G.R. No.

11263 November 2, 1916

ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Felix Socias for appellant.
Sanz, Opisso and Luzuriaga for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. From a judgment sustaining the
defendant's demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action, followed by an order
dismissing the case after the plaintiff declined to amend, the latter appealed.
It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his
own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from the defendant.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately thereafter established their residence at 115
Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The pertinent
allegations of the complaint are as follows:
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform unchaste and
lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act
other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made similar
lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the
defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body;
and that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from
maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solemnities established by General Orders No. 68, in
so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the consent of the parties. (Garcia vs. Montague, 12 Phil. Rep., 480, citing article 1261
of Civil Code.) Upon the termination of the marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed between the parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs.
Encarnacion, 16 Phil. Rep., 137.) To this extent a marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than
a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the
general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations. Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in
its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any
contract they may make .The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law determines from
time to time, and none other. When the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and
controlled by the state or government upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the
object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable. With these principles to guide us, we will inquire into the status of the law touching
and governing the question under consideration.
Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34). Articles 44 to
78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870, in force in the Peninsula, were extended to the Philippine Islands by royal decree on April 13,
1883 (Ebreo vs. Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705). Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law read:
ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to mutually assist each other.
ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second paragraph deals with the management of the wife's property.)
ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him when he charges his domicile or residence.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may for just cause relieve her from this duty when the husband
removes his residence to a foreign country.
And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the whole extent specified in the preceding article.
1. The consorts.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by paying the pension that may be fixed or by
receiving and maintaining in his own home the person having the right to the same.
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease. The failure of the wife to live with her
husband is not one of them.
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and obligations of the spouses. The spouses
must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with
her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence, except when he removes to a foreign country. But the
husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her

1
in his own home. May the husband, on account of his conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay the pension? Is
the rule established by article 149 of the Civil Code absolute? The supreme court of Spain in its decision of December 5, 1903, held:.
That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its decisions dated May 11, 1897, November 25, 1899, and July 5,
1901, the option which article 149 grants the person, obliged to furnish subsistence, between paying the pension fixed or receiving and
keeping in his own house the party who is entitled to the same, is not so absolute as to prevent cases being considered wherein, either
because this right would be opposed to the exercise of a preferential right or because of the existence of some justifiable cause morally
opposed to the removal of the party enjoying the maintenance, the right of selection must be understood as being thereby restricted.
Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise to this appeal was whether there was any reason to prevent the
exercise of the option granted by article 149 of the Civil Code to the person obliged to furnish subsistence, to receive and maintain in
his own house the one who is entitled to receive it; and inasmuch as nothing has been alleged or discussed with regard to the parental
authority of Pedro Alcantara Calvo, which he ha not exercised, and it having been set forth that the natural father simply claims his child
for the purpose of thus better attending to her maintenance, no action having been taken by him toward providing the support until,
owing to such negligence, the mother was obliged to demand it; it is seen that these circumstances, together with the fact of the
marriage of Pedro Alcantara, and that it would be difficult for the mother to maintain relations with her daughter, all constitute an
impediment of such a nature as to prevent the exercise of the option in the present case, without prejudice to such decision as may be
deemed proper with regard to the other questions previously cited in respect to which no opinion should be expressed at this time.
The above was quoted with approval in United States and De Jesus vs. Alvir (9 Phil. Rep., 576), wherein the court held that the rule
laid down in article 149 of the Civil Code "is not absolute." but it is insisted that there existed a preexisting or preferential right in each of
these cases which was opposed to the removal of the one entitled to support. It is true that in the first the person claiming the option
was the natural father of the child and had married a woman other than the child's mother, and in the second the right to support had
already been established by a final judgment in a criminal case. Notwithstanding these facts the two cases clearly established the
proposition that the option given by article 149 of the Civil Code may not be exercised in any and all cases.
Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the decision of the supreme court of Spain, dated November 3, 1905. In
this case Don Berno Comas, as a result of certain business reverses and in order no to prejudice his wife, conferred upon her powers
to administer and dispose of her property. When she left him he gave her all the muniments of title, mortgage credits, notes, P10,000 in
accounts receivable, and the key to the safe in which he kept a large amount of jewels, thus depriving himself of all his possessions
and being reduced in consequence to want. Subsequently he instituted this civil action against his wife, who was then living in
opulence, for support and the revocation of the powers heretofore granted in reference to the administration and disposal of her
property. In her answer the wife claimed that the plaintiff (her husband) was not legally in a situation to claim support and that the
powers voluntarily conferred and accepted by her were bilateral and could not be canceled by the plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff the defendant wife appealed to the Audencia Territorial wherein, after due trial, judgment was rendered in her favor
dismissing the action upon the merits. The plaintiff appealed to the supreme court and that high tribunal, in affirming the judgment of
the Audencia Territorial, said:
Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code, providing that the spouses are mutually obliged to provide each other with
support, cannot but be subordinate to the other provisions of said Code which regulates the family organization and the duties of
spouses not legally separated, among which duties are those of their living together and mutually helping each other, as provided in
article 56 of the aforementioned code; and taking this for granted, the obligation of the spouse who has property to furnish support to
the one who has no property and is in need of it for subsistence, is to be understood as limited to the case where, in accordance with
law, their separation has been decreed, either temporarily or finally and this case, with respect to the husband, cannot occur until a
judgment of divorce is rendered, since, until then, if he is culpable, he is not deprived of the management of his wife's property and of
the product of the other property belonging to the conjugal partnership; and
Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond
and separate from each other of their own free will, thus establishing, contrary to the legal provision contained in said article 56 of the
Civil Code, a legal status entirely incompatible with the nature and effects of marriage in disregard of the duties inherent therein and
disturbing the unity of the family, in opposition to what the law, in conformity with good morals, has established; and.
Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and Doña Adela Galindo are not legally separated, it is their duty to live together
and afford each other help and support; and for this reason, it cannot be held that the former has need of support from his wife so that
he may live apart from her without the conjugal abode where it is his place to be, nor of her conferring power upon him to dispose even
of the fruits of her property in order therewith to pay the matrimonial expenses and, consequently, those of his own support without
need of going to his wife; wherefore the judgment appealed from, denying the petition of D. Ramon Benso for support, has not violated
the articles of the Civil Code and the doctrine invoked in the assignments of error 1 and 5 of the appeal.
From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it appears quite clearly that the spouses separated voluntarily in
accordance with an agreement previously made. At least there are strong indications to this effect, for the court says, "should the
doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each other
of their own free will." If this be the true basis upon which the supreme court of Spain rested its decision, then the doctrine therein
enunciated would not be controlling in cases where one of the spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the other or
where the husband voluntarily abandons such abode and the wife seeks to force him to furnish support. That this is true appears from
the decision of the same high tribunal, dated October 16, 1903. In this case the wife brought an action for support against her husband

2
who had willfully and voluntarily abandoned the conjugal abode without any cause whatever. The supreme court, reversing the
judgment absolving the defendant upon the ground that no action for divorce, etc., had been instituted, said:
In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don Teodoro Exposito who left the conjugal abode, although he claims, without
however proving his contention, that the person responsible for this situation was his wife, as she turned him out of the house. From
this state of affairs it results that it is the wife who is party abandoned, the husband not having prosecuted any action to keep her in his
company and he therefore finds himself, as long as he consents to the situation, under the ineluctable obligation to support his wife in
fulfillment of the natural duty sanctioned in article 56 of the Code in relation with paragraph 1 of article 143. In not so holding, the trial
court, on the mistaken ground that for the fulfillment of this duty the situation or relation of the spouses should be regulated in the
manner it indicates, has made the errors of law assigned in the first three grounds alleged, because the nature of the duty of affording
mutual support is compatible and enforcible in all situations, so long as the needy spouse does not create any illicit situation of the
court above described.lawphil.net
If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of November 3, 1905, and if the court did
hold, as contended by counsel for the defendant in the case under consideration, that neither spouse can be compelled to support the
other outside of the conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a final judgment granting the injured one a divorce or separation from the
other, still such doctrine or holding would not necessarily control in this jurisdiction for the reason that the substantive law is not in every
particular the same here as it is in Spain. As we have already stated, articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in force in the Peninsula are
not in force in the Philippine Islands. The law governing the duties and obligations of husband and wife in this country are articles 44 to
78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 .In Spain the complaining spouse has, under article 105 of the Civil Code, various causes for
divorce, such as adultery on the part of the wife in every case and on the part of the husband when public scandal or disgrace of the
wife results therefrom; personal violence actually inflicted or grave insults: violence exercised by the husband toward the wife in order
to force her to change her religion; the proposal of the husband to prostitute his wife; the attempts of the husband or wife to corrupt
their sons or to prostitute their daughters; the connivance in their corruption or prostitution; and the condemnation of a spouse to
perpetual chains or hard labor, while in this jurisdiction the only ground for a divorce is adultery. (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil
.Rep., 34, 45.) This positive and absolute doctrine was announced by this court in the case just cited after an exhaustive examination of
the entire subject. Although the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States and the judgment rendered by this court
was there reversed, the reversal did not affect in any way or weaken the doctrine in reference to adultery being the only ground for a
divorce. And since the decision was promulgated by this court in that case in December, 1903, no change or modification of the rule
has been announced. It is, therefore, the well settled and accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction.
But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce or separation, as it necessitates a
determination of the question whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for living separate from her husband; and,
consequently, if a court lacks power to decree a divorce, as in the instant case, power to grant a separate maintenance must also be
lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in the assumption that the power to grant support in a separate action is dependent upon a
power to grant a divorce. That the one is not dependent upon the other is apparent from the very nature of the marital obligations of the
spouses. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not
so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the
enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts
in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable either as
damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty
made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity
of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto
separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so
sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is
tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the
marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for judgment, heretofore filed in this case, rest.
Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.

3
G.R. No. L-11766 October 25, 1960
SOCORRO MATUBIS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ZOILO PRAXEDES, defendant-appellee.
Luis N. de Leon for appellant.
Lucio La. Margallo for appellee.
PAREDES, J.:
Alleging abandonment and concubinage, plaintiff Socorro Matubis, filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, on April 24,
1956, a complaint for legal Separation and changed of surname against her husband defendant Zoilo Praxedes.
The allegations of the complaint were denied by defendant spouse, who interposed the defense that it was plaintiff who left the
conjugal home.
During the trial, wherein the plaintiff alone introduced oral as well as documentary evidence, the following facts were established:.
Plaintiff and defendant were legally married on January 10, 1943 at Iriga, Camarines Sur. For failure to agree on how they should live
as husband and wife, the couple, on May 30, 1944, agreed to live separately from each other, which status remained unchanged until
the present. On April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement (Exhibit B), the significant portions of which are
hereunder reproduced..
. . . (a) That both of us relinquish our right over the other as legal husband and wife.
(b) That both without any interference by any of us, nor either of us can prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any other
crime or suit arising from our separation.
(c) That I, the, wife, is no longer entitled for any support from my husband or any benefits he may received thereafter, nor I the husband
is not entitled for anything from my wife.
(d) That neither of us can claim anything from the other from the time we verbally separated, that is from May 30, 1944 to the present
when we made our verbal separation into writing.
In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting with one Asuncion Rebulado and on September 1, 1955, said Asuncion gave birth to a
child who was recorded as the child of said defendant (Exh. C.).It was shown also that defendant and Asuncion deported themselves
as husband and wife and were generally reputed as such in the community.
After the trial, without the defendant adducing any evidence, the court a quo rendered judgment holding that the acts of defendant
constituted concubinage, a ground for legal separation. It however, dismissed the complaint by stating:
While this legal ground exist, the suit must be dismissed for two reasons, viz:
Under Art. 102 of the new Civil Code, an action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on
which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when the cause occurred. The plaintiff
became aware of the illegal cohabitation of her husband with Asuncion Rebulado in January, 1955. The complaint was filed on April 24,
1956. The present action was, therefore, filed out of time and for that reason action is barred.
Article 100 of the new Civil Code provides that the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has
been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. As shown in Exhibit B, the plaintiff has consented to the commission
of concubinage by her husband. Her consent is clear from the following stipulations:
(b) That both of us is free to get any mate and live with as husband and wife without any interference by any of us, nor either of us can
prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from our separation. (Exh. B).
This stipulation is an unbridled license she gave her husband to commit concubinage. Having consented to the concubinage, the
plaintiff cannot claim legal separation.
The above decision is now before us for review, plaintiff- appellant claiming that it was error for the lower court to have considered that
the period to bring the action has already elapsed and that there was consent on the part of the plaintiff to the concubinage. The
proposition, therefore, calls for the interpretation of the provisions of the law upon which the lower court based its judgment of
dismissal.
Article 102 of the new Civil Code provides:
An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of
the cause and within five years from after the date when cause occurred.
The complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by the above Article. By the very admission of plaintiff, she came to know the
ground (concubinage) for the legal separation in January, 1955. She instituted the complaint only on April 24, 1956. It is to be noted
that appellant did not even press this matter in her brief.
The very wording of the agreement Exhibit B. gives no room for interpretation other than that given by the trial judge. Counsel in his
brief submits that the agreement is divided in two parts. The first part having to do with the act of living separately which he claims to be
legal, and the second part — that which becomes a license to commit the ground for legal separation which is admittedly illegal. We do
not share appellant's view. Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are necessarily the import of paragraph 6(b) of the

4
agreement. The condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. The law (Art. 100 Civil Code), specifically provides
that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy (People
vs. Scheneckenburger, 73 Phil., 413). Plaintiff's counsel even agrees that the complaint should be dismissed. He claims however, that
the grounds for the dismissal should not be those stated in the decision of the lower court, "but on the ground that plaintiff and
defendant have already been legally separated from each other, but without the marital bond having been affected, long before the
effectivity of the new Civil Code" (appellants brief, pp. 7-8). Again, we cannot subscribed to counsel's contention, because it is contrary
to the evidence.
Conformably with the foregoing, we find that the decision appealed from is in accordance with the evidence and the law on the matter.
The same is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

5
G.R. No. 153206 October 23, 2006
ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner, vs. LUCITA G. ONG, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 59400
which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 41, Dagupan City granting the petition for legal separation
filed by herein respondent, as well as the Resolution2 of the CA dated April 26, 2002 which denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin
Church in Manila. They have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of majority.3
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code4 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41 alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation
and grossly abusive conduct.5
Lucita claimed that: soon after three years of marriage, she and William quarreled almost every day, with physical violence being
inflicted upon her; William would shout invectives at her like "putang ina mo", "gago", "tanga", and he would slap her, kick her, pull her
hair, bang her head against concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could reach with his hand; the causes of these fights were
petty things regarding their children or their business; William would also scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies
using the buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box her; on
December 9, 1995, after she protested with William’s decision to allow their eldest son Kingston to go to Bacolod, William slapped her
and said, "it is none of your business"; on December 14, 1995, she asked William to bring Kingston back from Bacolod; a violent
quarrel ensued and William hit her on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and arms; when William hit her on the stomach and she bent
down because of the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house; she then went to her
sister’s house in Binondo where she was fetched by her other siblings and brought to their parents house in Dagupan; the following
day, she went to her parent’s doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano for treatment of her injuries.6
William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife, used insulting language against her, or whipped the children
with the buckle of his belt. While he admits that he and Lucita quarreled on December 9, 1995, at their house in Jose Abad Santos
Avenue, Tondo, Manila, he claimed that he left the same, stayed in their Greenhills condominium and only went back to their Tondo
house to work in their office below. In the afternoon of December 14, 1995, their laundrywoman told him that Lucita left the house.7
On January 5, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal separation of plaintiff and defendant, with all the
legal effects attendant thereto, particularly the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties, for which purpose the
parties are hereby ordered to submit a complete inventory of said properties so that the Court can make a just and proper division,
such division to be embodied in a supplemental decision.
SO ORDERED.8
The RTC found that:
It is indubitable that plaintiff (Lucita) and defendant (William) had their frequent quarrels and misunderstanding which made both of their
lives miserable and hellish. This is even admitted by the defendant when he said that there was no day that he did not quarrel with his
wife. Defendant had regarded the plaintiff negligent in the performance of her wifely duties and had blamed her for not reporting to him
about the wrongdoings of their children. (citations omitted)
These quarrels were always punctuated by acts of physical violence, threats and intimidation by the defendant against the plaintiff and
on the children. In the process, insulting words and language were heaped upon her. The plaintiff suffered and endured the mental and
physical anguish of these marital fights until December 14, 1995 when she had reached the limits of her endurance. The more than
twenty years of her marriage could not have been put to waste by the plaintiff if the same had been lived in an atmosphere of love,
harmony and peace. Worst, their children are also suffering. As very well stated in plaintiff’s memorandum, "it would be unthinkable for
her to throw away this twenty years of relationship, abandon the comforts of her home and be separated from her children, whom she
loves, if there exists no cause, which is already beyond her endurance.9
William appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC decision. In its Decision dated October 8, 2001, the CA found that the
testimonies for Lucita were straightforward and credible and the ground for legal separation under Art. 55, par. 1 of the Family Code,
i.e., physical violence and grossly abusive conduct directed against Lucita, were adequately proven.10
As the CA explained:
The straightforward and candid testimonies of the witnesses were uncontroverted and credible. Dr. Elinzano’s testimony was able to
show that the [Lucita] suffered several injuries inflicted by [William]. It is clear that on December 14, 1995, she sustained redness in her
cheek, black eye on her left eye, fist blow on the stomach, blood clot and a blackish discoloration on both shoulders and a "bump" or
"bukol" on her head. The presence of these injuries was established by the testimonies of [Lucita] herself and her sister, Linda Lim. The
Memorandum/Medical Certificate also confirmed the evidence presented and does not deviate from the doctor’s main testimony --- that

6
[Lucita] suffered physical violence on [sic] the hands of her husband, caused by physical trauma, slapping of the cheek, boxing and fist
blows. The effect of the so-called alterations in the Memorandum/Medical Certificate questioned by [William] does not depart from the
main thrust of the testimony of the said doctor.
Also, the testimony of [Lucita] herself consistently and constantly established that [William] inflicted repeated physical violence upon her
during their marriage and that she had been subjected to grossly abusive conduct when he constantly hurled invectives at her even in
front of their customers and employees, shouting words like, "gaga", "putang ina mo," tanga," and "you don’t know anything."
These were further corroborated by several incidents narrated by Linda Lim who lived in their conjugal home from 1989 to 1991. She
saw her sister after the December 14, 1995 incident when she (Lucita) was fetched by the latter on the same date. She was a witness
to the kind of relationship her sister and [William] had during the three years she lived with them. She observed that [William] has an
"explosive temper, easily gets angry and becomes very violent." She cited several instances which proved that William Ong indeed
treated her wife shabbily and despicably, in words and deeds.
xxx
That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were brought to bear upon [Lucita] by [William] have been duly established by
[Lucita] and her witnesses. These incidents were not explained nor controverted by [William], except by making a general denial
thereof. Consequently, as between an affirmative assertion and a general denial, weight must be accorded to the affirmative assertion.
The grossly abusive conduct is also apparent in the instances testified to by [Lucita] and her sister. The injurious invectives hurled at
[Lucita] and his treatment of her, in its entirety, in front of their employees and friends, are enough to constitute grossly abusive
conduct. The aggregate behavior of [William] warrants legal separation under grossly abusive conduct. x x x11
William filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA on April 26, 2002.12
Hence the present petition where William claims that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE PETITION FOR
LEGAL SEPARATION WAS INSTITUTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF REMOVING FROM
PETITIONER THE CONTROL AND OWNERSHIP OF THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES AND TO TRANSFER THE SAME TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S FAMILY.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING CLEAR EVIDENCE REPUDIATING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT’S CLAIM OF REPEATED PHYSICAL VIOLENCE AND GROSSLY ABUSIVE CONDUCT ON THE PART OF
PETITIONER.13
William argues that: the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to wrest control and ownership of properties belonging
to the conjugal partnership; these properties, which include real properties in Hong Kong, Metro Manila, Baguio and Dagupan, were
acquired during the marriage through his (William’s) sole efforts; the only parties who will benefit from a decree of legal separation are
Lucita’s parents and siblings while such decree would condemn him as a violent and cruel person, a wife-beater and child abuser, and
will taint his reputation, especially among the Filipino-Chinese community; substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked
which warrant an exception to the general rule that factual findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal; the findings of the
trial court that he committed acts of repeated physical violence against Lucita and their children were not sufficiently established; what
took place were disagreements regarding the manner of raising and disciplining the children particularly Charleston, Lucita’s favorite
son; marriage being a social contract cannot be impaired by mere verbal disagreements and the complaining party must adduce clear
and convincing evidence to justify legal separation; the CA erred in relying on the testimonies of Lucita and her witnesses, her sister
Linda Lim, and their parent’s doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzanzo, whose testimonies are tainted with relationship and fraud; in the 20 years of
their marriage, Lucita has not complained of any cruel behavior on the part of William in relation to their marital and family life; William
expressed his willingness to receive respondent unconditionally however, it is Lucita who abandoned the conjugal dwelling on
December 14, 1995 and instituted the complaint below in order to appropriate for herself and her relatives the conjugal properties; the
Constitution provides that marriage is an inviolable social institution and shall be protected by the State, thus the rule is the
preservation of the marital union and not its infringement; only for grounds enumerated in Art. 55 of the Family Code, which grounds
should be clearly and convincingly proven, can the courts decree a legal separation among the spouses.14
Respondent Lucita in her Comment, meanwhile, asserts that: the issues raised in the present petition are factual; the findings of both
lower courts rest on strong and clear evidence borne by the records; this Court is not a trier of facts and factual findings of the RTC
when confirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal; the contention of William that Lucita filed the
case for legal separation in order to remove from William the control and ownership of their conjugal properties and to transfer the
same to Lucita’s family is absurd; Lucita will not just throw her marriage of 20 years and forego the companionship of William and her
children just to serve the interest of her family; Lucita left the conjugal home because of the repeated physical violence and grossly
abusive conduct of petitioner.15
Petitioner filed a Reply, reasserting his claims in his petition,16 as well as a Memorandum where he averred for the first time that since
respondent is guilty of abandonment, the petition for legal separation should be denied following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code.17

7
Petitioner argues that since respondent herself has given ground for legal separation by abandoning the family simply because of a
quarrel and refusing to return thereto unless the conjugal properties were placed in the administration of petitioner’s in-laws, no decree
of legal separation should be issued in her favor.18
Respondent likewise filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions.19
We resolve to deny the petition.
It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The rule finds more
stringent application where the CA upholds the findings of fact of the trial court. In such instance, this Court is generally bound to adopt
the facts as determined by the lower courts.20
The only instances when this Court reviews findings of fact are:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of
the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of
fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.21
As petitioner failed to show that the instant case falls under any of the exceptional circumstances, the general rule applies.
Indeed, this Court cannot review factual findings on appeal, especially when they are borne out by the records or are based on
substantial evidence.22 In this case, the findings of the RTC were affirmed by the CA and are adequately supported by the records.
As correctly observed by the trial court, William himself admitted that there was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife, which made
his life miserable, and he blames her for being negligent of her wifely duties and for not reporting to him the wrongdoings of their
children.23
Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous accounts of the instances when William displayed violent temper against Lucita
and their children; such as: when William threw a steel chair at Lucita;24 threw chairs at their children;25 slapped Lucita and utter
insulting words at her;26 use the buckle of the belt in whipping the children;27 pinned Lucita against the wall with his strong arms
almost strangling her, and smashed the flower vase and brick rocks and moldings leaving the bedroom in disarray;28 shouted at Lucita
and threw a directory at her, in front of Linda and the employees of their business, because he could not find a draft letter on his
table;29 got mad at Charleston for cooking steak with vetchin prompting William to smash the plate with steak and hit Charleston, then
slapped Lucita and shouted at her "putang ina mo, gago, wala kang pakialam, tarantado" when she sided with Charleston;30 and the
December 9 and December 14, 1995 incidents which forced Lucita to leave the conjugal dwelling.31
Lucita also explained that the injuries she received on December 14, 1995, were not the first. As she related before the trial court:
q. You stated on cross examination that the injuries you sustained on December 14, 1995 were the most serious?
a. Unlike before I considered December 14, 1995 the very serious because before it is only on the arm and black eye, but on this
December 14, I suffered bruises in all parts of my body, sir.32
To these, all William and his witnesses, could offer are denials and attempts to downplay the said incidents.33
As between the detailed accounts given for Lucita and the general denial for William, the Court gives more weight to those of the
former. The Court also gives a great amount of consideration to the assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses
as trial court judges enjoy the unique opportunity of observing the deportment of witnesses on the stand, a vantage point denied
appellate tribunals.34 Indeed, it is settled that the assessment of the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect
and weight having had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.35
In this case, the RTC noted that:
William’s denial and that of his witnesses of the imputation of physical violence committed by him could not be given much credence by
the Court. Since the office secretary Ofelia Rosal and the family laundrywoman Rosalino Morco are dependent upon defendant for their
livelihood, their testimonies may be tainted with bias and they could not be considered as impartial and credible witnesses. So with
Kingston Ong who lives with defendant and depends upon him for support.36
Parenthetically, William claims that that the witnesses of Lucita are not credible because of their relationship with her. We do not agree.
Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and label a witness’s testimony as biased and unworthy of credence37 and a
witness’ relationship to one of the parties does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony.38 Considering the detailed
and straightforward testimonies given by Linda Lim and Dr. Vicente Elinzano, bolstered by the credence accorded them by the trial
court, the Court finds that their testimonies are not tainted with bias.

8
William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in order for her side of the family to gain control
of the conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing to destroy his reputation by filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her
siblings could control the properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such reasoning hard to believe. What benefit would Lucita
personally gain by pushing for her parents’ and siblings’ financial interests at the expense of her marriage? What is more probable is
that there truly exists a ground for legal separation, a cause so strong, that Lucita had to seek redress from the courts. As aptly stated
by the RTC,
...it would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of relationship, abandon the comforts of her home and be separated
from her children whom she loves, if there exists no cause, which is already beyond her endurance.39
The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and label him as a wife-beater and child-abuser also
does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a smear on his reputation then it would not be because of Lucita’s
decision to seek relief from the courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be
granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have
given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more
than one year.40 As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment
contemplated by the said provision.
As a final note, we reiterate that our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution.41
The Constitution itself however does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage and the family, as it remains the
province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it and put into
operation the constitutional provisions that protect the same.42 With the enactment of the Family Code, this has been accomplished as
it defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life,
as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation.43 As Lucita has adequately proven the
presence of a ground for legal separation, the Court has no reason but to affirm the findings of the RTC and the CA, and grant her the
relief she is entitled to under the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

9
G.R. No. 166357 September 19, 2011
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner ,vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported by well-established facts. It is the plaintiff’s burden to convince the court of the
existence of these facts.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review1 of the Court of Appeals’ (CA) May 27, 2004 Decision2 and December 15, 2004 Resolution3
in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240, which reversed the trial court’s declaration of nullity of the herein parties’ marriage. The fallo of the assailed
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE¸the appeal is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE and VACATED while the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.4
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973. They maintained a relationship and
eventually married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976. They had four children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy
or Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay).
Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who gave birth to a son
in March 1983.5
In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws) and her four children with Tyrone.6 Meanwhile, Tyrone
started living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.7
In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in
a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver.8 The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the children
whenever any of them got sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on weekends.9
In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyn’s permission to go to Japan for a one-week vacation. Malyn acceded only
to learn later that Tyrone brought the children to the US.10 After just one year, Ria returned to the Philippines and chose to live with
Malyn.
Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyn’s family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical custody of the two younger children, Miggy
and Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her house on weekends because of alleged weekend
plans with their father.11
Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code.12 He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the
essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity was
manifested by her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation, as shown by Malyn’s
following acts:
1. she left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night;
2. she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day; and
3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in flagrante delicto.13
During trial,14 Tyrone narrated the circumstances of Malyn’s alleged infidelity. According to him, on June 9, 1985, he and his brother-
in-law, Ronald Fernandez (Malyn’s brother), proceeded to Hyatt Hotel and learned that Malyn was occupying a room with a certain
Benjie Guevarra (Benjie). When he proceeded to the said room, he saw Benjie and Malyn inside.15 At rebuttal, Tyrone elaborated that
Benjie was wearing only a towel around his waist, while Malyn was lying in bed in her underwear. After an exchange of words, he
agreed not to charge Malyn with adultery when the latter agreed to relinquish all her marital and parental rights.16 They put their
agreement in writing before Atty. Jose Palarca.
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to
testify on Malyn’s psychological incapacity.
Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyn’s behavior – her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong
playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends – may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).17 NPD is present when a
person is obsessed to meet her wants and needs in utter disregard of her significant others.18 Malyn’s NPD is manifest in her utter
neglect of her duties as a mother.19

10
Dr. Gates reported that Malyn’s personality disorder "may have been evident even prior to her marriage" because it is rooted in her
family background and upbringing, which the psychologist gathered to be materially deprived and without a proper maternal role
model.20
Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrone’s sister-in-law), and the son
Miggy. She also read the transcript of Tyrone’s court testimony.21
Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates’ assessment. He concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital
duties.22 He explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly
inflated Malyn’s ego to the point that her needs became priority, while her kids’ and husband’s needs became secondary. Malyn is so
self-absorbed that she is incapable of prioritizing her family’s needs.
Fr. Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with friends are not disorders by themselves. They only constitute
psychological incapacity whenever inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities to the detriment of one’s familial duties.23
Fr. Healy characterized Malyn’s psychological incapacity as grave and incurable.24
He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well as the report of Dr. Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan),
Malyn’s expert witness.25 He clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of the factual allegations regarding Malyn’s "habits"
because he believed it is the court’s duty to do so.26 Instead, he formed his opinion on the assumption that the factual allegations are
indeed true.
Malyn’s version
Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated.27 While she admitted playing mahjong, she denied playing as frequently as Tyrone
alleged. She maintained that she did so only two to three times a week and always between 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only.28 And in those
instances, she always had Tyrone’s permission and would often bring the children and their respective yayas with her.29 She
maintained that she did not neglect her duties as mother and wife.
Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985. She, however, explained that she did so only to escape her physically abusive
husband.30 On the day she left, Tyrone, who preferred to keep Malyn a housewife, was upset that Malyn was preparing to go to work.
He called up the security guards and instructed them not to let Malyn out of the house. Tyrone then placed cigarette ashes on Malyn’s
head and proceeded to lock the bedroom doors. Fearing another beating, Malyn rushed out of their bedroom and into her mother-in-
law’s room. She blurted that Tyrone would beat her up again so her mother-in-law gave her ₱300 to leave the house.31 She never
returned to their conjugal home.
Malyn explained that she applied for work, against Tyrone’s wishes, because she wanted to be self-sufficient. Her resolve came from
her discovery that Tyrone had a son by Jocelyn and had secretly gone to the US with Jocelyn.32
Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only booked a room at the Hyatt Hotel for her because she was so
drunk after partying with friends. She admitted finding her brother Ronald and Tyrone at the door of the Hyatt Hotel room, but
maintained being fully clothed at that time.33 Malyn insisted that she wrote the letter relinquishing all her spousal and parental rights
under duress.3
After the Hyatt Hotel incident, Malyn only saw her children by surreptitiously visiting them in school. She later obtained partial custody
of the children as an incident to the legal separation action filed by Tyrone against her (which action was subsequently dismissed for
lack of interest).
As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone who was suffering from psychological incapacity, as manifested by his
drug dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing, and physical violence.35 Malyn presented Dr. Dayan a clinical psychologist, as her
expert witness.
Dr. Dayan interviewed Tyrone, Malyn, Miggy/Mickey, Jay, and Ria for her psychological evaluation of the spouses. The factual
narrations culled from these interviews reveal that Tyrone found Malyn a "lousy" mother because of her mahjong habit,36 while Malyn
was fed up with Tyrone’s sexual infidelity, drug habit, and physical abuse.37 Dr. Dayan determined that both Tyrone and Malyn were
behaviorally immature. They encountered problems because of their personality differences, which ultimately led to the demise of their
marriage. Her diagnostic impressions are summarized below:
The marriage of Tyrone and Malyn was a mistake from the very beginning. Both of them were not truly ready for marriage even after
two years of living together and having a child. When Malyn first met Tyrone who showered her with gifts, flowers, and affection she
resisted his overtures. She made it clear that she could ‘take him or leave him.’ But the minute she started to care, she became a
different person – clingy and immature, doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person
in his life. She became relationship-dependent. It appears that her style then was when she begins to care for a man, she puts all her
energy into him and loses focus on herself. This imbalance between thinking and feeling was overwhelming to Tyrone who admitted
that the thought of commitment scared him. Tyrone admitted that when he was in his younger years, he was often out seeking other
women. His interest in them was not necessarily for sex, just for fun – dancing, drinking, or simply flirting.
Both of them seem behaviorally immature. For some time, Malyn adapted to her husband who was a moody man with short temper and
unresolved issues with parents and siblings. He was a distancer, concerned more about his work and friends tha[n] he was about
spending time with his family. Because of Malyn’s and Tyrone’s backgrounds (both came from families with high conflicts) they

11
experienced turmoil and chaos in their marriage. The conflicts they had struggled to avoid suddenly galloped out of control Their
individual personalities broke through, precipitating the demise of their marriage.38
Dr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation report that Malyn exhibited significant, but not severe, dependency,
narcissism, and compulsiveness.39
On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while Malyn had relationship problems with Tyrone, she appeared to have a good
relationship with her kids.40 As for Tyrone, he has commitment issues which prevent him from committing himself to his duties as a
husband. He is unable to remain faithful to Malyn and is psychologically incapacitated to perform this duty.41
Children’s version
The children all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided for their needs, and loved them. Rio testified that they would
accompany their mother to White Plains on days that she played mahjong with her friends. None of them reported being neglected or
feeling abandoned.
The two elder kids remembered the fights between their parents but it was only Ria who admitted actually witnessing physical abuse
inflicted on her mother.42 The two elder kids also recalled that, after the separation, their mother would visit them only in school.43
The children recalled living in Valle Verde with only the househelp and driver during the time that their dad was abroad.44 While they
did not live with their mother while they were housed in Valle Verde, the kids were in agreement that their mother took care of them on
weekends and would see to their needs. They had a common recollection that the househelp would call their mother to come and take
care of them in Valle Verde whenever any of them was sick.45
Other witnesses
Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrone’s attending psychiatrist at the Manila Sanitarium, testified that, for the duration of Tyrone’s confinement,
the couple appeared happy and the wife was commendable for the support she gave to her spouse.46 He likewise testified that Tyrone
tested negative for drugs and was not a drug dependent.47
Malyn’s brother, Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrone’s allegation that they found Malyn with Benjie in the Hyatt hotel room. Contrary
to Tyrone’s version, he testified that neither he nor Tyrone entered the room, but stayed in the hallway. He likewise did not recall seeing
Benjie or Malyn half-naked.48
Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who was allegedly part of Malyn’s group of friends. He stated on the stand that they would
go on nights-out as a group and Malyn would meet with a male musician-friend afterwards.49
Social worker
The trial court ordered the court social worker, Jocelyn V. Arre (Arre), to conduct a social case study on the parties as well as the minor
children. Arre interviewed the parties Tyrone and Malyn; the minor children Miggy/Mickey and Jay; Tyrone’s live-in partner, Jocelyn;50
and Tyrone and Malyn’s only daughter, Ria. While both parents are financially stable and have positive relationships with their children,
she recommended that the custody of the minor children be awarded to Malyn. Based on the interviews of family members themselves,
Malyn was shown to be more available to the children and to exercise better supervision and care. The social worker commended the
fact that even after Malyn left the conjugal home in 1985, she made efforts to visit her children clandestinely in their respective schools.
And while she was only granted weekend custody of the children, it appeared that she made efforts to personally attend to their needs
and to devote time with them.51
On the contrary, Tyrone, who had custody of the children since the couple’s de facto separation, simply left the children for several
years with only a maid and a driver to care for them while he lived with his second family abroad.52 The social worker found that
Tyrone tended to prioritize his second family to the detriment of his children with Malyn. Given this history during the formative years of
the children, the social worker did not find Tyrone a reliable parent to whom custody of adolescents may be awarded.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court53
After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated
to perform the essential marital obligations under the Family Code. The court’s Decision is encapsulated in this paragraph:
From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from psychological incapacity to perform their essential marital obligations
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties entered into a marriage without as much as understanding what it entails. They failed
to commit themselves to its essential obligations: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of their children to become responsible individuals. Parties’ psychological incapacity is grave, and serious
such that both are incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. The incapacity has been clinically established and
was found to be pervasive, grave and incurable.54
The trial court then declared the parties’ marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.55
Ruling of the Court of Appeals56

12
Malyn appealed the trial court’s Decision to the CA.1âwphi1 The CA reversed the trial court’s ruling because it is not supported by the
facts on record. Both parties’ allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a finding of psychological incapacity. The
parties’ faults tend only to picture their immaturity and irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial obligations. At most, there
may be sufficient grounds for a legal separation.57 Moreover, the psychological report submitted by petitioner’s expert witness, Dr.
Gates, does not explain how the diagnosis of NPD came to be drawn from the sources. It failed to satisfy the legal and jurisprudential
requirements for the declaration of nullity of marriage.58
Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration59 but the same was denied on December 15, 2004.60
Petitioner’s arguments
Petitioner Tyrone argues that the CA erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, which is the court that is in the best
position to appreciate the evidence. He opines that he has presented preponderant evidence to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations, to wit:
a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy, proved on the stand that respondent’s egocentric attitude, immaturity, self-obsession
and self-centeredness were manifestations of respondent’s NPD;61
b) these expert witnesses proved that respondent’s NPD is grave and incurable and prevents her from performing her essential martial
obligations;62 and
c) that respondent’s NPD existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage because it is rooted in her upbringing, family
background, and socialite lifestyle prior to her marriage.63
Petitioner stresses that even respondent insisted that their marriage is void because of psychological incapacity, albeit on petitioner’s
part.64
Respondent’s arguments
Respondent maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his burden of proving her alleged psychological incapacity.65 She argues that
the testimonies of her children and the findings of the court social worker to the effect that she was a good, loving, and attentive mother
are sufficient to rebut Tyrone’s allegation that she was negligent and irresponsible.66
She assails Dr. Gates’s report as one-sided and lacking in depth. Dr. Gates did not interview her, their common children, or even
Jocelyn. Moreover, her report failed to state that Malyn’s alleged psychological incapacity was grave and incurable.67 Fr. Healy’s
testimony, on the other hand, was based only on Tyrone’s version of the facts.68
Malyn reiterates the appellate court’s ruling that the trial court Decision is intrinsically defective for failing to support its conclusion of
psychological incapacity with factual findings.
Almost four years after filing her memorandum, respondent apparently had a change of heart and filed a Manifestation with Motion for
Leave to Withdraw Comment and Memorandum.69 She manifested that she was no longer disputing the possibility that their marriage
may really be void on the basis of Tyrone’s psychological incapacity. She then asked the Court to dispose of the case with justice.70
Her manifestation and motion were noted by the Court in its January 20, 2010 Resolution.71
Issue
Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial court’s Decision for lack of legal and factual
basis.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations.72
The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff.73 The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his
or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of
marriage, and must be incurable.74
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the
testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of
these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s
experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with
friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly

13
to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the
form of NPD.
But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually
proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a result. Respondent
admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother
and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to
three times a week and always with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children
corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when she played mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner did not present
any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he
intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The
least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these two children
were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating
frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and
obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent
partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that
respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming
arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual
infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal
separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no
basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite
conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and
performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary,
they narrated that she took care of them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent
made real efforts to see and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever
that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the
second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic shortcomings to Malyn’s actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no
error in the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there was psychological incapacity. The trial court’s Decision merely summarized
the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the
credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its
legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the best of
themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity
that voids a marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May 27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004
Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

14
G.R. No. 179620 August 26, 2008
MANUEL G. ALMELOR, petitioner, vs. THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, BRANCH 254, and LEONIDA
T. ALMELOR, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses' right to the community of their whole lives. It likewise involves a true intertwining of
personalities.1
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the petition for annulment of judgment
and affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Las Piñas, Branch 254. The CA dismissed outright the Rule 47
petition for being the wrong remedy.
The Facts
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 at the Manila
Cathedral.3 Their union bore three children: (1) Maria Paulina Corinne, born on October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon Manuel, born on
August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel Homer, born on July 4, 1994.4 Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist
and a pediatrician, respectively.5
After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their marriage on the ground that
Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. The case, docketed as LP-00-0132 was raffled off to
Branch 254.
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the San Lazaro Hospital where they worked as medical student
clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful person who got along well with other people. They soon became
sweethearts. Three years after, they got married.6
Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect
husband and father. This was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian,
unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel's unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their
frequent fights as a couple.7 Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his
mother. Manuel's deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on her decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida.8
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her suspicions were first aroused when she noticed
Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. For instance, she caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting
his affection for a male caller.9 She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession.10 Her worse fears were
confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales.11 When she confronted Manuel,
he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support
to their children.12
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida's claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified that she
conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-
to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child).13 She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated.14 Such
incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable.
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments here and there. He, however, maintained that their
marital relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for annulment filed by Leonida came as a surprise to him.
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility against him was their professional rivalry. It began when he refused to heed
the memorandum15 released by Christ the King Hospital. The memorandum ordered him to desist from converting his own lying-in
clinic to a primary or secondary hospital.16 Leonida's family owns Christ the King Hospital which is situated in the same subdivision as
Manuel's clinic and residence.17 In other words, he and her family have competing or rival hospitals in the same vicinity.
Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. He denied maltreating them. At most, he only imposed the
necessary discipline on the children.
He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was nothing wrong for him to return the love and affection of the
person who reared and looked after him and his siblings. This is especially apt now that his mother is in her twilight years.18 Manuel
pointed out that Leonida found fault in this otherwise healthy relationship because of her very jealous and possessive nature.19
This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid the company of female friends. He wanted to avoid any further
misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead conjured up stories about his sexual preference. She also fabricated tales about
pornographic materials found in his possession to cast doubt on his masculinity.20
To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus narrated that he usually stayed at Manuel's house during
his weekly trips to Manila from Iriga City. He was a witness to the generally harmonious relationship between his brother Manuel and
sister-in-law, Leonida. True, they had some quarrels typical of a husband and wife relationship. But there was nothing similar to what
Leonida described in her testimony.21

15
Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida allegedly saw Manuel kissed another man. He denied that such
an incident occurred. On that particular date,22 he and Manuel went straight home from a trip to Bicol. There was no other person with
them at that time, except their driver.23
Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's findings by presenting his own expert witness. However, no psychiatrist
was presented.
RTC Disposition
By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for annulment, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 January 1989 and all its effects under the law null and void from the
beginning;
2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same parties with forfeiture of defendant's share thereon in favor of the
same parties' children whose legal custody is awarded to plaintiff with visitorial right afforded to defendant;
3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the children; and
4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:
a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment upon its finality in the Book of Entry of Judgment and to issue an
Entry of Judgment in accordance thereto; and
b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Piñas City and Manila City to cause the registration of the said Entry of Judgment in their
respective Books of Marriages.
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. It ratiocinated:
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the allegations in the complaint and of the
evidence presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that in this case (sic) there is more than meets the eyes (sic).
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally incompatible with hetero sexual marriage. This is reason enough
that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as a special contract exclusively only between a man and a woman x x x and
thus when homosexuality has trespassed into marriage, the same law provides ample remedies to correct the situation [Article 45(3) in
relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family Code]. This is of course in recognition of the biological fact that no matter how a
man cheats himself that he is not a homosexual and forces himself to live a normal heterosexual life, there will surely come a time
when his true sexual preference as a homosexual shall prevail in haunting him and thus jeopardizing the solidity, honor, and welfare of
his own family.25
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due course. Undaunted, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment with
the CA.26
Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the lower court's jurisdiction; that it had no jurisdiction to dissolve
the absolute community of property and forfeit his conjugal share in favor of his children.
CA Disposition
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS in toto the Decision (dated
November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 254), in Las Piñas City, in Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs.27
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary remedy of petition for annulment of judgment. Said
the appellate court:
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision rendered by the lower Court. But the remedy assuming there
was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of Judgment but an ordinary appeal. An error of judgment may be reversed or corrected
only by appeal.
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is properly the subject of an ordinary appeal.
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims excess in the exercise thereof. "Excess" assuming there was
is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the exercise thereof.28
Issues
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the CA the following errors:

16
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A
PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE
ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PETITIONER'S PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE
ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.29
Our Ruling
I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice and in the Court's exercise of equity
jurisdiction.
Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.30 This is to
prevent the party from benefiting from one's neglect and mistakes. However, like most rules, it carries certain exceptions. After all, the
ultimate purpose of all rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.31
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be resorted to if the ordinary remedies are available or no longer
available through no fault of petitioner.32 However, in Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals,33 this Court clarified the proper appreciation for
technical rules of procedure, in this wise:
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and, therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid
and technical sense. The exception is that while the Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the
manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these rules have sometimes been
relaxed on equitable considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal perfected out of time
where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice
and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules governing appeals.35 It has, in the past,
refused to sacrifice justice for technicality.36
After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the indulgence of this Court to consider his petition before the CA
instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of discretion to the lower court for annulling his marriage on
account of his alleged homosexuality. This is not the first time that this Court is faced with a similar situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service
Commission,37 petitioner Delia R. Nerves elevated to the CA a Civil Service Commission (CSC) decision suspending her for six (6)
months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school teacher, is deemed to have already served her six-month suspension during the
pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is ordered reinstated without back wages. On appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia:
1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution of the Philippines and under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91) petitioner is filing the instant petition
with this Honorable Court instead of the Supreme Court.38 (Underscoring supplied)
The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy or the inappropriate mode of appeal.39 The CA opined that
"under the Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 x x x appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of CSC
is by a petition for review."40
This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially complied with the Administrative Circular. The Court stated:
That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only a minor procedural lapse, not fatal
to the appeal. x x x
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with merit. Hence, the Court of Appeals should have overlooked the
insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice to the parties concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about
procedural rules, which should be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. As it has been said, where the rigid application of the rules would
frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a particular case from
the operation of the rules.41 (Underscoring supplied)

17
Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,42 petitioner Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong remedy by filing a petition for review
on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal. In the interest of justice, this Court considered the petition, pro hac
vice, as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
This Court found that based on Tan's allegations, the trial court prima facie committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering a
judgment by default. If uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great injustice. The Court elucidated in this wise:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the Rules,
we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice.43 (Underscoring supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving due course to the present petition and treating petitioner's
CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, considering that what is at stake is the validity or non-validity of a marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,44 citing Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines, this Court reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right,
nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right
to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free
from the constraints of technicalities.45
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on the merits
to attain the ends of justice.46
Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuel's counsel that prejudiced his right to appeal. His counsel, Atty.
Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies. After the denial of her notice of appeal, she failed to move for
reconsideration or new trial at the first instance. She also erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment rather than pursue an
ordinary appeal.
These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsel's incompetence. These gravely worked to the detriment of Manuel's appeal.
True it is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Still, this Court has recognized certain exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client's
liberty and property; or (3) where the interest of justice so require.47
The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or gross negligence of petitioner's former
counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should not be made to suffer for his counsel's grave mistakes. Higher interests of
justice and equity demand that he be allowed to ventilate his case in a higher court.
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 this Court explained thus:
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the
scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. However, where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance,
negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the client's being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of
his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground. In the instant case, higher interests of justice and equity demand
that petitioners be allowed to present evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the lawyer's mistakes. This
Court will always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright incompetence of
lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their clients, of their day in court.49 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the demands of justice require it.
With more conviction should it wield such power in a case involving the sacrosanct institution of marriage. This Court is guided with the
thrust of giving a party the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of one's action.50
The client was likewise spared from counsel's negligence in Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson Commercial Buildings,
Inc.51 and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.52 Said the Court in Bengson:
But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and
chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has
the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.53
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage. Persistent in his quest, he fought back all the heavy
accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown at him.
The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no basis at all because the supporting grounds relied upon can not legally
make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code." It went further by citing Republic v. Molina:54
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood
swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or failure in the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice
to establish psychological incapacity.55

18
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the guidelines set in Molina. What Leonida attempted
to demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant among homosexual individuals.56
She wanted to prove that the perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential marital obligations.
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage between Manuel and Leonida on the ground of vitiated
consent by virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower court reasoned out:
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is smoke surely there is fire. Although vehemently denied by
defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough to establish with certainty that defendant is really a homosexual. This is the fact that
can be deduced from the totality of the marriage life scenario of herein parties.
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him even including his own close friends doubted his true sexual
preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-75, 15 December 2003). After receiving many forewarnings, plaintiff told
defendant about the rumor she heard but defendant did not do anything to prove to the whole world once and for all the truth of all his
denials. Defendant threatened to sue those people but nothing happened after that. There may have been more important matters to
attend to than to waste time and effort filing cases against and be effected by these people and so, putting more premiums on
defendant's denials, plaintiff just the same married him. Reasons upon reasons may be advanced to either exculpate or nail to the
cross defendant for his act of initially concealing his homosexuality to plaintiff, but in the end, only one thing is certain - even during his
marriage with plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about his real preference continued and even got thicker, reason why obviously defendant
failed to establish a happy and solid family; and in so failing, plaintiff and their children became his innocent and unwilling victims.
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is meticulous over even small details in the house (sic) like wrongly
folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative in knowing what clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15
December 2003); but these admissions of defendant taken in the light of evidence presented apparently showing that he had extra
fondness of his male friends (sic) to the extent that twice on separate occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February 2001) he was allegedly
seen by plaintiff kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the homosexual magazines and tapes likewise allegedly discovered underneath
his bed (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the doubt as to his real sex identity becomes stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus thereof of
defendant may be the name of the game in this case; but the simple reason of professional rivalry advanced by the defendant is
certainly not enough to justify and obscure the question why plaintiff should accuse him of such a very untoward infidelity at the
expense and humiliation of their children and family as a whole.57
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to
Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuel's sexual preference without the
corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his
marriage with Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud,58 such
as concealment of homosexuality.59 Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a
homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife.60 It is the concealment of homosexuality,
and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to
defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated
consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances61
constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its concealment.
This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the deliberations62 of the Committees on the Civil Code and Family Law, to
wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the provision on the grounds for legal separation. Dean Gupit,
however, pointed out that in Article 46, they are talking only of "concealment," while in the article on legal separation, there is actuality.
Judge Diy added that in legal separation, the ground existed after the marriage, while in Article 46, the ground existed at the time of the
marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for clarity, they add the phrase "existing at the time of the marriage" at the end of
subparagraph (4). The Committee approved the suggestion.63
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that serves as a valid ground to annul a
marriage.64 Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element
that respondent failed to prove.
In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for divorce. It indicates that questions of sexual identity strike so
deeply at one of the basic elements of marriage, which is the exclusive sexual bond between the spouses.65 In Crutcher v. Crutcher,66
the Court held:
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to the wife, and which would make the marriage relation so
revolting to her that it would become impossible for her to discharge the duties of a wife, and would defeat the whole purpose of the
relation. In the natural course of things, they would cause mental suffering to the extent of affecting her health.67

19
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines, the legal overtones are significantly different. Divorce is not
recognized in the country. Homosexuality and its alleged incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to
sever the marriage bond in our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and board.
What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union for more than eleven (11) years, which produced three (3)
children. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, she failed to discharge this onus.
The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated marital consent was found in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals.68
In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent, appellant resorted to baseless portrayals of his wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent
schemes. Said the Court:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the instant case, are generally
binding on this Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and
that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus -
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to the
appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to
his life and safety. x x x
The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to
enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a
security guard in a bank. Given the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm's way. x
xx
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child
when they were married. Appellant's excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection
during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with
the appellee. x x xx x x x
x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the
marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his
failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of these grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.69
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by solely taking into account petitioner's homosexuality per se and
not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from its existence.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family.70 The State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these
social institutions against desecration by fabricated evidence.71 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.
III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their community or conjugal property.
Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community property, provides:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five
years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition
or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
A similar provision, Article 12472 prescribes joint administration and enjoyment in a regime of conjugal partnership. In a valid marriage,
both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of the property regime, jointly.
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community property of Manuel and Leonida. In the same breath, the
trial court forfeited Manuel's share in favor of the children. Considering that the marriage is upheld valid and subsisting, the dissolution
and forfeiture of Manuel's share in the property regime is unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators of the community property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition in the trial court to
annul the marriage is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

20
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761 February 8, 2012
AIDA R. CAMPOS, ALISTAIR R. CAMPOS, and CHARMAINE R. CAMPOS, Complainants, vs.
JUDGE ELISEO M. CAMPOS, Municipal Trial Court, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Respondent.
The Case
Before the Court is a complaint for serious misconduct, immorality and dishonesty filed by Aida R. Campos, Alistair R. Campos, and
Charmaine R. Campos (complainants) against Eliseo M. Campos (respondent), former Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Bayugan, Agusan del Sur.
The Antecedent Facts
Complainant Aida and respondent were married on 9 September 1981. They had two children, complainants Alistair and Charmaine.
On 16 July 2008, respondent filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 1118, raffled before the
Regional Trial Court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Branch 7. Respondent alleged that he and Aida were both psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. For his part, respondent alleged that he is a homosexual who could not
be intimate with his wife unless he imagined he was with another man. Respondent alleged that as a result of his homosexuality, his
wife had affairs with other men which he did not bother to stop or question.
Aida denied the allegations in respondent’s petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage and alleged that respondent wanted their
marriage annulled so that he could marry another woman with whom he was having a relationship. Aida opposed the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage and filed instead a petition for legal separation.
Aida further alleged that soon after filing the petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage, respondent executed an affidavit of loss
claiming that the title covering Lot No. 4747-A, Csd-13-002130-D, a parcel of registered land evidenced by OCT No. P-28258 under the
name of Alistair, was lost in his possession. Respondent requested the Register of Deeds of the Province of Agusan del Sur to
annotate the affidavit of loss on the title. Aida alleged that at the time of respondent’s execution of the affidavit of loss, the title was in
Alistair’s possession. Aida alleged that respondent wanted the property back in the event his petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage would be granted by the court. Aida alleged that respondent claimed before the Register of Deeds that he was the real owner
of the property and it was only wrongly registered in the name of Alistair.
Respondent denied the allegations of Aida and alleged that he admitted to his children that the cause of the filing of the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage was his homosexuality and Aida’s infidelity. Respondent further alleged that his children already
abandoned him and he had to transfer to the basement of their house to avoid them. Respondent admitted executing the affidavit of
loss of the title of OCT No. P-28258 but only to protect his interest. Respondent alleged that right after the filing of the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage, he learned that Aida and Alistair wanted to use the property as a collateral for a loan.
In its 2 July 2010 Resolution, the Court referred the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Sur for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The Report of the Investigating Judge
In his report dated 16 February 2011, Executive Judge Hector B. Salise stated that respondent’s admission of homosexuality does not
make him automatically immoral. The investigating judge also found no evidence of respondent having a relationship with another
woman as claimed by Aida.
The investigating judge also found that respondent was not guilty of dishonesty. The investigating judge stated that the fact that
respondent had children with Aida was not a proof that he was not a homosexual and thus he was lying in his petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The investigating judge also stated that as far as respondent was concerned, the title to the property was lost and
that he was only trying to protect his right as the true owner of the land. The investigating judge further stated that the complainants did
not controvert respondent’s allegation that while the property was in the name of Alistair, respondent was the real owner of the
property.
However, the investigating judge found respondent guilty of misconduct in causing the registration of the land in the name of Alistair
despite the fact that Alistair was still a minor at the time of the registration. According to the investigating judge, respondent
manipulated the transaction in such a way that the title ended up with Alistair despite his lack of legal capacity to enter into the
transaction. The investigating judge noted that Aida conspired with respondent in causing the registration of the title in the name of
Alistair because at that time, there was a pending case against respondent. Respondent and Aida were afraid that if respondent lose
the case, the property would be taken from them. The investigating judge stated that the action was clearly intended to defraud a
possible judgment-obligee.
The investigating judge did not submit a recommendation and left it to the discretion of this Court to impose the proper penalty on
respondent.
In its 8 June 2011 Resolution, this Court referred the report of the investigating judge to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the OCA
In a Memorandum dated 12 October 2011, the OCA agreed with the report of the investigating judge. The OCA stated that the burden
of proving the charge of immorality rests with the complainants. Complainants failed to prove their allegation that respondent had a

21
relationship with another woman. Neither was the charge of respondent’s immorality on account of his being a homosexual proven by
complainants.
The OCA likewise found that respondent was not guilty of dishonesty. According to the OCA, respondent’s allegation of homosexuality
in his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage could only be proven in the proceeding before the trial court. Thus, the OCA cannot
rule on whether respondent is falsely claiming that he is a homosexual. As regards the affidavit of loss, the OCA noted that even Alistair
admitted that respondent is the real owner of the property although it was registered in his name. The OCA further noted that the
perjury case filed against respondent because of his execution of the affidavit of loss was dismissed because the prosecutor found that
respondent was acting in good faith to protect his right.
However, the OCA found respondent guilty of simple misconduct in allowing the title of the property to be registered in the name of then
minor Alistair. The OCA agreed with the investigating judge that respondent manipulated the transaction to avoid losing the property
should he lose in the case filed against him.
The OCA recommended the dismissal of the complaints for immorality and dishonesty. The OCA further recommended that respondent
should be held administratively liable for misconduct and should be imposed a fine equivalent to three months salary at the time of his
resignation from service on 1 July 2009.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of simple misconduct.
The Ruling of this Court
Complainants failed to present any proof of respondent’s alleged relationship with another woman, so as to justify a charge for
immorality. There was no evidence that respondent engaged in scandalous conduct that would warrant the imposition of disciplinary
action against him. We take this occasion to remind respondent, however, that the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary1
provides that, as a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by
the ordinary citizen. In particular, judges must conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.2
Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon
him. Thus, the judge must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most
searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.3
With respect to respondent’s alleged homosexuality, such issue is for the determination of the trial court wherein the petition for
declaration of nullity is pending. Thus, we also agree with the investigating judge and the OCA in absolving respondent from the charge
of dishonesty. The fact that respondent got married and had children is not proof against his claim of homosexuality. As pointed out by
the investigating judge, it is possible that respondent was only suppressing or hiding his true sexuality.
We also agree with the investigating judge and the OCA’s findings that respondent was not guilty of dishonesty as regards the
declaration of loss of title covered by OCT No. P-28258. As found by the investigating judge, the title was kept by respondent in his
drawer. When respondent could not find the title in his usual place for safekeeping, he sought the advice of the Register of Deeds who
told him to execute the affidavit of loss. In addition, while the property was registered in Alistair’s name, he did not controvert his
father’s claim that he was the real owner of the land and that his father kept the title in his possession. Thus, respondent did not appear
to have acted in bad faith or committed dishonesty in executing the affidavit of loss of the title to the property.
We agree with the investigating judge and the OCA in finding respondent guilty of simple misconduct in causing the registration of the
title over OCT No. P-28258 in his son’s name with the intention of defrauding a possible judgment-obligee.
The Court defined simple misconduct as follows:
Simple misconduct has been defined as an unacceptable behavior that transgresses the established rules of conduct for public officers.
It is an unlawful behavior. "Misconduct in office is any unlawful behavior by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office, willful in
character. It generally means wrongful, improper, unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose
although it may not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent."4
Simple misconduct is a transgression of some established rule of action, an unlawful behavior, or negligence committed by a public
officer.5 In this case, respondent knew at that time of the registration of the property that he had a pending case and that he could
possibly lose the case. In order to manipulate the situation and taking advantage of his knowledge of the law, respondent caused the
registration of the property in Alistair’s name with the intention of defrauding a possible judgment-obligee. Clearly, it was an improper
behavior which warrants a disciplinary sanction by this Court.1âwphi1
Under Section 9 in relation to Section 11(B), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, simple misconduct is a less serious offense punishable by
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one month nor more than three months or a fine of more than
₱10,000 but not exceeding ₱20,000.6 Since respondent has already tendered his resignation from the judiciary effective 1 July 2009,
his suspension is no longer possible. However, we modify the recommendation of the OCA that in lieu of suspension, a fine equivalent
to three months salary at the time of his resignation should be imposed on respondent. Pursuant to the imposable penalty in
accordance with the Rules of Court, a fine of ₱20,000 is in order.WHEREFORE, we find respondent Eliseo M. Campos GUILTY of
simple misconduct and FINE him Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000) to be deducted from whatever benefits, if any, that he is still
entitled to after his resignation from the judiciary. If there is none, respondent is ORDERED to pay directly the fine of ₱20,000

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G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias
EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellant.
D. G. Eufemio for respondent-appellee.
REYES J.B.L., J.:
Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, for review by certiorari of an order, dated 29 July 1969, of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 20387, dismissing said case for legal separation on the ground that the death
of the therein plaintiff, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the pendency of the case, abated the cause of action as well as the
action itself. The dismissal order was issued over the objection of Macario Lapuz, the heir of the deceased plaintiff (and petitioner
herein) who sought to substitute the deceased and to have the case prosecuted to final judgment.
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that
they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and
wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired properties during their
marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or
about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant
Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. library
In his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses, and,
along with several other claims involving money and other properties, counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his
marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and
customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. But before the trial could be completed
(the respondent was already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence on 9 and 18 June 1969), petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in
a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her death. virtual law library
On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" 1on two (2) grounds, namely: that the petition
for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen
abated the action for legal separation.
On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel
for Eufemio opposed the motion.
On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the case. 2In the body of the order, the court stated that the
motion to dismiss and the motion for substitution had to be resolved on the question of whether or not the plaintiff's cause of action has
survived, which the court resolved in the negative. Petitioner's moved to reconsider but the motion was denied on 15 September 1969.
After first securing an extension of time to file a petition for review of the order of dismissal issued by the juvenile and domestic
relations court, the petitioner filed the present petition on 14 October 1969. The same was given due course and answer thereto was
filed by respondent, who prayed for the affirmance of the said order. 3chanrobles virtual law library
Although the defendant below, the herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio, filed counterclaims, he did not pursue them after the court
below dismissed the case. He acquiesced in the dismissal of said counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the order that
dismissed not only the petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and void
ab initio.]
But petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (through her self-assumed substitute - for the lower court did not act on the motion for substitution)
stated the principal issue to be as follows:
When an action for legal separation is converted by the counterclaim into one for a declaration of nullity of a marriage, does the death
of a party abate the proceedings?
The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed conversion of a legal separation suit to one for declaration of nullity of a
marriage, which is without basis, for even petitioner asserted that "the respondent has acquiesced to the dismissal of his counterclaim"
(Petitioner's Brief, page 22). Not only this. The petition for legal separation and the counterclaim to declare the nullity of the self same
marriage can stand independent and separate adjudication. They are not inseparable nor was the action for legal separation converted
into one for a declaration of nullity by the counterclaim, for legal separation pre-supposes a valid marriage, while the petition for nullity
has a voidable marriage as a pre-condition]
The first real issue in this case is: Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action?
If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights? .
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute
divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the
innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their

23
reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself - actio personalis moritur cum persona.
... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue
the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during the course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3). The action is absolutely dead
(Cass., July 27, 1871, D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D. H. 1933, 332.") 4 .
Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an action for divorce is a proceeding brought for the
purpose of effecting a dissolution of that relation. The action is one of a personal nature. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the
death of one of the parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death has settled the question of separation beyond all
controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the action and of the subject-matter of the
action itself. For this reason the courts are almost unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding, before
final decree, abates the action. 1 Corpus Juris, 208; Wren v. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72; Danforth v. Danforth, 111 Ill. 236; Matter of Grandall,
196 N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578; 134 Am St. Rep. 830; 17 Ann. Cas. 874; Wilcon v. Wilson, 73 Mich, 620, 41 N.W. 817; Strickland v.
Strickland, 80 Ark. 452, 97 S. W. 659; McCurley v. McCurley, 60 Md. 185, 45 Am. Rep. 717; Begbie v. Begbie, 128 Cal. 155, 60 Pac.
667, 49 L.R.A. 141.
The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and maintenance (Johnson vs. Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412; 1 Corpus
Juris 208).
A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal
separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. On the point, Article 106 of the Civil
Code provides: .
Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed; .
(2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community of property shall be dissolved and liquidated, but the
offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, without prejudice to the
provisions of article 176;
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, unless otherwise directed by the court in the interest of
said minors, for whom said court may appoint a guardian;
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in
favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent one shall be revoked by operation of law.
From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute community of
property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, or his
disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the
offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested
exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as
assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under
Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of the deceased party.
Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time
as may be granted...
The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the actions that survive for or against administrators in Section 1,
Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No action upon a claim for the
recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or
personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to
person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be deemed fairly included in the enumeration..
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that
these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come
into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the
pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent
that such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be no further interest in continuing the same
after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article

24
144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by
the heirs of the appellant.
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code,
because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when
she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved
had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be brought during the
lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from
such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly provided in
Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations is hereby affirmed. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

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G.R. No. L-3047 May 16, 1951
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
GUADALUPE ZAPATA and DALMACIO BONDOC, defendants-appellees.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles for appellant.
Francisco M. Ramos and Moises Sevilla Ocampo for appellee Dalmacio Bondoc.
Hernandez and Laquian for appellee Guadalupe Zapata.

PADILLA, J.:
In the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife,
and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse during the period from the year 1946 14
March 1947, the date of the filing of the complaint, Dalmacio Bondoc knowing his codefendant to be a married woman (criminal case
No. 426). The defendant wife entered the plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months of arresto mayor which penalty she
served. In the same court, on 17 September 1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous acts committed by his
wife and her paramour from 15 March 1947 to 17 September 1948, the date of the filing of the second complaint (criminal case No.
735). On 21 February 1949, each of the defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint of the ground that they would be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court upheld the contention of the defendants and quashed the second
complaint. From the other sustaining the motions to quash the prosecution has appealed.
The trial court held that the adulterous acts charged in the first and second complains must be deemed one continuous offense, the
defendants in both complaints being the same and identical persons and the two sets of unlawful acts having taken place continuously
during the years 1946, 1947 and part of 1948, and that the acts or two sets of acts that gave rise to the crimes of adultery complained
of in both cases constitute one and the same offense, within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision that "No person
shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.".
Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency, as the Supreme Court of Spain has held (S. 10 December 1945); it is a instantaneous
crime which is consummated and exhausted or completed at the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual intercourse constitutes a
crime of adultery (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 569). True, two or more adulterous acts committed by the same defendants
are against the same person — the offended husband, the same status — the union of the husband and wife by their marriage, and the
same community represented by the State for its interest in maintaining and preserving such status. But this identity of the offended
party, status society does not argue against the commission of the crime of adultery as many times as there were carnal consummated,
for as long as the status remain unchanged, the nexus undissolved and unbroken, an encroachment or trespass upon that status
constitutes a crime. There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for adultery as there were
adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime.
The notion or concept of a continuous crime has its origin in the juridical fiction favorable to the law transgressors and in many a case
against the interest of society (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 521). For it to exist there would be plurality of acts performed
seperately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which
means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the
same criminal purpose or aim (Ibid. p. 520).In the instant case the last unity does not exist, because as already stated the culprits
perpetrate the crime in every sexual intercourse and they need not to another or other adulterous acts to consummate it. After the last
acts of adultery had been committed as charged in the first complaint, the defendants again committed adulterous acts not included in
the first complaint and for which the second complaint was filed. It was held by the Supreme Court of Spain that another crime of
adultery was committed, if the defendants, after their provincional release during the pendency of the case in which they were sent to
prison to serve the penalty imposed upon them(S. 28 February 1906; 76 Jur. Crim. pp. 208-210).
Another reason why a second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts not included in the first complaint does not
constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, if the second places complaint the defendants twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, the adultery committed by the male defendant charged in the second complaint, should
he be absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence that he did not know that his codefendant was a married
woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense set up by him against the first charge upon which he was acquitted would no
longer be available, because at the time of the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, he already knew that this
defendant was a married woman and he continued to have carnal knowledge of her. Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous
wife, such pardon would not exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon
was granted because the pardon refers to previous and not to subsequent adulterous acts(Viada [5th ed.] Vol. 5, p. 208; Groizard [2nd
ed.] Vol. 5, pp. 57-58).
The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is hereby reversed and set aside, and trial court directed to
proceed with the trial of the defendants in accordance with law, with costs against the appellees.
Feria, Pablo, Tuason and Jugo, JJ., concur.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon and Montemayor, JJ., concur in the result.
Paras, C.J., Mr. Justice Reyes voted for the reversal.

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