Journal of Safety Research 68 (2019) 187–196

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Safety Research

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jsr

Applicability of accident analysis methods to Chinese

construction accidents
Jiangshi Zhang, a,⁎ Wenyue Zhang, a Peihui Xu, a Na Chen b
a
School of Resources and Safety Engineering, China University of Mining and Technology, D11, Xueyuan Road, Haidian District, Beijing 100083, China
b
School of Mechanics and Engineering Science, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, 100 Science Avenue, Zhengzhou City, China

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Introduction: It is necessary to clearly understand construction accidents for preventing a rise in Chinese con-
Received 27 March 2018 struction accidents and deaths. Better analysis methods are required for Chinese construction sector accidents.
Received in revised form 27 August 2018 Methods: Choosing and analyzing a typical construction accident based on four popular contemporary accident
Accepted 29 November 2018 causation models: STAMP, AcciMap, HFACS, and the 2-4 Model. Then we evaluated the models' applicability to
Available online 2 January 2019
construction accidents, including their usability, reliability, and validity. Results: STAMP addressed how complex-
ity within the accident system influenced the accident development, and its output makes the responsibilities
Keywords:
Chinese construction accidents
clearer for the accident. AcciMap described the entire system's failure, the entire accident's trajectory, and the re-
Accident causation models lationship between them. AcciMap showed that the accident was a dynamic developing process, and this method
Accident analysis has a high usability. The taxonomic nature of HFACS is an important feature that provides it with a high reliability.
Applicability In the accident reviewed here, we found that poor management was a critical factor rather than the individual
factor in the accident. The 2-4 Model provided detailed causes of the accident and established the relationship
among the accident causes, the safety management system, and the safety culture. It also avoided capturing all
of the complexity in the large sociotechnical system and revealed a dynamic analysis and developing process.
We confirmed that it has a high usability and validity. Therefore, the 2-4Model is recommended for future Chi-
nese construction accident analysis efforts. Practical Applications: The study provides a useful, reliable, and effec-
tive analysis method for Chinese construction accidents.
© 2018 National Safety Council and Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
1.1. Background
In China, construction is a high-risk industry. Since 2012, the num-
ber of deaths in the construction sector has surpassed that of coal
mines, ranking first out of all the industrial production sectors in
China (Chen, Zhao, Tian, & Li, 2013). Compared to other industries, the
construction industry has poor working environments, a complex situ-
ation, high labor turnover rate, lack of safety management, poor educa-
tional standards, and poorly trained workers (Hu, 2017). The statistics
released by the Ministry of Housing and Urban–Rural Development of
the People's Republic of China (Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural
Development of the People, 2017) about the numbers of construction
accidents from 2004 to 2016 are shown in Fig. 1. During the first nine
years shown in the figure, the number of accidents declined because
the Chinese government formulated some policies in 2004; one partic-
ularly important policy, “Regulations on Safety Production Management of
Construction Projects,” was initiated in February, 2014. However, in the
⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: zjsh0426@163.com (J. Zhang), nchen@zzu.edu.cn (N. Chen).
last three years of the graph, the number of accidents has shown little
decrease, which is still higher than that of many developed countries.
In 2016, there were 634 accidents, which is similar to the number
from 2010. Correspondingly, the death toll in the construction sector
shows the same trend (Fig. 2). Therefore, the feasibility condition
must be improved. In order to prevent a rise in construction accidents
and deaths, it is necessary to clearly understand construction accidents.
1.2. Literature review
There are some accident causation models that are widely used, such
as Reason's (1990) omnipresent Swiss Cheese model, which uses the
layers and holes in Swiss cheese to represent the defenses within a sys-
tem and their associated inadequacies(Lawton & Ward, 2005);
Rasmussen's (1997) risk management framework, which makes a series
of predictions in relation to the performance and safety in complex
sociotechnical systems(Johnson & de Almeida, 2008; Cassano-Piche,
Vicente, & Jamieson, 2009; Salmon, Williamson, Lenne, Mitsopoulos, &
Rudin-Brown, 2010; Svedung & Rasmussen, 2002); Rasmussen
(1997), named after his risk management framework, which was devel-
oped as a means of graphically representing factors from different sys-
tem levels that contribute to accidents(Kontogiannis, 2012; Margaret,

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsr.2018.11.006
0022-4375/© 2018 National Safety Council and Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
188 J. Zhang et al. / Journal of Safety Research 68 (2019) 187–196

1200 1144
1015
1000
888 859
772
800
684

Numbers
627 634
589
600 522 524
489
442
400

200

0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Years

Fig. 1. Construction accidents, 2004–2016.

Paul, & Michael, 2014); the Human Factors Analysis and Classification
System (HFACS), which is a theory-based tool for investigating and an-
alyzing human error associated with accidents and incidents(Daramola,
2014); Leveson's (2004) Systems Theoretic Accident Modeling and Pro-
cesses model (STAMP), which considers technical (including hardware
and software), human, and organizational factors in complex
sociotechnical systems(Ouyang, Hong, Yu, & Fei, 2010); and the 2-4
Model (2005), proposed by Fu, which builds a circuit from the idea
that one-time behavior comes from habitual behavior, and habitual be-
havior comes from the organizational safety management system,
which is led by the safety culture(Fu, 2013; Fu, Yang, Yin, & Dong, 2014).
1.2.1. STAMP methodology
Professor Leveson first used STAMP to analyze the accident that oc-
curred on the American Challenger space shuttle. It views systems as hi-
erarchical structures with multiple control levels. Each level in the
hierarchy imposes constraints on the activity of the level beneath it,
and the events leading to losses only occur when the safety constraints
are not successfully enforced or the constraints have been violated
(Leveson, 2011). It describes various forms of control, including mana-
gerial, organizational, physical, operational, and manufacturing-based
controls. The STAMP taxonomy, along with a generic sociotechnical sys-
tem control structure, is presented in Fig. 3.
Samadi used STAMP in a general programmatic risk analysis for CO2
capture, transport, and storage (Samadi, 2012). Georges used it to ana-
lyze the risk of quality loss in complex system design (Goerges, 2013).
The STAMP process provides the framework for the structured leading
indicator identification process. The functional safety control structure
is designed with the safety responsibilities identified for each compo-
nent and these control responsibilities are traceable to the system safety
constraints (Leveson, 2015). However, it is difficult to obtain the exten-
sive data associated with the overall system required for a thorough and
in-depth analysis. The recommendations generated in the analysis may
also be difficult to carry out substantially and in a timely manner (Kim,
Nazir, & Øvergård, 2016).
1.2.2. AcciMap methodology
AcciMap is a system method based on the control theory. Rasmussen
believed that the accident is the result of losing control to potentially
harmful physical processes, and each organizational level in the system
affects the control of these hazards (Rasmussen, 1997). AcciMap was
developed from analyzing a series of interaction events and the deci-
sion-making process, which are beyond control in the system. This
method of analysis typically focuses on the failures across the following
six organizational levels: government policy and budgeting; regulatory
bodies and associations; local area government planning and budgeting
(including company management); technical and operational manage-
ment; physical processes and actor activities; and equipment and sur-
roundings (Salmon, Cornelissen, & Trotter, 2012). The AcciMap
method is presented in Fig. 4.
This method was applied to examine the safety leadership decisions
and actions in the mining industry, and it demonstrated its utility in

1200 1324
1198
1000
1048 1012
921
800
802 771 738
Numbers

734
670
600 624 583
554
400

200

0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Years

Fig. 2. Death toll in construction accidents, 2004–2016.

 J. Zhang et al. / Journal of Safety Research 68 (2019) 187–196 189

Report Report Report Feedback Feedback Sensor

Local Manage
government ment Control
Legislature Ministries Enterprise Controller
and relevant departm target
departments ent

Laws and Specifications Supervision

and Constraint Constraint Machine
regulations and standard
guidance

Fig. 3. The control structure of STAMP.

applying systems-thinking methods to examine safety leadership as a
characteristic of positive system performance (Donovan & Salmon,
2017). In addition, it was used to represent the dependencies and link-
ages within and across system levels in the road freight transportation
industry and to identify common factors and interactions across multi-
ple crashes (Sharon & Natassia, 2015). AcciMap has generated both the-
oretical and practice-oriented debates, but its emphasis is perhaps more
on conceptual and theoretical descriptions, rather than data-driven
analysis and evaluation. Therefore, “mixing and matching” and
“remixing” of many of the models are likely the future directions for
analysis methods (Waterson, Jenkins, Salmon, & Underwood, 2017).
The further development of “hybrid” accident models based on the
basic AcciMap format, rather than new models, is an especially likely oc-
currence (Coze, 2013).
1.2.3. HFACS methodology
The HFACS system was originally developed and tested within the
U.S military. Later its framework was used to analyze and classify op-
erator errors in naval aviation accidents by Wiegmann in 2000 (John,
Schmidt, & Figlock, 1999). Fig. 5 illustrates the general framework of
the analytical HFACS mechanism, showing four main levels: (1) man-
agement organization is missing; (2) insecure leadership; (3) prereq-
uisites for unsafe behavior; and (4) unsafe behavior (Shappell &
Wiegmann, 2000). Each level includes some sub-factors. Unsafe
behavior is the most obvious cause of accidents, and this is designated
as the lowest level. The remaining three levels are the hidden
faults. This model emphasizes the impact of high-level errors on
low-level errors and the top-level's organized management impact
on accidents.
HFACS has been successfully applied to provide a retrospective anal-
ysis of minor incident investigations in the rail industry (Madigan,
Golightly, & Madders, 2016) and the nuclear industry to reveal the haz-
ards and their relationships in terms of organizational factors (Kim,
Yong, Tong, Oh, & Shin, 2014). The HFACS taxonomy can be used to an-
alyze and search for trends that point to weaknesses in certain areas of
the system. Moreover, conducting association analysis among the
HFACS categories can help identify additional areas for improvement
(Ergai, Cohen, & Sharp, 2016). However, reliable HFACS data are not
easy to obtain. Therefore, in order to improve its practical value,
HFACS was integrated with other methods. The ANP model was used

System level

1.Government policy Current assessment

and budgeting prerequisites

2.Regulatory bodies and

associations
3.Local area
government (plan Decision Priority
and budget)
company
Policy
management

4.Technology and Function

operational Decision
management Plan
Policy

Task or activity
5.Physical processes
and actor activities Decisive
Direct result Indirect result
event
Task or
activity Direct result

6.Equipment and
surroundings Conclusion Current assessment
prerequisites

Fig. 4. AcciMap's framework.

190 J. Zhang et al. / Journal of Safety Research 68 (2019) 187–196

Management vulnerabilities
First level: Management
organization Management cultural defects
missing
Unreasonable management resources

Inadequate supervision

Second level: Insecure Improper operation plan

leadership
No corrections found

Supervise the violation

Staff resource
management
Third level: Personal ready state

Mental state
Prerequisites
for unsafe Physiological state
behavior
Physical and
intellectual limitations
Physical environment

Technical environment

Violation Skill errors

Unsafe
Fourth level: behaviors
Error Decision making error

Misunderstanding

Fig. 5. Hierarchical classification diagram of HFACS.

to help calculate the priority weights of the accident causes related to
human error (Akyuz, 2017). In addition, the F-DEMATEL technique
was adopted to conduct the inner dependency analysis in order to ana-
lyze railway accidents (Zhan, Zheng, & Zhao, 2017).
1.2.4. 2-4 Model methodology
The 2-4 Model is a modern accident cause theory, based on
Heinrich's classical accident cause chain, as well as Wigglesworth,
Bird, Loftus, Reason, and Stewart's view points (Fu et al., 2014). In
this model, the direct factors are still a human's unsafe behavior and
the situation's unsafe conditions, as in Heinrich's accident cause
chain. The indirect factors include safety knowledge, safety
consciousness, habit, and physiological and psychological states,
which are different from Stewart's model (Fu, 2013). The safety man-
agement system was thought to be a part of the safety culture, so it is
regarded as a radical cause. The safety culture is the root cause. As
seen in the Fig. 6, the occurrence of the accident was the result of
two organizational levels and individual levels, as well as the

External Factors

Unsafe acts
Safety knowledge
Safety Safety awareness
Safety culture management Safety habits Accident
system Psychological status
Physiological status
Unsafe conditions

Root causes Radical causes Indirect causes Direct causes Accident

Phase I:
Phase IV: Phase III: Phase II: One-time behaviors and Result of the
Directing behaviors Operational behaviors Habitual behaviors conditions behaviors
Result of the
Level II: organizational level Level I: individual level behaviors

Legends:
Organization boundary Clear impacts

Fig. 6. The 2-4 Model.

 J. Zhang et al. / Journal of Safety Research 68 (2019) 187–196 191

development of four stages: guidance, operation, and the habitual and

one-time behaviors. Therefore, it was called the 2-4 Model.
The 2-4 Model was first used for the safety culture measurement,
and then it was further developed and improved. From 2005 to 2017,
it has been modified four times; these modifications made up for the
model's initial failure to take into consideration the impact of the inter-
nal and external causes of the accident and have made it more compre-
hensive when it comes to revealing the causes of accidents (Fu et al.,
2014). The 2-4 Model has been widely used in the coal, chemical, fire,
and other industries. It was applied to the safety training systems in
coal mining (Fu, Yin, Dong, Fan, & Zhu, 2013) as well as to the typical
cases of chemical and fire accidents to verify its reliability (Fu, Liu, Ge,
Fig. 7. A brief structure of the steel grid.
& Tao, 2015; Kang, Fu, Fu, & Gao, 2017).
These causation models have their own unique features, but these
features are rare in the construction accidents. Therefore, the aim of 3. Re-analyses of the accident reasons
this paper was to compare and contrast the four methods (STAMP,
AcciMap, HFACS, and the 2-4 Model) for construction accident analyses. 3.1. The output by using STAMP

The STAMP analysis consisted of two phases. The control structure

2. Incident descriptions
A whole steel system collapsed at a construction site, which killed 10
workers who were installing drains and banding cross bars in the mid-
dle of the upper and lower layers of a steel grid at 8:20 am on December
29, 2014. A brief description of the accident is given below.
The project was planned to build five floors above ground and two
floors underground. Reinforcement work is processing at the time of
the accident. Two layers of steel grids were arranged inside a floor.
The two layers of steel grid used double-row two-way steel bars, and
the upper steel grid was supported by “horse stool”.1 Building the
lower reinforcement, placing the “horse stool” and laying the upper
steel bars had been completed before the accident occurred.
On the afternoon of 28 December, the labor captain of the construc-
tion team arranged to have the tower crane lift steel material to the
upper layer of the steel grid. From 17:58 to 22:16 on the 28th and
7:27 to 7:47 on the 29th, there were a total of 24 bundles of steel mate-
rial lifted, 21 bundles on the 28th and 3 bundles on the 29th.
At 6:20 am on 29 December, the workers began to work again, plac-
ing the steel reinforcement bars and banding them together. At around
7:00, a worker found that the “horse stool” did not correspond with the
calibrated axis, and he informed the labor captain. Then, the labor cap-
tain reported it to the deputy manager. At 8:10, it was confirmed that
the whole steel system had moved 10 cm to the east. Later, the deputy
manager asked the team leader to tell the workers to stop working.
While they were planning to remove the bundles of steel rods from
the upper layer and firm up the junctions of the “horse stool” and layers,
the steel system collapsed. The duration of the collapse was less than 2 s.
Ten workers were killed in the middle of the upper and down layers of
the steel grid. A simple description and the collapse scene are presented
in Figs. 7 and 8, respectively.
According to the accident investigation report, the investigation
group found that the diameters of the steel rods were 25 and 28 mm,
not the standard 32 mm. The spacing between the junctions of the
“horse stool” varied, and the average spacing was far more than that
specified in the safety standards. Poor welding between the junctions
of the “horse stool” of the upper and lower layers was also a major prob-
lem. Worse, the supervising departments did not fulfill their own re-
sponsibilities to all the units because they failed to provide adequate
site management, ensure the safety of the workers, or provide the nec-
essary technical documentation and records.
was the first output, shown in Fig. 9. The legislature is the highest
level of government for promulgating laws and regulations. Then, the
safety administration of the Ministry of Housing and Urban–Rural De-
velopment of the People's Republic of China receives these instructions
and constrains the local government construction department and
safety supervision department using specifications and standards. The
Safety Supervision department guides the construction projections be-
fore the projects begin. Before it starts work, Party A needs to sign a con-
tract with the supervision unit, designers, and owner. Party B also needs
a construction unit, which is achieved by a contract, too. The supervision
unit should supervise the duties of the construction unit and its
workers. Designers draw the project plans and give them to the con-
struction unit. The laborers are constrained by the construction unit,
but they can provide feedback if they find problems.
The second output was identifying the faults and responsibilities of
the participants involved in each level in the accident. The involved par-
ticipants are shown in Fig. 9. The Local Administration and Work Safety
department and the other local supervision departments did not check
all the construction materials as required, and the time of the examina-
tions was not sufficient. Party A compressed the specified working dura-
tion by 27.6% to complete the project ahead of schedule, and they did
not inform the Ministry of Housing and Urban–Rural Development of
the start date. Moreover, when Party A found the manager was off
duty, they did not quickly rectify the problem. The designer was also ir-
responsible. There were some mistakes in the construction drawings.
The checked construction unit records were incomplete, and the re-
cords of the contract explanations were different from the actual deal.
The supervision unit is important for the project, but the supervisors ig-
nored the fact that the project manager was off duty and failed to per-
form the necessary safety education and training for the workers.

1
“Horse stool” is commonly known as “support tendons”. It is used for reinforcing the
upper and the lower steel mesh plate, as well as separating the upper and lower mesh
to maintain the spacing. It has different sizes and it is perpendicular to the upper and lower
layers. Fig. 8. Scene of after the collapse.
192 J. Zhang et al. / Journal of Safety Research 68 (2019) 187–196

Report Report Report Supervision

Ministry of Feedback
Local unit
Housing and
administrati
Urban-Rural
on and work
Development Construction
Legislature safety and Party A Designers Labor
and State unit
local
Administration
supervision
and Work
departments Constraint
Safety Party B
Laws and Specification Supervision
regulations and standard and guidance

Fig. 9. Safety control structure of the project.

Worse, the project managers did not follow the requirements and safety
standards for steel construction projects. Party B allowed someone who
was not on the staff of the company to sign the contract. They did not
follow the correct procedures to change the manager on record. The
construction unit lacked the technical documentation for the project
and neglected the safety education and training of the workers. The
members of the construction unit also failed to find that the workers'
workload was excessive and that the steel rods were on the upper layers
in bundles, which contributed to the concentrated load. The most direct
factors were that the workers used non-standard steel rods, increased
the distance between the two junctions of the “horse stool” at will,
and badly welded the upper and lower layers of the grid together.
These issues were caused by the workers' lack of education, knowledge,
and safety awareness.
3.2. The output by using AcciMap
Using the accident's outline and its investigation report, we created a
timeline for the incident, as shown in Fig. 10.
The timeline shows the incident's developing process, including the
tasks, policies, plans, decisions, and faults. By combining these data with
Fig. 4, we classified these factors and placed them on six levels to better
illustrate their relationships to each other. Our AcciMap diagram is
shown in Fig. 11. The root causes of this accident were all the responsi-
bility of Party B due to its poor management of the project. Although
there were many contributory factors from the physical processes and
actors' activities, Party B's actions directly caused the accident.
3.3. The output by using HFACS
Although there are limitations to HFACS, its approach to human
physiological and physical states is more exhaustive than that of the
other methods. However, poor management accounted for a large pro-
portion of this accident. The workers' physiological and physical states
were not discussed in the investigation, and so this part of the method
is not applicable. The workers directly caused problems by reducing or
increasing the required parameters at will and welded badly; these er-
rors can be categorized as unsafe acts, as shown in Fig. 12.
3.4. The output by using the 2-4 Model
Fig. 6 shows that we can classify the causes into two levels and four
phases, as shown in Fig. 13. The direct causes were the workers' unsafe
acts and the unsafe conditions. Reducing the diameter of the steel rods,
increasing the spacing, bad welding, and centralized stacking directly
contributed to the collapse. Party B's poor management was the most
severe factor. From preparing the bid to the accident investigation,
Party B's unprofessional staff managed the project, which caused the
operating system to have many weak points. In addition, the supervi-
sion department and designer were both guilty of dereliction of duty.
4. Discussion and conclusions
We compared and contrasted four popular contemporary accident
analysis methods based on their application to the analysis of a

2014.2.27 2014.3 2014.6.12 2014.6.30 2014.7.6 2014.7 2014.7.18 2014.8.1 2014.10

Construction
Mr. Yang Party B Obtained the Party B
The Mr. Yang began even
Party B Obtained employed Miss Li formulated permission of the obtained some
construction joined the though there
won the provincial to undertake the “the steel housing urban and tax money
plan was staff of the was a lack of
bid permission budget and construction rural construction and gave it to
passed company technical
accounting work plan” committee Mr. Yang
documentation

2014 2014
12.28 12.29
17:58 22:16 6:20 7:27 7:50 8:10 8:20
Timeline

Transport Transport of Transport of A worker The entire

Workers
of the first the second the third realizes the steel
begin to Collapse
bundle of bundle of steel bundle of structure is structure
work
steel rods rods steel rods moving moves 10 cm

Fig. 10. Time line of the accident.

 J. Zhang et al. / Journal of Safety Research 68 (2019) 187–196 193

1. Government
Allowing to design
policy and
and calculate
budgeting

2.Regulatory Lack of a Being responsible for

Incomplete
bodies and timely check quality and safety
check
associations on materials supervision

3.Local area
government Lack of
planning and Lack of Did not correct Ignore
Employed an professional safety
budgeting. management illegal behavior safety
unqualified person managemant
company coordination immediately education
workers
management

4.Technology Some mistakes

Lack of the Lack of safety Unreasonable
and in the
contract training and subcontract
operational construction
explanation safety education management
management drawings

Used non-
Placed the first
standard steel
bundle of steel rods
rods
Increasing the on the upper layer
5.Physical
distance Bad
processes and
between 2 welding Placed the second Placed the third
actor
junctions bundle of steel bundle of steel
activities
Compressed the rods on the upper rods on the
working schedule layer upper layer
by 27.6%

6.Equipment
Speeding up the
and
construction progress
surroundings

Fig. 11. The AcciMap analysis.

HFACS

Organizational Prerequisites for Unsafe acts or

Unsafe supervision unsafe acts operations
influences

Unreasonable
Management Inadequate Supervise the Technical
resource Violations
vulnerabilities supervision violation environment
management
The project Lack of Some mistakes in Compressed the
Employing Safety investment
manager was off professional the construction specified working
unqualified person costs not in its place
duty safety officers drawings duration by 27.6%

Management Failure to correct Personnel

Errors
cultural defects problem readiness
Used non-standard materials,
Lack of safety Failure to stop placing
increasing the distance
education and steel rod bundles on Inadequate training
between junctions, and utilized
training the upper layer
poor welding practices

Fig. 12. The HFACS analysis.

194 J. Zhang et al. / Journal of Safety Research 68 (2019) 187–196

Event The whole steel system collapsed.

1. Too many bundles of steel with centralized stacking.

Unsafe acts 2. Non-standard steel rods were used (standard rods are 32 mm in diameter, but the rods used in
and unsafe the project were 25 mm or 28 mm in diameter).
conditions 3. Increased the distance between 2 junctions and had uneven spacing.
4. Badly welded, so the rods did not form a solid, whole structure.

Flaws in safety
knowledge, safety 1. Lack of safety knowledge and awareness causing some mistakes in the drawings.
awareness and 2. Workers’ bad habits failed to meet construction standards.
safety habits

1. Poor management and a lack of technical documentation and records.

2. Registered manager was off duty and there was a lack of professional safety officers.
Deficiencies in
3. Lack of a professional manager.
safety
4. Ignored the lack of a project manager.
management
5. Did not find that workers did not meet the requirements for steel construction projects.
system
6. Did not find the lack of safety technical explanations and safety education training.
7. Building management department did not check all the materials.
8. Short, insufficient check times were implemented by the building management department.
9. Lack of safety education training and safety awareness.

Safety is the first priority; safety performance lies on good safety awareness; the importance of
Deficiencies in
safety laws and regulations; the importance of safety training; the importance of safety
safety culture
management system; the importance of top management commitment

Fig. 13. The 2-4 Model analysis.

construction accident. The differences among the methods in regard to
their usability, reliability, and validity were clarified. Usability refers to
the probability that a method was chosen to use to analyze accidents.
The terms and models used in a method will determine whether the
method will be chosen for use, although assessing how easy the analysis
tools are to understand and apply clearly involves the subjective opin-
ion of the user. The reliability of a method must also be considered.
Some methods do not provide a detailed taxonomy of the contributory
factors, which further reduces their reliability. However, this also means
that the analyst can classify such factors with more freedom. The valid-
ity refers to the credibility of the output. These four methods are based
on a recognized theory of accident causation and have been used across
multiple domains, which suggests that an acceptable degree of external
validity exists (Fu, Cao, Zhou, & Xiang, 2017; Kim et al., 2016; Reason,
1990; Salmon, Goode, & Archer, 2014).
4.2. The application of AcciMap
AcciMap purposefully sets out to analyze the dynamic behavior that
exists within a system and how it contributes to accidents. Our timeline
shows how the causes gradually progressed towards the collapse. The
guidance available for AcciMap also provides a detailed description
about the conceptual aspects and purpose of the method, that is, the
analysis of a system's dynamic behavior that reduces or increases the re-
quired parameters. However, the AcciMap guidance material provides
little support for the method in comparison to that of STAMP
(Svedung & Rasmussen, 2002). Therefore, this method is considered to
have a low reliability.
4.3. The application of HFACS

4.1. The application of STAMP
The usage guidance provided for STAMP is considerable, which pro-
vides the analyst with a body of information that can facilitate a more ef-
fective and efficient analysis. We found that each level in the control
system corresponded to the construction accident. STAMP has been im-
proved by detailed descriptions of safety factors and accident causes,
and the model usage guidance for this method means that its reliability
is high. Moreover, STAMP addresses how the complexity within a system
influences accident events and its output makes the responsibilities of the
actors clear. However, it was not easy to distinguish all the major factors
in the reviewed construction accident. Capturing all of the complexity in a
large sociotechnical system and the resource constraints of an accident
investigation are beyond the capability of an individual analysis model.
Due to the background of HFACS, its terms are limited to those of the
aviation field, so its usability is lower. Worse, HFACS is entirely depen-
dent upon the quality of the data provided and the analysts involved.
However, the taxonomic nature of HFACS is an important feature of
the method. HFACS not only has its own frame, but it also makes a de-
tailed division of each level. That division enhances its reliability. In
the construction accident reviewed here (see Fig. 12), we can see that
organizational influences, unsafe supervision, and unsafe acts or opera-
tions account for a large proportion of the causes of the accident. How-
ever, the workers' physiological and psychological states were not
mentioned in the accident report. Furthermore, there is no classification
hierarchy that can contain the laws and regulatory factors of the partic-
ipating units. This method cannot address the many factors that caused
this accident.
 J. Zhang et al. / Journal of Safety Research 68 (2019) 187–196
4.4. The application of the 2-4 Model
The 2-4 Model was devised specifically for the purposes of accident
analysis. The model and the terms are easy to understand and so it is
used frequently, which is the most obvious advantage over the other
methods. In addition, the 2-4 Model classifies the causes of the accident
into four phases and has clear boundaries between the two phases. We
found all the factors contributing to the collapse using the inverted
order of Fig. 6, which can also make the factors more accurate. In addi-
tion, the dynamic analysis process was shown and the liability in this ac-
cident can be classified as “direct responsibility”. This method combines
the advantages of the other three methods.
We compared four popular contemporary accident causation
models using their usability, reliability, and validity for a construction
accident. Our analysis revealed the differences between the four
methods. Construction accidents are caused by various issues, and the
causes of all accidents vary. Therefore, the analysis methods chosen to
analyze construction accidents should be generalized. First, the results
of this paper show that the AcciMap and 2-4 Model have universal ap-
plicability. However, AcciMap has a low reliability because the qualita-
tive nature of the model negatively impacts on its reliability. In
reviewing this accident, we had more freedom in how to classify such
factors. Second, STAMP and AcciMap are more comprehensive in deter-
mining factors. However, it was not easy to distinguish the major factors
in this accident. The complexity of the system and the material collec-
tion of the accident were beyond the capability of an individual to deter-
mine. Third, the results of the HFACS and 2-4 Model are more reliable
than those of the other methods, as determined by the nature of the
classification and the characteristics that are applicable to multi-case
study analysis. HFACS's development for aviation accidents limits its ap-
plication. Further, the errors and contributing factors of the HFACS tax-
onomies cannot conceivably be classified by the method in its original
format. In the present analysis, some factors in this accident could not
be classified, such as the regulatory factors. In this case, the 2-4 Model
made up for these shortcomings in the HFACS and the low reliability
of AcciMap, focusing on the divisions of responsibility rather than the
causes like STAMP. Direct causes, indirect causes, radical causes, and
root causes were compartmentalized and detailed, and this method of
classification covered most of the factors involved in the accident. In ad-
dition, it takes external factors, such as government regulation and so-
cial politics, into consideration. Finally, the responsibility divisions are
provided and accident prevention methods have a basis to follow.
This article presented a case-study-based comparison of four acci-
dent analysis methods: STAMP, AcciMap, HFACS, and the 2-4 Model. Al-
though it may be not representative to choose one construction
accident out of all the accidents in the Chinese construction sector, the
analysis process provides guidance for synthesizing the strengths of
the various methods to apply to accidents in the construction sector.
The 2-4 Model seems to offer more practical applicability, so it is recom-
mended that the 2-4 Model is further developed into a method that in-
corporates flexible taxonomies for future construction accident analysis
efforts.
Acknowledgments
This work was financially supported by the Beijing Social Science
Fund Project (NO. 16GLB027) and National Natural Science Foundation
of China (No. 51174209).
References
Akyuz, E. (2017). A marine accident analysing model to evaluate potential operational
causes in cargo ships. Safety Science, 92, 17–25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.
09.010.
Cassano-Piche, A. L., Vicente, K. J., & Jamieson, G. A. (2009). A test of Rasmussen's risk
management framework in the food safety domain: BSE in the UK. Theoretical
195
Issues in Ergonomics Science, 10(4), 283–304. https://doi.org/10.1080/
14639220802059232.
Chen, D. W., Zhao, C. Y., Tian, H. Z., & Li, D. (2013). Study on an innovation in construction
accidents statistical indexes system and its application. Chinese Journal of Safety
Science, 23(11), 72–78. https://doi.org/10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2013.11.006.
Coze, J. L. (2013). New models for new times: An anti-dualist move. Safety. Science, 59,
200–218. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2013.05.010.
Daramola, A. Y. (2014). An investigation of air accidents in Nigeria using the human fac-
tors analysis and classification system (HFACS) framework. Journal of Air Transport
Management, 35(4), 39–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jairtraman.2013.11.004.
Donovan, S. L., & Salmon, P. M. (2017). Safety leadership and systems thinking: Applica-
tion and evaluation of a Risk Management Framework in the mining industry.
Ergonomics, 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/00140139.2017.1308562.
Ergai, A., Cohen, T., & Sharp, J. (2016). Assessment of the human factors analysis and clas-
sification system (HFACS): Intra-rater and inter-rater reliability. Safety Science, 82,
393–398. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2015.09.028.
Fu, G. (2013). Safety Management—A Behavior-based Approach to Accident Prevention. Bei-
jing: Science Press978-7-03-039707-2.
Fu, G., Cao, J. L., Zhou, L., & Xiang, Y. C. (2017). Comparative study of HFACS and the
24Model accident causation models. Petroleum Science, 3, 1–9. https://doi.org/10.
1007/s12182-017-0171-4.
Fu, G., Yang, C., Yin, W. T., & Dong, J. Y. (2014). Extended version of behavior-based acci-
dent causation “2-4” Model. Journal of Coal Science, 39(6), 994–999. https://doi.org/
10.13225/j.cnki.jccs.2013.1145.
Fu, G., Yin, W. T., Dong, J. Y., Fan, D., & Zhu, C. J. H. (2013). Behavior-based accident cau-
sation: The “2-4” model and its safety implication in coal mines. Journal of Coal
Science, 38(7), 1123–1129. https://doi.org/10.13225/j.cnki.jccs.2013.07.032.
Fu, J., Liu, H., Ge, J., & Tao, R. R. (2015). Analyses about chemical industry accident based
on the behavior safety “2-4” Model. Journal of Jilin Institute of Chemical Technology,
32(6), 59–64. https://doi.org/10.16039/j.cnki.cn22-1249.2015.06.014.
Goerges, S. L. (2013). System theoretic approach for determining causal factors of quality
loss in complex system design. American Society of Mechanical Engineers. https://doi.
org/10.1115/DETC2014-34156.
Hu, M. Y. (2017). Study on safety status of building construction and accident prevention.
China High Tech Enterprises, (07), 176–177. https://doi.org/10.13535/j.cnki.11-4406/
n.2017.07.083.
John, K., Schmidt, R. C., & Figlock, C. D. T. (1999). Human factors analysis of naval transport
aircraft maintenance and flight line related incidents. SAE Technical Papers.. https://
doi.org/10.4271/1999-01-2981.
Johnson, C. W., & de Almeida, I. M. (2008). Extending the borders of accident investiga-
tion: applying novel analysis techniques to the loss of the Brazilian space launch ve-
hicle VLS-1 V03. Safety Science, 46(1), 38–53.
Kang, R., Fu, G., Fu, Z. M., & Gao, P. (2017). Comparative study on death causes of fire-
fighters in China and USA. Journal of Safety Science and Technology, 13(4), 181–185.
https://doi.org/10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2017.04.029.
Kim, S. K., Yong, H. L., Tong, I. J., Oh, Y. J., & Shin, K. H. (2014). An investigation on unin-
tended reactor trip events in terms of human error hazards of Korean nuclear
power plants. Annals of Nuclear Energy, 65, 223–231. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
anucene.2013.11.009.
Kim, T., Nazir, S., & Øvergård, K. I. (2016). A STAMP-based causal analysis of the Korean
Sewol ferry accident. Safety Science, 83, 93–101. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2015.
11.014.
Kontogiannis, T. (2012). Modeling patterns of breakdown (or archetypes) of human and
organizational processes in accidents using system dynamics. Safety Science, 50(4),
931–944. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2011.12.011.
Lawton, R., & Ward, N. J. (2005). A systems analysis of the Lad broke grove rail crash.
Accident Analysis and Prevention, 37(2), 235–244. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2004.
08.001.
Leveson, N. (2004). A new accident model for engineering safer systems. Safety Science, 42
(4), 237–270. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0925-7535(03)00047-X.
Leveson, N. (2015). A systems approach to risk management through leading safety indi-
cators. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 136, 17–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
ress.2014.10.008.
Leveson, N. G. (2011). Applying systems thinking to analyze and learn from events. Safety
Science, 49(1), 55–64. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2009.12.021.
Madigan, R., Golightly, D., & Madders, R. (2016). Application of human factors analysis
and classification system (HFACS) to UK rail safety of the line incidents. Safety
Science, 97, 122–131. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2016.08.023.
Margaret, J. T., Paul, M. S., & Michael, G. L. (2014). Impromaps: Applying Rasmussen's risk
management framework to improvisation incidents. Safety Science, 64(64), 60–70.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2013.11.021.
Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of the People's Republic of China
(MOHURD) [EB/OL] (2017). http://ginfo.mohurd.gov.cn/ -5-16.
Ouyang, M., Hong, L., Yu, M. H., & Fei, Q. (2010). STAMP-based analysis on the railway ac-
cident and accident spreading: Taking the China-Jiaoji railway accident for example.
Safety Science, 48(5), 544–555. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2010.01.002.
Rasmussen, J. (1997). Risk management in a dynamic society: A modelling problem.
Safety Science, 27(2–3), 183–213. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0925-7535(97)00052-0.
Reason, J. (1990). Human error. New York: Cambridge University Press9781139062367
Online ISBN.
Salmon, P. M., Cornelissen, M., & Trotter, M. J. (2012). Systems-based accident analysis
methods: A comparison of Accimap, HFACS, and STAMP. Safety Science, 50,
1158–1170. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2011.11.009.
Salmon, P. M., Goode, N., & Archer, F. (2014). A systems approach to examining disaster
response: Using AcciMap to describe the factors influencing bushfire response.
Safety Science, 70, 114–122. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2014.05.003.
196 J. Zhang et al. / Journal of Safety Research 68 (2019) 187–196
Salmon, P. M., Williamson, A., Lenne, M. G., Mitsopoulos, E., & Rudin-Brown, C. M. (2010).
Systems-based accident analysis in the led outdoor activity domain: Application and
evaluation of a risk management framework. Ergonomics, 53(8), 927–939. https://doi.
org/10.1080/00140139.2010.489966.
Samadi, J. (2012). Development of a systemic risk management approach for CO2 capture,
transport and storage projects. Ecole Nationale Supérieure Des Mines De Paris, 48(3),
615http://pastel.archives-ouvertes.fr/pastel-00870894.
Shappell, S. A., & Wiegmann, D. A. (2000). The human factors analysis and classification
system—HFACS. American Libraries, 1(1), 20–46https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/247897525.
Sharon, N., & Natassia, G. (2015). Do not blame the driver: A systems analysis of the
causes of road freight crashes. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 76, 141–151.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2015.01.016.
Svedung, I., & Rasmussen, J. (2002). Graphic representation of accident scenarios: Map-
ping system structure and the causation of accidents. Safety Science, 40(5),
397–417. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0925-7535(00)00036-9.
Waterson, P., Jenkins, D. P., Salmon, P. M., & Underwood, P. (2017). Remixing Rasmussen’:
The evolution of Accimaps within systemic accident analysis. Applied Ergonomics, 59,
483–503. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apergo.2016.09.004.
Zhan, Q. J., Zheng, W., & Zhao, B. B. (2017). A hybrid human and organizational analysis
method for railway accidents based on HFACS-Railway Accidents (HFACS-RAs).
Safety Science, 91, 232–250. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.08.017.
Jiangshi Zhang is an Associate Professor and researcher who is currently working at
School of Resources and Safety Engineering, China University of Mining and Technology,
Beijing. He has worked and studied in higher education for more than 10 years. His re-
search focus on behavioral safety, safety management, and safety culture.
Wenyue Zhang is a postgraduate at School of Resources and Safety Engineering, China
University of Mining and Technology, Beijing. She majored in construction safety engi-
neering in Chang'an University in Xi'an as an undergraduate. After graduation, she does
some researches on accident cause theories and accidents prevention in China University
of Mining and Technology, Beijing.
Peihui Xu is a postgraduate at School of Resources and Safety Engineering, China Univer-
sity of Mining and Technology, Beijing. He did some research on occupational health when
he was an undergraduate. After graduation, his research focus includes occupational
health and dust explosion in China University of Mining and Technology, Beijing.
Na Chen is an Associate Professor and lecturer working at School of Mechanics and Engi-
neering Science, Zhengzhou University. She was a visiting scholar in University of Michi-
gan, School of Engineering, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering during
2015–2016. Her area of expertise is safety management, Safety ergonomics and Emer-
gency behavior and management.