I.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
A. In General
1.Definition
2.Importance
B. Construction vs. Interpretation
C. When Construction is Necessary
1.Purpose: to determine spirit of the law/legislative intent in case of ambiguity of the statute
2.Effect when the text of the statute utterly fails to express the legislative intent
D. Power to Construe: Judicial Function
1.Separation of Powers
2.Interrelationship/Overlap of Powers
a. Executive and Legislative Powers
b. Executive and Judicial Powers
c. Judicial and Legislative Powers
CASE: Floresca v. Philex Mining 136 SCRA 506
Topic. Purpose of Construction: Limitation on the power of courts to construe
Case. Petition to review lower court decision dismissing a civil complaint lodged against Philex
Facts.
It is alleged that prior to the accident, Philex failed to address safety concerns in the mining site. Much water
accumulated in an open pit area which caused pressure in the working shafts below. As a result, said area
collapsed. Out of 48, 5 escaped, 22 rescued within the week. But 21 were left to die due to Philex’s order to stop
rescue mission.
Heirs of the 21 filed a civil complaint in CFI. Philex filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the accident falls
under the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) and thus outside of CFI jurisdiction. WCA provides that (1) such
work-connected deaths are within the jurisdiction of Workmen’s Compensation Commission (WCC) and (2) if the
employer is negligent, employer shall pay the compensation plus 50% of same compensation. But in essence,
the respondents invoke Section 5 of the WCA which states: “Exclusive right to compensation — The rights and
remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall
exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or
nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury.” Because the
heirs have already received compensation, they are no longer entitled to a damage suit.
The heirs of the deceased filed the present petition.

Issue. (1) Does CFI has jurisdiction? -Yes

(2) Whether the petitioners can only avail of WCA action or have a choice between WCA action and civil damage
in regular court or can avail of both WCA and civil damage? –Choose either one but not both.

Ratio. To answer the two issues, (2) should be addressed before (1). (2) Generally, petitioners must choose
between a WCA action and civil suit. This is what the Section 5 of WCA provides and what has been applied in
various court decisions. But the court decided to render leeway to the petitioners given the peculiarity of the
instances. Petitioners have already received compensation under the WCA. Afterwards, they learned of the true
cause of the accident which was Philex’s negligence. And then they filed a civil suit. The court reasoned that had
the petitioners learned of the cause much sooner, petitioners would have filed for a civil suit instead. Petitioners’
initial resort to WCA action, the court said, is based on ignorance or mistake of fact. Because petitioners were not
informed of the true cause, they had not the choice between a WCA and a civil suit. This then creates an
exception to Section 5 of WCA. Hence, court remanded the case to lower court for proper judgment. (1) CFI now
has jurisdiction because of the court’s making an exception of the case.

Doctrine: The topic, limitation on the power of courts to construe, can be found within court’s discussion of the
second issue. The two dissenting opinions posit that a careful reading of Section 5 of WCA would demonstrate
that when a complainant has already availed of compensation via WCA, his/her right to sue in civil or other courts
are understood to have been extinguished. After passage of WCA, legislature had plenty of occasion to modify
relevant provision but did not do so. This, according to dissent, is manifest of legislative’s continuing intent to
retain the exclusivity provided therein. In the majority opinion’s decision to allow petitioners to file case despite
having received their WCA compensation, dissent argues that the court has exercised a power outside of its
capacities, i.e. that it has legislated.
To this, the majority opinion enunciates that it has not legislated. What it did was a mere implementation of
the Constitution and relevant statutes. Secs. 6, 7, and 9 of Art. II of 1973 Constitution guarantees social justice,
establishes adequate services in employment, and protects labor. With these provisions, the present court only
gave effect to the rights petitioners are entitled to. No legislation occurred, because the principles are already
present and need only be applied.

3.Power of Judicial Review: Requisites

4.Declaration of unconstitutionality of statutes
a. Doctrine of constitutional supremacy
(1)Constitution superior to statutes
 (2)Executive issuances cannot prevail over statutory policy
CASE: Petitioner-Organizations v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 147036-37,
April 10, 2012
FACTS:

These are consolidated petitions to declare unconstitutional certain presidential decrees and executive
orders of the martial law era and under the incumbency of Pres. Estrada relating to the raising and use of
coco-levy funds, particularly: Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b)Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468, (c) E.O. 312,
and (d) E.O. 313.
Congress enacted R.A. 6260 that established a Coconut Investment Fund (CI Fund) for the development of
the coconut industry through capital financing. Coconut farmers were to capitalize and administer the Fund
through the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) whose objective was to advance the coconut farmers interests.
President Marcos enacted P.D. 755 which approved the acquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of
the coconut farmersto enable such bank to promptly and efficiently realize the industry's credit policy.
Then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.) 312, establishing a Sagip Niyugan Program
which sought to provide immediate income supplement to coconut farmers and encourage the creation of a
sustainable local market demand for coconut oil and other coconut products.
At about the same time, President Estrada issued E.O. 313, which created an irrevocable trust fund known
as the Coconut Trust Fund (the Trust Fund).This aimed to provide financial assistance to coconut farmers, to the
coconut industry, and to other agri-related programs. These shares were acquired with CII Funds and constituted
approximately 27% of the outstanding capital stock of SMC.E.O. 313 designated UCPB, through its Trust
Department, as the Trust Funds trustee bank.
On January 26, 2001, however, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the suspension of E.O.s
312 and 313. This notwithstanding, on March 1, 2001 petitioner organizations and individuals brought the
present action in G.R. 147036-37 to declare E.O.s 312 and 313 as well as Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468
unconstitutional.
On April 24, 2001 the other sets of petitioner organizations and individuals instituted G.R. 147811 to nullify
Section 2 of P.D. 755 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 also for being unconstitutional.

ISSUES: Are the coco-levy funds public funds?

Are (a) Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b) Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468, (c) E.O. 312, and (d) E.O. 313
unconstitutional?

RULING:
Coco-levy funds are public funds. The Court was satisfied that the coco-levy funds were raised pursuant to
law to support a proper governmental purpose. They were raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of
the State for the benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers in general. The COA reviewed the use of the
funds. The BIR treated them as public funds and the very laws governing coconut levies recognize their public
character.

Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III, Section 5of P.D. 961, and Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 completely
ignore the fact that coco-levy funds are public funds raised through taxation. And since taxes could be exacted
only for a public purpose, they cannot be declared private properties of individuals.

These assailed provisions, which removed the coco-levy funds from the general funds of the government
and declared them private properties of coconut farmers, do not appear to have a color of social justice for their
purpose. The levy on copra that farmers produce appears to be a business tax judging by its tax base. The
concept of farmers-businessmen is incompatible with the idea that coconut farmers are victims of social injustice
and so should be beneficiaries of the taxes raised from their earnings.

But, since coco-levy funds are taxes, the provisions of P.D.s755,961 and 1468 as well as those of E.O.s 312
and 313 that remove such funds and the assets acquired through them from the jurisdiction of the COA violate
Article IX-D, Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 2(1) vests in the COA the power and authority to
examine uses of government money and property.
E.O. 313 strays from the special purpose for which the law raises coco-levy funds in that it permits the use of
coco-levy funds for improving productivity in other food areas. Clearly, E.O.313 above runs counter to the
constitutional provision which directs that all money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be
treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only.

A final point,the E.O.s also transgress P.D. 1445,Section 84(2),the first part by the previously mentioned
sections of E.O. 313 and the second part by Section 4 of E.O. 312 and Sections 6 and 7 of E.O. 313.E.O. 313 vests
the power to administer, manage, and supervise the operations and disbursements of the Trust Fund it
established (capitalized with SMC shares bought out of coco-levy funds) in a Coconut Trust Fund Committee.

Section 4 ofE.O. 312 does essentially the same thing. It vests the management and disposition of the
assistance fund generated from the sale of coco-levy fund-acquired assets into a Committee of five members.

In effect, the provision transfers the power to allocate, use, and disburse coco-levy funds that P.D. 232
vested in the PCA and transferred the same, without legislative authorization and in violation of P.D. 232, to the
Committees mentioned above. An executive order cannot repeal a presidential decree which has the same
standing as a statute enacted by Congress.
 b. Effect
c. Partial unconstitutionality: separable provisions/with separability clause
CASES:
Lidasan v. COMELEC, supra
FACTS:
The Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790 entitled: “An Act Creating
the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur”. Comelec, prompted by the coming elections,
adopted its resolution the composition of the new municipality of Dianaton which will be the basis of the
establishment of precincts, registration of voter and other election purposes. It stated that the Dianaton, Lanao
del Sur shall be comnposed of 9 barrios situated in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur; 2 barrios
situated in the municipality of Buldon, Cotabato; and 10 situated in the municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato.
Apprised of this development the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the
statute be suspended until “clarified by correcting legislation.” Comelec, by another resolution, stood by its own
interpretation, declared that the statute “should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court.”

ISSUE: Whether R.A. 4790 is unconstitutional and therefore COMELEC’s resolutions pertaining to the said law be
nullified.

HELD:
Yes. The title — “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur“ — projects
the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. The totality of
R.A. 4790 was null and void since the remaining parts, which may be considered as valid, are dependent to the
parts being argued.
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part
is valid, the valid portion if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the
valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature would
have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. . . Enough must
remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . . The
language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and
what remains must express the legislative will independently of the void part, since the court has no power to
legislate.
In the case at bar, The phrase “in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” is misleading because it did not inform the
concerned parties, particularly the affected people of the 2 towns of Cotabato, of the full impact of the law.
Moreover, a change of boundaries of two (2) provinces could not be considered as a mere effect of the enacted
law since it is as important as creating a new municipality, which the title did not reflect. Thus, the resolutions of
COMELEC and to prohibit from implementing the same for electoral purposes.

Tatad v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997

FACTS:
In the case of Tatad v. Secretary of Energy, the petitioner is questioning the constitutionality of some
provisions in Republic Act No. 8180 or otherwise known as the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996. R.A.
No. 8180 which was created primarily to liberalize and deregulate the downstream oil industry in order to ensure
a truly competitive market under a regime of fair prices, adequate and continuous supply of
environmentally-clean and high-quality petroleum products. The Act was created to promote and encourage the
entry of new participants in the downstream oil industry, and introduce adequate measures to ensure the
attainment of these goals. However this was not the way the petitioners saw the act and instead looked at it in
a way which would violate the equal protection clause of those new entrants who want to enter the market with
the imposition of the different tariffs which would discourage the new entrants, maintaining the market control
of the big companies such as Caltex, Shell and Petron and thus promoting monopolies in the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in
restraint of trade and unfair competition.

RULING:
The court found that the following provisions violate Section 19 of Article XII of the constitution: Section
5(b), Section 6 and Section 9(b) , therefore making R.A. 8180 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL and E.O. 372 VOID
Section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly violated by the aforestated provisions of R.A. No. 8180
mandates: “The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.”

d. Doctrine of Relative of Constitutionality

CASE: Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. BSP, 446 SCRA 299
FACTS:
The Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc, filed a Petition for Prohibition against BSP and the
Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last
provisio in Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
July 3, 1993, RA No 7653 (The New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the
Philippines and created a new BSP.
Article II, Section 15 (c) RA 7653: A compensation structure based on job evaluation studies and wage
surveys and subject to the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bank Sentrals
human resource development program. Provided that the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as
closely as possible with the principles provided for under RA No 6758 (Salary Standardization Act). Provided,
however, that compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and
below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under RA No 6758.
ISSUE: Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, runs afoul of the
constitutional mandate that “No person shall be … denied equal protection of the laws”

HELD:
The last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, is unconstitutional.
With the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of the other government financial
institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653, constitutes
invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
The prior view on the constitutionality of RA 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification between
the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because there were substantial distinction that
made real differences between the 2 classes.
The subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that considerably
alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653. This
relates to the constitutionality of classifications between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs. The
classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the class. The provisio
may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as
practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who are without differences.
The inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption rests on the policy
determination by the legislature. The policy determination argument may support the inequality of treatment
between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment
between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs who are similarly situated.
The issue is not the declared policy of the law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress inconsistent and
unequal policy towards the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs. The challenge to the constitutionality
of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653 is premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by
Congress in its treatment of persons similarly situated.
In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that “no person shall be denied the equal protection of the
laws” includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly.
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges conferred and liabilities enforced.
Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principles is that equal protection and security shall
be given to every person under circumstance which, if not identical are analogous.

5.Reversal of Judicial Construction

6.Promulgation: Operative Act for the Effectivity of a Decision
CASES:
Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178831-32, July 30, 2009
See also Araneta v. Dinglasan, supra [Re: effect of the death of a justice J. Perfecto]
Facts:
Limkaichong ran as a Representative in the first district of Negros Oriental. Her rival Olivia Paras, and some
other concerned citizens filed a disqualification case against Limkaichong. The latter allegedly not a natural born
citizen of the Philippines because when she was born, her father was still a Chinese and that her mom, though
Filipino, lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s dad. During the pendency of the case,
election day came, and votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over Paras. Comelec after due
hearing, declared Limkaichong as disqualified. Notwithstanding their proclamation of disqualification, Comelec
issued a proclamation declaring Limkaichong as the winner. This is in compliance with Resolution no. 8062
adopting the disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and
resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation, filed a petition before the Comelec.

Issue: WON the proclamation done by the Comelec is valid, and WON Comelec should still exercise jurisdiction
over the matter.

Held:
The proclamation of Limkaichong is valid. the HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s
proclamation. The SC has invariably held once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath and
assumed office as a member of the House of Rep., the Comelec’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
election, returns, and disqualification ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the
proclamation of a winning candidate divests the Comelec of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the
time of proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding
before the HRET. The use of the word “sole” in Sec.17 Art. VI of the Constitution and in Sec. 250 of the Omnibus
Election Code underscores the exclusivity of the electoral tribunal’s jurisdiction over election contest relating to
its members.

Sec 17, Article VI of the Constitution- Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an electoral
tribunal which shall be the “sole” judge of all contests relating to the election returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. Each electoral tribunals shall be composed of 9 members……

7.Rulings of the SC (in construing a statute)

a. Part of Legal System (See Art. 8, NCC)
 b. Judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed
CASES:
Senarillos v. Hermosisima, G.R. No. L-10662, December 14, 1956
FACTS:
Petitioner was appointed as Chief of Police in Sibonga, Cebu. Upon the charges filed by Petitioner, Senarillos
was suspended by Municipal Mayor of Sibonga and investigated by a “police committee” composed of 3
councilors created by Resolution No.2 Series 1952 of the municipal council. The committee came up with an
adverse decision subsequently signed by the members of the council. This was appealed to and affirmed by the
Commissioner of Civil Service and by the Civil Service Board of Appeals.

ISSUE: W/N Sibonga had jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos.

HELD:
No. Under RA No.557 the investigation of police officers must be conducted by council itself and not by a
mere committee thereof. Sibonga therefore had no jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos. RA
No.557 has eliminated the provision authorizing investigation by a committee council. Hence, the decision
against him was invalid, even if concurred in by the rest of the councilors. The fact that the decision of the
Municipal Council was issued before the decision of the Supreme Court cannot validate the action of the police
committee. The initial proceeding was illegal ab initio and the subsequent reaffirmation of the decision of the
municipal council by the civil service authorities could not validate the proceeding.
That the decision of the Municipal Council of Sibonga was issued before the decision in Festejo vs. Mayor of
Nabua was rendered, would be, at the most, proof of good faith on the part of the police committee, but can not
sustain the validity of their action. It is elementary that the interpretation placed by this Court upon Republic Act
557 constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect.

Phil. International Trading Corp. v. COA, G.R. No. 205837, November 21, 2017
FACTS:
With the issuance of PD 1071, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the Philippine International
Trading Corporation, thenPresident Marcos issued EO 756, authorizing the reorganization of PITC. On February
18, 1983, President Marcos issued ExecutiveOrder No. 87. Romero, an officer of petitioner, filed a July 16, 2001
request, seeking from petitioner payment of retirementdifferentials on the strength of Section 6 of Executive
Order No. 756. COA Comm. Habitan issued the assailed ruling,stating thatReserve for Retirement Gratuity and
Commutation of Leave Credits of petitioners employees did not include allowances outside ofthe basic salary,
said officer ruled that Executive Order No. 756 was a special law issued only for the specific purpose
ofreorganizing petitioner corporation. Finding that Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 was simply an incentive
to encourageemployees to resign or retire at the height of petitioners reorganization, said decision went on to
make the following pronouncements, to wit:"Moreover, RA No. 4968 prohibits the creation of any insurance
retirement plan by any government agencyand government-owned or controlled corporation other than the
GSIS.

ISSUE: Whether Executive Order No. 756 is an additional alternative to existing general retirement laws and/or
an exception to theprohibition against separate or supplementary insurance retirement or pension plans.

HELD: No.
POLITICAL LAW: interpretation of statute; Executive Order No. 756 as an additional alternative to existing
generalretirement law.Time and again, it has been held that every statute must be so interpreted and brought in
accord with other laws as to form auniform system of jurisprudence. In the absence of a manifest and specific
intent from which the same may be gleaned, Section 6 ofExecutive Order No. 756 cannot be construed as an
additional alternative to existing general retirement laws and/or an exception tothe prohibition against separate
or supplementary insurance retirement or pension plans as aforesaid. Aside from the fact that ameaning that
does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein
byconstruction, petitioner would likewise do well to remember that repeal of laws should be made clear and
express. Repeals byimplication are not favored as laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full
knowledge of all laws existing on thesubject, the congruent application of which the courts must generally
presume. For this reason, it has been held that the failure toadd a specific repealing clause particularly
mentioning the statute to be repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal anyexisting law on the matter,
unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.

c. Generally, no retroactive effect

CASES:
People v. Santayana, G.R. No. L-22291, November 15, 1976 (in relation to People
v. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, August 30, 1967 and People v. Macarandang, G.R. No.
L-12088, December 23, 1959)
Facts:
On 19 February 1962, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was appointed as “Special Agent” by then Colonel Jose
C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On 9 March 1962, Col. Maristela issued an undated certification to the effect that
the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol described in the said Memorandum Receipt was
given to him by virtue of his appointment as special agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the
same in the performance of his official duty and for his personal protection. On 29 October 1962, the accused was
found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the firearms and ammunition without a license to possess them. An
investigation was conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the accused. The case
underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime charged. Hence, the case was appealed to
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Santayana, a secret agent, was liable for illegal possession of firearms

Held:
The appointment of a civilian as “secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns
and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a peace officer equivalent even to a member
of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879 (People v. Macarandang). In the present case,
Santayana was appointed as CIS secret agent with the authority to carry and possess firearms. He was issued a
firearm in the performance of his official duties and for his personal protection. Application of license was
unnecessary, according to Col. Maristela, as the firearm is government property. No permit was issued,
according to Capt. Adolfo Bringas as he was already appointed as a CIS agent. Even if the case of People vs. Mapa
revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case, this was made only on 30 August 1967, years after the accused
was charged.
Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellant’s appointment as secret agent, he
incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor
General, and acquitted Jesus Santayana, canceling the bond for his provisional release; with costs de oficio.

Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 110318, August 28, 1996
FACTS:
- Complainants thru counsel lodged a formal complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation for
Violation of PD. NO. 49, as amended, and sought its assistance in their anti-film piracy drive
- On November 14, 1987, NBI Senior Agent Lauro Reyes applied for a search warrant with the court against
Sunshine seeking the seizure, among others pirated video tapes of copyrighted films all of which were
enumerated in a list attached to the application, televisiob sets, video cassettes and laser disc recording eqptd
- Search warrant served at about 1:45 pm on Decemver 14, 1986 to Sunshine and they found and seized
various video tapes of duly copyrighted motion pictures owned or exclusively distributed by private complainants
and machines, eqpt., other machines
- Senior Agent reiterated the things he wrote in his written statement during the hearing and corroborated.
- On Decmber 16, 1987, "A Return of Search Warrant" was fiked
- A Motion to life the order of search warrant was filed but was later denied for lack of merit
- A Motion for reconsideration was filed and granted justified in this manner
- It is undisputed that the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films wete allegedly
copies, were never presentes in the proceedings for the issuabce of the search warrants in question. The orders
of the Court grantingsearch warrants and denying the urgent motion to lift order of search warrants were
therefore issued in error. Consequently they must be set aside.
- 20th Century Fox Film Corp. V. CA

ISSUE: Whether or not the 20th Century Fox decision is applicable to the motion to quash the search warrant.

HELD:
No. The 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be retroactively applied to the instant case to justify the quashal of
the search warrant. Judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally
passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, and more so there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should
not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith.
In the case at bar, the 20th Century Fox case was inexistent in December 198u when Search Warrant
87-053 was issued by lower court. It is indiputable, therefore, that at the time of the application, or on December
14,1987, the lower court did not commit any error nor did it fail to comply with any legal requirement for the valid
issuance of search warrant.

d. SC ruling cannot be undone by Congress by re-enacting a provision previously declared

unconstitutional
CASE: Sameer Oversees Placement v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.

Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract for a monthly salary
of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged
that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked
to work as a cutter.

Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior
notice, that she was terminated and that “she should immediately report to their office to get her salary and
passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation.” Joy claims that she was told that from June 26
to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover
her plane ticket to Manila.
 On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal.
LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations
Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three months’ worth of salary, the
reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s fee.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal dismissal

HELD:

YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s salary should be
increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract. Petitioner is
also ORDERED to reimburse respondent the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary and pay respondent attorney’s fees of
NT$300.00 at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment.

Ruling on the constitutional issue:

The clause, “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore,
null and void.

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government may exercise
its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports
such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of the
Constitution. Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the
nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or
provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so
changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION RULES

A. Ratio Legis: Spirit of the law/Legislative Intent as the Primary Object
1.As expressed in the literal reading of the text
a. Verba legis (literal or plain meaning rule)
CASES:
Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

FACTS:

Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married in the Philippines to Yoshino Minoro, a Japanese national. She divorced
Minoro in Japan and a Japanese court issued the divorce decree dated December 6, 2011.On January 10, 2012,
she filed in the RTC of Dagupan City a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San
Juan, Manila, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. She also prayed that she be allowed to use her maiden
surname: Manalo. She claims there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage cancelled so that it would
not appear that she is still married to a Japanese national who is no longer married to her, and so that she shall
not be bothered and disturbed by said entry should she decide to remarry.

ISSUE: W/N a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his/her alien spouse who is capacitated to
remarry.

RULING:

YES, pursuant to Par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code. However, this case was remanded to the RTC to allow
Manalo to prove the Japanese law on divorce.

Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino souse is the
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning
of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are
found in the statue. Verbal egist non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.

[The spirit of the law and the true intent of the legislature prevails]

Assuming arguendo that the word “obtained” should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding
must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do
so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but
to carry out such ends and purposes.

Bustamante v. NLRC, 265 SCRA 61

FACTS:

Private respondent moves to reconsider the earlier decision of the Supreme Court First Division on grounds that
(a) petitioners are not entitled to recover backwages because they were not actually dismissed but their
probationary employment was not converted to permanent employment; and (b) assuming that petitioners are
entitled to backwages, computation thereof should not start from cessation of work up to actual reinstatement,
and that salary earned elsewhere (during the period of illegal dismissal) should be deducted from the award of
such backwages.

ISSUE: How should backwages be computed?

HELD:

-The prevailing rule is that backwages to be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee, should not be
diminished or reduced by the earnings derived by him elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal.
The underlying reason of this ruling is that the employee, while litigating the legality (illegality) of his
dismissal, must still earn a living to support himself and family, while his backwages have to be paid by
the employer as part of the price or penalty he has to pay for illegally dismissing his employee.
-Under Art. 279, as amended, the provision handling for "full backwages" to illegally dismissed employees is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity and, therefore, must be applied without attempted or strained
interpretation. Index animi sermo est.

Therefore, petitioners are entitled on their full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their
monetary equivalent, from the time their actual compensation was withheld on them up to the time of their
actual reinstatement.

-Post-Labor Code
o Art. 279 provided that an unjustly dismissed employee shall be entitled “to his back wages
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
reinstatement.”

IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663

FACTS
On June 20, 1975, the petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent bank for the payment of holiday
pay before the then Department of Labor, NLRC in Manila. Conciliation having failed, the case was certified for
arbitration and later on a decision was rendered by the Labor Arbiter granting petitioner’s complaint. Respondent
bank complied by paying the holiday pay to and including January 1976. On December 1975, PD 850was
promulgated amending the provisions of the Labor Code with the controversial section stating that monthly paid
employees receiving uniform monthly pay is presumed to be already paid the “10 paid legal holidays”. Policy
instruction 9 was issued thereafter interpreting the said rule. Respondents bank stopped the payment by reason
of the promulgated PD 850 and Policy Instruction 9.

ISSUE: Whether or not monthly paid employees are excluded from the benefit of holiday pay.

HELD
No. It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and
unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar, the provisions of the Labor
Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit- it provides for both the coverage of
and exclusion from the benefits. In Policy Instruction 9, the then Secretary of Labor categorically state that the
benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be
paid their regular holiday pay. While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statue by
executive officers whose duty is to enforce it should be given great weight by the courts, still if such construction
is so erroneous, the same must be declared as null and void.

Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople, 138 SCRA 273

FACTS:
On May 20, 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association instituted a complaint with the Department of
Labor against private respondent Chartered Bank, for the payment of ten (10) unworked legal holidays, as well
as for premium and overtime differentials for worked legal holidays from November 1, 1974. Both the arbitrator
and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, the Minister of
Labor set aside the decision of the NLRC and dismissed the petitioner's claim for lack of merit basing its decision
on the provisions of Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not the respondent Secretary of Labor acted contrary to law and abused his discretion in
denying the claim of petitioners

HELD:
While it is true that the respondent Minister has the authority in the performance of his duty to promulgate
rules and regulations to implement, construe and clarify the Labor Code, such power is limited by provisions of
the statute sought to be implemented, construed or clarified. An administrative interpretation which diminishes
the benefits of labor more than what the statute delimits or withholds is obviously ultra vires. Any slight doubts
must be resolved in favor of the workers. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate of promoting social
justice and affording protection to labor..

(1) Dura lex sed lex

CASES: Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 561
FACTS:
Don Andres Pascual died intestate (on October 12, 1973) without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged
natural, adopted or spurious children.
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late
Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual.
Petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to
reiterate Hereditary Rights. the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an order,
the dispositive portion of which resolved to deny this motion reiterating their hereditary rights. Their motion for
reconsideration was also denied.
Petitioners appealed their case to the Court of Appeals, but like the ruling of CA, their motion for
reconsideration was also dismissed.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview
of Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized (and acknowledged)
natural children as their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were
under conception.
Statute/s subject of construction:
§ ARTICLE 992 OF THE CC
- “An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father
or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.”

ISSUE: WON Article 992 of the CC can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance
of the deceased.

HELD:
No. The petition is devoid of merit. Petition dismissed.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners herein
cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent
Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an
elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to
mean exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]).
The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA,
127 SCRA 233 [1984]).
When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected,
even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42).
And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but
reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved
in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute,
the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.

a) Exception: Inapplicability in criminal cases

CASE: People v. Santayana, 74 SCRA 25 in relation to People v. Mapa, 20 SCRA
1164
Facts:
Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in an information dated 14
August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative Code in connection with Section 2692 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 and as further amended by RA 4 (home-made revolver
(Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the
necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities)
Accused admits to possession of firearm on ground of being a secret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste of
Batangas. On 27 November 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime and
sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and one day to two years. As the appeal involves a question of law,
it was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the governor is exempt from the
requirement of having a license of firearm

Held: The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or
ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition (Sec 878 RA 4 of the RAC) except when such firearms are in
possession of such public officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties; as those
firearms and ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors or marines, the
Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial
governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of
provincial prisoners and jails (Sec 879) It is the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the law;
Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them. The law cannot be any clearer, there being no provision made for a secret agent.

Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no longer speaks with authority
to the extent that the present decision conflicts with. It may be note that in People v. Macarandang, a secret
agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment of the accused as a secret agent to assist
in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put him within the category
of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879, Thus,
in the present case, therefore, the conviction must stand.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment.

2.As determined through Construction

a. General Rule: Statute must be capable of construction, otherwise inoperative
CASE: Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106
Facts:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and
Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials,
through People’s Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides
for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution.
Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing
and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang
Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as
intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which
is cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin
filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition
rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to
amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed;
(2) The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term
limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of people’s initiative. The Supreme Court granted
the Motions for Intervention.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of
the Constitution.

Held:
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing legislation the same
cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if
Congress does not provide for its implementation.

The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been
delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the
COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of
the right to people’s initiative.

The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the
Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to
opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative.
However, considering the Court’s decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision
or amendment has become academic.

b. Specific Rules
(1) Mens Legislatoris: Ascertain spirit/intent/purpose of the law
CASES:
Matabuena v. Cervantes, 38 SCRA 284
FACTS:
The stipulated facts agreed upon by both the plaintiff and the defendant assisted by their respective counsels,
are:
1. The deceased Felix Matabuena owned the property in question;
2. Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos (referring to a transfer or gift made during one's
lifetime, as opposed to a testamentary transfer which is a gift that takes effect on death) in favor of defendant,
Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on February 20, 1956, which same donation was accepted
by defendant;
3. The donation of the land to Petronila (defendant) which took effect immediately was made during the common
law relationship as husband and wife, they were married on March 28, 1962;
4. The deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962;
5. The plaintiff claims the property by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the
deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the land declared in her
name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon.

Cornelia (plaintiff-appellant), sister of Felix Matabuena maintains that the donation made by Felix to Petronila
Cervantes (defendant-appellee) was void because they were living without the benefit of marriage (common law
marriage). This is in pursuant to Article 133 of Civil Code which provides "Every donation between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void. On 23 November 1965, the lower court upheld the validity of the
donation as it was made before Cervantes’ marriage to the donor. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: WON the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law
relationship

HELD:
The lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the complaint with costs is REVERSED. The
questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso (for an undivided
part). The case is remanded to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the above
opinion.

RATIO:
It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is
written. If there is ever any occasion where the principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit
of the law is as much a part of it as what is written, then such would be it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible
in such codal provision would not be attained.

A 1954 Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code
says clearly that if the policy of the law is (in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that
Court) "to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law then there is every
reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without benefit of
nuptials.

King v. Hernandez, 114 SCRA 730

ISSUE: Whether a Chinese holding a noncontrol position in a retail establishment, comes within the prohibition
against aliens intervening “in the management, operation, administration or control” followed by the phrase
“whether as an officer, employee or laborer…
·
HELD:
Following the principle, the entire scope of personnel activity, including that of laborers, is covered by the
prohibition against the employment of aliens.

Bustamante v. NLRC, supra

US v. Toribio, 15 Phil 85
Facts:
The appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption the carabao described in the
information, without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in
violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and
slaughter of large cattle.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered there is no
municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances the provisions of
Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure.

Issue:
Whether or not the proper construction of the language of these provisions limit the prohibition contained in
Section 30 and the penalty imposed in Section 33 to cases:
(1) of slaughter of large cattles for human consumption in a municipal slaughter house without a permit duly
secured from the municipal treasurer, and
(2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal slaughter-house without a permit duly secured from the
municipal treasurer.

Held:
The prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption,
anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) expressly and specifically to the
killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the penalty provided
in section 33 applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a
permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a
municipal slaughterhouse without such permit.
Sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human consumption or killing for food at a
municipal slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit issued by the municipal treasurer, and section 32
provides for the keeping of detailed records of all such permits in the office of the municipal and also of the
provincial treasurer.

Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should
be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for
which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other
provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment.
Therefore, sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for
human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30.

Bocobo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520

Planters Association of Negros, Inc. v. Ponferrada, G.R. No. 114087, October

26, 1999

a) Instance when the literal import must yield to spirit/intent: in election-related cases
CASE:
Villanueva v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-54718, December 4, 1985 (Read the dissent
of Justice Aquino for the caveat on this rule)
FACTS:
On January 25, 1980, Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice Mayor of Dolores for the
January 30 elections in substitution for his companion Mendoza who withdrew candidacy
without oath upon filing on January 4.
Petitioner won in the election but Respondent Board disregarded all his votes and proclaimed
Respondent Candidate as the winner on the presumption that Petitioner’s candidacy was not
duly approved by Respondent.
Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of the proclamation but was dismissed by
Respondent Commission on the grounds that Mendoza’s unsworn withdrawal had no
legal effect, and that assuming it was effective, Petitioner’s candidacy was not valid since
Mendoza did not withdraw after January 4.

ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of formal or technical defects.

HELD:
No. The fact that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality, which should not be used to
frustrate the people’s will in favor of Petitioner as the substitute candidate. Also, his withdrawal
right on the very same day that he filed his candidacy should be considered as
having been made substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the literal reading of
the provision by Respondent Commission. The spirit of the law rather than its literal reading
should have guided Respondent Commission in resolving the issue of last-minute
withdrawal and substitution of other persons as candidates.

DISSENTING OPINION

AQUINO, C.J.:

Vivencio G. Lirio of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan was the candidate for vice mayor of Dolores, Quezon Province in the election held on January 30, 1980.

The other candidate for vice mayor was Narciso L. Mendoza, Jr., who filed his certificate of candidacy on January 4, 1980, the last day for filing certificates
of candidacy. But at 7:27 in the evening of that day, Mendoza withdrew his candidacy by means of a handwritten letter of withdrawal which was not
under oath. He handed that letter to the election registrar of Dolores.
Five days before the election or on January 25, 1980, Crisologo Villanueva filed his certificate of candidacy for vice mayor in substitution for Mendoza. On
January 26 the election registrar transmitted Villanueva's certificate of candidacy and Mendoza's withdrawal letter to the provincial election registrar who,
in turn, indorsed the same to the Commission on Elections. These papers were received by the Comelec Law Department only on February 11, 1980 or
after the election and after the proclamation of Lirio as the duly elected vice mayor.

Villanueva's name was not included in the official list of candidates. However, on the eve of the election or on January 29, he addressed a letter to all
chairmen and members of the board of election inspectors of Dolores wherein he informed them of his candidacy in substitution for Mendoza. He
requested them to count the votes cast in his favor.

The municipal election registrar asked the provincial election registrar to clarify the status of Villanueva's candidacy. On election day, the provincial
election registrar replied that since Villanueva's name was not included in the official list of candidates it could be legally presumed that the Comelec did
not approve his certificate of candidacy.

On January 31, 1980 the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Lirio as the duly elected vice mayor. The votes cast for Villanueva were not
counted because he was not an official candidate. They were regarded as stray votes. It cannot be assumed that he received 3,112 votes as against 2,660
votes for Lirio.

Villanueva filed a petition to annul Lirio's proclamation. The Comelec dismissed it on the grounds (1) that Mendoza's withdrawal had no legal effect be-
cause it was not under oath as required in section 27 of the Election Code and (2) that even assuming that it was effective, Villanueva's substitute
candidacy was not valid under section 28 of the Election Code since Mendoza did not withdraw after January 4 but on that very day.

Any votes cast for Villanueva were stray votes under section 155(15) of the Election Code. It cannot be said that Villanueva obtained more votes than Lirio,
a reelectionist.

It is dangerous to rely on the so-called spirit of the law which we cannot see nor handle and which we do not know very much.

The Comelec resolution was affirmed by this Court. Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration.

I vote to deny said motion.

Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. CTA, 100 Phil 850

b) When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases
CASES:
Comendador v. De Villa, GR No. 93177, August 2, 1991
FACTS:

 The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in
the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.
 January 14, 1990, a Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had been constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 to
investigate the petitioners.
 January 30, 1990, the PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena individually addressed to the petitioners. The petitioners
acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates
of victims of the rebellion. At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various
grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days to file their objections in writing through a Motion for
Summary Dismissal.
 February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days to submit their respective
counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.
 May 15, 1990, the petitioners manifested that they were exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against
the president and members of GCM No.14 by invoking Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408. GCM No. 14 ruled, however,
that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No.39.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not petitioners can manifest the right to peremptory challenge.

HELD:

 Yes, the petitioners have the right to peremptory challenge. The right to peremptory challenge was originally provided
under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War).
 November 7,1972, when President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition,
Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory
challenge.
 January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the state of martial law
throughout the Philippines. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created
there under, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante
rationelegis, cessat ipsa lex. Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in P.D. No.
39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No.2045, As a
result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to
peremptory challenge.
People v. Almuete, supra
(2) ut magis valeat quam pereat: construe statute as a whole
CASE:
Sajonas v. CA, G. R. No. 102377, July 5, 1996
Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes, supra
Planters Association v. Ponferrada, supra
Aisporna v. CA, supra