1- Liaqat Hussain v Federation

5 constitutional petitions were filed calling out an ordinance, through which Military
courts were established where civilians could be tried, as violating different provisions of
Constitution (Art 175 Establishment and Jurisdiction of Courts “Establishment of a parallel
tribunal system”, Art 9 Guarantee to life “Since Military courts were deemed to be
unconstitutional so they are infringing the right to life of people tried in these courts”, Art 25
Equality of Citizens “Denies citizens equality before law as the crimes of different natures
have the same punishment” etc.)
The defendants in this case referred to Article 245 which is Functions of Armed Forces, they
relied on the term “aid of civil power”
The ordinance XII of 1998 was held to be unconstitutional.
2- Muhammad Ayub V Chairman SC:-
Muhammad Ayub took 2000 rupees as illegal gratification and was tried under section
161 of PPC and Section 5 of Prevention of corruption act but wasn’t found guilty and was
acquitted. Under Departmental proceedings he was held liable and was awarded retirement.
Case was of double jeopardy
Article 13 of Constitution “No person shall be prosecuted or punished for the same offence
more than once”
Court holds that criminal infringement is different from private rights, and is punishable
under criminal law.
Petition Dismissed.
3- Plessy v Ferguson
A Louisiana statute required railroad companies to provide separate, but equal
accommodations for its Black and White passengers.
Was the statute requiring separate, but equal accommodations on railroad transportation consistent
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution?
Yes, The State Supreme Court is affirmed.
Justice Henry Brown (J. Brown) stated that although the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution was designed to enforce the equality between the races, it was not intended to abolish
distinctions based on color, or to enforce a commingling of the races in a way unsatisfactory to
either. Laws requiring the separation of the races do not imply the inferiority of either. Laws
enacted in good faith, for the promotion of the public good and not for the annoyance or
oppression of another race are reasonable. As such, the statute was reasonable.
This case marks the beginning of the “separate but equal” doctrine. It is later overturned by
Brown v. Board of Education.
4- Asfand Yar Wali Khan Case
http://courtingthelaw.com/2019/05/08/laws-judgments-2/judgment-analysis/supreme-
courts-judgment-in-2001-regarding-national-accountability-bureau/

5- DeShaney Joshua v Winnebago Case

DeShany was a four-year old boy from Winnebago, Wisconsin. He was severely beaten by
his father, resulting brain damage and comma. Department of Social Services received numerous
complaints of the abuse and took various steps to protect the child. The Department did not,
however, remove Joshua from his father’s custody. Ms. DeShaney subsequently sued the
Department. She contended that the Department had deprived the child of his “liberty interest in
bodily integrity, in violation of his rights under the substantive component of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, by failing to intervene to protect him against his father’s
violence.”

The Due Process Clause does not impose a special duty on the state to provide services to the
public for protection against private actors if the state did not create those harms.

Thus, the Court concluded, “[t]he Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to
governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property
interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.

6- Roth v U.S.

Roth operated a book-selling business in New York and was convicted of mailing obscene
circulars through the mail for advertising and selling a publication called American Aphrodite
containing literary erotica and nude photography, a book that was in violation of a federal
obscenity statute.

Does prohibiting the sale or transfer of obscene materials through the mail, infringe upon the
freedom of expression as guaranteed by the First Amendment?
The Court held that obscenity was not "within the area of constitutionally protected speech or
press." The First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance or form of expression,
such as materials that were "utterly without redeeming social importance."

The Court defined obscenity more strictly, and held that the test to determine obscenity was
"whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to indecent interest."

7- Dada Amir Khan Case

Dada Amir Haider Khan was an "old political worker" of "Communist Thought". He
applied for the issuance of a passport in 1974 but his application was refused in 1975. The case
was decided in his favour.

Whether non-issuance of passport to Mr Dada Amir Khan was unconstitutional and that
government was not empowered to do such an act?

The court stated that both Article 9 (Security of person) and article 4(2) (Right of individual to be
dealt with in accordance with law etc.) of the constitution does not allow any action detrimental to
liberty of the person except in accordance with the law. Similarly, article 15 (Freedom of
movement, etc.) allows every citizen to enter, leave and move freely in Pakistan. Thus, these
articles allow every citizen liberty to go abroad and to re‑enter Pakistan for which Passport is
essential.

The court reasoned that although under the Passport Act the government do possess the right to
regulate the entry and exit of people into Pakistan but this discretion of the government must be
exercised fairly, reasonably, in good faith, in an non-arbitrary fashion and in pursuance of the
purpose for which the act was enacted.

The court also noted that right to leave Pakistan is closely associated with the right to association
and free will and is very important to inform oneself considering the present nature of the world.

8- Alamdar Hussain v. Abdul Baseer Qureshi

The petitioner, a police sub-inspector, and two others were accused of torturing a person
while he was in police custody, as a result of which the person died subsequently. The case was
first tried under a special military court but since martial law ended the case went to Magistrate
court which closed the case due to lack of evidence. It was reopened after a session judge ordered
for a fresh trial. A petition was filed against a high court which was dismissed so a petition was
filed in Supreme Court.

The petitioner contended that he has been prosecuted before by three different forums, so it is
against the fundamental right provided by Article 13 of the Constitution of 1973, under which, no
person can be prosecuted or punished for the same offence more than once.

The court observed that the fundamental rights provided by the constitution are suspended by
Article 2(3) (The Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II of the Constitution, and
all proceedings pending in any Court, insofar as they are or the enforcement of any of those
Rights, shall stand suspended.) of “The Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977”. So, no
proceeding for their enforcement is presently competent. But the court discussed the merits of the
case.

The Court first analysed the word prosecution in Article 13 and concluded that, “prosecution”
means “commencing, conducting and carrying a suit to a conclusion in a court of justice.” So,
Article 13 gives protection against double punishment, once the prosecution has finally concluded
either in acquittal or conviction a fresh prosecution for the same offence would be barred.But
none of the forums who tried the case pursued it to the end, so it cannot be said that the
prosecution is complete.

9- Mamukanjan Cotton Factory V Punjab Province & Others (PLD 1975 SC 50)

Petitioners were owners of cotton-ginning factories run by diesel engine. The

government passed a law “West Punjab cotton Act 1949”, under which factories were
charged with a cotton fee. However, the definition of factory under the act did not include
ginning factories run by diesel. The petitioner was still asked to make the payments to the
government. On filing of complain, the court ruled it to be ultra-vires (outside of powers
granted). The Government than passed the West Pakistan ordinance to rectify this and add
diesel run factories under the definition of factories that were to be charged originally.

The court in another case “Chaudhry brothers cotton ginning factory V E.A Bahawalnagar”,
ruled that the government can retain the charges collected (when it did not have the power to
do so) and adjust it for future payments rather than returning it. However, the government
refused to adjust the charges taken from the petitioner and sent further notices for the
missed/due payments.

The question than was “Can the legislation undo the court’s decision”? And it was held that
No, it cannot. Legislative is always legislating on remedial and curative matters. The
judiciary doesn’t cut out on the powers of legislature and likewise, legislature cannot do it
too.

10- Kesaanand Bharati case:

Bharti, chief of a religious sect in Kerala, bought land under its name. The
Government by virtue of Kerala land reform act 1963 and Kerala land reform (amendment)
act 1969; had the right to acquire so of this land for economic purposes. The petitioner sought
to have certain fundamental rights enforced through court, during which time another land
amendment was passed by government, Kerala land reform amendment 1971.

In order to understand this case, the Golanknath judgment needs to be studied since it
basically stated that the parliament does not have the power to amend the constitution, only
apply it. The court in that case ruled that Article 368 in fact did only tell the procedure and
not confers amending powers upon the parliament. Golaknath case led to the parliament
passing the 24th, 25th and 29th amendment, strengthening the power of the parliament to
amend the constitution.

In bharti case, Petitioner argued that the power of the parliament to amend the constitution is
limited by the constitution itself. And their fundamental rights are protected on basis of basic
structure theory.

Respondent argued that Parliament is supreme and thus has unlimited power to amend the
constitution, based on the supremacy of Parliament theory.

Ruling: Parliament can pass any amendment as long as they don’t violate or infringe the basic
structure theory.

Doctrine of Basic Structure: The constitutional amendment can be struck down on two
reasons

1- The procedure is not followed.

 2- It does not fit in the constitution as a whole.

11- Mehtabjan Case

Municipal committee issued notice to all people practicing prostitution in Serai Beli
Ram area to vacate their land, in accordance with section 152 of Punjab Municipal Act, as it
harms the morals of all residents of the locality.

whether section 152 of the Punjab Muncipal Act violates Article 11 and Article 12 of the
Constitution of Pakistan 1956 since prostitution is not expressly prohibited by any law and
thus is not unlawful.

Article 11 of 1956 Constitution “freedom of movement: Subject to any restriction imposed by

law: every citizen shall have the right to move freely, reside and settle in Pakistan.”

Article 12 of 1956 constitution “freedom of profession: “ Every citizen, possessing such

qualification, if any, as may be prescribed by law in relation to his profession or occupation,
shall have the right to enter upon any lawful profession or occupation, and to conduct any
lawful trade or business.”

Provided that the Article shall prevent:

(a) The regulation of any trade or profession by a licensing system”

Section 152 of Punjab Municipal Act:

“The committee may, by public notice, prohibit in any specified part of the municipality:

(a) The keeping of a brothel

(b) Residence of any person who practices prostitution

(c) After issuing of this notice still resides within the prohibited area shall be punished with
imprisonment

Held: Section 152 does not violate Article 11 and 12 of the constitution because:
(a) Every fundamental right has to be read in accordance with morality and decency which
is fundamental features of the constitution even if not expressly mentioned AND Prostitution
an indecent profession and can not be openly practiced.

(b) Any profession and trade can be restricted to a particular locality (especially if they have
aggravating factors like school, hospitals etc in their vicinity) and there is nothing unlawful
about it.

(c) Article 12 expressly allows restriction of profession through a system of licensing,

however it is not practical in every case (like the one in hand) to provide license to every
worker and in such cases an act itself can impose such restriction through its provision. This
is done by section 152 of the Punjab Municipal act.

(d) Article 11 is not violated because the Municipal act is only asking them to change their
locality in accordance with the Punjab Act and the Constitution and not altogether prohibiting
their right to reside elsewhere.

Petition dismissed.

12- Abdul Aziz Case

The appellants were in preventive detention for six months by the West Pakistan
Government which was extended from time to time. These orders were made under S. 3 of
the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949. The condition of such an order was "to prevent any
person from acting in any manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public
order". It is provided by the section that no order of detention or of extension of detention
shall be for a period of more than six months at a time. Another provision included in this
section enables the Government at any time to release a person detained under the statute.

This act allowed the detention of a person for a period in excess of three months which was
against article 7(4) of 1956 Constitution "No law providing for preventive detention shall
authorise the detention of a person for a period exceeding three months unless the appropriate
Advisory Board has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that
there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for such detention.”

The article 7(5) states that when any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under
any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as
may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall
afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. Provided that
the authority making any such order may refuse to disclose facts which such authority
considers being against the public interest to disclose."

Whether the section 3 of the Punjab Public Safety Act is violating article 7(4) and article 7(5)
of the Constitution by not providing the provision for the advisory board and not making the
provision for communicating the grounds of detention and the allowance of counsel?

The court stated that clause (5) of Article 7 guarantees certain rights to the detenu, but does
not prescribe that the detention law such as the statute must necessarily contain such
corresponding provision and that authority can refrain from disclosing fact if they deem
against the public order.

The court observed that article 7(4) is not of organic nature i.e. it does not authorize the
making of laws nor does it impose the conditions upon making laws relating to preventive
detention. In Article 7, there are general statements which are actually operating as a statute
giving a detailed character and do need a statute enabling the right provided in this article.

(Article 7 (detention) of the Constitution does not hit the case, since it is not very substantive
in nature. It lays down a procedure, just a like statue does.)

13- Marbury v Madison

https://www.britannica.com/event/Marbury-v-Madison

14- Miranda v Arizona

https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/criminal-procedure/criminal-procedure-keyed-to-
israel/police-interrogation-and-confessions/miranda-v-arizona-2/

15- Rhode Island v Innis

Innis was convicted of murder, robbery and kidnapping. When arrested, Innis was unarmed
and read his Miranda rights. The arresting officers suspected that a gun was hidden close to
where he was apprehended. Innis told the officers that he knew his rights and wanted an
attorney. After being placed in the back of a squad car, the officers began discussing their
concerns regarding the location of the gun and its proximity to a nearby handicapped school.
In response, Innis disclosed the location of the gun to the officers because he did not want
any children to get hurt. At trial, the judge held that Innis had properly received his Miranda
rights and that the officers addressing their concerns for the children in the presence of Innis
were understandable. As a result, the gun and the statement were introduced at trial.

On appeal, the state supreme court reversed the trial court’s decision. The Supreme Court of the
United States granted Certiorari.

Under Miranda is a person interrogated when they are in a squad car with an officer who
expresses their concerns for the safety of the public? No.

The Court reversed the state supreme court’s judgment.

An interrogation for purposes of Miranda occurs when an officer should reasonably know that
their own comments may elicit an incriminating statement by a suspect. When statements are
made amongst officers, those statements do not qualify as an interrogation. Here, the facts do not
indicate that the officers actually knew or should have known that Innis would confess to the guns
location based on his sensitivity for handicapped children.

16- Jibendra Kishore Case 1957

o East Pakistan State Acquisition and tenancy Act

o Which allowed the provincial government to acquire and distribute land.
o Section 3 and 5 of the Act were allegedly violating fundamental rights (Equal
protection before law and freedom of religion)
o The Court said that the provisions were not violating fundamental rights on
its face, hence the act could still be functional.
o But you can still come before the court and establish that your land has been
acquired illegally.