Frege, Russell & Negative Existential Propositions

PH2242 Short Response Essay

A0142356J — Aw Cenxin Clive

November 2, 2019

In this short paper, I will seek to show that negative exisential propositions can serve as a point of
adjudication between Fregean semantics (FS) and Russellian semantics (RS), arguing that RS seems more
viable at tackling this particular sort of propositions

In FS, a singular term’s meaning consists of reference and sense. The exact definition of sense can be
understood as a representation that the speaker has with respect to the singular term’s referent. Meanwhile,
the referent is simply whatever the singular term refers to. Notably, while semantic value might be found
in both aspects, truth value (TV) is found only in the referent of the singular term. What this means is
that under FS, a proposition, for instance,

Nessie is slippery. (1)

might be without TV but still have meaning. This is because Nessie has no referent, but still possesses a
sense. In this way, if a referenceless singular term augments a predicate, the resultant proposition will be,
under FS, necessarily without TV, but not necessarily without meaning.

Russell deals with these sorts of propositions quite differently. For RS, singular terms designate definite
descriptions (eg. Nessie → the seamonster in Loch Ness) that in turn decompose into statements. For
the case of (1), the proposition decomposes to:

1. There is a seamonster in Loch Ness.

2. There is not more than one sea monster in Loch Ness.

3. Whatever is a sea monster in Loch Ness is slippery.

In logical notation, such propositions have the general form:

F is G ⇐⇒ ∃x Fx ∧ ∀y(Fy → y = x) ∧ Gx (2)

That is, F has the property “is G” if and only if there exists some x such that x is F and for every y that
is F, that y is x, and x is G.

1
Enter the aforementioned negative existential propositions (NEPs) - propositions stating something’s non-
existence. For instance,
P¬N : Nessie does not exist. (3)

The problem for FS is quite obvious. Since Nessie as a singular term is referenceless, it results in P¬N
being without TV. This seems intuitively wrong, since P¬N seems true and, thus, not without TV.

The problem seems to go even deeper. One could show that arguing for P¬N having no TV would result
in a latent contradiction under FS. Let’s say a FS theorist “bites the bullet” and says that the intuition
that P¬N has TV is a false one. Now, how would he argue for the conclusion C below?

C : P¬N has no truth value.

It seems to rest on at least one premise emergent from FS:

P3 : If Nessie has no referent, then P¬N has no truth value.1

How is it that Nessie has no referent? It seems the most natural reply from the FS theorist would be
“Well, it’s because Nessie doesn’t actually exist. She isn’t real.” Which is really just P¬N . This translates
to these two preceding premises:

P2 : If P¬N , then Nessie has no referent

P1 : P¬N

One can see where this is going. If P1 is to be affirmed then P1 needs to be actually true. Hence,

P0 : If P¬N , then P¬N has truth value.

Putting P1 and P0 together:

¬C : P¬N has truth value

Hence, it seems that in order to argue for C, one must affirm premises that consequently also deny C.
Which is absurd. Therefore, the FS theorist must find a workaround for these sorts of NEPs.

RS tackles NEPs differently. Since (2) already includes a quantifying aspects, an RS theorist can translate
“F does not exist” to be equivalent to “it is not the case that there is a x such that x is F and for every
y that is F, that y is x”. In logical notation:


F does not exist ⇐⇒ ¬ ∃x Fx ∧ ∀y(Fy → y = x) (4)


Since for referenceless singular terms (such as Nessie) do not exist, then ∃x Fx ∧ ∀y(Fy → y = x) is
false. Making “F does not exist” true. Which is the expected result for NEPs.

In conclusion, it seems, at least regarding NEPs, RS fares better than FS. The FS theorist must thus
tackle the above arguments or modify his framework to make it a more viable option with respect to this
special class of (intriguing) propositions.

1 How FS results in this was argued in earlier paragraphs.

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