POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

LECTURE 1 CASES (Part II)

Xavier University – Ateneo de Cagayan College of Law
M. ALO, A. AWING, Jr., J. CABELTES. J. DELA CERNA, L. ELEGIO, N. GAID, N. GALARRITA, S. GOMEZ, J. LANZADERAS, A. MAANDIG, S. A. MUNDER - GANDAMRA, J. SABADO

CONSTI REV LECTURE 1 SECOND HALF MEMAID

Title PERTINENT FACTS CONSTI RELATED RULING

ISSUE

1. Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of 1. WON Petitioner 1. In the case before us, petitioners failed to show, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they have
138570, October 10, 2000 America forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized, Bayan (Bagong sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As
among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory Alyansang Makabayan) taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing
Section 8 by United States military personnel. has locus standi. NO. or spending powers.

August 30, 1951: To further strengthen their defense and
security relationship, the Philippines and the United States
entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty. Under the treaty, the
parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their
territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft.
Before the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement
in 1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a
possible extension of the military bases agreement. On
September 16, 1991, the Senate rejected the proposed RP-US
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect,
would have extended the presence of US military bases in the
Philippines.
With the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement,
the periodic military exercises conducted between the two
countries were held in abeyance. However, the defense and
security relationship between the Philippines and the United
States of America continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense
Treaty.
After negotiations between Ph and US, Visiting Forces
Agreement was drafted and was respectively signed by public
respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador
Thomas Hubbard on February 10, 1998. Pres. Estrada and
respondent Sec. of DFA ratified the VFA.
On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to
the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification,
the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence
pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The
senate concurred. On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered
into force after an Exchange of Notes between respondent
Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Hubbard.
2. Does the VFA violate
the prohibition against
nuclear weapons under
Article II, Section 8?
[One of the issues
raised by the petitioners
but was not answered
in the case]
3. Which provision of
the Constitution
applies, with regard to
the exercise by the
Senate of its
constitutional power to
concur with the VFA,
Section 21, Article VII of
the Constitution or
Section 25, Article
XVIII? The latter
applies.
However, the Supreme Court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, brush aside procedural barrier
and take cognizance of petitions raising issues of paramount importance and constitutional significance,
such as this case.
3. Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution deals with treaties or international agreements in general,
while Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of
foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines.
Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in which case, the
concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the subject
treaty, or international agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. This provision lays
down the general rule on treaties or international agreements and applies to any form of treaty with a
wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not limited to, extradition or tax treaties or those economic in
nature. All treaties or international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject
matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be
valid and effective.
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the
presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the
concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional
requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further
requires that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue
of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum
held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a
limited sense, however, the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the
issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid
concurrence of the Senate, as will be further discussed hereunder.
There is nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or
placed permanently in the Philippines—when no distinction is made by law, the Court should not
distinguish.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast
by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

2. Roe v. Wade In 1969, Norma McCorvey, a Texas woman in her early 20s,
410 US 390 sought to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. McCorvey, who
had grown up in difficult, impoverished circumstances,
previously had given birth twice and given up both children for
adoption. At the time of McCorvey’s pregnancy in 1969
abortion was legal in Texas—but only for the purpose of saving
a woman’s life.
While American women with the financial means could obtain
abortions by traveling to other countries where the procedure
was safe and legal, or pay a large fee to a U.S. doctor willing
to secretly perform an abortion, those options were out of
reach to McCorvey and many other women.
As a result, some women resorted to illegal, dangerous, “back-
alley” abortions or self-induced abortions. In the 1950s and
1960s, the estimated number of illegal abortions in the United
States ranged from 200,000 to 1.2 million per year, according
to the Guttmacher Institute.
After trying unsuccessfully to get an illegal abortion, McCorvey
was referred to Texas attorneys Linda Coffee and Sarah
Weddington, who were interested in challenging anti-abortion
laws.
In court documents, McCorvey became known as “Jane Roe.”
Jane Roe was an unmarried and pregnant Texas resident in
1970. Texas law made it a felony to abort a fetus unless “on
medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.”
Roe filed suit against Wade, the district attorney of Dallas
County, contesting the statue on the grounds that it violated
the guarantee of personal liberty and the right to privacy
implicitly guaranteed in the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and 14th
Amendments. In deciding for Roe, the Supreme Court
invalidated any state laws that prohibited first trimester
abortions.
3 Imbong v Ochoa December 21, 2012: Congress enacted RA No. 10354 also
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
RA 10354 Health Act of 2012 (RH LAW)
WON RA 10354/RH Bill
is unconstitutional for
violating the right to life.
For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds
itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the
mandate of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court decided in favor of Roe in a 7-2 decision. Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for the
majority, which recognized that a woman’s choice whether to have an abortion is protected by her right
to privacy. Justices Stewart, Burger and Douglas wrote concurring opinions. Justices White and
Rehnquist dissented.
The majority determined that a woman’s right to decide whether to have an abortion involved the question
of whether the Constitution protected a right to privacy. The justices answered this question by asserting
that the 14th Amendment, which prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any person of … liberty … without due
process of law,” protected a fundamental right to privacy. Further, after considerable discussion of the
law’s historical lack of recognition of rights of a fetus, the justices concluded “the word ‘person,’ as used
in the 14th Amendment, does not include the unborn.” The right of a woman to choose to have an abortion
fell within this fundamental right to privacy, and was protected by the Constitution.
A woman’s right to choose to have an abortion was not considered an absolute right. The Court stated
that government restrictions on a woman’s right to choose were subject to the highest standard of review,
that of strict scrutiny. This level of review requires that in order to be enforceable, a government regulation
of this right must be shown to be narrowly tailored to a meet a compelling state interest. The justices
noted that states did have some legitimate interests in regulating or prohibiting abortions. The first interest
was the protection of the health of the mother from the dangers of abortion procedures; the second was
the protection of the life of the fetus. While these interests were not very strong in the early stages of
pregnancy, they became stronger (more compelling) in the later stages of the pregnancy. Striking a
balance between a woman’s right to privacy and a state’s interests, the Court set up a framework laying
out when states could regulate and even prohibit abortions.
According to the framework, in the first trimester (the first three months of the pregnancy), a woman’s
right to privacy surrounding the choice to have an abortion outweighed a state’s interests in regulating
this decision. In the first trimester, having an abortion does not pose a grave danger to the life and health
of the mother, and the fetus is still undeveloped. The state’s interests are not yet compelling, so it cannot
interfere with a woman’s right to privacy by regulating or prohibiting her from having an abortion during
the first trimester. During the second trimester, the state’s interests become more compelling as the
danger of complications increases and the fetus becomes more developed. During this stage, it may
regulate, but not prohibit abortions, as long as the regulations are aimed at protecting the health of the
mother. During the third trimester, the danger to the woman’s health becomes the greatest and fetal
development nears completion. In the final trimester the state’s interests in protecting the health of the
mother and in protecting the life of the fetus become their most compelling. The state may regulate or
even prohibit abortions during this stage, as long as there is an exception for abortions necessary to
preserve the life and health of the mother.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist argued that the framers of the 14th Amendment did not intend
for it to protect a right of privacy, a right which they did not recognize, and that they definitely did not
intend for it to protect a woman’s decision to have an abortion. Justice Rehnquist further argued that the
only right to privacy is that which is protected by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures. Finally, he concluded that because this issue required a careful balance of the
interests of the woman against the interests of the state, it was not an appropriate decision for the Court
to make, but instead was a question that should have been left up to state legislatures to resolve.
NO
(Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012)
Section 12 and 15
The president’s imprimatur and support for the said law lead to
a range of petitions against the law leading to iuris controversy
in court.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition were placed by
numerous parties. All in all, 14 petitions and 2 petitionsin-
intervention were filed.
March 15, 2013: the RH-IRR or enforcement of the law took
place.
March 19, 2013: After deliberating the issues and arguments
raised, the court issued Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO) which
lead to a 120 day halt on the implementation of the legislation.
Due to further arguments and debates from opposing parties,
the SQAO was extended until further orders of the court last
July 16, 2013
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life
of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
The framers of the Constitution intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and
(b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those
that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally
permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the
Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH
Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient
(Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those
that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.

Petitioners claim that the provisions of RA 10354 are

unconstitutional as they violate the rights to life, to health, to
freedom of expression and speech, to the privacy of families,
to academic freedom, to due process of law, to equal
protection, and against involuntary servitude. They also intrude
on the autonomy of local governments and the ARMM, and
violate natural law. Furthermore, they claim that Congress’
delegation of authority to the FDA in determining which should
be included in the EDL is invalid.

The respondent avers that there is no actual case or

controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for
judicial determination. Some petitioners lack standing to
question the RH Law. The petitions are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction.

4. Pierce, Governor of Oregon, et
al. v. Society of the Sisters of the
Holy Names of Jesus and Mary
268 U.S. 510 (1925)
Article II, Section 12
These appeals are from decrees which granted preliminary
orders restraining the State of Oregon from enforcing the
Compulsory Education Act.
In 1922, the State of Oregon enacted the Oregon Compulsory
Education Act requires every parent, guardian or other person
having control or charge or custody of a child between 8 and
16 years old to send him to a public school for the period of
time a public school shall be held during the current year in the
district where the child resides. Failure so to do is declared a
misdemeanor.
WON the subject Yes.
Oregon statute is
unconstitutional. Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control. Rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has
no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State. The fundamental theory of
liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not
the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.

Exempted from this law are the ff: children who are not normal,
or those who have completed the eighth grade, those who
reside at considerable distances from any public school, or (d)
whose parents or guardians hold special permits from the
County Superintendent.

5 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 40 LW
4426
6. GINSBERG VS NEW YORK
The purpose of the law is to compel general attendance at
public schools by normal children, between eight and sixteen,
who have not completed the eighth grade.
Two organizations operating private schools in Oregon, (1) the
Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary and
(2) the Hill Military Academy, challenged the constitutionality of
the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that it
deprived them of property without due process of law.
The case involved three Amish fathers—Jonas Yoder, Wallace
Miller, and Adin Yutzy—who, in accordance with their religion,
refused to enroll their children, aged 14 and 15, in public or
private schools after they had completed the eighth grade. The
state of Wisconsin required, pursuant to its compulsory
attendance law, that children attend school to the age of 16.
The children were not enrolled in any private school, or within
any recognized exception to the compulsory attendance law,
and they are conceded to be subject to the Wisconsin statute.
On complaint of the school district administrator for the public
schools, respondents were charged, tried, and convicted of
violating the compulsory attendance law in Green County
Court, and were fined the sum of $5 each.Respondents
defended on the ground that the application of the compulsory
attendance law violated their rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. The trial testimony showed that
respondents believed, in accordance with the tenets of Old
Order Amish communities generally, that their children's
attendance at high school, public or private, was contrary to
the Amish religion and way of life. They believed that, by
sending their children to high school, they would not only
expose themselves to the danger of the censure of the church
community, but, as found by the county court, also endanger
their own salvation and that of their children. The State
stipulated that respondents' religious beliefs were sincere.
A trial and circuit court upheld the convictions, concluding that
the state law was a “reasonable and constitutional” use of
government power. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
however, found that the application of the law to the Amish
violated the First Amendment’s free exercise of religion
provision.
This case presents the question of the constitutionality on its
face of a New York criminal obscenity statute which prohibits
the sale to minors under 17 years of age of material defined to
be obscene on the basis of its appeal to them whether or not it
would be obscene to adults.
Appellant and his wife operate "Sam's Stationery and
Luncheonette" in Bellmore, Long Island. They have a lunch
counter, and, among other things, also sell magazines
Whether or not Yes. There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens,
Wisconsin’s to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education. Providing public schools
compulsory school ranks at the very apex of the function of a State. Yet even this paramount responsibility was, in Pierce,
attendance law was made to yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent education in a privately operated system.
unconstitutional when There, the Court held that Oregon's statute compelling attendance in a public school from age eight to
applied to the Amish, age 16 unreasonably interfered with the interest of parents in directing the rearing of their offspring,
because it violated their including their education in church-operated schools. As that case suggests, the values of parental
rights under the First direction of the religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative years
Amendment, which have a high place in our society.
guaranteed the free
exercise of religion. Thus, a State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a
balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically
protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents
with respect to the religious upbringing of their children so long as they, in the words of Pierce, "prepare
[them] for additional obligations.
According to the court, to compel Amish children to enroll in public or private high schools past the eighth
grade would have mandated that they “either abandon belief and be assimilated into society at large or
be forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant region.” The evidence showed that the Amish
provide continuing informal vocational education to their children designed to prepare them for life in the
rural Amish community. The evidence also showed that respondents sincerely believed that high school
attendance was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life, and that they would endanger their own
salvation and that of their children by complying with the law.
The State's claim that it is empowered, as parens patriae, to extend the benefit of secondary education
to children regardless of the wishes of their parents cannot be sustained against a free exercise claim of
the nature revealed by this record, for the Amish have introduced convincing evidence that
accommodating their religious objections by forgoing one or two additional years of compulsory education
will not impair the physical or mental health of the child, or result in an inability to be self-supporting or to
discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other way materially detract from the
welfare of society.
Whether 484-h of the NO. We do not regard New York's regulation in defining obscenity on the basis of its appeal to minors
New York Penal Law under 17 as involving an invasion of such minors' constitutionally protected freedoms. Rather 484-h
constitutes an unvasion simply adjusts the definition of obscenity "to social realities by permitting the appeal of this type of material
of constitutionally to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests . . ." of such minors. That the State has power to make
protected freedoms that adjustment seems clear, for we have recognized that even where there is an invasion of protected
freedoms "the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its
authority over adults . . . ." Prince v. Massachusetts.
 including some so-called "girlie" magazines. Appellant was
prosecuted under two informations, each in two counts, which
charged that he personally sold a 16-year-old boy two "girlie"
magazines on each of two dates in October 1965, in violation
of 484-h of the New York Penal Law. The conviction was
affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Term, Second
Department, of the Supreme Court. Appellant was denied
leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals and then
appealed to this Court.
Appellant's attack is not that New York was without power to
draw the line at age 17. Rather, his contention is the broad
proposition that the scope of the constitutional freedom of
expression secured to a citizen to read or see material
concerned with sex cannot be made to depend upon whether
the citizen is an adult or a minor. He accordingly insists that
the denial to minors under 17 of access to material condemned
by 484-h, insofar as that material is not obscene for persons
17 years of age or older, constitutes an unconstitutional
deprivation of protected liberty.
7 ORCEO vs.COMELEC Questioning the validity of Resolution No. 8714 insofar as it
provides that the term
G.R. No. 190779. March 26, “firearm” includes airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations,
2010.* which results in their coverage by the gun ban during the
election period this year.
Resolution No. 8714 contains the IRR of Sec. 32 (Who May
Bear Firearms) and Section 33 (Security Personnel and
Bodyguards) of RA No. 7166, entitled An Act Providing for
Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral
Reforms.
Petitioner claims that he is a real party-in-interest, because he
has been playing airsoft since the year 2000. The continuing
implementation of Resolution No. 8714 will put him in danger
of sustaining direct injury or make him Liable for an election
offense if caught in possession of an airsoft gun and its
replica/imitation in going to and from the game site and playing
the sport during the election period.
Petitioner contends that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
including “airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations” in the
definition of “firearm” in Resolution No. 8714, since there is
nothing in R.A. No. 7166 that mentions “airsoft guns and
their replicas/imitations.” He asserts that the intendment of
R.A. No. 7166 is that the term “firearm” refers to real firearm in
its common and ordinary usage.
Petitioner prays that the Court render a decision as follows: (1)
Annulling Resolution No. 8714 insofar as it includes airsoft
The well-being of its children is of course a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate,
and, in our view, two interests justify the limitations in 484-h upon the availability of sex material to minors
under 17, at least if it was rational for the legislature to find that the minors' exposure to such material
might be harmful. First of all, constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents'
claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of
our society. The legislature could properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who
have this primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to
aid discharge of that responsibility.
The State also has an independent interest in the well-being of its youth.
To sustain state power to exclude material defined as obscenity by 484-h requires only that we be able
to say that it was not irrational for the legislature to find that exposure to material condemned by the
statute is harmful to minors. In Meyer v. Nebraska we were able to say that children's knowledge of the
German language "cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful." That cannot be said by us of minors'
reading and seeing sex material. To be sure, there is no lack of "studies" which purport to demonstrate
that obscenity is or is not "a basic factor in impairing the ethical and moral development of . . . youth and
a clear and present danger to the people of the state." But the growing consensus of commentators is
that "while these studies all agree that a causal link has not been demonstrated, they are equally agreed
that a causal link has not been disproved either." We do not demand of legislatures "scientifically certain
criteria of legislation." We therefore cannot say that 484-h, in defining the obscenity of material on the
basis of its appeal to minors under 17, has no rational relation to the objective of safeguarding such
minors from harm.
WON the COMELEC NO.
gravely abused its
discretion in including Evidently, the COMELEC had the authority to promulgate Resolution No. 8714 pursuant to Sec. 35 of
airsoft guns and their R.A. No. 7166. It was granted the power to issue the IRR of Secs. 32 and 33 of R.A. No. 7166. Under
replicas/imitations in this broad power, the COMELEC was mandated to provide the details of who may bear, carry or transport
the term “firearm” in firearms or other deadly weapons, as well as the definition of “firearms,” among others. These details are
Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. left to the discretion of the COMELEC, which is a constitutional body that possesses special knowledge
8714. and expertise on election matters.
The COMELEC’s intent in the inclusion of airsoft guns in the term “firearm” by the election gun ban is to
avoid the possible use of recreational guns in sowing fear, intimidation or terror during the election period.
An ordinary citizen may not be able to distinguish between a real gun and an airsoft gun.
Contrary to petitioner’s allegation, there is a regulation that governs the possession and carriage of airsoft
rifles/pistols, namely, PNP Circular No. 11, entitled Revised Rules and Regulations Governing the
Manufacture, xxx Carrying of Airsoft Rifles/ Pistols xxx. It classifies the airsoft rifle/pistol as a special type
of air gun, which is restricted in its use only to sporting activities.
However, the Court excludes the replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and airguns from the term
“firearm” under Resolution No. 8714, because they are not subject to any regulation, unlike airsoft guns.
In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Solicitor General, states that it adheres to the
aforementioned state policies, but even constitutional freedoms are not absolute, and they may be
abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and important interests.
As a long-time player of the airsoft sport, it is presumed that petitioner has a license to possess an airsoft
gun. As a lawyer, petitioner is aware that a licensee of an airsoft gun is subject to the restrictions imposed
upon him by PNP.
The Court holds that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in including airsoft guns and
airguns in the term “firearm” in Resolution No. 8714 for purposes of the gun ban during the election

8. Boy Scouts of the Philippines
v. COA, supra.
9 JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN
T. DRILON, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court-Branch
41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE
JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself
and in behalf of minor children,
namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH
EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE,
guns and their replicas/imitations within the meaning of
“firearm,” and declaring the Resolution as invalid; xxxx
Petitioner further contends that Resolution No. 8714 is not in
accordance with the State policies in these constitutional
provisions: “Art. II, Sec. 12. (Sanctity of family life), Sec. 17.
(priority to, education x x x sports), and Art. XV, Sec. 1. (Filipino
family as the foundation of the nation).
Petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding
moments among family members. Families are entitled to
protection by the society and the State under the UDHR. They
are free to choose and enjoy their recreational activities. These
liberties, petitioner contends, cannot be abridged by the
COMELEC.
This case arose when the COA issued Resolution No. 99-
011on August 19, 1999 ("the COA Resolution"), with the
subject "Defining the Commission's policy with respect to the
audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines."
In its whereas clauses, the COA Resolution stated that the
BSP was created as a public corporation under
Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 460 and Republic Act No. 7278; that in Boy Scouts
of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission, the
Supreme Court ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its
charter, was a "government-controlled corporation within the
meaning of Article IX(B)(2)(1) of the Constitution"; and that "the
BSP is appropriately regarded as a government instrumentality
under the 1987 Administrative Code." The COA Resolution
also cited its constitutional mandate under Section 2(1), Article
IX (D).
COA resolved to conduct an annual financial audit of the Boy
Scouts of the Philippines. And that for purposes of audit
supervision,the Boy Scouts of the Philippines shall be
classified among the government corporations belonging to
the Educational, Social, Scientific, Civic and Research
Sectorunder the Corporate Audit Office I, to be audited, similar
to the subsidiary corporations, by employing the team audit
approach
R.A. No. 9262, An Act Defining Violence Against Women and
Their Children (VAWC) is being assailed by a husband for
being violative of the equal protection and due process
clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay
officials.
The immediate case: Rosalie Jaype-Garcia sued her husband,
Jesus C. Garcia, under R.A. No. 9262 claiming to be a victim
of physical abuse, emotional, psychological, and economic
violence as a result of infidelity on the part of petitioner, with
Does COA have
jurisdiction over BSP?
Yes. Petition for
Prohibition is
dismissed.
WON the CA committed
serious error in failing to
conclude that RA 9262
is discriminatory, unjust
and violative of the
equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed
grave mistake in not
finding that RA 9262
runs counter to the due
period, with the apparent objective of ensuring free, honest, peaceful and credible elections this year.
However, the replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and airguns are excluded from the term
“firearm” in Resolution No. 8714.
The BSP Charter (Commonwealth Act No. 111, approved on October 31, 1936) created the BSP as a
"public corporation"
There are three classes of juridical persons under Article 44 of the Civil Code and the BSP, as presently
constituted under Republic Act No. 7278, falls under the second classification.Article 44 reads:
“Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2)Other corporations,institutions and entities for public interest or purpose created by law; their
personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a
juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.”
The BSP, which is a corporation created for a public interest or purpose, is subject to the law creating it.
The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it was created in order to implement
a State policy declared in Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution, which reads: “Section 13. The State
recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.”
1. Garcia contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex
issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court,
it may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all
that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should
be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the
all surnamed GARCIA,
Respondents.
Sec 14. Role of Women and
Equality of Men and Women
VAWC Discrimination
10. Imbong v Ochoa
RA 10354
(Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012)
Section 12 and 15
threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support. The victim sought reliefs, such as, the Barangay
Protection Order (BPO).
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of
Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her
husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to
be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic
violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her
children and of financial support and also a victim of marital
infidelity on the part of Garcia.
The TPO was granted but Garcia failed to faithfully comply with
the conditions set forth by the said TPO, Rosalie filed another
application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court
issued a modified TPO and extended the same when Garcia
failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified.
After the given time allowance to answer, GArcia no longer
submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in
futility.”
Garcia filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer
for injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of
the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection
clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an
unwanted product of an invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but
however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of
constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the
petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the
trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.
Garcia filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus,
this petition is filed.
December 21, 2012: Congress enacted RA No. 10354 also
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH LAW)
The president’s imprimatur and support for the said law lead to
a range of petitions against the law leading to iuris controversy
in court.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition were placed by
numerous parties. All in all, 14 petitions and 2 petitionsin-
intervention were filed.
March 15, 2013: the RH-IRR or enforcement of the law took
place.
March 19, 2013: After deliberating the issues and arguments
raised, the court issued Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO) which
lead to a 120 day halt on the implementation of the legislation.
process clause of the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class.
Constitution Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by
WON the CA erred in favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.
not finding that the law The unequal power relationship that women are more likely to be victims of violence; and, the widespread
does violence to the gender bias and prejudice against women, make for real differences.
policy of the state to 3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
protect the family as a process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
basic social institution support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the
WON the CA seriously right to due process.
erredin declaring RA 4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Garcia’s contention that by not allowing
9262 as invalid and mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic
unconstitutional autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court
because it allows an shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for
undue delegation of compromise.
judicial power to Brgy. 5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes
Officials. the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the
Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. The same
holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies
is consistent with their duty executive function.
The BPO is issued against a perpetrator to compel him to desist from (a) causing harm to the woman or
her child; and (b) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. This function is purely
executive in nature pursuant to the LGC “to enforce all laws and ordinances” and “to maintain public
order in the barangay.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
WON RA 10354/RH Bill NO
is unconstitutional for
violating the right to A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete
health. with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health.
Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.(including Art II Sec.11,12,13 AND Art XVI Sec 9).
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions
clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory.
There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions
Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it requires the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective family planning products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the regular
purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They
 Due to further arguments and debates from opposing parties,
the SQAO was extended until further orders of the court last
July 16, 2013
Petitioners claim that the provisions of RA 10354 are
unconstitutional as they violate the rights to life, to health, to
freedom of expression and speech, to the privacy of families,
to academic freedom, to due process of law, to equal
protection, and against involuntary servitude. They also intrude
on the autonomy of local governments and the ARMM, and
violate natural law. Furthermore, they claim that Congress’
delegation of authority to the FDA in determining which should
be included in the EDL is invalid.
The respondent avers that there is no actual case or
controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for
judicial determination. Some petitioners lack standing to
question the RH Law. The petitions are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction.
11 Oposa. v. Factoran The petitioners are all minors represented and joined by their
July 30, 1993 parents. Factoran was then Secretary of the DENR. The
complaint prayed for judgment ordering the DENR to cancel all
Section 16 existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country, and
to cease and desist from processing new ones.
ASSERTIONS OF OPOSA ET. AL.: (using science)
● Scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain
a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's
land area should be utilized based on a ratio of
54% for forest cover and 46% for agricultural,
residential, industrial, commercial and other uses;
● 25 years ago, the Philippines had 16 million
hectares of rainforests constituting 53% of the
country’s land mass;
● Satellite images in 1987 show that only 1.2 million
hectares (4.0%) remain;
● More recent surveys show that only 850,000
hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left
and about 3 million hectares of immature and
uneconomical second growth forests
According to public records, the DENR has granted TLAs to
various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million
hectares for commercial logging purposes. At the present rate
of deforestation, the Philippines will be bereft of forest
resources after the end of the ensuing decade.
cite risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills. Some petitioners, particularly
ALFI(ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC.) do not question contraception
and contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray that the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained.
These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-licensed
physician.
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of
R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are
still to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the
effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale,
distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a
licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public
that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions
of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be
from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these
contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The
distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must
be protected by all possible means.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these
devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot
determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.
Whether Oposa et. al YES. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right – the right to a balanced and healthful
alleged with sufficient ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
definiteness a specific fundamental law. (See Sec. 16 Art. II)
legal right involved
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the
civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly
stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments
and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for
they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would
be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to
inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment. The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests.
The Administrative Code of 1987, under Declaration of Policy “the necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." EO 192 also declares
that it is the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, conservation, etc. of natural resources not
only for the present generation, but for future generations as well.
 Oposa et. al. maintain that they have a clear and constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology and have exhausted
all administrative remedies. Defendant’s refusal to cancel the
TLAs is manifestly contrary to public policy, including Sec. 16
of Art. II (“protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature”).
The respondents argue that Oposa et. al. failed to allege a
specific legal right violated by the Secretary for which relief is
provided by law. The allegations do not reveal a valid cause of
action. The remedy of Oposa et. al. should not be before the
courts, but to lobby before Congress.
12. Laguna Lake Development The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed BY
Authority vs. Court of Appeals LLDA against the City Government of Caloocan the CA, in a
decision promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled that the LLDA
231 SCRA 292 has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order
MARCH 16, 1994 enjoining the dumping of garbage in Barangay Camarin, Tala
Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition, a
Sec. 16 review of the decision of the CA.
Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes
Parish,Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with the LLDA
seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage
dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City
due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the
possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding
area.
The LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and
test sampling of the leachate that seeps from said dumpsite to
the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River. The
LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the Caloocan
was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without
first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)
from the EMB of the DENR as required under PD 1586 and
clearance from LLDA as required under RA 4850, as amended
by PD 813 and EO 927, series of 1983.
On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist
Order ordering the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan
Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to
completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind
of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
Dumping operation was stopped but sometime in August 1992
the dumping operation was resumed.
August 14, 1992, the LLDA issued another order reiterating the
December 5, 1991 order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist
Order enjoining the Caloocan. The LLDA, with the assistance
of PNP enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by
prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks.
Even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to
the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. PD 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy) and PD 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing
policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature
can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and
other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." As its goal, it speaks of the
"responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations." The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No.
192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.
Which agency can In Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al., the Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication
lawfully exercise Board (PAB) has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie
jurisdiction over the evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable standards set by the anti- pollution laws of the
matter at hand? country.
Caloocan claims that it The immediate response to the demands of “the necessities of protecting vital public interests” gives
is within its power, as a vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the
local government unit, 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:
pursuant to the general “The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
welfare provision of the with the rhythm and harmony of nature.”
LGC to determine the
effects of the operation As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment.
of the dumpsite on the This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state “to protect and promote the right to health
ecological balance and of the people and instill health consciousness among them.” It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines
to see that such is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978
balance is maintained. which recognize health as a fundamental human right.
The LLDA claims that The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA is a proper exercise of its
the CA deliberately power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued
suppressed and totally by the LLDA been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no
disregarded the further legal steps would have been necessary.
provisions of EO 927,
series of 1983, which The charter of LLDA, RA 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA the means of directly
granted administrative enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to institute “necessary legal
quasi-judicial functions proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any
to LLDA on pollution project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA.”
abatement cases.
Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation
Answer: LLDA betch of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by the government or the private sector, insofar
as the implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal with cases which might
possibly arise where decisions or orders issued pursuant to the exercise of such broad powers may not
be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its laudable objective. To meet such contingencies, then the writs
of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue, may be sought from the
proper courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The TRO enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City
Government of Caloocan from dumping their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan
City is hereby made permanent.

13. Pedro Arigo v. Scott Swift,
G.R. 206510, September 16,
2014
Caloocan filed with the RTC an action for the declaration of
nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of injunction.
Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority
empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the
right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology
within its territorial jurisdiction.
*loooong procedural stuff*
The USS Guardian requested diplomatic clearance to enter
and exit territorial waters of the Philippines. It ran aground at
the Tubbataha Reefs about 80 miles east of Palawan. The
Tubbataha Reefs have been declared as a Natural Park. The
U.S. Ambassador expressed his regrets over the incident and
assured the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that appropriate
compensation will be made. Salvaging was undertaken by the
U.S. Naval team.
Petitioners sought a directive from the Supreme Court through
the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan and the institution of civil,
administrative and criminal suits for acts in violation of
environmental laws and regulations.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-
salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue
to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect
the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo,
Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte,
Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
May the writ issue? No. In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance
with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment.
In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US
Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission
resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the Tubataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP)
was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a
judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US
government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore
bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
Under Article 31 of UNCLOS, [t]he flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage
to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated
for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and
rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues impinges on our
relations with another State in the context of common security interests under the VFA. It is settled that
“[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive
and legislative—“the political”--departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done
in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.”
The VFA governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance
of the objectives of the agreement. As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to
criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions, such as, the present petition for issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan.
14. Resident Marine Mammals v
Reys GR 180771, April 21, 2015
Section 16. The State shall
protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of
nature
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the
“Resident Marine Mammals” in the petition, are the toothed
whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species,
which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They
are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and Rose-Liza
Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as their legal guardians and as
friends (to be collectively known as “the Stewards”) who
allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the
aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an
unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, for her express declaration and undertaking in the
ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among others.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 are the Central Visayas
Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock,
nonprofit, nongovernmental organization, established for the
welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII; and Cerilo D.
Engarcial (Engarcial), Ramon Yanong (Yanong) and Francisco
Labid (Labid), in their personal capacities and as
representatives of the subsistence
fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and
Pinamungajan, Cebu.
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting
through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and
Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This
contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the
Tañon Strait. The studies included surface geology, sample
analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data.
JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and
satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon
Strait.7
On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted
GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the exploration, development, and
production of petroleum resources in a block covering
approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon
Strait.8
From May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in
and around the Tañon Strait. A multi-channel sub-bottom
profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done
to determine the area’s underwater composition.9
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the
second sub-phase of the project. Since the well was to be
drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan,
where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in
1988,10 JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental
Impact Assessment requirements pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1586, entitled “Establishing An Environmental
Impact Statement System, Including Other Environmental
Management Related Measures And For Other Purposes
On January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management
Board12 of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued
Resolution No. 2007- 001,13 wherein it adopted the Initial
I. Won petitioners have I. Legal Standing:
locus standi?
II. Won petitioners right Yes.
to a balanced and
healthful ecology is Even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had already
violated taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa v. Factoran,
Jr., 224 SCRA 792 (1993), we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn
“based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned.” Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right
that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. In light of the
foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our
Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental
laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in
representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown
in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine
Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.
II. Right to a balanced and healthy ecology:
Yes.
True to the constitutional policy that the “State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature,” Congress enacted the
NIPAS Act to secure the perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through the establishment
of a comprehensive system of integrated protected areas. These areas possess common ecological
values that were incorporated into a holistic plan representative of our natural heritage. The system
encompasses outstandingly remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of
rare and endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems,
whether terrestrial, wetland, or marine. It classifies and administers all the designated protected areas to
maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems, to preserve genetic diversity, to ensure
sustainable use of resources found therein, and to maintain their natural conditions to the greatest extent
possible. The following categories of protected areas were established under the NIPAS Act: a. Strict
nature reserve; b. Natural park; c. Natural monument; d. Wildlife sanctuary; e. Protected landscapes and
seascapes; f. Resource reserve; g. Natural biotic areas; and h. Other categories established by law,
conventions or international agreements which the Philippine Government is a signatory.
Under Section 4 of the NIPAS Act, a protected area refers to portions of land and water, set aside due to
their unique physical and biological significance, managed to enhance biological diversity and protected
against human exploitation. The Tañon Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1234, was set aside and
declared a protected area under the category of Protected Seascape. The NIPAS Act defines a Protected
Seascape to be an area of national significance characterized by the harmonious interaction of man and
land while providing opportunities for public enjoyment through recreation and tourism within the normal
lifestyle and economic activity of this areas; thus a management plan for each area must be designed to
protect and enhance the permanent preservation of its natural conditions. Consistent with this endeavor
is the requirement that an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) be made prior to undertaking any
activity outside the scope of the management plan. Unless an ECC under the EIA system is obtained, no
activity inconsistent with the goals of the NIPAS Act shall be implemented.
Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX,
and favorably recommended the approval of JAPEX’s
application for an ECC.
On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an
ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas
exploration project in Tañon Strait.14 Months later, on
November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well,
with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the
western Cebu Province.15 This drilling lasted until February 8,
2008.16

Petitioners applied to this Court for redress, via two separate

original petitions both dated December 17, 2007, wherein they
commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from
implementing SC- 46 for, among others, violation of the 1987
Constitution.

Petitioners’ Allegations
Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX’s oil
exploration activities in the Tañon Strait, petitioners Resident
Marine Mammals and Stewards aver that a study made after
the seismic survey showed that the fish catch was reduced
drastically by 50 to 70 percent. They claim that before the
seismic survey, the average harvest per day would be from o
20 kilos; but after the activity, the fisherfolk could only catch an
average of 1 to 2 kilos a day. They attribute this “reduced fish
catch” to the destruction of the “payao,” also known as the “fish
aggregating device” or “artificial reef.”31 Petitioners Resident
Marine Mammals and Stewards also impute the incidences of
“fish kill”32 observed by some of the local fisherfolk to the
seismic survey. And they further allege that the ECC obtained
by private respondent JAPEX is invalid because public
consultations and discussions with the affected stakeholders,
a prerequisite to the issuance of the ECC, were not held prior
to the ECC’s issuance.

In its separate petition, petitioner FIDEC confirms petitioners

Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards’ allegations of
reduced fish catch and lack of public consultations or
discussions with the fisherfolk and other stakeholders prior to
the issuance of the ECC. Moreover, it alleges that during the
seismic surveys and drilling, it was barred from entering and
fishing within a 7-kilometer radius from the point where the
oilrig was located, an area greater than the 1.5-kilometer
radius “exclusion zone” stated in the IEE.33 It also agrees in
the allegation that public respondents DENR and EMB abused
their discretion when they issued an ECC to public respondent
DOE and private respondent JAPEX without ensuring the strict
compliance with the procedural and substantive requirements
under the Environmental Impact Assessment system, the
Fisheries Code, and their implementing rules and
regulations.34 It further claims that despite several requests
for copies of all the documents pertaining to the project in

15. Paje v Casino
749 SCRA 39
Art II, Section 16
16. International Service v.
Greenpeace, et. al.
G.R. No. 209271, December 8,
2015
Article II, Section 16
Petitioners:
Greenpeace Southeast Asia
(Philippines) (Greenpeace),
Magsasaka at Siyentipiko sa
Pagpapaunlad ng Agrikultura
Tañon Strait, only copies of the PAMB-Tañon Strait Resolution
and the ECC were given to the fisherfolk.35
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate for a
proposed coal-fired power plant at Subic, Zambales to be
implemented by RP Energy.
Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators filed a
Petition for Writ of Kalikasan against RP energy, SBMA, and
Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR secretary on the ground that
actual environmental damage will occur if the power plant
project is implemented and that the respondents failed to
comply with certain laws and rules governing or relating to the
issuance of an ECC and amendments thereto.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of
Kalikasan and invalidated the ECC. (The Casino group, argues
that it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan as it was able to prove
that the operation of the power plant would cause
environmental damage and pollution and that this would
adversely affect the residents of the provinces of Bataan and
Zambales. It cites as basis RP Energy’s EIS, which allegedly
admits that acid rain may occur in the combustion of coal; that
the incidence of asthma attacks among residents in the vicinity
of the project site may increase due to exposure to suspended
particles from plant operations and that increased sulfur oxides
and nitrogen oxides emissions may occur during plant
operations.)
Both the DENR and Casino filed an appeal, the former
imputing error in invalidating the ECC and its amendments,
arguing that the determination of the validity of the ECC as well
as its amendments is beyond the scope of a Petition for a Writ
of kalikasan; while the latter claim that it is entitled to a Writ of
Kalikasan.
Consolidated petitions seeking the reversal of the CA decision
which permanently enjoined the conduct of field trials for
genetically modified eggplant.
A Memorandum of Undertaking (MOU) was entered into by
University of the Philippines Los Baños Foundation, Inc.
(UPLBFI) and International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
Biotech Applications, Inc. (ISAAA), and the University of the
Philippines Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI), among
others, to conduct field trials for "bio-engineered eggplants,"
known as Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) eggplant (Bt talong). Bt
talong contains the crystal toxin genes from the soil bacterium
Bt, which produces the CrylAc protein that is toxic to target
insect pests. The Cry1Ac protein is said to be highly specific to
lepidopteran larvae such as the fruit and shoot borer, the most
destructive insect pest to eggplants.
WON the power plant
project violated or
threatened the
constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful
ecology
(The alleged thermal
pollution of coastal
waters, air pollution due
to dust and combustion
gases, water pollution
from toxic coal
combustion waste and
acid deposition in
aquatic and terrestrial
ecosystems that will be
caused by the project)
WON Greenpeace, et
al. has the legal
standing in filing the
petition.
No.
This Court agree with the appellate court.
The three witnesses presented by the Casino Group are not experts on the CFB technology or on
environmental matters. These witnesses even admitted on cross-examination that they are not
competent to testify on the environmental impact of the subject project. What is wanting in their
testimonies is their technical knowledge of the project design or some other aspects of the project, even
those not requiring expert knowledge, vis-a-vis the significant negative environmental impacts which the
Casino Group alleged will occur. Clearly, the Casino Group failed to carry the onus of proving the alleged
significant negative environmental impacts of the project. In comparison, RP Energy presented several
experts to refute the allegations of the Casino Group.
In upholding the evidence and arguments of RP Energy, relative to the lack of proof as to the alleged
significant environmental damage that will be caused by the project, the appellate court relied mainly on
the testimonies of experts, which we find to be in accord with judicial precedents. Thus, we ruled in one
case: Although courts are not ordinarily bound by testimonies of experts, they may place whatever weight
they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and
sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the
ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the
reasoning by which has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies,
and any other matters which serve to illuminate his statements. The problem of the credibility of the
expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling
thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. Hence, we sustain the appellate
court’s findings that the Casino Group failed to establish the alleged grave environmental damage which
will be caused by the construction and operation of the power plant.
Yes.
The case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., (1993), signaled an even more liberalized policy on locus standi in
public suits. In said case, the Court recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law.” We held that such right need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like
other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and
it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
The liberalized rule on standing is now enshrined in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules
“collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards
of nature,” and aims to “further encourage the protection of the environment.” There is therefore no
dispute on the standing of respondents to file before this Court their petition for writ of kalikasan and writ
of continuing mandamus.
(MASIPAG), and other
respondents Pursuant to the Administrative Order of the Department of
Agriculture's (DA), the Bureau of Plant Industries (BPI) issued
two (2)-year Biosafety Permits for field testing of Bt talong.
Consequently, field testing proceeded in approved trial sites in
North Cotabato, Pangasinan, Camarines Sur, Davao City, and
Laguna.

Greenpeace, et. al. filed before the Court a Petition for Writ of
Continuing Mandamus and Writ of Kalikasan with Prayer for
the Issuance of a TEPO. They alleged that the Bt talong field
trials violated their constitutional right to health and a balanced
ecology considering that: (a) the required Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) was not secured prior to the field
trials; (b) the required public consultations under the Local
Government Code (LGC) were not complied with; and (c) as a
regulated article under DAO 08-2002, Bt talong is presumed
harmful to human health and the environment, and that there
is no independent, peer-reviewed study showing its safety for
human consumption and the environment. Since the scientific
evidence as to the safety of Bt talong remained insufficient,,
and that preliminary scientific evaluation shows reasonable
grounds for concern, the precautionary principle should be
applied and, thereby, the field trials be enjoined.

Note that in this case, EMB, BPI and FPA questioned the legal
standing of Greenpeace, et al. in filing the petition for writ of
kalikasan as they do not stand to suffer any direct injury as a
result of the Bt talong field tests.

17. West Tower v. FPIC, 798
SCRA 292
Respondent FPIC operates two pipelines since 1969, viz: (1)
the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System, and (b) the Black Oil
Pipeline (BOPL) System. In May 2010, however, a leakage
from one of the pipelines was suspected after the residents of
West Tower started to smell gas within the condominium. A
search made on July 10, 2010 within the condominium
premises led to the discovery of a fuel leak from the wall of its
Basement 2. Owing to its inability to control the flow,
WestTower’s management reported the matter to the Police
Department of Makati City, which in turn called the city’s BFP.
What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a
15-20 drum a day affair. Eventually, the sump pit of the
condominium was ordered shut down by the City of Makati to
prevent the discharge of contaminated water into the drainage
system of Brgy. Bangkal. Eventually, the fumes compelled the
residents of WestTower to abandon their respective units on
July 23, 2010 and the condo’s power was shut down.
FPIC initially disowned any leak from its oil pipeline. Thus, the
residents of WestTower shouldered the expenses of hauling
the waste water from its basement. The UP-National Institute
of Geological Sciences (UP-NIGS), which the City of Makati
Whether a Permanent Yes. After a perusal of the recommendations of the DOE and the submissions of the parties, the Court
Environmental adopts the activities and measures prescribed in the DOE letter dated August 5, 2014 to be complied
Protection Order should with by FPIC as conditions for the resumption of the commercial operations of the WOPL. The DOE
be issued to direct the should, therefore, proceed with the implementation of the tests proposed in the said August 5, 2014 letter.
respondents to perform Thereafter, if it is satisfied that the results warrant the immediate reopening of the WOPL, the DOE shall
or to desist from issue an order allowing FPIC to resume the operation of the WOPL. On the other hand, should the probe
performing acts in order result in a finding that the pipeline is no longer safe for continued use and that its condition is irremediable,
to protect, preserve, or that it already exceeded its serviceable life, among others, the closure of the WOPL may be ordered.
and rehabilitate the
affected environment. With regard to petitioners’ March 29, 2012 Supplemental Manifestation about a recent possible leak in
the pipeline, the CA appropriately found no additional leak. However, due to the devastating effect on the
environs in Barangay Bangkal due to the 2010 leak, the Court finds it fitting that the pipeline be closely
and regularly monitored to obviate another catastrophic event which will prejudice the health of the
affected people, and to preserve and protect the environment not only for the present but also for the
future generations to come.
Respondent FPIC is also DIRECTED to undertake and continue the remediation, rehabilitation and
restoration of the affected Barangay Bangkal environment until full restoration of the affected area to its
condition prior to the leakage is achieved. For this purpose, respondent FPIC must strictly comply with
the measures, directives and permits issued by the DENR for its remediation activities in Barangay
Bangkal, including but not limited to, the Wastewater Discharge Permit and Permit to Operate. The DENR
has the authority to oversee and supervise the aforesaid activities on said affected barangay.
 invited to determine the source of the fuel, found a leak in
FPIC’s WOPL about 86 meters from West Tower. A day after,
FPIC admitted that indeed the source of the fuel leak is the
WOPL, which was already closed since October 24, 2010, but
denied liability by placing blame on the construction activities
on the roads surrounding West Tower.
Hence West Tower Corp. interposed the present Petition for
the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the residents
of West Tower and in representation of the surrounding
communities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. West Tower
Corp. also alleged that it is joined by the civil society and
several people’s organizations, non-governmental
organizations and public interest groups who have expressed
their intent to join the suit because of the magnitude of the
environmental issues involved. aw
18 LNL ARCHIPELAGO VS Petitioner LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. (LAMI) is the
AGHAM operator of a mining claim located in Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
APRIL 12, 2016 LAMI embarked on a project to build a private, noncommercial
port in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales. LAMI secured the
SECTION 16 following permits and compliance certificates for the port
project: (1) Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Environmental Compliance Certificate5 (ECC) R03-
1104-182 dated 2 May 2011 covering the development of
causeway, stockpile and related facilities on LAMI’s property
with an area of 18,142 sq. m.; (2) DENR provisional foreshore
lease agreement with LAMI; (3) Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA) Clearance to Develop a Port; (4) PPA Permit to
Construct a Port; (5) PPA Special Permit to Operate a
Beaching Facility; and (6) Tree Cutting Permit/Certificatio from
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the DENR.
Meanwhile, on 30 April 2012, the DENR Environmental
Management Bureau in Region III (DENR-EMB R3) received
a letter dated 27 April 2012 from Mayor Marty of Sta.
Cruzinquiring if the ECC the DENR issued in favor of LAMI
allowed LAMI to cut trees and level a mountain.
On6 June 2012, respondent Agham Party List (Agham),
through its President, former Representative Angelo B.
Palmones (Rep. Palmones), filed a Petition for the issuance of
a Writ of Kalikasan against LAMI, DENR, PPA, and the
Zambales Police Provincial Office (ZPPO).
Agham alleged that LAMI violated: (1) Section 6823 of PD No.
705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 or the Revised
Forestry Code; and (2) Sections 5726 and 6927 of Republic
Act No. 7942, or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (Philippine
Mining Act). Agham added that LAMI cut mountain trees and
flattened a mountain which serves as a natural protective
Art. II, Sec.16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
(1) whether LAMI 1.NO. It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan has to
violated the show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated. In the present case, the allegation
environmental laws as by Agham that two laws — the Revised Forestry Code, as amended, and the Philippine Mining Act —
alleged by Agham, and were violated by LAMI was not adequately substantiated by Agham. Even the facts submitted by Agham
(2) whether LAMI to establish environmental damage were mere general allegation. The following requisites must be
flattened any mountain present to avail of this remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to
and caused a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or
environmental damage omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened
of such magnitude as to violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
prejudice the life, health health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
or property of
inhabitants in two or As to the alleged violation of the Revised Forestry Code, LAMI had a permit to cut trees and complied
more cities or with the conditions thereof. As to the alleged violation of the Philippine Mining Act, the same cannot be
provinces. applied because LAMI was not conducting any mining operations in the portwhich is 25km away fromits
mining site.
2. NO. Agham reasoned that LAMI was destroying the environment by cutting mountain trees and leveling
a mountain to the damage and detriment of the residents of Zambales and the nearby towns of
Pangasinan. Agham simply submitted a picture taken on 4 June 2012 where allegedly the backhoes
owned by LAMI were pushing the remnants of the mountain to the sea. This explanation, absent any
concrete proof, is untenable.
Clearly, Agham did not give proper justifications for citing Sections 57 and 69 of the Philippine Mining
Act. Agham did not even present any evidence that LAMI violated the mining law or any mining
undertakings in relation to LAMI’s construction of a port facility. Agham only alleged in very general terms
that LAMI was destroying the environment and leveling a mountain without conducting any scientific
studies or submitting expert testimonies that would corroborate such allegations.
Agham, in accusing that LAMI allegedly flattened a mountain, did not cite any law allegedly violated by
LAMI in relation to this claim. Agham did not present any proof to demonstrate that the local residents in
Zambales, and even the nearby towns of Pangasinan, complained of any great danger or harm on the
alleged leveling of the land formation which may affect their lives, health or properties. Neither was there
any evidence showing of a grave and real environmental damage to the barangay and the surrounding
vicinity.
To belie Agham’s contentions, the records, from the testimonies of those experts in their fields, show that
there is in fact no mountain in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales.

19. PNB vs. DAN PADAO
G.R. Nos. 180849 and 187143.
November 16, 2011.*
barrier from typhoons and floods not only of the residents of
Zambales but also the residents of some nearby towns located
in Pangasinan.
Petititionnfor writ of kalikasan granted. LNL Archipelago
Minerals, Inc. (LAMI) is directed to PERMANENTLY CEASE
and [DESIST] from scraping off the land formation in question
or from performing any activity/ies in violation of environmental
laws resulting in environmental destruction or damage.
These are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari.
In G.R. No. 180849, Padao was a credit and loan officer in
Dipolog who was allegedly involved in the granting of behest
loans, where the collateral was over appraised and the credit
standings of the loan applicants were fabricated allowing them
to obtain larger loans from PNB causing to suffer millions in
losses. Padao was grounded on his having allegedly
presented a deceptively positive status of the business, credit
standing/rating and financial capability of loan applicants
Reynaldo and Luzvilla Baluma and eleven (11) others. It was
later found that either said borrowers’ businesses were
inadequate to meet their loan obligations, or that the projects
they sought to be financed did not exist.
After due investigation. PNB found Padao guilty of gross and
habitual neglect of duty and ordered him dismissed from the
bank. Padao appealed to the banks Board of Directors but was
ignored. So after almost 3 years, Padao filed a complaint
against the PNB with the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch in
Zamboanga City for reinstament, backwages, illegal dismissal
and treachery/badfaith and palpable discrimination in the
treatment of employees with administrative cases.
The ELA found the dismissal valid but still awarded separation
pay of 1/2 months pay for every year of service. And further
stating that in the case of Padao, there was no clear conclusive
showing of moral turpitude and thus he should not be left
without any remedy.
Padao appealed to the NLRC which reversed and declared
Padao’s dismissal to be illegal (Oct 30,2002). He was ordered
to be reinstated to his previous position without loss of seniority
rights and PNB was ordered to pay him full backwages and
attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent of the total monetary
award.
In G.R. No. 187143, During the pendency of G.R. No. 180849
before the Court, the NLRC issued an entry of judgment on
certifying that on February 28, 2003, its October 30, 2002
Resolution had become final and executory.
PNB filed an MR but was denied by the NLRC and thus it filed
a petition for certiorari with the CA.
WON Padao was NO. As he was terminated under an authorized or just cause as laid down in Art.282 (Gross and Habitual
illegally dismissed by Neglect by the employee of his duties) of Labor Code.
PNB.
In the 1987 Constitution, provisions on social justice and the protection of labor underscore the
importance and economic significance of labor. Article II, Section 18 characterizes labor as a “primary
social economic force,” and as such, the State is bound to “protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare.” Moreover, workers are “entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a
living wage.”
While it is an employer’s basic right to freely select or discharge its employees, if only as a measure of
selfprotection against acts inimical to its interest, the law sets the valid grounds for termination as well as
the proper procedure to be followed when terminating the services of an employee.38
Thus, in cases of regular employment, the employer is prohibited from terminating the services of an
employee except for a just or authorized cause.39 Such just causes for which an employer may terminate
an employee are enumerated in Article 282 of the Labor Code:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate family member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Further, due process requires the requirement of notice, the employer shall furnish the worker whose
employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for
termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of his representative if he so desires.
The role that a credit investigator plays in the conduct of a bank’s business cannot be overestimated.
The amount of loans to be extended by a bank depends upon the report of the credit investigator on the
collateral being offered. If a loan is not fairly secured, the bank is at the mercy of the borrower who may
just opt to have the collateral foreclosed. If the scheme is repeated a hundredfold, it may lead to the
collapse of the bank. He not only failed to perform what he was employed to do, but also did so
repetitively and habitually, causing millions of pesos in damage to PNB.
In sharp contrast, Padao, in affixing his signature on the fraudulent reports, attested to the falsehoods
contained therein. Moreover, by doing so, he repeatedly failed to perform his duties as a credit
investigator.
20. CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) formed by
T. GARCIA (Second District of Taiwanese investors applied with the Board of Investments
Bataan), petitioner, (BOI) an application for registration as a new export producer
vs. of petrochemicals.
THE BOARD OF
INVESTMENTS, THE Its application specified Limay, Bataan as the plant site and
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND the use of "naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or
INDUSTRY, LUZON fuel for its petrochemical plant.
PETROCHEMICAL
CORPORATION, and PILIPINAS On February 24, 1988, BOI issued a Certificate of Registration
SHELL CORPORATION, to BPC and together with incentives, such as exemptions from
respondents. tax on raw materials, repatriation of the entire proceeds of
liquidation of investments and remittance of earnings on
Article III, Section 7 (right to investments.
information);
Omnibus Investments Code, On April 11, 1989, BPC filed a request for an approval of an
Article 81 of the Omnibus amendment of its investment application in the BOI,
Investments Code (confidentiality concerning the increase of the investment amount from
of records in applications to the US$220 million to US$320 million, increase of the production
Board of Investments) ( capacity of its naphtha cracker, polyetheyleneplant and
Constitution, Other Law ) polypropylene plant, change of the feedstock from naphtha
only to "naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas and the
transfer the job site from Bataan to Batangas.
Vigorously opposing the transfer of the proposed
petrochemical plant to Batangas, the petitioner sent a letter to
the Department of Tradeand Industry (DTI), through BOI,
requesting for a copy together with attachments of the
amendment and the original application.
TheTaiwanese investors declined to give their consent to the
release of the documents requested.
Unhappy with the change of the site, Congressman Enrique
Garcia of the Second District of Bataan requested a copy of
BPC’s original and amended application documents.
The BOI denied the request on the basis that the investors in
BPC had declined to give their consent to the release of the
documents requested, and that Article 81 of the Omnibus
Investments Code protects the confidentiality of these
documents absent consent to disclose. The BOI subsequently
approved the amended application without holding a second
hearing or publishing notice of the amended application.
Garcia filed a petition before the Supreme Court.
21. Tanada v. Angara, supra. This case questions the constitutionality of the Philippines
being part of the World Trade Organization, particularly when
President Fidel Ramos signed the Instrument of Ratification
and the Senate concurring in the said treaty.
WON the BOI The petition for certiorari was granted.
committed a grave
abuse of discretion in The BOI's failure to publish such notice and to hold a hearing on the amended application deprived the
yielding to the oppositors, like the petitioner, of due process and amounted to a grave abuse of discretion on the part of
application of the the BOI.
investors.
Applications filed by a foreign investment group to build a petrochemical plant are covered by the
constitutional right to information and have to be disclosed with the exception of privileged information
containing the investors’ trade secrets and other confidential financial information.
The Court ruled that the BOI violated Garcia’s Constitutional right to have access to information on
matters of public concern under Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution. The Court found that the
inhabitants of Bataan had an “interest in the establishment of the petrochemical plant in their midst [that]
is actual, real, and vital because it will affect not only their economic life, but even the air they breathe”
(p. 4). The Court also ruled that BPC’s amended application was in fact a second application that required
a new public notice to be filed and a new hearing to be held (p.3).
Although Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code provides that “all applications and their supporting
documents filed under this code shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed to any person, except
with the consent of the applicant,” the Court emphasized that Article 81 provides for disclosure “on the
orders of a court of competent jurisdiction” (p.4). The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to order disclosure
of the application, amended application, and supporting documents filed with the BOI under Article 81,
with certain exceptions.
The Court went on to note that despite the right to access information, “the Constitution does not open
every door to any and all information” because “the law may exempt certain types of information from
public scrutiny” (p.4). Thus it excluded “the trade secrets and confidential, commercial, and financial
information of the applicant BPC, and matters affecting national security” from its order (p.4). The Court
did not provide a test for what information is excluded from the Constitutional privilege to access public
information, nor did it specify the kinds of information that BPC could withhold under its ruling.
According to the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 226) there shall be a
publication of applications for registration and a holding of consultations with affected communities
whenever necessary. Since the BPC's amended application (particularly the change of location from
Bataan to Batangas) was in effect a new application, it should have been published so that whoever may
have any objection to the transfer may be heard. And, when the BOI approved BPC's application to
establish its petrochemical plant in Limay, Bataan, the inhabitants of that province, particularly the
affected community in Limay, and the petitioner herein as the duly elected representative of the Second
District of Bataan acquired an interest in the project which they have a right to protect. Their interest in
the establishment of the petrochemical plant in their midst is actual, real, and vital because it win affect
not only their economic life but even the air they will breathe. Hence, they have a right to be heard or "be
consulted" on the proposal to transfer it to another site for the Investments Code does require that the
"affected communities" should be consulted.
The Board of Investments is ordered comply with the law and its own rules and regulations: (1) to publish
the amended application for registration of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, (2) to allow petitioner
to have access to its records on the original and amended applications for registration, excluding trade
secrets; and (3) to set for hearing petitioner's opposition to the amended application.
1. Does the text of the 1. A portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution. While sovereignty has
WTO and its Annexes traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to
limit, restrict or impair restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member
the exercise of of the family of nations.

Following World War 2, global financial leaders held a
conference in Bretton Woods to discuss global economy. This
led to the establishment of three great institutions: International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank),
International Monetary Fund and International Trade
Organization.
However, the ITO failed to materialized. Instead, there was the
General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs. It was on the
Uruguay Round of the GATT that the WTO was then
established.
The WTO is an institution regulating trade among nations,
including the reduction of tariff and barriers.
Petitioners filed a case assailing the WTO Agreement for
violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a
self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos, to give preference to qualified Filipinos
and to promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods.”
It is petitioners’ position that the “national treatment” and “parity
provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and
products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos
and local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First”
policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless
the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”
22 Gamboa v. Teves Wilson P. Gamboa is a stockholder of PLDT.
Sec. 21 TIMELINE:
legislative power by
Congress? NO The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain
restrictions enter into the picture: limitations imposed by the nature of membership in the family of nations
2. Do the provisions of & limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.
the WTO Agreement
contravene Section 19, 2. Petitioners’ Contentions:
Article II and Section 10
& 12, Artilce XII of the Petitioners argue that the “letter, spirit and intent” of the Constitution mandating “economic nationalism”
1987 Constitution? NO are violated by the so-called “parity provisions” and “national treatment” clauses scattered in parts of
WTO Agreement
○ This is in view of the most-favored nation clause (MFN) of the TRIMS (trade-
related investment measures), TRIPS (Trade Related aspects of intellectual
property rights), Trade in Services, and par. 4 of Article III of GATT 1994.
○ “shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products
of national origin”
● Sec. 19, Art II:The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.
● Sec. 10, Art XII: Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos.
● Sec. 12, Art XII: The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.”
● These provisions are not self-executing
○ Merely guides in the exercise of judicial review and in making laws.
● Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII should be read and understood in relation to the other sections
in said article, especially Sec. 1 and 13:
○ A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
○ A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services
○ An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life
● The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not.
Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the
Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.
And we hold that there are.
● WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies
○ Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in
the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign
equality, with each member’s vote equal in weight.
● Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries
○ Tariff reduction – developed countries must reduce at rate of 36% in 6 years,
developing 24% in 10 years
○ Domestic subsidy – developed countries must reduce 20% over six (6) years,
developing countries at 13% in 10 years
○ Export subsidy – developed countries, 36% in 6 years; developing countries,
3/4ths of 36% in 10 years
● Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
○ Encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets
● The Court will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an
economic policy. It will only perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate
committed grave abuse of discretion.
Whether the term We agree with petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention. The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the
"capital" in Section 11, Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the
Article XII of the

23. Navarro vs. Ermita
G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011
Section 25
This case is 114 pages. Pls. bear
with this digest. Haha
1928 – PLDT granted franchise
1969 – PTIC (Philippine Telecommunications Investment
Corp.) acquired 26% of the outstanding common shares of
PLDT
1977 – PHI (Prime Holdings Inc.) became the owner of
111,415 shares of PTIC stock
1986 – 111,415 PTIC shares sequestered by PCGG. This
amount represents 46.125% of PTIC outstanding capital stock
1999 – First Pacific, a foreign investment firm, acquired the
remaining 54% outstanding stock of PTIC
2006 – Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC) of Phil. Gov’t
announced that it would sell the 111,415 shares through public
bidding. First Pacific exercised right of first refusal and
purchased the shares for PHP 25 Billion.
Since PTIC is a stockholder of PLDT, the sale by the Philippine
Government of PTIC shares is actually an indirect sale of 12
million shares or about 6.3% of the outstanding common
shares of PLDT. With the sale, First Pacific’s common
shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7% to 37%, thereby
increasing the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to
about 81.47%.
On 31 January 2007, the House of Representatives (HR)
Committee on Good Government conducted a public hearing
on the particulars of the then impending sale of the 111,415
PTIC shares. Respondents Teves and Sevilla were among
those who attended the public hearing. The HR Committee
Report concluded that First Pacific’s intended acquisition of the
government’s 111,415 PTIC shares resulting in First Pacific’s
100% ownership of PTIC will not violate the 40% constitutional
limit on foreign ownership of a public utility, since PTIC holds
only 13.847% of the total outstanding common shares of
PLDT.
[The crux of the issue is the definition of the term “capital” and
its far-reaching implications. Other arguments against
petitioner were mostly procedural and not of interest to our
subject matter, so wala na nako gi include sa digest]
This is an URGENT MOTION TO RECALL Entry of Judgment
dated October 20, 2010.
On October 2, 2006, the president approved into law RA No.
9355, An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands.
On December 3, 2006, the COMELEC conducted the
mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the
province under the LGC.
The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502
negative votes. With the approval of the people from both the
mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of
Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim
set of provincial officials who took their oath of office on
Constitution refers to present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock comprising both
the total common common and non-voting preferred shares.
shares only or to the
total outstanding capital Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to preferred
stock (combined total of shares which usually have no voting rights, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
common and non- refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election
voting preferred shares) of directors, then the term "capital" shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in
of PLDT, a public utility the control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of
directors.
In short, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that
can vote in the election of directors. This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of public utilities. As
revealed in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, "capital" refers to the voting stock or
controlling interest of a corporation.
Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, reminds us
that the Filipinization provision in the 1987 Constitution is one of the products of the spirit of nationalism
which gripped the 1935 Constitutional Convention. The 1987 Constitution "provides for the Filipinization
of public utilities by requiring that any form of authorization for the operation of public utilities should be
granted only to ‘citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of
the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.’ The provision is [an
express] recognition of the sensitive and vital position of public utilities both in the national economy and
for national security." The evident purpose of the citizenship requirement is to prevent aliens from
assuming control of public utilities, which may be inimical to the national interest. This specific provision
explicitly reserves to Filipino citizens control of public utilities, pursuant to an overriding economic goal of
the 1987 Constitution: to "conserve and develop our patrimony" and ensure "a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos."
Whether RA RA No. Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local
9355, An Act Creating autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units
the Province of Dinagat should be liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results.
Islands, is valid, despite
non-conformity of the The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision [ruled that RA 9355 unconsti because
latter to the it did not follow the parameters of creation of an LGU under the LGC] could prove to be counter-
requirements of the productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province that consists
LGC in the creation of a of several municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The
province. YES. component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land area
requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be
made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of
several islands. This would mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a
province with contiguous land area over one composed of islands—and negate the greater imperative of
January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007
synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set
of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007.
On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor
F. Bernal and Rene O. Medina, former political leaders of
Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition for certiorari
and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the
petition on technical grounds. Their motion for reconsideration
was also denied.
Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the
Province of Surigao del Norte, filed another petition for
certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being
unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as
a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act
of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao
del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal
Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area.
They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had
a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population
of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC, on both counts,
viz:
Constitution, Article X—Local Government
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may
be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
LGC, Title IV, Chapter I
“Section 461. Requisites for Creation.—(a) A province may
be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by
the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million
pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:
(i) a continuous territory of at least two thousand (2,000)
square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land
area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the
time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2)
or more
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do
not contribute to the income of the province.
development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to the
constituency.
This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory
of a province is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one
with a contiguous land mass. Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could trench on the equal
protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined
in the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should be read together with territorial contiguity.
The Oversight Committee evidently conducted due deliberation and consultations with all the concerned
sectors of society and considered the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the LGC when
the IRR was formulated, amounting not only to an executive construction, entitled to great weight and
respect from this Court, but to legislative construction as well, especially with the inclusion of
representatives from the four leagues of local government units as members of the Oversight Committee;
In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that
exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355
creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
The bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in both Chambers of
Congress—thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No.
9355.
What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a LGU, is not conclusive in
showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of
P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which
is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province.
The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than
looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli
circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must be
seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province. This Court
should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity.
THUS, the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991 stating, “The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands,” is declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 is declared
as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the
election of the officials thereof are declared VALID.
 The Court granted the petition and declared R.A. No. 9355
unconstitutional for failure to comply with the requirements on
population and land area in the creation of a province under
the LGC, the proclamation of Dinagat and the election of its
officials as null and void, the provision on Article 9(2) of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR),
stating that, “[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where
the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands”
for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC, inasmuch
as such exemption is not expressly provided in the law. The
Court denied the MRs.

Meanwhile, the movants-intervenors filed on June 18, 2010 a

Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit
Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
dated May 12, 2010. They alleged that the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8790, relevant to this case, which certified the
plebiscite creating the Province of Dinagat, but also stating:
“depending on whether the Decision of the Supreme Court in
Navarro vs. Ermita is reconsidered or not, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to declare that:
1. If the Decision is reversed, there will be no problem
since the current system configuration is in line
with the reconsidered Decision;
2. If the Decision becomes final and executory before
the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will
revert to its previous status as part of the First
Legislative District, Surigao del Norte
3. If the Decision becomes final and executory after
the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will
revert to its previous status as part of the First
Legislative District of Surigao del Norte.
They further alleged that, because they are the duly elected
officials of Surigao del Norte whose positions will be affected
by the nullification of the election results in the event that the
May 12, 2010 Resolution is not reversed, they have a legal
interest in the instant case and would be directly affected by
the declaration of nullity of R.A. No. 9355. Simply put,
movants-intervenors’ election to their respective offices would
necessarily be annulled since Dinagat Islands will revert to its
previous status as part of the First Legislative District of
Surigao del Norte and a special election will have to be
conducted for governor, vice governor, and House of
Representatives member and Sangguniang Panlalawigan
member for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte.

This resolution is what gave the parties locus standi, according

to the Court and allowed them to intervene despite entry of
judgment of the previous ruling.

24. Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. Several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the Whether the 2013 1. Yes. Legislators are given project identification powers wherein they can identify PDAF projects for as
208566, November 19, 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) for being PDAF violates the long as the project falls under a general program listed in the program menu. They are also given powers
unconstitutional. principles of of fund release and fund realignment. These post-enactment measures are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly

25. Pamatong v Comelec. 427
SCRA 96
Section 26. The State shall
guarantee equal access to
opportunities f
The NBI began its probe into allegations that the gov’t has
been defrauded of some P10B over the past 10 years by a
syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and
various gov’t agencies.
COA released results of a 3-year audit investigation to
determine the propriety of funds under PDAF and Various
Infrastructures including Local Projects (VLP). The pertinent
findings are the following:
1. Amounts released to legislators significantly
exceed their respective allocations;
2. Amounts were released for projects outside of
legislative districts of sponsoring members;
3. Infrastructure projects were constructed on private
lots which have yet to be turned over to the gov’t;
4. Implementation of projects was not undertaken by
implementing agencies themselves, but by NGO’s
endorsed by legislators;
5. Selection of NGOs were not compliant with law
As for the Presidential Pork Barrel, whistleblowers allege that
P900M of the gas project from Palawan went into a dummy
NGO.
Several petitions declaring the PDAF unconstitutional were
filed.
Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for President on December 17, 2003. Respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due
course to petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy in its Resolution
No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. MR denied.
The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others
nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are
not supported by a registered political party with a national
constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for
petitioner.
In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse
the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of
his right to “equal access to opportunities for public service”
under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting
the number of qualified candidates only to those who can
afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated
by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the
COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on
the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign
people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly
erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among
all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the
constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the
1. Separation of belong to the Executive branch. From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
powers? empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
2. Local autonomy (Art. law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
II, Sec. 25)?
2. Yes. The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without
taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this
regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein
economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. Moreover, it runs in conflict with
the functions of the various Local Development Councils which are already mandated to assist in setting
the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its
territorial jurisdiction.
WON Comelec violated NO.
Sec 26, Art 2 of the Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring “equal access to opportunities
Constitution for public office” is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and,
particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege
subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a
right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language
of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on “Nuisance Candidates” and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452
dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to
give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. As long as the limitations apply to everybody
equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed
as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded
to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from
the limitations or the burdens which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates
who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling
interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the
State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the
number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased
allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of
course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time,
remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and

26. Navarro vs. Ermita
G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011
27. Belgica v. Ochoa, supra.
president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since
he has numerous national organizations under his leadership,
he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign
since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a
platform of government.
Repeated case. See case #23 betch.
Same facts with No. 24
proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that
erodes faith in our democratic institutions. As the United States Supreme Court held: [T]here is surely an
important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before
printing the name of a political organization and its candidates on the ballot—the interest, if no other, in
avoiding confusion, deception and even frustration of the democratic [process].
The discussion relating I join Justice Diosdado M. Peralta and Justice Arturo D. Brion in their dissents. I file this separate
to sec. 26, regarding dissenting opinion because the majority’s ruling today, legitimizing the creation of a province in blatant
political dynasties is violation of the Constitution and the Local Government Code, opens the floodgates to the proliferation of
found in Justice pygmy provinces and legislative districts, mangling sacred and fundamental principles governing our
Carpio’s dissenting democratic way of life and exacerbating the scourge of local dynastic politics.
opinion. I will quote his
opinion in the next Quasi- malapportionment laws like RA 9355 are double-edged knives thrust at the heart of the anti-
column for lack of dynastic vision of the 1987 Constitution—it fosters entrenchment of political dynasties and fuels
discussion of this topic feudalistic practices by assuring political dynasties easy access to public funds.
in the decision.
Members of Congress are entitled to an equal share of pork barrel funds regardless of the size of their
constituencies. Thus, each seat in the House of Representatives translates to a potent platform for
congressmen to cultivate patronage by doling out development, livelihood and support projects using
pork barrel funds allocated in annual budgets. For each new province created—entailing at the same
time the creation of a legislative district—a pipeline to a huge pool of resources is opened, with the
Congressman enjoying wide discretion on how and where he will dispense such legislative largesse.
Under the majority’s ruling, not only land area but also population is immaterial in creating island
provinces. This is an open invitation to ruling political clans strategically situated in this country’s
thousands of islands to sponsor the creation of more underpopulated provinces within their political
bailiwicks, enabling them to capture more pork barrel funds, thus tightening their grip on the levers of
power.
This inevitably fuels the feudal practices plaguing Philippine local politics by fortifying patron
(congressman)—ward (constituents) relations upon which dynastic politics thrive. All this at the expense
of taxpayers, mostly residing in city legislative districts with minimum populations of 250,000, who surely
would not want their taxes to be spent as pork barrel funds of political dynasties in underpopulated
legislative districts in island provinces.
To the Filipino people’s misfortune, Congress’ non-implementation of the constitutional directive to
prohibit political dynasties is now aggravated by this Court’s wantonly loose translation of the
Constitution’s apportionment standard of proportional representation.
The Constitution and the Local Government Code are normative guides for courts to reasonably interpret
and give expression to the will of the Filipino people as encoded in their provisions. Members of this
Court go beyond the bounds of their sworn duties when they second guess the intent of the Constitution’s
framers and the people’s elected representatives, pretending to act as if they themselves have been
accorded electoral mandate to amend statutes as they see fit. No amount of rhetoric singing paeans to
the virtues of promoting local autonomy can hide the blatant judicial legislation the majority has
succeeded in doing here today, to the detriment of the Constitution’s requirements of proportional
representation in the House of Representatives, equal protection under the law and the prohibition
against political dynasties, not to mention the blatant violation of Section 461 of the Local Government
Code.
Whether the 2013 No. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase “as
PDAF violates the may be defined by law.” It does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right
principle of political but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.

28 Dimapilis-Baldoz v COA
GR No. 199114, June 16, 2013
Leonel Labrador was the former Chief of the POEAs
Employment Services Regulation Division (ESRD). On May 2,
1997, then Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing
(Quisumbing) ordered his dismissal from service as he was
found to have bribed a certain Madoline Villapando, an
overseas Filipino worker, in the amount ofP6,200.00 in order
to expedite the issuance of her overseas employment
certificate.
Aside from the foregoing administrative proceedings, a
criminal case for direct bribery was instituted against Labrador
in view of the same infraction. Consequently, on August 31,
1999, the Sandiganbayan (SB) promulgated
Decision,convicting him of the aforementioned crime. Labrador
applied and was subsequently granted probation which then
suspended the execution proceedings.
However, despite his conviction and his being under probation,
Labrador continued to work at the POEA and received salaries
and benefits. When then POEA Administrator Baldoz received
a copy of the Sandiganbayan resolution stating that
Labarador’s application for probation was erroneously granted
due to his previous appeal from his judgment of conviction,
Baldoz immediately ordered his separation from the service on
11 March 2004.
Almost a year later, or on February 7, 2005, COA State Auditor
IV, Crescencia L. Escurel, issued an Audit Observation
Memorandum which contained her audit observations on the
various expenditures of the POEA pertaining to the payment of
salaries and benefits to Labrador for the period covering
August 31, 1999 to March 15, 2004. Consequently, it ordered
Dimapilis-Baldoz, among other POEA employees, personally
liable for the salaries and other benefits unduly received by
Labrador in the amount of P1,740,124.08, paid through various
checks issued from August 1999 to March 15, 2004.
Baldoz sought the reconsideration asserting that the POEA
should not be held liable for the refund of the foregoing amount
since Labrador’s employment was fully and promptly
terminated upon receipt of the SB’s March 2, 2004 Resolution.
The COA affirmed the Notice of Disallowance and reiterated
that the amount covering the salaries of Labrador should not
have been paid to him pending final resolution of the criminal
case against him.
dynasty (Art. II, Sec.
26)?
WON Dimapilis-Baldoz No.
is personally liable for
the salaries and The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective
benefits unduly measures against graft and corruption (Section 27, Article 2)
received by Labrador.
It is a standing rule that every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the discharge
of official duties, such that, in the absence of any proof that a public officer has acted with malice or bad
faith, he should not be charged with personal liability for damages that may result from the performance
of an official duty. Good faith is always presumed and he who alleges the contrary bears the burden to
convincingly show that malice or bad faith attended the public officer’s performance of his duties.
While admitting that Labrador did indeed continue to report for work despite the SBs August 31, 1999
a Decision convicting him of direct bribery, these antecedents show that Baldoz merely acted in good faith
and lawfully exercised her duties when she approved the payment of Labradors salaries, wages, and
other personnel benefits for the period beginning August 31, 1999 to March 2, 2004.
To elucidate, while the COA correctly affirmed the disallowance of the salaries and benefits which
Labrador unduly received when he continued to hold office despite his conviction, the liability for refund
cannot be imposed upon Dimapilis-Baldoz because she had no knowledge or any reasonable indication
that the payment of salaries to Labrador was actually improper. Two important incidents impel this
conclusion: first, Labradors 201 File with the POEA was without any record of the SB case; and second,
Dimapilis-Baldoz was only apprised of his conviction when her office was furnished a copy of the SBs
March 2, 2004 Resolution which ordered the revocation of Labradors probation. In addition, Dimapilis-
Baldozs good faith is further strengthened by the fact that she lost no time in issuing the Separation Order
as soon as she was apprised of Labradors situation.
It is well to stress that neither will it do justice to hold Baldoz personally liable simply because she
possessed the final authority for the disbursements and had direct supervision over her subordinates.
Case law exhorts that although a public officer is the final approving authority and the employees who
processed the transaction were directly under his supervision, personal liability does not automatically
attach to him but only upon those directly responsible for the unlawful expenditures.
Thus, absent any proof to the contrary, it cannot be gainsaid that Dimapilis-Baldoz's approval was spurred
only by the honest belief that the payment of salaries disbursed to Labrador was due and owing to him.
29 Neri v. Senate,
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
Senate Committees invited Romulo Neri, then Director
General of the National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA), to attend their joint investigation on the alleged
anomalies in the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project
where the Philippine Government contracted with the Chinese
firm Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE)
involving the amount of US$329,481,290. When Neri testified,
he disclosed that COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos,
brokering for ZTE, offered him P200 million in order for him to
approve NBN-ZTE deal. Neri narrated that he informed
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo about the bribery attempt
and that PGMA instructed him not to accept the bribe.
When Neri was probed on questions WON PGMA followed up
on the NBN project, WON PGMA directed him to prioritize the
project, and WON PGMA directed him to approve the said
project, Neri refused to answer and invoked the “executive
privilege.” Senate Committees issued a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum to Neri. They required him to appear and testify
on November 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita sent a letter to the Committees requesting them to
dispense with Neri’s testimony invoking executive privilege on
the ground that the information sought to be disclosed might
impair the diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
People’s Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in
which these information were conveyed to the President, Neri
cannot provide the Committee any further details of their
conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is
designed to protect.
Consequently, Neri did not appear before the Senate
Committees. The latter issued a Show Cause Letter to Neri
requiring him to show cause why he should not be cited for
contempt for his failure to attend the scheduled hearing on
November 2007.
On 29 November, Neri replied to the Show Cause Letter and
explained that his non-appearance was upon the order of the
President, and that his conversation with her dealt with delicate
and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating
to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government
officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors
and lenders in the Philippines.
Senate Committees found the explanation unsatisfactory.
They cited Neri in contempt and ordered for his arrest and
detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until he
appears and gives his testimony.
Neri filed the petition asking the Court to nullify both the Show
Cause Letter and the Contempt Order for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and stressed that his refusal to answer the three
questions was anchored on a valid claim to executive privilege
WON Neri’s refusal to Yes.
answer the 3 questions
were covered by In the case of United States vs. Nixon, the Court laid out the three elements of a valid claim of executive
executive privilege. privilege.
1. the protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power;
2. it must be authored, solicited, and received by a close advisor of the President or the
President himself. (The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with
the President) and
3. it may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely
contains important evidence,” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
First, Executive Secretary Ermita claimed executive privilege on the argument that the communications
elicited by the three questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and
public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process,” and that “the
information sought to be disclosed might impair the diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
People’s Republic of China.” It is clear then that the basis of the claim is a matter related to the
quintessential and non-delegable presidential power of diplomacy or foreign relations.
Second, the communications were received by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational
proximity” test, petitioner Neri can be considered a close advisor, being a member of the President’s
Cabinet.
Third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege
and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Presidential communications are presumptive privilege and that the presumption can be overcome only
by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to such conversations.
In the case at bar, the Senate Committees failed to show a compelling or critical need for the answers to
the three questions in the enactment of any law under Sec. 21, Art. VI. Instead, the questions veer more
towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under Sec. 22, Art. VI. As ruled in Senate vs.
Ermita, “the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.”
Neri’s refusal to answer based on the claim of executive privilege does not violate the people’s right to
information on matters of public concern simply because Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution itself provides
that this right is “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”
The petition was granted. The subject Order citing petitioner in contempt of the Senate Committee and
directing his arrest and detention was nullified.

30. Gamboa v. Teves
Sec. 28
31.Pollo v. Constantino-David,
G.R. No. 181881, October 18,
2011
Section 28. Subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed
by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.
in accordance with the ruling in the landmark case of Senate
vs. Ermita.
Senate Committees claimed that the refusal of Neri to answer
the three questions violates the people’s right to public
information.
(repeated case, please refer to #22 for the facts)
This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a
government employee who was charged administratively and
eventually dismissed from the service. The employee’s
personal files stored in the computer were used by the
government employer as evidence of misconduct.
Pollo is former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC
Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-Charge of the
Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the
“Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na” program of the CSC.
An unsigned letter- complaint addressed to respondent CSC
Chairperson Karina Constantino-David which was marked
“Confidential” and sent through a courier service (LBC) from a
Whether the term We agree with petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention. The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the
"capital" in Section 11, Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the
Article XII of the present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock comprising both
Constitution refers to common and non-voting preferred shares.
the total common
shares only or to the Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to preferred
total outstanding capital shares which usually have no voting rights, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
stock (combined total of refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election
common and non- of directors, then the term "capital" shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in
voting preferred shares) the control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of
of PLDT, a public utility directors.
In short, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that
can vote in the election of directors. This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of public utilities. As
revealed in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, "capital" refers to the voting stock or
controlling interest of a corporation.
Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, reminds us
that the Filipinization provision in the 1987 Constitution is one of the products of the spirit of nationalism
which gripped the 1935 Constitutional Convention. The 1987 Constitution "provides for the Filipinization
of public utilities by requiring that any form of authorization for the operation of public utilities should be
granted only to ‘citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of
the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.’ The provision is [an
express] recognition of the sensitive and vital position of public utilities both in the national economy and
for national security." The evident purpose of the citizenship requirement is to prevent aliens from
assuming control of public utilities, which may be inimical to the national interest. This specific provision
explicitly reserves to Filipino citizens control of public utilities, pursuant to an overriding economic goal of
the 1987 Constitution: to "conserve and develop our patrimony" and ensure "a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos."
WON the search 1. The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected
conducted on the office by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
computer and the Constitution, which provides: “Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
copying of the personal papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures x x”
files of a government The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of “unreasonable”
employee without his searches and seizures. SC cited a US case “some government offices may be so open to fellow
knowledge and consent employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable. x x x Given the great variety of work
is a transgression on environments in the public sector, the question of whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of
his constitutional right privacy must be addressed on a case-by- case basis. In the case of searches conducted by a public
to privacy. NO. employer, we must balance the invasion of the employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy against the
government’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.”
2. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or
government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a
 certain “Alan San Pascual.” The letter states: “As a concerned
citizen of my beloved country, I would like to ask from you
personally if it is just alright for an employee of your agency to
be a lawyer of an accused gov’t employee having a pending
case in the CSC. I honestly think this is a violation of law and
unfair to others and your office. I have known that a person
have been lawyered by one of your attorny in the region 4
office. He is the chief of the Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya
na division. He have been helping many who have pending
cases in the CSC. The justice in our govt system will not be
served if this will continue. Please investigate this anomaly xx.”
Chairperson David issued an order to back up all the files in
the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and
Legal divisions. Backing up was witnessed by the employees
and the files were turned over to Chairperson David. It was
found that there were draft pleadings or letters in connection
with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On
the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-
Cause Order dated January 11, 2007, requiring Pollo , who
had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or
counter-affidavit.
separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and
not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any
means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that
being in the public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like
friends, associates and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him
seemed a trivial request.
3. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that
they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office
computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or
human means. The CSC regulation declaring a no-privacy expectation on the use of government-owned
computers logically follows from the statutory rule that government-owned property shall be used “solely”
for a public purpose.
4. A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-
related misconduct. A formal administrative investigation ensued and later search warrants were secured
by the police department. The initial remote search of the hard drive of petitioner’s computer, as well as
the subsequent warrantless searches was held as valid under the O’Connor ruling that a public employer
can investigate work-related misconduct so long as any search is justified at inception
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

Pollo denied being the one referred to in the letter complaint

because he is not a lawyer and neither is he “lawyering” for
people with cases in the CSC. He asserts that the CSC officials
unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer,
and subsequently asking him to submit his comment which
violated his right against self- incrimination. He pointed out that
though government property, the temporary use and
ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum of
Receipt (MR) is ceded to the employee who may exercise all
attributes of ownership, including its use for personal
purposes.

The CSC issued a Resolution finding prima facie case against

the Pollo and charging him with Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). He was
investigated administratively.

32 Philippine Savings Bank v.
Senate Impeachment Court, G.R.
No. 200238, February 9, 2012
Petitioners Philippine Savings Bank (PSBank) and Pascual M. Whether or not
Garcia III, as President of PSBank, filed a Petition for Certiorari petitioner PSBank
and Prohibition seeking to nullify and set aside the Resolution should testify to the
of respondent Senate of the Republic of the Philippines, sitting foreign accounts of SC
as an Impeachment Court, which granted the prosecution's Chief Justice Corona.
requests for subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum to
PSBank and/or its representatives requiring them to testify and
produce before the Impeachment Court documents relative to
the foreign currency accounts that were alleged to belong to
then Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
(NOTE: On November 20, 2012, the petition was rendered moot and academic for reasons stated in the
facts of this case.)
A clear right to maintain the confidentiality of the foreign currency deposits of the Chief Justice is provided
under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act of the
Philippines (RA 6426). This law establishes the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits
Under R.A. No. 6426 there is only a single exception to the secrecy of foreign currency deposits,
that is, disclosure is allowed only upon the written permission of the depositor. In Intengan v. Court
of Appeals, the Court ruled that where the accounts in question are U.S. dollar deposits, the applicable
law is not Republic Act No. 1405(Bank Secrecy Law) but RA 6426.
Acting on the Special Civil Actions for Certiorari and Prohibition
with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, the Court resolves to:
(a) REQUIRE the respondents to COMMENT on the petition
NOT LATER THAN ten (10) days from receipt hereof; and
(b) ISSUE A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER in the
petition, enjoining the respondents from implementing the
Subpoena Ad Testificandum et Duces Tecum
(NOTE: On November 5, 2012, and during the pendency of
this petition, petitioners filed a Motion with Leave of Court to
Withdraw the Petition averring that subsequent events have
overtaken the petition and that, with the termination of the
impeachment proceedings against former Chief Justice
Corona, they are no longer faced with the dilemma of either
violating Republic Act No. 6426 (RA 6426) or being held in
contempt of court for refusing to disclose the details of the
subject foreign currency deposits.)
These two laws both support the confidentiality of bank deposits. There is no conflict between them.
Republic Act No. 1405 was enacted for the purpose of giving encouragement to the people to deposit
their money in banking institutions and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may be properly
utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the country. It covers all
bank deposits in the Philippines and no distinction was made between domestic and foreign deposits.
Thus, Republic Act No. 1405 is considered a law of general application. On the other hand, Republic Act
No. 6426 was intended to encourage deposits from foreign lenders and investors. It is a special law
designed especially for foreign currency deposits in the Philippines. A general law does not nullify a
specific or special law. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that Republic Act No. 6426 applies in this case.
The written consent under RA 6426 constitutes a waiver of the depositor’s right to privacy in relation to
such deposit. In the present case, neither the prosecution nor the Impeachment Court has
presented any such written waiver by the alleged depositor, Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. Also,
while impeachment may be an exception to the secrecy of bank deposits under RA 1405, it is not
an exemption to the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits under RA 6426