21. Soriano vs. Atty.

Manuel Dizon
January 25, 2006

Facts: The accused, Atty. Manuel Dizon, was on his way home with his wife when a
taxi driver overtook the care driven by the accused, along albano street, without him
knowing that the person he overtook was a lawyer and of good repute to the
community, who was under the influence of liquor. The accused tailed the taxi
driver until the latter had stopped to make a turn. The accused also stopped his car,
got down and berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To pacify the
aggressor, the taxi driver forced to open his door, hitting the accused causing him to
fall down. Taking pity on the accused who is an elderly, got out of his car to help him
get up, but the accused was enraged and tried to punch him but the taxi driver
managed to box the accused on the chest causing him to fall down the second time.
The accused further tried to box the taxi driver until he was able to pacify the
accused. The accused then went to his car and got his revolver making sure that the
handle was wrapped with a cloth. When the taxi driver was about to return the
eyeglasses of the accused, he was met by a barrel of the gun of the accused and shot
the taxi driver on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed
him off and sped up. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes, whose
testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver.

It was the witness who came to the aid of the Soriano and brought the latter to the
hospital. Soriano would have surely died were it not for the timely medical
assistance of the attending surgeon. The complainant also sustained a spinal cord
injury which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and disabling him to his
job.

The trial court promulgated its decision but the respondent filed for a probation and
was granted on several occasions, including the satisfaction of the civil liabilities
imposed by the coirt in favor of the offended party.

In her report and recommendation, the commissioner Herbosa recommended the

disbarment from the practice of law of the petitioner for having been convicted of a
crim involving moral turpitude. And said that he not only been convicted, but also
exhibited lack of good moral character based on the following acts.

1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the
latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him;
3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent
went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot
Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;
5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied
that he had shot Complainant;
6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one
mauled by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet
satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant.

Issue: Whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and
whether his guilt warrants disbarment.

Held: The Supreme Court upheld the findings and recommendation of the IBP
Commissioner.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving
moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a
lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and
to be no longer possessed of good moral character

Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the
crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by
every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular
conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently
depends on all the surrounding circumstances.

However in this case, Atty. Dizon was the aggressor, as he pursued and shot the
complainant when the latter least expected it. The Court also considers the finding
of treachery attendant in the situation when the complainant was about to return
the eyeglasses of the respondent when the respondent shot him.
The totality of the acts unmistakable bears the earmarks of moral turpitude.
It is also clear that the respondent transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibilities by his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm and his refusal to
justify his civil liabilities. He violated the law and the legal orders of the court.

Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude certainly relates to a lawyer’s good

moral character, where the misconduct outside the profession is gross as to show
them morally unfit for their office, the court by be justified in suspending or
removing them from that office.

As to the lack of good moral character of the accused, the Supreme court again
upheld the findings of the IBP. In the case at bar, when the respondent displayed
dishonest behavior when he sought the aid of the vice mayor for an out if court
settlement. But when the efforts failed, the respondent concocted a lie making it
appear that it was the complainant’s family who sought conference with them.
Another is that when Atty. Dizon said that he was mauled by three men but it does
not show on the medical examination conducted upon him.

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is

more important than truthfulness. The rigorous ethics of the profession places a
premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior. Hence, lawyers must not
mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they
are expected to act in good faith.

22. FACTS: A certain Celedonio Javier bought seven (7) parcels of land owned by
Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with a total area of about ten (10) hectares. These
properties were thereafter mortgaged by Javier with the petitioner to secure a loan
obligation of one Felix Angelo Bautista and/or International Hotel Corporation.
During the pendency of these suits that these parcels of land were sold by petitioner
to its sister corporation, Service Leasing Corporation and on the same day, the
properties were resold by the latter to Herby Commercial and Construction
Corporation. Three months later, mortgaged the same properties with Banco de Oro
wherein the lower court found that private respondent, did not have knowledge of
these transfers and transactions. Petitioner filed an urgent motion for
substitution of party as a consequence of the transfer of said parcels of land to
Service Leasing Corporation. Private respondent, on its part, filed a verified motion
to enter in the records of the aforesaid civil cases its charging lien, pursuant to
Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%)
of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties as its attorney's
fees. Despite due notice, petitioner failed to appear and oppose said motion, as a
result of which the lower court granted the same and ordered the, Register of Deeds
of Rizal to annotate the attorney's liens on the certificates of title of the parcels of
land.

Private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based on quantum
meruit, which motion precipitated an exchange of arguments between the parties.
On May 30, 1984, petitioner manifested that it had fully paid private respondent; the
latter, in turn, countered that the amount of P50,000.00 given by petitioner could
not be considered as full payment but merely a cash advance, including the amount
of P14,000.00 paid to it on December 15, 1980. It further appears that private
respondent attempted to arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid
suit, offering a compromise amount of P600,000.00 but the negotiations were
unsuccessful.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging
lien for payment of its attorney's fee.

2. Whether or not a separate civil suit is n ecessary for the enforcement of such lien.
3. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%) of the actual
and current market values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis.

HELD:
1. NO. On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides: He shall also
have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and
executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a
litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a
statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court
rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written
notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall
have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client
would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and
disbursements. Consequent to such provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as
security for the payment of attorney's fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a
judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the
main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to
fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident in the main action in which his
services were rendered when something is due his client in the action from which
the fee is to be paid. The civil cases below were dismissed upon the initiative of the
plaintiffs "in view of the frill satisfaction of their claims."

2. NOT NECESSARY. At this juncture an enforceable charging lien, duly recorded, is

within the jurisdiction of the court trying the main case and this jurisdiction subsists
until the lien is settled. Court trying main case will determine attorney’s fees.

3. The Court refused to resolve issue but gave the elements to be considered in
fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis
of quantum meruit. These are:

(1) the importance of the subject matter in controvers

(2) the extent of the services rendered, and
(3) the professional standing of the lawyer order of the trial court is hereby

REVERSED and SET.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED and the decision
of respondent Court of Appeals of February 11, 1988 affirming the order of the trial
court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to such appropriate
proceedings as may be brought by private respondent to establish its right to
attorney's fees and the amount the reof.
23. Welington Reyes vs. Atty. Salvador Gaa.
July 14, 1995.

Facts: On March 1971, the complainant reported to the National Bureau of

Investigation that he had been a victim of extortion by the respondent, Asst. Fiscal
Salvador Gaa of Manila City. According to him, he had given the respondent 500 in
March 1, 1971 and a total of 500 in three separate occasions. And was another
payoff was set at around 11 am that day.

An entrapment was set by the NBI. The complainant then furnished them several
bills containing 150. When the complainant wen to the respondent’s office to there
business, and when the complainant had given the entrapment money to the
respondent, the NBI agents then apprehended respondent and brought him to the
NBI Forensic and Chemistry Division for the examination of the yellow florescent
powder, which accordingly was found on his. . The respondent then was brought to
the NBI Anti-Organized Division where he was photographed, finger printed, and
record checked.

The NBI recommended the prosecution of the respondent and the administrative
case before the Secretary of Justice. Thereafter, he was suspended by Pres.
Ferdinand Marcs from office pending investigation and disposition of his
administrative case.

In his answer, to the complaint for disbarment, respondent alleged that the
complainant planted the marked money in his pocket without his knowledge. He
further said that the criminal case against him by the NBI was still pending at that he
had filed a criminal complaint fro incriminatory machinations, perjury, and
corruption of public officials against the complaint with the city fiscal of manila.

On a resolution by the Supreme Court, it resolved to refer the disbarment case to the
Solicitor General for investigation. However, by virtue of Rule 139-B, the case was
transferred to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and disposition. The IBP
Board of Governors Commissioner then recommended for the disbarment of the
respondent and was approved by the IBP Board of Governors.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Salvador Gaa be disbarred from the practice of law.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled to the affirmative. In the case at bench, the
respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of receiving the marked money
from the complainant during the entrapment operations, which resulted in his
arrest.

When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he
denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence
against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and
integrity which at all times is expected of him
Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as
to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be
disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds.

The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official,

which also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath imposes
upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath
is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension,
disbarment or other disciplinary action.

24. Sidra Ting-Dumalo vs. Atty. Roland Torres

Facts: The complainant is one of the six children of the spouses Julie Reynate and
Vicente Ting. Her siblings are, Marcelina T. Rivera; Miriam T. Saria; Felicima T.
Torres, who is married to the respondent; Vicente Ting; Eliseo ting. Their parents
died intestate and left several parcels of land. One half of Lot 1586 of the San
Francisco de Malabon Estate, Lot 1603 of San Francisco de Malabon Estate; and Lot
1605 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate.

According to the Complainant, the respondent used his relationship with her wife
and her brothers and used his profession to deprive them of what was due to the,
even for some unlawful, illegal and immoral means. The complainant avers the ff:

1. That the respondent participated, consented to, and failed to advise against the
perjury committed by his wife, Felicisima, and Miriam when they executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate wherein the two made it appear that they are the
sole heirs of the late spouses., knowing fully well that it was false.

2. That the respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise agains the
forgery of the complainant’s signature in the purported Deed involving the lot 1603,
when she was in Italy working as an overseas worker. And that he even presented
such falsified document to the Registry of Deeds of Cavite that enabled them to sell
lot 1603 to antel holdings.

3. In an LRC case by the complainant’s sisters Marcelina and Felicisima, the

respondent made a gross misrepresentation and offered false testimony to the effect
that Marcelina and Felicisima was the sole heirs of the late spouses for the purpose
of obtaining a new title for Lot 1605 in their names and was able to sell the involved
lot to Antel Holdings.

4. That the respondent made gross and false representations for the purpose of
profiting therefrom when he requested the buyer, through a certain Mrs. Ong to
release the full payment within a month, even though he knows it to be impossible
because he only presented evidence on Aug. 12, 1997 and even used a stationery of
the Philippine National bank to facilitate the release of the money.
In so far as Lot 1586 is concerned, the respondent affirms that Felicisim and Miriam
were not motivated by any desire to solely profit from the sale and that neither can
he be faulted in the execution of the deed of extra judicial settlment of Lot 1603 and
had no part thereon because he believed in good faith that the Ting sisters had
already agreed on how to dispose the said lot. He further avers that he did not take
advantage of his profession to deprive them of what was due to them. He also
admits that he was the counsel for Miriam and Felicisima for the reconstitution of
the tile of Lot 1605, and that the false testimony saying that his wifer and sister-in-
law are the sole heirs of the late spouses cannot be faulted to him because such was
an oversight.

After due hearing and consideration of the issues presented by both parties, the
commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline, found the actuations of the
respondent are in violation of Rule 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended him be
disbarred from the practice of law. However, the Board of Governors reduced the
sentence to suspension from the practice for 6 years.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Roland Torres be disbarred from the practice of law for.

Held: The Supreme Court held that indeed, he is morally and legally unfit to remain
in the Honorable and exclusive Legal Fraternity.

The Solemn oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to
dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice is not a mere ceremony or formality for
practicing law to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but
a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. By
swearing the lawyers oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law, as
well as instruments in the fair and impartial dispensation of justice

CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system.
When the respondent took the oath as a member of the legal profession, he made a
solemn promise to so stand by his pledge. In this covenant, respondent miserably
failed.

The records show that Felicima and Miriam stated in the Deed of Ectra Judicial
Settlement that they are the only heirs of the late spouses. Significantly, with the
respondent being the husband of the complainant’s sister, he knew, in fact, that it
was false. He even presented it to the Register of deeds of General Trias Cavite. It
also bears noting the respondent was consulted regarding the falsification of the
complainant’s signature which contains the waiver of his rights towards the
property, which is tantamount of falsification of public documents. Instead of
advising Marcelina and his wife to secure a special power of attorney to give them
authority on behalf of the complainant, he still proceeded to present such
documents to the registry of deeds. Such acts are also attributed to him.

The Code of Professional Responsibility underscores the primacy of such duty by

providing as its canon that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of
the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes. As such, he should make
himself more an exemplar for others to emulate. He should not, therefore, engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. He makes himself unfit to remain
in the profession who commits any such unbecoming act or conduct.

Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer owes

candor, fairness, and good faith to the court. He shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice. This Rule was clearly and openly violated by the respondent
when he permitted Marcelina to falsely testify that she had no siblings aside from
Felicisima and when he offered such testimony in the petition for reconstitution of
the title involving Lot 1605.

25. People of the Philippines vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda

January 30, 1990

Facts: Respondent, Atty. Fe Tuanda, received from Hermania Marquez several pieces
of jewelry worth P36,000.00 for sale on commission, with the condition that the
unsold pieces would be returned and the proceeds be turned over. But instead of
returning the unsold pieces of jewelry, res pondent instead issued 3 checks worth
26,500. Upon presentment for payment, all three checks were dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding the notice of dishonor, the
respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of the
checks wich bounced.

Consequently, four informations were filed against the respondent with the RTC
manila one for estafa and three B.P22 cases for each dishonored checks. In due time,
the trial court rendered its decision acquitting the respondent of the charge of
estafa; and convicted the respondent for violation of B.P22 in all three cases.

The respondent filed an appeal to the CA but the latter affirmed the decision of the
trial court and in addition, suspended respondent from the practice of law saying,
being a member if the bar with the offense being found guilty of involving moral
turpitude, respondent is suspended from the practice of law until further notice
from the Supreme Court, in accordance with Secs. 27 and 28 of the Rules of Court.

Respondent then filed a notice of appeal with the CA but the latter advised her to
send such notice to the forum of the Honorable Supreme Court, with the respondent
saying that the suspension is harsh if not a painful penalty aggravating the lower
court’s penalty considering the accused’s lack of intention to cause damage to the
complainant.

Issue: Whether or not it is proper for the CA to suspend the respondent for violation
of B.P22

Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA suspending the respondent
until further notice from the Supreme Court. The offense of which he is found guilty
involved moral turpitude. That the violation of B.P 22 is a serious criminal offense
which deleteriously affects public interest and public order.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of
the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the
community at large. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade
and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society
and the public interest

Respondent was correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been
convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in accordance with Sec. 27 and 28 of
Rule 138 of the rules of court wich states, among others, that a member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from his office as an attorney by the Supreme Court
by deceit, malpract ice, or gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by his reason of a crime involving moral turpitude. Sec. 28 provides that the
Court of Appeals and the Court of First instance may suspend an attorney from
practice for any causes named in Sec. 27 thereof.
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import
deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land."
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not relate to the exercise of
the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good
moral character of a person convicted of such offense.

26. Re: Elmo S. Abad, Successful Bar Examinee. Atty. Procopio Beltran Jr,
President of the Philippine Trial Lawers Association, Inc. vs. Elmo S.
Abad.
A.M. No. 139, March 28, 1983

Facts: This case involves a Atty. Procopio Beltran charging Elmo Abad of practicing
law without been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar. Herein Respondent
explained that he had pad all the amount due as per resolution of the Supreme
Court, before taking the Lawyer’s oath. On July 26, 1979 when Elmo Abad was about
to take the lawyer’s oath, he was made to sign the lawyer’s oath. While waiting
there, Atty. Romeo Medoza told hem that the Chief Justice Fernando wants to talk to
him regarding the reply of Mr. Jorge Uy to his answer to Mr. Jorge’s complaint. Thus,
suspending his oath taking.

Elmo Abad then filed his reply to Mr. Jorge’s Answer with a prayer that the
Honorable Court determines his fitness to be a member of the bar. While waiting for
further appropriate action, he received a letter from the IBP, Quezon City Chapter
informing him of the Annual General Meeting and requiring him to settle hiss accont
for the year 1980-1981.

With hom believing that with his signing of the lawyer’s oath and reply to Mr. Jorge
Uy’s answer and without the Supreme court striking his name before the IBP, he
then paid his dues to the IBP Quezon City Chapter and such included his name as a
qualified voter for the election of officer and directors for the year 1981-1982. His
belief was bolstered by the death of the complainant Jorge Uy.

In this case, the respondent, as a successful bar examinee, should know that the
circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his admission to the
Philippine Bar and the right to practice law thereafter. He should know that the
essential requisites before becoming a lawyer had to be performed, namely: The
lawyer’s oath as administered by the Supreme Court and the signing of the Roll of
Attorneys as provided by Rule 138 Sec. 17 and 19 of the Rules of Court.
27. Donna Marie Aguirre vs. Edwin Rana

FACTS: Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations. Respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvassers of Mandaon, Masbate and filed with the MBE s pleading dated 1 May
2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in some
Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented
himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and
signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan. Furthermore, respondent also
signed as counsel for Emily Estipona-Hao on 1 May 2001 in the petition filed before
the MBE praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for
mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. On 21 May 2001, one day Before the scheduled mass
oath taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar,
complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a petition for denial of
admission to the Bar. On 22 May 2001, respondent was allowed to take the lawyer’s
oath but was disallowed from signing the Roll of attorneys until he is cleared of the
charges against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to
represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and
advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law.

The court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant. The OBC the found
that indeed, the respondent appeared as a counsel before the MBEC even before he
becomes a member if the Bar. The OBC then recommends the denial of the
respondent the admission to the Philippine Bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent shall be denied admission to the Bar

RULING: Respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the
proceedings before the MBE and filed various pleadings, without license to do so.
Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent
called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. -
Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or
out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which
are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law
is to render any kind of service, which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. 4he exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of
integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a
lawyer is an officer of the court. Bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice
law simply by passing the Bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that
can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person
seeking admission had practiced law without a license. True, respondent here
passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However, it is the
signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact
that respondent passed the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the Bar is not
the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that
two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely, his
lawyer’s oath to be administered by this court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.

28. In Re: Atty. Marcial A. Edillon

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in

the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal
of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay
his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the
provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the
organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay
the same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his

constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to
maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to
pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial
support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he
is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court
Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership
fee to the IBP.

HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a
member of as distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely
optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed
for the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of
the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it
is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not
compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting
of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses.
The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory
program – the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right
to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure
is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as
unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their
regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the
court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.