Habitus, Intentionality, and Social Rules: A Controversy Between Searle and Bourdieu Gunter Gebauer

Habitus, Intentionality, and Social Rules: A Controversy between Searle and Bourdieu
Author(s): Gunter Gebauer and Jennifer Marston William

Source: SubStance, Vol. 29, No. 3, Issue 93: Special Issue: Pierre Bourdieu (2000), pp. 68-83
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
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Habitus, Intentionality, and Social Rules:
A Controversy between Searle and Bourdieu
Gunter Gebauer
Bourdieu's sociology contains many concepts and terms that could play
a significant role for philosophy. University philosophers are hardly inclined,
of course, to accept suggestions from other disciplines, in particular when
they carry the scent of empirical research in the everyday world. Their interest
lies-apart from a few exceptions, such as Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, and
Charles Taylor-beyond the sensory world, directed instead toward the
world of pure thought. The mind has no smell; it avoids contact with the
corporeal. When philosophers describe society, it is transformed into a
product of thought. The absence of sensuality lends intellectual rigor and
consistency to their attempts, inasmuch as they trace social structures back
to logical ones. In this way philosophy can achieve, at best, clarifications of
concepts from which sociology can also benefit. However, this advantage is
always obtained at a high price: intellectual construction ignores everything
that constitutes society-social practice, power, actions of social agents, their
habitus, their position, strategies, and the internal complexities of society
itself.
The weaknesses and advantages inherent in a logical reconstruction of

social processes can be studied in John R. Searle's The Construction of the
Social World (1995). Through a critical confrontation of these strengths and
weaknesses with Pierre Bourdieu's theory, it becomes clear how this theory
actually contributes to a philosophy of society. Searle's publication is the
logical continuation of his work on construction, which spans several
decades. It leads from his theory of the speech act, via the concept of
intentionality, to the "rediscovery of the mind," finally arriving at an
"ontology of social facts."' Bourdieu's starting points are his cultural-
anthropological field research, and empirical sociological studies of
traditional and modern societies. In these works, he develops a theory of
social action and of a society characterized by power structures.2 Searle
transfers an entire field out of the empiricism of sociology into the philosophy
of mind, and submits it to an ontological model of hierarchical levels of
reality. Bourdieu's aim has long been to dissociate the concept of the social
agent from the philosophy of mind. Both Bourdieu and Searle invest a wealth
of ideas in their attempt to reorder the respectively opposing discipline
68 SubStance # 93, 2000
Searle and Bourdieu 69
through approaches, theor

will briefly outline Searle
which I will then confront with Bourdieu's model for the construction of the
social agent and society from social practice.
Searle's Model for a Unified Material and Social Ontology
The basis of Searle's argument is his assumption of an external reality:

there is a world of objects which, as "brute facts," are independent of humans.
As a second category, Searle introduces "social facts," which are dependent
on humans. In contrast to brute facts, social facts exist solely because we
believe that they exist. Alternatively, he also characterizes them as
"institutional" facts, which exist "only by virtue of collective agreement or
acceptance" (Searle 1995, 39). Social reality is constructed on the foundation
of pre-social facts, with the aid of belief. Searle assumes a continuous
transition from "an ontology of biology to an ontology that includes cultural
and institutional forms" (ibid., 227).
The conscious acts of believing, from which society originates, are known
as "intentional acts" in Searle's terminology. Their intentional structure is
produced with the aid of language and its ability to symbolize and represent
social facts. Language is "the condition of possibility of the creation of all
human institutions" (ibid., 75). It generates social facts through speech acts,
in particular through declarations. In his earlier works, Searle had considered
individual intentionality exclusively; for the creation of social facts, however,
this is not sufficient. The linguistic act of creating institutions from brute
facts is achieved through "collective intentionality," a "social self-
consciousness." Searle understands this as a particular category that has no
social origin itself; he considers it instead as innate, in the biological sense.3
The speech acts in which institutions are brought about have a specific
form: they grant to a fact X, a social status of Y, which X did not previously
hold, and which it will from that point on possess in the context of C. In a
formal representation, Searle characterizes these as "status-functions":
X counts as Y in C.
Specific speech-act rules, designated by Searle as "constitutive rules,"4 are

used in imparting the new status Y. Such rules engender new conditions,
characteristics, and objects, through the production of new contexts. The
agent is equipped in a new context with a social status and with the power
to carry out specific actions. Searle describes the attribution of a new status
as an act of "authorization."
SubStance # 93, 2000
70 Gunter Gebauer
The Creation of Soci
At the center of Sear

a belief that the facts
conception, belief is t
early as 1982, in his
Bourdieu had already
power to certain social
that the effects of sp
and faculties, but, rat
The concept of beli
theory of social practi
and value is a strong
best be clarified throu
and meaning.5 The pla
lusio of the game's re
childhood, gives the p
players carry out in t
this certainty does he
makes this real and
into a part of the gam
In the sociologist's v
solely on the characte
effective until the ga
about serious social
recognition, it is clear
customs of our cultu
public performances.6
do not exist indepen
and presenting, nor
which emphasize a
Bourdieu's viewpoint
Objections to Searle
In the following, I w
from the standpoin
question of whether th
facts and in the powe
SubStanc
assumes social facts, then t

institutional facts and the
becomes problematic.
(1) Searle places singula
construction of social facts
The main principle behind B
is the overcoming of the opp
that every social agent grow
and is imbued by that socie
agent shares his or her rel
formulates its intentions a
expressed in first-person sta
the social realm. It is situat
itself especially in the appa
decision-making behavior.
matters of taste, career de
that characterize an enti
According to Searle, in state
often shows his own social po
of a social group, class, fac
social constituency of the a
agent does not possess anyth
itself as part of the social sp
subjectivity, individual life s
subjectivity are not in oppos
asthe agent expresses hims
articulating his individual
expressing his subjectivity, h
that others can recognize the
intentionalities fails to recog
one bases the processes of
models does it appear necessa
and the collective.
(2) Why does Searle single out verbal language as that which exclusively
creates society? Many social constructions do not require language. Social
actions are at least as important as language for the construction of social
facts. In accordance with A. Gehlen, it can be said that these often are
language-like, but inasmuch as they are involved in the completion of actions,
they have a different structure from verbal language.8 What Searle describes
72 Gunter Gebauer
as thinking and cons

entire body, over the
the hands, as well as
action are not a prelim
qualities, which play a
(3) Is social power e
has an extremely rest
mean much more than
allowed to do. He do
historical anthropolo
operates. He simply
habitualization of be
and exemplary perfo
real acts of violence, p
and racial and gende
(4) How can society
Every act of "authori
status obtains real pow
of the status, the stat
generally recognized
(5) Do societies origin
only possible throu
philosophy, it is assum
expressed) agreemen
explicit arrangement
oblige individuals an
developed form of soc
not in linguistically e
If one first concede
the aid of particular s
to one and the same p
them to create social
"intentionality." With
attitudes toward the w
bring forth reality, i
then, intentionality p
characteristic, it cann
like a computer. Rat
Intentionality appar
SubStanc
contexts by carrying out spee

necessitates the following ques
effected by a particular speech
the person who performs a spe
of society. Is it possible to sepa
belongs, and to treat the two
Searle's concept of collective in
This will be considered more
Intentionality and the Socia
With the term intentionality

toward the world.1' The spee
intentionality" is labeled by Se
"I assert" (assertives), "I com
"I congratulate" (expressives
are constructed from brute fac
that creates social reality with
take a closer look at the proper
In illocutionary speech acts, t
role from the self in ordinary
person-that he or she is tire
that grants it the authority t
as an institutionalized self; its
of this one speech act. It must
speech act. The act of authoriza
linguistic one. What is conside
appointment within a given
which type of self is entruste
all of this is tied to a multitud
modes of behavior, and rituals
individual, but as a social pe
social power, and representativ
From the above, I extract th
1. In illocutionary speech act
for itself. It makes a move wi
2. The role in the game that
within the game's fixed fram
language or linguistic structur
conduct, implicit understandin
74 Gunter Gebauer
3. Illocutionary spe
institutions. They are
person who is display
recognized, among o
the self contains an o
stems from the speak
In illocutionary spe
created and institutio
conditions not only of
those areas in which s
social actions are alwa
social facts are not p
contexts of social pra
Bourdieu's Conceptio
and the Formation of Habitus
In contrast to Searle, Bourdieu is attentive to the mute and

simultaneously eloquent symbolizations and institutionalizations formed
in social practice, and to the wordless acts of granting social status. He directs
his attention mainly to the practice of action, at the center of which is the
body: as a natural thing, this is essentially formed by society, but not in th
sense of a superficial formation. Instead, it is caused by conformity, by social
institutions, through which the body makes itself part of the society. The
construction of social orders takes place in social practice, not in the mind o
an agent. The regularity of society and of social agents originates in physica
action. From their first days of life, people cultivate movements, perform
them regularly, and, by way of habit, form from these movements goal
oriented actions with intentional structure-and ultimately, social skills,
practical knowledge, dispositions, and patterns of perception and judgment.
Through countless daily acts, the body gives itself (and preserves) its inner
and outer posture, its characteristics and way of appearance, its unconscious
reactions and intentional actions. In this process it produces, through its
own activity and under the influence of the social environment, a "habitus."
The habitus is not a product of the consciousness, but is formed through
a "reason immanent to the practices; it has its origin neither in the 'decisions'
of reason nor in the determinations through mechanisms which would b
external or superordinate to the acting person" (Bourdieu 1980, 85). The
ability to produce a behavior that agrees with social orders is called "practica
sense" by Bourdieu. This i

immediately, without refle
physical posture, social ord
passive occurrence, but hap
agent orients himself or he
Typically, this process o
language. Many social regu
directly learned, often with
acting person is subject and
of the social person is one o
social order. Actually, the a
this order, which has becom
become a part of the order
social world is only made
again and again in the same
In this way, it reaches
"prestabilized harmony" b
which they act.
Through numerous exam
education, and occupation in
it becomes a visible, integra
institutions are therefore e
which, owing to their cha
appear credible and reliab
institutions-such as docto
of the respective institutio
acts. Not only does the agen
versa-the individual is m
"intentionality" of the inst
In social practice, the effe
other on many levels. The
become embodied. The ag
reproduced over and over
blanket natural conditions and are manifested in them. Instead of
reconstructing a logical step-by-step process, Bourdieu describes the genesi
of social constructions. In contrast to analytical philosophy, he shows how
context of legitimation is formed out of the context of genesis in soc
conditions. The strict opposition of both contexts is necessary for the scienti
theory of the natural sciences. The theory of society, on the other hand, i
76 Gunter Gebauer
concerned with transi

to legitimized positi
legitimate power po
Bourdieu's social the
Searle's model: there
world, because this so
substances. It consists
highly differentiated
discipline for the des
the feature that essen
excludes the assumpt
activities. Social rea
material into the sym
social world exists b
is not independent fr
Bourdieu does not d
distinguish the ment
practice, a fundamen
can be built. One su
independent from t
designed as a "diseng
an incorporeal neute
socialscience's old id
does not respond to
understanding. His m
agent who intellectu
hisscientific work th
position in the socia
thereby objectifying i
A criticism to be ra
day neglected to furt
of his reasons for th
grammar-truly a b
competence and per
be better to leave hi
internalistic theory.
SubStan
Following a Rule: Searle's
In his description of regul

accordance with the rules
confusing: we follow social
conscious act of following a
of social action: the social
follows social rules in so doi
correspond to his social posi
For this important probl
as the social sciences up to n
he introduces an interme
"Background." The acting
brings about his action caus
but not in an arbitrary way
social environment with a r
or her reaction to this envi
"sensitive to specific struct
actually being constitute
Background is not produced
world, but by the agent
"functionally equivalent to
any representations or inte
Background, the agent, acti
accordance with its demand
itself.18
Background has a double function, causal andfunctional: it works causally

insofar as it induces the agent to perform a specific action: "The person
behaves the way he does, because he has a structure that disposes him to
behave that way" (ibid., 144). Functionally, Background has an effect in that
the agent acts in accordance with institutional rules.19 In short, the structure
of rules characterizes the social reality, but not the social agents. They possess
a "mechanism" that was not caused by the rules, but, rather, "the mechanism
has evolved precisely so that it will be sensitive to the rules. The mechanism explains
the behavior, and the mechanism is explained by the system of rules, but the
mechanism need not itself be a system of rules" (ibid., 146). The person
"doesn't need to know the rules of the institution and to follow them in
order to conform to the rules" (ibid., 144).
78 Gunter Gebauer
With this suggestion

have complicated th
conscious rule-adhe
Wittgenstein as "priv
Before I attempt to us
the incompatibilities
In addition to the cr
in particular, the clai
neurophysiological in
reflection of the soci
Although the appli
habitus concept is,
unproblematic, it can
more precise. Three in
the habitus through t
structure of society;
social rules structure;
leading from the soci
of the person is const
"causal effect" and fun
path, but a two-part c
directions: from the
habitus forward to the action.
After the logical structure of the habitus has, with the assistance of
Searle's explication, become more clear, two further unclear points concerning
this concept can also be eliminated: the question of (1) whether the habitus
possesses the rules structure of the society itself and (2) whether it is a real
thing, a postulate, or a construct of research. In regard to (1): the social agent
does not incorporate the rules found in society himself or herself; he or she
does not cultivate any type of inner representations or copies of the rules
himself or herself. His or her habitus is not structured through social rules,
but is functionally equivalent to them. It possesses its own structure that has
no characteristics in common with social rules. Insofar as rules do not exist
independently of action, it can be concluded that the habitus does not contain
rules at all. Chomsky's conception of "universal grammar," conceived as a
system of rules that also produces rules itself, is a systematically misleading
analogy. In regard to (2): the functional equivalence of the habitus is
recognizable not in the habitus itself, but in its productions. The social actions
of agents show whether the actual behavior is in agreement with the social
rules. The composition of t

accessible on the basis of em
attributions made by an ob
work, does not denote a r
construct" (Hans Lenk). The
from contexts of empirical
with one term that can be
as a regular, rational, and s
more than a pure postulat
The Normalcy of Regular
Why is the concept of the

if following the rules is,
interesting hint at this que
the features demanded by th
Rules make possible the rep
by society. It makes a diffe
this corresponds to the ru
norm with my acts. In the
obey a norm.22 My action ca
model of this norm. Di
differentiated.
If my action responds to
I justify it to myself and t
demand a similar action fro
It can be understood as a
supposed or expected to do.
justified, it appears to be su
others. The consent of all t
demonstrates that it was a c
In a final turn, I want to a
sociology. Interpreted from
levied on cultural behavior
the leading social classes ar
and, with the consent of
binding for the whole socie
With their conduct, the me
members of society, "This w
80 Gunter Gebauer
norms of the lower s

of these classes. The
their social class thro
the way you are," wh
social taste functions
positions. The agents'
to which they respon
through social taste.
In this regard, Bou
of everyday behavio
through the producti
as normative. Social
aesthetically beautif
correct, which includ
a comprehensive em
the correct, understo
not an exercise in e
Bourdieu's theory d
dependent on the age
that legitimate taste,
of correct and incor
interests in mind. Th
instead falls into the
with the socially corr
truth.
Free Uni
Translated b
Notes
1. Cf. in particular Searle 1965, 1969, 1979, 1983, 1992, 1995.
2. Cf. in particular Bourdieu 1962, 1972, 1979, 1980, 1992, 1994, 1997, as well as Bourdieu/
Chamboredon/Passeron, 1968.
3. In his new book Mind, Language and Society (Searle 1999), he holds onto this thought with
a somewhat different formulation: "With collective intentionality a species automatically
has social facts and social reality" (134). Searle argues here for the necessary assumption
of a collective intentionality.
4. With this, he refers to the theory of speech acts developed in his earlier works (Searle
1969, 1979). "Constitutive rules" are rules that create the possibility of certain activities.
Thus, there are constitutive rules for playing chess; they produce the possibility that
this game exists (Searle 1995, 28).
5. Cf. in particular the chapter o

connaissance par corps" in Bou
6. An impressive description of
power relations founded upon th
viewpoint of the non-believer, w
"our magistrates know" the secre
wrap themselves like furry cats,
all that solemn paraphernalia;
lawyers without their square c
taken in the world, which canno
the justice, and the physicians t
the majesty of the sciences wou
merely imaginary, they have to e
they turn to account, and thereb
With these remarks, Pascal calls a
exists in the demonstrative act
7. See Beate Krais's examination o
academic discipline (Krais 1996
8. Cf. Gehlen 1978, 170 ff., Gebau
9. A very old notion of the power
Through speaking, the world is
that of the christening. This act
community; a self is produced, id
The power of the christening o
given). As in the christening par
as a magical substance change. C
powerful means to call the soci
the act of christening must alread
cause a social fact.
10. "Intentionality is that property of many mental states and events by which they are
directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world" (Searle 1983, 1).
11. The criticism that Charles Taylor formulates against the "monological agent" of European
philosophy applies to Searle's concept of intentionality: the self is designed as an inner
space and "the inner space itself is definable independently of body or other. It is a
center of monological consciousness" (Taylor 1993, 49). In this essay, Taylor criticizes
the assumption of internal rules representations which supposedly determine social
action. Searle's intentionality is a variant of these representations, so that Taylor's criticism
applies to it: "Rather than representations being the primary locus of understanding,
they are similarly islands in the sea of our unformulated practical grasp on the world"
(50).
12. Searle himself sees that language is a social institution, though he does not draw from
this the conclusion that the construction of social reality rests not least on the
institutionalizations set into the language. Instead, Searle avoids this conclusion, in that
he describes language as "a self-identifying category of institutional facts" (Searle 1995,
73). Language possesses for Searle "the capacity to attach a sense, a symbolic function,
to an object that does not have that sense intrinsically" (ibid., 75). But how does language
acquire this power? Does language per se have a world-producing capacity?
13. See Gebauer/Wulf 1998 regarding the representation of the mimesis concept which
Bourdieu uses to describe the origin of a habitus; regarding the history of this concept
see Gebauer/Wulf 1992.
14. On the genesis and history of this view of the social agent in the European tradition
since John Locke, see Charles Taylor's extensive study on the "sources of the self" (Taylor
1989).
82 Gunter Gebauer
15. Cf. Bourdieu's metho

Passeron 1968, and Bour
16. Bourdieu says (1976, 20
following a rule.
17. Searle understands this
(1995, 129).
18. Searle characterizes this functioning as a "reflection," referring explicitly to Bourdieu's
habitus concept. Searle's formulation approaches Bourdieu's description of practical
sense: "In fact in many situations, we just know what to do, we just know how to deal
with the situation. We do not apply the rules consciously or unconsciously. [...] Rather,
we develop skills that are responsive to that particular institutional structure" (ibid.,
143).
19. "[The person] has come to be disposed to behave that way, because that's the way that
conforms to the rules of the institution" (ibid., 144).
20. A few further aspects of Searle's proposal that are incompatible with Bourdieu's habitus
concept should be briefly discussed: Searle characterizes the performance of the
Background as "reflection." In this, he suggests a passive reception of the environment.
For Bourdieu, the habitus has an active, dynamic role; it shapes, chooses from alternatives,
and assesses the action with help of social taste. Searle's claim of a "parallelism between
the functional structure of the Background and the intentional structure of the social
phenomena" (ibid.., 142) is also problematic from Bourdieu's standpoint. With this, Searle
refers to a dualistic view that has overcome the habitus concept-the opposition of
agent and society. This thought appears to be nothing more than a continuation of his I/
We opposition (agent vs. collective). Further, Searle's concept of following a rule seems
incompatible with his own considerations. It assumes that the regularly acting agent
has a genesis, insofar as his dispositions develop under the influence of the Background.
The previously formulated assertion that collective intentionality is innate is problematic
in light of these new assumptions.
21. In my attempt to use Searle's clarification of terms for the characterization of the habitus
concept, I am expressly not borrowing his causal interpretation of the production of
regular behavior.
22. When I take off my shoes upon entering a Japanese house, I am observing a norm, and
acknowledging the demand for what is supposed to be done. Thus, I will take off my
shoes when entering a house regardless of whether I am being observed, and regardless
of my attitude toward my hosts.
Works Cited
Bourdieu, Pierre. "Celibat et condition paysanne." Etudes rurales 5-6 (1962): 32 - 136.
-. Ce que parler veut dire. L'dconomie des &changes linguistiques. Paris: Minuit, 1965.
-. La distinction. Critique sociale du jugement. Paris: Minuit, 1979.
-. Esquisse d'une theorie de la pratique, precidd de trois etudes d'ethnologie kabyle. Geneva:
Droz, 1972.
-. Practical
-. M.ditations pascaliennes.
Reason: Paris:
On the Theory of Seuil,
Action.1997.
Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998. (Raisons pratiques,
1994).
-. Riponses pour une anthropologie riflexive. Paris: Seuil, 1992.
-. Le sens pratique. Paris: Minuit, 1980.
Bourdieu, Pierre, Jean-Claud Chamboredon, and Jean-Claude Passeron. Le metier du
sociologue. Paris:Mouton, Bordas, 1968.
Gebauer, Gunter. "Die Sprachmliigkeit des K6rpers." Sprache und Sprachen in der
Wissenschaft. Ed. H.E. Wiegand. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1999. 3-26.
Gebauer, Gunter and Christoph

Rowohlt, 1992.
-. Praxis und Asthetik. Neue Persp
Suhrkamp, 1993.
-. Spiel-Ritual-Geste. Das Mimetis
Gehlen, Arnold. Der Mensch. Sei
Akademische Verlagsgesellschaf
Krais, Beate. ,The Academic Dis
Action, Suppl. 2. Ed. D. Sciulli. G
Kripke, Saul. Wittgenstein on Rule
Oxford UP, 1982.
Pascal, Blaise. Pascal's Pensees. Tr
Searle, John R. The Construction
-. Expression and Meaning: Studies
UP, 1979.
-. Intentionality. An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge UP,
1983.
-. Mind, Language and Society. Philosophy in the Real World. New York: Basic Books, 1999.
-. The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Press, 1992.
--. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. London: Cambridge UP, 1969.
-. "What Is a Speech Act?" Philosophy in America. Ed. Max Black. Ithaca, N.Y., London:
Cornell, 1965.
Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
UP, 1989.
-. "To Follow a Rule..." Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives. Eds. Craig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma,
Moishe Postone. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993. 45-60.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophische Untersuchungen. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1960.

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Habitus, Intentionality, and Social Rules: A Controversy between Searle and Bourdieu

Author(s): Gunter Gebauer and Jennifer Marston William

The weaknesses and advantages inherent in a logical reconstruction of

68 SubStance # 93, 2000

through approaches, theor

Searle's Model for a Unified Material and Social Ontology

The basis of Searle's argument is his assumption of an external reality:

Specific speech-act rules, designated by Searle as "constitutive rules,"4 are

SubStance # 93, 2000

The Creation of Soci

At the center of Sear

assumes social facts, then t

SubStance # 93, 2000

as thinking and cons

contexts by carrying out spee

Intentionality and the Socia

With the term intentionality

In contrast to Searle, Bourdieu is attentive to the mute and

SubStance # 93, 2000

sense" by Bourdieu. This i

SubStance # 93, 2000

concerned with transi

Following a Rule: Searle's

In his description of regul

Background has a double function, causal andfunctional: it works causally

SubStance # 93, 2000

With this suggestion

SubStance # 93, 2000

rules. The composition of t

The Normalcy of Regular

Why is the concept of the

SubStance # 93, 2000

norms of the lower s

SubStance # 93, 2000

5. Cf. in particular the chapter o

SubStance # 93, 2000

15. Cf. Bourdieu's metho

SubStance # 93, 2000

Gebauer, Gunter and Christoph

SubStance # 93, 2000

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