FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT

and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA
G.R. No. 115634. April 27, 2000
Facts:

For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals in denying the petition filed
by petitioners for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in order to annul the Order
by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar.

The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the (CENRO) of the DENR
apprehended two motor vehicles. Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers
of the vehicles, failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the
apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber. The
impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and Abuganda from the custody
of the DENR.

One of the two vehicles was again apprehended. It was again loaded with
forest products. Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer
duly filed a criminal complaint against Constancio Abuganda, and certain Abegonia,
for violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended. Although
Abegonia and Abuganda were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Abuganda,

filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles
with an application for replevin against herein petitioners before the RTC of
Catbalogan. The trial court granted the application for Replevin. Petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss which was denied by the trial court.

The Supreme Court referred said petition to respondent appellate court for
appropriate disposition. The Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit.
It ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority granted by
Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 does not automatically place said conveyance in
custodia legis.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle , with plate number FCN 143, is in
custodia legis.
(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded
vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against the State.
Held:

The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances used
in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78. In addition, Section 78
makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying
legal documents unlawful and punishable.

Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without

pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to possession of said timber,
a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load was allowed under
Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code.

Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was
in accordance with law, it is the Court’s view that the subject vehicles were validly
deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is
property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of
the law, and not otherwise.

On the second issue, Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be
sued without its consent. And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in
effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable.
However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally
applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without
wilfulness, malice or corruption. In the present case, the acts for which the
petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of
their official duties. There was no malice or bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit
against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot
prosper without the State’s consent.

G.R. No. 108619 July 31, 1997

EPIFANIO LALICAN, petitioner, vs. HON. FILOMENO A.
VERGARA, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
The petitioners were apprehended on the Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan Puerto
Princesa for violating Section 68 of PD No. 705 or known as The Forestry Reform
Code of the Philippines. There were 1, 800 board feet of lumber loaded in two (2)
passenger jeeps in different sizes and dimension that were confiscated. On August 9,
1991, all the accused were pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Petioner Lalican
filed a motion to quash the information filed against them contenting that, Section 68
of PD 705 does not include lumber because the wording of the law categorically
specify timber to be collected as to constitute the violation on the said law. He
further contends that, the law is vague because it does specify the authority or legal
documents required by existing forest law and regulation. The prosecution opposed
the motion to quash on the ground that it is not the courts to determine the wisdom of
the law or to set the policy as rest by the legislature. He further asserts that the word
timber should include lumber which is a product or derivative of a timber. The
position of the prosecution could result to the circumvention of the law, for one could
stealthily cut a timber and process it to become a lumber. On September 24, 1991,
the lower court construed the interpretation of the law against the State thus the
motion was granted. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration on the order
underscoring the fact that the accused presented Private Land Timber Permit No.
030140 dated February 10, 1991 which had expired; that while the certificate of
origin indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the product actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that
the two jeeps bearing the product were not equipped with certificates of transport
agreement. Added to this was the fact that, if the product were indeed lumber, then
the accused could have presented a certificate of lumber origin, lumber sale
invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for transportation from one
point to another. The motion was approved thus this case.

Issue:
Whether the term lumber is included in the concept of timber in order to constitute
an offense as stated in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform
Code of the Philippines).

Ruling:
NO, The Court ruled that, the word lumber includes timber. The primary reason why
the law was enacted is to secure and maximize the use of the natural resources; the
non inclusion of lumber on the law may give rise for the circumvention of law.
Section 68 of the said law punishes these acts namely (a) the cutting, gathering,
collection, or removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein
mentioned without any authority; or (b) possession of timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.
Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is
clearly gleaned from the expressed reasons for enacting the law which, under
Executive Order No. 277. To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized
in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself.

PERFECTO PALLADA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 131270. March 17, 2000

Facts:
Sometime in the latter part of 1992, the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) office in Bukidnon received reports that illegally cut
lumber was being delivered to the warehouse of the Valencia Golden Harvest
Corporation in Valencia, Bukidnon. The company is engaged in rice milling and
trading.
DENR officers, assisted by elements of the Philippine National Police, raided
the company's warehouse in Poblacion, Valencia on the strength of a warrant issued
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and found a large stockpile of lumber of varying
sizes cut by a chain saw. As proof that the company had acquired the lumber by
purchase, petitioner produced two receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of
Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17, 1992. The DENR officers did not,
however, give credit to the receipts considering that R. L. Rivero Lumberyard's
permit to operate had long been suspended. The pieces of lumber were also cut by
chain saw and thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill operator.
The following day, September 29, 1992, the first batch of lumber, consisting of
162 pieces measuring 1,954.66 board feet, was taken and impounded at the FORE
stockyard.
On October 1, 1992, the raiding team returned for the remaining lumber.
Company President Francisco Tankiko and a certain Isaias Valdehueza, who
represented himself to be a lawyer, asked for a suspension of the operations to
enable them to seek a lifting of the warrant. The motion was filed with the court
which issued the warrant but, on October 5, 1992, the motion was denied.
Accordingly, the remaining lumber was confiscated.
On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together with Noel Sy,
as assistant operations manager, and Francisco Tankiko, as president of the Valencia
Golden Harvest Corporation, and Isaias Valdehueza, were charged with violation of
Section 68 of P.D .No. 705, as amended.
Issue:
Was petitioner guilty of illegal possession of lumber in violation of Section
68 of the Revised Forestry Code (P.D. No. 705, as amended)?
Held:
Yes. During the trial, the defense presented the following documents to establish
that Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation's possession of the seized lumber was
legal:
1. Certificate of Timber Origin;
2. Auxiliary Invoice;
3. Certificate of Transport Agreement;
4. Tally Sheet;
5. Delivery Receipt;
6. Cash Voucher; and
7. Official Receipt for Environmental Fee.
The Certificates of Timber Origin presented by petitioner was not given
credence since the lumber held by the company should be covered by Certificates
of Lumber Origin.
Petitioner contends that the term "timber" includes lumber and, therefore, the
Certificates of Timber Origin and their attachments should have been considered in
establishing the legality of the company's possession of the lumber.
As BFD Circular No. 10-83 states in pertinent parts:
“In order to provide an effective mechanism to pinpoint accountability and
responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting the
origin thereof, the attached Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . which form[s] part
of this circular [is] hereby adopted as accountable forms for official use by authorized
BFD officers. . . .
“5. Lumber . . . transported/shipped without the necessary Certificate of
Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . as herein required shall be considered as proceeding from
illegal sources and as such, shall be subject to confiscation and disposition in
accordance with LOI 1020 and BFD implementing guidelines.”
Petitioner invokes the SC ruling in Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
which says that lumber is merely processed timber and, therefore, the word
"timber" embraces lumber. The question in this case is whether separate certificates
of origin should be issued for lumber and timber. Indeed, different certificates of
origin are required for timber, lumber and non-timber forest products.
The SC also considered numerous irregularities and defects found in the
documents presented by the petitioner (i.e. the original typewritten name of the
consignee was clearly erased and changed, all the Auxiliary Invoice were not
properly accomplished: the data required to be filled are left in blank).
The Certificate of Timber Origin in Exhibit 7 bears no date, the dorsal side
bears the certification that the logs were "scaled on August 7, 1991," while the
receipt attached to that Certificate is dated February 6, 1992. Moreover, the four
delivery receipts list the sizes and volume of the lumber sold, indicating that the
company purchased cut lumber from the dealers, thus belying the testimony of
petitioner that when the company bought the forest products, they were still in the
form of flitches and logs, and they were cut into lumber by the company.
The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the presumption that the
CTOs were regularly executed by the DENR officials concerned. The presumption
invoked by petitioner applies only when the public documents are, on their faces,
regular and properly accomplished.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed and the sentence is modified
to six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.

G.R. No. 136142 October 24, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFONSO
DATOR et.al , Accused- Appelant
Facts:
with the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code. The accused while transporting pieces of
lumber bound to Maasin Souther Leyte, they were apprehended by the police officer
and seized pieces of lumber. As a result SPO1 Bacala issued a seizure receipt
covering the fifty-one (51) pieces of confiscated Dita and Antipolo lumber and one
(1) unit of Isuzu cargo truck with Plate No. HAF 628. The confiscated pieces of lumber
and the cargo truck were turned over to SPO3 Daniel Lasala, PNP Property
Custodian of Maasin, Southern Leyte who, in turn, officially transferred custody of the
same to the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte. The accused Telan alleged that the
pieces of lumber were cut from the track of land belonging to his mother in San Jose,
Maasin, Southern Leyte which he intended to use in the renovation of his house in
Barangay Abgao of the same municipality. He further contends that he secured
verbal permission to Boy Leonor an officer-in -charge of the DENR. The lower courts
found out that the accused is guilty in violation of PD
705 sentencing the accused to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties provided by law, which is two (2) degrees
higher than PRISION MAYOR maximum, the authorized penalty similar to Qualified
Theft, and to pay the costs. Thus, this case was elevated to the court.

Issue:
Whether the penalty imposed to Telan the accused is correct in violation of PD 705

Ruling:
No, In the case at bench, the confiscated fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Dita and
Antipolo lumber were classified by the CENRO officials as soft, and therefore not
premium quality lumber. It may be noted that the said pieces of lumber were cut by
the appellant, a mere janitor in a public hospital, from the land owned by his mother,
not for commercial purposes but to be utilized in the renovation of his house. It does
not appear that appellant Telen had been convicted nor was he an accused in any
other pending criminal case involving violation of any of the provisions of the
Revised Forestry Code (P.D. No. 705, as amended). In view of the attendant
circumstances of this case, and in the interest of justice, the basis for the penalty to
be imposed on the appellant should be the minimum amount under Article 309
paragraph (6) of the Revised Penal Code which carries the penalty of arresto mayor
in its minimum
and medium periods for simple theft. Considering that the crime of violation of
Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft under Article
310 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the said decree, the imposable penalty
on the appellant shall be increased by two degrees, that is, from arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods to prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods.

G.R. No. 161798 October 20, 2004

PICOP RESOURCES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. AUGUSTUS L. CALO, Presiding
Judge, respondent

Facts:
Petitioner PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) owns and operates a multi-billion peso
pulp and paper manufacturing facility in Bislig City, Agusan del Norte. It holds
government-issued Pulpwood and Timber License Agreement (PTLA) No. 47 and
Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) No. 35 which gave petitioner the
exclusive right to co-manage and develop with the State almost 130,000 hectares of
forest land within the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through its officers, rendered three
Memoranda, dated August 22, 1997, February 16, 2001 and April 6, 2001 designating
the petitioner as DENR depository and custodian for apprehended forest products
and conveyances within its concession. On May 25, 2001, the Office of the CENRO-
Bislig and petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) containing
"Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Verification of Private Tree Plantation." The
MOA provided, among others, that field validation/verification of applications for
Certificates of Private Tree wnership (CTPOs) shall be conducted jointly by the
DENR, the local government unit concerned, and petitioner. Pursuant to these
Memoranda, petitioner’s security personnel were deputized as DENR officers to
apprehend and seize the tools, equipment and conveyance used in the commission
of illegal logging and the forest products removed and possessed by the offenders.
In the course of the enforcement of the aforesaid Memoranda, petitioner PICOP,
through its security personnel, had on numerous occasions apprehended within its
concession and tree plantation area. These illegally cut forest products and
conveyances were kept in PICOP’s impounding area.
A class suit was initiated among the members of UFAB asking for preliminary
mandatory Injunction. They further asked for the declaration of the memoranda null
and void and sought to restrain the DENR and those who are participants from
enforcing the said memoranda.

Issue;
Whether petitioner has the right to retain the seized confiscated products by the
virtue of MOA regarding the Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Verification of
Private Tree Plantation.

Ruling:
Petitioner had no right or interest to protect in the confiscated forest products and
conveyances. Petitioner’s compound was used only as a depository for the
confiscated logs and conveyances by virtue of the Memorandum. While it claimed
that some of the confiscated forest products may have come from its concession
area, petitioner admitted that the ownership of the confiscated products was still to
be determined in the cases pending either at the CENRO-Bislig or at the Office of the
Government Prosecution- Surigao del Sur. Hence, petitioner’s interest in the
confiscated forest products was merely contingent and cannot be material as
contemplated under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner contends that private respondents’ intrusion was in violation of petitioner’s
PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. These license agreements gave petitioner the
exclusive right to co-manage and develop forest lands, and recognized petitioner as
owner of the trees and other products in the concession area. In filing this petition,
petitioner is merely defending its subsisting proprietary interest pursuant to these
license agreements.

G.R. No. 79538. October 18, 1990

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner, vs.
THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY
OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY
CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner entered into a timber license agreement with the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano,
wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except
prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of
54,920 hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya
from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990. However, on August 18, 1983, the Director
of the Bureau of Forest Development (Bureau), Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a
memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino
provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest
concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum order of
the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena.
Subsequently, petitioner’s timber license agreement was cancelled. He sent a letter
addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the
Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its contributions to forest conservation
and alleging that it was not given the opportunity to be heard prior to the
cancellation of its logging operations, but no favorable action was taken on his letter;
Barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half of the area formerly covered by
petitioner’s TLA was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation
under a new TLA which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was
allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award
or license. The latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of
deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. Soon after the change of government in
February 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the
President, and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the
Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber
license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos
administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks
Development and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in violation of
forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing
petitioner to take possession of all logs found in the concession area. However,
petitioner's request was denied. Petitioner moved for reconsideration reiterating,
among others, its request that the timber license agreement issued to private
respondent be declared null and void. The MNR however denied this motion.

HELD:
NO. The failure of petitioner to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable
period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences
of laches. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it of
declined to assert it. The rule is that unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in
seeking to enforce an alleged right may, depending upon the circumstances, be
destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws did these who are vigilant, not those
who sleep upon their rights. In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three
years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the
validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that petitioner,
throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to seek
relief from the courts which were normally operating at the time, its delay constitutes
unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ
of certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie. There is a more
significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner
and against public respondents herein. A long line of cases establish the basic rule
that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming
under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. More so
where, as in the present case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted
against that of the public at large on
the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the
wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the
appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the
proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources. Timber
licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence
a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest
products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded
by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not
deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors, and represented by their parents petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE
HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati,
Branch 66, respondents.

Facts
This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 44 children, through their
parents, claiming that they bring the case in the name of “their generation as well as
those generations yet unborn.” Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources HYPERLINK
"http://en.wikipilipinas.org/index.php?
title=Department_of_Environment_and_Natural_Resources" \t "_blank" , seeking to
have him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease
and desist from accepting and approving more timber license agreements. The
children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by
the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to
stop issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural law—
and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was
dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it
was brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

Issue
Whether children have the legal standing to file the case?

Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal
standing to file the case based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility”.
Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that
environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal
standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-
impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the
state in the interest of public welfare.
GR 152160
Bon vs. People of the Philippines
Jan 13, 2014

Petitioner Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged for violating Section
68 of PD 705, as amended,together with Rosalio Bon under an Information. The
petitioners cut, gather and manufacture into lumber four (4) narra trees, one (1)
cuyao-yao tree, and one (1) amugis tree, with an approximate volume of 4,315 bd. ft.
and valued at approximately P25,000.00, without the knowledge and consent of the
owner Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza and without having first obtained from proper
authorities the necessary permit or license and/or legal supporting documents, to
the damage and prejudice of the Government and the owner in the aforementioned
amount of P25,000.00.

Receiving information that trees inside the land were being stolen, cut [and] sawed
into lumber by her administrator and/or workers, she sent her brother Manuel
Dangalan to investigate the report. Manuel Dangalan sought the help of Barangay
Captain, who in turn wrote a letter to one of the barangay tanod to assist and
investigate Teresita’s complaint of Illegal Cutting of Trees. On February 12, 1990,
together with Julian Lascano, Manuel Dangalan, Ricardo Valladolid, Natividad
Legaspi and Virgilio Bon repaired to the land of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza].
During their investigation, the group discovered six (6) stumps of trees: four (4)
Narra trees, one cuyao-yao tree and one amugis tree. Virgilio Bon admitted ordering
the cutting and sawing of the trees into lumber. Oscar Narvaez testified that he
sawed the trees into six flitches upon instruction of Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr.;
Alexander Mendones, CENRO Officer, upon complaint of Teresita for Illegal Cutting
of Trees repaired to the land and found four stumps of trees.

Issues
Whether hearsay testimony allegedly made to potential prosecution witnesses who
are not police operatives or media representatives is admissible in evidence against
the author

Ruling
The Petition has no merit. The time-tested rule is that the factual findings and
conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve to be respected
because of its unique advantage of having observed their demeanor as they
testified. Punishable under the above provision are the following acts: (1) cutting,
gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products from the places
therein mentioned without any authority; and (b) possessing timber or other forest
products without the legal documents.
Petitioner was charged with the first offense. It was thus necessary for the
prosecution to prove the alleged illegal cutting, gathering or manufacture of lumber
from the trees.
It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. This kind of evidence,
however, is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its conclusions
and findings of guilt. Conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, as long
as the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain that leads to a fair and
reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.34
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that the
following elements concur:
1. There is more than one circumstance.
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven.
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.35
Did the circumstances in this case satisfy the above requirements? We rule in the
affirmative.

Chu vs. Judge Tamin

A.M. No. RTJ-03-1786. August 28, 2003

Facts:
• Chu filed administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law, serious
misconduct, and grave abuse of discretion against Judge Camilo E. Tamin of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur. Judge Tamin issued
search warrant against Chu for possession of “forest products of dubious origin” in
violation of PD 705 as applied for by Communty Environment and Natural Resources
Officer Michael dela Cruz (CENRO dela Cruz). On the strength of the warrant, 576
pieces of pagtapat lumber (mangrove specie) was seized from Chu. • Chu assailed
the validity of the warrant for violating Sec. 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure because the certified copies he obtained from the court did not
contain any transcript of the judge’s examination of CENRO dela Cruz or his witness
Cuaresma. Judge Tamin’s contention: the certified copies of the records obtained by
complainant did not include the transcript of his examination because the clerical
staff in his office who prepared the certified copies inadvertently failed to do so.
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)’s findings: Judge Tamin is liable for gross
ignorance of the law. Respondent judge apparently believes that searching
questions need not be in writing.

Issue: Whether Judge Tamin properly issued the search warrant against Chu.

Held: SC held that Judge Tamin is grossly ignorant of the law and ordered to pay
P5,000.00 fine. Art. III, Sec. 2 of Constitution and Rule 126, Sec. 5 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure implements the proscription against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The Court, in Pendon v. Court of Appeals, reiterated the requirements
of Section 2 on the issuance of search warrants, which judges must strictly observe,
as follows: Under the above provision, the issuance of a search warrant is justified
only upon a finding of probable cause. x x x In determining
the existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge x x x must examine
the x x x witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the
examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and
answers
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH VII)
G.R. No. L-46772 February 13, 1992

FACTS:
The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of
logs, defined and punished under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. On July 28, 29 and
30, 1976 at Barangay Mahabang Lalim Municipality of General Nakar, Province of
Quezon City, Godofredo Arrozal and Luis Flores together with 20 other whose
identities are still unknown enter the privately-owned land of Felicitacion Pujalte.
Inside the privately-owned land they illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away
without consent of the owner and without any authority under a license agreement,
lease license or permit, 60 logs of different species consisting of about 541.48 cubic.

On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the
information on two (2)grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts charged do not ,
constitute an offense; and, (2) that the informationdoes not conform substantially
to the prescribed form. The Trial court dismissed the information on thegrounds
invoked and the reconsideration sought was denied.Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the information charged an offense.

RULING:
The information substantially alleged all the elements of the crime of qualified
theft of logs as described in Section 68 of P.D. 705. While it was admitted that the
information did not precisely allege that the taking of the logs in question was
"without the consent of the state," nevertheless, said information expressly stated
that the accused "illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without
the consent of said owner and without any authority under a license agreement,
lease, lease, license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species. . . ." Since only the
state can grant the lease, license, license agreement or permit for utilization of forest
resources, including timber, then the allegation in the information that the
asportation of the logs was "without any authority" under a license agreement, lease,
license or permit, is tantamount to alleging that the taking of the logs was without the
consent of the state.

While it is only the state which can grant a license or authority to cut, gather,
collect or remove forest products it does not follow that all forest products belong to
the state. In the just cited case, private ownership of forest products grown in private
lands is retained under the principle in civil law that ownership of the land includes
everything found on its surface.

Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60

of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the failure of the information to allege the true owner of the
forest products is not material; it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was
without any authority or license from the government.

People vs. Que

G.R. No. 120365, December 17, 1996

Facts:
A member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received a reliable
information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with
illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos Norte. Two weeks later, while members of
the Provincial Task Force were patrolling along General Segundo Avenue, they saw
the ten-wheeler truck described by the informant. When they apprehended it at the
Marcos Bridge, Que, the owner of the truck and the cargo, admitted that there were
sawn lumber in between the coconut slabs. When the police officers asked for the
lumber's supporting documents, accused-appellant could not present any. Que was
charged of and convicted for violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 for possession of illegally
cut lumbers.
• Que’s contention: He argues that he cannot be convicted for violation of Section 68
of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 which amended Section 68 to penalize the possession
of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents did not
indicate the particular documents necessary to make the possession legal. Neither
did the other forest laws and regulations existing at the time
of its enactment. He also contended that the lumbers were fruits of an illegal search
and seizure and of an uncounselled extrajudicial admission.

Issue:
• Whether the search and seizure violated his constitutional rights;
• Whether he violated Sec. 68 pf PD 705.

Held:
Que was held guilty and sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua.

SC reject appellant's argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest
products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting,
gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is legal. There are two (2)
distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land without any authority; and
 (2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations. In the first offense, one can raise
as a defense the legality of the acts of
cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products by
presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it
is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest
products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest
products without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the
lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.O 277 considers the mere
possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents as
malum prohibitum. The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest,
a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles,
and the seizure of evidence in plain view. With regard to the search of moving
vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles
makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

ROLDAN, JR. vs. HON. MADRONA

G.R. No. 152989
September 4, 2002

FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land consisting of about 60,000 square
meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. TP-331 which he bought from a
certain Ildefonso O. Maglasang. On August 9, 2001, petitioner applied for a Private
Land Timber Permit (PLTP) from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources for him to cut some trees for a proposed road and poultry farm in his
property. While waiting for the permit to be issued, petitioner was allegedly
informed by some employees from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) that he could proceed with the cutting of trees even though his
application was still awaiting approval. Consequently,petitioner proceeded with the
cutting of trees and bulldozing of the roadway.He used the cut logs as materials to
build his chicken cages. About three weeks later, representatives of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources and personnel from the Intelligence Service,
Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) of Tacloban City raided petitioner's place,
allegedly without a search warrant. An inventory of the cut trees was conducted. The
logs were not confiscated but were entrusted to a barangay kagawad since there
was allegedly no search warrant at that time. Several days thereafter, the CENRO
group and ISAFP returned, this time armed with a search warrant and proceeded to
confiscate 872 pieces of sawn lumber/flitches (8,506 board feet) and three felled
timber logs with a total market value of P235,454.68 at P27.00 per board foot.
Consequently, on September 21, 2001, a complaint for violation of Section 68 of PD
705 as amended was filed against herein petitioner by CENRO before the City
Prosecutor of Ormoc City.

ISSUES & RULINGS:

(1) whether the owner of a private land, the petitioner in this case, is criminally
liable under Section 68 of PD 705 for cutting trees within his own property;
YES, he is still liable. Under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, it is clear
that the violators of the said law are not declared as being guilty of qualified theft.
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code were referred to only for the
purpose of determining the imposable penalties and not to define acts which
constitute qualified theft. Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by E.O. 277, otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines provides: SEC. 68. Cutting,
Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License.- Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code:Provided, That in case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the
officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable,
and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported
without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed,
or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally
used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied)
The said law does not even distinguish whether or not the person who commits the
punishable acts under the aforementioned law is the owner of the property, for what
is material in determining the culpability of a person is whether or not the person or
entity involved or charged with its violation POSSESSES THE REQUIRED PERMIT,
LICENSE OR AUTHORIZATION FROM DENR at the time he or it cuts, gathers or
collects timber or other forest products. (2) whether the owner of the private
property is dministratively liable under Sec. 14 of DENR Administrative Order No.
2000-21 despite the fact that he did not transport the logs out of his property and just
used them for his own agricultural purposes therein and the aforementioned
administrative order considers the mere act of transporting any wood product or
timber without the prescribed documents as an offense which is subject to the
penalties provided for by law. As to the defense of petitioner that he never
transported the logs out of his property, suffice it to say that such is a factual issue
which this Court under Rule 45 cannot determine. We are limited to resolving
questions of law. Section 14 of Administrative Order No. 2000-21, the "Revised
Guidelines in the Issuance of Private Land Timber Permit/Special Private Land
Timber Permit," provides: SEC. 14. Penal Provisions. - Any log/timber or finished-
wood products covered by these regulations which are transported without the
prescribed documents shall be considered illegal and, therefore, subject to
confiscation in favor of the government and shall be disposed in accordance with
laws, rules and regulations governing the matter. DENR Officials found issuing
defective certificate of origin and other transport documents required in this Order
shall be subject to suspension without prejudice to the imposition of other penalties
as may be warranted by extant Civil Service Laws, rules and regulations. (3) whether
the logs confiscated by the DENR should be returned to the petitioner considering
that the same were not transported out and merely used for his own agricultural
purposes. any pronouncement thereon at this point would be premature as the guilt
of the petitioner has not been legally established.