POLITICAL LAW REVIEW - CASE DOCTRINES
Marcial Notes - 4B - Atty Gabriel
Due Process of Law
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
Ichong vs Hernandez
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POLICE POWER
NATURE AND SCOPE.—Police power is far-
reaching in scope, and it is almost impossible
to limit its sweep. It derives its existence from
the very existence of the State itself, and does
not need to be expressed or defined in its
scope. It is said to be co-extensive with self-
protection and survival, and as such it is the
most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and
marcial
illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of
society and of nations have multiplied to
almost unimaginable proportions; the field and
scope of police power has become almost
notes
boundless, just as the fields of public interest
and public welfare have become almost all-
embracing and have transcended human
foresight.
GUARANTEES IN SECTION I, ARTICLE III OF
THE CONSTITUTION; UNIVERSALITY OF
APPLICATION.—The constitutional guarantees
in Section I, Article III, of the Constitution,
which embody the essence of individual liberty
and freedom in democracies, are not limited to
citizens alone but are admittedly universal in
their application, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality
(Yiek Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed., 220, 226).
LAW DEPRIVATION OF LIFE, LIBERTY OR
PROPERTY; TEST OR STANDARD.—The conflict
between police power and the guarantees of
due process and equal protection of the laws
is more apparent than real. Properly related,
the power and the guarantees are supposed to
coexist. The balancing is the essence, or the
indispensable means for the" attainment of
legitimate aspirations of any democratic
society. There can be no absolute power,
Section 1
Article 3 - bill of rights Due process of law
whoever exercises it, for that would be
tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute
liberty, for that would mean license and
anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of
life, liberty or property, provided there is due
process of law; and persons may be classified
into classes and groups, provided everyone is
given the equal protection of the law. The test
or standard, as always, is reason. The police
power legislation must be firmly grounded on
public interest and welfare, and a reasonable
relation must exist between purposes and
means. And if distinction or classification has
been made, there must be a reasonable basis
for said distinction.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW CLAUSE;
WHEN NOT DEEMED INFRINGED BY
LEGISLATION.—The equal protection of the
law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality.
It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which
is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by territory within which it is to
operate. It does not demand absolute equality
among residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not (2 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 824-825).
LEGISLATIVE POWER TO MAKE DISTINCTION
AND CLASSIFICATION AMONG PERSONS;
CITIZENSHIP AS GROUND FOR
C L A S S I F I C AT I O N .—T h e p o w e r o f t h e
legislature to make distinctions and
classifications among persons is not curtailed
or denied by the equal protection of the laws
clause. The legislative power admits of a wide
scope of discretion, and a law can be violative
of the constitutional limitation only when the
classification is without reasonable basis.
Citizenship is a legal and valid ground for
classification.
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 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW - CASE DOCTRINES
Marcial Notes - 4B - Atty Gabriel
TEST OF REASONABLENESS.—The law in
question is deemed absolutely necessary to
bring about the desired legislative objective,
i.e., to free the national economy from alien
control and dominance. It is not necessarily
unreasonable because it affects private rights
and privileges (II Am. Jur., pp. 1080-1081).
The test of reasonableness of a law is the
appropriateness or adequacy under all
circumstances of the means adopted to carry
out its purpose into effect. Judged by this test,
the disputed legislation, which is not merely
reasonable but actually necessary, must be
c o n s i d e r e d n o t t o h ave i n f r i n g e d t h e
constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER
CORPORATION, vs. HON. RUBEN D.
TORRES, Secretary of Labor and
Employment, HON. RODOLFO S. MILADO,
Department of Labor and Employment
marcial
Mediator-Arbiter for Region VIII,
Tacloban City, and PHILPHOS MOVEMENT
FOR PROGRESS, INC. (PMPI).
Labor Law; Due Process; The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard,
notes
or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.—We do not see
it the way PHILPHOS does here. The essence
of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s
side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Where, as in the instant case,
petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position
paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to
consider the case submitted for decision on
the basis of the position papers filed by the
parties, there was sufficient compliance with
the requirement of due process, as petitioner
was afforded reasonable opportunity to
present its side. Moreover, petitioner could
have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to
confront and examine the witnesses of the
other party. But it did not; instead, it opted to
submit its position paper with the Mediator-
Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the
opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its
appeal to the Secretary of Labor.x
Section 1
Article 3 - bill of rights Due process of law
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE
STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED
NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO,
ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION
IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Lower courts
have authority to resolve the issue of
constitutionality of legislative measures.—This
Court has declared that while lower courts
should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are
nonetheless not prevented from resolving the
same whenever warranted, subject only to
review by the highest tribunal. We have
jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or rules of court may
provide," final judgments and orders of lower
courts in, among others, all cases involving
the constitutionality of certain measures. This
simply means that the resolution of such cases
may be made in the first instance by these
lower courts.
Same; Due Process; Judgments must be
based on the sporting idea of fair play.—The
closed mind has no place in the open society.
It is part of the sporting idea of fair play to
hear "the other side" before an opinion is
formed or a decision is made by those who sit
in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-
half of the question; the other half must also
be considered if an impartial verdict is to be
reached based on an informed appreciation of
the issues in contention. It is indispensable
that the two sides complement each other, as
unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the
correct ruling after examination of the
problem not from one or the other perspective
only but in its totality. A judgment based on
less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that
a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted
with the vice of bias or intolerance or
ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive
regimes, the insolence of power.
The ban on the transportation of carabaos
from one province to another (E.O. 626-A),
their confiscation and disposal without a prior
court hearing is violative of due process for
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 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW - CASE DOCTRINES
Marcial Notes - 4B - Atty Gabriel
lack of reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose to be
achieved and for being confiscatory.—But
while conceding that the amendatory measure
has the same lawful subject as the original
executive order, we cannot say with equal
certainty that it complies with the second
requirement, viz., that there be a lawful
method. We note that to strengthen the
original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A
imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter
of the carabaos but on their movement,
providing that "no carabao regardless of age,
sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no
carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another." The object of the
prohibition escapes us. The reasonable
connection between the means employed and
the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing.
marcial
Same; Same; Same.—Even if a reasonable
relation between the means and the end were
to be assumed, we would still have to reckon
with the sanction that the measure applies for
violation of the prohibition. The penalty is
notes
outright confiscation of the carabao or
carabeef being transported, to be meted out
by the executive authorities, usually the police
only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was
sustained because the penalty prescribed was
fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the
court after trial and conviction of the accused.
Under the challenged measure, significantly,
no such trial is prescribed, and the property
being transported is immediately impounded
by the police and declared, by the measure
itself, as forfeited to the government.
Same; Same; Same.—We also mark, on top of
all this, the questionable manner of the
disposition of the confiscated property as
prescribed in the questioned executive order.
It is there authorized that the seized property
shall "be distributed to charitable institutions
and other similar institutions as the Chairman
of the National Meat Inspection Commission
may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to
deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the
case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The
phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous
Section 1
Article 3 - bill of rights Due process of law
and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is
laden with perilous opportunities for partiality
and abuse, and even corruption. One searches
in vain for the usual standard and the
reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe
when they make their distribution. There is
none. Their options are apparently boundless.
Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of
their generosity and by what criteria shall they
be chosen? Only the officers named can
supply the answer, they and they alone may
choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their
own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is
here a "roving commission," a wide and
sweeping authority that is not "canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing," in
short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid
delegation of legislative powers.
Same; Same; Same.—To sum up then, we find
that the challenged measure is an invalid
exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is
not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due
process is violated because the owner of the
property conf iscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on
the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the of ficers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken.
Same; Same; Omission of right to a prior
hearing can be justified only where a problem
needs immediate and urgent correction.—It
has already been remarked that there are
occasions when notice and hearing may be
validly dispensed with notwithstanding the
usual requirement for these minimum
guarantees of due process. It is also conceded
that summary action may be validly taken in
administrative proceedings as procedural due
process is not necessarily judicial only. In the
exceptional cases accepted, however, there is
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 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW - CASE DOCTRINES
Marcial Notes - 4B - Atty Gabriel
a justification for the omission of the right to a
previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the
problem sought to be corrected and the
urgency of the need to correct it. In the case
before us, there was no such pressure of time
or action calling for the petitioner's
peremptory treatment. The properties
involved were not even inimical per se as to
require their instant destruction. There
certainly was no reason why the offense
prohibited by the executive order should not
have been proved first in a court of justice,
with the accused being accorded all the rights
safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v.
Angeles, Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in
nature, the violation thereof should have been
pronounced not by the police only but by a
court of justice, which alone would have had
the authority to impose the prescribed
penalty, and only after trial and conviction of
marcial
the accused.
BAYANI M. ALONTE, petitioner, vs. HON.
MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR., NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and PEOPLE
notes
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Due
Process; Requisites of due process in criminal
proceedings.—Jurisprudence acknowledges
that due process in criminal proceedings, in
particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal
trying the case is properly clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter
before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully
acquired by it over the person of the accused;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to
be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered
only upon lawful hearing.
Same; Same; Same; The above constitutional
and jurisprudential postulates, by now
elementary and deeply imbedded in our
criminal justice system, are mandatory and
indispensable.—The above constitutional and
jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary
and deeply imbedded in our own criminal
justice system, are mandatory and
indispensable. The principles find universal
acceptance and are tersely expressed in the
oft-quoted statement that procedural due
process cannot possibly be met without a “law
Section 1
Article 3 - bill of rights Due process of law
which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment
only after trial.”
Same; Same; Same; There can be no short-
cut to the legal process, and there can be no
excuse for not affording an accused his full
day in court.—The Solicitor General has aptly
discerned a few of the deviations from what
otherwise should have been the regular course
of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been directed
to present evidence to prove their defenses
nor have dates therefor been scheduled for
the purpose; (2) the parties have not been
given the opportunity to present rebutting
evidence nor have dates been set by
respondent Judge for the purpose; and (3)
petitioners have not admitted the act charged
in the information so as to justify any
modification in the order of trial. There can be
no short-cut to the legal process, and there
can be no excuse for not affording an accused
his full day in court. Due process, rightly
occupying the first and foremost place of
honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and
invaluable right that cannot be denied even to
the most undeserving.
Same; Same; Courts; All suitors are entitled
to nothing short of the cold neutrality of an
independent, wholly-free, disinterested and
unbiased tribunal.—Relative to the prayer for
the disqualification of Judge Savellano from
further hearing the case, the Court is
convinced that Judge Savellano should, given
the circumstances, be best excused from the
c a s e . Po s s i b l e a n i m o s i ty b e t w e e n t h e
personalities here involved may not all be that
unlikely. The pronouncement of this Court in
the old case of Luque vs. Kayanan could again
be said: All suitors are entitled to nothing
short of the cold neutrality of an independent,
wholly-free, disinterested and unbiased
tribunal. Second only to the duty of rendering
a just decision is the duty of doing it in a
manner that will not arouse any suspicion as
to the fairness and integrity of the Judge. It is
not enough that a court is impartial, it must
also be perceived as impartial.
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG,
JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
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 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW - CASE DOCTRINES
Marcial Notes - 4B - Atty Gabriel
ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SPECIAL TASK FORCE, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Searches
and Seizures; Checkpoints; Election Law; Gun
Ban; A warrantless search is not violative of
the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected
to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is merely limited to a visual search.—
As a rule, a valid search must be authorized
by a search warrant duly issued by an
appropriate authority. However, this is not
absolute. Aside from a search incident to a
lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been
upheld in cases of moving vehicles and the
seizure of evidence in plain view, as well as
the search conducted at police or military
checkpoints which we declared are not illegal
per se, and stressed that the warrantless
search is not violative of the Constitution for
as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor
marcial
its occupants subjected to a body search, and
the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited
to a visual search.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An
notes
extensive search without warrant could only
be resorted to if the officers conducting the
search had reasonable or probable cause to
believe before the search that either the
motorist was a law offender or that they would
find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining
to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to
be searched.—Petitioner contends that the
guns were not tucked in Arellano’s waist nor
placed within his reach, and that they were
neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a
bag at the back of the car. Significantly,
COMELEC did not rebut this claim. The records
do not show that the manner by which the
package was bundled led the PNP to suspect
that it contained firearms. There was no
mention either of any report regarding any
nervous, suspicious or unnatural reaction from
Arellano when the car was stopped and
searched. Given these circumstances and
relying on its visual observation, the PNP could
not thoroughly search the car lawfully as well
as the package without violating the
constitutional injunction. An extensive search
without warrant could only be resorted to if
the officers conducting the search had
Section 1
Article 3 - bill of rights Due process of law
reasonable or probable cause to believe before
the search that either the motorist was a law
offender or that they would find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the
commission of a crime in the vehicle to be
searched. The existence of probable cause
justifying the warrantless search is determined
by the facts of each case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
The action of policemen who conducted a
warrantless search in spite of the absence of
any circumstances justifying the same
intruded into the petitioner’s privacy and the
security of his property, and the firearms
obtained thereby cannot be admitted for any
purpose in any proceeding.—In the case at
bench, we find that the checkpoint was set up
twenty (20) meters from the entrance to the
Batasan Complex to enforce Resolution No.
2327. There was no evidence to show that the
policemen were impelled to do so because of a
confidential report leading them to reasonably
believe that certain motorists matching the
description furnished by their informant were
engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms
or in organizing special strike forces. Nor, as
adverted to earlier, was there any indication
from the package or behavior of Arellano that
could have triggered the suspicion of the
policemen. Absent such justifying
circumstances specifically pointing to the
culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the
search could not be valid. The action then of
the policemen unreasonably intruded into
petitioner’s privacy and the security of his
property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the
Constitution. Consequently, the firearms
obtained in violation of petitioner’s right
against warrantless search cannot be admitted
for any purpose in any proceeding.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
“Consent” given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances is no consent within the
purview of the constitutional guaranty.—In the
case of petitioner, only his driver was at the
car at that time it was stopped for inspection.
As conceded by COMELEC, driver Arellano did
not know the purpose of the checkpoint. In
the face of fourteen (14) armed policemen
conducting the operation, driver Arellano
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Marcial Notes - 4B - Atty Gabriel
being alone and a mere employee of petitioner
could not have marshalled the strength and
the courage to protest against the extensive
search conducted in the vehicle. In such
scenario, the “implied acquiescence,” if there
was any, could not be more than a mere
passive conformity on Arellano’s part to the
search, and “consent” given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances is no
consent within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Criminal
Procedure; The non-disclosure by the City
Prosecutor to the petitioner that he was a
respondent in the preliminary investigation is
violative of due process.—Moreover, the
manner by which COMELEC proceeded against
petitioner runs counter to the due process
clause of the Constitution. The facts show that
petitioner was not among those charged by
marcial
the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election
Code. Nor was he subjected by the City
Prosecutor to a preliminary investigation for
such offense. The non-disclosure by the City
Prosecutor to the petitioner that he was a
notes
respondent in the preliminary investigation is
violative of due process which requires that
the procedure established by law should be
obeyed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Due
process guarantees the observance of both
substantive and procedural rights, whatever
the source of such rights, be it the
Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of
court.—COMELEC argues that petitioner was
given the chance to be heard because he was
invited to enlighten the City Prosecutor
regarding the circumstances leading to the
arrest of his driver, and that petitioner in fact
submitted a sworn letter of explanation
regarding the incident. This does not satisfy
the requirement of due process the essence of
which is the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to submit any evidence one may
have in support of his defense. Due process
guarantees the observance of both substantive
and procedural rights, whatever the source of
such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only
a statute or a rule of court.
Section 1
Article 3 - bill of rights Due process of law
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where a
person was merely invited to corroborate
another person’s explanation during the
preliminary investigation, without being
informed that he himself was a respondent, it
cannot be seriously contended that he was
fully given the opportunity to meet the
a c c u s a t i o n a g a i n s t h i m .— A p p a r e n t l y,
petitioner was merely invited during the
preliminary investigation of Arellano to
corroborate the latter’s explanation. Petitioner
then was made to believe that he was not a
party respondent in the case, so that his
written explanation on the incident was only
intended to exculpate Arellano, not petitioner
himself. Hence, it cannot be seriously
contended that petitioner was fully given the
opportunity to meet the accusation against
him as he was not apprised that he was
himself a respondent when he appeared
before the City Prosecutor.
SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and
ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS
GARAY, respondents.
Due Process; Election Law; A person cannot
be said to have been denied due process on
the claim that the election offenses charged
against him by another person are entirely
different from those for he stands to be
accused of before the court, as charged by the
COMELEC, where the Informations directed to
be filed by the COMELEC were based on the
same set of facts as originally alleged in the
Complaint-Affidavit.—Petitioners cannot be
said to have been denied due process on the
claim that the election offenses charged
against them by private respondent are
entirely different from those for which they
stand to be accused of before the RTC, as
charged by the COMELEC. In the first place,
there appears to be no incongruity between
the charges as contained in the Complaint-
Affidavit and the Informations filed before the
RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by
private respondent of the alleged violations to
be covered by Section 261(y)(2) and Section
261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189.
Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed
by the COMELEC against petitioners, and
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Marcial Notes - 4B - Atty Gabriel
which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were
based on the same set of facts as originally
alleged in the private respondent’s Complaint-
Affidavit.
Same; Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine; Facial
Challenges; Words and Phrases; The void-for-
vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially
invalid if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application; Facial invalidation or an “on-
its-face” invalidation of criminal statutes is not
appropriate.—The void-for-vagueness doctrine
holds that a law is facially invalid if men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application.
However, this Court has imposed certain
limitations by which a criminal statute, as in
the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized.
This Court has declared that facial invalidation
or an “on-its-face” invalidation of criminal
marcial
statutes is not appropriate. We have so
enunciated in no uncertain terms in
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371
(2004).
notes
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS
SATELLITE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC
Commissioner, and NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Legislative Power,
Delegation of; Absence of a fixed standard
delegation of power becomes unconstitutional;
Requisites of valid delegation of rate fixing
p o w e r.— F u n d a m e n t a l i s t h e r u l e t h a t
delegation of legislative power may be
sustained only upon the ground that some
standard for its exercise is provided and that
the legislature in making the delegation has
prescribed the manner of the exercise of the
delegated power. Therefore, when the
administrative agency concerned, respondent
NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act
must both be non-confiscatory and must have
been established in the manner prescribed by
the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a
fixed standard, the delegation of power
becomes unconstitutional. In case of a
delegation of rate-fixing power, the only
standard which the legislature is required to
Section 1
Article 3 - bill of rights Due process of law
prescribe for the guidance of the
administrative authority is that the rate be
reasonable and just. However, it has been held
that even in the absence of an express
requirement as to reasonableness, this
standard may be implied.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f ra t e - f i x i n g p o w e r o f
administrative bodies as to when quasi-judicial
or legislative.—In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc.
vs. Public Service Commission, we made a
categorical classification as to when the rate-
fixing power of administrative bodies is quasi-
judicial and when it is legislative, thus:
“Moreover, although the rule-making power
and even the power to fix rates—when such
rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all
enterprises of a given kind throughout the
Philippines—may partake of a legislative
character, such is not the nature of the order
complained of. Indeed, the same applies
exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more,
it is predicated upon the finding of fact—based
upon a report submitted by the General
Auditing Office—that petitioner is making a
profit of more than 12% of its invested capital,
which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the
latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker
of said, report, and to introduce evidence to
disprove the contents thereof and/ or explain
or complement the same, as well as to refute
the conclusion drawn therefrom by the
respondent. In other words, in making said
finding of fact, respondent performed a
function partaking of a quasijudicial character,
the valid exercise of which demands previous
notice and hearing.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Due
Process; Temporary rate fixing order is not
exempt from the procedural requirements of
notice and hearing.—While respondents may
fix a temporary rate pending final
determination of the application of petitioner,
such rate-fixing order, temporary though it
may be, is not exempt from the statutory
procedural requirements of notice and
hearing, as well as the requirement of
reasonableness. Assuming that such power is
vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in
an arbitrary and confiscatory manner.
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Marcial Notes - 4B - Atty Gabriel
Categorizing such an order as temporary in
nature does not perforce entail the
applicability of a different rule of statutory
procedure than would otherwise be applied to
any other order on the same matter unless
otherwise provided by the applicable law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Temporary rate fixing order becomes final
legislative act as to the period during which it
has to remain in force pending the final
determination of the case.—Again, the order
requires the new reduced rates to be made
effective on a specified date. It becomes a
final legislative act as to the period during
which it has to remain in force pending the
final determination of the case. An order of
respondent NTC prescribing reduced rates,
even for a temporary period, could be unjust,
unreasonable or even confiscatory, especially
if the rates are unreasonably low, since the
marcial
utility permanently loses its just revenue
during the prescribed period. In fact, such
order is in effect final insofar as the revenue
during the period covered by the order is
concerned. Upon a showing, therefore, that
notes
the order requiring a reduced rate is
confiscatory and will unduly deprive petitioner
of a reasonable return upon its property, a
declaration of its nullity becomes indubitable,
which brings us to the issue on substantive
due process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Public Utilities; Nature and scope of the power
of the State to regulate the conduct and
business of public utilities.—The rule is that
the power of the State to regulate the conduct
and business of public utilities is limited by the
consideration that it is not the owner of the
property of the utility, or clothed with the
general power of management incident to
o w n e r s h i p, s i n c e t h e p r i va t e r i g h t o f
ownership to such property remains and is not
to be destroyed by the regulatory power. The
power to regulate is not the power to destroy
useful and harmless enterprises, but is the
power to protect, foster, promote, preserve,
and control with due regard for the interests,
first and foremost, of the public, then of the
utility and of its patrons. Any regulation,
therefore, which operates as an effective
Article 3 - bill of rights
confiscation of private property or constitutes
an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of
property rights is void, because it is repugnant
to the constitutional guaranties of due process
and equal protection of the laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Method of determining reasonableness of the
rate fixed.—What is a just and reasonable rate
is not a question of formula but of sound
business judgment based upon the evidence;
it is a question of fact calling for the exercise
of discretion, good sense, and a fair,
enlightened and independent judgment. In
determining whether a rate is confiscatory, it
is essential also to consider the given
situation, requirements and opportunities of
the utility. A method often employed in
determining reasonableness is the fair return
upon the value of the property to the public
utility. Competition is also a very important
factor in determining the reasonableness of
rates since a carrier is allowed to make such
rates as are necessary to meet competition.
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO
TEODORO, manager and proprietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS' BROTHERHOOD,
petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL
LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
There are cardinal primary rights which must
be respected even in proceedings of this
character:

1. The first of these rights is the right to a
hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. In the language of Chief Justice
Hughes, in Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1,
-58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129,
"the liberty and property of the citizen shall
be protected by the rudimentary
requirements of fair play.”
2. Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights which he asserts but the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented.
Section 1
Due process of law Page 8
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Marcial Notes - 4B - Atty Gabriel
(Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U. S.
298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 Law. ed.
1288.) In the language of this Court in
Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the
right to adduce evidence, without the
corresponding duty on the part of the
board to consider it, is vain. Such right is
conspicuously futile if the person or
persons to whom the evidence is presented
can thrust it aside without notice or
consideration.”
3. "While the duty to deliberate does not
impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support
it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.)
This principle emanates from the more
marcial
fundamental principle that the genius of
constitutional government is contrary to
the vesting of unlimited power anywhere.
Law is both a grant and a limitation upon
power.
notes
4. Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion (City of
Manila vs. Agustin, G. R. No. 45844,
promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI 0.
G. 1335), but the evidence must be
"substantial." (Washington, Virginia &
Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 301 U. S. 142, 147, 57 S.
C t . 648, 650, 81 Law. ed . 965.)
"Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a evidence and informing itself of facts
conclusion.” (Appalachian Electric Power v.
National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F.
2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations
Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F.
2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co.
v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98
F. 2d 758, 760.) * * * The statute provides
that 'the rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling.' The obvious purpose of this
and similar provisions is to free
administrative boards from the compulsion
Section 1
Article 3 - bill of rights Due process of law
of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be
deemed incompetent in judicial
proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order. (Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44, 24
S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860;
Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88,
93, 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431;
United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry.
Co., 265 U. S. 274, 288, 44 S. Ct. 565,
569, 68 Law. ed. 1016; Tagg Bros. &
Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420,
442, 50 S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.)
But this assurance of a desirable flexibility
in administrative procedure does not go so
far as to justify orders without a basis in
evidence having rational probative force.
Mere uncorroboratborated hearsay or
rumor does not constitute substantial
evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct.
206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)”
5. The decision must be rendered on the
evidence pre-sented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected. (Interstate
Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co.,
227 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed.
431.) Only by confining the administrative
tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the
parties, can the latter be protected in their
right to know and meet the case against
them. It should not, however, detract from
their duty actively to see that the law is
enforced, and for that purpose, to use the
authorized legal methods of securing
material and relevant to the controversy.
Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the
purpose of investigating and determining
the facts in any given case, but their report
and decision are only advisory. (Section 9,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of
I n d u s t r i a l Re l a t i o n s m ay r e f e r a ny
industrial or agricultural dispute or any
matter under its consideration or
advisement to a local board of inquiry, a
provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or
any public official in any part of the
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Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation, and may delegate to
such board or public official such powers
and functions as the said Court of
Industrial Relations may deem necessary,
but such delegation shall not affect the
exercise of the Court itself of any of its
powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
6. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of
its judges, therefore, must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. It may be that the
volume of work is such that it is literally
impossible for the titular heads of the
Court of Industrial Relations personally to
decide all controversies coming before
them. In the United States the difficulty is
solved with the enactment of statutory
marcial
authority authorizing examiners or other
subordinates to render final decision, with
right to appeal to board or commission, but
in our case there is no such statutory
authority.
notes
7. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in
all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of
this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY,
FATHER JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J., DEAN
CYNTHIA ROXAS-DEL CASTILLO, JUDGE
RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., JUSTICE
VENICIO ESCOLIN, FISCAL MIGUEL
ALBAR, ATTYS. MARCOS HERRAS,
FERDINAND CASIS, JOSE CLARO TESORO,
RAMON CAGUIOA, and RAMON EREÑETA,
petitioners, vs. HON. IGNACIO M.
CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the RTC-
Makati, Br. 134, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, JR.,
ERNEST MONTECILLO, ADEL ABAS,
JOSEPH LLEDO, AMADO SABBAN,
DALMACIO LIM, JR., MANUEL ESCALONA
and JUDE FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Section 1
Article 3 - bill of rights Due process of law
Schools and Colleges; Minimum standards to
be observed by schools before imposing
disciplinary sanctions.—“(1) the students must
be informed in writing of the nature and cause
of any accusation against them; (2) that they
shall have the right to answer the charges
against them with the assistance of counsel, if
desired; (3) they shall be informed of the
evidence against them; (4) they shall have the
right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
and (5) the evidence must be duly considered
by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case.”
Same; Due Process; Administrative Law;
Administrative proceedings made by a school
against students charged with fatal hazing
need not be similar to a judicial proceeding.—
Respondent students may not use the
argument that since they were not accorded
the opportunity to see and examine the
written statements which became the basis of
petitioners’ February 14, 1991 order, they
were denied procedural due process. Granting
that they were denied such opportunity, the
same may not be said to detract from the
observance of due process, for disciplinary
cases involving students need not necessarily
include the right to cross examination. An
administrative proceeding conducted
investigate students’ participation in a hazing
activity need not be clothed with the attributes
of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination
of the March 2, 1991 hearing which
characterized the rules on the investigation as
being summary in nature and that respondent
students have no right to examine affiants-
neophytes, reveals that this is but a
reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz.
Same; Same; Argument that students’ rights
were violated as the word “hazing” is not
explicitly defined in the Ateneo Law School
Catalogue not an acceptable contention for
law students to advance.—With regard to the
charge of hazing, respondent students fault
petitioners for not explicitly defining the word
“hazing” and allege that there is no proof that
they were furnished copies of the 1990-91
Ateneo Law School Catalogue which prohibits
hazing. Such flawed sophistry is not worthy of
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students who aspire to be future members of
the Bar. It cannot be over-emphasized that
the charge filed before the Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee and the Disciplinary Board is not a
criminal case requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt but is merely administrative
in character. As such, it is not subject to the
rigorous requirements of criminal due process,
particularly with respect to the specification of
the charge involved. As we have had occasion
to declare in previous cases of a similar
nature, due process in disciplinary cases
involving students does not entail proceedings
and hearings identical to those prescribed for
actions and proceedings in courts of justice.
Accordingly, disciplinary charges against a
student need not be drawn with the precision
of a criminal information or complaint. Having
given prior notice to the students involved that
“hazing” which is not defined in the School
marcial
Catalogue shall be defined in accordance with
Senate Bill No. 3815, the proposed bill on the
subject of Sen. Jose Lina, petitioners have
said what needs to be said. We deem this
sufficient for purposes of the investigation
notes
under scrutiny.
Same; Same; Hazing is a valid ground for
student expulsion from school.—Hazing, as a
ground for disciplining a student, to the extent
of dismissal or expulsion, finds its raison d’
etre in the increasing frequency of injury, even
death, inflicted upon the neophytes by their
insensate masters.” Assuredly, it passes the
test of reasonableness and absence of malice
on the part of the school authorities. Far from
fostering comradeship and esprit d’ corps, it
has merely fed upon the cruel and baser
instincts of those who aspire to eventual
leadership in our country.
Same; Words and Phrases; “Academic
freedom” defined.—At this juncture, it would
be meet to recall the essential freedoms
subsumed by Justice Felix Frankfurther in the
term “academic freedom” cited in the case of
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, thus: (1) who may
teach; (2) what may be taught; (3) how it
shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted
to study.
Section 1
Article 3 - bill of rights Due process of law
Same; Attorneys; Petitioner school validly
dismissed law students found involved in fatal
fraternity hazing.—Having carefully reviewed
the records and the procedure followed by
petitioner university, we see no reason to
reverse its decision founded on the following
undisputed facts: that on February 8, 9 and
10, 1991, the Aquila Legis Fraternity
conducted hazing activities; that respondent
students were present at the hazing as
auxiliaries, and that as a result of the hazing,
Leonardo Villa died from serious physical
injuries, while Bienvenido Marquez was
hospitalized. In light of the vicious acts of
respondent students upon those whom
ironically they would claim as “brothers” after
the initiation rites, how can we countenance
the imposition of such nominal penalties as
reprimand or even suspension? We, therefore,
affirm petitioners’ imposition of the penalty of
dismissal upon respondent students. This finds
authority and justification in Section 146 of
the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT
NETWORK, INC., on behalf of the South-
South Network (SSN) for Non-State
Armed Group Engagement, and ATTY.
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., petitioners, vs.
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF
THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
respondents.
Vo i d f o r Va g u e n e s s D o c t r i n e ; Fa c i a l
Challenges; Criminal Law; Words and Phrases;
The doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of
overbreadth do not operate on the same
plane; A statute or act suffers from the defect
of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application; The overbreadth
doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose
to control or prevent activities constitutionally
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subject to state regulations may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of
p r o t e c t e d f r e e d o m s . —T h e c o n f u s i o n
apparently stems from the interlocking
relation of the overbreadth and vagueness
doctrines as grounds for a facial or as-applied
challenge against a penal statute (under a
claim of violation of due process of law) or a
speech regulation (under a claim of
abridgement of the freedom of speech and
cognate rights). To be sure, the doctrine of
vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do
not operate on the same plane. A statute or
act suffers from the defect of vagueness when
it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application.
It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure
to accord persons, especially the parties
marcial
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
the Government muscle. The overbreadth
notes
doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms. As distinguished from the
vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine
assumes that individuals will understand what
a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain
from that behavior, even though some of it is
protected.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Distinguished
from an as-applied challenge which considers
only extant facts affecting real litigants, a
facial invalidation is an examination of the
entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects,
not only on the basis of its actual operation to
the parties, but also on the assumption or
prediction that its very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities;
A litigant cannot successfully mount a facial
challenge against a criminal statute on either
vagueness or overbreadth grounds.—A “facial”
Section 1
Article 3 - bill of rights Due process of law
challenge is likewise different from an “as-
applied” challenge. Distinguished from an as-
applied challenge which considers only extant
facts affecting real litigants, a facial
invalidation is an examination of the entire
law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only
on the basis of its actual operation to the
parties, but also on the assumption or
prediction that its very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities.
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the
subtitle in his concurring opinion that the
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as
grounds for a facial challenge, are not
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus
successfully mount a facial challenge against a
criminal statute on either vagueness or
overbreadth grounds.
Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; The
allowance of a facial challenge in free speech
cases is justified by the aim to avert the
“chilling effect” on protected speech, the
exercise of which should not at all times be
abridged.—The allowance of a facial challenge
in free speech cases is justified by the aim to
avert the “chilling effect” on protected speech,
the exercise of which should not at all times
be abridged. As reflected earlier, this rationale
is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that
generally bear an “in terrorem effect” in
deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the
legislature may even forbid and penalize acts
formerly considered innocent and lawful, so
long as it refrains from diminishing or
dissuading the exercise of constitutionally
protected rights.
Same; Same; Same; By its nature, the
overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply
a facial type of invalidation in order to plot
areas of protected speech, inevitably almost
always under situations not before the court,
that are impermissibly swept by the
substantially overbroad regulation.—It is
settled, on the other hand, that the application
of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a
facial kind of challenge and, owing to the
given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable
only to free speech cases. By its nature, the
overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply
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Marcial Notes - 4B - Atty Gabriel

a facial type of invalidation in order to plot

areas of protected speech, inevitably almost
always under situations not before the court,
that are impermissibly swept by the
substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise
stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed
for being substantially overbroad if the court
confines itself only to facts as applied to the
litigants.

S a m e ; S a m e ; S a m e ; L e g a l Re s e a r c h ;
American jurisprudence instructs that
“vagueness challenges that do not involve the
First Amendment must be examined in light of
the specific facts of the case at hand and not
with regard to the statute’s facial validity”; In
this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness
doctrine asserted under the due process
clause has been utilized in examining the
constitutionality of criminal statutes.—
American jurisprudence instructs that

marcial

“vagueness challenges that do not involve the

First Amendment must be examined in light of
the specific facts of the case at hand and not
with regard to the statute’s facial validity.” For
more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court

notes
has evaluated defendants’ claims that criminal
statutes are unconstitutionally vague,
developing a doctrine hailed as “among the
most important guarantees of liberty under
law.” In this jurisdiction, the void-for-
vagueness doctrine asserted under the due
process clause has been utilized in examining
the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at
least three cases, the Court brought the
doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance
penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax
on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment
punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor
Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article
202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably,
the petitioners in these three cases, similar to
those in the two Romualdez and Estrada
cases, were actually charged with the therein
assailed penal statute, unlike in the present
case.


Section 1

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Equal Protection of the Law
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS and THE HONGKONG &
SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION,
petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge ad
interim of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG,
respondents.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS; CLASS
L E G I S L AT I O N ; C L A S S I F I C AT I O N O N
REASONABLE BASIS.—" * * * nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the
marcial
laws." This basic individual right sheltered by
the Constitution is a restraint on all the three
grand departments of our government and on
the subordinate instrumentalities and
s u b d i v i s i o n s t h e r e o f, a n d o n m a n y
constitutional powers, like the police power,
notes
taxation and eminent domain. What may be
regarded as a denial of the equal protection of
the laws is a question not always easily
determined. No rule that will cover every case
can be formulated. Class legislation
discriminating against some and favoring
others is prohibited. But classification on a
reasonable basis, and not made arbitrarily or
capriciously, is permitted. The classification,
however, to be reasonable must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; it must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and must apply
equally to each member of the class.
R E S U LTA N T I N E Q U A L I T Y F R O M
UNWARRANTED DELEGATION; PROBATION
ACT PERMITS DENIAL OF EQUAL
PROTECTION.—In the case of Act No. 4221,
the resultant inequality may be said to flow
from the unwarranted delegation of legislative
power to the provincial boards. While
inequality may result in the application of the
law and in the conferment of the benefits
Section 1
Article 3 - bill of rights Equal protection of laws
therein provided, inequality is not in all cases
the necessary result. But whatever may be the
case, it is clear that section 11 of the
Probation Act creates a situation in which
discrimination and inequality are permitted or
allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant
authorities requiring actual denial of the equal
protection of the law before courts should
assume the task of setting aside a law
vulnerable on that score, but premises and
circumstances considered, we are of the
opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221
permits of the denial of the equal protection of
the law and is on that account bad. We see no
difference between a law which denies equal
protection and a law which permits of such
denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face
and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits
of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within
the constitutional prohibition. In other words,
statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional
because of their effect in operation. If a law
has the effect of denying the equal protection
of the law it is unconstitutional.
S E C T I O N 1 1 O F P R O B AT I O N A C T;
GOVERNMENT OF LAWS; EQUALITY CLAUSE
NOT "A ROPE OF SAND".—Under section 11 of
the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in
force in one or several provinces and not be in
force in the other provinces, but one province
may appropriate for the salary of a probation
officer of a given year—and have probation
during that year—and thereafter decline to
make further appropriation, and have no
probation in subsequent years. While this
situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion
which delegation implies, it is here indicated
to show that the Probation Act sanctions a
situation which is intolerable in a government
of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the
Act, to make the guaranty of the equality
clause but "a rope of sand.”
Ichong vs Hernandez
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW CLAUSE;
WHEN NOT DEEMED INFRINGED BY
LEGISLATION.—The equal protection of the
law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality.
It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which
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is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by territory within which it is to
operate. It does not demand absolute equality
among residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not (2 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 824-825).
LEGISLATIVE POWER TO MAKE DISTINCTION
AND CLASSIFICATION AMONG PERSONS;
CITIZENSHIP AS GROUND FOR
C L A S S I F I C AT I O N .—T h e p o w e r o f t h e
legislature to make distinctions and
marcial
classifications among persons is not curtailed
or denied by the equal protection of the laws
clause. The legislative power admits of a wide
scope of discretion, and a law can be violative
of the constitutional limitation only when the
notes
classification is without reasonable basis.
Citizenship is a legal and valid ground for
classification.
TEST OF REASONABLENESS.—The law in
question is deemed absolutely necessary to
bring about the desired legislative objective,
i.e., to free the national economy from alien
control and dominance. It is not necessarily
unreasonable because it affects private rights
and privileges (II Am. Jur., pp. 1080-1081).
The test of reasonableness of a law is the
appropriateness or adequacy under all
circumstances of the means adopted to carry
out its purpose into effect. Judged by this test,
the disputed legislation, which is not merely
reasonable but actually necessary, must be
c o n s i d e r e d n o t t o h ave i n f r i n g e d t h e
constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner,
vs. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE
FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.
Same; The fee off P50.00 imposed by a city
ordinance of Manila on alien’s employment is
unreasonable because it failed to consider
Section 1
Article 3 - bill of rights Equal protection of laws
valid differences in situation among aliens
required to pay it.—The P50.00 fee is
unreasonable not only because it is excessive
but because it fails to consider valid
substantial differences in situation among
individual aliens who are required to pay it.
Although the equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not forbid classification, it is
imperative that the classification should be
based on real and substantial differences
having a reasonable relation to the subject
ofthe particular legislation. The same amount
to P50.00 is being collected from every
employed alien, whether he is casual or
permanent, part time or full time or whether
he is a lowly employee or a highly paid
executive.
Same; A city ordinance which does not lay
down any standard to guide the city mayor in
the issuance or denial of an alien employment
permit fee is null and void.—Ordinance No.
6537 does not lay down any criterion or
standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of
his discretion. It has been held that where an
ordinance of a municipality fails to state any
policy or to set up any standard to guide or
limit the mayor’s action, expresses no purpose
to be attained by requiring a permit,
enumerates no conditions for its grant or
refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus
conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted power to grant or deny the
issuance of building permits, such ordinance is
invalid, being an undefined and unlimited
delegation of power to allow or prevent an
activity per se lawful.
Same; Constitutional law; A city ordinance
which requires aliens to secure a mayor’s
permit before they can earn a means of
livelihood in the City of Manila is void and
unconstitutional.—Requiring a person before
he can be employed to get a permit from the
City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or
refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him
the basic right of the people in the Philippines
to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is
true that the Philippines as a State is not
obliged to admit aliens within its territory,
once an alien is admitted, he cannot be
deprived of life without due process of law.
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 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW - CASE DOCTRINES
Marcial Notes - 4B - Atty Gabriel
This guarantee includes the means of
livelihood. The shelter of protection under the
due process and equal protection clause is
given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff and appellee, vs. CAYAT,
defendant and appellant.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; GUARANTY OF EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS; LEGISLATION
BASED ON REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION.—It
is an established principle of constitutional law
that the guaranty of the equal protection of
the laws is not violated by a legislation based
on reasonable classification. And the
classification, to be reasonable, (!) must rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) must be
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must
not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the
same class.
marcial
That the classification is germane to the
purposes of law cannot be doubted. The
prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his
possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale,
notes
beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind,
other than the socalled native wines and
liquors which the members of such tribes have
been accustomed themselves to make prior to
the passage of this Act," is unquestionably
designed to insure peace and order in and
among the non-Christian tribes. It has been
the sad experience of the past, as the
observations of the lower court disclose, that
the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by
the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in
lawlessness and crimes thereby hampering the
efforts of the government to raise their
standard of life and civilization.
The law is not limited in its application to
conditions existing at the time of its
enactment. It is intended to apply for all times
as long as those conditions exist. The Act was
not predicated upon the assumption that the
nonChristians are "impermeable to any
civilizing influence." On the contrary, the
Legislature understood that the civilization of
a people is a slow process and that hand in
hand with it must go measures of protection
and security.
Section 1
Article 3 - bill of rights Equal protection of laws
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.—To constitute due
process of law, notice and bearing are not
always necessary. This rule is especially true
where much must be left to the discretion of
the administrative officials in applying a law to
particular cases. Due process of law means
simply: (1) that there shall be a law
prescribed in harmony with the general
powers of the legislative department of the
government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in
its operation; (3) that it shall be enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and (4) that 1 it shall be
applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to
all of a class.
POLICE POWER OF THE STATE.—Neither is the
Act an improper exercise of the police power
of the state. It has been said that the police
power is the most insistent and least limitable
of all the powers of the government. It has
been aptly described as a power coextensive
with self-protection and constitutes the law of
overruling necessity. Any measure intended to
promote the health, peace, morals, education
and good order of the people or to increase
the industries of -the state, develop its
resources and add to its wealth and
prosperity, is a legitimate exercise of the
police power, and unless shown to be
whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere
with the rights of an individual, the same must
be upheld.
PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and
ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.
Supreme Court; Judicial review; Election
Code; Supreme Court cannot rule upon the
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52
disqualifying a retired elective official from
running for the same post where no petition to
disqualify the petitioner has yet been filed and
the COMELEC has not yet given an adverse
ruling against him.—Petitioner Dumlao assails
the constitutionality of the first paragraph of
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted
earlier, as being contrary to the equal
protection clause guaranteed by the
Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent
COMELEC from implementing said provision.
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 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW - CASE DOCTRINES
Marcial Notes - 4B - Atty Gabriel
Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected
by the application of that provision. No
petition seeking Dumlao’s disqualification has
been filed before the COMELEC. There is no
ruling of that constitutional body on the
matter, which this Court is being asked to
review on Certiorari. This is a question posed
in the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in
effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from
this Court to be “rendered without the benefit
of a detailed factual record.” Petitioner
Dumlao’s case is clearly within the primary
jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion of now
Chief Justice Fernando in Peralta vs. Comelec,
82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of respondent
COMELEC as provided for in section 2, Art.
XII-C, of the Constitution.
Same; The provision of the Election Code that
the filing of charges for the commission of
crimes before a civil or military court shall be
marcial
prima facie evidence of the commission of an
act of disloyalty to the State is void as it
condemns a person before he is finally heard.
—Explicit is the constitutional provision that,
in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
notes
be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19,
1973 Constitution). An accusation, according
to the fundamental law, is not synonymous
with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes
the constitutional presumption of innocence,
as a candidate is disqualified from running for
public office on the ground alone that charges
have been filed against him before a civil or
military tribunal. It condemns before one is
fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the
degree of proof, no distinction is made
between a person convicted of acts of
disloyalty and one against whom charges have
been filed for such acts, as both of them
would be ineligible to run for public office. A
person disqualified to run for public office on
the ground that charges have been filed
against him is virtually placed in the same
category as a person already convicted of a
crime with the penalty of arresto, which
carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspension of the right to hold office during
the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised
Penal Code).
Section 1
Article 3 - bill of rights Equal protection of laws
Same; Same.—And although the filing of
charges is considered as but prima facie
evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted,
yet, there is “clear and present danger” that
because of the proximity of the elections, time
constraints will prevent one charged with acts
of disloyalty from offering contrary to
overcome the prima facie evidence against
him.
Same; Same.—Additionally, it is best that
evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be
aired before the Courts rather than before an
administrative body such as the COMELEC. A
highly possible conflict of findings between
two government bodies, to the extreme
detriment of a person charged, will thereby be
avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/
administrative determination of guilt should
not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial
determination.
PHIlLIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE
EXPORTERS, INC, petitioner, vs. HON.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of
Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D.
ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Labor Laws: Deployment
Ban of Female Domestic Helper; Concept of
Police Power.—The concept of police power is
well-established in this jurisdiction. It has
been defmed as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1)
an imposition of restraint upon liberty or
property, (2) in order to foster the common
good. It is not capable of an exact definition
but has been, purposely, veiled in general
terms to underscore its all-comprehensive
embrace. "Its scope, ever-expanding to meet
the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate
the future where it could be done, provides
enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuring the greatest benefits.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Police power
constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill
ofRights.—It constitutes an implied limitation
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 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW - CASE DOCTRINES
Marcial Notes - 4B - Atty Gabriel
on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it
is "rooted in the conception that men in
organizing the state and imposing upon its
governxnent limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to
enable an individual citizen or a group of
c i t i ze n s t o o b s t r u c t u n r e a s o n a b l y t h e
enactment of such salutary measures
calculated to ensure communal peace, safety,
good order, and welfare." Significantly, the Bill
of Rights itself does not purport to be an
absolute guaranty of individual rights and
liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all
rights, is not unrestricted license to act
according to one's will." It is subject to the far
more overriding demands and requirements of
the greater number.
Same; Same; Same; Equality before the law
under the Constitution; Requirements ofa valid
classification, satisfied.—The petitioner has
marcial
shown no satisfactory reason why the
contested measure should be nullified. There
is no question that Department Order No. 1
applies only to "female contract workers," but
it does not thereby make an undue
notes
discrimination between the sexes. It is well-
settled that "equality before the law" under
the Constitution does not import a perfect
identity of rights among all men and women.
It admits of classifications, provided that (1)
such classiflcations rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) they are germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined
to existing conditions; and (4) they apply
equally to all members of the same class. The
Court is satisfied that the classification made—
the preference for female workers—rests on
substantial distinctions.
Same; Same; Same; Valid Discrimination
between female and male contract workers
under Department OrderNo. l,justified.—The
same, however, cannot be said of our male
workers. In the first place, there is no
evidence that, except perhaps for isolated
instances, our men abroad have been afflicted
with an identical predicament. The petitioner
has proffered no argument that the
Government should act similarly with respect
to male workers. The Court, of course, is not
impressing some male chauvinistic notion that
Section 1
Article 3 - bill of rights Equal protection of laws
men are superior to women. What the Court is
saying is that it was largely a matter of
evidence (that women domestic workers are
being ill-treated abroad in massive instances)
and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary
yardstick that the Government acted in this
case. It is evidence capable indeed of
unquestionable demonstration and evidence
this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however,
say the same thing as far as men are
concerned. There is simply no evidence to
justify such an inference. Suffice it to state,
then, that insofar as classification are
concerned, this Court is content that
distinctions are borne by the evidence.
Discrimination in this case is justified.
Same; Same; Same; Department Order No. 1
does not impair the right to travel.—The
consequence the deployment ban has on the
right to travel does not impair the right. The
right to travel is subject, among other things,
to the requirements of "public safety, "as may
be provided by law." Department Order No. 1
is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in
particular, its basic policy to "afford protection
to labor," pursuant to the respondent
Department of Labor's rulemaking authority
vested in it by the Labor Code. The petitioner
assumes that it is unreasonable simply
because of its impact on the right to travel,
but as we have stated, the right itself is not
absolute. The disputed Order is a valid
qualification thereto.
IS H MA EL H IMA GA N, petition er, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON.
JUDGE HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC, Br. 11,
Davao City, respondents.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection
Clause; The imposition of preventive
suspension for over 90 days does not violate
the suspended policeman’s constitutional right
to equal protection of the laws.—The reason
why members of the PNP are treated
differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar
as the application of the rule on preventive
suspension is concerned is that policemen
carry weapons and the badge of the law which
can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses
against them, as succinctly brought out in the
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 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW - CASE DOCTRINES
Marcial Notes - 4B - Atty Gabriel
legislative discussions. If a suspended
policeman criminally charged with a serious
offense is reinstated to his post while his case
is pending, his victim and the witnesses
against him are obviously exposed to constant
threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the
mere fact that the accused is in uniform and
armed. The imposition of preventive
suspension for over 90 days under Section 47
of R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended
policeman’s constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The equal
protection clause does not absolutely forbid
classifications, and a distinction based on real
and reasonable considerations related to a
proper legislative purpose is neither
unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.—The
equal protection clause exists to prevent
undue favor or privilege. It is intended to
marcial
eliminate discrimination and oppression based
on inequality. Recognizing the existence of
real differences among men, the equal
protection clause does not demand absolute
equality. It merely requires that all persons
notes
shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to the
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
Thus, the equal protection clause does not
absolutely forbid classifications, such as the
one which exists in the instant case. If the
classification is based on real and substantial
differences; is germane to the purpose of the
law; applies to all members of the same class;
and applies to current as well as future
conditions, the classification may not be
impugned as violating the Constitution’s equal
protection guarantee. A distinction based on
real and reasonable considerations related to a
proper legislative purpose such as that which
exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious
nor unfounded.
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A.
TOLENTINO, JR., petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection Clause;
Requisites of Valid Classification.—In order
that there can be valid classification so that a
discriminatory governmental act may pass the
Section 1
Article 3 - bill of rights Equal protection of laws
constitutional norm of equal protection, it is
necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid
classification be complied with, namely: (1) It
must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the
law; (3) It must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It must apply equally
to all members of the class.
Same; Same; The differential treatment of
persons holding appointive offices as opposed
to those holding elective ones is not germane
to the purposes of the law.—Applying the four
requisites to the instant case, the Court finds
that the differential treatment of persons
holding appointive offices as opposed to those
holding elective ones is not germane to the
purposes of the law. The obvious reason for
the challenged provision is to prevent the use
of a governmental position to promote one’s
candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or
coercive influence on the electorate. The
measure is further aimed at promoting the
efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public
service by eliminating the danger that the
discharge of official duty would be motivated
by political considerations rather than the
welfare of the public. The restriction is also
justified by the proposition that the entry of
civil servants to the electoral arena, while still
in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency
in the performance of duty because they
would be attending to their campaign rather
than to their office work.
LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO, petitioner,
vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
OF 2010, respondent.
Same; Same; Equal Protection Clause; The
equal protection of the laws is embraced in the
concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of
justice and fair play.—One of the basic
principleson which this government was
founded is that of the equality of right which is
embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws
is embraced in the concept of due process, as
every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has
been embodied in a separate clause, however,
to provide for a more specific guaranty against
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 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW - CASE DOCTRINES
Marcial Notes - 4B - Atty Gabriel
any form of undue favoritism or hostility from
the government. Arbitrariness in general may
be challenged on the basis of the due process
clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down
is the equal protection clause.
Same; Same; Same; The concept of equal
justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective; The equal protection
clause is aimed at all official state actions, not
just those of the legislature.—According to a
long line of decisions, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.”
It “requires public bodies and institutions to
marcial
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner.” “The purpose of the equal protection
clause is to secure every person within a
state’s jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
notes
by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the state’s duly
constituted authorities.” “In other words, the
concept of equal justice under the law requires
the state to govern impartially, and it may not
draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective.” The equal protection
clause is aimed at all official state actions, not
just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions
cover all the departments of the government
including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a
state denying equal protection of the laws,
through whatever agency or whatever guise is
taken.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites; Superficial
differences do not make for a valid
classification.—It, however, does not require
the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification.
Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to
Section 1
Article 3 - bill of rights Equal protection of laws
be valid must pass the test of reasonableness.
The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) It applies equally to all members of
the same class. “Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.”
Same; Same; Same; For a classification to
meet the requirements of constitutionality, it
must include or embrace all persons who
n a t u ra l l y b e l o n g t o t h e c l a s s .— Fo r a
classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
persons who naturally belong to the class.
“The classification will be regarded as invalid if
all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is not necessary that
the classification be made with absolute
symmetry, in the sense that the members of
the class should possess the same
characteristics in equal degree. Substantial
similarity will suffice; and as long as this is
achieved, all those covered by the
classification are to be treated equally. The
mere fact that an individual belonging to a
class differs from the other members, as long
as that class is substantially distinguishable
from all others, does not justify the non-
application of the law to him.”
Same; Same; Same; The classification must
not be based on existing circumstances only,
or so constituted as to preclude addition to the
number included in the class—it must be of
such a nature as to embrace all those who
may thereafter be in similar circumstances
and conditions.—The classification must not be
based on existing circumstances only, or so
constituted as to preclude addition to the
number included in the class. It must be of
such a nature as to embrace all those who
may thereafter be in similar circumstances
and conditions. It must not leave out or
“underinclude” those that should otherwise fall
into a certain classification. As elucidated in
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, 59
SCRA 54 (1974), and reiterated in a long line
of cases, The guaranty of equal protection of
the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
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 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW - CASE DOCTRINES
Marcial Notes - 4B - Atty Gabriel
application of the laws upon all citizens of the
state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in
order to avoid the constitutional prohibition
against inequality, that every man, woman
and child should be affected alike by a statute.
Equality of operation of statutes does not
mean indiscriminate operation on persons
merely as such, but on persons according to
the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things
which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal
protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different.
It does not prohibit legislation which is limited
either in the object to which it is directed or
by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the
Constitution allows classification. Classification
in law, as in the other departments of
marcial
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of
things in speculation or practice because they
agree with one another in certain particulars.
A law is not invalid because of simple
inequality. The very idea of classification is
notes
that of inequality, so that it goes without
saying that the mere fact of inequality in no
manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based
on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences, that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; that it must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and that it must
apply equally to each member of the class.
This Court has held that the standard is
satisfied if the classification or distinction is
based on a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
Same; Same; Same; Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction—the Arroyo administration is
but just a member of a class, that is, a class
of past administrations, not a class of its own.
—Applying these precepts to this case,
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down
as violative of the equal protection clause. The
clear mandate of the envisioned truth
Section 1
Article 3 - bill of rights Equal protection of laws
commission is to investigate and find out the
truth “concerning the reported cases of graft
and corruption during the previous
administration” only. The intent to single out
the previous administration is plain, patent
and manifest. Mention of it has been made in
at least three portions of the questioned
executive order. Specifically, these are: * * *
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that
the Arroyo administration is but just a
member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own.
Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a
vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
retribution.
Same; Same; Same; While with regard to
equal protection claims, a legislature does not
run the risk of losing the entire remedial
scheme simply because it fails, through
inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil
that might conceivably have been attacked, in
Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no
inadvertence.—The Court is not unaware that
“mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the
validity of a law under the equal protection
clause.” “Legislation is not unconstitutional
merely because it is not all-embracing and
does not include all the evils within its reach.”
It has been written that a regulation
challenged under the equal protection clause
is not devoid of a rational predicate simply
because it happens to be incomplete. In
several instances, the underinclusiveness was
not considered a valid reason to strike down a
law or regulation where the purpose can be
attained in future legislations or regulations.
These cases refer to the “step by step” pro-
cess. “With regard to equal protection claims,
a legislature does not run the risk of losing the
entire remedial scheme simply because it fails,
through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover
every evil that might conceivably have been
attacked.” In Executive Order No. 1, however,
there is no inadvertence. That the previous
administration was picked out was deliberate
and intentional as can be gleaned from the
fact that it was underscored at least three
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 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW - CASE DOCTRINES

Marcial Notes - 4B - Atty Gabriel

times in the assailed executive order. It must

be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not
even mention any particular act, event or
report to be focused on unlike the
investigative commissions created in the past.
“The equal protection clause is violated by
purposeful and intentional discrimination.”

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-

appellant, vs. TREASURER OF ORMOC
CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC
CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS, as
Mayor of Ormoc City "and ORMOC CITY,
defendants-appellees.
Constitutional law; Equal protection of law;
Reasonable classification ; Requisites.—T he
eq ual protec tion c lause a only to persons or
things identically situated and does not bar a
reasonable classification of the subject of
legislation. A classification is reasonable where
(1) it is based on substantial distinctions

marcial

which make real differences; (2) these are

germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the
classification applies not only to present
conditions but also to future conditions which
are substantially identical to those of the

notes
present; (4) the classification applies only to
those who belong to the same class.

Same; Same; Same; Tax ordinance should not

be sin and exclusive.—When the taxing
ordinance was enacted, Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc.
was the only sugar central in the City. A
reasonable classification should be in terms
applicable to future conditions as well. The
taxing ordinance should not be singular and
exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central from the coverage of
the tax. A subsequently established sugar
central cannot be subject to tax because the
ordinance expressly points to Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
Taxation; Tax; Refund of; No interest can be
claimed; Reasons.—Appellant is not entitled to
interest on the refund because the taxes were
not arbitrarily collected. There is sufficient
basis to preclude arbitrariness. The
constitutionality of the statute is presumed
until declared otherwise.

Section 1

Article 3 - bill of rights Equal protection of laws Page "22 of 22

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