AZNAR VS GARCIA

Nationality Principle – Internal and Conflict Rule

Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided for a period of 9 years.
In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. In his will, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money
in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of
the Civil Code, California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of
the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the national law of the deceased must apply,
illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the successional rights of
his heirs.

HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two
rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to Californians domiciled in California and the
conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California. Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law
of his domicile must be followed. The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings – the
determination of the successional rights under Philippine law only

BELLIS VS BELLIS

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate children with his
first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally, three
illegitimate children.

6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties to
his seven surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they
have been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the Philippine law. Appellants argued
that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two
separate wills.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate children’s
successional rights

RULING: Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be
ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law
should govern.

Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be
governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his
illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.

The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which is
the national law of the deceased..
LARA V DEL ROSARIO

94 Phil 778 / Preliminary Title

Publication – Civil Code
Lara et al were former taxi drivers of the defendant. When the latter sold some of his vehicles, the plaintiffs who
were no longer needed were dismissed. Because their employer did not give them their one month’s salary in lieu of
the notice required in Article 302 of the Code of Commerce, this action was instituted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1949.
HELD: In this case, the Supreme Court in an obiter dictum held that the new Civil Code of the Philippines took
effect on August 30, 1950. This date is exactly one year after the Official Gazette publishing the Code was released
for circulation, the said release having been made on August 30, 1949. The plaintiffs then are not entitled to any
compensation, the New Civil Code having repealed the Code of Commerce

CADALIN VS POEA 238 SCRA 721

On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B. Evangelista, in theirown behalf
and on behalf of 728 other overseas contract workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by filingan "Amended
Complaint" with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for moneyclaims arising from their
recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII .
BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction; while
AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for
overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals.
The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the employment
contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest ofthe earnings of the
Travel and Reserved Fund, interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay; fringe benefits;
refund of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties
for committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of B
Issue: Whether or not the proceedings conducted by the POEA, as well as the decision that is the subject
of these appeals, conformed with the requirements of due process.
Whether or not what is the prevalent law to be applied in this case, Art. 291 of Labor Code or Art. 1144 of Civil
Code.
Ruling: Wherefore, all the three petitions are dismissed. The three petitions were filed under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court on the grounds that NLRC had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders. We find no such abuse of discretion.
NLRC believed money claims-all money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during
the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause ofaction accrued, otherwise
they shall be forever barred. This is embodied in the Article 291 of Labor Code which the petitioners failed to
comply. It applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater benefits than those stipulated in the
overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that "where the laws of the host country are
more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall form part of the overseas
employment contract."
Its interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a prepared form containing
the stipulations of the employment contract and the employees merely "take it or leave it." The presumption is that
there was an imposition by one party against the other and that the employees signed the contracts out of necessity
that reduced their bargaining power.
MICIANO V BRIMO Juan Miciano v Andre Brimo CITATION: GR No.22595, November 1, 1927| 50 Phil 867

Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the
brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Miciano’s participation in the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is a
Turkish citizen.
ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimo’s estates.
HELD: Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and disposed of in
accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall
be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the
testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good
morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include
Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.

VAN DORN V ROMILLO JR 139 SCRA 139

Alice Reyes (Filipino) and private respondent Richard Upton (American) were married in Hong Kong. After they
divorced in Nevada USA, private respondent filed a suit against petitioner stating that petitioner’s business in
Ermita, Manila is conjugal property and the he be declared to have management over the conjugal partnership.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal because the cause of action is barred by a previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had no
community property.Respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy.

ISSUE:Is respondent estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he
made in the divorce proceedings that they had no community property.

HELD:It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standard of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage.

Pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
to use in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by
the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercises jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does
not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife’s obligation under Article 109 of the Civil Code cannot be justified. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent.
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

PILAPIL V IBAY-SOMERA Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174
SCRA 653
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German
national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of
Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal
disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany
before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support
and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that
while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus
Chua sometime in 1983”.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no
longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private
respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is
concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended
spouse at the time he filed suit.
QUITA V CA December 22, 1998
Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on
May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23, 1954.Both of them remarried another person.
Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the responden therewith.
They were blessed with six children.On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to
who will be the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held that the divorce acquired by
the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private respondentstressed that the citizenship of petitioner was
relevant in the light of the ruling in VanDorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized
in the Philippnes provided they are valid according to their national law.
The petitioner herself answered that she was an American citizen since 1954. Through the hearing she
alsostated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time she obtained the divorce. Implying the she was no longer a Filipino
citizen.The Trial court disregarded the respondent’s statement. The net hereditary estate was ordered in favor the Fe
D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and the Padlan children moved for reconsideration. On
February 15, 1988 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis,
entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita.
Private respondent was not declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was declared void since it was
celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. Blandina and her children appeal to the Court
of Appeals that the case was decided without a hearing in violation of the Rules of Court.
Issue:(1)Whether or not Blandina’s marriage to Arturo void ab initio.(2) Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared
the primary beneficiary as surviving spouse of Arturo.
Held: No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D.Quita at the time of their
divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here since she was already an alien at the time she obtained
divorce, and such is valid in their country’s national law.Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of
Arturo. She cannot be the primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo.

VELAYO V SHELL 100 Phil 168 – Civil Law - Torts and Damages – Obligations arising from human relations

Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (abt. $79k) to Shell Company. CAL offered its C-54 plane
as payment to Shell Company (the plane was in California) but Shell at that time declined as it thought CALI had
sufficient money to pay its debt. In 1948 however, CALI was going bankrupt so it called upon an informal meeting
of its creditors. In that meeting, the creditors agreed to appoint representatives to a working committee that would
determine the order of preference as to how each creditor should be paid. They also agreed not to file suit against
CALI but CALI did reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay them up.
Shell Company was represented by a certain Fitzgerald to the three man working committee. Later, the working
committee convened to discuss how CALI’s asset should be divided amongst the creditors but while such was
pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising the latter that Shell Philippines is assigning its
credit to Shell USA in the amount of $79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not the entire indebtedness of
CALI to Shell Philippines. Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI has a C-54 plane is California and so Shell
USA petitioned before a California court to have the plane be the subject of a writ of attachment which was
granted.
Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment of credit made by Shell Philippines to Shell
USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALI’s asset to the Philippine Airlines. In September 1948, the other
creditors learned of the assignment made by Shell. This prompted these other creditors to file their own complaint
of attachment against CALI’s assets. CALI then filed for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the
Philippines from being attached. Alfredo Velayo’s appointment as CALI’s assignee was approved in lieu of the
insolvency proceeding. In order for him to recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a writ of injunction
against Shell Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the attachment and in
the alternative that judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double the amount of the C-54 plane. The
C-54 plane was not recovered. Shell Company argued it is not liable for damages because there is nothing in the law
which prohibits a company from assigning its credit, it being a common practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not violate any law.
HELD: Yes. The basis of such liability, in the absence of law, is Article 21 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage”.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would vouchsafe adequate
legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for
specifically in the statutes. A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should
be compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for
damages arises from a willful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.

ABS CBN VS CA G.R. No. 128690 January 21, 1999

In 1990, ABS-CBN and Viva executed a Film Exhibition Agreement whereby ABS-CBN was given the right of first refusal to
the next twenty-four (24) Viva films for TV telecast under such terms as may be agreed upon by the parties hereto, provided,
however, that such right shall be exercised by ABS-CBN from the actual offer in writing. Consequently, Viva, through
defendant Del Rosario, offered ABS-CBN, through its vice-president Charo Santos-Concio, a list of three(3) film packages (36
titles) from which ABS-CBN may exercise its right of first refusal under the afore-said agreement. ABS CBN rejected said list.
On February 27, 1992, Del Rosario approached Ms. Concio, with a list consisting of 52 original movie titles, as well as 104 re-
runs from which ABS-CBN may choose another 52 titles, or a total of 156 titles, proposing to sell to ABS-CBN airing rights
over this package of 52 originals and 52 re-runs for P60,000,000.00. The package was rejected by ABS-CBN.
On April 06, 1992, Del Rosario and Mr. Graciano Gozon of RBS discussed the terms and conditions of Viva’s offer
to sell the 104 films.

On April 07, 1992, defendant Del Rosario received through his secretary, a handwritten note from Ms. Concio
which reads: “Here’s the draft of the contract. I hope you find everything in order,” to which was attached a draft
exhibition agreement, a counter-proposal covering 53 films for a consideration of P35 million. The said counter-
proposal was however rejected by Viva’s Board of Directors.

On April 29, 1992, Viva granted RBS the exclusive right to air 104 Viva-produced and/or acquired films including
the fourteen (14) films subject of the present case.

ABS-CBN then filed a a complaint for specific performance. RTC rendered a decision in favor of RBS and VIVA
and against ABS-CBN, ruling that there was no meeting of minds on the price and terms of the offer. Furthermore,
the right of first refusal under the 1990 Film Exhibition Agreement had previously been exercised per Ms. Concio’s
letter to Del Rosario ticking off ten titles acceptable to them, which would have made the 1992 agreement an
entirely new contract. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES 1. Whether or not there was no perfected contract between petitioner and private respondent; 2. Whether
or not ABS-CBN has already exercised its right of first refusal
HELD
1. The issue should be resolved against ABS-CBN. Contracts that are consensual in nature are perfected upon mere
meeting of the minds. Once there is concurrence between the offer and the acceptance upon the subject matter,
consideration, and terms of payment a contract is produced. The offer must be certain. To convert the offer into a
contract, the acceptance must be absolute and must not qualify the terms of the offer; it must be plain, unequivocal,
unconditional, and without variance of any sort from the proposal. A qualified acceptance, or one that involves a
new proposal, constitutes a counter-offer and is a rejection of the original offer. Consequently, when something is
desired which is not exactly what is proposed in the offer, such acceptance is not sufficient to generate consent
because any modification or variation from the terms of the offer annuls the offer.
Even if it be conceded arguendo that Del Rosario had accepted the counter-offer, the acceptance did not bind
VIVA, as there was no proof whatsoever that Del Rosario had the specific authority to do so. That Del Rosario did
not have the authority to accept ABS-CBN’s counter-offer was best evidenced by his submission of the draft
contract to VIVA’s Board of Directors for the latter’s approval. In any event, there was between Del Rosario and
Lopez III no meeting of minds.

2. Yes. ABS-CBN’s right of first refusal had already been exercised when Ms. Concio wrote to VIVA ticking off ten
films. As observed by the trial court, the subsequent negotiation with ABS-CBN was for an entirely different
package. Ms. Concio herself admitted on cross-examination to having used or exercised the right of first refusal. She
stated that the list was not acceptable and was indeed not accepted by ABS-CBN. Del Rosario himself knew and
understood that ABS-CBN has lost its rights of the first refusal when his list of 36 titles were rejected.
YAO KEE VS GONZALES 167 scra 737 Applicability of Foreign Marriage Laws

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind properties here in the Philippines.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration alleging that they are the
children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee et al alleging that Yao Kee is
the lawful wife of the deceased whom he married in China. The trial court rendered decision in favor of the
opposition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, modifying the decision declaring the marriage of
Sy Kiat to Yao Kee as not has been proven valid in accordance with the laws of China. Hence, both parties moved
for reconsideration to which the Supreme Court granted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with Philippine laws.
HELD: Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. They must be alleged and proven as any other fact. To establish the validity of marriage, the existence
of foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged marriage must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
For failure to prove the foreign law or custom and consequently of the marriage, the marriage between Yao Kee
and Sy Kiat in China cannot be recognized in the jurisdiction of Philippine courts.

LOREA DE UGALDE V JON DE YSASI February 29, 2008

P and R married and got separated after 6years. They had a son. Respondent allegedly married another. Petitioner
filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with the RTC against respondent but respondent
countered that on 2 June 1961, he and petitioner entered into an agreement which provided, among others, that
their conjugal partnership of gains shall be deemed dissolved as of 15 April 1957.Pursuant to the agreement, they
submitted an Amicable Settlement to CFI. R also said that P already obtained a divorce from him in Mexico. RTC
DECISION: dismissed and CA affirmed the existence of a conjugal partnership of gains is predicated on a valid
marriage. Considering that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage
license, the marriage was null and void, and no community of property was formed between them.

Issue: WON P and R’s conjugal partnership of gains was dissolved?

Ruling: YES. P and R were married on 15 February 1951.The applicable law at the time of their marriage was
Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under ART 175 (4),conjugal
partnership terminates in the case of Judicial Separation of Property. The finality of the Order in Civil Case No.
4791approving the parties’ separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in
accordance with Article175 of the Family Code. Hence, when the trial court decided Special Proceedings No. 3330,
the conjugal partnership between petitioner and respondent was already dissolved.

A judgment upon a compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any other judgment, and conclusive only
upon parties thereto and their privies, and not binding on third persons who are not parties to it. CA decision
affirmed.

CAMPOREDONDO V AZNAR

In 1913 Edward E. Christensen, an American citizen, was already residing in Davao and on the following
year became the manager of Mindanao Estates located in the municipality of Padada of the same province. At a
certain time, which the lower court placed at 1917, a group of laborers recruited from Argao, Cebu, arrived to work
in the said plantation. Among the group was a young girl, Bernarda Camporendondo, who became an assistant to
the cook. Thereafter, thegirl and Edward E. Christensen, who was also unmarried staring living together as husband
and wife for over 30 years until the death of Christensen on April 30, 1953. Out of said relations, 2 children, Lucy
and Helen Christensen, were allegedly born.

Upon the demise of the American, who had left a considerable amount of properties his will naming Adolfo
Cruz Aznar as executor was duly presented for probate in court and became the subject of Special Proceedings No.
622 of the Court of First Instance of Davao. Said will contains, among others, the following provisions:

3. I declare . . . that I have but one (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard
Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665
Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

4. I further declare that I have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named daughter,
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia,
about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in
any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted to me, and who, from all information I have
now resides in Egipt, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREEE THOUSAND SIXHUNDRED
PESOS (P3,600) Philippine Currency, the same to be deposited in trust for said Maria Lucy Christensen
with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos
(P100), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have
accrued thereon, is exhausted.

8. I give devise and bequeath unto BERNARDA CAMPORENDONDO, now residing in Padada, Davao,
Philippines, the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000), Philippine Currency.

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA Lucy
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property
and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresover situated; of which
I may be possessed at any death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her
lifetime, Provided, howerer, that should the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY at any time
prior to her decease having living issue, then, and in that event, the life interest herein given shall terminate,
and if so terminated, then I give, devise, and bequeath to my said daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY, the rest remainder and residue of my property, with the same force and effect
as if I had originally so given, devised and bequeathed it to her; and provided, further, that should be said
Maria Lucy Christensen Daney die without living issue then, and in that event, I give, devise and bequeath
all the rest, remainder and residue of my property, one-half (1/2) to my well-beloved sister, Mrs. CARRIE
LOIUSE C. BORTON, now residing at No. 2124 Twentieth Street, Bakersfield, California, U.S.A. and one-
half (1/2) to the children of my deceased brother, JOSEPH C. CRISTENSEN, . . .

13. I hereby nominate and appoint Mr Adolfo Cruz Aznar, of Davao City, Philippines, my executor, and the
executor of this, my last will and testament.

Oppositions to the probate of this will were separately filed by Maria Helen Christensen Garcia and
Bernarda Camporendondo, the first contending that the will lacked the formalities required by law; that granting
that he had, thedispositions made therein were illegal because although she and Lucy Christensen were both
children had by the deceased with Bernarda Camporendondo, yet she was given only a meager sum of P3,600 out of
an estate valued at $485,000 while Lucy would get the rest of the properties; and that the petitioner Adolfo Cruz
Aznar was not qualified to be appointed as administrator of the estate because he had an interest adverse to that of
the estate. It was therefore prayed by his oppositor that the application for probate be denied and the will
disallowed; that the proceeding be declared intestate and that another disinterested person be appointed as
administrator.

Bernarda Camporedondo, on the other hand, claimed ownership over one-half of the entire estate in virtue
of her relationship with the deceased, it being alleged that she and the testator having lived together as husband and
wife continuously for a period of over 30 years, the properties acquired during such cohabitation should be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.

This opposition was dismissed by the probate court on the ground that she had no right to intervene in said
proceeding, for as such common-law wife she had no successional right that might be affected by the probate of the
will, and likewise, she could not be allowed to establish her title and co-ownership over the properties therein for
such questions must be ventilated in a court of general jurisdiction. In view of this ruling of the Court and in order
to attain the purpose sought by her overruled opposition Bernarda Camporedondo had to institute

In the meantime, Adolfo Cruz Aznar was appointed special adminsitrator of the estate after filing a bond
for P5,000 pending the appointment of a regular one, and letters of special administrition were correspondingly
issued to him on May 21, 1953.

Helen Christensen Garcia filed a supplemental opposition and motion to declare her an acknowledged
natural child of Edward E. Christensen, alleging that she was conceived during the time when her mother Bernarda
Camporendondo was living with the deceased as his common-law wife; that she had been in continous possession
of the status of a natural child of the deceased; thatahe had in her favor evidence and/or proof that Edward
Christensen was her father; and that she and Lucy had the same civil status as children of the decedent and
Bernarda Camporedondo.

This motion was opposed jointly by the executor and Maria Lucy Christensen Daney asserting that before,
during and after the conception and birth of Helen Christensen Garcia, her mother was generally known to be
carrying relations with 3 different men; that during the lifetime of the decedent and even years before his death,
Edward Christensen verbally as well as in writing disavowed relationship with said oppositor; that oppositor
appropriated and used the surname Christensen illegally and without permission from the deceased.

Thus they prayed the Court that the will be allowed; that Maria Helen Christensen Garcia be declared not in
any way related to the deceased; and that the motion of said oppositor be denied.

After due hearing, the lower court in a decision dated February 28, 1953, found that oppositor Maria Helen
Cristensen had been in continous possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased Edward Christensen
notwithstanding the fact that she was disowned by him in his will, for such action must have been brought about by
the latter's disaproval of said oppositor's marriage to a man he did not like. But taking into consideration that such
possession of the status of a natural child did not itself constitute acknowledgment but may only be availed of to
compel acknowledgment, the lower Court directed Maria Lucy Christensen Daney to acknowledge the oppositor as
a natural child of Edward E. Christensen. The will was, however, allowed the letters testamentary consequently
issued to Adolfo Cruz Aznar, the executor named therein. From the portion of the decision requiring Lucy
Christensen to acknowledge Helen as a natural child of the testator, the former and the executor interposed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-G. R. No. 13421-R), but the appellate tribunal elevated the same to Us on the
ground that the case involves an estate the value of which far exceeds P50,000.00 and thus falls within the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Section 17 (5), Republic Act No. 296.

The principal issue in this litigation is whether the lower court erred in finding that the oppositor Maria Helen
Christensen Garcia had been in continous possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased EdwardE.
Christensen and in directing Maria Lucy Christensen Daney, recognized daughter and instituted heirs of the
decedent, to acknowledge the former as such natural child.
Maria Lucy Christensen was born on April 25, 1922, and Maria Helen Christensen on July 2, 1934, of the same
mother, Bernarda Camporedondo, during the period when the latter was publicly known to have been living as
common-law wife of Edward E. Chrisiensen. From the facts of the case there can be no question as to Lucy's
parentage, but controversy arose when Edward Christensen, in making his last will and testament, disavowed such
paternity to Helen and gave her only a legacy of P3,600. ln the course of the proceeding for the probate of the will
Helen introduced documentary and testimonial evidence to support her claim that she, Lucy, was a natural child of
the deceased and, therefore, entitled to the hereditary share corresponding to such descendant. Several witness
testified in her favor, including the mother Bernarda Camporendondo, her former teachers and other residents of
the community, tending to prove that she was known in the locality as a child of the testator and was introduced by
the latter to the circle of his friends and acquaintances as his daughter. Family portraits, greeting cards and letters
were likewise presented to bolster her assertion that she had always been treated by the deceased and by Lucy
herself as a member of the family.

Lucy Christensen and Adolfo Cruz Aznar, as executor, tried to repudiate her claim by introducing evidence to prove
that on or about the period when she was conceived and born, her mother was carrying an affair with another man,
Zosimo Silva, a former laborer in her Paligue plantation. Silva executed an affidavit and even took the witness stand
to testify to this effect. Appellants also strived to show that the defendant's solicitations for Helen's welfare and the
help extended to her merely sprang out generosity and hammered on the fact that on several occasions, the
deceased disclaimed any relationship with her

Going over the evidence adduced during the trial, it appears indubitable that on or about the period when Helen
was born, Bernarda Camporendondo had established residence at her plantation at Paligue, Davao, and that
although Edward Christensen stayed in Davao City to manage his merchandising business, he spent the weekends
with the former and their child Lucy in the Christensen plantation. Even granting that Zosimo Silva at his stage
fitted himself into the picture, it cannot be denied that Helen's mother and the deceased were generally and publicly
known to be living together as husband and wife. This must have been the reason why Christensen from Helen's
birth in 1934 provided for her maintenance; shouldered the expenses for her education to the extent that she was
even enrolled as an intern in an exclusive college for girls in Manila; tolerated or allowed her carrying the surname
"Christensen", and in effect gaver her the attention and care that a father would only do to this offspring. We
should take note that nothing appears on record to show that Christensen ever entertained any doubt or disputed
Helen's paternity. Hisrepudations of her relationship with him came about only after he and Bernarda
Comperodondo parted ways in March, 1950, and apparently after Helen took sides with her mother. Furthermore,
it seems that despite that decedent's desire that she continue her studies, Helen ignored the same andgot married to
a man for Christensen held no high esteem. We may state at his juncture that while it is true that herein appellants
introduced witnesses to disprove oppositor's claim, the lower Court that had the opportunity to observe the
conduct of the witnesses while testifying and could better gauge their credibility and impartiality in the case, arrived
at the conclusion that Maria Helen Christensen had established that she had been in continuous possessions of the
status of a natural child of the deceased. Considering the preponderant evidence on record, We see no reason to
reverse said ruling. The testator' last acts cannot be made the criterion in determining whether oppositor was his
child or not, for human frailty and parental arrogance may draw a person to adopt unnatural or harsh measures
against an erring child or one who displeases just so the weight of his authority could be felt. In the consideration of
a claim that one is a natural child, the attitude or direct acts of the person against whom such action is directed or
that of his family before the controversy arose or during his lifetime if he predeceases the claimant, and not a single
opportunity or an isolated occasions but as a whole, must be taken into account. The possession of such status is
one of the cases that gives rise to the right, in favor of the child, of coumpulsaryr ecognition. (Art. 283, Civil Code).

The lower Court, however, after making its finding directed Maria Lucy Christensen Daney, an heir of the decedent,
to recognize oppositor as a natural child of the deceased. This seems improper. The Civil Code for 2 kinds of
acknowledgement of a natural child: voluntary and compulsory. In the first instance, which may be effected in the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in an authentic writing (Art. 278,Civil Code), court
intervention is very nil and not altogether wanting, whereas in the second, judicial pronouncement is essential, and
while it is true that the effect of a voluntary and a compulsory acknowledgment on the right of the child so
recognized is the same, to maintain the view of the lower Court would eliminate the distinction between voluntary
acts and those brought about by judicial dicta. And if We consider that in the case, where, the presumed parent dies
ahead of the child and action for compulsory recogniton is brought against the heirs of the deceased, as in the
instant case, the situation would take absurd turn, for the heirs would be compelled to recognize such child as a
natural child of the deceased without a proper provision of the law, for as it now stands, the Civil Code only
requires a declaration by the court of the child's status as a natural child of the parent who, if living, would be
compelled to recognize his offspring as such. Therefore, We hold that in cases of compulsory recognition, as in the
case at bar, it would be sufficient that a competent court, after taking into account all the evidence on record, would
declare that under any of the circumstances specified by Article 283 of the Civil Code, a child has acquired the
status of a natural child of the presumptive parent and as such is entitled to all rights granted it by law, for such
declaration is by itself already a judicial recognition of the paternity of the parent concerned which is her against
whom the action is directed, are bound to respect.

Coming now to Civil Case No. 1076 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Bernarda Camporendondo claimed in
her complaint 1/2 of the properties of the deceased as co-owner thereof in virtue of her relations with the deceased.
She alleged as basis for action that she and the deceased Edward E. Christensen had lived and cohabitated as
husband and wife, continously and openly for a period for more than 30 years; that within said period, plaintiff and
the deceased acquired real and personal properties through their common effort and industry; and that in virtue of
such relationship, she was a co-owner of said properties. As the executor refused to account for and deliver the
share allegedly belonging to her despite her repeated demands, she prayed the court that said executor be ordered to
submit an inventory and render an accounting of the entire estate of the deceased; to divide the same into 2 equal
parts and declare that one of them lawfully belonged to plaintiff; and for such other reliefs as may be deemed just
and equitable in the premises. In his answer, the executor denied the averments of the complaint, contending that
the decedent was the sole owner of the properties left by him as they were acquired through his own efforts; that
plaintiff had never been a co-owner of any property acquired or possessed by the late Edward christensen during
his lifetime; that the personal relationship between plaintiff and the deceased was purely clandestine because the
former habitually lived in her plantation at Paligue, Davao, from the time she acquired the same in 1928; that she
also maintained relations with 2 other men; and that the claim of plaintiff would violate the provisions of Article
2253 of the Civil Code as the vested rights of the compulsory heirs of the deceased would be impaired. Defendant
thus prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and as counterclaim demanded the sum ofP70.000.00 representing
actual, moral and exemplary damages.

Due hearing was conducted thereon and after the parties ad submitted their respective memoranda, the lower Court
on August 25, 1954, rendered judgment finding that the deceased Edward Christensen and Bernarda
Camporendondo, not otherwise suffering from any impediment to contract marriage, lived together as husband and
wife without marital ties continously for over 30years until the former's death in 1953; that out of such relations 2
childrenwere born; and that the properties in controversy were acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry. Relying on Section 144 of theCivil Code which said court considered to have created another
mode of acquiring ownership, plaintiff was held to be entitled to one-half of said properties as co-owner thereof in
view of her relationship with the deceased and ordered the executor to account for and deliver the same by her.
From this decision, defendant Aznar, as Executor of the will, perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals, but as
the property involved in the litigation exceeds P50,000.00 said tribunal elevated the case to Us for consideration.

It is not controverted that at the time of his death, Edward Christensen was the owner of certain properties,
including shares of stock in the plantation bearing his name and a general merchandising store in Davao City. It is
also undeniable that the deceased and appellee, both capacitated to enter into the married state, maintained relations
as husband and wife, continuously and publicly for a considerable number of years which the lower Court declared
to be until the death of Christensen in 1953. While as a general rule appellate courts do not usually disturb the lower
court's findings of fact, unless said finding is not supported by or totally devoid of or inconsistent with the evidence
on record, such finding must of necessity be modified to confrom with the evidence if the reviewing tribunal were
to arrive at the proper and just solution of the controversy. In the instant case, the court a quo overlooked or failed
to consider the testimonies of both Lucy and Helen Christensen to the effect that the deceased and their mother
Bernarda Camporendondo had some sort of quarrel or misunderstanding and parted ways as of March, 1950, a fact
which appelleewas not able to overcome. Taking into account the circumstances of this case as found by the trial
court, with the modification that the cohabitation should appear as continuous from the early 20's until March,
1950, the question left for our determination is whether Bernarda Camporedondo, by reason of such relationship,
may be considered as a co-owner of the properties acquired by the deceased during said period and thus entitled to
one-half thereof after the latter's death.

Presumably taking judicial notice of the existence in our society of a certain kind of relationship brought about by
couples living together as husbands and wives without the benefit of marriage, acquiring and bringing properties
unto said union, and probably realizing that while same may not be acceptable from the moral point of view they
are as much entitled to the protection of the laws as any other property owners, the lawmakers incorporated Article
144 in Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code of the Philippines) to govern their property relations. Said article read as
follows:

ART. 114. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules of co-ownership.

It must be noted that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and the woman thus living together
must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage and that the properties realized during their cohabitation
be acquired through the work, industry, employment or occupation of both or either of them. And the same thing
may be said of whose marriages are by provision of law declared void ab intio. While it is true that these requisites
are fully met and satisfied in the case at bar, We must remember that the deceased and herein appellee were already
estranged as of March, 1950. There being no provision of law governing the cessation of such informal civil
partnership, if ever existed, same may be considered terminated upon their separation or desistance to continue said
relations. The Spanish Civil Code which was then enforce contains to counterpart of Article 144 and as the records
in the instant case failed to show show that a subsequent reconciliation ever took place and considering that
Republic Act No. 386 which recognized such form of co-ownership went into operation only on August 30, 1950,
evidently, this later enactment cannot be invoked as basis for appellee's claim.

In determining the question poised by this action We may look upon the jurisprudence then obtaining on
the matter. As early as 1925, this Court already declared that where a man and a woman, not suffering from any
impediment to contract marriage, live together as husband and wife, an informal civil partnership exists and made
the pronouncement that each of them has an interest in the properties acquired during said union and is entitled to
participate therein if said properties were the product of their JOINT efforts.

In another case, this Court similarly held that although there is no technical marital partnership between
person living maritally without being lawfully married, nevertheless there is between them an informal civil
partnership, and the parties would be entitled to an equal interest where the property is acquired through their JOINT efforts.
Appellee, claiming that the properties in controversy were the product of their joint industry apparently in her desire
to tread on the doctrine laid down in the aforementioned cases, would lead Us to believe that her help wassolicited
or she took a hand in the management of and/or acquisition of the same.

But such assertion appears incredible if We consider that she was observed by the trial Court as an illiterate
woman who cannot even remember simple things as the date when she arrived at the Mindanao Estate, when she
commenced relationship with the deceased, not even her approximate age or that of her children. And considering
that aside from her own declaration, which We find to be highly improbable, there appears no evidence to prove
her alleged contribution or participation in the acquisition of the properties involved therein, and that in view of the
holding of this Court that for a claim to one-half of such property to be allowed it must be proved that the same
was acquired through their joint efforts and labor.

We have no recourse but reverse the holding of the lower Court and deny the claim of
BernardaCampredondo. We may further state that even granting, for the sake of argument, that this case falls under
the provisions of Article 144 of the Civil Code, same would be applicable only as far as properties acquired after the
effectivity of Republic Act 386 are concerned and to no other, for such law cannot be given retroactive effect to
govern those already possessed before August 30, 1950. It may be argued, however, that being a newly created right,
the provisions of Section 144 should be made to retroact if only to enforce such right. Article 2252 of the same
Code is explicit in this respect when it states:

SEC. 2252. Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Code which may prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation, shall have ro retroactive effect.

As it cannot be denied that the rights and legitimes of the compulsory heirs of the deceased Edward Christensen
would be impaired or diminished if the claim of herein appellee would succeed, the answer to such argument
wouldbe simply obvious.

RAYMUNDO V PENAS

Patrocino Raymundo and Doroteo Peñas were validly married to each other in Manila on March 29, 1941.
The spouses had no children, nor acquired conjugal property. Sometime in July 1949, the husband Doroteo Peñas
abandoned his wife, appellant herein, and during August and September, 1949, lived maritally with another woman,
Carmen Paredes. At the instance of the deserted wife, an information for concubinage was filed on October 3,
1949. The husband, Peñas, was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by the Court of First Instance of Manila
on May 5, 1950. Pending his appeal, on July 14, 1950, the wife instituted the present proceedings, praying for a
decree of absolute divorce. The conviction of Doroteo Peñas was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on October 31,
1951.

The Court below found that the acts of concubinage that gave rise to the action, as well as the judgment of
conviction rendered by the Court of First Instance, took place before the repeal of Act 2710 by the new Civil Code.
The Court a quo dismissed the complaint on the ground that the appellant had acquired no right to a divorce that
the Court bound to recognize after the effectivity of the New Civil Code.

Counsel's argument in support of the alleged right of the plaintiff would be indisputable if (it were ) not for
the following provision of Article 2254 of the new Civil Code. Art. 2254. No vested or acquired right can raise from
acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the rights of others.'

The above quoted provisions is entirely new, not found in the old Civil Code. Evidently it is designed to
meet situations like the present. Under its explicit and unequivocal terms no acquired or vested right can rise from
offenses or acts which infringe upon the rights of others. It follows therefore that the acts of concubinage of the
defendant, which are not only against the law, but infringe upon the rights of his wife, could not and did not give
rise to o a vested right in favor of the plaintiff which would entitle her to secure a divorce from her husband, the
defendant herein. Under Article 97 of the new Civil Code the most that the wife is now entitled to in case of
concubinage on the part of the husband is to secure a legal separation.

In our opinion, the judgment appealed from is incorrect. It should be apparent, upon reflection, that the
prohibition of Article 2254 must be directed at the offender, not the offended party who is in no way responsible
for the violation of legal duty. The interpretation adopted by the Court below results in depriving a victim of any
redress because of the very acts that injured him. The protection of vested rights is but a consequence of the
constitutional guaranty against deprivation of property can in no way constitute such due process. Our view of the
true import of Article 2254 is supported by the Report of Code Commission submitted to the Legislature in
explanation of the motives behind the innovations of the proposed Civil Code. Speaking of Article 2274 of the draft
(now Art. 2254 of the Code), the Report states: It is evident that no one can validly claim any vested or acquired
right if the same is founded upon his having violated the law or invaded the rights of others.

It follows that Article 2254 can not militate against the right of appellant to secure an absolute divorce as a
result of the concubinage of her husband. Despite the change in legislation, plaintiff-appellant is protected by
Article 2253 of the new Civil Code:
 Art. 2253. The Civil Code of 1889 and other previous laws shall govern rights originating, under said laws,
from acts done or events which took place under the regime, even though this Code may regulate them in a
different manner, or may not recognize them.

Conceding that there can not be a vested right in the continuation of a law recognizing absolute divorce
(Grant vs. Grant, 32 Am. Rep. 506), still , the terms of Article 2253 are sufficiently broad to protect the rights of the
appellant to a remedy against her husband's infidelity in conformity with the terms of the old legislation. True that
the new Civil Code does not recognize absolute divorce, but only legal separation (Articles 97 to 108), thereby
impliedly repealing Act 2710; but other provisions of the Code clearly safeguard rights and actions arising under the
preceding law. Its Article 4 expresses the well established principle that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless
the contrary is provided"; and Article 2258 plainly indicates that rights and actions already existing (and a fortiori,
actions already initiated) should be governed by the prior legislation

Art. 2258. Actions and rights which came into being but were not exercised before the effectivity of this
Code, shall remain in full force in conformity with the old legislation; but their exercise, duration and the
procedure to enforce them shall be regulated by this Code and by the Rules of Court. If the exercise of the
right or of the action was commenced under the old laws, but is pending on the date this Code takes effect,
and the procedure was different from that established in this new body of laws, the parties concerned may
choose which methods or course to pursue.

Further, Article 2267 explicitly enumerates the articles that are to apply to actions pending (like the present) when
the new Civil Code became effective, and Articles 97 to 108 on legal separation are not included therein.

Art. 2267. The following provisions shall apply not only to future cases but also to those pending on the
date this Code becomes effective:

(1) Article 29, relative to criminal prosecutions wherein the accused is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt;.

(2) Article 33, concerning cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries.

The plain implication of these provisions is that the Code did not intend its provisions on legal separation to
apply retroactively; and that the change from absolute divorce to legal separation was not designed to affect at the
time the reform was introduced.

It is of no comment that the conviction of the husband only became final after the new Civil Code, denying
absolute divorce, came into effect, for their Court has already ruled in Chereau vs. Fuentebellla (43 Phil., 220) that
section 8 of Act 2710 1is only evidentiary in character, since it merely has reference, of course, to the species of
proof required to establish the basal fact on which the right to the divorce rests; and the circumstance that this fact
is not so proved in no wise impairs the jurisdiction of the Court.". The decision appealed from is reversed, and a
new judgment shall be entered granting a decree of absolute divorce as prayed for.

SEA COMMERCIAL CO. v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 122823, November 25, 1999

SEA COMMERCIAL (SEACOM for brevity) is engaged in the business of selling and distributing agricultural
machinery, products and equipment. SEACOM entered into a dealership agreement with JAMANDRE
INDUSTRIES, INC. (JII for brevity) appointing the latter as its exclusive dealer in the Province and City of Iloilo.
The agreement was later amended to include Capiz in the territorial coverage and to make the agreement non-
exclusive. JAMANDRE in his personal capacity was also bound to SEACOM solidarily by suretyship for any
liability of JII to SEACOM. Later, SEACOM sued JII for P18,843.85 for unpaid deliveries, interest and attorney’s
fees. But in its Answer, JII denied said obligation and interposed a counterclaim for damages. Originally, JII
contracted to sell 21 Mitsubishi power tillers to a group of farmers to be financed by the Farm System Dev’t. Corp.,
or FSDC. But acting in bad faith, SEACOM went directly to FSDC and sold the latter 21 tractors, depriving JII of
P85,415.61 in unrealized profits. The TC found in favor of both SEACOM and JII. SEACOM appealed the award
on JII’s counterclaim. The CA held that, while there is no agency relationship between SEACOM and JII,
SEACOM is liable for damages and unrealized profits to JII, for competing directly with its own dealer.

ISSUE: Can a principal be held liable for a quasi-delict for competing with its own non-exclusive dealer? Or, is
competing with one’s dealer an abuse of right?

HELD: YES. In finding for JII, both the TC and CA invoked Art. 19. Art. 19 was intended to expand the
concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. If mere fault or negligence in one’s acts can make him [a
person] liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable.
The absence of good faith is essential to abuse of right. Good faith is an honest intention to abstain from taking
any unconscientious advantage of another x x x x. We find no cogent reason to overturn the factual finding of the
two courts that SEACOM joined the bidding for the sale of the farm equipment after it was informed that JII was
already promoting the sale of said equipment to FSDC, and even offering FSDC a lower price than that of JII.
Even if the dealership agreement was amended to make it non-exclusive, SEACOM may not exercise its right
unjustly or in a manner not in keeping with honesty or good faith. Art. 19 was intended to embody certain basic
principles “that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the
social order”. What is sought to be written into the law is the pervading principle of equity and justice above strict
legalism.

RELLOSA V PELLOSIS

Respondents were lessees of a panel of land owned by Marta Reyes located at San Pascual St., Malate, Manila. After
the demise of Marta, Victor Reyes, her son, inherited the land. Victor informed the respondents that they would
have a right of first refusal to buy the land. In 1989, without the knowledge of respondents, the land was sold to
petitioner Cynthia Ortega who was able to ultimately secure title to the property in her name.
On May 25, 1989, Cynthia Ortega filed petition for condemnation of the structures on the land. The office of
building Official issued a resolution ordering the demolition of the houses of respondents on November 27, 1989.
Copies were received by respondents on December 7, 1989 and on December 12, the day respondents filed an
appeal contesting the order, petitioners proceeded with the demolition of the house.
Respondents filed case before Manila RTC which was dismissed. On appeal, CA reversed the decision and ordered
petitioners to pay respondents for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE: Whether the CA ruling in favor of respondents tenable.

RULING: The court rules for affirmance of the assailed decision.

A right to power, privilege or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law or recognized as a
result of long usage constitute of a legally enforceable claim of one person against another.
The decision of CA was MODIFIED by reducing the awards for exemplary and moral damages to P20,000 to each
respondent. The decision of the appellate court is affirmed.