Republic of the Philippines

Court of Appeals
VISAYAS STATION
Cebu City

NINETEENTH (19th) DIVISION

TELEPHILIPPINES, INC., CA G.R. SP No. 07121
Petitioner,

-versus- Members:

NLRC, 7TH DIVISION, CEBU DELOS SANTOS, Chairperson,

CITY/ and JANRAE MAXINO,
ALCANTARA SANICAS, SEMPIO DIY, JJ
Respondents.

Promulgated on:
_______________
x-------------------------------------- -----x
DECISION
DELOS SANTOS, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 with Verified

Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which seeks to annul the Decision2 dated 28 March 2012 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) – Seventh Division
(Formerly Fourth Division), Cebu City, in NLRC CASE No. VAC-12-
000920-2011 and its Resolution3 dated 30 May 2012.

The NLRC Decision dated 28 March 2012 affirmed the Decision4

of the Labor Arbiter granting the private respondent’s complaint for
1
Rollo, p. 3.
2
Rollo, p. 45.
3
Rollo, p. 59.
4
Rollo, p. 62.
CA G.R. SP No. 07121 Page 2 of 18
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Illegal Dismissal with prayer for Reinstatement, Full Backwages,

Allowances and Other Benefits, Damages (Moral And Exemplary) and
Attorney’s Fees. The Resolution dated 30 May 2012, on the other
hand, denied the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration to the
aforementioned NLRC decision.

THE ANTECEDENTS

Petitioner TELEPHILIPPINES, INC. (“Teleperformance

Philippines” or “Teleperformance”) is a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines and is engaged in the call
center industry, with offices at Luxur Place, Magsaysay Avenue,
Bacolod City.

Private respondent Janrae A. Sanicas had been employed with

petitioner TELEPHILIPPINES, INC. - Bacolod City (Teleperformance,
hereinafter) since 19 March 2007 until she was terminated as Quality
Assurance (QA) Analyst on 1 March 2011 for alleged violations of the
company’s Code of Conduct. These alleged violations are found in the
Notice of Termination dated 1 March 20115 sent to the private
respondent, to wit:

“Section I.A.1. Falsifying personnel records, certifications, medical

certificates, production statistics, vouchers, receipts, time records,
application forms or other documents or records.

Section I.C.2 - Unauthorized disclosure of confidential information,

which includes but is not limited to Company records, trade secrets,
financial operations statements, salary/wages, financial records, and
client’s personal information to other persons.

Section I.F.5 – Carrying out fraudulent transaction using company

equipment, computer or systems data done, whether in or outside
of the Company’s network.”

The events leading to the termination of the private respondent

are as follows:

5
Rollo, p. 134.
CA G.R. SP No. 07121 Page 3 of 18
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Sometime in January 2011, Teleperformance received reports

that some Quality Assurance (QA) Department employees managed
to avoid being marked as tardy by Teleperformance’s computerized
system by requesting their co-employees to log them in the Contact
Center Management System (CCMS) prior to their arrival at the
workplace. In response to these reports, Teleperformance conducted
a random audit of the attendance records of the QA Department
employees consisting of 20% of the total number of QA Analysts. The
audit was meant to verify attendance records in December 2010 and
January 2011 by comparing the exact time of the employee’s log-in
time in the CCMS – where an employee’s attendance is recorded upon
logging into the network using his/her username and password vis-à-
vis the same employee’s badge access record – or the record of time
when the employee swipes his/her badge through a device everytime
he/she wants the door to open and allow him/her to go through to
his/her workstation. Private respondent was among the representative
sample randomly selected. After the audit, a discrepancy was found in
her log-in entries in her CCMS and badge access record, consisting of
nineteen (19) instances, in December 2010 and January 2011, when
her log-in time in CCMS was earlier than the time recorded in the
badge access area.

Thereafter, private respondent received a Memorandum or

Letter dated 12 February 20116 informing her of the result of the
aforementioned random audit and the alleged violations of the
Teleperformance’s Code of Conduct. On 22 February 2011, an
administrative hearing was conducted wherein the private respondent
was assisted by a counsel. On 1 March 2011, private respondent
received a Letter7 terminating her employment after her alleged
violations of Teleperformance’s Code of Conduct have been concretely
substantiated when she failed to provide justifiable evidences to
support her defenses against the irregular timekeeping records she
have acquired in the IBSS System and CCMS Timeclock.

Aggrieved by her dismissal, private respondent filed a complaint

for Illegal Dismissal with prayer for Reinstatement, Full Backwages,

6
Rollo, p. 125.
7
Rollo, p. 134.
CA G.R. SP No. 07121 Page 4 of 18
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Allowances and Other Benefits, Damages (Moral And Exemplary) and

Attorney’s Fees against petitioner Teleperformance and Isabel Frias-
Locsin and Sheryl Leduna, in their official capacity as Human
Resources – Employee Relations Supervisor and Manager of
Teleperformance, respectively, (Teleperformance, hereinafter, to
avoid confusion) on 15 April 2011 before the NLRC – Regional
Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City.

In her position paper, private respondent alleges that the charge

against her was malicious and a retaliatory move initiated by Sheryl
Leduna, the Quality Assurance Manager. She used to have friendly
relations with Sheryl Leduna but after she turned down the latter’s
request to allow her (Leduna) to use and ride-on in private respondent’s
credit card in the purchase of a laptop, Leduna’s treatment towards
private respondent became antagonistic. Private respondent then
explains the discrepancies in the computer print-outs of her badge-in
access record as against her log-in to CCMS to prove that she had not
falsified any of her daily time records, to wit:

The log-in to CCMS refers to Contact Center Management

System to which the employee’s attendance or time-in is recorded in
the computer when he or she enters his network log-in username and
password. The log-in to CCMS of an employee in Teleperformance’s
online communication system can be done through logging-in at
his/her own workstation or any available computer within the office
premises. On the other hand, the badge-in is before an employee can
proceed to an area within the office wherein there are computers, the
employee has to go through one or more badge access areas, wherein
the employee would have to swipe or badge-in his/her ID through the
machine attached to the door, and only then will the door open to let
him/her go through.

During the period from December 2010 to January 2011, the

door at the Adobe Section was experiencing mechanical troubles
wherein the door would remain always open and the employees need
not swipe or badge-in their IDs in the machine attached to the door
before it will open. It was in the said period when private respondent
was almost late that she would hurriedly pass through the defective
door of the Adobe Section which was already open, hence, she need
not swipe or badge-in her ID to enter. In some instances if the door
was functioning well, the private respondent need not swipe or badge-
in her ID at the door before entering the Adobe Section because she
CA G.R. SP No. 07121 Page 5 of 18
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was following another employee and the door was already open and
she would just pass through without swiping her ID in the machine.
After entering the door in the Adobe Section which was already open,
or that the door in the Adobe Section was already open because
private respondent was following another employee who had already
entered the door after swiping or having badge-in his/her ID, private
respondent would immediately proceed to the Adobe Section to log-in
to CCMS her attendance in one of the computer of the employee in
the said section using his password. Thereafter, the private respondent
would proceed to the door at the main lobby where she would swipe
or badge in her ID in order for the door to open and that will be the
only time when private respondent can proceed to the second floor at
the Motorola Section where she was assigned.

On the basis of the foregoing explanation, private respondent

claims that she was already inside the building of Teleperformance when
she first logged in to CCMS her attendance at the Adobe Section. When
she badged in her ID by swiping it in the machine at the door when she
entered the main lobby, it would appear that it would already be after
she had logged in to CCMS her attendance at the Adobe Section. This
explains the suspicion of the management of Teleperformance that
somebody was logging-in to CCMS her attendance because her badge-
in records, through swiping her ID in the machine at the door of the
main lobby, came after she had log-in to CCMS for her attendance.

In support of her allegation that the door in going to the Adobe

Section was experiencing mechanical troubles, and that during those
times private respondent had been logging-in to CCMS her attendance
in the computer of her co-employees at the Adobe Section, private
respondent attached the affidavits of her co-employees Arle P. Lim and
Rube Jane Pacheco in her complaint. Private respondent also avers that
during the 22 February 2011 administrative investigation on the charge
of falsifying her time records, she intended to present witnesses who
were employees in the Adobe Section, but her request to present
witnesses was denied. Due to the denial of the management panel to
allow her to present witnesses, private respondent wrote Ms. Isabel
Frias-Locsin about her observation and stand on the conduct of the said
hearing. She also submitted her Affidavit of Explanation8 and the

8
Rollo, p. 206.
CA G.R. SP No. 07121 Page 6 of 18
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Affidavits9 of her co-employees, namely Arle P. Lim, Rube Jane A.

Pacheco and Elaine Mae Nicolas-Latoza - who all corroborated her
statement concerning the defective badge access device at the door
leading to the Adobe Section and her logging-in to the CCMS using the
computers of her co-employees. She also presented an email
communication between certain officers of Teleperformance concerning
the door leading to the Adobe Section.

On the other hand, Teleperformance contends in its position

paper that private respondent was justly terminated for dishonesty
and fraud, in addition to serious misconduct and willful disobedience
to the company rules. It is its position that the private respondent
was charged and proven to have divulged log-in information and
password, and had asked her colleagues to log-in on her behalf.
Teleperformance explains that before any employee can reach his or
her workstation, or any computer in the office, they will first swipe
their badge in the badge access area, and only then will they get to
the computer to log in through CCMS. In the result of the random
audit conducted, it shows that there were nineteen (19) instances
wherein private respondent was already logged in through the
computer at CCMS, while according to the badge access reports, she
was not even in the area where the computer was. From the said
data report, it seems that private respondent was at a workstation
computer even before physically entering the building or the
workstation. This, according to Teleperformance, could have been
possible only if there was someone else, already in the premises and
in front of the computer, who logged in for her while she was not yet
in the office or before she physically arrived at her workstation.
Teleperformance alleges that the only reason why private respondent
asked someone else to log-in for her is so that she will not be marked
as tardy and to avoid disciplinary consequences, as well as the
proportionate deduction in salary. It avers that these acts by the
private respondent qualify as an intentionally fraudulent act which is
proscribed by the Teleperformance’s Company Code of Conduct,
particularly covered by the provisions involving Falsification and
Fraud, and constitute falsification and fraud committed against the
company (Teleperformance) which is a just case for termination under
9
Rollo, pp. 209-219.
CA G.R. SP No. 07121 Page 7 of 18
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the law.

On 15 November 2011, Labor Arbiter Jessie G. Sullano rendered

a Decision10 in favor of the private respondent and held that she was
illegally dismissed from the service. The Labor Arbiter reasoned out that
if there was any falsification committed, it was done by another person
who did the actual logging in for complainant (herein private
respondent). The Decision states that the private respondent should not
be held liable of falsification as defined in their company rules but
somebody else, and if indeed she was benefited by such falsification,
and did not disclose it upon recovery, her penalty under the company
policy is uncertain. Moreover, the Labor Arbiter also pointed out that
even if such act is within the penalized act of the company rules,
petitioner is still duty bound to establish by substantial evidence, that
indeed, respondent TP was prejudiced, and none was introduced in this
case, hence, the private respondent’s termination based on the alleged
acts is groundless.

For being illegally dismissed, the Labor Arbiter ordered the

reinstatement of the private respondent to her former position or its
equivalent without loss of seniority rights and awarded her full
backwages, allowances and other privileges, 13th month pay, service
incentive leave pay, and attorney’s fees.

On 9 December 2011, Teleperformance appealed to the public

respondent, NLRC 7th Division (Formerly Fourth Division).

On 28 March 2012, public respondent NLRC rendered the now

assailed Decision dismissing the petitioners’ appeal.

Anent the procedural issue raised in the appeal, the public

respondent held that the Labor Arbiter did not abuse his discretion
when he admitted the private respondent’s position paper despite its
belated filing. According to the public respondent, jurisprudence has
consistently held that technicalities must give way to the substantial
rights of parties. Moreover, failure to submit a position paper on time
is not a ground for striking it from the records of the case.
10
Rollo, 51.
CA G.R. SP No. 07121 Page 8 of 18
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Going into the merits of the illegal dismissal case, the public
respondent subscribed to the Labor Arbiter’s findings that the private
respondent was illegally dismissed. While public respondent NLRC
believes that the act of inducing a co-employee to log into the CCMS
for someone who is not yet physically in the office (to preclude being
recorded as tardy) would constitute falsification and would justify an
employee’s termination, it however gave more weight to the private
respondent’s evidence which proves that she (private respondent) did
not commit the alleged fraudulent acts. The public respondent gave
more weight to the testimonies of private respondent’s witnesses, Arle
P. Lim, Rube Jane A. Pacheco and Elaine Mae Nicolas-Latoza - who
are employees of Teleperformance – who corroborated the private
respondent’s explanation or defense. In the mind of the public
respondent, these witnesses are detached and dispassionate
witnesses who stand to gain nothing by their testimonies and even
stand the risk of earning the ire of their employer by giving statement
unfavorable to the latter’s cause. On the other hand, the officers of
Teleperformance, who executed sworn statements to negate the
private respondent’s claim or explanation, are expected to stand by
and protect the interest of the company, thus, their testimonies are
self-serving and of little value, made worse by the fact that these
testimonies were uncorroborated.

In addition, the public respondent also gave significance to the

email communication between Isabel Frias-Locsin and the
Teleperformance’s Facilities Administrator which support the allegation
of private respondent that there was a problem with the door and the
badge access device in the Adobe Section. Public respondent NLRC
held that while the door might not have been physically broken, the
email suggests that there was, in deed, some trouble with the access
door. Lastly, the public respondent also noted the private respondent’s
statement that her request for second administrative hearing to
present her co-employees was denied. It held that had
Teleperformance been more serious in unearthing the truth,
Teleperformance could have easily issued a memorandum directing
these employees to narrate what they know concerning the issue.
Teleperformance’s failure to do so made the public respondent doubt
CA G.R. SP No. 07121 Page 9 of 18
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the validity of their position.

For the foregoing circumstances, the public respondent ruled

that Teleperformance failed to discharge the burden of proving the
legality of private respondent’s dismissal by substantial evidence.
Hence, the unfavorable 28 March 2012 NLRC decision.

Dissatisfied with the public respondent’s ruling, Teleperformance

filed a Motion for Reconsideration11 but the same was denied by the
public respondent in its assailed 30 May 2012 Resolution.

Aggrieved, Teleperformance filed the instant petition, anchored

on the following grounds, to wit:
I. THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
AFFIRMED A MONETARY AWARD TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENT THAT HAS ABSOLUTELY NO BASIS IN LAW
OR THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

II. THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT

ABSOLUTELY DISREGARDED PETITIONER’S SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE, IN FAVOR OF A BIASED AND BASELESS
WEIGHING OF EVIDENCE IN PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S
FAVOR.

THE COURT’S RULING

The petition is partly meritorious.

With respect to the dismissal of the private respondent,

Teleperformance contends that the public respondent’s weighing of
Teleperformance’s and private respondent’s evidence was an abuse of
discretion in excess of its jurisdiction since the public respondent only
had to determine whether Teleperformance had substantial evidence
to justify the termination of the private respondent. It then asserts
that Teleperformance’s evidence, in the form of (a) documentary
proof regarding private respondent’s attendance violations; (b)
credible witness evidence belying her excuses for her attendance
11
Rollo, p. 318.
CA G.R. SP No. 07121 Page 10 of 18
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violations; and (c) private respondent’s own admissions, met and

exceeded the substantial evidence requirement, and that the NLRC’s
rebuff of petitioner’s witnesses’ testimony is baseless speculation, and
unreasonably favors private respondent.

This Court is not convinced.

This Court holds that the public respondent did not commit
grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter in finding that the private respondent was illegally dismissed.

It is well-established that the quantum of evidence required in

labor cases filed before the Labor Arbiter and NLRC is substantial
evidence in accordance to the rule that in cases filed before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.12

This Court could not subscribe to the idea of Teleperformance

that the public respondent violated the above-mentioned rule when it
weighed and took into consideration the evidence of both parties and
subsequently arrived at the opinion that the private respondent’s
evidence proved that she did not commit the alleged fraudulent acts.
To the mind of this Court, the step taken by the public respondent is
part of the process of determining whether the evidence of
Teleperformance would constitute substantial evidence so as to justify
a conclusion that the private respondent was justly dismissed. Just
like in any labor case, the evidence of Teleperformance should be
considered and passed upon by the deciding tribunal (public
respondent NLRC in this case) in light of the evidence presented by
the opposing party (private respondent) and all circumstances
surrounding the case. It is only after such step that the deciding
tribunal can best arrive at a conclusion of whether or not the evidence
of Teleperformance was able to hurdle the quantum of proof required
in the instant labor case. If the Court or Tribunal would simply rely on

12
See Sec. 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court; Barros vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 123901, Sept. 22,
1999; Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 117038, Sept. 25, 1997.
CA G.R. SP No. 07121 Page 11 of 18
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the evidence of Teleperformance and from there decide whether or

not it is enough to prove that the private respondent was justly
dismissed, then the decision will be not be based on the entire picture
of the case but rather on a selective and one-sided version of facts –
an instance of injustice on the part of the other party (private
respondent in this case). After a careful study of the decision by the
public respondent, this Court observes that it (NLRC) took the logical
step aforementioned and still ruled the case on the basis of the
substantial evidence requirement, hence, there was no grave abuse of
discretion.

The foregoing considered, the main question now is whether or

not Teleperformance was able to prove by substantial evidence that
the private respondent was justly terminated.

This Court rules in the negative.

This Court agrees with the opinion of the public respondent and
with the stand of Teleperformance that the act of inducing a co-
employee to log into the CCMS for someone who is not yet physically
present in the office (to preclude being recorded as tardy) would
justify an employee’s termination. The alleged act would tantamount
to fraud, dishonesty, serious misconduct and willful disobedience to
the company rules which, under Art. 282 of the Labor Code and
prevailing jurisprudence, are grounds for justly dismissing an
employee. This Court, however, is not convinced that Teleperformance
is able to prove that the private respondent committed the alleged act
of falsifying her time/attendance records and/or inducing a co-
employee to aid her in falsifying her time/attendance record.

If this Court is to consider only the evidence of

Teleperformance, specifically the employees’ log-in and badge-in
records, the allegation by Teleperformance against the private
respondent appears to be meritorious. As what Teleperformance
contends, the records suggest that the private complainant is already
logged-in before she could enter the work premises and the
immediate explanation to it is because another employee was logging
in for private respondent while she was still outside the office.
CA G.R. SP No. 07121 Page 12 of 18
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However, the private respondent was able to explain the

discrepancies in the computer print-outs of her badge-in access record
as against her log-in to CCMS. That is because she was able to log-in
first in the CCMS at the computer of her co-employee at the Adobe
Section before she would badge in at the door in the main lobby going
to her workstation at the Motorola Section. She did this during the times
when she was in a hurry to save some time in going to and logging in at
her own workstation by logging in at the computer of her co-employee
at the Adobe Section and therefore avoid being marked as tardy. To the
mind of this Court, private respondent’s explanation satisfactorily
clarified the discrepancies in her CCMS log-in and Badge-in Records.

It may be argued, however, that even if she was able to log in at

the computer of her co-employee in the Adobe Section before accessing
the door going to her workstation, her badge-in record should have still
appeared earlier than her CCMS log-in since there was a badge-in
access door at the Adobe Section before she could enter the said
section and use the computer of her co-employee. But once again, the
private respondent was able to explain why her CCMS log-in came
earlier than the door access “badge-in.” She explained that during the
period from December 2010 to January 2011, the door at the Adobe
Section was experiencing mechanical troubles wherein the door would
remain always open and the employees need not swipe or badge-in
their IDs in the machine attached to the door before it will open. In
some instances if the door was functioning well, the private respondent
need not swipe or badge-in her ID at the door before entering the
Adobe Section because she was following another employee and the
door was already open and she would just pass through without swiping
her ID in the machine. It was only after passing the door at the Adobe
Section and after logging-in at the computer of her co-employee at the
said section that she would badge-in at the second door at main lobby
leading to her workstation. Thus, it would still appear that her CCMS
was logged in earlier than her badge-in record.

It is on the above explanation that Teleperformance argued that

there is no evidence that the door at the Adobe Section is defective and
that there is no truth to the allegation that the private respondent would
CA G.R. SP No. 07121 Page 13 of 18
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just “tailgate” other employee accessing the door and enter the same
while it is open without swiping her ID/Badge.

Contrary to the allegations of Teleperformance, records show

that the private respondent presented proof to support her
explanation.

There were the testimonies of private respondents’ witnesses.

This Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public
respondent in giving weight to the testimonies of the private
respondents’ witnesses, who, as correctly held by the public
respondent, are detached and dispassionate witnesses who stand to
gain nothing by their testimonies and even stand the risk of earning
the ire of their employer by giving statement unfavorable to the
latter’s cause.

Moreover, the public respondent also gave significance to the

email communication from a certain Malvar Gualdrapa to the officers
of Teleperformance which support the allegation of private
respondent that there was a problem with the door and the badge
access device in the Adobe Section. A reading of the said email
communication shows that while the door might not have been
“physically broken,” the email suggests that there was, in deed, some
trouble with the access door.

Lastly, the public respondent also noted the private respondent’s

allegation that her request for second administrative hearing to
present her co-employees was denied. While it is true that
Teleperformance is not required or obliged to grant the requested
second hearing and to conduct an adversarial proceeding or actual
hearing where the said employees may be presented, it must be
noted that aforementioned observation by the public respondent was
only used to strengthen its finding. The same was not made as the
sole or primary basis of its conclusion that the private respondent did
not commit the alleged fraudulent act. If the said circumstance is
considered together with the other evidence presented by the private
respondent, this Court could not blame the public respondent for
doubting the validity of the position of Teleperformance.
CA G.R. SP No. 07121 Page 14 of 18
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Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious and whimsical

exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of
discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so
patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law."13 This, the Court cannot find on the part of the
public respondent when it ruled that Teleperformance failed to
discharge the burden of proving the legality of private respondent’s
dismissal by substantial evidence. On the contrary, this Court is of the
opinion that the private respondent was able to prove by substantial
evidence that she was illegally dismissed by being terminated due to
allegations or charges not proven and which she was able to
satisfactorily explain.

Nevertheless, if doubt exists between the evidence of both

parties as to whether there is just cause in terminating the private
respondent, the same should be resolved in her (private respondent)
favor. It is well-settled that if doubts between the evidence presented
by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be
tilted in favor of the latter. In controversies between a laborer and his
master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence should be
resolved in the former’s favor. The policy is to extend the doctrine to a
greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the
law which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to
give maximum aid and protection to labor.14 Thus, as applied in this
case, if there is doubt arising from the evidence between
Teleperformance and the private respondent, the same should be
resolved in favor of the latter.

This Court, however, finds grave abuse of discretion on the part

of the public respondent when it affirmed the award of 13th month
pay and service incentive leave pay as computed by the Regional
13
Don Orestes Romualdez Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 128389, November 25,
1999.
14
Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. vs. Oberio, G.R. No. 168424, June 8, 2007; Mayon
Hotel and Restaurant vs. Adana, G.R. No. 15734, May 16, 2005.
CA G.R. SP No. 07121 Page 15 of 18
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Arbitration Branch (RAB) Fiscal Examiner.

This Court disagrees with Teleperformance’s contention that the

private respondent should not be awarded the 13th month pay and
service incentive leave pay. However, its contention that the awards
should not be reckoned from a date which has no significance in this
case nor has basis in law is found to be meritorious.

Teleperformance cannot insist that the private respondent

should not be awarded 13th month pay and service incentive leave
pay on the reason that these benefits were not prayed for in her
complaint.

As can be read in the private respondent’s complaint, she

prayed for full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to her other
benefits or monetary equivalent computed from the time her
compensation was withheld up to her actual reinstatement. Moreover,
it is provided in Article 279 of the Labor Code that an employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.15

Clearly, the award of 13th month pay and service incentive leave
pay are benefits granted to employees and which the private
respondent is entitled to by law.16 Thus, by including in her illegal
dismissal complaint the prayer for “other benefits” that she is entitled
to and by virtue of Art 279 of the Labor Code, the private respondent
15
Food Traders House, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 120677 December 21, 1998; The Philippine Sky-
landers, Inc. vs. Dakila, G.R. No. 199547, September 24, 2012; Pasos vs. Philippine National
Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 192394, July 3, 2013.

16
Presidential Decree No. 851, as amended, requires an employer to pay its rank and file employ-
ees a 13th month pay not later than 24 December of every year. However, employers not paying
their employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent are not covered by said law.

Service incentive leave, as provided in Art. 95 of the Labor Code, is a yearly leave benefit of five
(5) days with pay, enjoyed by an employee who has rendered at least one year of service. Un-
less specifically excepted, all establishments are required to grant service incentive leave to
their employees.
CA G.R. SP No. 07121 Page 16 of 18
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should be awarded the 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay
granted to an illegally dismissed employee who was not able to collect
or earn the said benefits because of the unjust dismissal.

A modification, however, is warranted with regard to the award

and computation of service incentive leave pay in favor of the private
respondent. As admitted by Teleperformance, it grants fifteen-day
vacation leave with pay and fifteen-day sick leave with pay which may
be converted to cash if not enjoyed in lieu of the five (5) days service
incentive leave pay provided under Article 95 of the Labor Code. Under
Article 95 of the Labor Code, the provision pertaining to service
incentive leave pay shall not apply to those who are already enjoying
the said benefit and those enjoying vacation leave pay with pay of at
least five days. Moreover, the grant of benefit in excess of that
provided in Art. 95 shall not be made a subject of arbitration or nay
court or any administrative action. Therefore, the award given to the
private respondent should be those benefits granted by
Teleperformance instead of five (5) days service incentive leave with
pay for every year of service only.

Moreover, contrary to the computation by the RAB Fiscal

Examiner, the above benefits should be computed from the time the
private respondent was illegally dismissed. It is on this time that the
private respondent’s compensation may be considered to have been
withheld from her. As provided in Art. 279 of the Labor Code, an
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled
to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement.17 The “other benefits” awarded in an illegal
dismissal case should be in the same nature with backwages which are
awarded to the employee to recover from the employer that which the
former lost by way of wages as a result of his illegal dismissal from
employment.18 Since these benefits refer to the compensation,
17
New City Builders, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 149281, June 15, 2005; Voyeur Visage Studio, Inc.
vs. CA, G.R. No. 144939, March 18, 2005.
18
See Dela Cruz vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 121288, Nov. 20, 1998 and Carlos vs. CA, G.R. No.168096,
Aug. 28, 2007 for the rationale of the rule behind Art. 279 of the Labor Code.
CA G.R. SP No. 07121 Page 17 of 18
Decision
x---------------x

privileges and benefits that an employee should have been earned but
were not collected because of the unjust dismissal,19 it follows that
these awards refer only to those amounts during the time that the
employee was not able to work for being illegally dismissed. It could
not include the benefits during the time that the employee is actually
employed since it is not the subject of the illegal dismissal complaint
and is therefore presumed to have been paid until the dismissal of the
employee, unless there is a claim or complaint for non-payment of
these benefits. To rule otherwise would be an injustice and would
violate the employer’s right to due process as it/he is not given the
opportunity to present evidence that these benefits were paid during
actual employment on the reason that the same was not alleged and
prayed for in the complaint against it/him and could not also be
considered as a logical or legal consequence of a purely illegal
dismissal case. Thus, as applied in the instant case, the award of 13 th
month pay, 15-day vacation leave with pay and 15-day sick leave with
pay to the private respondent with respect to the instant illegal
dismissal case should be computed from the time of the dismissal of
the private respondent or on 1 March 2011 until her actual
reinstatement. The award of 13th month pay, and vacation and sick
leave with pay, however, is without prejudice to the right of the
private respondent to commute20 or to file a complaint for non-
payment of the said benefits earned during the time of her actual
employment with the employer prior to her dismissal. By then, the
right of private respondent to receive the said benefits shall be
ascertained and both parties will be given the opportunity to prove
payment or non-payment of the aforementioned benefits granted by
law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTLY

GRANTED. The Decision dated 28 March 2012 of the National Labor

19
See St. Joseph Academy of Valenzuela Faculty Association (SJA VFA)-FUR Chapter-TUCP vs.
St. Joseph Academy of Valenzuela and Damaso D. Lopez, G.R. no. 182957, June 13, 2013.

20
In the case of Service Incentive Leave Benefit, the employee may choose to either use his
leave credits or commute it to its monetary equivalent if not exhausted at the end of the year.
Furthermore, if the employee entitled to service incentive leave does not use or commute the
same, he is entitled upon his resignation or separation from work to the commutation of his
accrued service incentive leave. (Auto Bus Transport System, Inc. vs. Bautista, G.R. No. 156367,
May 16, 2005)
CA G.R. SP No. 07121 Page 18 of 18
Decision
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Relations Commission (NLRC) – Seventh Division (Formerly Fourth

Division), Cebu City in NLRC CASE No. VAC-12-000920-2011 is
MODIFED in that the private respondent is awarded 15-day vacation
leave pay and 15-day sick leave pay in lieu of the five (5) days service
incentive leave pay. Further, the award of 13th month pay, vacation
leave pay and sick leave pay in favor of private respondent Janrae A.
Sanicas with respect to the instant illegal dismissal case is reckoned
from 1 March 2011 until her actual reinstatement, without prejudice
to the right of the private respondent to commute or to file a
complaint for non-payment of the said benefits earned during the
time of her actual employment with the employer prior to her
dismissal. Let this case be remanded to the Labor Arbiter for proper
computation in accordance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.

EDGARDO L. DELOS SANTOS

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PAMELA ANN ABELLA MAXINO

Associate Justice

MARIA ELISA SEMPIO DIY

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court.

EDGARDO L. DELOS SANTOS

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Nineteenth Division