Succession Lecture - 28/11/2019

DIAZ vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. L-66574, June 17, 1987

FACTS:
Private respondent filed a Petition with the CFI of Cavite praying among other things, that the
corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her favor and that she be appointed as special
Administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who
together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti
and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa
Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the
widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only
legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual
Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the
time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit:
four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.

Judge declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Jardin was allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero
by Order of the Court. Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, moved to exclude
Felisa Pamuti Jardin dated March 13, 1980, from further taking part or intervening in the settlement
of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estate of Pascual
Santero and Pablo Santero.

Judge excluded Felisa Jardin "from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and
Pablo Santero and declared her to be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court, Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to
the IAC. A decision was rendered reversing the decision of the trial court. Hence this case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners, as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate
child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero.

HELD:
No. The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows — who are the legal heirs of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of
Pablo Santero)?

Petitioners contend in their pleadings that Art. 990 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law on the
case. They contend that said provision of the New Civil Code modifies the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil
Code) and recognizes the right of representation (Art. 970) to descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code denied illegitimate children the right to represent
their deceased parents and inherit from their deceased grandparents, but that Rule was expressly
changed and/or amended by Art. 990 New Civil Code which expressly grants the illegitimate children
the right to represent their deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of their grandmother
Simona Pamuti).
Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary conflict refers solely to the intestate
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the
applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:

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ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from
the illegitimate child. (943a)

Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors
(petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product
of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth,
by avoiding further grounds of resentment. 6

Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to
the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier
provided for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative"
includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. 7 The record shows that from the commencement of
this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir
to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

DIAZ vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. L-66574 February 21, 1990

FACTS:
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who
together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti
and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa
Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the
widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only
legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual
Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the
time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit:
four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

HELD:
No. Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code (Civil Code of
Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the Philippines) constitute a
substantial and not merely a formal change, which grants illegitimate children certain successional
rights. We do not dispute the fact that the New Civil Code has given illegitimate children successional
rights, which rights were never before enjoyed by them under the Old Civil Code. They were during

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that time merely entitled to support. In fact, they are now considered as compulsory primary heirs
under Article 887 of the new Civil Code (No. 5 in the order of intestate succession). Again, We do not
deny that fact. These are only some of the many rights granted by the new Code to illegitimate
children. But that is all. A careful evaluation of the New Civil Code provisions, especially Articles 902,
982, 989, and 990, claimed by petitioners to have conferred illegitimate children the right to
represent their parents in the inheritance of their legitimate grandparents, would in point of fact
reveal that such right to this time does not exist.

Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are
transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children)
who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever
manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are
themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of
representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of
a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of
a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that
"the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion
is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his
father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is
inapplicable to instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother. It may not be amiss to state that Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.

The Court is fully aware of certain substantial changes in our law of succcession, but there is no
change whatsoever with respect to the provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, by the
said substantial change, Article 992, which was a reproduction f Article 943 of the Civil Code of Spain,
should have been suppressed or at least modified to clarify the matters which are now the subject of
the present controversy. While the New Civil Code may have granted successional rights to
illegitimate children, those articles, however, in conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the right of
representation from being exercised where the person to be represented is a legitimate child.
Needless to say, the determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be
represented. If the person to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person to be represented is legitimate,
his illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only his legitimate
descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason of the barrier imposed Article 992. In
this wise, the commentaries of Manresa on the matter in issue, even though based on the old Civil
Code, are still very much applicable to the New Civil Code because the amendment, although
substantial, did not consist of giving illegitimate children the right to represent their natural parents
(legitimate) in the intestate succession of their grandparents (legitimate). It is with the same line of
reasoning that the three aforecited cases may be said to be still applicable to the instant case.

In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the legitimate
family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the
Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in
its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code
allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child
from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an
illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future
revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue
enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or
contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 992 and 998. The first solution would be more
in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on the Reform of
hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quartet 1976, Volume 4,
Number 1, pp. 40-41). (p. 7, Decision; p. 196, Rollo)

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It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is
broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. (Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing p.
2862 Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol. 11, Third Revision, Eight Edition) The record reveals that from the
commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to
be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

It is the Court’s shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral
relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used
in a more restrictive or limited sense — which as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar.

LEONARDO vs. CA
G.R. No. 125485, 13 September 2004

FACTS:
Petitioner Restituta Leonardo is the only legitimate child of the late Sps. Tomasina Paul and Balbino
Leonardo. Private respondents Teodoro, Victor, Corazon, Piedad, et. al, all surnamed Sebastian, are
the illegitimate children of Tomasina with Jose Sebastian after she separated from Balbino Leonardo.
In 1988, private respondent Corazon Sebastian with her niece and a certain Bitang, came to
Restituta’s house to persuade her to sign a deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of Tomasina
Paul and Jose Sebastian. Before signing the document, Restituta allegedly insisted that they wait for
her husband Jose Ramos so he could translate the document which was written in English.
Subsequently, she proceeded to sign the document even without her husband and without reading
the document, on the assurance of private respondent Corazon that she will get her share as a
legitimate daughter. Petitioner then asked private respondent Corazon and her companions to wait
for her husband so he could read the document. When petitioner’s husband arrived, however, private
respondent Corazon and her companions had left without leaving a copy of the document. It was only
when petitioner hired a lawyer that they were able to secure a copy and read the contents thereof.

Petitioner refuted private respondents’ claim that they were the legitimate children and sole heirs of
Jose Sebastian and Tomasina Paul since the latter were never married to each other, thus, the
extrajudicial partition was therefore unlawful and illegal. Petitioner also claimed that her consent was
vitiated because she was deceived into signing the extrajudicial settlement. She further denied having
appeared before a Judge of MTC of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan to acknowledge the execution of the
extrajudicial partition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the consent given by petitioner to the extrajudicial settlement of the estate was given
voluntarily.

HELD:
No. Contracts where consent is given by mistake or because of violence, intimidation, undue influence
or fraud are voidable. These circumstances are defects of the will, the existence of which impairs the
freedom, intelligence, spontaneity, and voluntariness of the party in giving consent to the agreement.
In determining whether consent is vitiated, Courts are given a wide latitude in weighing the facts
considering the age, physical infirmity, intelligence, relationship and the conduct of the parties at the
time of making the contract and subsequent thereto, irrespective of whether the contract is in a
public or private writing.

In this case, private respondents failed to offer any evidence to prove that the extrajudicial settlement
of the estate was explained in a language known to the petitioner, i.e. the Pangasinan dialect. Clearly,
petitioner, who only finished Grade 3, was not in a position to give her free, voluntary and

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spontaneous consent without having the document, which was in English, explained to her in the
Pangasinan dialect.

TEOTICO vs. DEL VAL

GR No. L18753, March 26, 1965

FACTS:
Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She executed a will written in
Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before Notary Public by her and the witnesses.
Among the legacies made in the will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was married to the
testatrix’s niece, Josefina Mortera. The usufruct of Maria’s interest in the Calvo Building were left to
the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her grandchildren, the
legitimate children of said spouses. Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole and universal heir to all
the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by will. Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the
probate of the will but was opposed by Ana del Val Chan, claiming that she was an adopted child of
Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased brother of
Maria), that said will was not executed as required by law and that Maria as physically and mentally
incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution and was executed under duress, threat, or
influence of fear.

ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.

HELD:
No. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding is that he must have an interest in the estate, will or in the property to be affected by
either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an heir or one who has a
claim against it as creditor. Under the terms of the will, defendant has no right to intervene because
she has no such interest in the estate either as heir, executor or administrator because it did not
appear therein any provision designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of the estate. She could
have acquired such right if she was a legal heir of the deceased but she is not under the CIVIL CODE.
Even if her allegations were true, the law does not give her any right to succeed the estate of the
deceased sister of both Jose and Francisca because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law
from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father and that relationship established by
adoption is limited solely to the adopter and adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the
adopting parents except only as expressly provided by law. As a consequence, she is an heir of the
adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.

Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in the probate
proceeding.

CORPUS vs. CORPUS

G.R. No. L-22469, 23 October 1978, 85 SCRA 567

FACTS:
In 1939, Teodoro R. Yangco, who had no forced heirs, died in Manila at the age of 75. His will dated
August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila and the decree of probate was
then affirmed.

At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half
sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L.
Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of
his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita later died.

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Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas
Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas
Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus.

Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition was submitted by the administrator
and the legatees named in the will. That project of partition was opposed by the estate of Luis R.
Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be declared because the will does not
contain an institution of heir. It was also opposed by Atty. Cruz, who represented Juanita Corpus,
Pedro Martinez and Juliana de Castro. Juanita Corpus was already dead when Atty. Cruz appeared as
her counsel. Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partion was not in conformity with
the will because the testator intended that the estate should be “conserved” and not physically
partitioned. Later, the probate court approved the project of partition.

From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the estate of Luis
R. Yangco appealed, but was dismissed after the legatees and the appellants entered into
compromise agreements. Herein appellant Tomas Corpus signed that compromise settlement as the
sole heir of Juanita Corpus. The estate of Luis R. Yangco entered into a similar compromise agreement
and the resolution dismissing the appeal became, final and executory.

In 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed an action in the Court of First Instance
of Manila to recover his supposed share in Yangco intestate estate but the trial court dismissed the
action on the grounds of res judicata and laches. Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals but
the latter court endorsed the case to the SC since it covers real property valued at more than
50,000.00.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Tomas Corpus may inherit from Teodoro Yangco.

HELD:
No. The SC ruled in the negative, because his mother (Juanita Corpus) does not have the right to
inherit via intestacy from his half-blood brother.

Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita
Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, the SC hold that appellant
Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother,
Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco’s estate.

Accordingly, Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession
between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.

Also, Article 943 of the old Civil code prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between
legitimate and illegitimate relatives.

The rule in article 943 of the old Civil Code is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides
that “an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child”.

That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the
legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child.
Article 992 of the Civil Code also provides that “an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child”.

Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, “if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child
should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who acknowledged
such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall

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inherit from it share and share alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children
shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for
legitimate brothers and sisters.”

Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco’s half brothers on the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to
succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy.

PARISH PRIEST OF VICTORIA vs. RIGOR

G.R. No. L-22036, April 30, 1979

FACTS:
Testator (Father Rigor) left a will with named devisees constituting his three sisters: Florencia
Rigor-Escobar, Belina RigorManaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao as well as his cousin, Fortunato
Gamalinda. Also, he devised the 44-has of riceland infavor to anyone of his nearest male relatives
who would pursue an ecclesiastical career until his ordination as a priest. The lower court approved
and all devises was partitioned and delivered except for the 44-ha riceland. Inasmuch as no nephew
of the testator claimed the devise and as the administratrix (Florencia Rigor – Escobar) and the legal
heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer the 44-ha ricelands was not
delivered to the church.

After thirteen years, the parish priest of Victoria petition that ricelands be delivered to the church
contending that the testator's grandnephew was studying for the priesthood at the San Jose Seminary.
The intestate heirs countered petition that the bequest be declared inoperative since petitioner
admitted that "no nearest male relative of the testator" has ever studied for the priesthood.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the testator’s nearest male relative who took the priesthood after the testator’s
death falls within the intention of the testator in providing to whom the bequest is to be given.

HELD:
No. The High Court found no merit on the petition. Citing Article 1025 of the Civil Code, the High
Court held that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time of his
death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. In order to be capacitated to inherit, the devisee
must be living at the moment the succession opens. The bequest refers to the testator's nephew who
was living at the time of his death, when his succession was opened and the successional rights to his
estate became vested, rests on a judicious and unbiased reading of the terms of the will.

Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable
conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the
administration of the ricelands by the church, as envisaged in the will, was likewise inoperative.

Concurring with the appellate court, the High Tribunal emphasized that if the devise for any reason
should become ineffective, it shall be merged into the mass of the estate (Art 956) and legal
succession shall take place with respect to the property not effectively disposed (Art 960 [2]).

CAYETANO vs. LEONIDAS

G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the respondent judge of the
CFI of Manila, which admitted to and allowed the probate of the last will and testament of Adoracion
C. Campos, after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by herein private respondent.

Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private
respondents as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he

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executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he
adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.

Eleven months after, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased,
Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.

Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and that her last will
and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered in Philadelphia.

An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by petitioner alleging that the will in question is a
forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American
laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would work
injustice and injury to him.

The respondent judge issued an order stating that the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion is
admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines, and appointed Nenita Campos Paguia as
Administratrix of the estate of said decedent.

Petitioner died and left a will, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament.
Cayetano, filed a motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the instant case which was granted by
the court.

Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge acted without or in excess
of his jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the
reprobate of Adoracion’s will.

HELD:
No. As a general rule, the probate court’s authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will,
the due execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after
the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated,
the court should meet the issue.

In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate of
Adoracion’s will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law
for him.

This contention is without merit.

Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent
judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established
that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.

Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:

Art. 16 par. (2).

xxx xxx xxx

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,

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 shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found.

Art. 1039.

Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

the law which governs Adoracion Campos’ will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national
law of the decedent.

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by
Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply.

Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit.
Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided that:

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the CFI of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in
an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record.

BORROMEO-HERRERA vs. BORROMEO

G.R. No. L-41171. July 23, 1987

FACTS:
Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died on March 13, 1952,
inParanaque, Rizal at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties inthe
province of Cebu.

On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for
theprobate of a one page document as the last will and testament left by the said deceased,devising
all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equaland undivided
shares, and designating Junquera as executor thereof.

After due trial, the probate court held that the document presented as the will of the deceasedwas a
forgery. The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings.

After determining the intestate heirs of the decedent, the court ordered that the assets of
theintestate estate of Vito Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed inequal
and equitable shares among the 9 declared intestate heirs.

On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as heir underthe
forged will, filed a motion before the trial court praying that he be declared as one of theheirs of the
deceased Vito Borromeo, alleging that he is an illegitimate son of the deceased andthat in the
declaration of heirs made by the trial court, he was omitted, in disregard of the lawmaking him a
forced heir entitled to receive a legitime like all other forced heirs. As anacknowledged illegitimate
child, he stated that he was entitled to a legitime equal in every caseto four-fifths of the legitime of an
acknowledged natural child.

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Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already barred by the order of the courtdated
April 12, 1969 declaring the persons named therein as the legal heirs of the deceasedVito Borromeo,
the court dismissed the motion on June 25, 1973.

Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the memorandum he submitted tosupport
his motion for reconsideration, Fortunato changed the basis for his claim to a portion ofthe estate. He
asserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967, supposedly signed by
Pilar N. Borromeo, Maria B. Putong, Jose Borromeo, Canuto V. Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo,
Patrocinio Borromeo-Herrera, Marcial Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V. Borromeo,
Consuelo B. Morales, Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B.Talam In the waiver, five of the nine heirs
relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputedestate. The motion was opposed on the ground
that the trial court, acting as a probate court,had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim; that
respondent Fortunato Borromeo isestopped from asserting the waiver agreement; that the waiver
agreement is void as it was executed before the declaration of heirs; that the same is void having
been executed before thedistribution of the estate and before the acceptance of the inheritance; and
that it is void abinitio and inexistent for lack of subject matter.

On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial court concluding that the five declared heirswho
signed the waiver agreement assigning their hereditary rights to Fortunato Borromeo hadlost the
same rights, declared the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo.

It is argued by the petitioner that the document entitled " waiver of Hereditary Rights" executedon
July 31, 1967, aside from having been cancelled and revoked on June 29, 1968, by TomasL. Borromeo,
Fortunato Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo, is without force and effect becausethere can be no
effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid acceptance ofthe inheritance the
heirs intend to transfer. Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil Code, to makeacceptance or repudiation
of inheritance valid, the person must be certain of the death of theone from whom he is to inherit
and of his right to the inheritance. Since the petitioner and herco-heirs were not certain of their right
to the inheritance until they were declared heirs, theirrights were, therefore, uncertain. This view,
according to the petitioner, is also supported by Article 1057 of the same Code which directs heirs,
devicees, and legatees to signify their acceptance or repudiation within thirty days after the court
has issued an order for the distribution of the estate.

Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand, contends that under Article 1043 of theCivil
Code there is no need for a person to be first declared as heir before he can accept orrepudiate an
inheritance. What is required is that he must first be certain of the death of theperson from whom he
is to inherit and that he must be certain of his right to the inheritance. Hepoints out that at the time
of the signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, thesignatories to the waiver document
were certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead as wellas of their rights to the inheritance as
shown in the waiver document itself.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an acceptance or renunciation of inheritance, in order to be valid, must bepreceded
by a court declaration that the person making the acceptance or renunciation isindeed an heir.

HELD:
No. The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that "the properties included in
anexisting inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs,
who by fiction of law continue the personality of the former. Nor do such properties have the
character of future property, because the heirs acquire a right to succession from themoment of the
death of the deceased, by principle established in article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil
Code, according to which the heirs succeed the deceased by the merefact of death. More or less, time
may elapse from the moment of the death of the deceased untilthe heirs enter into possession of the
hereditary property, but the acceptance in any eventretroacts to the moment of the death, in
accordance with article 989 of the Civil Code. The rightis vested, although conditioned upon the
adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion."The heirs, therefore, could waive their
hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition theestate was issued only in 1969.

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In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to
beeffective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2)
theknowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right. The intention
towaive a right or advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof
ofintention rests in what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative
of an intent to, voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage that no other reasonable
explanation of his conduct is possible.

The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver document did not havethe
clear and convincing intention to relinquish their rights,

Thus: (1) On October 27, 1967.Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading entitled
"Compliance" wherein theysubmitted a proposal for the amicable settlement of the case. In that
Compliance, they proposedto concede to all the eight (8) intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all
properties, personal and real,including all cash and sums of money in the hands of the Special
Administrator, as of October31, 1967, not contested or claimed by them in any action then pending in
the Court of FirstInstance of Cebu. In turn, the heirs would waive and concede to them all the 14
contested lots. In this document, the respondent recognizes and concedes that the petitioner, like the
othersignatories to the waiver document, is an heir of the deceased Vito Borromeo, entitled to
sharein the estate. This shows that the "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" was never meant to be what the
respondent now purports it to be. Had the intent been otherwise, there would not be any reasonfor
Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to mention the heirs in the offer to settle the caseamicably,
and offer to concede to them parts of the estate of the deceased;

(2) On April 21 and30, 1969, the majority of the declared heirs executed an Agreement on how the
estate theyinherited shall be distributed. This Agreement of Partition was approved by the trial court
on August 15, 1969;

(3) On June 29, 1968, the petitioner, among others, signed a documententitled Deed of Assignment"
purporting to transfer and assign in favor of the respondent andTomas and Amelia Borromeo all her
(Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and participationas an intestate heir in the estate of the
deceased Vito Borromeo. The stated consideration forsaid assignment was P100,000.00;

(4) On the same date, June 29, 1968, the respondentTomas, and Amelia Borromeo (assignees in the
aforementioned deed of assignment) in turnexecuted a "Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of the
heirs-assignors named in the same deed ofassignment. The stated consideration was P50,000.00;

(5) A Cancellation of Deed of Assignment and Deed of Reconveyance was signed by Tomas Borromeo
and Amelia Borromeoon October 15, 1968, while Fortunato Borromeo signed this document on
March 24, 1969.

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