G.R. No.

159110 : December 10, 2013

VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, Petitioner, v. CITY OF CEBU, T.C. (TITO) SAYSON AND RICARDO HAPITAN,Respondents.

FACTS:

On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the traffic
enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in the Traffic
Code of Cebu City.

On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban,Sr.) and his son Atty. Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban (Jaban,Jr.)
brought suit in the RTC against the City of Cebu, then represented by Hon. Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cebu City and its Presiding Officer, Hon. Renato V. Osme, and the chairman and operatives or officers of the
City Traffic Operations Management (CITOM),seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in
violation of due process and for being contrary to law, and damages.

Their complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had properly parked his car in a paying parking area on Manalili
Street, Cebu City to get certain records and documents from his office and after less than 10 minutes, he had found his car
being immobilized by a steel clamp. His car was impounded for three days, and was informed at the office of the CITOM that
he had first to pay P4,200.00 as a fine to the City Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car but such imposition the fine
was without any court hearing and without due process of law. He was also compelled to payP1,500.00 (itemized as P500.00
for the clamping andP1,000.00 for the violation) without any court hearing and final judgment;

That on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a very secluded place where there was no sign prohibiting parking; that his
car was immobilized by CITOM operative and that he was compelled to pay the total sum ofP1,400.00 for the release of his car
without a court hearing and a final judgment rendered by a court of justice.

On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the City of Cebu, demanded the delivery of personal
property, declaration of nullity of theTraffic Code of Cebu City, and damages.

He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had left his car occupying a portion of the sidewalk and the street outside
the gate of his house to make way for the vehicle of theanayexterminator, upon returning outside, his car was towed by the
group even if it was not obstructing the flow of traffic.

The cases were consolidated. The RTC rendered its decision declaring Ordinance No. 1664 as null and void

The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC declaring the Ordinance
No. 1664 valid.

Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration the Jabans and Legaspi came to the Court via separate
petitions for review on certiorari. The appeals were consolidated.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 1664 is valid and constitutional.

HELD: The Court of Appeals decision is sustained.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Tests for a valid ordinance

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005the Court restates the tests of a valid ordinance thusly:

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must
not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;(3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate
powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e.,
involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as
well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).

InMetropolitan Manila Development Authorityv. Bel-Air Village Association,Inc., G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000the Court
cogently observed that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or
body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the
President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units.
Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking
body. (emphasis supplied)

In the present case, delegated police power was exercised by the LGU of the City of Cebu.

The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the legislative power to enact traffic rules and
regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC, and also generally by virtue of the General Welfare Clause
embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the
people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically
as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the
prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis,
may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and
property.

Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of law, the contentions of the petitioners
cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and
constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the
requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy.

The subject of Ordinance No. 1664 is to ensure "a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu at all
times".

To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to enforce the ordinance against its
transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade liability by simply driving away. DENIED
itCASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Bantangas CATV vs. C.A.
BATANGAS CATV, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD and BATANGAS CITY MAYOR [G.R. No. 138810. September 29, 2004]

FACTS:
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting
petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the
Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates
specified therein, “provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod.

Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per
month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless
it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.

Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging that
respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by
CATV operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines.

ISSUE :
may a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within
its territorial jurisdiction?

HELD: No.

xxx

The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC
exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies.

xxx

Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare
clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public
properties. (It uses public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical realities of
constructing CATV system – the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and
the parceling of large regions – allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators.

xxx

But, while we recognize the LGUs’ power under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain
Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well recognized limits of its
power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it
violates the State’s deregulation policy over the CATV industry.
LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive
regulatory power of the NTC.
 Acebedo v. CA
ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC. v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000

FACTS:
 Petitioner Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan City.
After hearing the sides of local optometrists, Mayor Camilo Cabili of Iligan granted the permit but he
attached various special conditions which basically made Acebedo dependent upon prescriptions or
limitations to be issued by local optometrists. Petitioner basically is not allowed to practice optometry
within the city (but may sell glasses only). Acebedo however acquiesced to the said conditions and
operated under the permit.
 Private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI), Iligan Chapter, lodged a
complaint against the petitioner before the Office of the City Mayor, alleging that Acebedo had violated
the conditions set forth in its business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such
permit. Acting on such complaint, then City Mayor conduct an investigation through the City Legal Officer
on the matter. Respondent City Legal Officer submitted a report to the City Mayor finding the herein
petitioner guilty of violating all the conditions of its business permit and recommending the
disqualification of petitioner from operating its business in Iligan City.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the respondent city mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing the special
conditions in the permit

HELD:
 Yes, the power to issue licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to revoke,
withdraw or cancel the same. And the power to revoke or cancel, likewise includes the power to restrict
through the imposition of certain conditions. In the case of Austin-Hardware, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[7]
it was held that the power to license carries with it the authority to provide reasonable terms and
conditions under which the licensed business shall be conducted. As the Solicitor General puts it:
 "If the City Mayor is empowered to grant or refuse to grant a license, which is a broader
power, it stands to reason that he can also exercise a lesser power that is reasonably incidental to his express
power, i. e. to restrict a license through the imposition of certain conditions, especially so that there is no
positive prohibition to the exercise of such prerogative by the City Mayor, nor is there any particular official or
body vested with such authority"
 However, Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do business and
the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular profession. The first is usually granted
by the local authorities and the second is issued by the Board or Commission tasked to regulate the
particular profession. A business permit authorizes the person, natural or otherwise, to engage in
business or some form of commercial activity. A professional license, on the other hand, is the grant of
authority to a natural person to engage in the practice or exercise of his or her profession.
 In the case at bar, what is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to
engage in the business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the
practice of optometry as a corporate body or entity, although it does have in its employ, persons who are
duly licensed to practice optometry by the Board of Examiners in Optometry.
 A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor
cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession, like that of optometry.
Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law
to supervise the profession, in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of
Examiners in Optometry.
 The regulatory power to issue licenses or permits extends only up to the regulation of a business
and not in the regulation of a profession. Therefore, the acts of the mayor are ultra vires and cannot be
given effect.
 CASE DIGEST: PARAYNO VS. JOVELLANOS
12:41 AM

G.R No. 148408

July 14, 2006

Concepcion Parayno vs. Jose Jovellanos

FACTS:

Respondent Parayno was an owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao
petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another location. The matter was
referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their
advice, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioner's gasoline station. Resolution
50 stipulated the alleged violations of the gasoline station in question. Petitioner sought for reconsideration, which was then denied. She
then filed a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus in the RTC, contending that her gasoline station was not covered by Section
44 of the Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, which prohibits gasoline service stations which are within 100meters away from any public or
private school, public library, playground, church, and hospital based on the straight line method measured from the nearest side of the
building nearest the lot if there are no intervening buildings to the nearest pump of the gasoline station. Petitioner contended that hers
was not a "gasoline service station" but a "gasoline filling station" governed by Section 21 thereof. Moreover, the decision of the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in a previous case filed by the same respondent Jovellanos against her predecessor (Dennis
Parayno) should bar the grounds invoked by respondent municipality in Resolution No. 50. The RTC ruled against petitioner by applying
the virtue of ejusdem generis, saying that a “gasoline filling station” fell within the ambit of Section 44. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
but was, again, only denied by the RTC. The same fate was met by the petition in the CA. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s gasoline filling station could be likened to that of a gasoline service station as provided for in Section 44
of the Official zoning Code by virtue of Ejusdem Generis.

HELD:

The Court held that the zoning ordinance of respondent municipality made a clear distinction between a gasoline service station and a
gasoline filling station as found in Section 21 and Section 42 of the said ordinance. It was made clear that the two terms were intended
to be distinguished from the other, which the respondent further admitted. Respondent municipality cannot invoke the principle of Ejusdem
generis which means "of the same kind, class or nature” but rather should apply the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius which means that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others.

With the distinction clearly provided, respondents could not insist that "gasoline service station" under Section 44 necessarily included
"gasoline filling station" under Section 21.
The Court also held that the HLURB decision in the previous case filed against her predecessor (Dennis Parayno) by respondent
Jovellanos had effectively barred the issues in Resolution No. 50 based on the principle of res judicata or the rule that a final judgment
or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all
points and matters determined in the former suit. With the similarity of the identity of interest of the case at bar and that of the previous
case already decided by HLURB, the litigation should already end since the concerns had already been resolved. The Court stated that
an individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause.
Tano vs Socrates
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine
GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997

FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the
shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998.
Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution
prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live
marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the said
ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of the
due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of
Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged ordinances did
not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing
that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII
aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to
protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to
the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and utilization...shall
be under the full control and supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of
decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be
doubted.
MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village Association (G.R. No. 135962)

Facts:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its private road,
Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that
the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary
injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial
court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction. On appeal, the appellate court ruled that the MMDA has no
authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the
authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.

MMDA said it has the authority to open Neptune St. because it is an agent of the Government endowed with police
power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From the premise of police powers, it follow then that it need
not for an ordinance to be enacted first.

Hence this petition.

Issue:
Does MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers?

Ruling:
According to SC, Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. Police power is lodged primarily in the National
Legislature, which the latter can delegate to the President and administrative boards, LGU or other lawmaking
bodies.

LGU is a political subdivision for local affairs. Which has a legislative body empowered to enact ordinances, approved
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the province/city/municipality.

The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its functions are administrative in
nature.The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination,
regulation,implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power

In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs, acting through
their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of
Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.

Wherefore, the petition is denied.