recommended to Comelec that the
operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified
by correcting legislation."
4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should
be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes
barrios located in another province — Cotabato is
unconstitutional for embracing more than one
subject in the title
HELD:
YES. RA 4790 is null and void.
1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations
upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain
from conglomeration, under one statute, of
heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill
is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the
legislators and the public and those concerned of the
import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance
here is the second directive. The subject of the statute
must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This
constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of
command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact
that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the
obligation to read during its deliberations the entire
text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247,
which became RA 4790, only its title was read from
its introduction to its final approval in the House
where the bill, being of local application, originated.
2. The Constitution does not require Congress to
employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if
the title should serve the purpose of the
constitutional demand that it inform the legislators,
the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and
the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of
the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead
them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and
discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon,
and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the
legislators.
3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it
is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not
essential, and the subject need not be stated in
express terms where it is clearly inferable from the
details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of
the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to
its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring
to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real
subject or scope of the act, is bad.
4. The title — "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" —
projects the impression that only the province of
Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton.
Not the slightest intimation is there that communities
in the adjacent province of Cotabato are
incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The
phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read
 without subtlety or contortion, makes the title
misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the
legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in
one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton
purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of
Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao
del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two
municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from
Lanao del Sur.

5. Finally, the title did not inform the members of

Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did not
apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and
Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato
itself that part of their territory is being taken away
from their towns and province and added to the
adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the
public in the dark as to what towns and provinces
were actually affected by the bill.
GIRON vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 188179
January 22, 2013
[Doctrine: Title of Bills]
FACTS:
Petitioner Henry Giron (Giron) and petitioners-in-
intervention assail the constitutionality of Section 12
(Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14
(Repealing Clause) of Republic Act No. (R.A.)9006,
otherwise known as the Fair Election Act. Giron
asserts that the insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in the
Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1), Art. VI of
the 1987 Constitution, which specifically requires:
Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof. He avers that these provisions are unrelated
to the main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting
of the political ad ban. Section 12 refers to the
treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates
after the official ballots have been printed, while
Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67
(Candidates holding elective office) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code. Section 67 of this law
concerns the ipso facto resignation of elective
officials immediately after they file their respective
certificates of candidacy for an office other than that
which they are currently holding in a permanent
capacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14
in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the one subject-one
title rule?
HELD:
The petition must fail.
POLITICAL LAW: one subject-one title rule.
It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal
interpretation in favor of the constitutionality of a
legislation, as Congress is deemed to have enacted a
valid, sensible, and just law. Because of this strong
presumption, the one who asserts the invalidity of a
law has to prove that there is a clear, unmistakable,
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution;
otherwise, the petition must fail.
The Court finds that the present case fails to present
a compelling reason that would surpass the strong
presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor
of the Fair Election Act. Constitutional provisions
relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes
should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or
impede the power of legislation.
The requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and
not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title
be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means necessary
or convenient for the accomplishing of that object.
Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not
be an abstract or index of the Act.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional
directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced
in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes,
the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent
the enactment into law of matters which have not
received the notice, action and study of the legislators
and the public. DISMISSED.