PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

TULIN
G.R. No. 111709 August 30, 2001
MELO, J.

FACTS:
MT Tabangao, cargo vessel owned by PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, was
sailing near the coast of Mindoro loaded with barrels of kerosene, gasoline, and diesel oil
with a total value of 40.4M was suddenly boarded by seven fully armed pirates. The
pirates detained the crews and took control of the vessel, the PNOC logo were painted
over with black and was painted over with the name Galilee. The ship crew was forced to
sail to Singapore and later went back to Batangas, Philippines and remained at sea.

Days later, it sailed back to Singapore and later another vessel called the Navi Pride
anchored beside it. Cheong San Hiong, supervised the Navi's crew and received the cargo
on board MT Tabangao/Galilee. After the transfer of goods were completed, MT
Tabangao/Galilee sailed back to the Philippines and the original crew members were
released by the pirates and was ordered not to report to authority. However, the chief
engineer reported the incident to the coast guard and thereafter followed a series of
arrests were effected and charged the accused of qualified piracy or violation of PD 532.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are guilty of qualified piracy.

RULING:
Yes, the accused are guilty of piracy.
Art. 122 of the RPC (piracy in general and mutiny in the high seas) provided that piracy
must be committed in the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor
a passenger thereof. It was amended by RA 7659, which broadened the law to include
offenses committed in Philippine waters. PD 532 on the other hand, embraces any person,
including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in the Philippine
waters. Passenger or not, member of the complement or not, any person is covered by
the law. No conflict exists among the mentioned laws; they exist harmoniously as
separate laws.

The attack on and the seizure of MT Tabangao and its cargo were committed in Philippine
waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore, where
its cargo was offloaded, transferred and sold. Such transfer was done under Hiong's
supervision.

Although the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo was not done in
Philippine waters, it is still deemed part of the same act. Piracy falls under Title 1 of Book
2 of the RPC. It is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same
principle applies to the case, even if Hiong is charged with violation of a special penal law,
instead of the RPC. Regardless of the law penalizing piracy, it remains to be a
reprehensible crime against the whole world.
PEOPLE v. NEMESIO L. AGPANGAN
GR No. L-778, Oct 10, 1947
79 Phil. 334
PERFECTO, J.

Facts:
Agpangan stands accused of Treason, committed between December 1944 and January
1945, in the province of Laguna. It was alleged that the accused was a member of the
Ganap, a subversive pro-Japanese organization, joined the Pampars, a military
organization supporting the Imperial Japanese Army, and was equipped with a 1903
Springfield rifle, caliber .30 and was made to undergo training. That from or about
January 12, 1945 to March 15, the accused was assigned to guard duty once a week,
armed with a rifle with orders to shoot any Filipino prisoners who might attempt to escape
and also any guerrilla or American soldier who might approach the Japanese garrison.

Three witnesses testified for the prosecution namely, Tomas C Serrano, a farmer who saw
the accused doing guard duty at the entrance of the garrison with a rifle and bayonet at
his side. Serrano saw the accused confiscating foodstuffs for the support of Japanese
soldiers and accompanying the latter in arresting suspected guerrillas. Mauricio Adaro,
another farmer was the second witness who testified that he saw the accused mounting
guard, getting food supplies from the civilians and giving them to the Japanese. The last
witness was Delfin Redor, mayor of Siniloan who testified that the accused belongs to
Pampar Makapili, detailed as guard in front of the garrison with arms and ammunitions.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of treason.
Ruling:
None of the several overt acts alleged in the information has been proved in accordance
with the two-witness rule provided in Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. To meet the
test under two-witness rule, it is necessary that, at least, two witnesses should testify as
to the perpetration of the same treasonous overt act, and the sameness must include not
only identity of kind and nature of the act, but as to the precise one which has actually
been perpetrated.

The decision to acquit him is not only based on the reasonable doubt as to his guilt,
because the prosecution has not satisfied the requirements of the two-witness rule, but
was rather inclined to believe in his testimony to the effect that he might have the same
fate that befell Vicente Auxilio, a guerrilla member. The Court believed that the accused
could have adhered to the Japanese, the same who tortured and killed his own son,
Bienvenido Agpangan. The decision is reversed and the appellant is acquitted.
 ADRIANO V. ALBIOR v. DONATO A. AUGUIS
A.M. No. P-01-1472. June 26, 2003
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

FACTS:

Respondent Donato Auguis, Clerk of Court II of the MCTC, Branch 4, Talibon-Getafe, Talibon,
Bohol, is charged by Adriano Albior, of usurpation of judicial function and negligence in the
performance of official duties. According to complainant, respondent usurped judicial functions
when he issued the order for the detention of one Edilberto Albior, the son of complainant.
Further, complainant alleged that respondent committed negligence when he failed to inform
Acting Presiding Judge Avelino N. Puracan of that court regarding the filing of cases that
necessitated issuance of the detention order.

On January 25, 1999, two complaints for rape were filed against Edilberto Albior before the
MCTC. As clerk of court of the said court, respondent Auguis received and filed the complaints.
The next day, respondent issued a detention order of the accused Edilberto Albior.

According to complainant, Albior, said order was issued without a prior preliminary investigation
and without a warrant of arrest. Neither was there any record of the accused apprehension nor
his surrender. Also no proof that he signed a waiver for his detention. And the respondent failed
to inform the judge about the rape complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent should be held administratively liable for the issuance of a detention
order resulting in the actual detention of the accused.

RULING:

The OCA report stresses that respondent clerk of court is not empowered to issue the questioned
detention order. The duties of a clerk of court in the absence of the judge are defined under
Section 5, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 5. Duties of the clerk in the absence or by direction of the judge. - In the
absence of the judge, the clerk may perform all the duties of the judge in receiving
applications, petitions, inventories, reports, and the issuance of all orders and notices…xxx

It is also aptly pointed out that where a judge is not available, the arresting officer is duty-bound
to release a detained person, if the maximum hours for detention provided under Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code had already expired.
ART. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities.
xxx… public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and
shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of:
twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent;
eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their
equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or
capital penalties, or their equivalent.
WHEREFORE, respondent DONATO AUGUIS, is hereby found administratively liable for issuing
the assailed detention order without lawful authority as well as failing to inform the Presiding
Judge of that court regarding such order, thus committing GRAVE MISCONDUCT in the discharge
of official functions.
 MACARIO GUNABE v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
GR No. 1231, Jan 30, 1947
77 Phil. 993
PARAS, J.
FACTS:
The petitioners more or less admit that in November, 1942, they were charged in criminal
cases Nos. 988 and 1010 of the Court of First Instance of Manila with murder and
frustrated murder and that, in virtue of said cases (continued as criminal cases 1838 and
1839) which are still pending, the petitioners have been detained by the respondent
Director of Prisons under proper commitment orders.

Nevertheless, in the present petition for the writ of habeas corpus, the petitioners pray
for their release on the grounds (1) that from one to four months after their arrest, their
detention was unlawful as it was a brazen violation of their right to be delivered to the
judicial authorities within six hours following their arrest.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the arresting authorities be held liable under article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code.

RULING:
With respect to the first ground, it is sufficient to state that the alleged failure of the
authorities (who arrested or are detaining the petitioners) to deliver the latter to the
judicial authorities within six hours which may of course be the subject of criminal
prosecution under article 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot affect the legality of the
confinement of the petitioners which is admittedly under subsisting process, issued by a
competent court. Indeed, if it appears that the persons alleged to be restrained of their
liberty are in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge having
jurisdiction to issue the process, the writ of habeas corpus shall not be allowed
 SAYO VS. CHIEF OF POLICE OF MANILA
80 PHIL 859 (1948)
FERIA, J.:

FACTS:
Upon complaint of one Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having
committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila,
arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a complaint against them with
the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, the petitioners were still detained or under
arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them an information with
the proper court of justice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners had been illegally restrained of their liberty?

RULING:
Yes. Petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby
ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent court
of justice. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “the penalties provided in
the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall
detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper
judicial authorities within the period of six hours.” Without making any pronouncement
as to the responsibility of the officers who intervened in the detention of the petitioners,
for the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the absence of a clear cut
ruling on the matter in believing that he had complied with the mandate of article 125 by
delivering the petitioners within six hours to the office of the city fiscal, and the latter
might have ignored the fact that the petitioners were being actually detained when the
said policeman filed a complaint against them with the city fiscal, The court holds that the
petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby
ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent court
of justice.
 Alvarez v Court of First Instance
G.R. No. 45358; 29 Jan 1937
64 Phil 331
IMPERIAL, J.

FACTS:
The chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice
presented to respondent Judge an affidavit alleging that petitioner kept in his house
books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with
his activities as a money-lender, charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law.
He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own personal knowledge of the
facts. Upon the affidavit in question, respondent judge issued the warrant, ordering the
search of petitioner’s house as well as the seizure of the books and documents
mentioned.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not there was sufficient probable cause for the issuance of the search
warrant.

HELD:
NO. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient
and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made. Therefore, the
search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and
other papers are illegal. The warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only
on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.

Search warrant and seizure and the orders of the respondent court authorizing the
retention of the books and documents are declared ILLEGAL and are SET ASIDE. Presiding
Judge is ordered to direct the IMMEDIATE RETURN to the petitioner of the nineteen (19)
documents.
 Umil v Ramos
G.R. No. 81567; 09 Jul 1990
187 SCRA 311
EN BANC

FACTS:
The Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM)
received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit being treated
for a gunshot wound at a hospital. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded
person who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon is actually petitioner
Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad responsible for the killing of two
CAPCOM soldiers the day before. He was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the
gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car and fired at the
two CAPCOM soldiers seated inside.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not petitioner’s arrest was lawful.

HELD:
YES. Petitioner Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA),
an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of
Rolando Dural without a warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an
offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in
connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of
continuing crime.

Petitions are DISMISSED.

 Lagman, et. Al. Vs. Medialdea, et. Al
G.R. Nos. 231658, July 4, 2017
CARPIO, J.

FACTS:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Duterte issued
Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. Within the timeline set by the Constitution, the
President submitted to Congress, a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.
After the submission of the report and briefings before Congress, both houses of Congress
expressed full support to the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas of corpus.
However, Proclamation No. 216 was contested by three petitions. All three petitions allege that
there is no sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the President
did not commit grave abuse of discretion when he determined that there is sufficient factual
basis for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.

ISSUES:
Whether there is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus.
RULING:
There is sufficient basis for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus only in Marawai City and not in the rest of Mindanao.

In exercising the power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ, the
1987 Constitution requires that the President establish the following: (1) the existence of
actual rebellion or invasion; and (2) public safety requires the declaration of martial law
or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the instant case, probable
cause exists that there is actual rebellion in Marawi City and that public safety requires
the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ in Marawi City.
The armed and public uprising in Marawi City by Maute-Hapilon armed fighters, with the
announced intention to impose Shariah Law in Marawi City and make it an Islamic State,
is concrete and indisputable evidence of actual rebellion; thereby justifying Proclamation No.
216. However, this finding does not apply to the rest of Mindanao. Proclamation No. 216 and
the President's Report to Congress do not contain any evidence whatsoever of actual
rebellion outside of Marawi City. The President attempts to justify Proclamation No. 216 by citing
the capacity to rebel of the earlier mentioned groups in the rest of Mindanao. Capability to
rebel, absent an actual rebellion or invasion, is not a ground to declare martial law or
suspend the privilege of the writ under the 1987 Constitution. Thus, there is a clear violation
of the 1987 Constitution.
 People of the Philippines v. Hernandez
G.R. Nos. L-6025-26; 18 Jul 1956
99 Phil. Rep 515 (1956)
LABRADOR, J
FACTS:
Amado Hernandez and several others were accused of the crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, arsons and robberies. They were convicted of the crime and sentenced
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not there is a complex crime of rebellion with murder.

HELD:
NO. Under the allegations of the amended information, the murders, arsons and
robberies described therein are mere ingredients to the crime of rebellion allegedly
committed by said defendants as means “necessary” for the perpetration of said offense
of rebellion. The crime, therefore, is simple rebellion.

Motion for bail is GRANTED.

 SATURNINO C. OCAMPO vs. HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO
G.R. No. 176830
February 11, 2014
SERENO, CJ

FACTS:

On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine
Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte. The mass grave contained skeletal remains
of individuals believed to be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease" (Operation VD) launched by members of
the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military informers.

While the doctrine of hierarchy of courts normally precludes a direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction, we
take cognizance of these petitions considering that petitioners have chosen to take recourse directly before us
and that the cases are of significant national interest.

ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners were denied due process during preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the
warrants of arrest.
2. Whether the murder charges against petitioners should be dismissed under the political offense doctrine.

RULINGS:
1. Petitioners were accorded due process during preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the warrants
of arrest.
a. Preliminary Investigation
In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the
opportunity to be heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the
respondent’s side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide
whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has been
committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer
is bound to dismiss the complaint.

b. Search Warrant and Warrant of Arrest

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."
It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutor’s report and supporting
documents showing the existence of probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to
disregard the prosecutor's resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in determining its existence.
2. The political offense doctrine is not a ground to dismiss the charge against petitioners prior to a
determination by the trial court that the murders were committed in furtherance of rebellion.

Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense,
are divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the main
crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the
principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty."

WHEREFORE, Petitioner Ocampo shall remain on provisional liberty. He shall remain on provisional liberty until
the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila. The OSG has given its conformity to the provisional
liberty of petitioners Echanis, Baylosis and Ladlad in view of the ongoing peace negotiations.