 DOES THE DISTRICT COURT OF JERUSALEM HAVE JURISDICTION TO

TRY THE CASE IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT EICHMANN IS A FOREIGN

NATIONAL AND CRIMES WERE COMMITTED ON FOREIGN
TERRITORY?

ANSWER: The first point of discussion or argument of this case would be base on the
principle of state jurisdiction mainly focusing on universality principle to illustrate and
determine Israel’s jurisdiction over this case. Under this principle each and every state
has jurisdiction to try particular offences. The basis for this is that the crimes are
regarded as particularly offensive to the international community as a whole. For
instance war crimes which such crimes clearly belong to the sphere of the universal
jurisdiction. However, The Charter of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the Statutes
of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court all confirm that courts can exercise
jurisdiction over grave crimes under international law regardless of the official capacity
of the accused at the time of the crime or later, be it a head of state, head or member of
government, member of parliament or other elected or governmental capacity. The fact
that no one is above the law was confirmed when the British House of Lords ruled in
Pinochet case had no right to immunity from prosecution as a former head of state. Thus
the actions of Eichmann’s being no different from war crimes, it means that Israel is
justified in the trial of Eichmann before their court due to universal jurisdiction.
Eichmann who was convicted and brought to trial in Israel under the Israeli law of 1951
for war crimes and crimes against the Jewish people and crimes against humanity was
clearly justified and lawful because international law was in need of legislatives and
judicial organs of every state to give effect to its criminal interdictions in bringing
criminals of war to trial. However Article 49 of the Geneva Red Cross convention 1949
also made provision supporting universal jurisdiction over grave breaches and criminal
offences like war crimes and crimes against humanity. Although the fact that the crimes
were committed prior to the establishment of Israel did not prevent the correct
applications of its powers pursuant to universal jurisdiction under international law
instead Israel municipal law merely reflected the reiterated offences existing under
international law. However, the territorial principle has also quite definitely a purpose
in the area of practice and procedure. Already in 1928, Donnedieu de Vabres had asked
to regulate international criminal law so as to warrant as completely as possible the
 elucidation of truth, the punishment of the guilty and the acquittal of the innocent. These
claims are best met by the territorial principle; for only in proceedings respecting this
principle is it possible to compel, in case of need, the appearance of witnesses by
applying compulsory measures of the State. Outside the territorial principle, there are
no such means of compulsion aimed at the elucidation of truth and the realization of
justice. No state has the legal means to cause foreign witnesses outside its territory to
appear in one of its tribunals and to give evidence. This objection in the area of practice
and procedure exists to a far greater extent in respect of the trial of Eichmann in Israel;
for according to a statement made in the Parliament of Israel by the Minister of Justice
of Israel, Rosen, witnesses prepared to give evidence in the imminent trial in favour of
the Accused Eichmann could not expect to be granted immunity. If in the Leipzig trials
the majority of foreign witnesses did not appear despite the grant of immunity by the
German Government, it is to be expected that in the Eichmann trial no witness for the
Defense will come forward at all in order to give evidence, the more so as many of the
persons capable of doing so are exposed to prosecution and punishment, in view of the
exceedingly wide scope of Sec. 3 (a) of the “Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment)
Law” which provides for up to seven years imprisonment for the mere membership in
an “enemy organization.”

 IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, IS JURISDICTION NEGATED BY THE

ABDUCTION OF THE ACCUSED FROM A FOREIGN COUNTRY?

ANSWER: The second basis of the argument in this case is on the basis principle of rendition.
This principle was adopted and illustrated under the international Law commission which
adopted a draft criminal code of crimes against peace and security of mankind in 1991. Article
6 provides that a state in whose territory an individual alleged to have committed a crime
against the peace and security of mankind is present shall try or extradite him. At his point in
time Israel could argue that they were entitle extradite Eichmann by means of bilateral
extradition treaty. But although the abduction and removal of Eichmann wasn’t done in by
following due process but Israel could also argue that they are not in violation of Argentina’s
sovereignty because the abduction of Eichmann was carried out by a group of volunteers
(Mossad) whom were not supported by the government of Israel or not emanation of Israel
state. The abduction would have been wrong and unjust or even a violation of sovereignty of
Argentina if it was done by an emanation of state of Israel or the government of Israel itself.
in Foster, A and others v. British Gas plc [3] states that a body, whatever its legal form, which
has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the state, for providing a public
service under the control of the state and has for that purpose special powers beyond that which
result from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals is an emanation of the
state but on the other hand a state is not liable for actions or crimes committed by a group or
private individuals not an emanation of that state so therefore by relating this illustration to the
case at hand it can be argued that Israel is not in violation of Argentina’s sovereignty because
mossad the group of volunteers are not under the control of the state or owned by the state.

Another basis of the argument in this case is on the basis of Crime against the Jewish people
which he committed, An offence under section 1(a) of this law, in that during the period from
August 1941 to May 1945 in the territories and areas on this convention, he together with others
subjected millions of Jews to the living condition which were likely to bring about their
physical destruction in order to implement the plan which was known as the “Final solution of
the Jewish Question “with intent to exterminate the Jewish people. The accused together with
others carries out these acts by adopting methods; sudden mass arrests of innocent Jews,
without judicial process and only because of their being Jews and their torture in concentration
camps, such as those at Dachau and Buchanwald. And the organization of mass persecution by
means of arrests, cruel beatings, the infliction of serious injury, of approximately 2,000 Jews
of Germany and Austria on the night between the 9th and 10th November 1938; Putting into
practice the laws know as “the Nuremberg law” for the purpose of depriving millions of Jews
in all those countries specified in the first court of their human rights. Also the accused carried
out these acts with the intention of destroying the Jewish people. Furthermore, The Crime
against the Jewish people defined on the pattern of the genocide crime defined in the
convention for the prevention and punishment of genocide which was adopted by the United
Nations Assembly on 9 December 1948. The crime against humanity and the war crime are
defined on the pattern of crimes of identical designations defined in the charter of the
international Military Tribunal (which is the statute of the Nuremberg Court) annexed to the
Four power Agreement of 8 August 1945 on the subject of the trial of the principal war
criminals (the London Agreement), and also in law No10 of the control council of Germany of
20 December 1945.

Also the abduction of Eichmann can also be justified on the basis of necessity.