Inter- regionalism: the case of LATAM- EU relations

Dri, Clarissa
- 2009→ shift in EU- LATAM relations→ new development to reinforce relations
- in the 90s → closer links were established
- 1999 → strategic partnerships with the European Commission

Before the 90s…

- Before WWII---LATAM was Europe’s most important trade partner
- 1950s→ high volume of trade with the European Community
- was not a priority because France was seeking to keep free access to the exports of
its former colonies in Africa
- dominant North American influence on Latin America → economic dependence of
the region vis-a-vis the USA → political Pan- Americanism
- the forgotten subcontinent

End of the Cold War and new regionalism wave:

- export EU’S model of integration into LATAM
- creation of MERCOSUR

Three phases
1. 1970s-1990s → reactivate commercial routes with LATAM countries
2. 1990-2005 → renewal of attempts at regional integration → politics counted as much
as trade to EU negotiators → region-to-region approach
3. since 2005 → more pragmatic european approach centred in emerging states
through inter regional or bilateral contacts

A peripheral trade partnership

in the 50s and 60s → relations influenced by political and economic context of the end of the
WWII
- intervention of US to avoid the communist threat
- Europe kind of abandons Latin America by focusing on internal integration of the
European market by the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957
- Europe giving preferences to African countries
- LATAM turning towards the USA
- regionalism in LATAM emerged without European support!
- European external tariffs and agricultural protectionism in the 60s led to the creation
of LAFTA based on developmental assumptions from the north American influence

The 70s:
- external measures of the EC towards LATAM
- institutionalization in 1970 of EC ministers of foreign affairs’ meetings in the form of
the European Political Cooperation
- first political dialogues → EC Council’s Declaration of December 1970 →
establishment of regular meetings between the Group of Latin American
Ambassadors (GRULA) and EC representatives in brussels
- first generation commercial agreements → bilateral treaties with Argentina (1971),
Uruguay and brazil (1973) and Mexico (1975) → on commercial interests (LATAM
 was facing limits of industrialization through import substitution) → set the basis for
economic cooperation
- EC’s Generalized System of Preferences → grant several developing countries non-
reciprocal trade preferences → LATAM less advantaged than African states
- Through the Lomé Convention in 1975, the Caribbean countries were also within the
preferences of the EU with UK accession to the Community→ group of African,
caribbean and Pacific states (ACP)
- EU- ACP → based on notion of association, extension of colonial economic practices
so as to preserve the influence of the metropole
- 1984 → shift seeking pacification and democratization in Central America after
Nicaragua- El Salvador military conflict
- second generation of agreements → add political component to the economic bases
of the first generation
● 1983 trade and cooperation agreement with CAN→ return of civilian
democratic regimes
● 1985 signed cooperation agreement
- in common is the regional approach→ started developing agreements that would
have a commercial, political and social impact upon groups of states preferably if the
were a formalized region → response to historical ties than the expression of a
genuine European foreign policy design

The inter- regional model applied to LATAM

End of the 80s... → new global order→ end of bipolarized system and acceleration of
globalization
- erosion of trade preferences granted to LATAM cause Europe focused on deepen its
integration process
- The Uruguay Round created by the WTO to make bilateral agreements
- emergence of regions as global actors → renewal of relation and re- establishment of
links with LATAM
- “inter- regionalism” → institutionalized relations between world regions → essential
theoretical tool to understand the EU’s relations with LATAM during the 90s that
should strengthen the integration process

The 90s: Maastricht’s effects and the spread of regionalism:

- informal relations with the Rio Group because of EC’s participation in the peace
process in Central America
- institutionalization of the political dialogue in the 90s
- “open regionalism” in LATAM→ trade liberalization, commercial openness, institution-
building and increased participation of public and private actors
- Maastricht Treaty → created the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) →
broader set of objectives for external policies → protection of democracy and HHRR,
conflict prevention, promotion of regional integration, goo governance, international
cooperation networks
- cooperation and development policies more interconnected
- third generation of agreements
● former mechanisms regarding social, economic and institutional cooperation
● new political and commercial provisions
● inclusion of regular political dialogue and a democratic clause
 ● foreseeing free trade area
● EU strategy → reinforce its presence and consolidate its legal personality
- After the Caribbean region, Central America was the main destination of direct EC
aid to LATAM during the 70s and 80s
- in the 90s though:
● countries became eligible for credit from the EIB
● CA promoting its own integration process (SICA)
● 1993 a framework cooperation agreement signed with EU
● 2003 → Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement
● more to do with EU as a unified international actor than with economic
possibilities offered by the region
- CAN:
● 1993 → Framework Cooperation Agreement
● declaration signed in rome in 1996 to establish meetings at ministerial and
technical levels
● 2003 → Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement → anti drug policies
core issue → trade rates keep declining
- Cuba:
● main destination of humanitarian aid along with haiti

- ACP:
● Cotonou Agreement in 2000 → continued financial aid but chang in non-
reciprocal preferences
● eU negotiating economic partnership agreements with the more developed
regions within the ACP
● includes a significant political dimension
● “triumph of neoliberal values in the EU’S external relations” from less
advanced markets to emerging ones
● Caribbean region being replaced

- Chile and Mexico:

Mexico:
● 1991 → Framework Cooperation Agreement
● 1997 → Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and cooperation
Agreement → first and largest one signed with a Latin American countries
and out of EU regions
● seeking to counterbalance US’s influence and taking advantage of Mexico
wanting to diversify the country’s external links
Chile:
● two Framework Cooperation Agreements in 1991 1996
● 2002 Association Agreement feeting Chilean strategy of an effective reinsertion
within the international community
Mexico and Chile→ fourth generation agreements → add a specific calendar for trade and
investment liberalization
- the countries’ economic policies favoured the free trade agreements, while the other
regions were more reluctant
- negotiations with a unique state were simples and faster
common strategy for the whole subcontinent:
- 1999 Biennial summits between the EU and LATAM, including Caribbean countries
and Cuba with the EU Council
- LATAm became the concern of the EU’s CFSP pillar
- high- level dialogue to counterbalance north American weight
- reinforce ongoing commercial negotiations with subregions or countries
- promote development cooperation towards the reduction of poverty and social
inequality and to improve education levels

Institutional mimesis of the EU: case of MERCOSUR

- supporting the integration project in South America was central to inter- regional
strategy of the EU during the 90s
- trade potential and economic weight → strongest LATAM economies joining for
economic integration → opportunity to consolidate EU presence through the export of
its own model of regionalism
- Links were developed with Europe since 1991
- Inter- Institutional Agreement signed between EC and Mercosur plus more detailed
bilateral cooperation agreements between EC and four members of MERCOSUR
(between 1990 and 1995 the EU had bilateral agreements with the four members)
focusing on trade and economic cooperation
- 1995 → Interrégional Framework Cooperation Agreement between EU and
Mercosur
● politics
● trade → liberalization
● economic cooperation
● encourage integration cooperation → technical assistance and inter-
institutional aid to foster integration in the new bloc
● formalized political dialogue→ Under the institutional framework a
Cooperation Council will be set up to oversee the Agreement's
implementation and will meet regularly at ministerial level
● 1991 was the start of negotiations of an inter- regional free trade area
● prepare for an interregional Association

two main roles:

- international balancing→ encourage mercosur organization
- internal institution- building → stimulate mercosur institutionalization
- external cooperation EU’S expenses doubled from 1986 to 1993
- trade flows multiplied during the 90s
- EU first mercosur trade partner in 2004
- initial aim of mercosur was to avoid complex institutional design and opting for a
model more based on the WTO than that of the EU
- mimic of main instruments of European integration → influence of political elite within
Mercosur (idealization of the EU example)
Passive and active behaviours
- passive → EU fosters its ideal of integration
- active → the EU acts to diffuse its model
- EU has influenced the shaping of mercosur institutions and mechanisms
 - transfer of knowledge and direct financial aid towards Mercosur → shape mercosur
according to EU’s own programmes values and interests
- however, EU model hardly exportable
- Mercosur and its inter- presidential character → presidents more responsible than
governments or regional institutions
- the dialogue with EU strengthened internal cohesion and coordination of regional
integrations in latam to only a limited extend

The pragmatic approach

The 2000s...dialogues with CAN, SICA and Mercosur → however, deepest and most
complete agreements were concluded with countries not with blocs
- special treatment reserved for major players → Brazil and Mexico → state centred
approach
- priority returned to trade
2004 → negotiations with Mercosur were suspended because of difficulties in reaching a
deal on agricultural and service sectors
EU proposed a strategic partnership to Brazil and signed an Economic Partnership
Agreement with some CARICOM members

Since the Rio summit in 1999…

- the economic content of negotiations remained limited to decisions taken in the
multilateral trade system limiting the regionalisms in this area
Three political events:
1. 9/11 → attention to Asia
- main motivation of uS influence was to limit US influence but this declined after 2001
- EU and uS became more concerned about security issues while LATAM remained
on economic growth, trade and development
2. election of left- wing presidents in South America from 2002 onwards:
- divergence of interest with majority of right- wing governments in Europe
- prefered to boost south. south cooperation
3. EU’s enlargement in 2004
- EU focused on new members reinforcing internal opposition to free trade
agreement with other regions
- EU’s external strategy more focused towards the East
- 2004 suspension of EU Mercosur negotiations
- move towards bilateralism → weakening power of the Commission and
increasing role of intergovernmental orientations
Brazil special status and seen as the focal point

After the economic crisis, regionalism is back→ restart EU Mercosur negotiations and
conclude EU SICA association agreements → “new inter- regionalism”
- political dialogue → built on the foundations of democracy, the rule of law and
respect for human rights
- cooperation → better use of the aid that the EU gives to Central America.
- trade → establishment of a Free Trade Area that seeks to facilitate the exchange of
goods and services.

Case study → MERCOSUR’s long negotiation with the EU

https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/mercosur/
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48807161
https://ideas.llorenteycuenca.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/5/2019/07/190709_IDEAS_Informe_Mercosur_UE_ENG-1.pdf
https://www.ft.com/content/a564ca96-99e7-11e9-8cfb-30c211dcd229
https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-48833560

Negotiations between Mercosur and the European Union began in June 1999 in Rio de
Janeiro, taking place at a time when the Latin America and Caribbean region was also
discussing the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) with the United States.
Following the turn of the millennium, negotiations came to a standstill. The failure of the Doha
Round, sponsored by the World Trade Organization in 2004, coupled with the final rejection
of the FTAA the following year and the disagreements regarding agricultural matters between
the blocs cooled the talks.

The European Union is Mercosur’s second largest commercial partner and the first in terms
of investment. Mercosur is the EU’s eighth extra-regional trading partner.

On 28th June, the EU and Mercosur reached a “political agreement” for a balanced
comprehensive trade deal. The new trade framework will consolidate a strategic political and
economic partnership and create opportunities for sustainable growth on both sides → “This
makes it the largest trade agreement the EU has ever concluded” (Juncker)

EU main objective to fight protectionism and support multilateralism and free tradeand reformist
governments in Argentina and bRAZIL IN THE WAKE OR MIDST of deep economic crises

Under the FTA, the EU will remove tariffs on 100 percent of its imports of industrial goods from
Mercosur, while Mercosur will remove tariffs on 90 percent of industrial goods imports from the
EU, expressed in value of present imports. The EU will remove tariffs on 82 percent of agricultural
goods while Mercosur will remove tariffs on 93 percent.

Main features of the new agreement:

KEY BENEFITS FOR EU COMPANIES:
1. Remove the majority of tariffs on EU exports to Mercosur, making EU companies
more competitive by saving them €4 billion worth of duties per year.

2. Easier customs and compliance procedures The two sides will simplify their customs
procedures and work together more closely on technical regulations and standards, so
that any differences that may exist do not stop EU companies from exporting to
Mercosur.

3. Selling services and setting up a business presence Mercosur countries have thus far
given limited access to services providers from other World Trade Organization (WTO)
countries but EU companies are already involved in providing Mercosur with
telecommunications, financial, business and transport services, among other sectors.

4. Getting access to public contracts The EU-Mercosur trade agreement will allow EU
firms to bid for public contracts on equal terms with Mercosur companies
 5. Supporting small and medium-sized companies. SMEs will benefit from a new online
platform providing easy access to information on market requirements and customs
rebates.

BENEFITS FOR MERCOSUR:

For Mercosur, the deal eliminates tariffs on 93 per cent of exports to the EU and grants
“preferential treatment” for the remaining 7 per cent. Negotiators said that one of the biggest
prizes for the South American bloc was increased access to the European market for
agricultural goods — notably for beef, poultry, sugar and ethanol. Brazilians expect tariffs on
orange juice, instant coffee and fruits to be zeroed, which would be “a huge victory for the
agribusiness sector”, said André Perfeito, economist at broker Spinelli in São Paulo.

UPHOLDING THE EU’S RIGOROUS FOOD SAFETY STANDARDS:

Any product arriving to Europe must comply with the EU’s stringent food safety standards.
The EU-Mercosur trade agreement does not change anything in that respect. The
agreement also reaffirms the ‘precautionary principle’, the right of both sides to adopt
measures to protect human, animal and plant health, including in situations where
scientific information is not conclusive. So in short:
- At the same time, the provisions of the agreement will help us better tackle common
challenges such as antimicrobial resistance, promote animal welfare standards and
reinforce the flow of information to help keeping unsafe products out of the market

CONTRIBUTING TO SUSTAINABLE PRODUCTION:

The EU-Mercosur agreement is based on the premise that trade should not happen at the
expense of the environment or labour conditions; on the contrary, it should promote
sustainable development.
- The EU and Mercosur commit to effectively implement the Paris Climate Agreement
and agree to cooperate on the climate aspects of trade between the two sides. This
includes tackling deforestation.
- The EU and Mercosur agree that they will not lower labour or environmental
standards in order to promote trade and attract investment. To the contrary, the
dedicated chapter includes specific commitments related to environment protection,
workers’ rights and promotion of responsible business conduct.
- The 'precautionary principle' is upheld in the agreement and ensures that the EU and
the Mercosur countries can continue to regulate, including on environment or labour
matters, even if this affects trade, also in situations where scientific information is not
conclusive.

Another benefit → more transparency in the use of trade defence instruments, explicit
public consultation and cooperation mechanisms on sanitary and phytosanitary standards
and on technical standards, and more transparent and inclusive government procurement
procedures.

However, aside from its economic benefits, this agreement should be considered in
geopolitical terms. It is a diplomatic study between the two trade blocs, one that contrasts
with other global economic powerhouses’ current attitudes. This is a lesson that, if received
by other countries, could become a true “antidote” to growing protectionist tensions.

Challenges facing the agreement → In Europe, the main criticisms come from farmers
(especially French and Irish livestock breeders) who fear Mercosur goods will displace
European products. In Mercosur, it is the industrial sector that sees the agreement as a risk.
1. A long process of ratification. Requires national ratification. After the initial
agreement, the ratification process begins among all parties—a process that could
take up to two years. The reluctance shown by various sectors could indicate a
difficult approval process. Both governments and parliaments must approve the
agreement individually; in coming weeks, more than 70 favorable votes will be
required. A single “no” could end the treaty before it comes into effect. In fact, Ireland
voted “No” as seeing the agreement as “risky for its economy ireland and the
planet”. In France, the president’s spokesperson said they are not yet ready to ratify
the agreement, and that they must study it in detail
2. Environmental pressure. In Europe, ecologists have been among the main
opponents to the agreement. Greenpeace has led a campaign against the
agreement, saying it encourages the deforestation of the Amazon rainforest.
According to the organization, 63 percent of cleared areas in the Amazon are used
for livestock, and the boost in beef exports would galvanize this process.
3. Open competitive bidding. One of the points that has required careful consideration
has been equal access to public tenders in Mercosur countries for European
companies, and vice versa. However, it will be mainly the European companies
closely watching to ensure this liberalization is more than theoretical, and that they
will have real chances to win these tenders.
4. Argentina’s new presidential term. As this is an election year, the repercussions in
Argentina around the strategic agreement between the two blocs went beyond
sectorial declarations of caution, expected in any negotiation of this nature, to include
political repercussions as well. With the looming presidential elections, statements
from the Kirchnerist opposition candidate, Alberto Fernandez, were to be expected.
However, he strongly opposed the government’s decision, saying the signing of the
agreement—rather than cause for celebration— should raise concern. He added that
he will not hesitate to review the international commitments Macri has signed thus
far→ ““It is not clear what the concrete benefits are for our country. But it is clear
what the damage for our industry and Argentine employment would be,” Mr
Fernández said. “An agreement like that is nothing to celebrate but provides plenty of
reasons to worry.”

LEER
http://omal.info/spip.php?article8558
https://bruegel.org/2019/09/deep-focus-whats-slowing-the-mercosur-agreement/
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/640138/EPRS_BRI(2019)64013
8_EN.pdf
https://blogs.iadb.org/integracion-comercio/es/la-union-europea-y-mercosur-un-acuerdo-
historico-y-prometedor/

https://bruegel.org/2019/09/the-european-union-mercosur-free-trade-agreement-
prospects-and-risks/
Very uncertain outcome
1. Departure from import substitution models and will impose greater discipline within
Mercosur, where there is impediments for internal trade. Brazil and Argentina
account for 95% of Mercosur’s GDP
2. Respond to protectionism from the united States. Might function even in the event of
the WTO faltering
3. EU finally opening to competition in the agriculture sector → EU agriculture remains
highly subsidised and protected, with EU farmers receiving 37 percent of their
income on average from public sources
Challenges for the EU:
- improve farmer’s ability to compete and find way to extend the scope of the
agricultural chapters
- monitor implementation mechanisms such as removal of non- tariff barriers in
Mercosur and Brazil’s compliance with the Paris Agreement
Challenges for Mercosur;
- profound economic reforms to strengthen their competitiveness
- exploit opportunities to export to the EU not just in agriculture → The FTA also
provides for a monitoring mechanism that includes civil-society representatives in
monitoring implementation of these environmental commitments
- it could give preferences to EU products than to products coming within Mercosur
and other LATAM countries, preventing LATAM regionalism

Opposition in Europe:
- economic damage to EU farmers, especially in france, Ireland and belgium
- environmental and HHRR protection regarding Bolsonaro
- incentivize further deforestation in Mercosur countries → tighter environmental
conditions and more active implementation and monitoring mechanisms on the trade
and sustainable development chapter
https://www.fundacioncarolina.es/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/DT_FC_13.pdf
Rio Summit y los acuerdos de asociación
- political dialogue
- cooperation development
- free mutual trade
Bilateral agreements signed meanwhile
- Mexico (1999), chile (2002), Peru y Colombia (2010), CA (2012) and eCUADOR
(2014)
- Post- cotonu association economic agreement with Caribbean countries (2000)
- Dialogue and Cooperation agreement with Cuba (2016)

Three main phases that prevented Mercosur- EU trade deal

1. open regionalism and interregionalism (1999-2003)
- in favour of liberal vision of regionalism and influence of globalization
- limits → low institutionalization and regulatory frameworks and almost no economic
integration within Mercosur and obstacles to free circulation in Mercosur
- desacceleration of integration process of Mercosur after double crisis in Brasil in
1998 and Argentina in 2001
- in the 90s, the UE was the first trade parnter from Mercosur. now, EU is the second
partner after China.
 2. Normative divergence and third markets (2003-2013)
- new cycle of leftist progressive governments
- more political and social Mercosur “postliberal regionalism”
- EU preference for the typical liberal model and open regionalism
- European central countries accesion to the UE
- huge opportunity in other markets in Asia, especially in China → less interest in
subregional or european markets
3. Globalization crisis and liberal- conservative shift in Mercosur (2014-2019)
- end of commodity products → very vulnerable to external shocks
- more attractiveness into regional markets and more commercial diversification
- however, reluctance of developed countries to globalization and to foreign direct
investment that fragmented international trade
- since 2015 → megarregional negotiations (TPP and the TIIP) were stuck because of
protectionist measures and trade wars
- polititization of negotiations → response to the globalization crises and protectionist
measures
- defense the neoliberal model

Case study from the 2000s...EU- CELAC

Relations with subregions
Gardini and Ayudo (2015): https://eulacfoundation.org/en/system/files/1530-la-
eu_5to_incluir_aqui_quede.pdf
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/176/latin-america-and-the-
caribbean
Interregionalism encompasses political interactions, formal institutional relations, material
transactions and cultural exchanges among the parties (Garzón, 2015). Group to group
institutional dialogue “pure interregionalism” based on relations between EU and LAC sub-
regional schemes:

EU- CA (CR, El Salvador, Guatemala, honduras, Nicaragua and Panama)

Relations with Central American countries have developed on the basis of the ‘San José
Dialogue’. Initiated in 1984, the dialogue has since broadened to issues including economic and
social development, migration and security. Following the first two cooperation agreements
concluded in 1985 and 1993, a Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement was signed in
2003, introducing various new areas of cooperation. An Association Agreement, the first region-
to-region agreement of this type concluded by the EU, was signed in June 2012 and ratified by
the European Parliament in December 2012. It establishes the goal of developing a privileged
political partnership based on values, principles and common objectives, reinforcing human
rights, reducing poverty, fighting inequality, preventing conflict, and encouraging good
governance, security, regional integration and sustainable development. The Association
Agreement also liberalises trade in industrial products and fisheries and eliminates most tariffs on
agricultural trade. The agreement’s trade chapter provisionally entered into force during 2013 (on
different dates for different countries). An Association Parliamentary Committee, composed of
MEPs and members of the Parlacen and of Costa Rica’s and Panama’s national parliaments, will
monitor the implementation of the agreement.
- more successful of the EU support to LAC regional integration

EU- CAN (Bolivia, Colombia, ecuador and Peru):

The EU has maintained regular contact with the Andean countries since the 1969 founding of the
Andean Group (later called the Andean Community). The first Cooperation Agreement was
signed in 1983, followed by a broader Framework Cooperation Agreement in 1993. In December
2003, the two regions concluded a Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement, which further
broadened the scope of the cooperation but has not yet entered into force. Negotiations on an
Association Agreement started in June 2007 and finally led to a multi-party trade agreement with
Peru and Colombia in March 2010. The trade agreement, signed in June 2012 and ratified by the
European Parliament in December 2012, entered into force with Peru on 1 March 2013 and with
Colombia on 1 August 2013. The agreement provides for the total liberalisation of trade in
industrial products and fisheries over 10 years (with most tariffs eliminated upon its entry into
force) and increases market access for agricultural products. The agreement covers public
procurement, investment, human rights and labour and environmental standards. Ecuador joined
the trade agreement on 1 January 2017.
- This was an achievement for the extension of the EU map of trade agreements but it also
can be seen as a failure in the EU inter-regionalist strategy with the CAN.
- The EU being displaced by China
- This loss of importance in the EU-CAN relations may be partially offset by European
involvement in the Peace Process in Colombia and by the growing priority of the security
issues related to drug trafficking and transnational crimes for the EU.

EU- MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, paraguay and Uruguay)

The EU and the Southern Common Market (Mercado Común del Sur, Mercosur), founded in
1991, have maintained institutional relations since 1992. In 1995, they signed an Interregional
Framework Agreement, establishing regular political dialogue and setting out objectives and
arrangements for trade and economic cooperation, including in the areas of investment
promotion, transport, the environment, and science and technology.

Negotiations on an Association Agreement, including political dialogue, cooperation and free

trade, started in 1999. After being suspended in 2004, negotiations resumed in 2010, focusing on
the political and cooperation chapters and the ‘normative’ part of the trade chapter (rules of
origin, etc.), but stalled again in 2012. However, after the parties reaffirmed their commitment to
reach an agreement, they exchanged offers on market access for goods, services and
government procurement in May 2016 and the negotiations started again. Despite the two
parties’ commitment, their goal to reach a deal on an Association Agreement by late 2017 was
not met and the negotiations continue in 2018. On various occasions, the European Parliament
has expressed its support for an ambitious and balanced agreement that takes account of the
sensitivities of both regions’ economic sectors.

- strongest and deepest historical and cultural bonds with Europe

- supply the bloc with technical assistance
- the EU is MERCOSUR’s main trade partner: nearly 20% of the bloc’s commercial
relations
- the eU is also a major exporter of commercial services to MERCOSUR and biggest
foreign investor in the region
- countries prioritized multilateral discussions on similar topics within the WTO → The
multilateral draft under discussion at the WTO was more favourable to MERCOSUR
countries than the EU bilateral proposal at least until 2006, when the collapse of the
Doha Round provided incentive to re- engage in bilateral dialogue
- The European Commission’s own estimates confirm that a potential liberalization,
whether partial or complete, would have relatively more positive effects for the EU than
 for MERCOSUR. This can be explained by the fact that over 60 per cent of products that
MERCOSUR countries export to the EU are already free from import duty. This is true for
both industrial and agricultural products. On the other hand, the EU’s most important
export sectors (automotive, transport components, mechanical and electrical products)
are subject to relatively high customs duties when entering MERCOSUR. Considering
that the EU also has an undeniable comparative advantage in services and investments,
the inclusion of these sectors in the free trade agreement linked to the association
agreement would be another advantage for Europe. More importantly, the EU Common
Agricultural Policy, through which European farmers are subsidised, is perceived as an
obstacle to negotiations by MERCOSUR members, Yet, for both economic and
social/environmental reasons, both fair and justified it has to be said, the EU does not
seem inclined to make significant concessions in this domain
- why relaunch of negotiations in 2010? → rise of China forces the eU to look for new
markets to compete globally and defend its market quota abroad. Second, the stalemate
of multilateral negotiations at the WTO seems endless, which increases the convenience
of bi- regional option to both parties. Third, the global crisis that shook the EU requires
new strategies to reactive growth and employment. fourth, Brazil’s rise

EU- CARICOM:
The EU has historically maintained strong relations with the Caribbean. This stems in large part
from the colonial presence of European countries in the region; many are still present through
Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) (France, UK and the Netherlands) and islands
dependent from border countries. EU-Caribbean relations are shaped by various overlapping
institutional frameworks. The most important are the Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000 with 79
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, and the EU-Cariforum Economic Partnership
Agreement (EPA), signed in 2008. The key partner for the bi-regional dialogue with the EU is
Cariforum. Of the organisation’s 16 members, 14 — Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St
Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago — are members of the Caribbean
Community (Caricom). The Dominican Republic (a signatory to the Cotonou Agreement and the
EPA) and Cuba, which holds a special status, are also members.

Since November 2012, EU-Caribbean relations have been governed by the Joint EU-Caribbean
Partnership Strategy (JECS), which provides a structured framework for broader and deeper
dialogue and cooperation. The strategy sets out five priority areas: regional cooperation and
integration; the reconstruction of Haiti; climate change and natural disasters; crime and security;
and joint action in bi-regional and multilateral forums and on global issues.

Interparliamentary relations are an important part of EU-Caribbean ties. In addition to dedicated

regional meetings and the broader ACP-EU Joint Inter-parliamentary Assembly, the 2008 EPA
established a Cariforum-EU Joint Parliamentary Committee to monitor the implementation of the
agreement. The Committee has met three times, most recently from 31 October to 1 November
2017 in Trinidad and Tobago.

- CARICOM very small proportion of the LAC total

- small sizes makes countries more sensitive to external fluctuations
- negative trade balance of payments is a shread trend
- EU less relevant position than the US (exception with Belize, where it is above the UE)
- weak economic links although strong historical and cultural relations (16 Caribbean
countries are part of the ACP group)
 - bi- regional relations are largely framed under the 2000 conotonu Agreement
- EPA Agreement: It removes all tariffs and quotas from Caribbean exports to the EU.
Caribbean countries offer a gradual opening of markets over a period of twenty-five
years, but they are allowed to exclude sensitive products and industries. Improved rules
of origin intend to have positive effects on the development of industries to export
products to Europe. The implementation of the EPA has been difficult and with important
delays in a context of the EU crisis and the economic downturn in most Caribbean states

EU- CELAC:

1. EU- CELAC SUMMITS: Historically there have been two official mechanisms for
interregional political dialogue between Europe and Latin America: EU–LAC summits and
EU–Rio Group summits. The first are biennial bilateral meetings between heads of state
and government which identify the basic drivers and priorities for the bi-regional
relationship. The first summit took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1999. The 2010 Madrid
Summit may well have marked the end of an era and a cooperation model. With the
creation of CELAC in 2011, and the first EU-CELAC Summit, celebrated in Santiago de
Chile in January 2013, Latin America and the Caribbean now attempt to speak with one
voice in international venues. This is meant to increase the global weight of Latin
America and to make it heavier than that of sub-regional groupings
2. EU- Rio Group Summits: The second mechanism, the EU–Rio Group summits of
ministers, used to take place every two years, alternating with the EU–Latin America
summits. Now both mechanisms are incorporated in the new EU-CELAC system.
- some say the CELAC is a political project
- not meant to produce direct economic benefit but to pursue political objectives and
coordination
- The EU-CELAC interregional mechanism also responds to a fast changing international
scenario (Sanahuja, 2013). EU-LAC institutionalized biregional relations started in the
1980s, in a context of Cold War, conflict in Central America, and democratic transition.
Today, distribution of power and wealth are significantly different. The North Atlantic area
is losing importance while the Asia-Pacific is rising. New partners are available both for
Europe and Latin America and the EU itself seems to be less important to Latin America.
In this sense, the new format of EU-CELAC Summit may offer an opportunity to rethink
EU-LAC interregionalism.
- CELAC can be seen as a response to a changing context but also as a counter-
hegemonic project in opposition to the US and the OAS. While diversity of members is
taken as a given, the ability to reach significant consensus on issues with practical impact
remains to be seen. Some members favour institutionalization and others prefer a loose
and flexible structure. While CELAC boosted an Action Plan to develop economic
relations with China, only a few members actively open their economies towards Asia
while for instance MERCOSUR countries resist that.
- more pluralistic and inclusive format: Both the 2013 and the 2015 EU-CELAC Summits
brought together societal actors and state bodies other than the executives. In spite of
the costs associated and other criticisms, this is a laudable step to reduce the democratic
deficit and involve an ampler sample of the institutional spectrum from the two regions
figures in terms of
trade...http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/608793/EPRS_IDA(2
017)608793_EN.pdf

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/11/20/fear-itself-why-closed-
borders-are-bad-for-america-and-the-world/
Otras cosas:
https://www.ibei.org/en/call-for-papers-regionalism-international-organizations-and-
global-challenges-in-fragmented-
world_163200?fbclid=IwAR35gkU4ANKTRqGYADfJ4dv0wDev76jpH7avlrGbiV21dRteJ
MwCH5aSKfc

https://www.ibei.org/call4papers_regionalism-io-and-global-challenges_163232.pdf

https://www.unitar.org/event/cart

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0002764207302474

https://glc.yale.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/new_slavery_old_binaries.pdf