G.R. No. 221697. March 8, 2016.
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 221698-700. March 8, 2016.*
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P.
CONTRERAS and AMADO D. VALDEZ, respondents.
Election Law; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; The Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the
qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.—The issue before the COMELEC is
whether or not the CoC of petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled
_______________
* EN BANC.
2 qualification must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority
2 statute, by executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal. If a
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
“on the exclusive ground” that she made in the certificate a false material
representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the
COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications of the
candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or
undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same
cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.
Same; Disqualification of Candidates; As presently required, to disqualify a candidate
there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the
candidate sought to be disqualified “is guilty of or found by the Commission to be
suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.”—Clearly,
the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an
authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of candidate.
Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration
by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified
“is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification
provided by law or the Constitution.”
Same; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Misrepresentation; If a candidate
cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a
disqualification “provided by law or the Constitution,” neither can the certificate of
candidacy (CoC) be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false
representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative
finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary
measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found.—Insofar as the
qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one to
the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction,
for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of
properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by
candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering
from a disqualification “provided by law or the Constitution,” neither can the
certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false
representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative
finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary
measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found. The only exception
that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity
and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions
against which the falsity of representation can be determined.
Citizenship; Burden of Proof; The burden of proof was on private respondents to
show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen.—At the outset, it must be
3 Same; Same; As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.—As
VOL. 786, MARCH 8, 2016
3 in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in
Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity
and Filiation. That said, there is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has
Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of
proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The
private respondents should have shown that both of petitioner’s parents were aliens.
Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because such
status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in
this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are
Filipinos.
Same; Foundlings; Presumptions; That a person with typical Filipino features is
abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the
Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a ninety-
nine percent (99%) chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino,
would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner’s
parents are Filipinos.—Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner’s
parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church
in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight
black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face. There is a disputable presumption
that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life. All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino
features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of
the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a
99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate
more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner’s parents are
Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under
Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language
which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity
the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284 (1987),
this Court held that: The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of
the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task
in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may
also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided
mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
Same; Same; Burden of Proof; The burden is on those who wish to use the
constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the constitution really
intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board
marginalization.—The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers
“worked to create a just and humane society,” that “they were reasonable patriots and
that it would be unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent against
foundlings.” He exhorts that, given the grave implications of the argument that
foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the records of the
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions “for an express intention to deny foundlings the
status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution to
discriminate against foundlings to show that the constitution really intended to take
this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board marginalization.” We find
no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the
laws. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several
provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the “State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights,” Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to “give highest priority to
the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x” and Article
XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the “right of children to assistance,
including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.”
Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on
account of their unfortunate status.
Same; Same; Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings
are Filipinos.—Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings
are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the
adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The
most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that “[l]aws
relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are
binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad.” Adoption deals
with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee
is a Filipino.
Same; Same; Adoption; Republic Act (RA) No. 8043 entitled “An Act Establishing
the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes” (otherwise known as the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995”), RA No.
8552, entitled “An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of
Filipino Children and For Other Purposes” (otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court’s A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the “Rule on
Adoption,” all expressly refer to “Filipino children” and include found-
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5
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
lings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.—Recent legislation is more
direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled “An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-
Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes” (otherwise known as
the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995”), R.A. No. 8552, entitled “An Act
Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For
Other Purposes” (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this
Court’s A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the “Rule on Adoption,” all expressly refer to
“Filipino children” and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be
adopted. It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling
leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of
said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the
foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2
“Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.” In the
first place, “having to perform an act” means that the act must be personally done by
the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the
child but by the authorities. Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of
the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is
certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine
citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a
Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it. In this
instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling,
as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor. The Decree of Adoption
issued on 13 May 1974, which approved petitioner’s adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe
and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario
Militar, as her “foundling parents,” hence effectively affirming petitioner’s status as a
foundling.
Same; Same; Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.—Foundlings
are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an
international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. On the other hand, generally accepted principles
of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form
part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations. International customary rules are accepted as binding
as a result from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and
consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the
opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the
6 established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases where
6 been born on the territory of the State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring
it. “General principles of law recognized by civilized nations” are principles
“established by a process of reasoning” or judicial logic, based on principles which
are “basic to legal systems generally,” such as “general principles of equity, i.e., the
general principles of fairness and justice,” and the “general principle against
discrimination” which is embodied in the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the
Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111)
Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation.” These are
the same core principles which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as
embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.
Same; Same; The common thread of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is to obligate the
Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless.—The
common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to
grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of
nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the
application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least
eighteen (18) years old. The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified
by the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law. The first is
Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the
Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the
“nationality of the country of birth,” to wit: Article 14 A child whose parents are both
unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child’s parentage is
the parentage is known. A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the
country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness: Article 2 A foundling found in the
territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be
considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality
of that State.
Same; Same; Foreign Judgments; Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against
discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and
which are “basic to legal systems generally,” support the notion that the right against
enforced disappearances and the recognition of foreign judg-
7 Philippines to this generally accepted principle of international law. In particular,
VOL. 786, MARCH 8, 2016
7 foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
ments, were correctly considered as “generally accepted principles of international
law” under the incorporation clause.—Our approach in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 606
SCRA 598 (2009), and Mijares v. Ranada, 455 SCRA 397 (2005), effectively takes
into account the fact that “generally accepted principles of international law” are
based not only on international custom, but also on “general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations,” as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph
(c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against discrimination,
which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which are “basic
to legal systems generally,” support the notion that the right against enforced
disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly considered
as “generally accepted principles of international law” under the incorporation clause.
Same; Same; It is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume
foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is
found.—Petitioner’s evidence shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and
South America, and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its
citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the
sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness;
twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2
February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed
(or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances, including
the practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of
international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the
country in which the foundling is found.
Same; Same; Passports; It has been pointed that the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens.
This shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers
foundlings as Philippine citizens.—Current legislation reveals the adherence of the
R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court’s Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to
“Filipino children.” In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who
could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to
executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine
citizens. Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the
1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the
jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship
of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the
Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at
more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
Same; Same; Repatriation; Natural-born Citizens; Parreño v. Commission on Audit,
523 SCRA 390 (2007), is categorical that “if petitioner reacquires his Filipino
citizenship (under Republic Act [RA] No. 9225), he will . . . recover his natural-born
citizenship.”—R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such
in several cases. They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, 678 SCRA 267
(2012), where we described it as an “abbreviated repatriation process that restores
one’s Filipino citizenship x x x.” Also included is Parreño v. Commission on Audit,
523 SCRA 390 (2007), which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals, 500 SCRA 9 (2006),
where we said that “[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover
his natural-born citizenship. Parreño v. Commission on Audit is categorical that “if
petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will . . .
recover his natural-born citizenship.”
Same; Natural-born Citizens; Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born
citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disagree with the Congress’
determination.—The COMELEC construed the phrase “from birth” in the definition
of natural citizens as implying “that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and
remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth.” R.A. No. 9225 was obviously
passed in line with Congress’ sole prerogative to determine how citizenship may be
lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship may be
reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with
the Congress’ determination. More importantly, COMELEC’s position that natural-
born status must be continuous was already rejected in Bengson III v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545 (2001), where the phrase “from
birth” was clarified to mean at the time of birth: “A person who at the time of his
birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural­born citizen thereof.” Neither is
“repatriation” an act to “acquire or perfect” one’s citizenship. In Bengson III v. House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, this Court pointed out that there are only two
types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized,
and that there is no third category for repatriated citizens: It is apparent from the
enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two
classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a
natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate
category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire
it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born
or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode
prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz
was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire
his citizen-
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VOL. 786, MARCH 8, 2016
9
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
ship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary
qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.
Election Law; Commission on Elections; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
cannot reverse a judicial precedent.—The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial
precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And while we may always revisit a doctrine,
a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In Carpio-
Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr., 774 SCRA 431 (2015),
where we decreed reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it “should be
prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines.” This Court also said that “while the future may ultimately
uncover a doctrine’s error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law
prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people’s reliance thereupon should be
respected.”
Civil Law; Adoption; One (1) of the effects of adoption is “to sever all legal ties
between the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is
the spouse of the adopter.”—It was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments
that petitioner committed a falsehood when she put in the spaces for “born to” in her
application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents,
and this misled the BI to presume that she was a natural-born Filipino. It has been
contended that the data required were the names of her biological parents which are
precisely unknown. This position disregards one important fact — petitioner was
legally adopted. One of the effects of adoption is “to sever all legal ties between the
biological parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of
the adopter.” Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended birth
certificate “attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)” and
which certificate “shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue.” That law
also requires that “[a]ll records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the
files of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any other
agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly
confidential.” The law therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive parents
were her birth parents as that was what would be stated in her birth certificate
anyway. And given the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner
was not obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee. Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling
on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in the same case for
cancellation of CoC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous.
The whole process undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of
discretion.
Election Law; Presidential Candidates; Residence; The Constitution requires
presidential candidates to have ten (10) years residence in the Philippines
10
10
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
before the day of the elections.—The Constitution requires presidential candidates to
have ten (10) years’ residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections. Since
the forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a
resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the
requested information of “Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the day before
May 09, 2016,” she put in “10 years 11 months” which according to her pleadings in
these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for
good from the U.S. When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her
original domicile, which is the Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new
domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain
there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile. To successfully effect a change
of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose
to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the
new domicile must be actual.
Same; Same; Same; Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and her family’s actual continuous stay in the Philippines over
the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.—
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited
by the respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be
counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and
taken together leads to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon
her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting
quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment
of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband
resigning from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently
relocate to the Philippines and actually reestablished her residence here on 24 May
2005 (securing T.I.N., enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property
here, constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad,
her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to
reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family’s actual continuous stay in the
Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it
was for good.
Same; Residence; Balikbayan Program; A closer look at Republic Act (RA) No. 6768
as amended, otherwise known as the “An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program,”
shows that there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as tempo-

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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
rary visitors who must leave after one (1) year.—The COMELEC also took it against
petitioner that she had entered the Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look
at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise known as the “An Act Instituting a
Balikbayan Program,” shows that there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as
temporary visitors who must leave after one year. Included in the law is a former
Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and “comes or returns to the Philippines.”
The law institutes a balikbayan program “providing the opportunity to avail of the
necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant
members of society upon their return to the country” in line with the government’s
“reintegration program.” Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients. Given
the law’s express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him
reintegrate into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute
terms that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free period is obviously
granted him to allow him to reestablish his life and reintegrate himself into the
community before he attends to the necessary formal and legal requirements of
repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner did — she reestablished life here by
enrolling her children and buying property while awaiting the return of her husband
and then applying for repatriation shortly thereafter.
Same; Same; It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy
(CoC) which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement.—It was grave abuse
of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 CoC as a binding and conclusive
admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was
by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate’s mistake as to
period of residence made in a CoC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos
v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995), the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months
as her period of residence where the required period was a minimum of one year. We
said that “[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy
which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied
the constitution’s residency qualification requirement.” The COMELEC ought to
have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that
she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it
would have seen that the 2012 CoC and the 2015 CoC both correctly stated the
pertinent period of residency.
Same; Misrepresentation; Disqualification of Candidates; The candidate’s
misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) must not only refer to a
material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a
deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible.—The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or
even hint at an intention to hide the 2012 statement and have it
12
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this Court’s
pronouncement that: Concededly, a candidate’s disqualification to run for public
office does not necessarily constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole
ground for denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a CoC. Further, as
already discussed, the candidate’s misrepresentation in his CoC must not only refer to
a material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a
deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to
one’s qualifications to run for public office. Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on
Elections, 786 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 221697, G.R. Nos. 221698-700 March 8, 2016
No. L-25300. January 4, 1974.*
IN RE: APPLICATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP OF CHAN TECK LAO.
CHAN TECK LAO, petitioner-appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
oppositor-appellant.
Naturalization; Non-retroactivity of a judicial pronouncement that would impose an a
party proceeded against in a denaturalization proceeding a requirement not in
existence at a time that his application was heard and favorably acted on; Reasons;
Case at bar.—As Professor Freund has put it, the issue ‘involves considerations, not
only of principle, but, also, of practical administration.” In this case, the very same
consideration presents itself with equal validity. To rely on the 1964 Tan Ten Koc
ruling which, after all these years, would require that positive proof as to the paper
wherein the application was published in the place where the proceeding was had
being of general application to petitioner-appellant who, as far back as June 15, 1950,
had already been granted his citizenship by this Court, his certificate being issued two
years thereafter, would, in the language of Gan Tsitung, be far from “just, fair and
reasonable.”
Same; Same; Equal protection guarantee.—To impose an additional burden for the
first time to warrant the denaturalization of a citizen whose naturalization was
obtained after the most exacting scrutiny not only by the lower courts but by this
Tribunal, and especially so after a long lapse of time, would be clearly to subject him
to a risk that certainly the Constitution, with its pledge of equal protection, cannot
countenance.
Same; Decision of court on matter of citizenship should be given preclusive effect;
Reasons.—Recognizing the basic premise, that there must be an end to litigations,
some authorities recognize that administrative rulings or decisions should have res
judicata or preclusive effect. x x x The same observation holds true with respect to a
decision of a court on the matter of citizenship as a material matter in issue in the case
before it which is affirmed by this Court. For the “effective operation of courts in the
social and economic scheme requires that their decision have the respect of and be
observed by the parties, the general public and the courts themselves. According
insuffi-
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
2
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Chan Teck Lao vs. Republic
cient weight to prior decisions encourages disrespect and disregard of courts and their
decisions and invites litigation.’ Lim Biak Chiao vs. Republic, 55 SCRA 1, No. L-
25300 January 4, 1974
G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004.*
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX E. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE (a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004.*
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004.*
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR.,
respondents.
Election Law; Disqualification Cases; Jurisdiction; Decisions of the COMELEC on
disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 in an
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; COMELEC’s
decision on a disqualification case involving a presidential candidate could be
elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, the Supreme Court.—
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court per Rule 64 in an action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads—
“Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision
or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon
the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself.
_______________
* EN BANC.
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or
ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.” Additionally,
Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law which
power “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” It is
sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G.R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated
to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a
gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to
make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest
government post in the land.
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; The omission in the 1935 and
1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and
vice-presidential contests, has constrained the Supreme Court to declare as “not
(being) justiciable” controversies and disputes involving contests on the elections,
returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President; The statutory set-up
under Republic Act No. 1793 would now be deemed revived under the present
Section 4, paragraph 7 of the 1987 Constitution.—Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G.R.
No. 161434, and Velez, in G.R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme
Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The
Constitutional provision cited reads: “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.” The
provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the
1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and
vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,
as “not (being) justiciable” controversies or disputes involving contests on the
elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President. The
constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No.
1793, “An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try,
Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-
President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the
Same.” Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent
adoption of the parliamentary form of govern-
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ment under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No.
1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the
present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Election Contests; Quo Warranto; Words and Phrases;
Ordinary usage would characterize a “contest” in reference to a post-election
scenario; Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto
which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to
dislodge the winning candidate from office.—Ordinary usage would characterize a
“contest” in reference to a postelection scenario. Election contests consist of either an
election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have
one objective in view, i.e.,to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of
the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the “Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal” promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992,
would support this premise.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
defined by Sec. 4, par. 7, of the 1987 Constitution, does not include cases directly
brought before it questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or
vice-presidency before the elections are held; A quo warranto proceeding is generally
defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully
holds or exercises a public office.—The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction
of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
“President” or “Vice-President”, of the Philippines, and not of “candidates” for
President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being
an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises
a public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-
election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received
either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This
rule again presupposes a post-election scenario. It is fair to conclude that the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it questioning the
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections
are held.
Citizenship; Words and Phrases; Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship
was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the
“citizen” to refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the
holding of an office.—Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that
given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the “citizen” to refer
to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office.
Aristotle saw its
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significance if only to determine the constituency of the “State”, which he described
as being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a
self-sufficient existence. The concept grew to include one who would both govern
and be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could
be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one
hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other. In its ideal setting, a citizen was
active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the
general interest of society.
Same; Same; The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries,
from simply being limited to civil citizenship and then expanding to include political
citizenship, social citizenship, and an ongoing and final stage of development might
well be the internationalization of citizenship.—The concept of citizenship had
undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited,
by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual
freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice. Its meaning expanded
during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right
to participate in the exercise of political power. The 20th century saw the next stage
of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the
citizen to economic well-being and social security. The idea of citizenship has gained
expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An
ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global
village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship.
Same; Same; There was no such term as “Philippine citizens” during the Spanish
regime but “subjects of Spain” or “Spanish subjects.”—There was no such term as
“Philippine citizens” during the Spanish regime but “subjects of Spain” or “Spanish
subjects.” In church records, the natives were called ‘indios’, denoting a low regard
for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly
codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to
one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were
made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal
Decrees.
Same; Same; Treaty of Paris; Upon the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, and pending
legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the
Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects, and although they did not become
American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be “aliens”under American laws and
were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to
the protection of the United States.—The year 1898 was another turning point in
Philippine
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede
her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An
accepted principle of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while
resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on
civil laws, which would remain virtually intact. The Treaty of Paris was entered into
on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United States. Under Article IX of the
treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories
ceded to the United States would be determined by its Congress—x x x Upon the
ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the
subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects.
Although they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be
“aliens” under American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be
citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.
Same; Same; Philippine Bill of 1902; The term “citizens of the Philippine Islands”
appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as
the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the
Congress of the United States in the Philippines.—The term “citizens of the
Philippine Islands” appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also
commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive
legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines—“. . . . that all
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish
subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their
children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed end held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight.” Under the
organic act, a “citizen of the Philippines” was one who was an inhabitant of the
Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term
“inhabitant” was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who
was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers
on or before 11 April 1899.
Same; Jus Soli Principle; With respect to the status of children born in the Philippines
from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was
extant in the Philippines, weight was given to the view that the common law principle
of jus soli, otherwise known as the principle of territoriality, governed.—Controversy
arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01
July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines.
Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time,
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of
territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed those born in the
Philippine Archipelago within that period.
Same; Philippine Bill of 1902; Jones Laws (Philippine Autonomy Act); Words and
Phrases; With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of “Philippine
citizens” had for the first time crystallized; The word “Filipino” was used by William
H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made
mention of it in his slogan, “The Philippines for the Filipinos”; Under the Jones Law,
a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed a citizen of the Philippines as
of 11 April 1899 if he was (1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, (2) residing in the
Philippines on said date, and, (3) since that date, not a citizen of some other
country.—With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of “Philippine
citizens” had for the first time crystallized. The word “Filipino” was used by William
H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General inthe Philippines when he initially made
mention of it in his slogan, “The Philippines for the Filipinos.” In 1916, the Philippine
Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912—x x x Under
the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen
of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April
1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen
of some other country.
Same; Jus Sanguinis Principle; 1935 Constitution; The 1935 Constitution brought to
an end to any such link to the common law principle of jus soli by adopting, once and
for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as the basis of Filipino citizenship.—While
there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of
acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with
common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as
being the basis of Filipino citizenship.
Same; Same; 1973 and 1987 Constitutions; Seeking to correct the anomaly of women
automatically losing their Filipino citizenship and acquiring that of their foreign
husbands, resulting in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the
women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and
requiring such children to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as
equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new
Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns.—Subsection (4), Article III, of
the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provi-
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sions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino
citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory
situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino
citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino
mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking
to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of
Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the
provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns—x x x The
1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except
for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Same; Evidence; Public Documents; Birth Certificates; Marriage Certificates; Death
Certificates; Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of
Fernando Poe, Jr., constitute prima facie proof of their contents.—Being public
documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of
their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides: “Entries in
official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.” The
trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein
could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement
made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine
and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which
makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred.
Same; Parent and Child; Paternity; Filiation; Acknowledgment; Under the Civil Code
of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 8 December 1889 to 30 August
1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was
required to establish filiation or paternity.—Under the Civil Code of Spain, which
was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30
August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment
was required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial
(compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible
only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment
could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document. Complementary
to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5
thereof, that—“In case of an illegiti-
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mate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of
the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be
permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could
be identified.” In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove
voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be
signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same
useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; The 1950
Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children
into voluntary, legal or compulsory; Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which
would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs
of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment could only be brought during the
lifetime of the presumed parent.—The 1950 Civil Code categorized the
acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or
compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record
of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal
acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an
illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory
acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child had in his
favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which
would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs
of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought
during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The growing trend to
liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to
break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-
legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare
of the child; There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil
status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his
relationship to the State; Civil law has been defined as the mass of precepts which
determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among
members of a family, and those which exist among members of society for the
protection of private interests.—It should be apparent that the growing trend to
liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to
break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-
legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare
of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal
affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or
illegitimate
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civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his
relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on “citizenship” could be found in
the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the
domain of civil law; particularly—Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its
double purpose the organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has
thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations
of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and those which
exist among members of a society for the protection of private interests.”
Same; The relevance of “citizenship” or “nationality” to Civil Law is best
exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code.—The relevance of “citizenship” or
“nationality” to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating
that—“Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad”—that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the
Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil
relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code, such as on successional rights
and family relations. In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered
the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child
but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law and not his
political status.
Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; Civil law provisions point to an obvious
bias against illegitimacy; The distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy should
remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the
domain of political law—the proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of
determining a child’s citizenship should be deemed independent from and not
inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes.—Civil law provisions
point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be
traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining proprietary and
successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of
legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the
distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines
and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was
paramount. These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in
the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish
Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction,
however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly
impede or impinge on the domain of political law. The proof of filiation or paternity
for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed independent
from and not inextricably tied
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code
provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have
preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules
on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is
not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code
provisions.
Same; Same; Evidence; Acts or Declarations About Pedigree; Requisites.—Section
39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides—“Act or Declaration about pedigree.
The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable totestify, in respect to the
pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the
two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
‘pedigree’ includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates
when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It
embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.” For the
above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or
unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must
be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be
made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the
declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration.
Same; Paternity; Filiation; DNA Testing; In case proof of filiation or paternity would
be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing,
which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and
any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to.—In case proof of
filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult
to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted
to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of
Appeals,this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing—“Parentage
will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using
DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines
Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the
capability toconduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The
analysis is based on the fact that the DNA or a child/person has two (2) copies, one
copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the
alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a
novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge.
Eventually, as the ap-
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propriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA
evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to
deny progress.”
Same; Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; Where jurisprudence regarded an
illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit
of the child; Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the 1935 Constitution
states that among the citizens of the Philippines are “those whose fathers are citizens
of the Philippines.”—Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking
after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a
Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the
assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had
the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or
discriminate against him. The fact of the matter—perhaps the most significant
consideration—is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the
day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is.
Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the
citizens of the Philippines are “those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.”
There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where
there clearly are none provided.
Same; Same; Same; The 1935 Constitution confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.—In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion
has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of
whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on
whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a
Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would
have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish
rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954,
in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence
before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse
Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen
first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
288
288
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Same; Election Law; Cancellation of Certificates of Candidacy; While the totality of
the evidence may not establish conclusively that Fernando Poe, Jr. is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation
to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.—But while the totality of the evidence
may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold
that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the
Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before
the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their
position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not
only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J., Separate Opinion:
Election Law; Election Contests; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; The actions
contemplated in Sec. 4, Art. VII of the Constitution are post-election remedies,
namely, regular election contests and quo warranto.—Both the petitions of Tecson
and Velez invoke the jurisdiction of this Court as provided for in the last paragraph of
Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution, and raise the issue of the ineligibility of a
candidate for President on the ground that he is not a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. The actions contemplated in the said provision of the Constitution are
postelection remedies, namely, regular election contests and quo warranto. The
petitioner should have, instead, resorted to pre-election remedies, such as those
prescribed in Section 68 (Disqualifications), in relation to Section 72; Section 69
(Nuisance candidates); and Section 78 (Petition to deny course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy), in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code,
which are implemented in Rules 23, 24 and 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
These pre-election remedies or actions do not, however, fall within the original
jurisdiction of this Court.
Citizenship; For purposes of the citizenship of an illegitimate child whose father is a
Filipino and whose mother is an alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough for the
child to follow the citizenship of his putative father.—Petitioner Fornier never alleged
that Allan Poe was not the father of FPJ. By revolving his case around the
illegitimacy of FPJ, Fornier effectively conceded paternity or filiation as a non-issue.
For purposes of the citizenship of an illegitimate child whose father is a Filipino and
whose mother is an alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough for the child to
289
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004
289
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
follow the citizenship of his putative father, as advanced by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, one
of the amici curiae. Since paternity or filiation is in fact admitted by petitioner
Fornier, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that FPJ is
a Filipino citizen, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, which reads: Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: . .
. (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. Tecson vs. Commission on
Elections, 424 SCRA 277, G.R. No. 161434, G.R. No. 161634, G.R. No. 161824
March 3, 2004
BAR MAT. No. 914. October 1, 1999.*
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR. VICENTE D.
CHING, applicant.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; If the citizenship of a person was subject to
challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter
even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the
new Constitution.—When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the
1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed
the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child
elected Philippine citizenship. This right to elect Philippine citizenship was
recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that “(t)hose who elect
Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nine-
_______________
* EN BANC.
2
2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Application For Admission to the Philippine Bar. Vicente D. Ching
teen hundred and thirty-five” are citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this
recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which
states that “(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority” are Philippine citizens. It
should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the
election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect
on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935
Constitution.If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old
charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.
Same; Same; C.A. No. 625 prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order
to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship.—C.A. No. 625 which was enacted
pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure
that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship.
Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention “in a statement to be signed and
sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths,
and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the
aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines.”
Same; Same; The 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period
within which the election of Philippine citi-zenship should be made; The phrase
“reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made
within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority; As held in Cuenco vs.
Secretary of Justice, the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule.—The 1935
Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides
that the election should be made “upon reaching the age of majority.” The age of
majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. In the opinions of the
Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine
citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of
this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the
proper period for electing
3
VOL. 316, OCTOBER 1, 1999
3
Re: Application For Admission to the Philippine Bar. Vicente D. Ching
Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department
of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be
made within a “reasonable time” after attaining the age of majority. The phrase
“reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made
within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. However, we held in Cuenco
vs. Secretary of Justice, that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule.
Same; Same; Based on the interpretation of the phrase “upon reaching the age of
majority,” Ching’s election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the
allowable period within which to exercise the privilege.—In the present case, Ching,
having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he
complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen
(14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the
phrase “upon reaching the age of majority,” Ching’s election was clearly beyond, by
any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege.
It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by
Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a
certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official,
cannot vest in him Philip-pine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
Same; Same; One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an
inchoate right to such citizenship.—Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a
commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient.One
who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such
citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine
citizenship and, as a result, this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp. Re:
Application For Admission to the Philippine Bar. Vicente D. Ching, 316 SCRA 1,
BAR MAT. No. 914 October 1, 1999
G.R. No. 188829. June 13, 2016.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. RAUL S. GONZALEZ, in his capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Justice, HON. ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., in
his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration, HON. ARTHEL B.
CAROÑONGAN, HON. TEODORO B. DELARMENTE, HON. JOSE D.
CABOCHAN, and HON. FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, in their capacity as members of
the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, petitioners, vs. DAVONN
MAURICE C. HARP, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; In Heirs of Rodolfo Crisostomo v. Rudex
International Development Corp., 656 SCRA 205 (2011), the Supreme Court (SC)
explained that the limited period of appeal was instituted to prevent parties from
intentionally and unreasonably causing a delay in the administration of justice.— The
one-day delay in the filing of the Petition is excusable. In Heirs of Rodolfo
Crisostomo v. Rudex International Development Corp., 656 SCRA 205 (2011), the
Court explained that the limited period of appeal was instituted to prevent parties
from intentionally and unreasonably causing a delay in the administration of justice.
The dismissal of a petition is unwarranted if the element of intent to delay is clearly
absent from a case. Here, it is apparent that the delay in the filing of the Petition was
for a valid reason, i.e., respondent had to wait for the RTC Order allowing him to
withdraw his then pending Petition. It is likewise clear that he did not intend to delay
the administration of justice, as he in fact filed the appeal with the CA on the very
same day the RTC issued the awaited Order.
Department of Justice; Jurisdiction; As the agency tasked to “provide immigration
and naturalization regulatory services” and “implement the laws governing
citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens,” the Department of Justice (DOJ)
has the power to authorize the recognition of citizens of the Philippines.—As the
agency tasked to “provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services” and
“implement the laws governing citizenship and the
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
166
166
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Harp
admission and stay of aliens,” the DOJ has the power to authorize the recognition of
citizens of the Philippines. Any individual born of a Filipino parent is a citizen of the
Philippines and is entitled to be recognized as such. Recognition is accorded by the BI
and the DOJ to qualified individuals, provided the proper procedure is complied with
and the necessary documents are submitted. In this case, respondent was accorded
recognition as a citizen on 24 February 2000. On 24 October 2000, he was issued
Identification Certificate No. 018488, which confirmed his status and affirmed his
entitlement to all the rights and privileges of citizenship.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Without more, the Supreme Court
(SC) finds no reason to set aside the rule that public documents, particularly those
related to the civil register, are “prima facie evidence of the facts therein
contained.”—The evidence relied upon by the DOJ and the BI is simply not enough
to negate the probative value of the documentary evidence submitted by respondent to
prove his Philippine citizenship. Without more, the Court finds no reason to set aside
the rule that public documents, particularly those related to the civil register, are
“prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.” Hence, we rely on these
documents to declare that respondent is a citizen of the Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; Deportation; In Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa, 197
SCRA 853 (1991), the Supreme Court (SC) reiterated the doctrine that citizens may
resort to courts for protection if their right to live in peace, without molestation from
any official or authority, is disturbed in a deportation proceeding.—It is settled that
summary deportation proceedings cannot be instituted by the BI against citizens of
the Philippines. In Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 (1991), the
Court reiterated the doctrine that citizens may resort to courts for protection if their
right to live in peace, without molestation from any official or authority, is disturbed
in a deportation proceeding. Republic vs. Harp, 793 SCRA 165, G.R. No. 188829
June 13, 2016
G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999.*
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and
theCOMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
Remedial Law; Election Law; Parties; Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an
interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene;
The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, reiterated in several cases, only applies to cases in
which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one
who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner.—
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in
litigation nor an interest to protect because he is “a defeated candidate for the vice-
mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of
Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and
executory judgment.” The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time
petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had
already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty
contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to
private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that
time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent
from the race at the time he sought to intervene.
_______________
* EN BANC.
631
VOL. 307, MAY 26, 1999
631
Mercado vs. Manzano
The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,reiterated in several cases,only applies to cases in
which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one
who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the
present case, at the time petitioner filed a “Motion for Leave to File Intervention” on
May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner’s purpose
was precisely to have private respondent disqualified “from running for [an] elective
local position” under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally
instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was
competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate
for vice mayor of Makati City.
Same; Same; Same; That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the
proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from §6 of
Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987.—
Nor is petitioner’s interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a
motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been
shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice
mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from §6 of R.A. No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Lawof 1987.
Same; Same; Same; Intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification
even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.—Intervention
may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet
been no final judgment rendered.
Same; Same; Same; Failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner’s motion
for intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in
filing the instant petition for certiorari.—The failure of the COMELEC enbanc to
resolve petitioner’s motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion,
justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC
enbanc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition properly deals not
only with the denial of petitioner’s motion for intervention but also with the
substantive issues respecting private respondent’s alleged disqualification on the
ground of dual citizenship.
632
632 upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
633
Mercado vs. Manzano

Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.—
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result
of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.For instance, such a situation
may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such
a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states.
Same; Same; Instances where it is possible for certain classes of citizens of the
Philippines to possess dual citizenship.—Considering the citizenshipclause (Art. IV)
of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the
Philippines to possess dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or
mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in
the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’
country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by
the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act
or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual
allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
VOL. 307, MAY 26, 1999
633
Mercado vs. Manzano
with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence
of conflicting laws of different states. Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630, G.R.
No. 135083 May 26, 1999
G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001.*
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by
birth and (2) by naturalization; A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a
particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.—There are two ways of acquiring
citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring
citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the
naturalized citizen.

Same; Same; The phrase “dual citizenship” in Republic Act No. 7160, §40(d) and in _____________
Republic Act No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.”—In
including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional * EN BANC.
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 546
§20 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with
mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the 546
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bengzon III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-
born citizen thereof.
Same; Same; Naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens
through naturalization generally under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473.—On the
other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the
Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No.
2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that
he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to
become a Filipino citizen.
Same; Same; Modes by Which Philippine Citizenship may be Reacquired by a
Former Citizen.—Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however
reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (CA
No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by
direct act of Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.—
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
Same; Same; Same; A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a
natural-born Filipino; As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through
naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a
natural-born Filipino.—Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not
natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under
the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are
natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who
is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization
to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is
the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as
547
VOL. 357, MAY 7, 2001
547
Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the
reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law
for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go
through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce
a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be
elected as member of the House of Representatives.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; The Court’s jurisdiction over the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is merely to check “whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the
latter; There is no showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.—The HRET has
been empowered by the Constitution to be the “sole judge” of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House. The Court’s
jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check “whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the
latter. In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court’s
judgment for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of a
petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision. There is
no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case. Bengson III vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545, G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
G.R. No. 180088. January 19, 2009.*
MANUEL B. JAPZON, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAIME
S. TY, respondents.
Citizenship; Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003; Republic Act
(RA) No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-
born Filipino.—It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner
in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship
despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under
such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all
touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its
provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of
such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of
the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship
independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent
of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the
same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either
in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.
Same; Same; Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-
born Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for public office.—Residency in the
Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual
citizenship decides to run for public office. Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225
reads: SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.—Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
of the Philippines and the
_______________
* EN BANC.
332
following conditions: x x x x (2) Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by
the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Same; Same; A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth.—The term
“residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to
“dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the
place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain (animus manendi).” A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth.
It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In Coquilla v.
Commission on Elections, 385 SCRA 607 (2002), the Court already acknowledged
that for an individual to acquire American citizenship, he must establish residence in
the USA. Since Ty himself admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen,
then he must have necessarily abandoned the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines, as his domicile of origin; and transferred to the USA, as
his domicile of choice.
Same; Same; Ty’s reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile.—As has already
been previously discussed by this Court herein, Ty’s reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his
residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not
necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming
his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined
from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of
his birth.
Election Law; Residence; Animus Revertendi; The principle of animus revertendi has
been used to determine whether a candidate has an “intention to return” to the place
where he seeks to be elected.—Our decisions have applied certain tests and concepts
in resolving the issue of whether or not a candidate has complied with the residency
requirement for elective positions. The principle of animus revertendi has been used
to determine whether a candidate has an “intention to return” to the place where he
seeks to be
333
elected. Corollary to this is a determination whether there has been an “abandonment”
of his former residence which signifies an intention to depart therefrom. In Caasi v.
Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 229 (1990), this Court set aside the appealed orders of
the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent
as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that respondent’s
immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile
and residence in the Philippines. Being a green card holder, which was proof that he
was a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, and in the absence of any
waiver of his status as such before he ran for election on January 18, 1988, respondent
was held to be disqualified under §68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
Same; Same; Same; The fact that respondent made periodical journeys to his home
province in Laoag revealed that he always had animus revertendi.—In Co v. Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692 (1991), respondent Jose
Ong, Jr. was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the 2nd District of
Northern Samar. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) upheld his
election against claims that he was not a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar. In sustaining the ruling of the HRET, this Court, citing
Faypon v. Quirino, applied the concept of animus revertendi or “intent to return,”
stating that his absence from his residence in order to pursue studies or practice his
profession as a certified public accountant in Manila or his registration as a voter
other than in the place where he was elected did not constitute loss of residence. The
fact that respondent made periodical journeys to his home province in Laoag revealed
that he always had animus revertendi.
Same; Same; Same; It was held that the sudden departure from the country of
petitioner, because of the EDSA People’s Power Revolution of 1986, to go into self-
exile in the United States until favorable conditions had been established, was not
voluntary so as to constitute an abandonment of residence.—In Romualdez v. RTC,
Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408 (1993), the Court held that “domicile” and
“residence” are synonymous. The term “residence,” as used in the election law,
imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. “Domicile” denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return. In that case, petitioner Philip G. Romualdez established
his residence during the early 1980’s in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. It was held
that the sudden departure from the country of petitioner, because of the EDSA
People’s Power Revolution of 1986, to go into self-exile
334
in the United States until favorable conditions had been established, was not
voluntary so as to constitute an abandonment of residence. The Court explained that
in order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or
bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with
animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be
for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Same; Same; The Court recapitulates in Papandayan, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,
381 SCRA 133 (2002), that it is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor in
determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the residency qualification
requirement.—The Court recapitulates in Papandayan, Jr. that it is the fact of
residence that is the decisive factor in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the residency qualification requirement.
Judgments; Administrative Agencies; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); It is
axiomatic that factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the COMELEC,
which have acquired expertise in their field are binding and conclusive on the
Court.—The COMELEC, taking into consideration the very same pieces of evidence
presently before this Court, found that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections.
It is axiomatic that factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the
COMELEC, which have acquired expertise in their field are binding and conclusive
on the Court. An application for certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is
confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial
denial of due process, considering that the COMELEC is presumed to be most
competent in matters falling within its domain.
Same; Same; The findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired
expertise in the specific matters entrusted to their jurisdiction are accorded by this
Court not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial
evidence.—The findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired
expertise in the specific matters entrusted to their jurisdiction are accorded by this
Court not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence.
Only substantial, not preponderance, of evidence is necessary. Section 5, Rule 133 of
the Rules of Court provides that in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial
bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or
that
335
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.

Election Law; Residence; The Court has previously ruled that absence from residence
to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the
place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence.—There is no basis
for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May
2007 local elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To the contrary,
the Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or
practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is
elected, does not constitute loss of residence. The Court also notes, that even with his
trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months preceding
the 14 May 2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not
necessarily determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does strongly support and
is only consistent with Ty’s avowed intent in the instant case to establish
residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Same; Same; In Aquino v. COMELEC (248 SCRA 400 [1995]), the Court did not
find anything wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an
elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has
effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by
law.—Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to comply
with the one-year residency requirement, so Ty could run as a mayoralty candidate in
the 14 May 2007 elections. In Aquino v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400 (1995), the
Court did not find anything wrong in an individual changing residences so he could
run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty
that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period
required by law. As this Court already found in the present case, Ty has proven by
substantial evidence that he had established residence/domicile in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior to the 14
May 2007 local elections, in which he ran as a candidate for the Office of the Mayor
and in which he garnered the most number of votes.
Same; Same; When the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a
candidate for an elective position is weak or inclusive and it clearly
336
appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victor’s
right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected.—When the evidence
of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an elective position is
weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be
thwarted by upholding the victor’s right to the office, the will of the electorate should
be respected. For the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate,
the will of the voters. To successfully challenge Ty’s disqualification, Japzon must
clearly demonstrate that Ty’s ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional
and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the
apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very
democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so
zealously protect and promote. In this case, Japzon failed to substantiate his claim that
Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines. Japzon vs. Commission on Elections, 576 SCRA 331, G.R. No.
180088 January 19, 2009
NESTOR A. JACOT, petitioner, vs. ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship and Naturalization; Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already
naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship.—
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the
_______________
* EN BANC.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jacot vs. Dal
Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain
their Philippine citizenship: SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.—Any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Same; Same; Election Law; The law categorically requires persons seeking elective
public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired
it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the
filing of the certificate of candidacy.—The law categorically requires persons seeking
elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who
reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with
or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Same; Same; Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos,
who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or
retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3
of Republic Act No. 9225 and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the
Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship.—Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born
Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who
reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance
under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public
offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in
Philippine elections. Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the
Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an
undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with under Section
3 thereof (oath of
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Jacot vs. Dal
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of
the Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No.
4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act
No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur
Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance
is different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Same; Election Law; To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must
only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.—There is little doubt,
therefore, that the intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or
retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their
foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify
as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship,
namely, Philippine citizenship.
Appeals; As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised
in the proceedings below.—As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal
unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or
quasi-judicial body need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be
raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due
process impel this rule. Courts have neither the time nor the resources to
accommodate parties who chose to go to trial haphazardly.
Same; Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; The piecemeal presentation of
evidence is not in accord with orderly justice.—Section 1 of Rule 43 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that “In the absence of any applicable
provisions of these Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the
Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in suppletory character and effect.”
Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court categorically enjoins the
admission of evidence not formally presented: SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.—The
court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose
for which the evidence is offered must
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Jacot vs. Dal
be specified. Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC,
respondent had no opportunity to examine and controvert it. To admit this document
would be contrary to due process. Additionally, the piecemeal presentation of
evidence is not in accord with orderly justice.
Attorneys; Pleadings and Practice; The only exceptions to the general rule—that a
client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel—which this court finds acceptable are
when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of
law, or when the application of the rule results in the outright deprivation of one’s
property through a technicality.—It is a well-settled rule that a client is bound by his
counsel’s conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the case, and the client
cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had his lawyer
proceeded differently. The only exceptions to the general rule—that a client is bound
by the mistakes of his counsel—which this Court finds acceptable are when the
reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or
when the application of the rule results in the outright deprivation of one’s property
through a technicality. These exceptions are not attendant in this case.
Same; Same; Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency,
relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence, the proper defense or the burden of
proof, failure to introduce evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue the case—
unless they prejudice the client and prevent him from properly presenting his case—
do not constitute gross incompetence or negligence, such that clients may no longer
be bound by the acts of their counsel.—The Court cannot sustain petitioner’s
averment that his counsel was grossly negligent in deciding against the presentation
of the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness; the sufficiency, relevancy or
irrelevancy of certain evidence; the proper defense or the burden of proof, failure to
introduce evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue the case—unless they
prejudice the client and prevent him from properly presenting his case—do not
constitute gross incompetence or negligence, such that clients may no longer be
bound by the acts of their counsel.
Same; Same; The wrongful insistence of the lawyer in filing a demurrer to evidence
had totally deprived De Guzman of any chance
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Jacot vs. Dal
to present documentary evidence in his defense.—Petitioner cites De Guzman v.
Sandiganbayan, 256 SCRA 171 (1996), where therein petitioner De Guzman was
unable to present a piece of evidence because his lawyer proceeded to file a demurrer
to evidence, despite the Sandiganbayan’s denial of his prior leave to do so. The
wrongful insistence of the lawyer in filing a demurrer to evidence had totally deprived
De Guzman of any chance to present documentary evidence in his defense. This was
certainly not the case in the Petition at bar.
Same; Same; A case lost due to an untenable legal position does not justify a
deviation from the rule that clients are bound by the acts and mistakes of their
counsel.—Petitioner was in no way deprived of due process. His counsel actively
defended his suit by attending the hearings, filing the pleadings, and presenting
evidence on petitioner’s behalf. Moreover, petitioner’s cause was not defeated by a
mere technicality, but because of a mistaken reliance on a doctrine which is not
applicable to his case. A case lost due to an untenable legal position does not justify a
deviation from the rule that clients are bound by the acts and mistakes of their
counsel.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; The rules on citizenship qualifications of a
candidate must be strictly applied.—Petitioner also makes much of the fact that he
received the highest number of votes for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman
during the 2007 local elections. The fact that a candidate, who must comply with the
election requirements applicable to dual citizens and failed to do so, received the
highest number of votes for an elective position does not dispense with, or amount to
a waiver of, such requirement. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed that the
candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate must be
strictly applied. If a person seeks to serve the Republic of the Philippines, he must
owe his loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to
any other state. The application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity. Jacot vs. Dal, 572 SCRA 295, G.R. No.
179848 November 27, 2008
G.R. No. 199113. March 18, 2015.*
RENATO M. DAVID, petitioner, vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Citizenship; Dual Citizenship; Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003;
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003,” was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (PGMA)on August 29, 2003.—R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the
“Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,” was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law
read: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared the policy of the State that
all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. SEC. 3.
Retention of Philippine Citizenship.—Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the fol-
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
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VOL. 753, MARCH 18, 2015
527
David vs. Agbay
lowing oath of allegiance to the Republic: “I ___________, solemnly swear (or
affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.” Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after
the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Same; Same; Same; In the case of those who became foreign citizens after Republic
Act (RA) No. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having
acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new
law.—In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be
deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA
63, under which naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by which
Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by
doing away with the provision in the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship
from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries and
allowing dual citizenship, and also provides for the procedure for reacquiring and
retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after
R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired
foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.
Criminal Law; Falsification of Documents; Falsification of documents under
paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
refers to falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did
not take advantage of his official position, of public, private, or commercial
documents.—Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to
Article 171 of the RPC refers to falsification by a private individual, or a public
officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position, of public,
private, or commercial documents. The elements of falsification of documents under
paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender is a private indi-
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David vs. Agbay
vidual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official
position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article
171 of the RPC; and (3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or
commercial document. David vs. Agbay, 753 SCRA 526, G.R. No. 199113 March 18,
2015
G.R. No. 207264. October 22, 2013.*
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, respondents.
Election Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); In Special Actions and
Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission En Banc shall become final
and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the
Supreme Court.―The COMELEC Rules indicate the manner by which the
impediment to proclamation may be removed. Rule 18, Section 13 (b) provides: “(b)
In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission En
Banc shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation
unless restrained by the Supreme
_______________
* EN BANC.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
Court.” Within that five (5) days, petitioner had the opportunity to go to the Supreme
Court for a restraining order that will remove the immediate effect of the En Banc
cancellation of her certificate of candidacy. Within the five (5) days the Supreme
Court may remove the barrier to, and thus allow, the proclamation of petitioner. That
did not happen. Petitioner did not move to have it happen. It is error to argue that the
five days should pass before the petitioner is barred from being proclaimed. Petitioner
lost in the COMELEC as respondent. Her certificate of candidacy has been ordered
cancelled. She could not be proclaimed because there was a final finding against her
by the COMELEC. She needed a restraining order from the Supreme Court to avoid
the final finding. After the five days when the decision adverse to her became
executory, the need for Supreme Court intervention became even more imperative.
She would have to base her recourse on the position that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in cancelling her certificate of candidacy and that a
restraining order, which would allow her proclamation, will have to be based on
irreparable injury and demonstrated possibility of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the COMELEC. In this case, before and after the 18 May 2013 proclamation,
there was not even an attempt at the legal remedy, clearly available to her, to permit
her proclamation. What petitioner did was to “take the law into her hands” and secure
a proclamation in complete disregard of the COMELEC En Banc decision that was
final on 14 May 2013 and final and executory five days thereafter.
Same; Electoral Tribunals; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET);
That the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the
House of Representatives is a written constitutional provision.―Petitioner is in error
when she posits that at present it is the HRET which has exclusive jurisdiction over
her qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives. That the HRET is the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives is a written constitutional provision. It is,
however unavailable to petitioner because she is NOT a Member of the House at
present. The COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as the rightful winner in the
election for such membership. Indeed, the action for cancellation of petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is the indispensable determinant of the
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199
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
right of petitioner to proclamation, was correctly lodged in the COMELEC, was
completely and fully litigated in the COMELEC and was finally decided by the
COMELEC. On and after 14 May 2013, there was nothing left for the COMELEC to
do to decide the case. The decision sealed the proceedings in the COMELEC
regarding petitioner’s ineligibility as a candidate for Representative of Marinduque.
The decision erected the bar to petitioner’s proclamation. The bar remained when no
restraining order was obtained by petitioner from the Supreme Court within five days
from 14 May 2013.
Same; Certificates of Candidacy; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; The
special action before the COMELEC which was a Petition to Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy was a summary proceeding or one “heard summarily.”―The special
action before the COMELEC which was a Petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
was a SUMMARY PROCEEDING or one “heard summarily.” The nature of the
proceedings is best indicated by the COMELEC Rule on Special Actions, Rule 23,
Section 4 of which states that the Commission may designate any of its officials who
are members of the Philippine Bar to hear the case and to receive evidence.
COMELEC Rule 17 further provides in Section 3 that when the proceedings are
authorized to be summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may, after due
notice, be required to submit their position paper together with affidavits, counter-
affidavits and other documentary evidence; x x x and that “[t]his provision shall
likewise apply to cases where the hearing and reception of evidence are delegated by
the Commission or the Division to any of its officials x x x.”
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Words and Phrases; The special and
civil action of Certiorari is defined in the Rules of Court thus: When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board
or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.―The
special and civil action of Certiorari is defined in the Rules of Court thus: When any
tribunal, board or officer exercising
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Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
judicial or quasi--judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. The accepted
definition of grave abuse of discretion is: a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.
Election Law; Certificates of Candidacy; Commission on Elections (COMELEC);
The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, and its due
course or its cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions that determines who can
be legally proclaimed.―It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the
COMELEC and the HRET insofar as the petitioner’s being a Representative of
Marinduque is concerned. The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner’s certificate
of candidacy, and its due course or its cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions
that determines who can be legally proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme
Court but not as a continuation of the proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in
fact ended, but on an original action before the Court grounded on more than mere
error of judgment but on error of jurisdiction for grave abuse of discretion. At and
after the COMELEC En Banc decision, there is no longer any certificate cancellation
matter than can go to the HRET.
Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) jurisdiction over the qualification of the
Member of the House of Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such,
proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just
stated has been terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular, not summary,
proceeding.―The HRET’s constitutional authority opens, over the qualification of its
MEMBER, who becomes so only upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the
first and unavoidable step towards such membership. The HRET jurisdiction over the
qualification of
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Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
the Member of the House of Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such,
proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just
stated has been terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular, not summary,
proceeding. It will determine who should be the Member of the House. It must be
made clear though, at the risk of repetitiveness, that no hiatus occurs in the
representation of Marinduque in the House because there is such a representative who
shall sit as the HRET proceedings are had till termination. Such representative is the
duly proclaimed winner resulting from the terminated case of cancellation of
certificate of candidacy of petitioner. The petitioner is not, cannot, be that
representative. And this, all in all, is the crux of the dispute between the parties: who
shall sit in the House in representation of Marinduque, while there is yet no HRET
decision on the qualifications of the Member.
Remedial Law; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance
of the parties, but continues until the case is terminated.―The motion to withdraw
petition filed AFTER the Court has acted thereon, is noted. It may well be in order to
remind petitioner that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the
parties, but continues until the case is terminated. When petitioner filed her Petition
for Certiorari, jurisdiction vested in the Court and, in fact, the Court exercised such
jurisdiction when it acted on the petition. Such jurisdiction cannot be lost by the
unilateral withdrawal of the petition by petitioner. More importantly, the Resolution
dated 25 June 2013, being a valid court issuance, undoubtedly has legal
consequences. Petitioner cannot, by the mere expediency of withdrawing the petition,
negative and nullify the Court’s Resolution and its legal effects. At this point, we
counsel petitioner against trifling with court processes. Having sought the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, petitioner cannot withdraw her petition to erase the ruling
adverse to her interests. Obviously, she cannot, as she designed below, subject to her
predilections the supremacy of the law.
Sereno, CJ., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Election Law; Electoral Tribunals; Jurisdiction; View that the 1987 Constitution
transferred the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to the electoral tribunals of the Senate
and the House of Representatives
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Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
to “be the sole judge[s] of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members,” but the constitutional language has not
changed.―The 1987 Constitution transferred the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to the
electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives to “be the sole
judge[s] of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members,’’ but the constitutional language has not changed. The
jurisdiction granted was similar to that of the COMELEC under the 1973
Constitution, which the Court interpreted to mean “full authority to hear and decide
these cases from beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including those
arising before the proclamation of the winners.” When the same language was
adopted in the 1987 Constitution, it must be interpreted in the same way. Thus,
petitions to deny due course or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of those aspiring
to be members of the Senate or the House of Representatives under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code should be under the jurisdiction of the electoral tribunals and
not of the COMELEC.
Same; Due Process; View that the right of petitioner to due process was never
violated, as she was given every opportunity to present her side during the reception
of evidence at the Division level.―The right of petitioner to due process was never
violated, as she was given every opportunity to present her side during the reception
of evidence at the Division level. She was furnished a copy of the Manifestation with
Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and Amended List of Exhibits. She had
all the right to interpose her objections to the documentary evidence offered against
her, but she failed to exercise that right. The COMELEC First Division, therefore, did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it admitted in evidence the documents
offered, even if the printed Internet article showing that petitioner had used a U.S.
passport might have been hearsay, and even if the copy of the Bureau of Immigration
Certification was merely a photocopy and not even a certified true copy of the
original.
Same; View that Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides
for the suppletory application of the Rules of Court. The third paragraph of Section
36, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides that “an offer of evidence in
writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a
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different period is allowed by the court.”―Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure provides for the suppletory application of the Rules of Court. The
third paragraph of Section 36, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides
that “an offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after
notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court.” Petitioner failed
to raise any objection to the offer of evidence on time. It is now too late for her to
question its admissibility. The rule is that evidence not objected to may be deemed
admitted and validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. As a
corollary point, the COMELEC En Banc committed no grave abuse of discretion
when it did not set petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for hearing. Setting a case
for hearing is discretionary on its part. In fact, in summary proceedings like the
special action of filing a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy, oral testimony is dispensed with and, instead, parties are required to
submit their position paper together with affidavits, counter affidavits and other
pieces of documentary evidence.
Same; The COMELEC was correct in ruling that she was no longer a Filipino citizen
when she filed her Certificate of Candidacy and that without complying with the
requirements of R.A. 9225, she was not qualified to run for public office.―This
submission of the Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship and the
Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration confirms the
acquisition of foreign citizenship by petitioner and the applicability of R.A. 9225 to
her. Thus, the COMELEC was correct in ruling that she was no longer a Filipino
citizen when she filed her Certificate of Candidacy and that without complying with
the requirements of R.A. 9225, she was not qualified to run for public office. Since
these two documents were not submitted to the COMELEC, there can be no grave
abuse of discretion either on the part of the COMELEC First Division when it
cancelled her Certificate of Candidacy, or on the part of the COMELEC En Banc
when it affirmed the cancellation.
Same; View that the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC), a subordinate body
under the direct control and supervision of the COMELEC, cannot simply disregard a
COMELEC En Banc Resolutionbrought before its attention and hastily proceed with
the proclamation by reasoning that it has not officially received the resolution
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or order.―On 16 May 2013, petitioner had already received the judgment cancelling
her Certificate of Candidacy. As mentioned, two days thereafter, the PBOC still
proclaimed her as the winner. Obviously, the proclamation took place
notwithstanding that petitioner herself already knew of the COMELEC En Banc
Resolution. It must also be pointed out that even the PBOC already knew of the
cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner when it proclaimed her. The
COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 9 July 2013 and submitted to this Court
through the Manifestation of private respondent, quoted the averments in the Verified
Petition of petitioner therein as follows: xxx While the proceedings of the PBOC is
suspended or in recess, the process server of this Honorable Commission, who
identified himself as PEDRO P. STA. ROSA II (“Sta. Rosa,” for brevity), arrived at
the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque where the provincial
canvassing is being held. xxx The process server, Sta. Rosa, was in possession of
certified true copies of the Resolution promulgated by the Commission on Elections
En Banc on 14 May 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) entitled “Joseph Socorro B. Tan
vs. Atty. Regina Ongsiako Reyes” and an Order dated 15 May 2013 to deliver the
same to the Provincial Election Supervisor of Marinduque. The said Order was signed
by no less than the Chairman of the Commission on Elections, the Honorable Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr. xxx Process Server Pedro Sta. Rosa II immediately approached Atty.
Edwin Villa, the Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) of Marinduque, upon his
arrival to serve a copy of the aforementioned Resolution dated 14 May 2013 in SPA
No. 13-05 3 (DC). Despite his proper identification that he is a process server from
the COMELEC Main Office, the PES totally ignored Process Server Pedro Sta. Rosa
II. xxx Interestingly, the PES likewise refused to receive the copy of the Commission
on Elections En Banc Resolution dated 14 May 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) despite
several attempts to do so. xxx Instead, the PES immediately declared the resumption
of the proceedings of the PBOC and instructed the Board Secretary to immediately
read its Order proclaiming Regina Ongsiako Reyes as winner for the position of
Congressman for the Lone District of Marinduque. This narration of the events shows
that the proclamation was in contravention of a COMELEC En Banc Resolution
cancelling the candidate’s Certificate of Candidacy. The PBOC, a subordinate body
under the direct control and supervision of the COMELEC, cannot simply disregard a
COMELEC En Banc Resolution brought before its attention and hastily proceed with
the
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proclamation by reasoning that it has not officially received the resolution or order.
Same; View that the law provides for the suspension of a proclamation whenever
there are pending disqualification cases or petitions to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy, and the evidence of guilt is strong.―The law provides for the
suspension of a proclamation whenever there are pending disqualification cases or
petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, and the evidence
of guilt is strong. This provision points to the legislative intent to be cautious in
proceeding with the proclamation of candidates against whom pending
disqualification cases or petitions for cancellation of certificate of candidacy are filed.
When the petition for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy is no longer pending
as when the COMELEC En Banc had, in fact, affirmed the cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy, the need for the suspension of the proclamation becomes
more apparent.
Same; Prejudicial Questions; View that applying the elements of a prejudicial
question to Secs. 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 on the pendency of disqualification cases or of
petitions filed under Sec. 78 call for the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate
when the evidence of guilt or the likelihood of the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy is strong.―The elements of a prejudicial question in criminal actions as set
forth in Sec. 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as follows: (a) The
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to that
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action. (b) The resolution of this issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Applying the elements of
a prejudicial question to Secs. 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 on the pendency of
disqualification cases or of petitions filed under Sec. 78 call for the suspension of the
proclamation of a candidate when the evidence of guilt or the likelihood of the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy is strong. The main issue in the
disqualification case or the Petition to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy is directly
related to and, is, in fact, the crucial element that must be decided before a
proclamation can be had.
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CarpiO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); Jurisdiction;
View that the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that proclamation alone of a
winning congressional candidate following the elections divests COMELEC of its
jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
proclaimed representative in favor of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET).―We have consistently ruled that proclamation alone of a winning
congressional candidate following the elections divests COMELEC of its jurisdiction
over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed
representative in favor of the HRET. Proclamation alone of a winning congressional
candidate is sufficient, and is the only essential act to vest jurisdiction upon the
HRET. Taking of the oath and assumption of office are merely descriptive of what
necessarily comes after proclamation. In Jalosjos v. COMELEC, 674 SCRA 530
(2012), the most recent decision on the matter, the ponente Justice Roberto A. Abad
wrote: The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a
congressional candidate following the election divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction
over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed
Representatives in favor of the HRET.
Same; Same; Same; View that upon proclamation, jurisdiction over any election
contest against the proclaimed candidate is vested in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) by operation of the Constitution.―Upon proclamation,
jurisdiction over any election contest against the proclaimed candidate is vested in the
HRET by operation of the Constitution. Any challenge to the validity of the
proclamation falls under the HRET’s jurisdiction as “sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications” of House Members. To hold that
the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a challenge to the validity of a
proclamation is to hold that while jurisdiction vests in the HRET upon proclamation,
the HRET loses such jurisdiction if a challenge is filed assailing the validity of the
proclamation. If so, a party then exercises the power to terminate HRET’s jurisdiction
that is vested by the Constitution. This is an absurdity. It may also happen that one
losing candidate may assail the validity of the proclamation before the Supreme
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Court while another losing candidate will file an election protest before the HRET
within 15 days from the proclamation. In such a situation, there will be a direct clash
of jurisdiction between the Supreme Court and the HRET. The case in the Supreme
Court can remain pending even after the House Members have assumed their office,
making the anomaly even more absurd.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court’s ruling today is a double flip-flop:
(1) it reverses the well-settled doctrine that upon proclamation of a winning
congressional candidate, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
acquires sole jurisdiction over any contest relating to the “election, returns and
qualifications” of House Members; and (2) it also reverses the well-settled doctrine
that any question on the validity of such proclamation falls under the sole jurisdiction
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).―The Court’s ruling
today is a double flip-flop: (1) it reverses the well-settled doctrine that upon
proclamation of a winning congressional candidate, the HRET acquires sole
jurisdiction over any contest relating to the “election, returns and qualifications” of
House Members; and (2) it also reverses the well-settled doctrine that any question on
the validity of such proclamation falls under the sole jurisdiction of the HRET.
Brion, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Remedial Law; Courts; Jurisdiction; Rule on Adherence of Jurisdiction; View that the
rule on adherence of jurisdiction states that once the jurisdiction of a court attaches,
the court cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a
character that would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance;
the court retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.―The rule on
adherence of jurisdiction applies to the present case. This rule states that once the
jurisdiction of a court attaches, the court cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings
or events, although of a character that would have prevented jurisdiction from
attaching in the first instance; the court retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of
the case. If at all possible, the withdrawal should be for a meritorious and justifiable
reason, and subject to the approval of the Court.
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Same; Civil Procedure; Dismissal of Actions; View that Rule 17 of the Rules of Court
on the dismissal of actions at the instance of the plaintiff embodies this spirit and can
be applied by analogy. Under this Rule, dismissal by notice of the plaintiff can only
be before service of the defendant’s answer or before service of a motion for
summary judgment. On the other hand, dismissal of a complaint by motion of the
plaintiff can only be upon approval by the court and upon such terms and conditions
that the court shall deem to be proper.―Reyes’ unilateral withdrawal of her petition
after the Court had acted on the petition, in my view, was not done in the exercise of
any right of withdrawal that Reyes can demand from this Court. While no express
rule exists under the Rules of Court on the withdrawal of an original petition before
the Supreme Court, this is the only conclusion that can be made, consistent with the
spirit that pervades the Rules of Court. Rule 17 of the Rules of Court on the dismissal
of actions at the instance of the plaintiff embodies this spirit and can be applied by
analogy. Under this Rule, dismissal by notice of the plaintiff can only be before
service of the defendant’s answer or before service of a motion for summary
judgment. On the other hand, dismissal of a complaint by motion of the plaintiff can
only be upon approval by the court and upon such terms and conditions that the court
shall deem to be proper.
Election Law; Evidence; Blog Article; Due Process; View that even without the use
of technical rules of evidence, common sense and the minimum sense of fairness, to
my mind, dictate that a blog article published online or unidentified documents cannot
simply be taken to be evidence of the truth of what they say, nor can photocopies of
documents not shown to be genuine can be taken as proof of the “truth” on their
faces.―Even without the use of technical rules of evidence, common sense and the
minimum sense of fairness, to my mind, dictate that a blog article published online or
unidentified documents cannot simply be taken to be evidence of the truth of what
they say, nor can photocopies of documents not shown to be genuine can be taken as
proof of the “truth” on their faces. By accepting these materials as statements of the
“truth,” the COMELEC clearly violated Reyes’ right to both procedural and
substantive due process.
Same; Disqualification of Candidates; Renunciation of Citizenship; View that as
applied to Reyes, her possession and use of a U.S. passport, by themselves, did not
signify that she is no longer a natu-
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Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
ral born Filipino citizen or that she had renounced her Philippine citizenship.―An
admission of dual citizenship, without more, is not a sufficient basis for a CoC
cancellation, as this Court has already held in its settled rulings. While Reyes might
have admitted in her motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC that she had
been married to an American citizen, the admission did not mean that she had already
lost her Philippine citizenship in the absence of any showing that, by her act or
omission, she is deemed under the law to have renounced it. Section 4, Article 4 of
the Constitution is very clear on this point — “Citizens of the Philippines who marry
aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed,
under the law, to have renounced it.” As applied to Reyes, her possession and use of a
U.S. passport, by themselves, did not signify that she is no longer a natural born
Filipino citizen or that she had renounced her Philippine citizenship.
Same; Due Process; View that where the denial of the fundamental right to due
process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right should be declared
void for lack of jurisdiction.―I submit that the violation of Reyes’ right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue that cannot be glossed over or disregarded
at will, and cannot be saved by the claim that she had been accorded her hearing
rights. The latter relates purely to the actual hearing process and is rendered
meaningless where there is failure at the more substantive deliberation stage. Where
the denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right should be declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The rule is
equally true for quasi--judicial bodies (such as the COMELEC), for the constitutional
guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative)
where the violation occurs. Consequently, the assailed March 27, 2013 and May 14,
2013 COMELEC resolutions cancelling Reyes’ CoC should be declared void for
having been rendered in violation of her right to due process.
Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Jurisdiction; Pre-Proclamation
Controversies; View that by law, it is the COMELEC that has the original and
exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies, including the annulment
of proclama-
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Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
tions for positions other than the President, the Vice President, and the Members of
the two Houses of Congress which all have their specific constitutional rules on the
resolution of their elections, returns and qualifications.―I submit that the Court
cannot rule on the issue of the validity or invalidity of Reyes’ proclamation as this is
NOT an issue raised in the present petition before this Court, nor an issue in the
COMELEC proceedings that is now under review. Proclamation is a separate
COMELEC action that came after and separately from the CoC cancellation ruling.
As a cautionary note, any ruling by the Court on the validity or invalidity of Reyes’
proclamation is beyond the Court’s jurisdiction at the present time since the Court
does not have original jurisdiction over annulment of proclamations and no petition is
before this Court seeking to impugn or sustain Reyes’ proclamation. By law, it is the
COMELEC that has the original and exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation
controversies, including the annulment of proclamations for positions other than the
President, the Vice President, and the Members of the two Houses of Congress which
all have their specific constitutional rules on the resolution of their elections, returns
and qualifications.
Same; Same; Same; Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals (HRET);
View that prevailing jurisprudence dictates that upon proclamation of the winning
candidate and despite the allegation of the invalidity of the proclamation, the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) acquires jurisdiction to hear the
election contest involving the election, returns and qualifications of a member of the
House of Representatives.―With the fact of Reyes’ proclamation established or
undisputed, the HRET alone — to the exclusion of any other tribunal — has
jurisdiction over Reyes’ qualifications, including the matter of the validity or
invalidity of her proclamation. Prevailing jurisprudence dictates that upon
proclamation of the winning candidate and despite the allegation of the invalidity of
the proclamation, the HRET acquires jurisdiction to hear the election contest
involving the election, returns and qualifications of a member of the House of
Representatives.
Same; Due Process; View that elementary fairness demands that if bad faith would be
imputed, the ponencia should have viewed the Marinduque election dispute in its
entirety, starting from the fact
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that Reyes handily won over her opponent and that the only claim to negate this
victory is the cancellation of her Certificate of Candidacy through extremely
questionable proceedings before the COMELEC.―Elementary fairness demands that
if bad faith would be imputed, the ponencia should have viewed the Marinduque
election dispute in its entirety, starting from the fact that Reyes handily won over her
opponent and that the only claim to negate this victory is the cancellation of her CoC
through extremely questionable proceedings before the COMELEC. Notably, in these
proceedings, no less than COMELEC Chairman Brillantes spoke out to comment on
the grave abuse of discretion that transpired. If only the ponencia had been mindful of
this reality and the further reality that the democratic choice of a whole province
should be respected, then perhaps it would not have carelessly imputed bad faith on
Reyes.
Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); Proclamation of
Candidates; View that the proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative fact
that triggers the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) over election contests relating to the winning candidate’s election, returns,
and qualifications.―I reiterate my previous Dissenting Opinion position that the
proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative fact that triggers the
jurisdiction of the HRET over election contests relating to the winning candidate’s
election, returns, and qualifications. In other words, the proclamation of a winning
candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at
the time of the proclamation; the party questioning the election, returns and the
qualifications of the winning candidate should now present his or her case in a proper
proceeding (i.e., an election protest or a quo warranto petition) before the HRET that,
by constitutional mandate, has the sole jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives.
Same; 2011 House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) Rules; View that
Rule 19 of the 2011 HRET Rules provides that the period for the filing of the
appropriate petition, as prescribed in Rule 16 and Rule 17, is jurisdictional and cannot
be extended.―In this regard, I take exception to Justice Abad’s view that the period
for the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto is
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Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
merely a deadline. The HRET Rules clearly state that filing periods are jurisdictional.
Rule 19 of the 2011 HRET Rules provides that the period for the filing of the
appropriate petition, as prescribed in Rule 16 and Rule 17, is jurisdictional and cannot
be extended. Significantly, the filing of an election protest or petition for quo
warranto beyond the periods provided in Rule 16 and Rule 17 of the HRET Rules is a
ground for summary dismissal of the petition.
Abad, J., Concurring Opinion:
Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; View that when Congress enacted the
Omnibus Election Code, among its concerns were persons who, although not
qualified, seek public office and mar the orderly conduct of the elections.―When
Congress enacted the Omnibus Election Code, among its concerns were persons who,
although not qualified, seek public office and mar the orderly conduct of the
elections. To address this problem and for the public good, Congress empowered the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hear and decide petitions for the
cancellation of their certificates of candidacies on the ground of false material
representations that such certificates contain. Section 78 of the Code reads: Sec. 78.
Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.—A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be
filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election.
Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); View that for the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to have jurisdiction, the case must
involve a “member” of the House. The fact alone that one won the elections and has
been proclaimed does not, to be sure, make him a “member” of the House. To
become a member, the candidate to the position must win the election, take an oath,
and assume office when his term begins.―The HRET’s jurisdiction covers only
contests relating, among other things, to “the qualifications of their respective
Members.” This power is inherent in all organizations as a means of preserving their
integrity. For the
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HRET to have jurisdiction, the case must involve a “member” of the House. The fact
alone that one won the elections and has been proclaimed does not, to be sure, make
him a “member” of the House. To become a member, the candidate to the position
must win the election, take an oath, and assume office when his term begins. The
term of a “member” of the House begins on the 30th of June next following his
election. Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution, provides: Sec. 7. The Members of
the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall
begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election. Clearly, a proclaimed winner will be a “member” of the
House only at noon of June 30 following his election and not earlier when he was
merely proclaimed as a winning candidate. The reason is simple. There is no vacancy
in that office before noon of June 30. It is implicit that the term of the member whom
he would succeed would continue until noon of that day when the term of the new
member begins. Consequently, the proclaimed winner in the elections remains an
outsider before June 30. Only on June 30 will his term begin. And only then will the
COMELEC be divested of its jurisdiction over any unresolved petition for the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; View that the supposed clash of jurisdiction between the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Supreme Court is
illusory and cannot happen; The Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the
jurisdictional boundaries of all constitutional bodies. The House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has never claimed this role.―Justice Carpio also claims
that it could happen that a losing candidate would assail the validity of the
proclamation before the Supreme Court while another losing candidate could file an
election protest before the HRET within 15 days of the proclamation. When this
happens, he says, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the HRET would be in
direct clash. But such supposed clash of jurisdiction between the HRET and the Court
is illusory and cannot happen. Any clash of jurisdiction would essentially be between
the COMELEC, asserting its power to hear and decide petitions for cancellation of
certificates of candidacies of those who seek to be elected to the House, and the
HRET, asserting its power to decide all contests relating to the qualifications of its
members. The Supreme Court is the final arbiter
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Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
of the jurisdictional boundaries of all constitutional bodies. The HRET has never
claimed this role.
Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); View that in Codilla, Sr.
v. Hon. De Venecia, 393 SCRA 639 (2002), the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) cannot assume jurisdiction over a cancellation case involving
members of the House that had already been decided by the COMELEC and is under
review by the Supreme Court.―The HRET cannot oust the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction under the Constitution. As the Court held in Codilla, Sr. v. Hon. De
Venecia, 393 SCRA 639 (2002), the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over a
cancellation case involving members of the House that had already been decided by
the COMELEC and is under review by the Supreme Court. It can be said that it is for
the above reasons that the Court heard and decided a number of petitions filed by
losing party-list organizations that sought membership in the House. The Court did
not inhibit itself from deciding their cases even if the winners had already been
proclaimed since it was merely exercising its sole power to review the decisions of
the COMELEC in their cases. The Court took cognizance of and decided their
petitions in Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc.
(Senior Citizens Party-List) vs. Commission on Elections, 701 SCRA 786 (2013).
Leonen, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals; Jurisdiction;
Proclamation of Candidates; View that the Supreme Court should maintain its
consistent doctrine that proclamation is the operative act that removes jurisdiction
from the Supreme Court or the Commission on Elections and vests it on the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).―In case of doubt, there are fundamental
reasons for this Court to be cautious in exercising its jurisdiction to determine who
the members are of the House of Representatives. We should maintain our consistent
doctrine that proclamation is the operative act that removes jurisdiction from this
Court or the Commission on Elections and vests it on the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
Same; Electoral Tribunals; Proclamation of Candidates; View that the earliest
moment when there can be members of the House of Representatives or the Senate is
upon their proclamation as winners
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of an election.―The earliest moment when there can be members of the House of
Representatives or the Senate is upon their proclamation as winners of an election.
Necessarily, this proclamation happens even before they can actually assume their
office as the elections happen in May, and their terms start “at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following their election.” Contests of elected representatives or
senators can happen as soon as they are proclaimed. We should remain faithful to the
intention of the Constitution. It is at the time of their proclamation that we should
declare ourselves as without jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court has been asked to resolve the issue
when jurisdiction over election contests vests on electoral tribunals.―Time and
again, this Court has been asked to resolve the issue when jurisdiction over election
contests vests on electoral tribunals. In all these cases, this Court has consistently held
that it is the proclamation of a candidate in the congressional elections that vests
jurisdiction on the electoral tribunals of any election contest, even though the
candidate has not yet assumed his or her office or the protest was filed before June 30.
Once the winning candidate vying for a position in Congress is proclaimed, election
contests must be lodged with the electoral tribunals and not with the Commission on
Elections. To repeat, “certification by the proper x x x board of canvassers is
sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in [Congress] and to render him eligible
to any office in the said body.”
Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); Jurisdiction; View that
once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as
a member of the House of Representatives, [the] COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)’s own jurisdiction begins.―It is
my opinion that this Court did not, in any of the cases cited in the main ponencia,
change the time-honored rule that “where a candidate has already been proclaimed
winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of the petitioner is to file an
electoral protest [or a petition for quo warranto] with the [House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal].” The main ponencia cites several cases to support its ratio
decidendi that three requisites must concur before a winning candidate is consid-
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ered a “member” of the House of Representatives to vest jurisdiction on the electoral
tribunal. These cases appear to have originated from Guerrero v. Commission on
Elections, 336 SCRA 458 (2000). In Guerrero, this Court held that “x x x once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
member of the House of Representatives, [the] COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.” The case cited Aquino v. Commission on
Elections, 248 SCRA 400 (1995) and Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on
Elections, 248 SCRA 300 (1995) to support the statement.
Same; Electoral Tribunals; Proclamation of Candidates; View that there is only one
rule that the Supreme Court has consistently applied: It is the proclamation of the
winning candidate vying for a seat in Congress that divests the Commission on
Elections of jurisdiction over any electoral protest.―To reiterate, there is only one
rule that this Court has consistently applied: It is the proclamation of the winning
candidate vying for a seat in Congress that divests the Commission on Elections of
jurisdiction over any electoral protest. This rule is consistent with the Constitution,
the 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, the Omnibus
Election Code, and jurisprudence.
Same; Same; Same; View that an electoral protest that also assails the validity of the
proclamation will not cause the Commission on Elections to regain jurisdiction over
the protest.―An electoral protest that also assails the validity of the proclamation will
not cause the Commission on Elections to regain jurisdiction over the protest. Issues
regarding the validity or invalidity of the proclamation may be threshed out before the
electoral tribunals. As held in Caruncho III v. Commission on Elections, 315 SCRA
693 (1999), the electoral tribunal has jurisdiction over a proclamation controversy
involving a member of the House of Representatives.
Same; Same; View that matters relating to factual findings on election, returns, and
qualifications must first be vetted in the appropriate electoral tribunal before these are
raised in the Supreme Court.―The second fundamental reason for us to exercise
caution in determining the composition of the House of Representatives is that this is
required for a better administration of justice. Matters relating to factual findings on
election, returns, and qualifications must
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first be vetted in the appropriate electoral tribunal before these are raised in the
Supreme Court.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; View that when a litigant exhausts all the
remedies which the rules allow, in order to seek an impartial adjudication of his case,
the dignity of the judge is not thereby assailed or affected in the least; otherwise, all
remedies allowed litigants, such as appeals from judgments, petitions for
reconsideration thereof or for the disqualification of judges, or motions questioning
the jurisdiction of courts, would be deemed derogatory to the respect due a
judge.―Good faith must be presumed in the conduct of the petitioner unless evidence
to the contrary is submitted to this Court. We have already ruled that: When a litigant
exhausts all the remedies which the rules allow, in order to seek an impartial
adjudication of his case, the dignity of the judge is not thereby assailed or affected in
the least; otherwise, all remedies allowed litigants, such as appeals from judgments,
petitions for reconsideration thereof or for the disqualification of judges, or motions
questioning the jurisdiction of courts, would be deemed derogatory to the respect due
a judge. These remedies may be availed of by any litigant freely, without being
considered guilty of an act of disrespect to the court or the judge. Reyes vs.
Commission on Elections, 708 SCRA 197, G.R. No. 207264 October 22, 2013