U.S.

Policy Toward India and Pakistan In the Post-Cold War Era∗ 27

U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan In the Post-Cold War

Era∗

By David. S. Chou*

Realism has been the driving force for U.S. policy toward South Asia.
The end of the Cold War freed both the United States and India from the
Soviet factor. Washington and New Delhi accelerated the pace of improving
relations with each other; meanwhile, the strategic importance of Pakistan
to Washington declined. The United States imposed sanctions against
Pakistan in 1990 because it would no longer tolerate Islamabad’s
clandestine development of nuclear weapons. The Clinton administration
adopted a policy of tilting toward India, considering India a more important
partner than Pakistan in political, commercial, and potentially strategic
terms. The long-standing policy of preventing the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) in South Asia suffered a sudden death when
both India and Pakistan openly held nuclear tests in May 1998. Washington
retaliated by imposing sanctions against them; however, the sanctions
failed to change their nuclear policy, and the United States soon lifted part
of the sanctions. The George Bush administration inclined to adopt an
“ India First” policy toward South Asia, but the September 11 attacks

∗
This paper is based largely on the author’s book, U.S. Policy Toward South Asia in the
Post-Cold War Era (Taipei: Sheng-Chih Book Co. Ltd., 2003).
Dr. David Chou (周煦) is Professor of the Department of Diplomacy, National Chengchi
University. He has a Ph.D. from Duke University and specializes in U.S. policy toward
East Asia.
28 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs

dramatically restored Pakistan’ strategic importance to Washington. In

order to win the support of Pakistan for the anti-terrorist war in
Afghanistan, the United States has had to adopt a balanced policy toward
India and Pakistan and lifted all the sanctions imposed in 1998.

Keywords: U.S. policy toward South Asia, U.S.-Indian relations,

U.S.-Pakistani relations, South Asia, Kashmir, Musharraf,
Vajpayee, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W.
Bush, Armitage.

Realism is always the driving force behind the evolution of U.S. policy
toward South Asia. Realists argue that there is no eternal friend or eternal
enemy, only eternal national interest. The U.S. eternal interest is to preclude
a hostile power from dominating Europe or Asia. In order to maintain that
interest the United States built a global alliance system to contain the Soviet
Union during the Cold War era, and wanted India, the dominant state in
South Asia, to join it. However, India adopted a non-alignment policy.1
Washington was forced to choose Pakistan as an ally for containing the
Soviet Union in South Asia. The U.S.-Pakistani relations fluctuated
according to the rise and fall of Pakistan’s strategic value to the United
States. For instance, because the Carter administration at first adopted a
policy of détente and cooperation with the Soviet Union, it downgraded the
strategic importance of Pakistan, and in October 1979, suspended economic
and military assistance to Islamabad for its clandestine development of
nuclear weapons. Meanwhile it improved relations with India and
continued to supply India with nuclear fuels for India’s nuclear reactors in

1
For U.S.-Pakistan relations in the Cold War era, see Satu .P. Limaya, U.S.-Indian
Relations: The
Pursuit of Accommodation (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993).
 U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan In the Post-Cold War Era∗ 29

spite of the fact that India had detonated a nuclear device in 1974. The
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 restored Pakistan’s
strategic value to the United States. Carter offered to renew economic and
military aid to Pakistan. The latter rejected the aid as “peanuts”. Only after
the Reagan administration raised the aid to $3.2 billion for six years did
Pakistan agreed to help the United States engage in a proxy war against the
Soviet Union in Afghanistan. When Moscow withdrew its troops from
Afghanistan in 1988, Pakistan lost again its importance to the United States.
The war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime of Afghanistan in 2001
dramatically enhanced Pakistan’s strategic value to the United States. This
paper seeks to show that since the end of the Cold War, the United States
has moved from improving relations with India to an “India First” policy,
largely due to the strategic consideration of the “China Threat,” and that the
need of an anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan turned Pakistan into a
frontline state and forced Washington to maintain a balanced policy toward
India and Pakistan.

1. The George H. W. Bush Administration

When George H. W. Bush came to power in 1989, the Cold War was
drawing to an end and the Soviet Union was in the process of disintegration.
Uncertain of the changing international relations, the Bush administration
refrained from making fundamental changes in its policy toward South Asia.
Consequently, there was more continuity than change.

1.Maintaining Security Relations with Pakistan

Although the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan by

February 1989 decreased the strategic value of Pakistan to the United States,
the Bush administration still sought to maintain close relations with
30 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs

Pakistan.
In June 1989, the Pakistani Premier Benazir Bhutto visited the United
States and held talks with President Bush. The latter reiterated U.S. pledges
for the security and economic development of Pakistan, and agreed to sell
Pakistan 28 F-16 fighter planes. He also asked the U.S. Congress to provide
Islamabad with $380 million economic aid and $240 million military aid in
FY1990.2 The official rationale for the aid was that the Afghan Communist
regime installed by Moscow still existed, and the Afghan resistance forces
had yet to overthrow it. In other words, the United States had to work
closely with Pakistan for the sake of containing Soviet influence in
Afghanistan.
When the United States imposed sanctions against Pakistan in 1990 in
an effort to dissuade the latter from developing nuclear weapons, the U.S.
Department of Defense and military agencies still tried to maintain normal
military links with their counterparts in Pakistan, partly because Pakistan
was considered very important for U.S. military operations in the Gulf,
partly because they wanted to maintain their long-standing influence on the
Pakistani military, and partly because they did not relish the prospect that
Pakistan might be forced to side with the radical Muslim states for help in
its confrontation against India. As a result, the United States engaged in a
series of selective sales of military spare parts and equipments to Pakistan.3
In August 1992, U.S. naval ships conducted contacts with two Pakistani
naval ships in the Arabian Seas near Karachi. Although these efforts had no
impact on preventing Pakistan from developing nuclear weapons, Pakistan
supported the United States in the Gulf War.

2 Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

2
The Washington Post, June 7, 1989, A4.
3
Ibid., March 3, 1992, A4.
 U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan In the Post-Cold War Era∗ 31

(WMDs)

One of the main goals of the Bush administration’s South Asia policy
was to prevent the proliferation of WMDs. Due to strategic considerations,
President Bush at first chose to ignore Pakistan’s clandestine development
of nuclear weapons. Like President Reagan, Bush’s priority goal was to
contain Soviet influence in Afghanistan,
Therefore, he needed the cooperation of Pakistan. In May 1989, CIA
Director
William H. Webster warned that there were indications that India was
interested in acquiring the capability of nuclear weapons, that Pakistan was
obviously engaged in developing nuclear weapons, and, therefore, that
there would soon emerge a nuclear arms race in South Asia.4
During her visit to Washington in June, Bhutto assured Webster and
Bush that Pakistan had no interest in developing nuclear weapons and asked
Bush to help her country and other South Asian States signing the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Bush merely asked her to stop Pakistan’s
nuclear development program, but Pakistan’s nuclear program was
controlled by the military, which never supported Bhutto’s pledge that her
government would not develop nuclear weapons. While the Bush
administration failed to persuade Pakistan from secretly developing nuclear
weapons, the Afghan Communist regime was finally overthrown, and the
country sank into a bloody civil war in which the United States had no
interest in intervening. Under these circumstances, the Bush administration
no longer tolerated Pakistan’s secret development of nuclear weapons. In
October 1990, it notified the Congress of its inability to verify that Pakistan
had not engaged in developing nuclear weapons. The Congress voted to
suspend military and economic assistance to Pakistan under the Pressler

4
Ibid., June 7, 1989, A4.
32 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs

Amendment. The White House did not even try to prevent the Congress
from taking the actions. However, the United States did not suspend
commercial military sales to Pakistan. In FY1991, which began from
October 1, 1990, the State Department approved $100 million commercial
arms sale. Its officials conceded that the sale was made with the purpose of
stabilizing the long-standing relationship with Pakistan. But they also
defended the sale by saying that it involved only spare parts for the weapons
the United States had already sold, and not for new weapons. However, the
author of the Amendment maintained that the Amendment also prohibited
commercial sales.5
After imposing sanctions against Pakistan, the United States asked for
permission to conduct inspections on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities so as to
verify Pakistan’s assertion that it had no nuclear devices. Partly because of
the consideration of national sovereignty and honor, and partly because of
the sanctions, Pakistan turned down the request. Both sides also differed on
the definition of a nuclear device. To the United States, it referred not only
to a device already assembled and ready for launching, but also to its
components. To Pakistan, it referred only to the former. Washington also
called upon Islamabad to abide by the NPT. Pakistan could not accept
Washington’s request because it was against its long-held position on the
NPT.6
The American sanctions had great impact on Pakistan. The cut-off of
American economic assistance caused the Pakistani economy to further
deteriorate. The suspension of military aid meant that Pakistan could not
obtain the F-16 fighters it had ordered and also must try to get from other
countries the spare parts to the American made fighters, tanks, and other
weapons it had already bought. The sanctions weakened Pakistan’s

5
Ibid.
6
Nazin Kamal, “Nuclear and Missile Proliferation Issues: Some Approaches to Stability in
South Asia”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 13, no. 4 (March 1992): 378-79.
 U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan In the Post-Cold War Era∗ 33

conventional force deterrence to India and increased its sense of insecurity

that strengthened the call in Pakistan for the development of nuclear
weapons. In short, Washington’s sanctions not only failed to achieve its
objectives, but also weakened its influence on Pakistan.
After several rounds of talks between the United States and Pakistan,
Pakistan proposed on June 6, 1991, that the United States, Russia, China,
India and Pakistan hold a conference to discuss nuclear weapons and a
nuclear-free zone in South Asia.7 The United States supported the proposal.
In November, Undersecretary of State Reginald Bartholomew visited India
and called upon India to participate in the proposed five-nation’s conference.
He maintained that even if the conference could only reach a preliminary
agreement on nuclear proliferation in South Asia, it would be conducive to
the final resolution of the issue. India was willing to discuss only the
confidence-building measures relating to nuclear weapons, but refused to
discuss any limitation on the development of nuclear weapons and
missiles.8
That India refused to take part in the conference was due to three
reasons. First of all, India had long insisted that the issue of nuclear
weapons was a global, not regional problem, and that, to deter China, India
had to develop nuclear weapons. Second, India suspected that Pakistan
would take advantage of the conference to re-establish formally military
and political relations with the United States. Third, Pakistan might be
willing to abandon nuclear weapons in exchange for diplomatic victory, and
thereby make India the only country that possessed nuclear weapons
illegally.
Pakistan made it clear that it would not suspend its nuclear development
programs, if India refused to take similar actions.

7
US Department of State Dispatch (hereafter cited as Dispatch), 2, no. 47 (November 25,
1991): 859.
8
A.G. Noorani, “An India-US Détente: Potentialities and Limits”, Global Affairs, VII (Fall
1993),: 128.
34 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs

Although Russia and China agreed to take part in the conference, India
refused to do so. The conference was stillborn. American pressure on India
had gotten nowhere.9
On the issue of missile proliferation in South Asia, the United States
focused its efforts on Pakistan, because India had already possessed
indigenous capability to produce missiles, and there was no way for
Washington to prevent it from carrying out its missile program. The case of
Pakistan was different. It had no comparable (home grown) ability to
produce missiles. Its missile program heavily relied on outside assistance,
the main source of which, Washington believed, was China. Therefore, it
had repeatedly asked Beijing to abide by the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR). Although in 1988 China had promised Secretary of
Defense Frank Carlucci to abide by the MTCR, it, nevertheless, agreed to
sell M-11 missiles to Pakistan. Due to strong U.S. protest, the sale was
cancelled. On June 16, 1991, the United States announced its decision to
ban the sale of supercomputers and spare parts of satellites to China,
because the latter had tried to sell missiles to Pakistan. In November,
Chinese leaders gave an oral assurance to visiting Secretary of State James
Baker that China would strictly abide by the rules of the MTCR, provided
that the United States lifted the ban. On February 21, 1992, the Bush
administration accepted China’s request and rescinded the ban.10
The United States also tried to curb India’s missile development. In
1989, Russia’s Glavobosmos sold $250 million of missile engine
technology to India’s Space Research Organization. India claimed that the
technology was used for launching commercial satellites. The United States,
however, believed that the engine could be used for missiles capable of
carrying nuclear warhead and with a range exceeding 300 kilometers;
therefore, Washington claimed the sale violated the MTCR regulation.

9
The Washington Post, February 8, 1992, A15.
10
The New York Times, February 22, 1992, A1.
 U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan In the Post-Cold War Era∗ 35

Russia refused to cancel the sale.

In May 1989, the Bush administration applied limited sanctions against
Glavobosmos and Space Research Organization, prohibiting the U.S.
government from engaging in any trade with the two organizations.11 In late
May 1989, the Bush administration also banned the sale of the Combined
Acceleration Vibration Climatic Test System to India, for fear that the
system might help upgrade India’s nuclear and missile capability.12

3. Improving Security Relations with India

During the Cold War era, U.S. efforts to improve relations with India
were hindered by its strategic goal of containing the Soviet Union, because
India would not improve relations with Washington at the expense of its
relations with Moscow. The end of the Cold War, together with the end of
the U.S. containment policy toward Moscow, freed both the United States
and India from the Moscow factor and enabled them to improve bilateral
security relations.
In 1991 the U.S. and the Indian navies gradually increased bilateral
links, including small-scale but unprecedented joint exercises, code-named
Malabar 92, in the Indian Ocean. Similar relations were also established
between the army and naval departments of the two countries.

4. Mediating the Kashmir Dispute

Since the mid-1980s, radical separatist groups in Kashmir, such as the

Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, have launched strikes,
demonstrations, and other violent activities against Indian rule.
Pakistan supported the cause of the Muslim separatist movement in

11
The Washington Post, May 12, 1989, A 15.
12
Ibid., May 28, 1989, A. 8.
36 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs

Kashmir and even provided them with weapons and materials.

Indianaturally accused Pakistan of supporting terrorists and interfering in
India’s domestic affairs. Pakistan maintained that the people in Kashmir
had the right to determine their political future. It therefore insisted on
holding a plebiscite in Kashmir. India would have nothing of it.
In February 1990, tension between India and Pakistan began to rise
again because of the Kashmir dispute. About 18,000 Pakistanis held an
anti-Indian demonstration in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir in support of the
Muslim separatist movement in India-controlled Kashmir. The
demonstrators crossed the border, destroyed a village about 50 kilometers
from the city of Jammu, the winter capital of India-controlled Kashmir, and
attempted to set a governmental building on fire. The Indian garrison troops
opened fire on the intruders, three of them were killed, and more were
injured.13
India accused Pakistan of instigating the cross-border incursion. Indian
Premier V.P. Singh claimed that Pakistan had massed troops on the border
and responded by deploying 400,000 troops in Kashmir. The two countries
were on the brink of war.
The United States appealed to both sides for restraint. To prevent them
from slipping into war, President Bush sent Deputy National Security
Advisor Robert M. Gates as a special envoy to South Asia. He led a group
of U.S. officials, including Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian
Affairs Martin Kelly, and senior National Security Council official in
charge of South Asia and the Middle East Affairs Richard N. Haass. From
May 19 to 21, Gates and his associates mediated between the two countries
and finally succeeded in preventing them from falling into war. The United
States believed that the two states had nuclear weapons, and hence, that the
outbreak of conventional war between them might lead to a nuclear war.

13
The United Daily, February 7, 1990, 11.
 U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan In the Post-Cold War Era∗ 37

The Deputy Director of the CIA Richard Kerr later revealed that the
explosive situation in South Asia was more serious than the Cuban Missile
Crisis of 1962, and that only U.S. intervention had prevented a nuclear
war.14

2. The Clinton Administration

President Bill Clinton at first did not pay much attention to South Asia.
Before President Bush stepped down, the Congress had passed legislation
that divided the State Department Bureau of the Near East and South Asia
into two bureaus, each in charge separately of the Middle East and South
Asia affairs. Although Clinton formally established the new bureau of
South Asia affairs, it took more than a year for him to appoint the assistant
secretary for the bureau. Moreover, the new Assistant Secretary Robin
Raphal repeatedly made remarks that New Delhi considered unfriendly. On
October 28, 1993, for instance, she said that Kashmir was a disputed
territory, thereby denying the legitimacy of India’s rule in Kashmir.15 In his
address to the UN General Assembly in September 1993, President Clinton
said that India violated human rights in Kashmir. Beginning in 1994,
however, he readjusted U.S. policy toward South Asia. While improving
relations with Pakistan, he upgraded military and economic cooperation and
exchanges with India. Like his predecessors, he tried to prevent India and
Pakistan from developing nuclear weapons and to defuse the tension
between them over Kashmir.

1. Upgrading Relations with India

From 1994 on, the Clinton administration took various steps to improve

14
C. Uday Bhaskar, “The May 1990 Nuclear Crisis: An Indian Perspective”, Strategic
Digest, 23, no.5 (May 1998): 730.
15
South China Morning Post, March 4, 1994, 13.
38 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs

relations with India. On May 14, 1994, the Indian Premier Narasimha Rao
made an official visit to the United States, the first visit by an Indian
premier since Rajiv Gandhi’s visit in 1987. Rao delivered a speech to the
U.S. Congress, the first head of a foreign government to do so since Clinton
had come to power.
Both countries looked upon Rao’s visit as an opportunity to eliminate
the cool and even tense relations between them. In order to create a friendly
atmosphere, Clinton and Rao concentrated their talks on economic and
trade cooperation and exchanges, and barely touched upon such sensitive
issues as human rights and nuclear proliferation.16
In late May, Pakistani President Farooq Leghari made a private visit to
Washington. U.S. officials virtually ignored his visit, thereby reflecting the
fact that the United States attached greater importance to relations with
India than that with Pakistan.
In mid-January 1995, Defense Secretary William Perry visited South
Asia. During his stay in India, he signed with his Indian counterpart a
security agreement whereby a “Defense Policy Forum” was established to
review strategies in the post-Cold War era, promote exchange of senior
officials and military officers, and gradually upgrade the scale of training
and joint exercises. 17 The agreement was a breakthrough in bilateral
relations. It meant that both sides decided to bury past grievances and
moved beyond economic and trade cooperation and exchanges.
Immediately after Perry’s visit, Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown
went to India.
Leading a large group of American business leaders, he signed an
agreement with his Indian counterpart to establish a “Commerce Forum”, a
sort of joint venture between government officials and business executives,
whose function was to promote bilateral economic relations.

16
The Japan Times, May 21, 1994, 9.4.
17
Ibid., January 13, 1995, 9.4.
 U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan In the Post-Cold War Era∗ 39

There were several reasons for the Clinton administration to upgrade

relations with India. First of all, the collapse of the Soviet Union had
destroyed the foundation of India’s defense and foreign policy. India could
no longer use Moscow as a counterweight to Washington. The end of the
Cold War also meant that there was no need for the United States to have a
suspicious attitude toward India even if it still maintained close relations
with Russia. Second, after the Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan,
Pakistan’s strategic value to the United States had greatly declined. As the
predominant state in the subcontinent, India became more important to the
United States for maintaining regional peace and stability. Third, Rao’s
reform had changed India’s economy from a central planning system to a
market one. Washington considered India a huge potential market for U.S.
capital, technology, and goods. Fourth, India is the largest democracy in the
world. In terms of shared values, the United States had a closer affinity to
India than to Pakistan. Finally, geopolitical considerations perhaps also had
an effect on Clinton’s policy toward India. In spite of his effort to build a
strategic partnership with China, he perhaps also envisaged India as a
counterweight to China.
The most dramatic measure he took to reveal Washington’s tilt toward
India was his visit to South Asia in March 2000. He stayed in India for five
days, but stopped over in Pakistan only for five hours, just long enough to
deliver a televised speech to the Pakistani people and hold a meeting with
General Pervaiz Musharraf, who on October 12, 1999, as the army chief,
had overthrown President Shariff in a coup.18

2.Maintaining relations with Pakistan

Although the Clinton administration upgraded relations with India, it

18
South Morning China Post, October 16, 1999, 9.14.
40 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs

also tried to improve U.S.– Pakistan relations. Following his visit to India,
Perry flew to Islamabad. He and his Pakistani counterpart agreed to
reactivate the U.S. – Pakistan Military Cooperation Forum that had been
suspended over the last four years.
In April 1995, Pakistan’s Premier Benazir Bhutto formally visited the
United States. She stressed the importance of improving relations between
the two countries and called upon Washington to abide by the contract the
two countries had signed and deliver the 28 F-16 fighter planes for which
Pakistan had already paid. Clinton responded positively to Bhutto’s appeal
and emphasized that Pakistan had always been and continued to be an
important partner for the United States. He conceded that the United States
was not very fair to Pakistan so far as arms sales were concerned and
promised to urge the Congress to reconsider the Pressler Amendment.
In the joint communiqué issued after their meeting, both acknowledged
that the territorial dispute on Kashmir was the root cause of regional
tensions; agreed that India and Pakistan needed to conduct substantial
dialogues for resolving the Kashmir question; reaffirmed their support for
preventing global and regional proliferation of WMD; and agreed to expand
the political and legal dimensions of bilateral defense relations.19
After Bhutto returned home, Clinton made great efforts to get the
Congress to agree to deliver the F-16 fighters to Pakistan. On October 24,
1995, the Congress passed the Brown Amendment, authorizing the
President to deliver to Pakistan the military equipment Islamabad had
ordered prior to October 1, 1990. It excluded the delivery of the fighter
planes, but authorized the President to sell them to third countries and pay
back Pakistan through the earnings from the sale. The Amendment did not
abolish the Pressler Amendment, nor did it permit arms sales to Pakistan;
however, it did help improve U.S.–Pakistani relations.

19
Dispatch, 6:17 (April 24, 1995), 356-58.
 U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan In the Post-Cold War Era∗ 41

In September 1996, the two countries signed a Memorandum of

Understanding, establishing a U.S.–Pakistani commerce development
forum. In July 1997, the U.S. Congress passed the Henkin-Werner
Amendment which permitted American Overseas Investment Corporations
to provide guarantees to American investors in Pakistan and allowed the
government to develop limited military cooperation with Pakistan,
including international military education and training programs.
There were three main reasons for the change in American attitude
toward Pakistan. First of all, judging from the effect of sanctions the United
States had imposed against Pakistan since 1990, Washington not only failed
to realize its objectives, but also greatly weakened its influence in Pakistan.
Second, as the armed conflicts and terrorist activities in the Middle East and
the Balkans continued to increase, the United States recognized again the
strategic importance of Pakistan as a moderate Muslim country. Third, the
security challenges the United States faced in the 1990s and even in the
twenty-first century included the proliferation of WMD, the international
narcotics traffic, and Muslim fundamentalism. In all these issue areas,
Pakistan could play an important role.

3. Preventing the Proliferation of WMD

The Clinton administration also tried to prevent the proliferation of

WMD in South Asia. In December 1995, it received information that India
was preparing for a nuclear test in Rajasthan. U.S. officials privately
warned India not to hold any test and threatened to cut off
economicassistance to India. The information was perhaps a false alarm,
because India did not hold any nuclear test. Nevertheless, Washington
became increasingly concerned with the Janata Party that advocated for
turning India into a nuclear country. In 1998, it became the largest party in
the Indian parliament, and formed a coalition government with more than
42 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs

ten small parties.

On May 11, 1998, India surprised the United States by openly testing
nuclear weapons, using the China threat as an excuse. Washington strongly
condemned the test and tried in vain to prevent Pakistan from following
suit. The Clinton administration immediately imposed economic and
military sanctions against India and Pakistan. It also pushed through the UN
Security Council a resolution that condemned the tests; moreover, the U.S.
called upon both countries to stop holding any more tests and to sign the
NPT immediately.
Pakistan would agree to sign the NPT and give up its nuclear weapons,
provided that India did the same. India accused the NPT of legalizing
“nuclear apartheid” in the world and would agree to sign it and to give up its
nuclear weapons on the condition that the five nuclear powers destroy their
own nuclear weapons first. Washington naturally rejected the condition.
Since the sanctions could not change the nuclear policy of India and
Pakistan and reduced American influence on them, the Clinton
administration had to back down. On July 15, 1998, the Congress passed the
India-Pakistan Relief Act, commonly known as the Brownback
Amendment that relaxed sanctions on them. On October 1, 1999, the
Congress passed the Second Brownback Amendment, authorizing the
President to suspend indefinitely the Pressler Amendment.20 On November
16, the Clinton administration lifted up part of the sanctions against the two
countries. Its policy of nuclear non-proliferation was in tatters.

4.Preventing War Between India and Pakistan

The Clinton administration was also concerned with the allegation that
Pakistan supported the Muslim terrorists in Kashmir; it hoped that the two

20
International Herald Tribune, October 15, 1999, 5.
 U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan In the Post-Cold War Era∗ 43

countries could solve the Kashmir dispute peacefully.

In order to convince the Clinton administration that Pakistan had
nothing to do with terrorists, Pakistani President Shariff sent in March 1993
a special envoy Chaudhury Nisan Ali Khan to Washington. He maintained
that the Muslim fundamentalists, who appeared in his country and were
accused of engaging in terrorist activities in Kashmir, were foreigners that
had fought alongside the Afghan “freedom fighters” in the 1980s and were
supported by the United States. He pointed out that his government had
already asked them to leave his country. He claimed that the Muslim
separatists in Kashmir were freedom fighters whom his government
provided only political, moral, and diplomatic support, not arms and
training.
His visit did not succeed in eliminating Washington’s suspicion about
Pakistan’s support of terrorists in Kashmir. However, U.S. officials did not
want to put Pakistan on the list of countries that supported terrorism,
because it would entail economic sanctions against Pakistan. They were
afraid that the sanctions would cause economic and social instability in
Pakistan and increase the strength of Muslim fundamentalists
Pakistan’s support of Muslim militants in Kashmir frequently led to
shootings between the forces of India and Pakistan along the Line of
Control (LOC). In late 1996, such shootings caused more than thirty
Pakistani casualties. A much more serious hostility occurred in spring 1999
when about one thousand Afghan mercenaries and Pakistani militants
infiltrated India-controlled Kashmir, occupied several strategic
mountaintops near Kargil and Dras, and thereby threatened to cut off the
important lines of communication and supplies among the Indian garrison
positions in the region. India responded by launching a large-scale air and
ground attack against the intruders and threatened to open a second front
44 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs

along the border between India and Pakistan.21

As the hostilities continued and tensions escalated, Clinton sent the
commander of the Central Command General Anthony Zinni to Islamabad.
Zinni reiterated Clinton’s earlier proposal that Pakistan withdraw its troops
and Muslim militants from the mountaintops. Pakistan still maintained that
it was the Muslim freedom fighters, over whom Islamabad had no control,
and not Pakistani soldiers who occupied the tops. Clinton urged both
countries to exercise self-restraint while keeping pressure on Pakistan. India
redoubled its military efforts to expel the intruders and threatened to attack
Pakistan’s province of Punjab. Since Pakistan was no match for India in
terms of conventional forces, Islamabad countered by threatening to use
nuclear weapons to defend itself.
To avert the danger of a nuclear war between the two countries, Clinton
personally intervened in the crisis. In a meeting with Pakistani President
Shariff on July 6 at the White House, he succeeded in obtaining a public
pledge from Shariff that Pakistan would take concrete measures to
re-establish the LOC in Kashmir; moreover, Pakistan would use its
influence to advise the “Muslim freedom fighters” to stop fighting and
withdraw from the Indian side of the LOC. In spite of strong domestic
opposition, Shariff fulfilled his pledge. The crisis ended by the end of 1999
when both countries withdrew their troops from the border.

3. The George W. Bush Administration

The Bush administration inclined to take an “India First” policy toward

South Asia, partly because Pakistan supported the Taliban regime of
Afghanistan that backed Al Qaeda. However, the terrorist attacks against
New York and Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001, suddenly changed

21
Sumantra Bose, “Kashmin: Sources of Conflict, Dimensions of Peace,” Survival 41, no.
3 (Autumn,1999): 149-171.
 U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan In the Post-Cold War Era∗ 45

the power context in South Asia. The anti-terrorist campaign in general, and
the U.S.-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in particular, revived the
strategic value of Pakistan to the US.

1. An “India First” Policy

Unlike his predecessor who endeavored to develop a constructive

strategic partnership with China, Bush openly called China a strategic rival,
not a strategic partner. He and most of his chief advisors believed that China
was the most likely candidate for a potential challenger to the United States
in the Asia-Pacific, if not in the world.
Such being the case, the China factor was an important part of Bush’s
calculations for South Asia. There was an inherent recognition of the way
that India served as a counterweight to China. India had fought a border war
with China in 1962. The Chinese-Indian border dispute has yet to be settled.
India is also the predominant state in South Asia. The Bush administration,
therefore, naturally sought to strengthen strategic relations with India as a
foil to China.22
At the invitation of Secretary of State Collin Powell, India’s External
Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh visited the United States in April 2000, and
received special treatment. When Singh held a meeting with National
Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice at her office in the White House,
President Bush suddenly dropped in and unprecedently invited Singh to his
Oval Office for a “chat” that lasted more than forty-five minutes. Bush’s
message was clear and loud: he considered India an important and friendly
country and intended to develop a close strategic and cooperative
relationship with New Delhi. As C. Raja Mohan said, Bush and “his
administration conveyed even more vigorously the U.S. distinction between

22
Far Eastern Economic Review, February 15, 2001, 27.
46 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs

India and Pakistan and the new positive U.S. attitude toward New Delhi.”23
Bush downplayed the cornerstone of Clinton’s non-proliferation policy
in South Asia: persuading both India and Pakistan to sign the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Republican-dominated U.S.
Senate voted in 1999 against ratifying the treaty. Bush’s determination to
deploy a missile defense system also undermined international and U.S.
efforts to control the missile race in South Asia. In order to strengthen
strategic relations with India, Powell signaled his opposition to sanctions
the Clinton administration had imposed on India and Pakistan in 1998 by
allowing India to import U.S.-made helicopter parts on February 2, 2001.24
On May 1, Bush announced the plan of deploying a national missile
defense system. On May 2, India’s foreign ministry immediately made a
public statement, supporting the plan. The statement came before
America’s allies, including Britain, had endorsed Bush’s plan.
The Bush administration moved swiftly to upgrade military ties
between the two countries. In June 2001, the two countries held a joint
military exercise. In July the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
Henry Shelton visited India, the highest U.S. military officer to visit the
county since 1998. Shelton told the Indian leaders that Washington had
decided to reactivate the “Defense Policy Forum” that had been put on the
back burner three years ago.
In November, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and CINCPAC
Commander Dennie C. Blair separately visited New Delhi. As Blair said,
bilateral cooperation on the military and security issues had reached a new
level.
In mid-May 2002, hundreds of Indian and U.S. paratroopers conducted
joint exercises outside the northern city of Agra, the largest military

23
C. Raja Mohan, “A Paradigm Shift toward South Asia?” The Washington Quarterly 26,
no. 1 (Winter 2002-03):144.
24
Far Eastern Economic Review, February 15, 2001, 27.
 U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan In the Post-Cold War Era∗ 47

exercise ever held between the two countries. A steady stream of U.S. naval
ships had made port calls in India. The United States sold India
sophisticated radar systems to pinpoint the origin of hostile artillery fire.
The Indian navy has begun helping the United States protect international
shipping against pirates in the Malacca Strait. Today the
military-to-military relationship has become the strongest part of the
relationship between the United States and India. Washington intends to
strengthen military ties with India for the purpose of helping create an
Asian counterweight to Chinese dominance. A deeper security relationship
with the United States also dovetails neatly with India’s big-power
ambitions.

2. Anti-terrorism

The September 11 attacks changed dramatically the focus of U.S. global

strategy. The U.S. strategic priority shifted from the concern with the
“China threat” to the global war against international terrorism. Pakistan
was clearly the crucible of the U.S. campaign against Al Qaeda and the
Taliban for both geographic and strategic reasons. Islamabad was one of the
few countries that recognized the Taliban. Though India’s offer of support
to the U.S. war against terrorism was immediate and unconditional, it could
not provide what Pakistan had: a long border of 2500 kilometers with
Afghanistan and a long, close association with the Taliban. Thus the Cold
War history was replayed with the United States treating Pakistan as a
frontline state facing Afghanistan. Musharraf allowed U.S. troops to use
Pakistan territory for logistical operations. As a result of the decision,
however, Pakistan swiftly re-emerged as a key regional power and vital U.S.
ally.
When the September 11 attacks happened, Musharraf condemned the
terrorist attacks on the United States a brutal crime and pledged to cooperate
48 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs

with the international community to combat terrorism. On September 13, he

met with U.S. Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin, who expressed the
expectation of the Bush administration that the U.S. anti-terrorist policy
would obtain Pakistan’s support and cooperation. Musharraf responded
positively to it.25
In a national address delivered on September 19, he asked the Pakistani
people to support the government’s decision of siding with the United
States in the anti-terrorism drive and let them know that the decision was
the most critical decision Pakistan had faced since 1971. He pointed out
without hesitation that India would provide the Washington with all support
necessary for combating anti-terrorist actions with the purpose of accusing
Pakistan as a terrorist country.26
There were several reasons for Musharraf’s decision. First of all, the
September 11 attacks drew the attention of the international community to
terrorism. Pakistan had long supported the Taliban regime and, therefore,
was afraid of being isolated internationally.
Second, the United States had succeeded in winning Muslim states to its
side in spite of the U.S. decision to launch a war against Afghanistan, and
the central Asians states, Russia, and China all expressed support for the
American action.
Third, President Bush made it clear that on the issue of anti-terrorism,
all the countries in the world were either with the United States or with its
enemies; hence, Musharraf was under intense American pressure to join the
anti-terrorist campaign.
Fourth, Pakistan’s arch enemy, India, also supported U.S. anti-terrorism
action.
Fifth, the United States offered Pakistan the carrots of lifting up the

25
The Washington Post, September 14, 2001, A4.
26
Ibid., September 20, 2001, A4.
 U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan In the Post-Cold War Era∗ 49

sanctions imposed in 199827 and of promising economic assistance.

U.S. relations with Pakistan had since then broadened significantly. On
September 24, 2001, the two countries signed an agreement to reschedule
$379 million in debt owed to the United States. The day before, Washington
lifted sanctions imposed against Pakistan in 1998. When Secretary of State
Colin L. Powell visited Islamabad in October, Musharraf told him that
Pakistan would remain part of the war effort as long as the campaign’s goals
remained unmet, although the majority of his countrymen opposed the
U.S.-led military action in Afghanistan; moreover, Pakistan would continue
to share intelligence with the United States, extending overflight rights and
providing logistical support to U.S. forces.28 Starting with partnership in the
war on terrorism and cooperation in the U.S.-led Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan, Washington re-established a USAID program that
provided assistance to Pakistan in the areas of education, economic
development, and health; it also restored military ties between the two
countries.
U.S.-Pakistan cooperation in the war took place on several fronts,
including coordination of intelligence and agencies in hunting Al Qaeda
members and other terrorists within Pakistan, coordinating with military
and law enforcement agencies along the borders with Afghanistan, and
efforts to strengthen Pakistan’s law enforcement and counter-terrorism
capabilities and institutions. Since the war, Pakistan has been vital in the
hunt for Al Qaeda fugitives. Three of the top Al-Qaeda arrests have
occurred in Pakistan, including the arrest of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed on
March 1, 2003, the alleged mastermind of the September 11 attack. As of
March 10, Pakistan had arrested more than 350 Al Qaeda members, 346 of
whom were transferred to Washington.29

27
http://asia.cnn/2001/World/asiapcf/south/09/24.html
28
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5329-2001 Oct 16.html
29
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac 2/wp-dyn/ A30844-2003 Mar15.html
50 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs

3. Going Beyond Arms Control

Although the Bush administration is ready to go beyond arms control

in South Asia, it seeks to upgrade the export control system of India and
Pakistan to the international non-proliferation standard and keeps a
watchful eye on Pakistan’s trade of nuclear technology with North Korea.
Since the United States is trying to prevent North Korea from developing
nuclear weapons, Washington seeks to isolate it until it has dismantled the
nuclear program. The United States suspected that Islamabad was involved
in North Korea’s program through trading nuclear technology in exchange
for missile parts. After the September 11 attacks, Musharraf had personally
guaranteed that questionable transactions with North Korea would cease.
However, U.S. officials thought that he was either unwilling or unable to
halt the transactions. In November 2002, Powell publicly warned that
“consequences” would apply if the United States discovered that the
Pakistani government continued to make suspect nuclear transfers to North
Korea. But the Bush administration was reluctant to act against Pakistan for
fear that the uneasy alliance with Musharraf might be harmed.
However, after months of debate, including a trip to Islamabad by
Bush’s Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, the Bush
administration decided in early April 2003, to impose relatively mild
sanctions: a two-year ban on any dealings with the A.Q. Khan Research
Institute, a government-affiliated nuclear laboratory. 30 Washington has
thereby publicly acknowledged for the first time that Pakistan was the key
supplier of the technology that has enabled North Korea to develop a
clandestine program to build nuclear weapons. But it took a low profile in
imposing the sanctions that were in fact announced first by Pakistanis

30
International Herald Tribune, April 3, 2003, 7.
 U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan In the Post-Cold War Era∗ 51

themselves. The sanctions were imposed against the institute, not the
Pakistani government, so as not to embarrass Musharraf. Moreover, three
days later, the United States wrote off $1 billion in Pakistani debt. The debt
relief represented nearly one third of what Pakistan owed the United States.
The rest of the money was rescheduled on more favorable terms last year
with approval from the U.S. Congress. Officials on both sides said that debt
relief was a sign of renewed friendship, the rebirth of a long-time
partnership between the two countries.

4. Defusing India-Pakistan Tensions

Violence led to tensions between India and Pakistan in late 2001. On

December 13, five militants armed with automatic weapons and grenades
stormed the Indian parliament in New Delhi, killing more than nine people
before they were killed themselves. It was one of the most serious attacks to
take place in New Delhi. India blamed two extremist militant organizations
based in Pakistan, the Jaish-e-Muhammad (Army of the Prophet ) and
Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) for the attack.31
Musharraf condemned the attack. India asserted that Pakistan-based
militants were responsible for the attack and turned down the Pakistani and
U.S. request for releasing evidence of the assertion.
Tensions continued to rise. On December 22, two Indian border
guards were killed, allegedly by Pakistani fire. India moved several
divisions of its eastern command to the Pakistan border. It clearly saw the
attack on its parliament as a golden opportunity to end Pakistan’s support
for the Kashmiri militants. New Delhi issued a list of twenty alleged
Pakistani terrorists it wanted to extradite to India.
British Premier Tony Blair traveled to South Asia to calm the tension.

31
Alexander Evans, “India Pakistan and the Prospect of War.” Current History (April
2002): 160.
52 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs

Following a meeting in Islamabad on January 7, 2002 with Blair, Musharraf

denounced terrorism in all its forms and pledged to unveil within days a
plan to combat militancy in the country. But both India and the United
States said that the statement did not go far enough. The onus was on
Pakistan to make concessions.32
On January 12, Musharraf condemned zealotry and extremist violence
within his country. Most importantly, he pledged to stop militant groups
operating on Pakistan soil and banned the two groups India blamed for the
attack. To stave off Indian action, Pakistan froze Lashkar-e-Taiba bank
accounts. This was followed by the detention by Pakistani security forces of
Jaish-e-Muhemmad chief Maulana Msood Azhar.
To calm the tension in South Asia, the United States formally placed
the two militant groups on the list of banned terrorist organizations. Powell
visited South Asia in late January in an effort to push both countries back
from the brink of war. But he also failed in his mission.33
From February to May 2002, a fresh spate of violence by Islamic
militants in India-controlled Kashmir sharply raised the odds of an Indian
attack on suspected training camps in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir or on
Pakistan itself. Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes declined to meet
with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca who arrived in New
Delhi on May 14 in an attempt to avert the growing risk of war. Just a few
hours afterwards, however, Islamic militants killed more than thirty people
in an attack on an Indian army camp. 34 Washington found itself in a
dilemma. If it did not condemn Pakistan, its nascent strategic relationship
with India would probably go unraveled. If it pushed Pakistan too hard,
Musharraf’s government might be destabilized, and the war on terrorism
would also be affected. Keeping Pakistan focused on supporting the war on

32
Far Eastern Economic Review, January 17, 2002, 20.
33
Http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guoji/209/7077/7205/20020117/649802.html
34
Far Eastern Economic Review, May 30, 2002, 14.
 U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan In the Post-Cold War Era∗ 53

terrorism was an important foreign policy priority. Pakistan had already

moved forces to the border with India that could have been used to intercept
and detain suspected terrorists entering from Afghanistan.
Phone calls by Bush and Powell to their Indian and Pakistani
counterparts all failed to calm the tension. The United States had to put
pressure on Pakistan for more concessions to India. On May 26, U.S.
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage arrived in Pakistan. He
threatened Musharraf with going to the UN Security Council with the
charge that Pakistan was not implementing UNSC Resolution 1373, which
committed UN members to fight terrorism. 35 Security Council debate
would amount to a global condemnation of Pakistan as a sponsor of
terrorism. Armitage’s heavy-handed mediation resulted in a rough quid pro
quo: Pakistan agreed to stop militants from crossing into Indian-controlled
Kashmir and shut down their training camps in Pakistan-controlled
Kashmir, while India dropped its demand of extraditing twenty Pakistanis
to India and promised to withdraw troops from the borders with Pakistan.
From June 11 to 15, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited India
and Pakistan, proposing to provide India with ground sensor equipments
and a joint U.S.-British helicopter to monitor the activities of Pakistani
militants who cross the LOC into the Indian-controlled areas. But India
rejected the proposal. In late July Powell came to South Asia again. He
made it clear that the United States would like to play the role of a friend to
promote or help the two countries sit down and talk. The cumulative effect
of these U.S. efforts clearly bore fruit: in October 2002, both countries
withdrew their troops to peacetime locations, and the crisis finally came to
an end.
Although Muslim military incursion into the Indian-controlled Kashmir
had occurred again in April 2003, Indian prime minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee urged peace and offered to restore full diplomatic ties and
54 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs

commercial air and bus links with Pakistan as a possible prelude to direct
talks on Kashmir. Musharraf softened his insistence on negotiating
“Kashmir First,” indicating a willingness to discuss steps such as trade and
transportation links. The two countries have restored full diplomatic ties
and resumed a cross-border bus service. But India still links talks on
Kashmir to a drop in attacks in Kashmir by separatists. Washington praised
India’s peace initiative, but does not intend to intervene in the Kashmir
dispute.

Conclusion

History clearly shows that strategic interest has been the most important
factor for U.S. policy toward South Asia. That policy has been a part of a
U.S. global strategy that seeks to prevent a hostile power from dominating
Europe or Asia. From the U.S. perspective, the Soviet Union was that
power in the Cold War era, and China emerges as the most likely candidate
for that power in the post-Cold War Era.
The end of the Cold War freed both the United States and India from the
Soviet factor. Washington and India accelerated the pace of improving
bilateral relations and widened the scope of cooperation and exchanges.
With Pakistan’s strategic value to Washington having declined in the new
international situation, Washington would no longer tolerate Pakistan’s
clandestine development of nuclear weapons and imposed sanctions on
Islamabad. The Clinton administration adopted a policy of tilting toward
India, considering India as a more important partner in political,
commercial, and strategic terms. However, the long-standing policy of
preventing the proliferation of WMD in South Asia suffered a sudden death
when India and Pakistan openly and separately held nuclear tests in May

35
Ibid., June 6, 2002, 18.
 U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan In the Post-Cold War Era∗ 55

1998. The United States retaliated by imposing on both nations sanctions,

which failed to change their nuclear policy. Washington had no choice but
to live with the fait accompli and, within a short period, lifted part of the
sanctions. President George Bush and his administration at first adopted an
“India First” policy, treating India as a foil to China, but the September 11
attacks dramatically restored Pakistan’s strategic importance to the United
States. In order to win the support of India and Pakistan for anti-terrorism in
general and the U.S.-led war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in particular,
the United States lifted all the sanctions against them, provided Pakistan
with loans and debt relief, and strengthened military and intelligence
cooperation with Pakistan. Due to Muslim militant terrorist actions in
Indian-controlled Kashmir, tensions between India and Pakistan repeatedly
flared up. The United States had to step in, for fear that they might escalate
into war, or worse, nuclear war. But Washington is unable to help solve the
Kashmir dispute.
As long as the shadow of the “China Threat” lingers in the mind of U.S.
policy makers, Washington will treat New Delhi as its natural partner in
South Asia. As long as the anti-terrorist campaign goes on and the
reconstruction of Afghanistan remains unfinished, however, the United
States will need Pakistan’s cooperation; hence, the United States will try to
maintain its current balanced policy toward India and Pakistan. Musharraf
is either unable or unwilling to stop the cross-border incursions by the
Muslim militants into the Indian-controlled Kashmir. The incursions may
lead again to tensions between India and Pakistan, and Washington will
again play the unenviable role of a fire brigade. In the years to come, as in
the past, the United States will continue to prevent the two countries from
going to war.
56 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs