PANGASINAN VS ALMAZORA

Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize neglect or
sleeping upon one’s right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly
inequitable situation.

The four (4) elements of laches are as follows: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a
remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the
defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right
on which he bases his suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is
not held to be barred.

Caltex PH

Civil Law; Prescription of Actions; The rationale behind the prescription of actions is to suppress
fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at great distances of time when all the proper vouchers
and evidence are lost or the facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or defective memory or
death or removal of witnesses.

Same; Same; It is settled that prescription may be considered by the courts motu proprio if the facts
supporting the ground are apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record.—There is no dispute
that the respondents’ cause of action against the petitioners has prescribed under the Civil Code. In fact,
the same is evident on the complaint itself. The respondents brought their claim before a Philippine
court only on March 6, 2001, more than 13 years after the collision occurred.

Rep vs Espinosa

Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529); As Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 categorically provides,
only private properties may be acquired thru prescription and under Articles 420 and 421 of the Civil
Code, only those properties, which are not for public use, public service or intended for the
development of national wealth, are considered private.―Being clear that it is Section 14(2) of P.D. No.
1529 that should apply, it follows that the subject property being supposedly alienable and disposable
will not suffice. As Section 14(2) categorically provides, only private properties may be acquired thru
prescription and under Articles 420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for
public use, public service or intended for the development of national wealth, are considered private

Same; Prescription; For prescription to run against the State, there must be proof that there was an
official declaration that the subject property is no longer earmarked for public service or the
development of national wealth.―For prescription to run against the State, there must be proof that
there was an official declaration that the subject property is no longer earmarked for public service or
the development of national wealth. Moreover, such official declaration should have been issued at
least ten (10) or thirty (30) years, as the case may be, prior to the filing of the application for
registration. The period of possession and occupation prior to the conversion of the property to private
or patrimonial shall not be considered in determining completion of the prescriptive period. Indeed,
while a piece of land is still reserved for public service or the development of national wealth, even if the
same is alienable and disposable, possession and occupation no matter how lengthy will not ripen to
ownership or give rise to any title that would defeat that of the State’s if such did not commence on
June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Espinosa failed to prove that: (a) Isabel’s possession of the property dated back to June 12, 1945 or
earlier; and (b) the property is alienable and disposable. On the other hand, applying Section 14(2) of
P.D. No. 1529, Espinosa failed to prove that the property is patrimonial. As to whether Espinosa was able
to prove that his possession and occupation and that of Isabel were of the character prescribed by law,
the resolution of this issue has been rendered unnecessary by the foregoing considerations.

Heirs of Delfin vs NHA

For acquisitive prescription to set in pursuant to Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, two (2)
requirements must be satisifled: first, the property is established to be private in character; and second,
the applicable prescriptive period under existing laws had passed.

Private Property; Private Property consists of all property belonging to private persons, either
individually or collectively, as well as the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and
municipalities

Acquisitive Prescription; Only publicly owned lands which are patrimonial in character are susceptible to
prescription under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.—Accordingly, only publicly
owned lands which are patrimonial in character are susceptible to prescription under Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529. Consistent with this, Article 1113 of Civil Code demarcates properties of
the state, which are not patrimonial in character, as being not susceptible to prescription.

Two (2) requisites must be satisfied before claims of title to public domain lands may be confirmed: first,
that the land subject of the claim is agricultural land; and second, open, continuous, notorious, and
exclusive possession of the land since June 12, 1945.

Clearly then, petitioners acquired title over the Iligan Property pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act.
First, there is no issue that the Iligan Property had already been declared to be alienable and disposable
land. Respondent has admitted this and Deputy Public Land Inspector Pio Lucero, Jr.’s letters to the
Director of Land attest to this.
Second, although the Delfin Spouses’ testimonial evidence and tax declarations showed that their
possession went only as far back as 1952, Deputy Public Land Inspector Pio Lucero, Jr.’s letters to the
Director of Land nevertheless attest to a previous finding that the property had already been occupied
as early as June 1945.
Having shown that the requisites of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act have been satisfied and having
established their rights to the Iligan Property, it follows that petitioners must be compensated for its
taking.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.

Republic vs Malijan-Javier

Alienable and Disposable Lands; It is well-settled that a Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) or Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office PENRO) certification is not
enough to establish that a land is alienable and disposable.

Same; DENR Secretary; Land Classification; The certification issued by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary is necessary since he or she is the official authorized to approve
land classification, including the release of land from public domain.

“[T]he exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive
Department.”

Same; Absent the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary’s issuance
declaring the land alienable and disposable, the land remains part of the public domain.—In this case,
although respondents were able to present a CENRO certification, a DENR-CENRO report with the
testimony of the DENR officer who made the report, and the survey plan showing that the property is
already considered alienable and disposable, these pieces of evidence are still not sufficient to prove
that the land sought to be registered is alienable and disposable. Absent the DENR Secretary’s issuance
declaring the land alienable and disposable, the land remains part of the public domain

Heirs of Feliciano vs Hermogenes

Civil Law; Co-ownership; As a rule, prescription does not run in favor of a coheir or co-owner as long as
he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he cannot acquire by prescription the share
of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership.—A co-ownership is a form of
trust, with each owner being a trustee for each other. Mere actual possession by one will not give rise to
the inference that the possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of
the property. Thus, as a rule, prescription does not run in favor of a coheir or co-owner as long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he cannot acquire by prescription the share of
the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. An action to demand partition
among co-owners is imprescriptible, and each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
common property.

Prescription may nevertheless run against a co-owner if there is adverse, open, continuous and exclusive
possession of the co-owned property by the other co-owner/s. In order that a co-owner’s possession
may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the following requisites must
concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui
que trust or other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to
the cestui que trust or other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.

Same; A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a property held in trust for him by another cannot
repudiate the trust by relying on the registration.—When Feliciano registered the subject property in his
name, to the exclusion of the other heirs of Hermogenes, an implied trust was created by force of law
and he was considered a trustee of the undivided shares of the other heirs of Hermogenes in the
property. As trustees, the heirs of Feliciano cannot be permitted to repudiate the trust by relying on the
registration. “A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a property held in trust for him by another
cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration.”

Abalos vs Heirs of Torio

Civil Law; Property; Possession; Prescription; Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights
may be ordinary or extraordinary; Concept of Possession “in Good Faith” and “Just Title.”—Acquisitive
prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten (10) years. Without good faith
and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires
uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty (30) years. Possession “in good faith” consists in the
reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing is received has been the owner thereof, and
could transmit his ownership. There is “just title” when the adverse claimant came into possession of
the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real
rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.

Same; Acts of possessory character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are
inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription.—Thus, having knowledge that they nor their
predecessors-in-interest are not the owners of the disputed lot, petitioners’ possession could not be
deemed as possession in good faith as to enable them to acquire the subject land by ordinary
prescription. In this respect, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners’ possession of the lot in
question was by mere tolerance of respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. Acts of possessory
character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of
acquisitive prescription. Possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be en
concepto de dueño, or, to use the common law equivalent of the term, that possession should be
adverse, if not, such possessory acts, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of
prescription.

In the instant case, it is clear that during their possession of the property in question, petitioners
acknowledged ownership thereof by the immediate predecessor-in-interest of respondents. This is
clearly shown by the Tax Declaration in the name of Jaime for the year 1984 wherein it contains a
statement admitting that Jaime’s house was built on the land of Vicente, respondents’ immediate
predecessor-in-interest.21 Petitioners never disputed such an acknowledgment. Thus, having knowledge
that they nor their predecessors-in-interest are not the owners of the disputed lot, petitioners’
possession could not be deemed as possession in good faith as to enable them to acquire the subject
land by ordinary prescription

Supapo vs De Jesus

Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Acquisitive Prescription; Lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.—In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands
covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. We have also held that a
claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is a registered land because of Article
1126 of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496 [now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529].

Same; Same; Possession; In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over
a land is also entitled to the possession thereof.—In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who
holds a Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to the possession thereof. The right to possess and
occupy the land is an attribute and a logical consequence of ownership. Corollary to this rule is the right
of the holder of the Torrens Title to eject any person illegally occupying their property. Again, this right
is imprescriptible.

Lausa vs Quilaton

Land Titles and Deeds; Innocent purchasers in good faith may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor, and neither the law nor the courts can oblige them to go behind the
certificate and investigate again the true condition of the property.—As a general rule, a person
transmits only the rights that he possesses. When innocent third persons, however, purchase or acquire
rights over the property relying on the correctness of its certificate of title,

In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies
against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for
value of a certificate of title.

Jurisprudence defines innocent purchaser for value as “one who buys the property of another, without
notice that some other person has a right or interest in such property and pays a full price for the same,
at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in
the property.”

Jurisprudence has established exceptions to the protection granted to an innocent purchaser for value,
such as when the purchaser has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would compel a
reasonably cautious man to inquire into the status of the lot; or of a defect or the lack of title in his
vendor; or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of
the property in litigation. The presence of anything that excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt
the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face
of the certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated as innocent purchaser
for value nor a purchaser in good faith

Republic vs ca

Estoppel; Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel; While the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or
errors of its officials or agents, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously
with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations, the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private
individuals.

Same; It is only fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel by laches against the
government to avoid an injustice to the innocent purchasers for value

Land Titles; Torrens System; Likewise time-settled is the doctrine that where innocent third persons,
relying on the correctness of the certificate of title, acquire rights over the property, courts cannot
disregard such rights and order the cancellation of the certificate—verily, all persons dealing with
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and the law
or the courts do not oblige them to go behind the certificate in order to investigate again the true
condition of the property.

Petitioner never presented proof that the private respondents who had bought their lots from St. Jude
were buyers in bad faith. Consequently, their claim of good faith prevails.

A figure in a certificate of title followed by the phrase “more or less” plainly means that the land area
indicated is not precise.

Same; What defines a piece of titled property is not the numerical data indicated as the area of the land,
but the boundaries or “metes and bounds” of the property specified in its technical description as
enclosing it and showing its limits.

Same; Equity; In the interest of justice and equity, the titleholder may not be made to bear the
unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his
complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons.

Fudalan vs Ocial

Civil Law; Ownership; Prescription; Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights
over immovable property, is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid
down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful,
uninterrupted, and adverse.—Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over
immovable property, is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by
law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted,
and adverse. Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for 10 years. When the Court
speaks of possession in “good faith,” it consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the
thing is received has been the owner thereof, and can transmit his ownership. There is “just title,” on
the other hand, when the adverse claimant comes into possession of the property through one of the
modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor is not the
owner or cannot transmit any right.

Same; Occupation; Occupation or use alone, no matter how long, cannot confer title by prescription or
adverse possession unless coupled with the element of hostility towards the true owner, that is,
possession under the claim of title.—In the present controversy, aside from Baldomera’s bare allegation
that her family had been in possession of the subject property since it was sold to her parents, no other
evidence, documentary or otherwise, showing that the title to the subject property was indeed
transferred from Juana to her parents was presented. In fact, she never denied that the tax declaration
of the property was still in the name of Juana Fuderanan. As such, for lack of “just title,” she could not
have acquired the disputed property by ordinary prescription through possession of ten (10) years.
Occupation or use alone, no matter how long, cannot confer title by prescription or adverse possession
unless coupled with the element of hostility towards the true owner, that is, possession under the claim
of title.

Andres vs Sta Lucia Realty

Same; Prescription; Extraordinary Acquisitive Prescription; View that in Heirs of Segunda Maningding v.
Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 601 (1997), the Supreme Court (SC) held that while extraordinary acquisitive
prescription did not require a title or the existence of good faith, the immovable property should have
been under uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty (30) years.—In Heirs of Segunda Maningding v.
Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 601 (1997), this court held that while extraordinary acquisitive prescription
did not require a title or the existence of good faith, the immovable property should have been under
uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years. With regard to the issue of the length of possession, the
trial court based its ruling on respondent’s alleged failure to deny in its Answer petitioners’ allegation of
uninterrupted adverse possession. This was subsequently overturned by the Court of Appeals, alongside
the finding that petitioners failed to produce evidence to support their allegations. At best, petitioners
may rely on the April 13, 1998 letter of Carlos Andres for their claim of adverse possession. However,
considering that 30 years have not elapsed thus far since the letter was made, petitioners’ claim has not
yet ripened to ownership through extraordinary acquisitive prescription. For having failed to prove
ownership over the property, petitioners are not entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way
against respondent.

Maybank philippines vs Tarrosa

An action to enforce a right arising from a mortgage should be enforced within ten (10) years from the
time the right of action accrues, i.e., when the mortgagor defaults in the payment of his obligation to
the mortgagee; otherwise, it will be barred by prescription and the mortgagee will lose his rights under
the mortgage. However, mere delinquency in payment does not necessarily mean delay in the legal
concept. To be in
default is different from mere delay in the grammatical sense, because it involves the beginning of a
special condition or status which has its own peculiar effects or results.

—In order that the debtor may be in default, it is necessary that: (a) the obligation be demandable and
already liquidated; (b) the debtor delays performance; and (c) the creditor requires the performance
judicially or extrajudicially, unless demand is not necessary — i.e., when there is an express stipulation
to that effect; where the law so provides; when the period is the controlling motive or the principal
inducement for the creation of the obligation; and where demand would be useless. Moreover, it is not
sufficient that the law or obligation fixes a date for performance; it must further state expressly that
after the period lapses, default will commence. Thus, it is only when demand to pay is unnecessary in
case of the aforementioned circumstances, or when required, such demand is made and subsequently
refused that the mortgagor can be considered in default and the mortgagee obtains the right to file an
action to collect the debt or foreclose the mortgage.

Was there delay on the part of the spouses?

Ruling:
Yes. In the absence of showing that demand is unnecessary for the loan obligation to become due and
demandable, Maybank's right to foreclose the real estate mortgage accrued only after the lapse of the
period indicated in its final demand letter for Sps. Tarrosa to pay, i.e., after the lapse of five (5) days
from receipt of the final demand letter dated March 4, 1998.

In order that the debtor may be in default, it is necessary that: (a) the obligation be demandable and
already liquidated; (b) the debtor delays performance; and (c) the creditor requires the performance
judicially or extrajudicially, unless demand is not necessary - i.e., when there is an express stipulation to
that effect; where the law so provides; when the period is the controlling motive or the principal
inducement for the creation of the obligation; and where demand would be useless. Moreover, it is not
sufficient that the law or obligation fixes a date for performance; it must further state expressly that
after the period lapses, default will commence. Thus, it is only when demand to pay is unnecessary in
case of the aforementioned circumstances, or when required, such demand is made and subsequently
refused that the mortgagor can be considered in default and the mortgagee obtains the right to file an
action to collect the debt or foreclose the mortgage.

BENTIR VS LEANDA

Same; The prescriptive period for actions based upon a written contract and for reformation of an
instrument is ten (10) years under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.—The remedy, being an extraordinary
one, must be subject to limitations as may be provided by law. Our law and jurisprudence set such
limitations, among which is laches. A suit for reformation of an instrument may be barred by lapse of
time. The prescriptive period for actions based upon a written contract and for reformation of an
instrument is ten (10) years under Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Prescription is intended to suppress
stale and fraudulent claims arising from transactions like the one at bar which facts had become so
obscure from the lapse of time or defective memory. In the case at bar, respondent corporation had ten
(10) years from 1968, the time when the contract of lease was executed, to file an action for
reformation. Sadly, it did so only on May 15, 1992 or twenty-four (24) years after the cause of action
accrued, hence, its cause of action has become stale, hence, time-barred.

Republic va Banez
—In Philippine National Railways v. NLRC, 177 SCRA 740 (1989), it was stated that a written
acknowledgment of debt or obligation effectively interrupts the running of the prescriptive period and
sets the same running anew. Hence, because Hojilla’s letter dated 15 August 1984 served as a written
acknowledgment of the respondents’ debt or obligation, it interrupted the running of the prescriptive
period and set the same running anew with a new expiry period of 15 August 1994.

Actions; Prescription; An action based on a written contract must be brought within ten (10) years from
the time the right of action accrued.—An action based on a written contract must be brought within ten
(10) years from the time the right of action accrued. Accordingly, a cause of action on a written contract
accrues only when an actual breach or violation thereof occurs. A cause of action has three elements, to
wit: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an
act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.

Same; Same; The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there
is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the
debt by the debtor

Anza vs Padua

contract of sale is perfected by mere consent, upon a meeting of the minds on the offer and the
acceptance thereof based on subject matter, price and terms of payment.

Same; Statute of Frauds; When a verbal contract has been completed, executed or partially
consummated, its enforceability will not be barred by the Statute of Frauds which applies only to an
executory agreement.—The verbal contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion did not violate the
provisions of the Statute of Frauds that a contract for the sale of real property shall be unenforceable
unless the contract or some note or memorandum of the sale is in writing and subscribed by the party
charged or his agent. When a verbal contract has been completed, executed or partially consummated,
as in this case, its enforceability will not be barred by the Statute of Frauds, which applies only to an
executory agreement. Thus, where one party has performed his obligation, oral evidence will be
admitted to prove the agreement.

Montero vs Times Transpo

Settled is the rule that when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of livelihood, the
action instituted to contest the legality of one’s dismissal from employment constitutes, in essence, an
action predicated upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff, as contemplated under Article 1146 of the
New Civil Code, which must be brought within four (4) years

The petitioners contend that the period when they filed a labor case on May 14, 1998 but withdrawn on
March 22, 1999 should be excluded from the computation of the four-year prescriptive period for illegal
dismissal cases. However, the Court had already ruled that the prescriptive period continues even after
the withdrawal of the case as though no action has been filed at all. The applicability of Article 1155 of
the Civil Code in labor cases was upheld in the case of Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation v.
Panganiban, 514 SCRA 404 (2007), where the Court held that “although the commencement of a civil
action stops the running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary
abandonment by plaintiff leaves the parties in exactly the same position as though no action had been
commenced at all.”

virtucio vs Alegarbes

Civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor.―Civil interruption
takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor. When no action is filed, then there is
no occasion to issue a judicial summons against the respondents. The period of acquisitive prescription
continues to run.

Virtucio insists that the period of acquisitive prescription was interrupted on October 30, 1961 (or in
1954 when Alegarbes filed the protest) when the Director of Lands rendered a decision giving due
course to his homestead application and that of Ulpiano Custodio. Virtucio further claims that since
1954, several extrajudicial demands were also made upon Alegarbes demanding that he vacate said lot.
Those demands constitute the “extrajudicial demand” contemplated in Article 1155, thus, tolling the
period of acquisitive prescription.

Article 1155 of the New Civil Code refers to the interruption of prescription of actions. Interruption of
acquisitive prescription, on the other hand, is found in Articles 1120-1125 of the same Code. Thus,
Virtucio’s reliance on Article 1155 for purposes of tolling the period of acquisitive prescription is
misplaced. The only kinds of interruption that effectively toll the period of acquisitive prescription are
natural and civil interruption.

In this case, Virtucio claims that the protest filed by Alegarbes against his homestead application
interrupted the thirty (30)-year period of acquisitive prescription. The law, as well as jurisprudence,
however, dictates that only a judicial summons can effectively toll the said period.

United Alloy vs UCPB

Civil Law; Contracts; Obligations; Article 1159 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “[o]bligations
arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied
with in good faith.”—As correctly held by both the RTC and the CA, Article 1159 of the Civil Code
expressly provides that “[o]bligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.” The RTC as well as the CA found nothing
which would justify or excuse petitioners from noncompliance with their obligations under the contract
they have entered into. Thus, it becomes apparent that petitioners are merely attempting to evade or,
at least, delay the inevitable performance of their obligation to pay under the Surety Agreement and the
subject promissory notes which were executed in respondent’s favor.