. Pushpa Rani vs . Krishan Lal ( 09 . 04 .

1981 - DELHC )

MANU/DE/0327/1981

Decision Date: 09.04.1981

Subject: Family

Citing Ref:

Discussed

Mentioned

Act: Hindu Marriage Act 1955 - Section 13

Case Note: Hindu Marriage Act - Section 13--It is open to court in exceptional cases to take into
consideration events which may have taken place subsequent to the filing of the petition and grant relief on
those basis where the relief as claimed originally in a suit may have become inappropriate by reason of
changed circumstances--Section 13(1)(ii)--'cruelty', meaning of--cruelty is willful and unjustified conduct of
such a charter as to cause danger to life, limb or health bodily or mental or as to give rise to reasonable
apprehension of such a danger--neither cruelty not desertion established.# The respondent filed a petition
against the petitioner for dissolution of marriage under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act on the grounds
of cruelty and desertion. The petitioner resisted the divorce petition and alleged that the respondent had
extra marital relation with another lady and also that she was forced to return to her parents by her
husband. The trial judge did not give any definite finding regarding the husband's allegation that the
petitioner had tried to commit suicide by setting fire to herself, and also took note of certain allegations
made by the wife regarding his relationship with another woman even though these allegations had not
been taken in the pleadings. The trial judge held that the facts elicited in cross-examination ought to be
taken into account in granting the required relief. A decree of dissolution of marriage on the ground of
cruelty and desertion was passed in favor of the respondent. Hence, the appeal. Allowing the appeal--# 1. It
is open to court, in exceptional cases, to take into consideration events which may have taken place
subsequent to the filing of a suit and grant relief on that basis where the relief as claimed originally in the
suit may have become inappropriate by reason of changed circumstances, particularly where this may
appear to be necessary in order to shorten unnecessary litigation or to subserve the substantial interest of
justice. (AIR 1956 Raj. 12 relied on). The trial judge was justified in holding that he could take into
consideration the allegation of adultery made by the wife at the time of cross examination and in her
deposition. However, the question still remained whether the allegation amounts to cruelty. Cruelty is willful
and unjustified conduct of such a charter as to cause danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental or such
conduct as would give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. The question in all such cases
whether the acts or conduct of the party charged were cruel according to the ordinary sense of the word. It
has no esotric or artificial meaning. Upon the story being fully told, if the men of ordinary prudence would
describe the conduct of the erring spouse as cruel, that should be held as cruelty. A false imputation of
adultery is certainly a mode of treating a person with cruelty. But in order to reach a positive finding the
circumstances of the case must be kept in mind (1978 M.L.R. 175 of 1978 and H.L.R. 415 relied on).# 2.
When the direct allegation of illicit relationship with other woman was made, the husband simply denied it
and did not react to say that it had caused him mental anguish. The husband had accused her of a worse
type of adultery and if she relaliate by an equally false charge, she should be excused because after all she
is a semi-literate girl of a poor man selling vegetables on the pavement. She is not wanted in her parent's
house who are trying to persuade her to live in the matrimonial home in spite of the harsh attitude of the
husband. Conditions in the parental house could be no better and she appears to be keen to make her
home. She has no animus to desert her husband even though she was justified to do so when he charged
her with incest and he himself left her at the door of her parents.# 3. The husband was not entitled to a
decree of dissolution of marriage because neither desertion nor cruelty has been established in the present
case.

Inindra Sarma vs . V . K . V . Sarma ( 26 . 11 . 2013 - SC )

Indra sarma vs.v. k. v. sama

MANU/SC/1230/2013

Decision Date: 26.11.2013

Subject: Criminal

Act: Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 - Section 2 Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act 2005 - Section 3 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 - Section 6 Protection
of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 - Section 12 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act
2005 - Section 12(1) Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 - Section 18 Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 - Section 19 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act
2005 - Section 20 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 - Section 21 Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act 2005 - Section 22 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 -
Section 23 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 - Section 26 Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act 2005 - Section 29 Special Marriage Act Hindu Marriage Act 1955 - Section 5 Hindu
Marriage Act 1955 - Section 7 Civil Partnership Act 2004 Family Law Act 1996 Domestic Violence
Intervention Act 2001 Violence Against Women Act 1994 Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012
Property (Relationships) Act 1984 Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (CrPC) - Section 125 Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 304B Indian Penal
Code (IPC) - Section 498A Constitution of India - Article 14 Constitution of India - Article 15 Constitution of
India - Article 15(3) Constitution of India - Article 21 Constitution of India - Article 39

Prior History: From the Judgment and Order dated 12.08.2011 by the High Court of Karnataka in Crl. R.P.
No. 856/2010 (MANU/KA/1045/2011)

Case Note: Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 - Section 2(f)--"Live in relationship" in
nature of marriage--Determination--Held--Since appellant was aware that the O.P. was a married person
having two children even before the commencement of relationship hence the status of appellant is that of a
concubine or mistress and cannot fall under Section 2(f) of Domestic Violence Act 2005 and cannot be come
within "Domestic relationship"--And therefore entitled for no relief--Appeal dismissed.

Disposition: Appeal Dismissed

7. Chanmuniya vs . Chanmuniya Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha and Ors . ( 07 . 10 . 2010 - SC )

MANU/SC/0807/2010

Decision Date: 07.10.2010

Subject: Family

Citing Ref:
Affirmed

Discussed

10
Relied On

Act: Hindu Marriage Act 1955 - Section 2 Hindu Marriage Act 1955 - Section 7 Hindu Marriage Act 1955 -
Section 7(1) Hindu Marriage Act 1955 - Section 9 Hindu Marriage Act 1955 - Section 20 Hindu Marriage Act
1955 - Section 20(1) Hindu Marriage Act 1955 - Section 22 Hindu Marriage Act 1955 - Section 26 Hindu
Marriage Act 1955 - Section 28 Family Law Act Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 -
Section 3 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 - Section 26 Code of Criminal Procedure
1973 (CrPC) - Section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure 1872 (CrPC) - Section 536 Code of Criminal
Procedure 1898 (CrPC) - Section 488 Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (CrPC) - Section 488(1) Indian Penal
Code (IPC) - Section 494 Constitution of India - Article 15(3) Constitution of India - Article 39

Prior History: From the Judgment and Order dated 28.11.2007 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
in First Appeal No. 110 of 2004 and order dated 23.01.2009 in Review Application No. 54098 of 2008 in F.A.
No. 110 of 2004

Case Note: Family - Live-in relationships - Presumption of Marriage - Claim of Maintenance - Claim sought
on the ground that Parties though not married, living together since long - Interpretation of the word "wife"
vis-à-vis Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Whether, strict proof of marriage essential
for a claim of maintenance under Section 125 of Cr.PC., having regard to provisions of Domestic Violence
Act, 2005 - Held, where a man, who lived with a woman for a long time and even though they may not have
undergone legal necessities of a valid marriage, should be made liable to pay maintenance if he deserts her
- Man should not be allowed to benefit from legal loopholes by enjoying advantages of a de facto marriage
without undertaking duties and obligations - Expansive interpretation should be given to term "wife" to
include even those cases where a man and woman had been living together as husband and wife for a
reasonably long period of time - Strict proof of marriage should not be a pre-condition for maintenance
under Section 125 of Cr.PC., so as to fulfil true spirit and essence of beneficial provision of maintenance
under Section 125 - Petition disposed of.

Special leave petition

The Constitution of India under Article 136 vests the Supreme Court of India, the
apex court of the country, with a special power to grant special leave, to appeal
against any judgment or order or decree in any matter or cause, passed or made by
any Court/tribunal in the territory of India.

Under article 136, the Supreme Court, at its discretion, may grant special leave to appeal from
any judgement, decree, determination, sentence or order, in any cause or matter passed or made
by any court or tribunal in the territory of India. These powers of the Supreme Court to
grant special leave to appeal are far wider than the High Courts’ power to grant certificates to
appeal to the Supreme Court under article 134A. The Supreme Court can grant special leave
against judgments of any court or tribunal in the territory, except the military courts, and in any
type of cases, civil, criminal or revenue. But, the Supreme Court has itself said that it will grant
special leave to appeal only in cases where there has been gross miscarriage of justice or where
the High Court or Tribunal is found to have been grossly wrong in law. If the judgment of the
court below shakes the conscience and shocks the sense of justice, the Supreme Court shall
interfere.
The principle governing the exercise of power by the Supreme Court under article 136 has been
summed up by the Court itself in Ganga Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 2005 SC 3123: (2005) 6
SCC 211: JT 2005 (6) SC 356 as follows:

(i) The powers of the Supreme Court under article 136 of the Constitution are very wide but in
criminal appeals the Supreme Court does not interfere with the concurrent findings of the fact
save in exceptional circumstances.

(ii) It is open to the Supreme Court to interfere with the findings of fact given by the High Court
if the High Court has acted perversely or otherwise improperly.

(iii) It is open to the Supreme Court to invoke the power under article 136 only in very
exceptional circumstances as and when a question of law of general public importance arises or a
decision shocks the conscience of the Court.

(iv) When the evidence adduced by the prosecution falls short of the test of reliability and
acceptability and as such it is highly unsafe to act upon it.

(v) The appreciation of evidence and finding is vitiated by any error of law of procedure or found
contrary to the principles of natural justice, errors of record and misreading of the evidence, or
where the conclusions of the High Court are manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the
evidence on record.

6. Durga Prasanna Tripathy vs . Arundhati Tripathy ( 23 . 08 . 2005 - SC )

MANU/SC/0500/2005

Decision Date: 23.08.2005

Subject: Family

Subject: Civil

Citing Ref:

Relied On

Act: Hindu Marriage Act 1955 - Section 13 Hindu Marriage Act 1955 - Section 13(1) Family Courts Act 1984
- Section 9 Family Courts Act 1984 - Section 19 Constitution of India - Article 136 Constitution of India -
Article 142

Prior History: From the Judgment and Order dated 23.12.2003 of the Orissa High Court in C.A. No. 10 of
2001 (MANU/OR/0354/2003)

Case Note: Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - Sections 13 (1) and 25--Divorce--Irretrievable breakdown of
marriage--Cruelty and desertion--Marriage took place on 5.3.1991--Respondent wife deserted on
21.10.1991 and never returned to matrimonial home--Both parties could not carry on their marital ties
beyond 7 months of marriage--Efforts to bring about reconciliation/ rapprochement between parties failed--
Family Court giving cogent and convincing reasons for passing decree of divorce in favour of appellant
husband--Division Bench of High Court erring in reversing finding of Family Court--14 years elapsed since
separation between parties -- Irretrievable breakdown of marriage between appellant and respondent--
Cruelty and desertion by wife proved--Reunion impossible--Judgment of High Court set aside--And that of
Family Court granting divorce affirmed--However, amount of permanent alimony enhanced.#Fourteen years
have elapsed since the appellant and the respondent have been separated and there is no possibility of the
appellant and the respondent resuming normal marital life even though the respondent is willing to join her
husband. There has been an irretrievable breakdown of marriage between the appellant and the respondent.
The respondent has also preferred to keep silent about her absence during the death of her father-in-law
and during the marriage ceremony of her brother-in-law. The Family Court, on examination of the evidence
on record, and having observed the demeanour of the witnesses, concluded that the appellant-husband had
proved that the respondent-wife was not only cruel but also deserted him since more than 7 years. The
desertion as on date is more than 14 years and, therefore, there has been an irretrievable breakdown of
marriage between the appellant and the respondent. The respondent in her evidence had not disputed the
fact that attempts have been made by the appellant and his family to bring her back to the matrimonial
home for leading a conjugal life with the appellant. Apart from that, relationship between the appellant and
the respondent have become strained over the years due to the desertion of the appellant by the
respondent for several years. Under the circumstances, the appellant had proved before the Family Court
both the factum of separation as well as animus deserendi which are the essential elements of desertion.
The evidence adduced by the respondent before the Family Court belies her stand taken by her before the
Family Court. Enough instances of cruelty meted out by the respondent to the appellant were cited before
the Family Court and the Family Court, being convinced, granted the decree of divorce. The harassment by
the in-laws of the respondent was an after-thought since the same was alleged after a gap of 7 years of
marriage and desertion by the respondent. The appellant having failed in his efforts to get back the
respondent to her matrimonial home and having faced the trauma of performing the last rites of his
deceased father without the respondent and having faced the ill-treatment meted out by the respondent to
him and his family had, no other efficacious remedy but to approach the Family Court for decree of divorce.

Disposition: Appeal Allowed

Naveen Kohli vs . Neelu Kohli ( 21 . 03 . 2006 - SC )

MANU/SC/1387/2006

Decision Date: 21.03.2006

Subject: Family

Citing Ref:

Discussed

25

Act: Hindu Marriage Act 1955 - Section 10 Hindu Marriage Act 1955 - Section 13 Hindu Marriage Act 1955 -
Section 13B Hindu Marriage Act 1955 - Section 13(1) Hindu Marriage Act 1955 - Section 24 Companies Act -
Section 397 Companies Act - Section 398 Hindu Marriage (Amendment) Act 1976 Indian Penal Code (IPC) -
Section 323 Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 324 Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 379 Indian Penal Code
(IPC) - Section 420 Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 467 Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 468 Indian
Penal Code (IPC) - Section 471 Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 498A Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section
504 Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 506 Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Section 11 Constitution of India -
Article 136 Constitution of India - Article 142
Prior History: From the Final Judgment and Order dated 7.7.2003 of the Allahabad High Court in First
Appeal No. 323 of 2003 (MANU/UP/0598/2003)

Case Note: Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - Section 13 (1) (ia)--Divorce--Cruelty--Irretrievable breakdown of
marriage--Petition for divorce by husband on ground of cruelty of wife--Parties living separately for more
than 10 years--Large number of criminal and civil proceedings initiated by wife respondent against husband
appellant -- Some proceedings also initiated by husband against wife--Matrimonial bond between parties--Is
beyond repair--Marriage between parties--Only in name--Marriage wrecked beyond hope of salvage--Public
interest and interest of all concerned lies in recognition of fact--And to declare defunct de jure what is
already defunct de facto--High Court ought to have visualised that preservation of such marriage is totally
unworkable--And would be greater source of misery for parties--Not to grant decree of divorce--To be
disastrous for parties--Judgment of High Court set aside--Marriage between parties directed to be dissolved-
-Appellant husband in view of his financial standing to pay Rs. 25 lakhs to respondent wife towards
permanent maintenance--Recommendation to Union of India to seriously consider bringing amendment in
Hindu Marriage Act to incorporate irretrievable breakdown of marriage as ground for grant of divorce.
Irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
Because of the change of circumstances and for covering a large number of cases where the marriages are
virtually dead and unless this concept is pressed into service, the divorce cannot be granted. Ultimately, it is
for the Legislature whether to include irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground of divorce or not but
the Legislature must consider irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for grant of divorce under the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Public interest demands not only that the married status should, as far as
possible, as long as possible, and whenever possible, be maintained, but where a marriage has been
wrecked beyond the hope of salvage, public interest lies in the recognition of that fact. Since there is no
acceptable way in which a spouse can be compelled to resume life with the consort, nothing is gained by
trying to keep the parties tied for ever to a marriage that in fact has ceased to exist. From the analysis and
evaluation of the entire evidence, it is clear that the respondent has resolved to live in agony only to make
life a miserable hell for the appellant as well. This type of adamant and callous attitude, in the context of the
facts of this case, leaves no manner of doubt that the respondent is bent upon treating the appellant with
mental cruelty. It is abundantly clear that the marriage between the parties had broken down irretrievably
and there is no chance of their coming together, or living together again. The High Court ought to have
appreciated that there is no acceptable way in which the parties can be compelled to resume life with the
consort, nothing is gained by trying to keep the parties tied forever to a marriage that in fact has ceased to
exist. To constitute cruelty, the conduct complained of should be "grave and weighty" so as to come to the
conclusion that the petitioner spouse cannot be reasonably expected to live with the other spouse. It must
be something more serious than "ordinary wear and tear of married life". The conduct taking into
consideration the circumstances and background has to be examined to reach the conclusion whether the
conduct complained of amounts to cruelty in the matrimonial law. Conduct has to be considered, as noted
above, in the background of several factors such as social status of parties, their education, physical and
mental conditions, customs and traditions. It is difficult to lay down a precise definition or to give exhaustive
description of the circumstances, which would constitute cruelty. It must be of the type as to satisfy the
conscience of the Court that the relationship between the parties had deteriorated to such extent due to the
conduct of the other spouse that it would be impossible for them to live together without mental agony,
torture or distress, to entitle the complaining spouse to secure divorce. Physical violence is not absolutely
essential to constitute cruelty and a consistent course of conduct inflicting immeasurable mental agony and
torture may well constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 10 of the Act. Mental cruelty may consist
of verbal abuses and insults by using filthy and abusive language leading to constant disturbance of mental
peace of the other party. The word 'cruelty' has to be understood in the ordinary sense of the term in
matrimonial affairs. If the intention to harm, harass or hurt could be inferred by the nature of the conduct or
brutal act complained of, cruelty could be easily established. But the absence of intention should not make
any difference in the case. There may be instances of cruelty by unintentional but inexcusable conduct of
any party. The cruel treatment may also result from the cultural conflict between the parties. Mental cruelty
can be caused by a party when the other spouse levels an allegation that the petitioner is a mental patient,
or that he requires expert psychological treatment to restore his mental health, that he is suffering from
paranoid disorder and mental hallucinations, and to crown it all, to allege that he and all the members of his
family are a bunch of lunatics. The allegation that members of the petitioner's family are lunatics and that a
streak of insanity runs though his entire family is also an act of mental cruelty. "Cruelty", therefore,
postulates a treatment of the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in his or
her mind that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party. Cruelty,
however, has to be distinguished from the ordinary wear and tear of family life. It cannot be decided on the
basis of the sensitivity of the petitioner and has to be adjudged on the basis of the course of conduct which
would, in general, be dangerous for a spouse to live with the other. The cruelty alleged may largely depend
upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions and their culture
and human values to which they attach importance. Each case has to be decided on its own merits. The
Court dealing with the petition for divorce on the ground of cruelty has to bear in mind that the problems
before it are those of human beings and the psychological changes in a spouse's conduct have to be borne
in mind before disposing of the petition for divorce. However insignificant or trifling, such conduct may cause
pain in the mind of another. But before the conduct can be called cruelty, it must touch a certain pitch of
severity. It is for the Court to weigh the gravity. It has to be seen whether the conduct was such that no
reasonable person would tolerate it. It has to be considered whether the complainant should be called upon
to endure as a part of normal human life. Every matrimonial conduct, which may cause annoyance to the
other, may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-
to-day married life, may also not amount to cruelty. Cruelty in matrimonial life may be of unfounded variety,
which can be subtle or brutal. It may be by words, gestures or by mere silence, violent or non-violent.

Disposition: Disposed off

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1643829/