CASE DIGEST OF LANDMARK CASES

Ethical Norm: Responsiveness to the Public

Case: JAMES J. McCARTHY, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTE ALDANESE,
defendant-appellee
G.R. No. L-19715 (March 5, 1923)1

FACTS:
This is an action in replevin against the Insular Collector of Customs for the recovery of
seven cases of cotton textiles alleged to have been imported into the Philippine Islands
on the Steamship City of Lincoln on or about October 23, 1920, or for the value of said
textiles if physical delivery cannot be made. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
the defendant absolving him from the complaint, from which judgment the plaintiff appeals
to this court.

ISSUE:
Whether the Insular Collector of Customs, a public officer, is liable.

HELD:
No. It is not intimated the defendant has been guilty of personal misfeasance or
malfeasance, but the plaintiff contends that the seven missing cases having disappeared
after coming into the hands of the Customs authorities and their disappearance not having
been satisfactorily explained, it must be presumed that they have been misdelivered. The
Supreme Court, however, finds this contention as clearly untenable. The presumption is
that official duty has been regularly performed and we cannot presume that the Collector
of Customs has delivered the merchandise to a person not entitled thereto. That the
goods have been misdelivered is therefore an affirmative allegation, the proof of which is
incumbent upon the party by whom it is made. If a misdelivery had been made, proof
thereof should not be difficult to obtain; the records of the Customs House are available
for that purpose. The plaintiff failed to prove that there was a misdelivery of the textiles.

Ethical Norm: Political Neutrality

Case: ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO JR., petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent
1
http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1923/mar1923/gr_l-19715_1923.php
G.R. No. 189698 (December 1, 2009)2

FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing Section 4(a)
of Resolution No. 8678 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). In view of pressing
contemporary events, the petition begs for immediate resolution.

Petitioners contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the
assailed Resolution. They aver that the advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections is
intended merely for the purpose of early printing of the official ballots in order to cope with
time limitations. Such advance filing does not automatically make the person who filed
the CoC a candidate at the moment of filing. Petitioners further posit that the provision
considering them as ipso facto resigned from office upon the filing of their CoCs is
discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution.

Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy
(CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection
with the May 10, 2010, National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No.
8678 provide:

SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.- a) Any person holding a public

appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy.

b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered

resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other
elective office or position.

SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.- The certificate of candidacy shall
be filed on regular days, from November 20 to 30, 2009, during office hours, except
on the last day, which shall be until midnight.

Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they
file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold
appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections,
filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-
quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void.

Petitioners contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the
assailed Resolution. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and

2
http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2010/february2010/189698_nachura.php
to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon
the filing of their CoCs.

ISSUE:

Whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and
Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678, are violative of the equal protection clause.

HELD:

Yes. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their
posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants,
specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact
alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions
and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.

In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act
may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4)
requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:

(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;

(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential
treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones
is not germane to the purposes of the law. There is thus no valid justification to treat
appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to
meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure
encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369
and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.