LegMeth Reviewer

a.
TEXT, STRUCTURE, HISTORY

❖ Labugal-B’laan v. Ramos
➢ Resort to the deliberations of the deliberations of the ConComm does not yield
an absolutely certain interpretation.
➢ In this case, the Court favored the validity of the Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement of the PH Government with Western Mining Corporation,
a foreign owned corporation, for the exploration, development, and utilization of
hectares of land in Mindanao.
➢ Petitioners argue that it is unconstitutional for allowing foreign corporations to
undertake exploration, development, and utilization of PH mining resources. But
the Court resolved that the phrase in Section 2(4) Article XII of the Constitution
saying “may enter into agreements involving either technical or financial
assistance” meant that the participation of the foreign corporations is not limited
to mere technical or financial assistance as the word “involving” indicates that
there may be other forms of assistance or activities.
➢ Deliberations showed that drafters interchangeably used the term “agreements
involving either technical or financial assistance” and “service contracts”. This
confirmed that these contracts are “new service contracts” and that drafters did
not intend to impose a total ban on such contracts.
b. OTHER RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

❖ Sarmiento v. Mison - p. 83
➢ Deals with ambiguous provision in the Constitution (Section 16, Article VII, 1987)
raising the issue of whether or not the respondent’s appointment is void for not
having been confirmed by the CoA.
➢ Deliberations of Constitutional Convention show that framers struck the middle
ground between 1935 Constitution which required all presidential appointments
to be confirmed by CoA and the 1973 Constitution which placed absolute power
in the President in matters of appointments. The 1987 Constitution made
classifications as to which appointees need confirmation and which not.
➢ Respondent’s appointment was held valid since it falls under the classification
which no longer needed confirmation.
❖ IBP v. Zamora - p.85

➢ Using literal construction, the Court made a distinction between the calling out
power of the President, the power to suspend the privilege of writ of habeas
corpus, and the proclamation of martial law. In Section 18 Article VII, while the
latter two require an actual invasion or rebellion and a requirement of public
safety, the calling out power remains discretionary upon the President “whenever
it becomes necessary.”
❖ Marcelino v. Cruz - p.88
➢ Mandatory and Directory Provisions - Directory nature of constitutional provisions
on procedure
➢ While constitutional provisions are generally mandatory, the court held that there
are exceptions. The Constitutional provision on the period of deciding a case
pursuant to Section 11 (1) Article X is widely held to be merely directory,
evidenced by the phrase “unless reduced by the Supreme Court,” which shows
that such period may be modified according to the Court’s sound discretion. The
Court relied on the pronouncement in Albermarle Oil & Gas Co. v Morris that
constitutional provisions on procedure are directory.
c. AIDS IN INTERPRETATION
❖ Legaspi v. Minister of Finance - p. 90
➢ The Court refers us to understand the purpose of a law (intent of the framers) in
interpreting its language. Interpretation is not simply the literal application of the
words of a Charter. It is important to remember that constitutional provisions are
meant to be transcendental and that interpretation of its language must consider
both the current events and developments, and the imperative considerations
rooted in the historical background and environment which brought about the law
being written.
❖ De Castro v. JBC w/ dissent by Justice Carpio-Morales - p. 93

➢ The Court and J. Carpio Morales relied on the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission (intent of the framers) to determine whether or not the president can
appoint a Chief Justice 2 months before the next presidential elections.The Court
concluded that the Judiciary is exempted from the constitutional prohibition on
midnight appointments. J. Carpio Morales on the other hand concluded that the
deliberations intended the ban to apply to all government appointments
irrespective of their independence, citing Davide who said that the prohibition is
meant to prohibit the incumbent president from prolonging his rule through
appointing people to sensitive positions in the commissions, ombudsman, and
even the judiciary.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
❖ Caltex v. Palomar
Caltex wanted to host a contest wherein the participants have to guess how much gas
would a hooded gas pump dispense during a specified period. The contest involves a
three-staged winner selection system - the station level, the regional level, and the national
level. Caltex foresaw the need to extensively make use of mailing services so they asked the
Postmaster General to have Caltex mails regarding the contest be cleared in advance.
However, the Postmaster General disallowed it, stating that the contest violates the
anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law.
The SC held that the proposed contest does not violate the Postal Law. The Postal
Law prohibits the use of postal services for “any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the
distribution of property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind.” The Supreme Court first
determined whether the proposed contest is considered a lottery. They looked into the case
of El Debate, Inc. v. Topacio where it stated that the essential elements of lottery are:
consideration, prize, and chance. The elements of prize and chance is obviously present
in the proposed contest, however, the element of consideration was not since the proposed
contest does not require any kind of fee in order to be a participant. The Supreme Court ruled
that the contest was not a lottery.
The Supreme Court then looked into whether the proposed contest was considered
a gift enterprise. Previous cases consider gift enterprises prohibited if it exhibit the three
elements of lottery while other cases prohibit it regardless of the elements of lottery. In solving
this, the Supreme Court applied the principle of noscitur a sociis in determining whether the
term “gift enterprise” in the Postal Law prohibits gift enterprises only if it exhibits the elements of
lottery. Since the term “gift enterprise” was enumerated in the same sentence as lottery,
the Supreme Court ruled that it should be accorded no other meaning than that which is
consistent with the term “lottery”. Therefore, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a
consideration aside from prize and chance, gift enterprises are likewise prohibited only if they
involve the element of consideration, [prize, and chance].
b. LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER TO CONSTRUE
❖ Endencia v. David
Collector of Internal Revenue Saturnino David ordered the taxing of Justice Endencia’s
and Justice Jugo’s compensation pursuant to Sec. 13, RA 590 which states that “No salary
wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as
exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.”
Respondents argue that Congress enacted RA 590 in response to the Court’s decision
on Perfecto vs. Meer in which it was held that imposition of income tax upon the salary of
Justices amount to diminution thereof.
Through RA 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a
decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation of the meaning of the
phrase “which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office,” found in Sec. 9, Art. 8,
of the Constitution. SC held that this act of interpreting the Constitution by the Legislature
is an invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
In conclusion, The Court reiterated the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto v.
Meer, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a
diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. Court further holds that the interpretation
and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and
jurisdiction of the judicial department.
In enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying
the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation
already given in a case by the highest court of the land.
❖ Angara v. Electoral Commission - p.333

➢ The SC has jurisdiction over interpreting the constitutional power granted to
Constitution-created bodies, and it ruled that the Electoral Commission has sole
jurisdiction over elections as it was created to counter partisan-related issues if
the power remained in the hands of the legislative.
➢ This clear grant of power to the Electoral Commission in Section 4, Article VI of
the 1935 Constitution, which stated that “The Electoral Commission shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly," is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature and is an implied
denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly.
➢ Even if the National Assembly had confirmed the election of Angara through a
Resolution on Dec 3, 1935 before the Electoral Commission fixed a date for the
last filing of electoral protests on Dec 9, 1935 through a Resolution adopted on
the same day, because the Electoral Commission was granted sole jurisdiction
by the constitution, the National Assembly’s resolution cannot prevail over the
Electoral Commission’s constitutional prerogative.
AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION
i. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
DEFINITION: The history of events that transpired during the process of enacting a law, from its
introduction in the legislature to its final validation has generally been the first extrinsic aid to
which courts turn to construe an ambiguous act. When such occasions arise, courts may take
judicial notice of the origin and history of the law, the deliberations during the enactment,
and prior laws on the same subject matter to ascertain the true intent or the spirit of the
law. In cases involving penal statutes, courts must take heed as to the language, legislative
history, and purpose in order to strictly determine the extent of the conduct that the law
forbids. It may also consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive
issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative construction. (Gatmaytan, 2016)
❖ Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v. Central Bank

How they applied the construction/interpretation:
The case hinged on whether cocoa beans are included in the term “chocolate”, and so
the Court provided a means to legally define chocolate. The Court can give weight to
legislators' deliberations, though this is not usual. Through the Journal of the h Senate, the
Court found that Senators deliberated that they do not intend “cocoa beans” and “chocolate” to
be synonymous when they passed RA 601 in the past; thus, this proved that the legislators see
a difference between cocoa beans and chocolate that is manufactured product ready for human
consumption. In the Journal of the Senate:
MR. PRESIDENT, On the same page (page 1), line 9, delete "cocoa beans". The text as
it came to the Senate was misleading. In the original law the exemption is for chocolate and the
version that we got from the Lower House is "(cocoa beans)" giving the impression that
chocolate and cocoa beans are synonymous. Now I think this is a sort of a rider, so your
committee recommends the deletion of those words.
Why they applied the construction/interpretation:
There was a tax exemption on “chocolate”, so if cocoa beans are included in the term
“chocolate” then the tax-exemption includes cocoa beans as well. (But alas, the Court did not
rule such. Cocoa beans ain’t “chocolate”)
Doctrine/Takeaway:
1. The burden of proof that one is exempted is on the claimant, or the actor to be
exempted. This is especially true in cases of taxation because taxes are
(supposed to be) the rule and exemption is the exception.
2. If one’s acts are exempted by new laws, they only apply prospectively, not
retroactively (i.e., if one wasn’t exempted before but is exempted now, one still
isn’t exempted before-- here, the plaintiffs’ importation of the cocoa was before a
legislative change that did include cocoa in the list of exemptions)
❖ Buenaseda v. Flavier
The National Center for Mental Health Nurses Association filed an administrative
complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against officers and
employees of the NCMH. The Office of The Ombudsman ordered the preventive suspension of
the aforementioned officers and employees. Such officers and employees then filed a petition in
Court seeking to nullify the Ombudsman’s Order.
They argue that the phrase “suspend any officer or employee under his authority” under
Sec 24, RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Law limits the power of the Ombudsman to suspend
government officials or employees connected with his office. Thus, he could only recommend to
the heads of the departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of officials and
employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his office.
The Court traced the legislative origin of the phrase “suspend any officer or
employee under his authority” in Sec. 24 of the Ombudsman Law. The provision in the
Ombudsman Law was put in contrast with provision of Sec. 694 of the Revised Administrative
Code which authorizes the chief of a bureau or an office to “suspend any subordinate or
employee in his bureau or under his authority pending an investigation”. The Ombudsman Law
deleted the words “subordinate” and “in his bureau” leaving the phrase to read: “suspend any
officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation.”
The Court concluded that with the deletion of the word “subordinate” before the
words “in his bureau” after “officer or employee”, the Congress intended to empower the
Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials and employees under investigation by his
office, irrespective of whether they are employed “in his office’ or any other office of the
government.

Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the
appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
The Courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of the law, the
deliberations during enactment, and prior laws on the same subject matter to ascertain the
true intent or spirit of the law.
ii. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION

DEFINITION: As an interpretation of a law by the implementing administrative agency, the
contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government is
accorded great respect by courts, but such is not binding on the courts.
❖ Philippine Scout Veterans Security & Investigation Agency Inc. v. NLRC
An employee of the petitioner retired and wanted his retirement benefits despite there
being no collective agreement or contract stipulations. Petitioner refused and made a
counter-offer but was then refused by the former employee. The former employee raised the
matter to the NLRC who ruled in favor of the former employee on the basis of Art. 287 of the
Labor Code and Rules Implementing the Labor Code. Hence, the appeal.
The Court conducted a plain-meaning interpretation of Art. 287 of the Labor Code as it
was written then and Secs. 13 and 14(a), Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the
Labor Code.
The Supreme Court found that there was no contractual or statutory basis for the
NLRC to award the retirement pay to the former employee.
So, despite the NLRC’s previous ruling in a similar case granting the retirement benefits,
the Supreme Court held that the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion in deciding in
favor of the former employee since there was no legal basis for such a decision.
The Supreme Court simply said that even if contemporaneous construction is given
great weight by the courts, if it is clearly wrong then it is null and void. It is the role of the
Judiciary to refine or correct constitutional or statutory interpretations.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
Contemporary construction is only given great weight and, if found to be erroneous or

clearly in conflict with governing laws, will be declared null and void by the Judiciary.
❖ Adasa v. Abalos
Abalos filed complaints against Adasa for Estafa. The Office of the City Prosecutor of
Iligan City found probable cause against petitioner and ordered the filing of Informations for
Estafa. Adasa filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ following her arraignment. DOJ
reversed and directed the withdrawal of the Information for Estafa against petitioner through a
resolution.
Abalos filed a motion for reconsideration of said resolution of the DOJ arguing that the
DOJ should have dismissed Adasa’s petition for review since Sec. 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70
mandates that when an accused has already been arraigned and the aggrieved party files a
petition for review, the Secretary of Justice (secretary of DOJ) cannot take cognizance of the
petition.
The DOJ denied the motion, saying that under Sec. 12 of Circular No. 70, the Secretary
of Justice is not precluded from taking cognizance because of the permissive language “may”
used in Sec. 12. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the DOJ.
Courts may disregard contemporaneous construction in instances where:
(1) the law or rule construed possesses no ambiguity;

(2) construction is erroneous;
(3) strong reason to the contrary exists; and
(4) court has previously given the statute a different interpretation.
A reading of Sec. 7 shows that it does not distinguish between appeals from original
resolutions and resolutions on reinvestigation. When the law does not distinguish, we must
not distinguish. The settled rule is that when an accused pleads to the charge, he is deemed
to have waived the right to preliminary investigation and the right to question any irregularity that
surrounds it; applicable in cases of reinvestigation and review of such reinvestigation.
Adasa erroneously construed that Sec. 7 distinguishes between an original resolution

and a resolution for a motion for reinvestigation, arguing that it would not apply to the latter.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
If a contemporaneous construction is found to be erroneous, the same must be declared

null and void.
iii. STATUTORY DIRECTIVES
❖ Vergara v. Coca-Cola Bottlers
Vergara is a retired employee of Coca-Cola who filed a complaint before the

NLRC for the payment of his full retirement benefits. In this case, the issue raised was
W/N to include the Sales Management Incentives in the computation of the
petitioner’s retirement benefits.
Generally, employees have a vested right over existing benefits voluntarily

granted to them by their employer. Thus, any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by
the employees cannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the
employer.
The principle of non-diminution of benefits is actually founded on the

Constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers, to promote their welfare, and to
afford them full protection (Sec. 18 Art II Constitution). In turn, said mandate is the basis
of Art. 4 of the Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be
rendered in favor of labor."
Here, despite the mandate to rule in favor of labor, as expressed by the Labor
Code and the Constitution, the Court strictly adhered to the requisites of the
principle of non-diminution of benefits which include:
(1) the grant or benefit is founded on a policy or has ripened into a practice
over a long period of time;
(2) the practice is consistent and deliberate;
(3) the practice is not due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful
or difficult question of law; and
(4) the diminution or discontinuance is done unilaterally by the employer.
[Sec 18 Art II Consti → Art 4 Labor Code → Principle of Non-Diminution of

Benefits → requisites]
In this case, witnesses’ testimonies of the respondents were found to be

sufficient in disproving the contention of the petitioner that the act of inclusion of the
Sales Monthly Incentive in the retirement benefits has not ripened into company practice
that may be considered an enforceable obligation. Although the Statutory Directive in
Art. 4 of the Labor Code utilizes the imperative word “shall” in interpreting pertinent
rules and regulations in favor of labor, the same provision gave rise to the principle
of Non-Diminution of Benefits requiring compliance to the requisites for the benefits to
be granted to laborers.
Therefore, absent any of these, the Court is compelled to rule not in favor of
labor but based on the evidentiary documents and testimonies presented in the case.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
The Statutory Directive in this case is Art. 4 of the Labor Code. Statutory
Directives are usually short, single-line guides for the courts to follow in the event that
interpretation is required in the future. It also serves as a reflection of the intention or
purpose of the law of which the provision is part of.
❖ Republic Act No. 6938, Sec. 126
Title of the Law: An Act to Ordain a Cooperative Code of the Philippines (Cooperative
Code of the Philippines)
Summary/What is it about: The RA provides for how the State will be providing
technical guidance, financial assistance and other services to duly registered private
cooperatives to achieve their respective social or economic goals.
Provision: Chapter XVII (Final Provisions), Section 126

SEC. 126. Interpretation and Construction. – In case of doubt as to the meaning of any
provision of this Code or the regulations issued in pursuance thereof, the same shall be
resolved liberally in favor of the cooperatives and their members.
❖ Republic Act No. 8792 (2000), Sec. 37
Title of the Law: An Act Providing for the Recognition and Use of Electronic
Commercial and Non-Commercial Transactions and Documents, Penalties for Unlawful
Use Thereof, and For Other Purposes (Electronic Commerce Act of 2000)
Summary/What is it about: The RA provides for the State policy that information and
communications technology has a vital role in nation-building. As such, the RA provides
guidelines for private sectors handling telecommunication and information technology, to
ensure the availability, diversity, and affordability of ICT products and services.
Provision: Part V (Final Provisions), Section 37

SEC. 37. Statutory Interpretation. - Unless otherwise expressly provided for, the
interpretation of this Act shall give due regard to its international origin and the need to
promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international
trade relations. The generally accepted principles of international law and convention on
electronic commerce shall likewise be considered.
❖ Republic Act No. 9285 (2004), Sections 8, 20, 25
Title of the Law: An Act to Institutionalize the Use of AN Alternative Dispute Resolution
System in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution,
and For Other Purposes (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004)
Summary/What is it about: The RA provides for the State policy to promote autonomy
of parties to resolve disputes in order to declog court dockets and achieve speedy and
impartial justice in trials. As such, the RA provides guidelines for a system called
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), outside of the court but still governed by the rules
of the Supreme Court, for parties to avail of as a means to resolve disputes.
Provisions: Chapter 2 (Mediation), Section 8
SEC. 8. Application and Interpretation. - In applying construing the provisions of this
Chapter, consideration must be given to the need to promote candor or parties and
mediators through confidentiality of the mediation process, the policy of fostering prompt,
economical, and amicable resolution of disputes in accordance with the principles of
integrity of determination by the parties, and the policy that the decision-making authority
in the mediation process rests with the parties.
Chapter 4 (International Commerce Arbitration), Section 20, 25

SEC. 20. Interpretation of Model Law. - In interpreting the Model Law, regard shall be
had to its international origin and to the need for uniformity in its interpretation and resort
may be made to the travaux preparatories and the report of the Secretary General of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law dated March 25, 1985 entitled,
"International Commercial Arbitration: Analytical Commentary on Draft Trade identified
by reference number A/CN. 9/264."
SEC. 25. Interpretation of the Act. - In interpreting the Act, the court shall have due
regard to the policy of the law in favor of arbitration. Where action is commenced by or
against multiple parties, one or more of whom are parties who are bound by the
arbitration agreement although the civil action may continue as to those who are not
bound by such arbitration agreement.
iv. INTERPRETATIONS OF WORDS AND PHRASES

GENERAL AND PARTICULAR USES OF WORDS
❖ Matuguina Integrated Wood Products v. Court of Appeals

The Director of Bureau of Forest Development issued a Provisional Timber License to
Milagros Matuguina to operate logging businesses under her business Matuguina Logging
Enterprises (MLE). Some time after, Milagros incorporated MIWPI, an entity separate from
MLE. Milagros later petitioned to have the timber license be transferred from MLE to MIWPI.
Pending approval of MLE’s petition, Davao Enterprises Corporation filed a complaint

against MLE alleging that MLE has encroached upon the area allotted for DAVENCOR’s timber
concession. The Minister of Natural Resources rendered his decision against MLE for illegal
logging operations on the portion of the land under the concession of DAVENCOR. Pursuant to
the finding, DAVENCOR requested to order MLE and/or MIWPI to comply with the ruling.
DAVENCOR cites Section 61 of P.D. 705 to establish MIWPI's succession to the liability
of Milagros Matuguina/MLE:
“The licensee, lessee, or permittee shall be allowed to transfer or convey his license agreement,
license, lease, or permit only if he has not violated any forestry law, rule or regulation; has been
faithfully complying with the terms and conditions of the license agreement, license, lease or
permit; the transferee has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to hold a license
agreement, license, lease or permit; there is no evidence that such transfer or conveyance is
being made for purposes of speculation; and the transferee shall assume all the obligations
of the transferor.

The court ruled that the term "obligations" as used in the final clause of the second
paragraph of Section 61 of P.D. 705 is construed to mean those obligations incurred by the
transferor in the ordinary course of business. It cannot be construed to mean those obligations
or liabilities incurred by the transferor as a result of transgressions of the law, as these are
personal obligations of the transferor, and could not have been included in the term "obligations"
absent any modifying provision to that effect.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
In construing statutes, the terms used therein are generally to be given their ordinary
meaning, that is, such meaning which is ascribed to them when they are commonly used, to the
end that absurdity in the law must be avoided.
❖ Tan v. People
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases
used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And
insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned,
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed
timber. Neither does the Court.
Citing Mustang Lumber Inc v. CA, Supreme Court held that lumber is included in the
term timber. Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the
Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage.
In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, lumber
is defined, inter alia, as ‘timber or logs after being prepared for the market.’ Simply put,
lumber is a processed log or timber. To exclude possession of lumber from the acts
penalized in Section 68 would emasculate the law itself.

Petitioners aver that there should be a distinction between the terms “lumber” and
“timber”
Doctrine/Takeaway:
In spite of the fact that statutes penal in nature should be construed liberally in favor of
the accused, if the law does not make a distinction between two terms, it must be construed that
no distinction was intended in the enactment of the statute.
❖ Malanyaon v. Lising
§ Mayor S.B. Pontanal is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. P-339 for Violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. During pendency of case, he was suspended from office
and during his incumbency he died, which dismissed the charges against him.
§ Malanyaon contends that any disbursement of funds by the Cesario Goleta, Municipal
Treasurer, in favor of Pontanal’s heirs for salaries corresponding to the period he was under
suspension and other benefits ARE CONTRARY to the provisions of Section 13 of RA 3019*
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) because Pontanal was not acquitted of the charge
against him.”
§ However, the respondent judge dismissed the action on the ground that “the criminal case
against the late Mayor S.B. Pontanal due to his death amounted to acquittal.”

Terms with different meanings. The Court held that the word “acquittal” in the statute as
applied in this case does not mean the same as “dismissal”.
§ People v. Salico differentiates acquittal from dismissal.

o Acquittal - based on the merits
o Dismissal – not based on merits or because defendant is not guilty; terminates
proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or
the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc
o “The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not correctly
used, instead of the proper term acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has
presented all its evidence, the defendant moves for the dismissal and the court
dismisses the case on the ground that the evidence fails to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in
reality an acquittal because the case is decided on the merits.”
Doctrine/Takeaway:
It is obvious that when the statute speaks of the suspended officer being “acquitted” it means
that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court is of the opinion
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the case against the
suspended officer will not suffice because dismissal does not amount to acquittal.
LATIN MAXIMS
NOSCITUR A SOCIIS
DEFINITION:
❖ Aisporna v. Court of Appeals
Petitioner’s husband is a licensed insurance agent who acquired an insurance policy
with one Isidro as beneficiary. Petitioner was later charged for violation of Sec. 189 of the
Insurance Act for acting as an insurance agent without the requisite certificate of authority
therefor, in connection with the said insurance policy. She was convicted by the lower court.
However, the SC reversed, holding that she could not be considered as an agent under the
definition in par. 2 of Sec. 189 which requires the element of compensation.
How they applied the maxim: The CA held that the definition of an insurance agent
under the second paragraph of Sec. 189 is not applicable to the insurance agent mentioned in
the first paragraph. This is wrong. The definition of an insurance agent as found in the second
paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word "agent" mentioned in the first and
second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its second paragraph, it is
explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189.
Why they applied the maxim: A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and
give effect to all its provisions whenever possible.
Doctrine/Takeaway: The doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that

where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible
of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the
company in which it is found or with which it is associated.
❖ Dai-Chi Electronics v. Villarama, Jr

For violation of a non-compete clause, petitioner sued respondent, a former employee.
The RTC said that they do not have jurisdiction over the case because the RTC believed that
the case is a labor case which, pursuant to the Labor Code, is under the jurisdiction of the
NLRC (i.e. a Labor Arbiter).
So the RTC dismissed the case.
Hence, this appeal.
How they applied the maxim:

Article 217, as amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 6715, provides as follows:
Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission - ....
Xxxx
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from
the employer-employee relations;
xxxx
The Supreme Court said that the RTC has jurisdiction since this was not a case arising
out of employer-employee relations under the Labor Code but out of a breach of contract under
the New Civil Code.
Why they applied the maxim:

The Supreme Court cited San Miguel v NLRC where they already ruled that this statute
pertains to cases or disputes arising out of or in connection with employee-employer disputes.
While this may seem like an employee-employer dispute, it is actually about a violation of the
terms and conditions of a contract.
The Supreme Court also cited Pepsi Cola Distributors where they ruled that the RTC
does have jurisdiction over the case since ‘complaint for damages was anchored not on the
termination of the employee's services per se, but rather on the manner and consequent effects
of such termination.’
Doctrine/Takeaway:
Noscituur a sociis is applied by an examination of the terms used in the paragraph
involved and the other paragraphs in the same article.
EJUSDEM GENERIS
DEFINITION:
Where a statute describes things of a particular class or kind accompanied by words of a
generic character, the generic word is usually limited to things of a similar nature with those
particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statute that would repel
such inference.
Stated otherwise: Where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by
words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their
widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind
or class as those specifically mentioned. But this rule must be discarded where the legislative
intention is plain to the contrary.
❖ Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.,

The main issue in this case centered on W/N the phrase "gambling and other
prohibited games of chance" under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code included all
forms of gambling, not just illegal ones. An interpretation that included all kinds of
gambling would have allowed Cagayan De Oro to prohibit the opening of a casino, which
is considered a legal type of gambling, through an ordinance. The Court, in this case,
used both noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis as tools. Under the rule of noscitur a
sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to or given the same meaning
of words with which it associated. During the discussion, I remember Sir Banez saying
noscitur a sociis is usually applied for words in pairs - as in, if the construction can be
done by pairing one word or phrase with another in the provision. Since the word
"gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the Court limited
the meaning of the word to illegal gambling, which, like other prohibited games of
chance, must be prevented or suppressed under the LGC.

Although the Court applied noscitur a sociis in its interpretation, this case was
categorized under ejusdem generis since Sec 458 contains an enumeration, ending with
a generic word/phrase:
Sec. 458 par 1(v):

Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for
habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment
and maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of
chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction,
maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution
or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such other
activities inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;
Usually, ejusdem generis would be used to interpret the meaning of general

words like "and other prohibited games of chance." But in this case, the issue was the
meaning of gambling, not the general words at the end of the enumeration. Baliktad. So,
both noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis were applied.
If ejusdem generis is used, theoretically, it will mean that since the class would be
“games of chance”, gambling should be interpreted as a “game of chance” which will
thus include even legal gambling which will lead to an opposite ruling.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
Noscitur a sociis applies for words in pairs. Ejusdem generis for enumerations of
words with specific meanings followed by general words or phrase.
❖ Philippine Basketball Association v. Court of Appeals

Main issue in the case was W/N the amusement tax on admission tickets to PBA
is considered as local or national tax. The Court ruled that this tax is considered as
national tax since Sec 13 of the Local Tax Code makes no mention of any authority to
tax professional basketball games. The taxes included in the local tax code are for
theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses, and other places of amusement.
However, the taxes for professional basketball games are expressly stated in Sec
44 of PD 1959. The same also provides for payment of taxes to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, hence, classifying the tax as a national tax.
Under the maxim of ejusdem generis, the Court declares that the meaning of the
phrase “other places of amusement” in Sec 13 of the Local Tax Code must refer to the
same class as those in the prior enumeration (theaters, cinematographs, concert halls,
circuses). All of them have the same characteristic of artistic expression which
professional basketball games do not share since it is classified unders sports and
gaming. Therefore, such does not fall under the same category as those enumerated in
Sec 13.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
If a class of things if followed by general wording (in this case: other places of
amusement), the general wording is restricted to the same class or category as those
enumerated.
EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS

DEFINITION:
The express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others.
❖ Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos (Duguiang)

Petitioner was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the
Solicitation Permit Law which prohibits soliciting for charitable or public welfare purposes
without having secured a permit. Petitioners argue that their solicitation was intended for
religious purpose, which was outside the scope of the said law.

The maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius” states that the express
mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. In the given
provision, the scope was expressed by the enumeration to be for charitable or public
welfare purposes. Applying the maxim, the provision should not be extended to religious
purpose.

There are other provisions in law that treat the words "charitable" and "religious"
separately and independently of each other. These legislative enactments specifically
spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree
No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes," this only goes to show
that the framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for religious
purposes within its coverage.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
The maxim proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made
specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and
to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
❖ Malinias v. COMELEC
A gubernatorial candidate filed a complaint against the Chief of Police of a
municipality and the Provincial Director of PNP for entering the canvassing room in violation of
Sec. 232 of BP 881. The Court ruled that the policemen in question did not incur any criminal
liability because the section they violated did not fall under the express enumeration of election
offenses in Sec. 262 of BP 881. So they will not be punished for anything.

Applied it on BP 881 (or the Omnibus Election Code) saying that Sec. 232 of BP
881 (“Persons not allowed inside the canvassing room”) is not one of those explicitly
enumerated under Sec. 261 (“Prohibited Acts) and 262 of BP 881 (“Other Election
Offenses”) as an election offense. Therefore, violations of Sec. 232 begets no criminal
liability.

Because the Chief of Police and the Provincial Director of the PNP entered the
canvassing room violating Sec. 232 of BP 881 and the issue raised was whether they
can be criminally charged.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
If there is an express enumeration, the maxim can be used to declare that the
law was intended to exclude all others not enumerated therein.
DISSIMILUM DISSIMILIS EST RATIO

DEFINITION:
Distinguishing when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a
distinction or qualification
❖ Garvida v. Sales
Garvida applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of
Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. Then she filed CoC for Chairman, Sangguniang
Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo. Sales, a rival candidate filed with the COMELEC en banc a
"Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" against petitioner Garvida for
falsely representing her age qualification in CoC. COMELEC en banc issued an order directing
the Board of Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the
proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the election.

There are 2 separate sections in the Local Gov. Code that specifies the qualifications to
be a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan and to be an elective official for SK. There are more
qualifications for an elective SK official like “at least fifteen (15) years but not more than
twenty-one (21) years of age on the day of his election, able to read and write Filipino, English,
or the local dialect, and must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.”
For a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, the age requirement is only fifteen (15) but not
more than twenty-one (21) years of age. On the other hand, there is a further qualification for an
elective SK official to be “at least fifteen (15) years but not more than twenty-one (21) years of
age on the day of his election.” So the Comelec resolution that interprets the qualifications of the
member as requiring the age for the elective official is ultra vires. The petitioner was declared
ineligible for the SK chaiamship post.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio - Of things dissimilar, the rule is dissimilar. Courts may
distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a
distinction or qualification.
CASUS OMISSUS PRO OMISSO HABENDUS EST

DEFINITION:
A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be held to have been
omitted intentionally
❖ Spouses Delfino v. St. James Hospital

Since hospitals are not among those enumerated as allowable uses within the
residential zone, the only inference to be deduced from said exclusion is that said hospitals
have been deliberately eliminated from those structures permitted to be constructed within a
residential area in Santa Rosa, Laguna (in the new Zoning Ordinance)

The issue involved the omission of the phrase "hospital with not more than ten-bed
capacity" in the new 1991 Zoning Ordinance, as opposed to the earlier 1981 Santa Rosa Zoning
Ordinance regarding the construction of medical institutions within a residential zone. In 1994,
the ten-bed capacity St James Hospital applied for and was given a permit by the zoning
administrator of Santa Rosa to make expansions despite the fact that the new Zoning
Ordinance had already been passed. Under the new Zoning Ordinance, hospitals were
excluded from the list of institutions allowed in residential zones in Sta Rosa. Applying casus
omissus (a thing omitted must be considered to have been omitted intentionally), the
Court held that the omission of the phrase "hospital with not more than ten capacity" in the new
Zoning Ordinance, and the corresponding transfer of said allowable usage to another zone
classification, only leads to the logical conclusion that the legislative body had intended that said
use be removed from those allowed within a residential zone.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object, or thing omitted from an
enumeration in a statute must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The rule applies when
the omission has been clearly established.
UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUERE DEBEMOS

DEFINITION:
Where the law does not distinguish, we ought not to distinguish.
❖ Ramirez v. Court of Appeals

Petitioner Ramirez filed a civil case for moral damages against private respondent for
insult and humiliation in a confrontation. She presented a transcript of the confrontation which
was based on a recording of the conversation. Private Respondent filed a criminal case against
petitioner for violating RA 4200 entitled, "An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes". Petitioner filed a
Motion to Quash Information with RTC on the ground that RA 4200 refers to taping of a
communication by a person other than a participant in the communication. RTC granted the
motion. After a series of appeals, the case came to SC with the main issue of whether or not
petitioner had violated Section 1 of RA 4200.

The Supreme Court ruled that the law was clear and unequivocal that it penalizes the
acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private conversations; and makes no
distinction if the violator is a party to the conversation or not.

Legislative Intent is determined principally from the language of the stature - The law
(Section 1 of RA 4200) is clear and unequivocal in that it makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all parties to any private conversation to secretly record such communication by
means of a tape recorder.
There is no distinction whether the accused is a party in the communication or a third

party. Senate Congressional Records show that lawmakers indeed contemplated to make
illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations / communications taken by either
the parties themselves or by third persons (where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish). The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
Doctrine/Takeaway:
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. Legislative intent is
determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear
and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be
resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead
to an injustice.
❖ MTRCB v, ABS-CBN
Basically in this case, MTRCB charged ABS CBN for not following their IRR; specifically,
ABS CBN did not submit an episode of their show, “The Inside Story” for MTRCB review. Said
episode caused an uproar in the PWU community precisely because the episode beschmirked
the university’s name. The respondent averred that their show is a public affairs program
protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press.

The court, in ruling, invoked the maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec distunguere debemos,
which means that where the law does not make any exceptions neither should the court, unless
compelled by sound reason. Since the IRR provides the MTRCB power to review all television
programs, this should mean to encompass the entirety of kinds of tv programs, including public
affairs programs.

They applied the maxim in order to determine the scope of review powers by MTRCB. In
this case, the principle assumes that the legislative body made no qualification in the use of
general word or expression, and thus the rules should be interpreted as one that does not
distinguish as to the kind of tv program referred to.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
Ubi lex non distinguit nec distinguire debemos; when the law does not distinguish, pls
dont distinguish also
REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS

DEFINITION:
Referring each to each; let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken
distributively.
❖ People v. Tamani,
This is an appeal of defendant Teodoro Tamani y Marinay from the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Isabela, convicting him of the murder of Jose Siyang and the attempted
murder of Eduardo Domingo. Following the decision of the lower court convicting him of the
crime, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied, and then after this he appealed
once again. The Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss appeal on the ground that the notice
of appeal was 47 days late (per Sec 6, Rule 122, Rules of Court).

The Court held that in interpreting Sec 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
"An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or
order appealed from" - the word “promulgation” should be construed as referring to “judgment,”
while the word “notice” should be construed as referring to “order.” This construction is
sanctioned by the rule of reddendo singula singulis: “referring each to each; referring each
phrase or expression to its appropriate object.” “or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the
words should be taken distributively.” Therefore, the fifteen-day period should not be counted
from February 25, 1963, when a copy of decision was allegedly served on appellant’s counsel
by registered mail, it should be counted from February 14, 1963, when the judgment of the court
was promulgated.

The Court held that the assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from
February 25, 1963, when a copy of the decision was allegedly served on appellant's counsel by
registered mail, is not well-taken. The word "promulgation" in section 6 should be construed as
referring to "judgment" (see section 6 of Rule 120), while the word "notice" should be construed
as referring to "order".
Doctrine/Takeaway:
Reddendo singula singulis: “referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression
to its appropriate object.” “or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be
taken distributively.”
❖ Amadora v. Court of Appeals

One of the issues raised is whether Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which states that
“Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trade shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody”
applies to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. The Supreme Court ruled: “Where
the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first
provision. This is the general rule. In case of the establishments of arts and trades, it is the head
thereof, and only he, (who) shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other
words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school
is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable."

Following the canons of reddendo singula singulis, ‘teachers’ should apply to the words
‘pupils and students’ and ‘heads of establishments of arts and trades’ to the words ‘apprentices.’
Doctrine/Takeaway:
Reddendo singula singulis means referring each to each; referring each phrase or
expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words
should be taken distributively. It requires that antecedents and consequences should be read
distributively to the effect that each word is to be applied to the subject to which it appears by
context most appropriately related and to which it is most applicable.
PROVISOS, EXEMPTIONS, SAVING CLAUSES
❖ AGPALO, Statutory Construction pp. 234-246 (2003)
➢ Proviso
■ Role: to restrain or qualify the generality of the enacting clause or section
which it refers
■ Primary purpose: to limit or restrict the general language or operation of
the statute, not to enlarge it
■ What proviso qualifies: A proviso is to be construed with reference to the
immediately preceding part of the provision, to which it is attached, and
not to the statute itself or to other sections thereof.
➢ Exceptions
■ Definition: a clause which exempts something from the operation of a
statute by express words
■ Expressed through these words and phrases – “except”, “shall not apply”,
“unless otherwise”, and such similar words as are used to take out of the
enactment something which would otherwise be part of its subject matter
■ Function: often to confirm the general rule, and not to dominate or destroy
it
➢ Saving Clauses
■ Definition: a clause in a provision of law which operates to except from
the effect of the law what the clause provides, or to save something which
would otherwise be lost.
■ Use: usually to except or save something from the effect of a repeal of a
statute
DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION

❖ Macalintal v. COMELEC
How they applied the doctrine:
● Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement
found in Section 1 of the same Article
● Sec 2 of Article V of the Constitution necessitates the allowance of absentee voting
Why they applied the doctrine:
● The case provides for a question of whether or not Filipinos residing in other
countries may register as voters although they have not satisfied the residency
requirement in Sec 1 of Art V of the Constitution
● Although Sec 1 provides for a residency requirement, Sec 2 of the same Article
provides for absentee voting which would necessarily imply that the ConCom
recognized and allowed Filipinos residing in different countries to vote in the national
elections
Doctrine/Takeaway:
● What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed
STILL STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
v. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE AS A WHOLE

❖ Professional Regulation Commission v. De Guzman,
Respondents are graduates of Fatima College of Medicine who passed the 1993 Physicians
Licensure Examinations. The PRC noticed that the scores of all Fatima College of Medicine test
takers were unusually and exceptionally high in the two hardest subjects.
So they had the NBI investigate. The NBI investigation led to the conclusion that the
aforementioned test takers had access to a leakage of the exam and so the PRC issued a
resolution nullifying their results.
RTC ruled in favor of the test takers and the CA reversed. Hence the appeal.

● Sec 20 of the Medical Act of 1959 directs the PRC to administer the oath and
register those who satisfy the requirements of the Board as physicians.
● But the SC ruled that this should be read with Sec 9 and 22 of the same act.
● Sec. 22 provides that the Board has the power to conduct administrative
investigations and disapprove applications for examination or registration, pursuant
to the objectives of the act as outlined in Sec. 1.
● Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 2382 prescribes that a person who aspires to practice
medicine in the Philippines, must have "satisfactorily passed the corresponding
Board Examination." Section 22, in turn, provides that the oath may only be
administered "to physicians who qualified in the examinations."
● "satisfactorily," defined as "sufficient to meet a condition or obligation" or "capable of
dispelling doubt or ignorance.
● Upon the investigation of the Board, it did not find that the respondents "satisfactorily
passed" the licensure examinations.

● Fatima university graduates passed the physician licensure exam but the Board of
Medicine observed unusually high grades for all these passers. All of them got a
score of 90% and above for what should have been the most difficult part of the
exam.
● The CA held that the PRC should issue licenses and allowed the Fatima University
graduates to take the oath after passing the medical exam and submitting all their
requirements because of Sec 20 of RA 2382(Medical Act of 1959)
● Sec 22 and Sec 8 should also be taken into account
Doctrine/Takeaway:
● All the provisions in a statute should be taken into consideration together
vi. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE IN RELATION TO OTHER STATUTES

❖ Akbayan Youth v. COMELEC
Students and civic leaders in this case sought to direct COMELEC to conduct a special
registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, arguing that around 4 million
youth (ages 18-21) failed to register on or before the Dec 27, 2000 deadline set through
RA 8189 or Voter’s Registration Act of 1996.
● Sec 8 of RA 8189 (w/c prohibits the conduct of registration 120 days before a regular
election) and Sec 28 of RA 8436 (w/c provides the “standby” powers of COMELEC to
fix other periods and dates for certain pre-election acts such as registration if it is no
longer possible to observe those prescribed by law) can be harmonized and do not
necessarily contradict each other.
● Sec 28 of RA 8436 would come into play in cases where pre-election acts can still be
reasonably performed within the available period prior to election day.
● But if COMELEC would already claim of the “operational impossibility” of conducting
such acts, then it is Sec 8 of RA 8189 that would apply.

● They invoked Sec 28 of RA 8436 to argue that COMELEC has the power to conduct
such special registration.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
● Interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi: The best method of
interpretation is that which makes laws consistent with other laws.
❖ Vda. De Urbano v. GSIS

Petitioner mortgaged their land but they were unable to pay the loan back.
Despite several chances on the payment of the price on the deadline of payment, GSIS
eventually sold the land to priv. resp. Dela Cruz (but they sold the land without the
knowledge of pets.)

- COA Circular No. 89-296 should be understood to have clarified the coverage of
the exception under COA Circular No. 86-264, i.e., sales of merchandise/
inventory held for sale in the regular course of business
- The correct rule of interpretation is, that if two statutes relate to the same thing,
they should all be taken into consideration in construing any one of them, and it
is an established rule of law, that all acts in pari materia are to be taken together,
as if they were one law.
- Agpalo, in his book Statutory Construction: Statutes in pari materia should be
read and construed together because enactments of the same legislature on the
same subject are supposed to form part of one uniform system; later statutes are
supplementary or complementary to the earlier enactments and in the passage of
its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislations on the
subject and to have enacted its new act with reference thereto

- Petitioners contend that COA Circ No. 86-264 mandates GSIS to dispose its
assets primarily through public bidding, and if it fails, then through negotiated
sale
- However, COA Circular No. 89-269 was issued, further explaining that
assets/collaterals acquired during the regular course of business shall be
exempted.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
- All acts in pari materia are to be taken together, as if they were one law.
vii. STRICT AND LIBERAL INTERPRETATION

❖ Planter’s Association v. Ponferrada
RA 6982 was passed, amending benefits received by sugar farm workers.
Section 12 stated that “All liens and other forms of production sharing in favor of the
workers in the sugar industry under RA 809 and PD 621, as amended, are hereby
SUBSTITUTED by the benefits under this Act.”
The sum of BOTH benefits under RA 809 and PD 621 is 33 million.

The law’s intent was to upgrade from PD 621’s benefits to RA 6982’s benefits,
from 3 million to 6 million.
The petitioner’s strict interpretation of Section 12 theorizes that this since the law
states that BOTH RA 809 and PD 621 are hereby substituted, BOTH benefits are
replaced by those under RA 6982 ALONE, which only grants 6 million.
This drop from 33 million to 6 million pesos was certainly not the law’s intent,
which is to upgrade the total benefits.

The Court did not adopt the strict interpretation since this will result in the drop of
their total benefits. The only way to actually upgrade the benefits was to liberally
interpret the law. To adhere to the intent, they adopted a liberal interpretation.

The intention of the policy is to upgrade the benefits. The only way to do that in this
case was to liberally interpret that it is not the plain text of the law that governs.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
The intention of the law necessitates whether to adopt strict or liberal interpretation.
❖ Elvira Yu Oh v. Court of Appeals
Petitioner purchased pieces of jewelry from Solid Gold International Traders.
Petitioner issued post-dated checks as payment. However, said checks later
turned out to refer to closed bank accounts. Solid Gold charged petitioner with
violation of Batas Pambansa Blng. 22 also known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
Petitioner contends that “Account Closed” in BP22 is not explicitly mentioned by

respondent as a reason to apply BP 22, but only mentions “insufficiency”.
Petitioner also argues that “check” does not contemplate a postdated check
since it is not being drawn payable on demand, is technically not a special kind of
a bill of exchange, called check, but an ordinary bill of exchange payable at a
fixed date. Hence, the instrument is still valid, bound by civil obligation to pay in
the future.

Court held that petitioner’s contention that cases of “closed accounts” are not included in
the coverage of BP 22 has no merit considering the clear intent of the law, which is to
discourage the issuance of worthless checks due to its harmful effects to the
public.
This Court, in Lozano vs. Martinez, was explicit in ruling that the language of B.P. Blg.
22 is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks, whether present dated or
postdated, or whether issued in payment of pre-existing obligations or given in mutual
or simultaneous exchange for something of value

Look at the intent behind BP 22:
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment … The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the
making or worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by law. The law
punished the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public
order.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcend the private interests of
the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute
the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually
hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
Liberal interpretation can be used to broaden the scope of a statute (to terms/situations
not explicitly worded in the law) as long as it remains true to the intent of the law
❖ Stomper v. Amalgamated Transit Union

Members of Amalgamated Transit Union are demanding from the union attorneys
fees after they sued seeking to inspect documents in the union’s possession. The
District Court dismissed the complaint but directed the Union to pay $10,000 in
fees, saying that since the members obtained most of the documents they
wanted, they are entitled to fees. The Union contested the interpretation by the
District Court of Sec 201(c) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act (LMRDA), which provides “The court in such action may, in its discretion, in
addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable
attorney's fee to be paid by the defendants, and costs of the action.”
The Union argues that the phrase “judgment awarded” means that for a party to
be entitled to fees, they must first need to prevail by court judgement. With this,
they argue that since the case filed by the members was dismissed by the
District Court, it was not a “judgement awarded to plaintiffs.” The members, on
the other hand, argue that since LMRDA is a remedial measure, it should be
liberally construed in favor of the members.

The maxim of remedial measures being construed in a liberal manner is useless. Every
statute is remedial in the sense that it alters the law or favors one group over another.
Saying this, the Court refused to liberally construe the provision. The Court ruled that
while the LMRDA is clear that Sec 201 (c) Section 201(c) is a pro-member law, for it
authorizes awards only to plaintiff, the courts still need to determine to what extent does
the law favor them. The members are favored but not to the extent that would
entitle them to fees despite a lack of a favorable judgement by a court.

The Court did not liberally construe the provisions as to allow fees for the members
because other laws exists which does entitle plaintiffs to fees without the “judgement”
requirement. The Court said that construing different text similarly as if they meant the
same thing would dishonor the laws Congress actually enacted.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
While remedial law is generally construed in favor of the party which it seeks to protect,
the courts still has the power to determine up to what extent such law may be
interpreted in their favor.
❖ Contract Courier Services, Inc. v. RS Program Administration, US Dep’t of Transp.

Contract Courier Services is an appeal by Contract Courier Services on a penalty
to be imposed upon them by the US Department of Transportation on grounds
that the word ‘knowingly’ in a penal statute includes ‘should have known’ and
therefore, though Contract Courier Services employees may not have been the
ones to have conducted the penalized acts, Contract Courier Services is still
liable.

The US Court of Appeals applied a Strict Interpretation and said that the words
‘knowingly’ does not include ‘should have known’.

The Court reasoned that if Congress wanted to those who should have known be liable
for violations that they should have known, then they would have expressly state it as
they have done so in other statutes.
This is not to say that a liberal/contemporary construction may never be applied. The
Supreme Court said that this only happens in three instances:
1) When said Agency operates in a field not defined by law and therefore acts by rule of
thumb.
2) When Congress gives said Agency legislative power in that area.
3) When the law is ambiguous, despite Congress not delegating legislative power to said
Agency.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
“[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs. Deciding what competing values
will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the very
essence of legislative choice— and it frustrates the legislative intent by assuming that
whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be the law.”
viii. MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY STATUTES

❖ Philippine Consumers Foundation v. National Telecommunications Commission
- Applied it on Sec. 2 of PD 217, particularly on the phrase, “pertinent rules and
regulations may be promulgated”
- Invoked verba legis to say that the law vested discretionary powers to NTC in
promulgating ruled with regard to the maximum price increase of the Subscriber
Investments Plan of PLDT
- Thus, the pertinent law PD 217, which is a different statute from a different
source, may apply since NTC did not promulgate any such rules.

- Consumers complained about the spike in the price of the Subscriber Investment
Plan of PLDT but PLDT retorted that what they did was legally allowed under the
existing rules in PD 217
Doctrine/Takeaway:
- Verba legis can be used to say that the word “may” in a statute may indicate
actions that are discretionary on part of the actor subject to the intent of the law;
in which case, “may” can be construed as implying mandatory powers, similar to
the word “shall”
❖ Philippine Registered Electrical Practitioners, Inc. v. Francia

In PREPI v. Francia, Petitioners were assailing the constitutionality of a resolution issued
by the Board of Electrical Engineering (BEE) because it added a requirement for the renewal of
electrical engineer licenses. Petitioners invoked PD 233and said that BEE’s power is limited
only to oversight functions. Petitioners added that Sec. 6 limits the BEE’s responsibility to ocular
inspections as provided by the line “the members of a Board may personally or through
subordinate employees of the Commission conduct ocular inspection…” which they argued was
violated by the additional requirement imposed by Res. No. 1.

Petitioners did not want additional requirements to renew their licenses.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
The use of the word “may” suggests a directive, discretionary option which the
Board may do away with if they wanted to. The conduct of ocular inspections is merely
discretionary, not mandatory.
Aside from the use of verba legis, a word must be construed with the whole provision. A
provision in a statute is mandatory if the omission to follow it renders the proceeding to which it
relates illegal and void. A provision is directory if its observance is not necessary to the validity
of the proceeding. In this case, even if the BEE did not conduct ocular inspections, it would still
be able to do its duty of checking working conditions of its members. The act of doing ocular
inspections was merely recommendatory.
A statute is mandatory if omission of it results in a penalty.
ix. PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES

❖ Subido Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (Duguiang)
The petitioners were charged before the Sandiganbayan with Arbitrary Detention
penalized by Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners argue that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over their case because the act was
committed before the enactment of R.A. No. 7975 which provides for
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction

Bar to retroactive application does not apply to RA 7975 because it is not a penal law,
but rather a procedural law or one which prescribes rules and forms of procedure of
enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion, or those which refer to rules of
procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.
Furthermore, R.A. No. 7975 may validly be given retroactive effect being curative or
remedial statute which cures defects and adds to the means of enforcing existing
obligations.

A retroactive law is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws,
or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in
respect of transactions or considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or
statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take
away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of
rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or
the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
A procedural and curative statute may validly be given retroactive effect, there being no
impairment of contractual or vested right.The reason is that as a general rule no vested
right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that "a person has
no vested right in any particular remedy.”
❖ Zulueta v. Asia Brewery

● The petitioner (Zulueta) was the dealer and operator of a business that sold the
beer products of the respondent. The petitioner filed an initial case alleging
breach of an existing dealership contract against the respondent. During the
pendency of this first case, the respondent filed a separate case for collection of
a sum owed to them by the respondent for the price of the beer products that it
delivered to the petitioner.
● The case was consolidated by the Makati RTC, on the grounds that the two
cases revolved around similar issues of fact and law. (Petitioner didn’t pay for
beer products because of the alleged breach of dealership contract)
● CA reversed.
● Petitioner claims that the respondent’s failure to file a certiorari case within the
60-day reglementary period as required by the 1997 rules of procedure rendered
the decision of the Makati RTC to consolidate the case final and executory
● Respondent claims that the reglementary period should be the ninety-day period
that was in effect prior to the promulgation of the 1997 rules of procedure. (Initial
case was in January 1997, Rules of Procedure effective on July 1997)

● In the case, the SC held that the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure could be
made retroactive as it conferred no vested rights upon the respondents. The prior
ninety-day limit with regards to the filing of a writ of certiorari was a mere
discretionary prerogative of the court.
● The SC held that while the retroactivity did have the effect of shortening the time
period (90 days to 60 days) of the filing of a certiorari case it did not amount to a
deprivation of the right.
● If they were so constrained, the respondents could have asked for an extension.

● Here, the SC held that while there is a general ban on retroactive laws, it does
not apply to laws that are procedural. Procedural Laws do not confer vested
rights, thus they can be made retroactive as a general rule, except in cases
where doing so would impair the vested rights of individuals.
○ Maybe an example of a procedural law impairing vested rights would be if
in the case above the revised rules of procedure made it so that the
adjustment of reglementary periods would immediately prevent the
respondents from filing an appeal?
Doctrine/Takeaway:
A remedial law is a statute that affords a remedy, i.e. provides the means by which a
remedy is obtained. A curative law is a law that retroacts in order to cure defects, errors,
omissions or irregularities in prior statutes. Laws are procedural if it does not create nor
take away rights. Instead, operate to further already existing rights or confer remedies to
individuals.
x. AMENDMENT, REVISION, CODIFICATION AND REPEAL

❖ Government Service Insurance System v. Commission on Audit
On May 30, 1997, Republic Act No. 8291, otherwise known as "The Government
Service Insurance System Act of 1997" (the GSIS Act) was enacted and
approved. Pursuant to the powers granted to it under Section 41(n) of the said
law, the GSIS Board of Trustees approved Board Resolution No. 326 wherein
they adopted the GSIS Employees Loyalty Incentive Plan (ELIP). Corporate
auditor of the GSIS contended that the plan was contrary to law. The GSIS Legal
Services Group opined that the GSIS Board was legally authorized to adopt the
plan since Section 28(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186 as amended by Republic
Act No. 4968 has been repealed by Sections 3 and 41(n) of Republic Act No.
8291. The latter sought the assistance of the COA in determining the legality of
the plan. COA opined that the plan was that of the nature of a supplementary
plan which was prohibited under Republic Act No. 4968, or the "Teves
Retirement Law." Notices of Disallowance were then issued by Auditor.
Unless the intention to revoke is clear and manifest, the abrogation or repeal of a law
cannot be assumed. The repealing clause contained in Republic Act No. 8291 is not an
express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the statutes that are
intended to be repealed. It is actually a clause, which predicated the intended repeal
upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior laws.
Republic Act No. 8291 made no express repeal or abrogation of the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 186 as amended by the Teves Retirement Law, the reliance of
the petitioners on its general repealing clause is erroneous. The failure to add a specific
repealing clause in Republic Act No. 8291 indicates that the intent was not to repeal any
existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms
of the new and old laws.
As to the claim of repeal by implication, the Court enunciated that to bring about an
implied repeal, the two laws must be absolutely incompatible and clearly repugnant that
the later law cannot exist without nullifying the prior law. The best method of
interpretation: that which makes laws consistent with other laws which are to be
harmonized rather than having one considered repealed in favor of the other. Every
statute must be so interpreted and brought in accord with other laws as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence -- interpretere et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi.

GSIS officials insist that under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8291, all provisions of the
Teves Retirement Law that are inconsistent with Republic Act No. 8291 are deemed
repealed or modified.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
Unless the intention to revoke is clear and manifest, the abrogation or repeal of a law
cannot be assumed. Implied repeals are to be avoided as much as possible and may
only be resorted to when the two statutes are substantially in conflict with each other in
that the operation of one renders the other inoperative.
❖ City Government of San Pablo Laguna v. Reyes

Meralco enjoyed tax exemptions by virtue of its legislative franchise but the City
of San Pablo imposed a local franchise tax when the Local Government Code
took effect in 1992. Meralco paid the taxes "under protest" but filed a petition for
certiorari arguing that the LGC neither expressly nor impliedly repealed the tax
incentive enjoyed by Meralco. The City of San Pablo, meanwhile argued that the
LGC via Sections 137 and 193 expressly repealed provisions of the Meralco
charter that granted tax incentives. The Court upheld the position of the City of
San Pablo.

This is an example of a clear implied repeal. First of all, the LGC contains a general
repealing clause under Section 534. It is not a specific repealing clause because it does
not mention the specific law(s) identified by number or title that are intended to be
repealed. Section 137, however, contains explicit, all encompassing and clear language,
which authorizes a province to impose franchise tax "notwithstanding any exemption
granted by a law or other special laws." Section 193 further supports the withdrawal of
tax exemption privileges by stating that unless otherwise provided in the Code, tax
exemptions are withdrawn except for three entities (local water districts, cooperatives,
and non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions), indicating an
obvious intent to limit the tax exemptions to the three enumerated entities (under the rule
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius). Taken together, the LGC does authorize LGUs
to impose a franchise tax within its jurisdiction, and categorically withdrew tax privileges
enjoyed under existing laws upon the effectivity of the LGC.

Implied repeals are frowned upon. In this case, there is a clear inconsistency between
the Meralco charter and the Local Government Code. Furthermore, the LGC, being a
later law, prevails over the Meralco charter.
Doctrine/takeaway:
Under the principle of separation of powers, with Congress being a co-equal branch of
government, the Court takes pains to harmonize laws instead of invalidating them
outrightly because there is a presumption that Congress knows what it's doing. Absent
an express repeal, there is a presumption that Congress intended laws to complement
each other. However, if there is clear inconsistency or repugnancy between provisions of
certain laws, then the provisions of older laws are deemed repealed.
❖ Manalo v. Court of Appeals

- Rule of StatCon that a later general law cannot repeal an earlier special law
(generalia specialibus non derogrant) finds application only when the latter
general law does not contain a repealing clause.
- Without a repealing clause, a latter general law will ordinarily not repeal a prior
special law on the same subject as the latter is generally regarded as an
exception to the former.
- R.A. 6655 specifically contains a repealing clause
- In this case, Sec 11 RA 6655 categorically declares that all laws inconsistent with
any provision of RA 6655 shall be deemed repealed or modified.
- Consequently, any pertinent provision of BP 412 inconsistent and irreconcilable
with the provision of R.A. 6655, specifically Sec. 7 thereof, is deemed repealed or
modified.

- Congress enacted BP 412 that converts Cebu School of Arts and Trade into
Cebu State College of Science and Technology. Under its Section 3, CSCST
shall offer additional courses such as engineering, forestry, fishery, nautical, and
physical and natural sciences
- Eventually, Congress enacted RA 6655 that vests in the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) the establishment, renaming, conversion,
integration, separation, administration, supervision and control of all public
secondary schools
- Under Sec 7 of RA 6655, DECS entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
(“MOA”) with then CSCST Pres Atanacio Elma, providing for the transfer of the
secondary education program of Abellana College of Arts and Trade (ACAT) and
its personnel and facilities and gradually phasing out its college offerings or
integrating them into the main campus beginning SY 1992-1993
- Petitioner contends that special law like BP 412 can’t be impliedly repealed by a
general law (RA 6655)
Doctrine/Takeaway:
- a later general law cannot repeal an earlier special law (generalia specialibus
non derogrant) BUT it can if it has a repealing clause
❖ Bender v. United States

Samuel Bender, was found guilty of knowingly and unlawfully violating Revised
Statute Section 3279. The statute requires that distilleries for the production of
spirituous liquors place a sign bearing the words `Registered Distillery' in its
business premises. Bender contends that this statute was repealed by the
National Prohibition Act. However, the National Prohibition was later repealed.
The issue is W/N the repeal of the National Prohibition Act had the effect of
reviving section 3279.

The Court held that If the statute which required a distiller to post a sign showing that his
place of business was a distillery has been repealed it follows as a matter of logic that a
statute making it a crime to work in a distillery upon which no such sign is posted is also
repealed.
The Court concluded that that Rev.St. § 3279 when repealed was not subsequently
revived by the repeal of the National Prohibition Act; therefore, the indictment
against the appellant was founded upon the provisions of a statute which had ceased to
exist as law.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
Whenever an Act is repealed, which repealed a former Act, such former Act shall not
thereby be revived, unless it shall be expressly so provided.
❖ J.G. Summit v. Court of Appeals

- When a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law first
repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided.
- Section 1 of P.D. No. 666 was expressly repealed by Section 20 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 391, the Investment Incentive Policy Act of 1983. Subsequently,
Executive Order No. 226, the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, was issued
and Section 85 thereof expressly repealed B.P. Blg. 391.
- The express repeal of B.P. Blg. 391 by E.O. No. 226 did not revive Section 1 of
P.D. No. 666, declassifying the shipbuilding and ship repair industry as a public
utility, as said executive order did not provide otherwise

- petitioner’s main contention is that PHILSECO, as a shipyard, is a public utility
and, hence, could be operated only by a corporation at least 60% of whose
capital is owned by Filipino citizens, in accordance with Article XII, Section 10 of
the Constitution. Petitioner asserts that a shipyard is a public utility pursuant to
Section 13 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 146. Respondents, on the other hand,
contend that shipyards are no longer public utilities by express provision of
Presidential Decree No. 666, which provided incentives to the shipbuilding and
ship repair industry
- So the court had to determine if PHILSECO is a public utility by examining the
statutes involved in the case
Doctrine/Takeaway:
- when a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law first
repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided.
xii. HEADINGS AND TITLES

❖ Commissioner of Customs v. Relunia
● The Court of Tax Appeals in this case held that RPS “MISAMIS ORIENTAL” is not
required to present any manifest as Sections 1221, 1225, and 1228 of the
Administrative Code (w/c require masters of Gov’t vessels to submit cargo manifests)
are found under Article VI of the Customs Law.
○ The title of the article reads: “Entrance of vessels in foreign trade”
○ Such article lays down the rules governing entry of vessels engaged in foreign
trade
○ Since RPS “MISAMIS ORIENTAL” is not engaged in foreign trade, it does not
need to submit the manifest required under Sec. 1225.
● However, the Supreme Court did not affirm this ruling and held that:
○ All other vessels coming from foreign ports, whether or not engaged in foreign
trade, should provide a manifest pursuant Sec. 1228, which requires every
vessel from a foreign port to do so.
○ The reason for requiring a manifest should be greatly considered: To serve as an
indication that the vessel is not engaged in smuggling or any illegal activities
done in secrecy.
○ Sec. 1234 of the Revised Administrative Code (w/c requires the master of a
transport of the US Army or Navy to present a manifest to the boarding officer) is
also clearly applicable for Philippine navy ships since the reasons for requiring a
manifest for transport and supply ships of the US Army or Navy are more
applicable to ships that carry out the policy of the Philippine government and
ships which the country/PH gov’t has more complete control over.

● One of the articles forfeited from RPS “MISAMIS ORIENTAL” was an electric range,
the consignee of which was Lt. Col. Leopoldo Relunia who subsequently filed before
the Court of Tax appeals due to this forfeiture.
● The Tax Court ruled in his favor and ordered the release of the article.
● However, the Commissioner of Customs filed an appeal before the SC.
● SC set aside the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and affirmed the decision of
the Commissioner of Customs, which affirmed the decision of the Collector of
Customs of Manila to declare the articles carried by RPS “MISAMIS ORIENTAL” as
forfeited for violating the Customs Law and by virtue of Sec 1363(g) of the
Administrative Code (w/c provides that “Unmanifested merchandise found on any
vessel, a manifest therefor being required” shall be subject to forfeiture)
Doctrine/Takeaway:
● Resort to title as an aid in interpretation is unsafe and should not be given much
weight.
● It should only be resorted to where there is doubt with regards to the meaning
of the law or the intention of the legislature.
❖ U.S. v. Roemer
Roemer, who was charged with violating 18 USC Section 3711, as a party to a
conspiracy to defraud the United States, appealed by saying there was a
violation of Rule 6 of the Southern District's Plan for Achieving Prompt
Disposition of Criminal Cases.
Rule 6: Retrials. Where a new trial has been ordered by the district court or a
trial or new trial has been ordered by an appellate court , it shall commence at
the earliest practicable time, but in any event not later than 90 days after the
finality of such order unless extended for good cause.
Government contends that Rule 6 is inapplicable because according to the rule's

caption, it deals only with delays in conducting retrials and the delay at issue in
the instant case is in commencing a first trial.
How they applied doctrine:

Court gave greater effect to intent of writers to regard title “retrials” as accurate but
underinclusive description of rule’s subject matter. The also mention “where a trial has
been ordered by an appellate court” which affirms its applicability to situations wherein
not retrial. This interpretation follows the principle of stat con wherein in the event of
irreconcilable conflict, precedence is given to words in the body of a provision over those
in the caption. So, Rule 6 is not limited to retrials but instead extends to cases which an
appellate court orders to a first trial
Doctrine:
Headings and titles are not meant to take the place of the detailed provisions of the text.
Nor are they necessarily designed to be a reference guide or a synopsis. The title of a
statute and the heading of a section cannot limit the plain meaning of the text. For
interpretative purposes, they are of use only when they shed light on some ambiguous
word or phrase. But they cannot undo or limit that which the text makes plain.
xiii. PROVISOS AND EXCEPTIONS

❖ Borromeo v. Mariano
Borromeo was appointed as Judge of the 24th Judicial District and he took
possession of the office. Then, he was appointed Judge of the 21st Judicial
District. Mariano was appointed Judge of the 24th Judicial District. Borromeo
refused to accept appointment to 21st Judicial District.

The concluding portion of section 155 of the Administrative Code, although not
beginning with the usual introductory word, "provided," is nevertheless, in the nature of a
proviso. Administrative Code Sec 155 states: save when judges of first instance are
detailed to try land registration cases or when assigned to vacation duty, "no judge of
first instance shall be required to do duty in any other district than that for which he is
commissioned." No other person could be placed in the position of this Judge of First
Instance since another rule of public officers is, that an appointment may not be made to
an office which is not vacant. The language of the proviso in section 155 of the
Administrative Code, interpreted with reference to the general law regarding public
officers, does not empower the Governor-General to force upon the judge of one district
an appointment to another district against his will, thereby removing him from his district.
Why they applied the construction

Principle of statutory construction that a proviso should not be given a meaning which
would tend to render abortive the main portions of the law, it should further be recalled
that judges of first instance are removable only through a fixed procedure. Appointment
is the sole act of those vested with the power to make it. Acceptance is the sole act of
the appointee. Persons may be chosen for office at pleasure; there is no power in these
Islands which can compel a man to accept the office.
❖ Filipinas Life Assurance v. Court of Tax Appeals

Filipinas Life Assurance Company is a domestic life insurance company. It filed
an income tax return with its full income from 1958 amounting to 57 million. Later,
however, it amended return of only 15 million or 25% of the dividends from
domestic corporations. Petitioner’s claim for refund was filed with the respondent
Commissioner of Revenue but, as he had been refused to be heard, petitioner
took the matter to the Court of Tax Appeals. CTA denied the petition and ruled
that life insurance companies should report full in their income on the ground that
the proviso allowing the return of only 25% of the income from dividends is found
in subsection (A) of section 24 of the National Internal Revenue Code, while life
insurance companies are dealt with in another subsection, although of the same
section. The petitioner appealed to SC, contending, on the basis of history of the
proviso, that the benefits of dividend exclusion are available to all domestic and
resident foreign corporation regardless of the business in which they may
engage.
The Supreme Court ruled that domestic and resident foreign life insurance companies
are entitled to the benefits of dividend exclusion, the position of the proviso allowing it
notwithstanding. It stated that the position of a proviso is not necessarily
controlling. The proviso may apply to sections or portions thereof which follow it or
even to the entire statute. Position, after all, cannot override intention, in the
ascertainment of which the legislative history of a statute is extremely more important.

They applied this interpretation to give more weight to the legislative history of Section
24 of the code which has undergone many amendments. From this, it was seen that
dividend exclusion has always been a dominant feature of corporate income tax. It is a
device for reducing extra or double taxation of distributed earnings. It is also not the
intention of the legislature to discriminate against domestic life insurance companies in
favor of resident foreign corporations engaged in other business.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
Even though the general rule of statutory construction states that a proviso is deemed to
apply only to the immediately preceding clause or provision, this cannot be applicable to
all cases since the position of a proviso should not be necessarily controlling. Legislative
intent should always be given weight.
xiv. SEPARABILITY
❖ Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy
Tatad here assails the validity of several provisions of RA 8180, otherwise known
as the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 which says that any person or
entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products,
allowing local oil companies to determine gas prices. Tatad was saying that RA
8180 is repugnant to Sec. 19 Art. XII of the Constitution which states that the
State shall prohibit combinations of trade restraints and monopolies. Ultimately,
the court held these provisions as unconstitutional.
How is it applied?
Normally, statutes contain a separability clause that enables the statute to stand without
the unconstitutional provisions; however, since the provisions here are the heart and
soul of the statute itself (these provisions provide for the deregulation schemes and
methods), the court ended up voiding the whole statute itself.
Why is it applied?
To determine the possibility of the statue being able to stand as valid without the
unconstitutional provisions.
Doctrine:
Statutes usually contain a separability clause that enables it to stand by itself
notwithstanding the express voiding of some of its provisions due to unconstitutionality.
All throughout PH case law, Court applied a rather liberal approach to the requirement of
a separability clause. Generally, the Court decides on a case-to-case basis in
determining whether a statute such be wholly voided or not should it be haunted by
some unconstitutional provisions. This is to respect the intent of the co-equal branch, the
Legislature, in drafting and making the statute in contention.
❖ Robinson Shell Oil
Respondent Shell Oil Co. fired petitioner Charles Robinson, Sr. Shortly
thereafter, petitioner filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), alleging that respondent had discharged him because of
his race. While that charge was pending, petitioner applied for a job with another
company. The company contacted respondent, as petitioner’s former employer,
for an employment reference. Petitioner claims that respondent gave him a
negative reference in retaliation for his having filed the EEOC charge. Petitioner
subsequently sued under Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 which prohibits employers to discriminate against any of his “employees”.
On respondent’s motion, the District Court dismissed the action holding that
Section 704(a) does not apply to former employees. Petitioner appealed, and
Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court. The Fourth Circuit thereafter affirmed
the District Court’s determination that former employees may not bring suit under
Section 704(a) for retaliation occurring after termination of their employment. The
Court now granted certiorari in order to resolve issue.

Consideration of the statutory language, the specific context in which it is used, and the
broader context of Title VII as a whole leads to the conclusion that the term “employees”
in § 704(a) is ambiguous as to whether it excludes former employees. Next, the Court
held that Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 includes former
employees. A holding that former employees are included within § 704(a)’s coverage is
more consistent with the broader context provided by other Title VII sections and with §
704(a)’s primary purpose of maintaining unfettered access to Title VII’s remedial
mechanisms.

They applied statutory construction to determine if the term was ambiguous and applied
it again to determine the proper interpretation of the term in that particular provision.
Doctrine/Takeaway:
Per class discussion, in determining w/n the term “employees” was ambiguous, the
Court already had to perform statutory construction beyond verbal legis (like looking into
other provisions, to intent).

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a.

TEXT, STRUCTURE, HISTORY

b. OTHER RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

❖ IBP v. Zamora - p.85

❖ De Castro v. JBC w/ dissent by Justice Carpio-Morales - p. 93

b. LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER TO CONSTRUE

❖ Angara v. Electoral Commission - p.333

❖ Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v. Central Bank

Why they applied the construction/interpretation:

How they applied the construction/interpretation:

Why they applied the construction/interpretation:

ii. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION

❖ Philippine Scout Veterans Security & Investigation Agency Inc. v. NLRC

How they applied the construction/interpretation:

Why they applied the construction/interpretation:

Contemporary construction is only given great weight and, if found to be erroneous or

How they applied the construction/interpretation:

Courts may disregard contemporaneous construction in instances where:

(1) the law or rule construed possesses no ambiguity;

Why they applied the construction/interpretation:

Adasa erroneously construed that Sec. 7 distinguishes between an original resolution

If a contemporaneous construction is found to be erroneous, the same must be declared

iii. STATUTORY DIRECTIVES

❖ Vergara v. Coca-Cola Bottlers

Vergara is a retired employee of Coca-Cola who filed a complaint before the

How they applied the construction/interpretation:

Generally, employees have a vested right over existing benefits voluntarily

The principle of non-diminution of benefits is actually founded on the

Why they applied the construction/interpretation:

[Sec 18 Art II Consti → Art 4 Labor Code → Principle of Non-Diminution of

In this case, witnesses’ testimonies of the respondents were found to be

Provision: Chapter XVII (Final Provisions), Section 126

❖ Republic Act No. 8792 (2000), Sec. 37

Provision: Part V (Final Provisions), Section 37

❖ Republic Act No. 9285 (2004), Sections 8, 20, 25

Chapter 4 (International Commerce Arbitration), Section 20, 25

iv. INTERPRETATIONS OF WORDS AND PHRASES

How they applied the construction/interpretation:

Pending approval of MLE’s petition, Davao Enterprises Corporation filed a complaint

Why they applied the construction/interpretation:

Why they applied the construction/interpretation:

How they applied the construction/interpretation:

Why they applied the construction/interpretation:

§ People v. Salico differentiates acquittal from dismissal.

Doctrine/Takeaway: The doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that

❖ Dai-Chi Electronics v. Villarama, Jr

How they applied the maxim:

Why they applied the maxim:

❖ Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.,

How they applied the maxim:

Why they applied the maxim:

Sec. 458 par 1(v):

Usually, ejusdem generis would be used to interpret the meaning of general

❖ Philippine Basketball Association v. Court of Appeals

EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS

❖ Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos (Duguiang)

How they applied the maxim:

Why they applied the maxim:

How they applied the maxim:

Why they applied the maxim:

DISSIMILUM DISSIMILIS EST RATIO

How they applied the maxim:

CASUS OMISSUS PRO OMISSO HABENDUS EST