Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009

VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying
that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution2 dated
July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.

On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:

INFORMATION

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crime of
BIGAMY, committed as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo,
being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage
having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered on
January 12, 1999.

Contrary to law.

On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial
proceeded.

The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.

On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony
solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H,
H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).

On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church
wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN
dated November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J.
Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R, R-1).

Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora
Santos Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on
November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church
wedding in Manila (Exh. E).

In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of
marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City x x x.

xxxx

Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of
which states:

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused Victoria Soriano
Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.

Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum.

This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the nullity of
accused’s bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their property. This
aspect is being determined by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.

Costs against the accused.

The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed Order
dated 2 August 2001.3

For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null
and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the
celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack
of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage
to Alocillo as far back as 1978.

On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July 21,
2003, the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with
Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been
declared null and void by the court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to
Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of
sufficient evidence, petitioner’s contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a
marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.

In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28,
2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the
ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July 9,
2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground
for the reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA, citing
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,4 denied reconsideration and ruled that "[t]he subsequent
declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not without legal consequences, among which is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy."5

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where
petitioner alleges that:

V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH

THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE
OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.

V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE

CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING
PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN
DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.

V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING

THAT THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.

V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING

THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING

THAT THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO
VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.

V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING

THE PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED
PENAL CODE AND THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.

The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed jointly. It is true
that right after the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of
the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of
petitioner’s marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her
appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated
by the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for
suspension, while the CA struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,6 the Court
categorically stated that:

x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in
such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil
case for declaration of nullity. x x x

xxxx

x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed
to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded
as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal
backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent
entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the
civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a
prejudicial question. x x x7

The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,8 where it was held thus:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had
no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage
be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.9

For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioner’s conviction of the
crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s
two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The
moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially
declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the
celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been
declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting.
Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any
difference.10 As held in Tenebro, "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage."11

Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which is
classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that
"[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years," while Article 91
states that "[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x x ."

Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence,
prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of
defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged to produce evidence in
support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-serving.12 Thus, for
petitioner’s defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidence
that as early as the year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.

A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to present
sufficient evidence to support her allegation. Petitioner’s testimony that her own mother told Uy in
1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it is totally
unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly observed that:

x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother – the person who allegedly actually told Uy
about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the confirmatory
testimony of her mother, the attribution of the latter of any act which she allegedly did is
hearsay.13
As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,14 "the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy
should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended
party, the authorities or their [agents]," as opposed to being counted from the date of registration
of the bigamous marriage.15 Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of
prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual. 1avv phi1

Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the
Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.

The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the
offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the
crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court
to determine the minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying
circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence.16

Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper. Under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The
penalty next lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The
minimum penalty of six years imposed by the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the
duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances proven
in this case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its medium period,
which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum
penalty of 10 years.

However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo has
after all been declared by final judgment17 to be void ab initio on account of the latter’s
psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse, the
Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner should
be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4)
months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as maximum.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as
to the penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.

SO ORDERED.