Part Two

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 164815 : September 3, 2009]
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
For resolution is the Letter-Appeal1 of Senior Inspector (Sr. Insp.) Jerry C. Valeroso
(Valeroso) praying that our February 22, 2008 Decision2 and June 30, 2008 Resolution3
be set aside and a new one be entered acquitting him of the crime of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition.
The facts are briefly stated as follows:
Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused
without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have
in his/her possession and under his/her custody and control
One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing serial no. 52315 with five (5) live
ammo.
without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded "not guilty."5 Trial on the merits ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses: Senior Police Officer (SPO)2
Antonio Disuanco (Disuanco) of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Central
Police District Command; and Epifanio Deriquito (Deriquito), Records Verifier of the
Firearms and Explosives Division in Camp Crame. Their testimonies are summarized as
follows:
On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., Disuanco received a Dispatch Order from the desk
officer directing him and three (3) other policemen to serve a Warrant of Arrest, issued
by Judge Ignacio Salvador, against Valeroso for a case of kidnapping with ransom.6
After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on Valeroso checking his
hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan. Eventually, the team members proceeded to
the Integrated National Police (INP) Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where
they saw Valeroso about to board a tricyle. Disuanco and his team approached Valeroso.
They put him under arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched
him. They found a Charter Arms revolver, bearing Serial No. 52315, with five (5) pieces
of live ammunition, tucked in his waist.7
Valeroso was then brought to the police station for questioning. Upon verification in the
Firearms and Explosives Division in Camp Crame, Deriquito presented a certification8
that the subject firearm was not issued to Valeroso, but was licensed in the name of a
certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.9
On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. (Timbol), and Adrian Yuson
testified for the defense. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in the boarding house of his
children located at Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He was awakened
by four (4) heavily armed men in civilian attire who pointed their guns at him and pulled
him out of the room.10 The raiding team tied his hands and placed him near the faucet
(outside the room) then went back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Moments
later, an operative came out of the room and exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa
loob!"11
Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a standing warrant for his arrest. However,
the raiding team was not armed with a search warrant.12
Timbol testified that he issued to Valeroso a Memorandum Receipt13 dated July 1, 1993
covering the subject firearm and its ammunition, upon the verbal instruction of Col.
Angelito Moreno.14
On May 6, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97, Quezon City, convicted
Valeroso as charged and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. The
gun subject of the case was further ordered confiscated in favor of the government.15
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed16 the RTC decision but the minimum
term of the indeterminate penalty was lowered to four (4) years and two (2) months.
On Petition for Review, we affirmed17 in full the CA decision. Valeroso filed a Motion
for Reconsideration18 which was denied with finality19 on June 30, 2008.
Valeroso is again before us through this Letter-Appeal20 imploring this Court to once
more take a contemplative reflection and deliberation on the case, focusing on his
breached constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure.21
Meanwhile, as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to timely file its
Comment on Valeroso's Motion for Reconsideration, it instead filed a Manifestation in
Lieu of Comment.22
In its Manifestation, the OSG changed its previous position and now recommends
Valeroso's acquittal. After a second look at the evidence presented, the OSG considers
the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense more credible and thus concludes that
Valeroso was arrested in a boarding house. More importantly, the OSG agrees with
Valeroso that the subject firearm was obtained by the police officers in violation of
Valeroso's constitutional right against illegal search and seizure, and should thus be
excluded from the evidence for the prosecution. Lastly, assuming that the subject firearm
was admissible in evidence, still, Valeroso could not be convicted of the crime, since he
was able to establish his authority to possess the gun through the Memorandum Receipt
issued by his superiors.
After considering anew Valeroso's arguments through his Letter-Appeal, together with
the OSG's position recommending his acquittal, and keeping in mind that substantial
rights must ultimately reign supreme over technicalities, this Court is swayed to
reconsider.23
The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration. While
a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is
within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the same, provided it is filed with prior
leave whenever substantive justice may be better served thereby.24
This is not the first time that this Court is suspending its own rules or excepting a
particular case from the operation of the rules. In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,25 despite
the denial of De Guzman's motion for reconsideration, we still entertained his Omnibus
Motion, which was actually a second motion for reconsideration. Eventually, we
reconsidered our earlier decision and remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan for
reception and appreciation of petitioner's evidence. In that case, we said that if we would
not compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities, petitioner would surely
experience the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime which he might not have
committed after all.26 Also in Astorga v. People,27 on a second motion for
reconsideration, we set aside our earlier decision, re-examined the records of the case,
then finally acquitted Benito Astorga of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground
of reasonable doubt. And in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,28 by
virtue of the January 13, 2004 En Banc Resolution, the Court authorized the Special First
Division to suspend the Rules, so as to allow it to consider and resolve respondent's
second motion for reconsideration after the motion was heard on oral arguments. After a
re-examination of the merits of the case, we granted the second motion for
reconsideration and set aside our earlier decision.
Clearly, suspension of the rules of procedure, to pave the way for the re-examination of
the findings of fact and conclusions of law earlier made, is not without basis.
We would like to stress that rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. They are conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the courts in
the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of
judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the balance, technicalities take a backseat to
substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules
would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it would always be within our
power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its operation.29
Now on the substantive aspect.
The Court notes that the version of the prosecution, as to where Valeroso was arrested, is
different from the version of the defense. The prosecution claims that Valeroso was
arrested near the INP Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, while he was about
to board a tricycle. After placing Valeroso under arrest, the arresting officers bodily
searched him, and they found the subject firearm and ammunition. The defense, on the
other hand, insists that he was arrested inside the boarding house of his children. After
serving the warrant of arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom), some of the police
officers searched the boarding house and forcibly opened a cabinet where they discovered
the subject firearm.
After a thorough re-examination of the records and consideration of the joint appeal for
acquittal by Valeroso and the OSG, we find that we must give more credence to the
version of the defense.
Valeroso's appeal for acquittal focuses on his constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure alleged to have been violated by the arresting police officers; and if so,
would render the confiscated firearm and ammunition inadmissible in evidence against
him.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III
of the Constitution which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
From this constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that, as a general rule, the
procurement of a warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly search or seize the
person, house, papers, or effects of any individual.30
To underscore the significance the law attaches to the fundamental right of an individual
against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Constitution succinctly declares in Article
III, Section 3(2), that "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding."31
The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The following are the well-recognized
instances where searches and seizures are allowed even without a valid warrant:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. [Seizure] of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: a) a prior valid intrusion based
on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties; b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have
the right to be where they are; c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and d)
"plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that
the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.32
8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]
9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and
building regulations.33
In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or
seizure, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a
judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause,
the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and
the character of the articles procured.34
In light of the enumerated exceptions, and applying the test of reasonableness laid down
above, is the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition valid? cralawred
We answer in the negative.

For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as an incident to a lawful arrest.
Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. - A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant.
We would like to stress that the scope of the warrantless search is not without limitations.
In People v. Leangsiri,35 People v. Cubcubin, Jr.,36 and People v. Estella,37 we had the
occasion to lay down the parameters of a valid warrantless search and seizure as an
incident to a lawful arrest.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person
arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or
effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest
itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for
and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or
destruction.38
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending
officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in
the permissible area within the latter's reach.39 Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the
seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or
within the area of his immediate control.40 The phrase "within the area of his immediate
control" means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.41 A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested
can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person
arrested.42
In the present case, Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest allegedly for
kidnapping with ransom. At that time, Valeroso was sleeping inside the boarding house
of his children. He was awakened by the arresting officers who were heavily armed. They
pulled him out of the room, placed him beside the faucet outside the room, tied his hands,
and then put him under the care of Disuanco.43 The other police officers remained inside
the room and ransacked the locked cabinet44 where they found the subject firearm and
ammunition.45 With such discovery, Valeroso was charged with illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition.
From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that the arresting officers
served the warrant of arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They placed him
immediately under their control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of
the room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was
locked, could no longer be considered as an "area within his immediate control" because
there was no way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be
used against him.
The arresting officers would have been justified in searching the person of Valeroso, as
well as the tables or drawers in front of him, for any concealed weapon that might be
used against the former. But under the circumstances obtaining, there was no comparable
justification to search through all the desk drawers and cabinets or the other closed or
concealed areas in that room itself.46
It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless search as an incident to
a lawful arrest) is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person
arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from
destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be strained
beyond what is needed to serve its purpose.47 In the case before us, search was made in
the locked cabinet which cannot be said to have been within Valeroso's immediate
control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what may be considered as an incident
to a lawful arrest.48
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain view doctrine."
The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find
evidence of defendant's guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object.49
As enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr.50 and People v. Leangsiri:51
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them
had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which[,] he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement
the prior justification - whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search
incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected
with a search directed against the accused - and permits the warrantless seizure. Of
course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view"
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges.52
Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of Valeroso's children, because
they were supposed to serve a warrant of arrest issued against Valeroso. In other words,
the police officers had a prior justification for the intrusion. Consequently, any evidence
that they would inadvertently discover may be used against Valeroso. However, in this
case, the police officers did not just accidentally discover the subject firearm and
ammunition; they actually searched for evidence against Valeroso.
Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valeroso's right against unreasonable
search and seizure. Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation of said right is
inadmissible in evidence against him. ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υ αl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional
guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary for public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for no enforcement of any statute is
of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of
an individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of
liberty.53
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers who

conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions.54
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped
naked of their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government
becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article
III of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law way above
the articles on governmental power.55
Without the illegally seized firearm, Valeroso's conviction cannot stand. There is simply
no sufficient evidence to convict him.56 All told, the guilt of Valeroso was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt measured by the required moral certainty for conviction. The
evidence presented by the prosecution was not enough to overcome the presumption of
innocence as constitutionally ordained. Indeed, it would be better to set free ten men who
might probably be guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a
crime he did not commit.57
With the foregoing disquisition, there is no more need to discuss the other issues raised
by Valeroso.
One final note. The Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic
constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative and
prosecutory powers of the government.58
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008 Decision and June 30,
2008 Resolution are RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is
hereby ACQUITTED of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-6025-26. July 18, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. AMADO V.
HERNANDEZ, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
CONCEPCION, J.:
This refers to the petition for bail filed by Defendant Appellant Amado Hernandez on June
26, 1954, and renewed on December 22, 1955. A similar petition, filed on December 28,
1953, had been denied by a resolution of this court dated February 2, 1954. Although not
stated in said resolution, the same was due mainly to these circumstances: The chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
prosecution maintains that Hernandez is charged with, and has been convicted of, rebellion
complexed with murders, arsons and robberies, for which the capital punishment, it is
claimed, may be imposed, although the lower court sentenced him merely to life
imprisonment. Upon the other hand, the defense contends, among other things, that
rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. Inasmuch as the issue thus
raised had not been previously settled squarely, and this court was then unable, as yet, to
reach a definite conclusion thereon, it was deemed best not to disturb, for the time being,
the course of action taken by the lower court, which denied bail to the movant. After mature
deliberation, our considered opinion on said issue is as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The first two paragraphs of the amended information in this case read: chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
“The undersigned accuses (1) Amado V. Hernandez alias Victor alias Soliman alias Amado
alias AVH alias Victor Soliman, (2) Guillermo Capadocia alias Huan Bantiling alias Cap
alias G. Capadocia, (3) Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony Collantes alias Bonifacio,
(4) Alfredo Saulo alias Elias alias Fred alias A.B.S. alias A.B., (5) Andres Baisa, Jr. alias
Ben alias Andy (6) Genaro de la Cruz alias Gonzalo alias Gorio alias Arong, (7) Aquilino
Bunsol alias Anong, (8) Adriano Samson alias Danoy, (9) Juan J. Cruz alias Johnny 2, alias
Jessie Wilson alias William, (10) Jacobo Espino, (11) Amado Racanday, (12) Fermin
Rodillas, and (13) Julian Lumanog alias Manue, of the crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, arsons and robberies committed as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date and continuously
thereafter until the present time, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and the place which
they had chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of
the Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating, and cooperating with each
other, as well as with the thirty-one (31) Defendants charged in criminal cases Nos. 14071,
14082, 14270, 14315, and 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (decided May 11,
1951) and also with others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, the said
accused and their co-conspirators, being then officers and/or members of, or otherwise
associated with the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO) formerly known as the
Committee on Labor Organization (CLO), an active agency, organ, and instrumentality of
the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), with central offices in Manila and
chapters and affiliated or associated labor unions and other ‘mass organizations’ in
different places in the Philippines, and as such agency, organ, and instrumentality, fully
cooperates in, and synchronizes its activities with the rebellious activities of the ‘Hukbong
Magpalayang Bayan, (H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) to thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the
complete and permanent success of the armed rebellion against the Republic of the
Philippines, as the herein Defendants and their co-conspirators have in fact synchronized
the activities of the CLO with the rebellious activities of the HMB and other agencies,
organs and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the Philippines and have otherwise
master- minded or promoted the cooperative efforts between the CLO and HMB and other
agencies, organs, and instrumentalities of the P.K.P. in the prosecution of the rebellion
against the Republic of the Philippines, and being then also high ranking officers and/or
members of, or otherwise affiliated with, the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.),
which is now actively engaged in an armed rebellion against the Government of the
Philippines through acts therefor committed and planned to be further committed in Manila
and other places in the Philippines, and of which party the ‘Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng
Bayan’ (HMB), otherwise or formerly known as the ‘Hukbalahaps’ (Huks), is the armed
force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously help, support, promote,
maintain, cause, direct and/or command the ‘Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan’ (HMB) or
the ‘Hukbalahaps’ (Huks) to rise publicly and take arms against the Republic of the
Philippines, or otherwise participate in such armed public uprising, for the purpose of
removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the government and laws
thereof as in fact the said ‘Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan’ or ‘Hukbalahaps’ have risen
publicly and taken arms to attain the said purpose by then and there making armed raids,
sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army detachments as well
as innocent civilians, and as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in
connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and there committed acts of
murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of private and public
property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the
accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as follows, to wit: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Then follows a description of the murders, arsons and robberies allegedly perpetrated by
the accused “as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection
therewith and in furtherance thereof.”
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall
be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.”
It is obvious, from the language of this article, that the same presupposes the commission
of two (2) or more crimes, and, hence, does not apply when the culprit is guilty of only one
crime.
Article 134 of said code reads: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms
against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any
body of land, naval or other armed forces, or of depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.”
Pursuant to Article 135 of the same code “any person, merely participating or executing
the commands of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period.”
The penalty is increased to prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000 for “any person
who promotes, maintains or heads a rebellion or insurrection or who, while holding any
public office or employment, takes part therein”: chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary
1. “engaging in war against the forces of the government”,

2. “destroying property”, or
3. “committing serious violence”,
4. “exacting contributions or”
5. “diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated”.
Whether performed singly or collectively, these five (5) classes of acts constitute only one
offense, and no more, and are, altogether, subject to only one penalty — prision mayor and
a fine not to exceed P20,000. Thus for instance, a public officer who assists the rebels by
turning over to them, for use in financing the uprising, the public funds entrusted to his
custody, could neither be prosecuted for malversation of such funds, apart from rebellion,
nor accused and convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with malversation of public
funds. The reason is that such malversation is inherent in the crime of rebellion committed
by him. In fact, he would not be guilty of rebellion had he not so misappropriated said
funds. In the imposition, upon said public officer, of the penalty for rebellion it would even
be improper to consider the aggravating circumstance of advantage taken by the offender
of his public position, this being an essential element of the crime he had perpetrated. Now,
then, if the office held by said offender and the nature of the funds malversed by him cannot
aggravate the penalty for his offense, it is clear that neither may it worsen the very crime
committed by the culprit by giving rise, either to an independent crime, or to a complex
crime. Needless to say, a mere participant in the rebellion, who is not a public officer,
should not be placed at a more disadvantageous position than the promoters, maintainers
or leaders of the movement, or the public officers who join the same, insofar as the
application of Article 48 is concerned.
One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words of said Article 135,
is by “engaging in war against the forces of the government” and “committing serious
violence” in the prosecution of said “war”. These expressions imply everything that war
connotes, namely; resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of taxes
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
and contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life,
and the hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake — except that, very
often, it is worse than war in the international sense, for it involves internal struggle, a fight
between brothers, with a bitterness and passion or ruthlessness seldom found in a contest
between strangers. Being within the purview of “engaging in war” and “committing serious
violence”, said resort to arms, with the resulting impairment or destruction of life and
property, constitutes not two or more offense, but only one crime — that of rebellion plain
and simple. Thus, for instance, it has been held that “the crime of treason may be committed
‘by executing either a single or similar intentional overt acts, different or similar but
distinct, and for that reason, it may be considered one single continuous offense. (Guinto
vs. Veluz, 77 Phil., 801, 44 Off. Gaz., 909.)” (People vs. Pacheco, 93 Phil., 521.)
Inasmuch as the acts specified in said Article 135 constitute, we repeat, one single crime,
it follows necessarily that said acts offer no occasion for the application of Article 48,
which requires therefor the commission of, at least, two crimes. Hence, this court has never
in the past, convicted any person of the “complex crime of rebellion with murder”. What
is more, it appears that in every one of the cases of rebellion published in the Philippine
Reports, the Defendants were convicted of simple rebellion, although they had killed
several persons, sometimes peace officers (U. S. vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil., 472; U. S. vs. chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
Baldello, 3 Phil., 509, U. S. vs. Ayala, 6 Phil., 151; League vs. People, 73 Phil., 155).chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
Following a parallel line are our decisions in the more recent cases of treason, resulting
from collaboration with the Japanese during the war in the Pacific. In fact, said cases went
further than the aforementioned cases of rebellion, in that the theory of the prosecution to
the effect that the accused in said treason cases were guilty of the complex crime of treason
with murder and other crimes was expressly and repeatedly rejected therein. Thus,
commenting on the decision of the People’s Court finding the accused in People vs. Prieto
(80 Phil., 138, 45 Off. Gaz., 3329) “guilty of the crime of treason complexed by murder
cralaw
and physical injuries” and sentencing him to death, and on the contention of the Solicitor
General that Prieto had committed the “complex crime of treason with homicide”, this
court, speaking through Mr. Justice Tuason, said: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the
infliction of physical injuries on others are not offenses separate from treason. Under the
Philippine treason law and under the United States constitution defining treason, after
which the former was patterned, there must concur both adherence to the enemy and giving
him aid and comfort. One without the other does not make treason.
“In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some
kind of action. Its very nature partakes, of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental
operation. (Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in
itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed
is charged as an element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and cannot
be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase
the penalty as Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one cannot be
punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber
cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery,
because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery
respectively, so may not a Defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in
conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive
ingredient of treason . Where murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of
cralaw
treason they cannot be regarded separately under their general denomination.” (Italics
cralaw
supplied.)
Accordingly, we convicted the accused of simple treason and sentenced him to life
imprisonment.
In People vs. Labra, 81 Phil., 377, 46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p. 159, we used the following
language: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The lower court found Appellant guilty not only of treason, but of murder, for the killing
of Tomas Abella, and, following the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
sentenced him to death, the maximum penalty provided by article 114.
“The lower court erred in finding Appellant guilty of the murder of Tomas Abella. The
arrest and killing of Tomas Abella for being a guerilla, is alleged in count 3 of the
information, as one of the elements of the crime of treason for which Appellant is
prosecuted. Such element constitute a part of the legal basis upon which Appellant stands
convicted of the crime of treason. The killing of Tomas Abella cannot be considered as
legal ground for convicting Appellant of any crime other than treason. The essential
elements of a given crime cannot be disintegrated in different parts, each one stand as a
separate ground to convict the accused of a different crime or criminal offense. The
elements constituting a given crime are integral and inseparable parts of a whole. In the
contemplation of the law, they cannot be used for double or multiple purposes. They can
only be used for the sole purpose of showing the commission of the crime of which they
form part. The factual complexity of the crime of treason does not endow it with the
functional ability of worm multiplication or amoeba reproduction. Otherwise, the accused
will have to face as many prosecutions and convictions as there are elements in the crime
of treason, in open violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.”
(Italics supplied.)
The same conclusion was reached in People vs. Alibotod 82 Phil., 164, 46 Off. Gaz., 1005,
despite the direct participation of the Defendant therein in the maltreatment and killing of
several persons.
In People vs. Vilo 82 Phil., 524, 46 Off. Gaz., 2517, we held: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The People’s Court, however, erred in classifying the crime as treason with murder. The
killing of Amado Satorre and one Segundo is charged as an element of treason, and it
therefore becomes identified with the latter crime, and cannot be the subject of a separate
punishment or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code provides.” (People vs. Prieto, L-399, 45 Off. Gaz. 3329. See, also
People vs. Labra, L-886, 46 Off. Gaz., [Supp. to No. 1], 159.)” (Italics supplied.)
To the same effect was our decision in People vs. Roble 83 Phil., 1, 46 Off. Gaz., 4207.
We stated therein: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The court held that the facts alleged in the information is a complex crime of treason with
murders, with the result that the penalty provided for the most serious offense was to be
imposed on its maximum degree. Viewing the case from the standpoint of modifying
circumstances, the court believed that the same result obtained. It opined that the killings
were murders qualified by treachery and aggravated by the circumstances of evident
premeditation, superior strength, cruelty, and an armed band.
“We think this is error. The tortures and murders set forth in the information are merged in
and formed part of the treason. They were in this case the overt acts which, besides
traitorous intention supplied a vital ingredient in the crime.” (Italics supplied.)
The accused in People vs. Delgado 83 Phil., 9, 46 Off. Gaz., 4213, had been convicted by
the People’s Court of “the crime of treason complexed with the crime of murder” and
sentenced to the extreme penalty. In our decision, penned by Mr. Justice Montemayor, we
expressed ourselves as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Appellant herein was and is a Filipino citizen. His adherence to the Japanese forces of
occupation and giving them aid and comfort by acting as their spy, undercover man,
investigator, and even killer when necessary to cow and compel the inhabitants to surrender
their firearms and disclose information about the guerrillas has been fully established. His
manner of investigation and maltreatment of some of his victims like Tereso Sanchez and
Patricio Suico, was so cruel, brutal and inhuman that it is almost unbelievable that a
Filipino can commit and practice such atrocities especially on his own countrymen. But,
evidently, war, confusion and opportunism can and do produce characters and monster
unknown during peace and normal times.
“The People’s Court found the Appellant guilty of treason complexed with murder. The
Solicitor General, however, maintains that the offense committed is simple treason, citing
the doctrine laid down by this court in the case of People vs. Prieto, (L-399, 45 Off. Gaz.,
3329) but accompanied by the aggravating circumstance under Article 14, paragraph 21,
of the Revised Penal Code, and not compensated by any mitigating circumstance, and he
recommends the imposition of the penalty of death. We agree with the Solicitor General
that on the basis of the ruling of this court in the case of People vs. Prieto, supra, the
Appellant may be convicted only a treason, and that the killing and infliction of physical
injuries committed by him may not be separated from the crime of treason but should be
regarded as acts performed in the commission of treason, although, as stated in said case,
the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried out may be taken as
an aggravating circumstance.” (Italics supplied.)
and reduced the penalty from death to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.
Identical were the pertinent features of the case of People vs. Adlawan, 83 Phil., 194, 46
Off. Gaz., 4299, in which, through Mr. Justice Reyes (A), we declared: chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary
“ we find merit in the contention that Appellant should have not been convicted of the so
cralaw
called ‘Complex crime of treason with murder, robbery, and rape.’ The killings, robbery,
and raping mentioned in the information are therein alleged not as specific offenses but as
mere elements of the crime of treason for which the accused is being prosecuted. Being
merged in and identified with the general charged they cannot be used in combination with
the treason to increase the penalty under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs.
Prieto, L-399, January 29, 1948, 45 Off. Gaz., 3329.) Appellant should, therefore, be held
guilty of treason only.” (Italics supplied.)
In People vs. Suralta, 85 Phil., 714, 47 Off. Gaz., 4595, the language used was: chanroblesvirtuallaw library
“ But the People’s Court erred in finding the Appellant guilty of the complex crime of
cralaw
treason with murder, because murder was an ingredient of the crime of treason, as we have
heretofore held in several cases. (Italics supplied.)
This was reiterated in People vs. Navea, 87 Phil., 1, 47 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 12, p. 252: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The Solicitor General recommends that the Appellant be sentenced for the complex crime
of treason with murder. We have already ruled, however, that where, as in the present case,
the killing is charged as an element of treason, it ‘becomes identified with the latter crime
and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to
increase the penalty as Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides.” (Italics supplied.)
The question at bar was, also, taken up in the case of Crisologo vs. People and Villalobos
(94 Phil., 477), decided on February 26, 1954. The facts and the rule therein laid down are
set forth in our unanimous decision in said case, from which we quote: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The Petitioner Juan D. Crisologo, a captain in the USAFFE during the last world war and
at the time of the filing of the present petition a lieutenant colonel in the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, was on March 12, 1946, accused of treason under Article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code in an information filed in the People’s Court. But before the accused
could be brought under the jurisdiction of the court, he was on January 13, 1947, indicted
for violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of War,
before a military court created by authority of the Army Chief of Staff, the indictment
containing three charges, two of which, the first and third, were those of treason consisting
in giving information and aid to the enemy leaving to the capture of USAFFE officers and
men and other persons with anti-Japanese reputation and in urging members of the
USAFFE to surrender and cooperate with the enemy, while the second was that of having
certain civilians filled in time of war. Found innocent of the first and third charges but
guilty of the second, he was on May, 8, 1947, sentenced by the military court to life
imprisonment.
“With the approval on June 17, 1948, of Republic Act No. 311 abolishing the People’s
Court, the criminal case in that court against the Petitioner was, pursuant to the provisions
of said Act, transferred to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and there the charges
of treason were amplified. Arraigned in that court upon the amended information,
Petitioner presented a motion to quash, challenging the jurisdiction of the court and
pleading double jeopardy because of his previous sentence in the military court. But the
court denied the motion and, after Petitioner had pleaded not guilty, proceeded to trial,
whereupon, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed in this court to have
the trial judge desist from proceeding with the trial and dismiss the case.
“It is, however, claimed that the offense charged in the military court different from that
charged in the civil court and that even granting that the offense was identical the military
court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same because the People’s Court had
previously acquired jurisdiction over the case with the result that the conviction in the court
martial was void. In support of the first point, it is urged that the amended information filed
in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga contains overt acts distinct from those charged
in the military court. But we note that while certain overt acts specified in the amended
information in the Zamboanga court were not specified in the indictment in the court
martial, they all are embraced in the general charge of treason, which is a continuous
offense and one who commits it is not criminally liable for as many crimes as there are
overt acts, because all overt act ‘he has done or might have done for that purpose constitute
but a single offense.’ (Guinto vs. Veluz, 44. Off. Gaz., 909; People vs. Pacheco, L-4750,
promulgated July 31, 1953.) In other words, since the offense charged in the amended
information in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga is treason, the fact that the said
information contains an enumeration of additional ovart acts not specifically mentioned in
the indictment before the military court is immaterial since the new alleged overt acts do
not in themselves constitute a new and distinct offense from that of treason, and this court
has repeatedly held that a person cannot be found guilty of treason and at the same time
also guilty of overt acts specified in the information for treason even if those overt acts,
considered separately, are punishable by law, for the simple reason that those overt acts are
not separate offenses distinct from that of treason but constitute ingredients thereof.”
(Italics supplied.)
Thus, insofar as treason is concerned, the opinion of this court, on the question whether
said crime may be complexed with murder, when the former was committed through the
latter, and it is so alleged in the information, had positively and clearly crystalized itself in
the negative as early as January 29, 1948.
We have not overlooked the decision in People vs. Labra (L-1240, decided on May 12,
1949), the dispositive part of which partly reads: chanroblesvirtual lawlibrary
“Wherefore, the verdict of guilty must be affirmed. Articles 48, 114 and 248 of the Revised
Penal Code are applicable to the offense of treason with murder. However for lack of
sufficient votes to impose the extreme penalty, the Appellant will be sentenced to life
imprisonment ..” cralaw
Although it mentions Articles 48 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code and “the offense of
treason with murder,” it should be noted that we affirmed therein the action of the People’s
Court, which, according to the opening statement of our decision, convicted Labra of
“treason aggravated with murder”. Besides, the applicability of said articles was not
discussed in said decision. It is obvious, from a mere perusal thereof, that this court had no
intention of passing upon such question. Otherwise, it would have explained why it did not
follow the rule laid down in the previous cases of Prieto, Labra (August 10, 1948),
Alibotod, Vilo, Roble, Delgado and Adlawan (supra), in which the issue was explicitly
examined and decided in the negative. Our continued adherence to this view in the
subsequent cases of Suralta, Navea, Pacheco and Crisologo, without even a passing
reference to the second Labra case, shows that we did not consider the same as reflecting
the opinion of the court on said question. At any rate, insofar as it suggests otherwise, the
position taken in the second Labra case must be deemed reversed by our decisions in said
cases of Suralta, Navea, Pacheco and Crisologo.
It is true that treason and rebellion are distinct and different from each other. This does not
detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof,
and, hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom
or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Besides there is more reason
to apply said rule in the crime of rebellion than in that of treason, for the law punishing
rebellion (Article 135, Revised Penal Code) specifically mentions the act of engaging in
war and committing serious violence among its essential elements — thus clearly
indicating that everything done in the prosecution of said war, as a means necessary
therefor, is embraced therein — unlike the provision on treason (Article 114, Revised Penal
Code) which is less explicit thereon.
It is urged that, if the crime of assault upon a person in authority or an agent of a person in
authority may be committed with physical injuries (U. S. vs. Montiel, 9 Phil., 162),
homicide (People vs. Lojo, 52 Phil., 390) and murder (U. S. vs. Ginosolongo, 23 Phil., 171;
U. S. vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil., 385), and rape may be perpetrated with physical injuries (U.
S. vs. Andaya, 34 Phil., 690), then rebellion may, similarly, be complexed with murder,
arson, or robbery. The conclusion does not follow, for engaging in war, serious violence,
physical injuries and destruction of life and property are inherent in rebellion, but not in
assault upon persons in authority or agents of persons in authority or in rape. The word
“rebellion” evokes, not merely a challenge to the constituted authorities, but, also, civil
war, on a bigger or lesser scale, with all the evils that go with it, whereas, neither rape nor
assault upon persons in authority connotes necessarily, or even generally, either physical
injuries, or murder. 1
In support of the theory that a rebel who kills in furtherance of the insurrection is guilty of
the complex crime of rebellion with murder, our attention has been called to Article 244 of
the old Penal Code of the Philippines, reading: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Los delitos particulares cometidos en una rebelion o sedicion, o con motivo de ellas, seran
castigados respectivamente segun las disposiciones de este Codigo.
“Cuando no puedan descubrirse sus autores seran penados como tales los jefes principales
de la rebelion o sedicion.”
and to the following observations of Cuello Calon (Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 110), in
relation thereto: chanroblesvir tuallawlibrary
“Se establece aqui que el en una rebelion o sedicion, o con motivo de ellas, comete otros
delitos (v.g., roba, mata o lesiona), sera responsable de estos ademas de los delitos de
rebelion o sedicion. La dificultad consiste en estos casos en separar los accidentes de la
rebelion o sedicion de los delitos independientes de estas, y como las leyes no contienen
en este punto precepto alguno aplicable, su solucion ha quedado encomendada a los
tribunales. La jurisprudencia que estos han sentado considera como accidentes de la
rebelion o sedicion — cuya criminalidad queda embedida en la de estos delitos, y, por
tanto, no son punibles especialmente — los hechos de escasa gravedad (v.g., atentados,
desacatos, lesiones menos graves); por el contrario, las infracciones graves, como el
asesinato o las lesiones graves, se consideran como delitos independientes de la rebelion o

de la sedicion.”
It should be noted, however, that said Article 244 of the old Penal Code of the Philippines
has not been included in our Revised Penal Code. If the applicability of Article 48 to
rebellion was determined by the existence of said Article 244, then the elimination of the
latter would be indicative of the contrary.
Besides, the crime of rebellion, referred to by Cuello Calon, was that punished in the
Spanish Penal Code, Article 243 of which provides: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Son reos de rebelion los que se alzaren publicamente y en abierta hostilidad contra el
Gobierno para cualquiera de los objetossiguientes: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. “Destronar al Rey, deponer al Regente o Regencia del Reino, o privarles de su libertad

personal u obligarles a ejecutar un acto contrario a su voluntad.
2. “Impedir la celebracion dc las elecciones para Diputados a Cortes o Senadores en todo
el Reino, o la reunion legitima de las mismas.
3. “Disolver las Cortes o impedir la deliberacion de alguno de los Cuerpos Colegisladores
o arrancarles alguna resolucion.
4. “Ejecutar cualquiera de los delitos previstos en el articulo 165.
5. “Sustraer el Reino o parte de el o algun cuerpo de tropa de tierra o de mar, o cualquiera
otra clase de fuerza armada, de la obediencia del Supremo Gobierno.
6. “Usar y ejercer por si o despojar a los Ministros de la Corona de sus facultades
constitucionales, o impedirles o coartarles su libre ejercicio. (Articulo 167, Codigo Penal
de 1850. — Veanse las demas concordancias del articulo 181.)”
Thus, the Spanish Penal Code did not specifically declare that rebellion includes the act of
engaging in war against the forces of the Government and of using serious violence for the
purposes stated in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code. In view of this express statutory
inclusion of the acts of war and serious violence among the ingredients of rebellion in the
Philippines, it is clear that the distinction made by Cuello Calon between grave and less
grave offenses committed in the course of an insurrection cannot be accepted in this
jurisdiction. Again, if both classes of offenses are part and parcel of a rebellion, or means
necessary therefor, neither law nor logic justifies the exclusion of the one and the inclusion
of the other. In fact, Cuello Calon admits that “the difficulty lies in separating the accidents
of rebellion or sedition from the offenses independent therefrom.” Ergo, offenses that are
not independent therefrom, but constituting an integral part thereof committed, precisely,
to carry out the uprising to its successful conclusion — are beyond the purview of Article
244. Indeed, the above quoted statement of Cuello Calon — to the effect that grave felonies
committed in the course of an insurrection are independent therefrom — was based upon
a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 5, 1872, which we find reported in
the Codigo Penal de Filipinas, by Jose Perez Rubio, as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia en sentencia de 5 de Febrero de 1872, tiene declarado: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Que segun los articulos 184 del Codigo Penal de 1830, y 259 del reformado (1870), los
delitos particulares cometidos en una rebelion o sedicion o con motivo de ellas se castigan
respectivamente segun las disposiciones de los mismos Codigos; y con arreglo al decreto chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
de amnistia de 9 de Agosto de 1876 estan solo comprendidos en aquella gracia las personas
sentenciadas, procesadas o sujatas a responsabilidad por delitos politicos de cualquiera
especie -cometidos desde el 29 de Septiembre de 1868; Que el asesinato del Gobernador chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
Civil de Burgos no fue resultado de movimiento alguno politico, sino de un mero tumulto
que imprimio el fanatismo, y cuya unica aparente tendencia era impedir que aquel
funcionario inventariase ciertos objetos artisticos que se decian existentes en la Catedral: chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary
Que esto lo demuestran las salvajes voces de muerte proferidas por los asesinos contra la
persona del Gobernador; sin que al ejecutar en el mismo recinto del templo los
horrorosos hechos que aparecen en la causa, alzasen bandera politica alguna ni dieran otro
grito que el, en aquel momento sacrilego e impio, de ‘Viva la religion: ’ Que la apreciar chanroblesvir tuallawlibrary
la Sala sentenciadora los hechos referentes al Gobernador Civil de delito de asesinato,

penarlo con arreglo al Codigo y declarar inaplicable el citado Decreto de Amnistia, no ha
cometido el error de derecho señalado en los casos 1.° 3.° del articulo 4.° de la ley sobre
establecimiento de la casacion criminal, ni infringido los articulos 250 y 259 del Codigo
Penal de 1870.” (Page 239; Italics supplied.) (See, also, “El Codigo Penal”, by Hidalgo
Garcia, Vol. I, p. 623.)’

It is apparent that said case is not in point. There was no issue therein on whether murder
may be complexed with rebellion or sedition. The question for determination was whether
the killers of the victim were guilty of the common crime of murder, or should have been
convicted only of rebellion or sedition. The court adopted the first alternative, not because
of the gravity of the acts performed by the accused, but because they had no political
motivation. Moreover, the Endnote: to said quotation from Cuello Calon reads: chanro blesvirtualla wlib rary chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Los atentados desacatos y lesiones a la autoridad u otros delitos contra el orden publico
cometidos en la sedicion o con motivo de ella, no son delitos distintos de la sedicion, 3
octubre 1903, 19 noviembre 1906; la resistencia o acometimiento a la fuerza publica por
los sediciosos es accidente de la rebelion, 23 mayo 1890.

“El asesinato de un gobernador cometido en el curso de un tumulto debe penarse como un
delito comun de asesinato, 5 febrero 1872. Sin embargo, la jurisprudencia, tratandose de
ciertos delitos, es vacilante; asi, v. g., el acometimiento al teniente de alcalde se ha
declarado en un fallo independiente de la perturbacion tumultuaria promovida para impedir

al alcalde el cumplimiento de sus providencias, 16 marzo 1885, mientras que un hecho
analogo se ha considerado en otra sentenda ya citada como accidente de la rebelion, 3
Octubre 1903. El acometimiento de los sediciosos a la fuerza publica es accidente de la
sedicion y no uno de los delitos particulares a que se refiere este articulo, 23 de mayo 1890.
Entre estos delitos a que alude el precepto se hallan las lesiones que puedan causar los
sediciosos, 19 noviembre 1906.” (Endnote: 21, II Cuelo Calon, Derecho Penal, pp. 110- cha nrob lesvirtuallawlibr ary
111.) (Italics supplied.)

Thus in a decision, dated May 2, 1934, the Supreme Court of Spain held: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Considerando que la nota deferencial entre los delitos de rebelion y sedicion, de una parte,
y el de atentado, esta constituida por la circunstancia de alzamiento publico que caracteriza
a los primeros, los cuales, por su indole generica, absorben a los de atentado y demas
infracciones que durante su comision y con su motivo se cometan, y afirmandose como
hecho en la sentencia recurrida que el procesado Mariano Esteban Martinez realizo, en
union de otros, el atendado que se le imputa sin alzarse publicamente, cae por su base el
recurso fundado en supuesto distinto.” (Jurisprudencia Criminal, Tomo 130, p. 551.)
(Italics supplied.)
To the same effect are, likewise, the following: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“La provocacion y el ataque a la Guardia Civil por paisanos alzadoz tumultuariamente para
impedir al Delegado de un Gobernador civil el cumplimiento de sus providencias, no
pueden estimarse constitutivos de un delito distinto del de sedicion, ni ser, por tanto,
perseguidos y penados separadamente.
“La resistencia o el acometimiento de los sublevados a la fuerza publica constituye, en su
caso, una circunstancia o accidente de la sedicion y no es delito de los que el Codigo Penal
en este articulo (formerly Article 244, now Article 227) supone que pueden cometerse en
ella o con su motivo, los cuales denomina delitos particulares, y manda que se penen
conforme a las disposiciones del propio Codigo. (S. 23-5-890; G. 23-6-890; t. 44; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary chan roblesvirtualawlibrary chan
pagina 671)” (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, p. 2411.) (Italics supplied.)
roblesvirtualawlibrary
“La Audiencia condeno como autores de atentado a dos de los amotinados que agredieron
al alcalde, e interpuesto recurso de casacion contra la sentencia, el Tribunal Supremo la
casa y anula, teniendo en cuenta lo dispuesto en el articulo 250 (numero 3.°) del Codigo
Penal;
‘Considerando que el acto llevado a cabo por el grupo constituye una verdadera sedicion,
sin que sea licito el dividir este hecho y calificarlo de atentado respecto a las personas que
agredieron a dicho alcalde, porque el acometimiento fue un accidente de la sedicion, de la
cual eran todos responsables, ya se efectuara por los agrupados en conjunto o por uno solo,
por ser comun el objeto que se proponian y no individual; y al calificar y penar este
hecho la Audencia de Gerona, de atentado , ha incurrido en error de derecho e infringido

cralaw
los articulos 250 y siguientes del Codigo Penal, por no haberlos aplicado, y el 263, numero
2.°, en relacion con el 264, numeros 1.° y 3.°, por su aplicacion ” (Sent. 3 octubre 1903. cralaw
— Gac. 12 Diciembre) (Enciclopedia Juridica Española, Tomo xxviii p. 250).

These cases are in accord with the text of said Article 244, which refers, not to all offenses
committed in the course of a rebellion or on the occasion thereof, but only to “delitos
particulares” or common crimes. Now, what are “delitos particulares” as the phrase is used
in said article 244? We quote from Viada: chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary
“Las disposicion del primer parrafo de este articulo no puede ser mas justa; con arreglo chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
a ella, los delitos particulares o comunes cometidos en una rebelion er sedicion no deberan
reputarse como accidentes inherentes a estas, sino como delitos especiales, a dicha rebelion
y sedicion ajenos, los que deberan ser respectivamente castigados con las penas que en este
Codigo se las señalan. Pero, que delitos deberan considerarse como comunes, y cuales
como constitutivos de la propia rebelion o sedicion? En cuanto a la rebelion, no ofrece esta
cuestion dificultad alguna, pues todo hecho que no este comprendido en uno y otro de los
objetos especificados en los seis numeros del articulo 243 sera extraño a la rebelion, y si
se hallare definido en algun otro articulo del Codigo, con arreglo a este debera ser castigado
como delito particular. Pero tratandose de la sedicion, comprendiendose como objetos de
la misma, en los numeros 3.°, 4.° y 5.° del articulo 250, hechos que constituyen otros tantos
ataques a las personas o a la propiedad, cuales se consideran como accidentes inherentes a
la propria sedicion, y cuales deberan reputarse como delitos particulares o comunes? En
cuanto a los casos de los numeros 4.° y 5.°, estimanos que el objeto politico y social que se
requiera para la realizacion de los actos en aquellos comprendidos es el que debe servirnos
de norma y guia para distinguir lo inherente a la sedicion de lo que es ajeno o extraño a
ella. Cuando no exista ese objeto politico y social, el acto de odio o venganza ejercido
contra los particulares o cualquiera clase del Estado, y el atentado contra las propiedades
de los ciudadanos o corporaciones mentados en el numero 5.° del articulo 250, no seran
constitutivos del delito de sedicion, sino que deberan ser apreciados y castigados como
delitos comunes, segun las disposiciones respectivas de este Codigo — y por lo que toca a
los actos de odio o venganza ejercidos en la persona o bienes de alguna Autoridad o sus
agentes, estimamos que deberan reputarse como delitos comunes todos aquellos hechos
innecesarios 2 para la consecucion del fin particular que se propusieran los sediciosos —
y como esenciales, constitutivos de la propia sedicion todos aquellos actos de odio o
venganza que sean medio racionalmente necesario para el logro del objeto especial a que
se encaminaran los esfuerzos de los sublevados. Asi, en el caso de la Cuestion 1 expuesta
en el comentario del articulo 258, es evidente que el fin que se propusieron los sediciosos
fue no pagar el impuesto a cuya cobranza iba a proceder el comisionado; pero para lograr chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
este objeto, como lo lograron, fue preciso hacer salir del pueblo al ejecutor, y a este efecto,
lo amenazaron, lo persiguieron y llegaron hasta lesionarle. Esas amenazas y lesiones no
pudieron apreciarse, ni las aprecio tampoco la Sala sentenciadora, como delito comun, sino
como accidente inherente a la misma sedicion, por cuanto fueron un medio racionalmente
necesario para la consecucion del fin determinado que se propusieron los culpables.
“Pero cuando tal necesidad desaparece, cuando se hiere por herir, cuando se mata por
matar, el hecho ya, no puede ser considerado como un accidente propio de la sedicion, sino
como un delito especial, al que debe aplicarse la pena al mismo correspondiente.” (III
Viada, pp. 311-312.) (Italics supplied.)
Cuello Calon is even more illuminating. He says: chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary
“La doctrina cientifica considera los delitos llamados politicos como infracciones de un
caracter especial distintas de los denominados delitos comunes. De esta apreciacion ha
nacido la division de los delitos, desde el punto de vista de su naturaleza intrinseca, en
delitos politicos y delitos comunes o de derecho comun.
“Se reputan delitos comunes aquellos que lesionan bienes juridicos individuales (v. gr., los
delitos contra la vida, contra la honestidad, contra la propiedad, etc.)
“La nocion del delito politico no parece tan clara. Desde luego revisten este caracter los
que atentan contra el orden politico del Estado, contra su orden externo (independencia de
la nacion, integridad del territorio, etc.), o contra el interno (delitos contra el Jefe del
Estado, contra la forma de Gobierno, etc.). Pero tambien pueden ser considerados como
politicos todos los delitos, cualesquiera que sean incluso los de derecho comun, cuando
fueron cometidos por moviles politicos. Deben, por tanto, estimarse como infracciones de
esta clase, no solo las que objetivamente tengan tal caracter por el interes politico que
lesionan, sino tambien las que, apreciadas subjetivamente, manifiestan una motivacion de
caracter politico.
“Asi podria formulares esta definicion: es delito politico el cometido contra el orden
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
politico del Estado, asi como todo delito de cualquiera otra clase determinado por moviles
politicos.” (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Tomo I, pp. 247-249.)
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such
common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is
the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common like homicide, is perpetrated
for the purpose of removing from the allegiance “to the Government the territory of the
Philippines Islands or any part thereof,” then said offense becomes stripped of its
“common” complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the
former acquires the political character of the latter.
Conformably with the foregoing, the case of murder against the Defendant in U. S. vs.
Lardizabal (1 Phil., 729) — an insurgent who killed a prisoner of war because he was too
weak to march with the retreating rebel forces, and could not be left behind without
endangering the safety of the latter — was dismissed upon the ground that the execution
of said prisoner of war formed part of, and was included in, the crime of sedition, which,
in turn, was covered by an amnesty, to the benefits of which said Defendant was entitled.
True, in U. S. vs. Alfont (1 Phil., 115), the commander of an unorganized group of
insurgents was, pursuant to Article 244 of our old Penal Code, convicted of homicide for
having shot and killed a woman who was driving a vehicle. But the complex crime of
rebellion with homicide was not considered in that case. Apart from this, the accused failed
to established the relation between her death and the insurrection. What is more, it was
neither proved nor alleged that he had been prompted by political reasons. In other words,
his offense was independent from the rebellion. The latter was merely the occasion for the
commission of the former.
It is noteworthy that the aforementioned decisions of this court and the Supreme Court of
Spain in cases of treason, rebellion and sedition, are in line with the trend in other countries,
as well as in the field of international relations. Referring to the question as to what offenses
are political in nature, it was said in In re Ezeta (62 Fed. Rep., 972): chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary
“What constitutes an offense of a political character has not yet been determined by judicial
authority. Sir James Stephens, in his work, History of the Criminal Law of England
(Volume 2, p. 71), thinks that it should be ‘interpreted to mean that fugitive criminals are
not to be surrendered for extradition crimes if those crimes were incidental to and formed
a part of political disturbances.’ Mr. John Stuart Mill, in the house of commons, in 1866,
while discussing an amendment to the act of ‘extradition, on which the treaty between
England and France was founded, gave this definition: Any offense committed in the chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
course of or furthering of civil war, insurrection, or political commotion.’ Hansard’s

Debates Vol. 184, p. 2115. In the Castioni Case, supra, decided in 1891, the question was
discussed by the most eminent counsel at the English bar, and considered by distinguished
judges, without a definition being framed that would draw a fixed and certain line between
a municipal or common crime and one of political character. ‘I do not think,’ said Denman,
J., ‘it is necessary or desirable that we should attempt to put into language, in the shape of
an exhaustive definition, exactly the whole state of things, or every state of things, which
might bring a particular case within the description of an offense of a political character.’
In that case, Castioni was charged with the murder of one Rossi, by shooting him with a
revolver, in the town of Bellinzona, in the canton of Ticino, in Switzerland. The deceased,
Rossi, was a member of the state council of the canton of Ticino. Castioni was a citizen of
the same canton. For some time previous to the murder, much dissatisfaction had been felt
and expressed by a large number of inhabitants of Ticino at the mode in which the political
party then in power were conducting the government of the canton. A request was
presented to the government for a revision of the constitution of the canton and, the
government having declined to take a popular vote on that question, a number of the
citizens of Bellinzona, among whom was Castioni, seized the arsenal of the town, from
which they took rifles and ammunition, disarmed the gendarmes, arrested and bound or
handcuffed several persons connected with the government, and forced them to march in
front of the armed crowd to the municipal palace. Admission to the palace was demanded
in the name of the people, and was refused by Rossi and another member of the
government, who were in the palace. The crowd then broke open the outer gate of the
palace, and rushed in, pushing before them the government officials whom they had
arrested and bound. Castioni, who was armed with a revolver, was among the first to enter.
A second door, which was locked, was broken open, and at this time, or immediately after,
Rossi, who was in the passage, was shot through the body with a revolver, and died, very
soon afterwards. Some other shots were fired, but no one else was injured. Castioni fled to
England. His extradition was requested by the federal council of Switzerland. He was
arrested and taken before a police magistrate, as provided by the statute, who held him for
extradition. Application was made by the accused to the high court of justice of England
for a writ of habeas corpus. He was represented by Sir Charles Russell, now lord chief
justice. The attorney general, Sir Richard Webster, appeared for the crown, and the solicitor
general, Sir Edward Clarke, and Robert Woodfal, for the federal council of Switzerland.
This array of distinguished counsel, and the high character of the court, commends the case
as one of the highest authority. It appeared from an admission by one of the parties engaged
in the disturbances ‘that the death of Rossi was a misfortune, and not necessary for the
rising.’ The opinions of the judges as to the political character of the crime charged against
Castioni, upon the facts stated, is exceedingly interesting, but I need only refer to the
following passages. Judge Denman says: chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary
“The question really is whether, upon the facts, it is clear that the man was acting as one of
a number of persons engaged in acts of violence of a political character with a political
object, and as part of the political movement and rising in which he was taking part.’
“Judge Hawkins, in commenting upon the character of political offenses, said: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
‘I cannot help thinking that everybody knows there are many acts of a political character
done without reason, done against all reason; but at the same time one cannot look too
hardly, and weigh in golden scales the acts of men hot in their political excitement. We
know that in heat, and in heated blood, men often do things which are against and contrary
to reason; but none the less an act of this description may be done for the purpose of
furthering and in furtherance of a political rising, even though it is an act which may be
deplored and lamented, as even cruel and against all reason, by those who can calmly
reflect upon it after the battle is over.’
“Sir James Stephens, whose definition as an author has already been cited, was one of the
judges, and joined in the views taken as to the political character of the crime charged
against Castioni. The prisoner was discharged. Applying, by analogy, the action of the
English court in that case to the four cases now before me, under consideration, the
conclusion follows that the crimes charged here, associated as they are with the actual
conflict of armed forces, are of a political character.
“The draft of a treaty on International Penal Law, adopted by the congress of Montevideo
in 1888, and recommended by the International American Conference to the governments
of the Latin-American nations in 1890, contains the following provisions (Article 23): chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
‘Political offenses, offenses subversive of the internal and external safety of a state or
common offenses connected with these, shall not warrant extradition. The determination
of the character of the offense is incumbent upon the nations upon which the demand for
extradition is made; and its decision shall be made under and according to the provisions
of the law which shall prove to be most favorable to the accused: ’ chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
“I am not aware that any part of this Code has been made the basis of treaty stipulations
between any of the American nations, but the article cited may be at least accepted as
expressing the wisdom of leading jurists and diplomats. The article is important with
respect to two of its features: (1) provides that a fugitive shall not be extradited for an
offense connected with a political offense, or with an offense subversive of the internal or
external safety of the state; and (2) the decision as to the character of the offense shall
be made under and according to the provisions of the law which shall prove most favorable
to the accused. The first provision is sanctioned by Calvo, who, speaking of the exemption
from extradition of persons charged with political offenses, says: chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
‘The exemption even extends to acts connected with political crimes or offenses, and it is
enough, as says Mr. Fuastin Helio; that a common crime be connected with a political chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
act, that it be the outcome of or be in the outcome of or be in the execution of such, to be

covered by the privilege which protects the latter’ Calvo, Droit Int. (3me ed.) p. 413, section
1262.
“The second provision of the article is founded on the broad principles of humanity found
everywhere in the criminal law, distinguishing its administration with respect to even the
worst features of our civilization from the cruelties of barbarism. When this article was
under discussion in the international American conference in Washington, Mr. Silva, of
Colombia, submitted some observations upon the difficulty of drawing a line between an
offense of a political character and a common crime, and incidentally referred to the crime
of robbery, in terms worthy of some consideration here. He said: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
‘In the revolutions, as we conduct them in our countries, the common offenses are
necessarily mixed up with the political in many cases. A colleague General Caamaño (of
Ecuador) knows how we carry on wars. A revolutionist needs horses for moving, beef to
feed his troops, etc.; and since he does not go into the public markets to purchase these
horses and that beef, nor the arms and saddles to mount and equip his forces, he takes them
from the first pasture or shop he find at hand. This is called robbery everywhere, and is a
common offense in time of peace, but in time of war it is a circumstance closely allied to
the manner of waging it.’ International American Conference, Vol. 2, p. 615.” (Italics
supplied.)
We quote the following from Endnote: chanrob lesvirtuallawlibra ry (23) on pages 249-250, Vol. I, of Cuello Calon’s
aforesaid work on “Derecho Penal.”
“En algunos Codigo y leyes de fecha proxima ya se halla una definicion de estos delitos.
El Codigo penal ruso, en el articulo 58, define como ‘delitos contra revolucionarios’ los
hechos encaminados a derrocar o debilitar el poder de los Consejos de trabajadores y
campesinos y de los gobiernos de la Union de Republicas socialistas sovieticas, a destruir
o debilitar la seguridad exterior de la Union de Republicas Sovieticas y las conquistas
economicas, politicas y nacionales fundamentales de la revolucion proletaria.’ El Codigo
Penal italiano de 1930 considera en eu articulo 8.° como delito politico ‘todo delito que
ofenda un interes politico del Estado o un derecho politico del ciudadano.’ Tambien se
reputa politico el delito comun deteminado, en todo o en parte por motivos politicos. En la
ley alemana de extradicion de 25 diciembre 1929 se definen asi: ‘Son delitos politicos chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
los atentados punibles directamente ejecutados contra la existencia o la seguridad del

Estado, contra el jefe o contra un miembro del gobierno del Estado como tal, contra una
corporacion constitucional, contra los derechos politicos las buenas relaciones con el
extranjero.’ parrafo 3.°, 2.
“La 6a. Conferencia para la Unificacion del Derecho penal (Copenhague, 31 agosto — 3
septiembre 1935) adopto la siguiente nocion del delito politico: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“1. Por delitos politicos se entienden los dirigidos contra la organizacion y funcionamiento
del Estado o contra los derechos que de esta organizacion y funcionamiento provienen para
el culpable.
“2. Tambien se consideran como delitos politicos los delitos de derecho comun que
constituyen hechos conexos con la ejecucion de los delitos previstos en seccion 1.°: como chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
los hechos dirigidos a favorecer la ejecucion de un delito politico o a permitir al autor de

este delito sustraerse a la aplicacion de la ley penal.
“3. No se consideraran delitos politicos aquellos a los que su autor sea inducido por un
motivo egoista y vil.
“4. No se consideraran delitos los que creen un peligro para la comunidad o un estado de
terror.” (Italics supplied.)
Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the
proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are
divested of their character as “common” offenses and assume the political complexion of
the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished
separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition
of a graver penalty.
There is one other reason — and a fundamental one at that — why Article 48 of our Penal
Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion,
and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the
following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of chanroblesvir tuallawlibrary
rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of
prision mayor; and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period
chan roblesv irtualawlibrary
to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other words, in the
absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him.
However, under Article 48, said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the
absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in
conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit,
not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the
several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the word of Rodriguez
Navarro: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia este
articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente en el principio pro reo.” (II
Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de España, p. 2168.) 3
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish
Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932,
reading:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho
constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el
otro.
“En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado
maximo, hasta el limite que represente la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando
separadamente los delitos.
“Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por
separado.” (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrino Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163.)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment,
restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period to the
case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged
were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to
our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two
or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed
for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense
be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other
purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each
offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of Article 48 is readily
discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed
less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of
sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum
of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum
total of the separate penalties for each offense.
Did the framers of Article 48 have a different purpose in dealing therein with an offense
which is a means necessary for the commission of another? To begin with, the culprit
cannot, then, be considered as displaying a greater degree of malice than when the two
offenses are independent of each other. On the contrary, since one offense is a necessary
means for the commission of the other, the evil intent is one, which, at least, quantitatively,
is lesser than when the two offenses are unrelated to each other, because, in such event, he
is twice guilty of having harbored criminal designs and of carrying the same into execution.
Furthermore, it must be presumed that the object of Article 48, in its entirety, is only one.
We cannot assume that the purpose of the lawmaker, at the beginning of the single sentence
of which said article consists, was to favor the accused, and that, before the sentence ended,
the former had a change of heart and turned about face against the latter. If the second part
of Article 48 had been meant to be unfavorable to the accused — and, hence, the exact
opposite of the first part — each would have been placed in, separate provisions, instead
of in one single article. If the first part sought to impose, upon the culprit, a penalty less
grave than that which he would deserve if the two or more offenses resulting from his
single act were punished separately, then this, also, must be the purpose of the second part,
in dealing with an offense which is a necessary means for the commission of another.
The accuracy of this conclusion is borne out by the fact that, since 1850, when the
counterpart of our Article 48 was inserted in the Penal Code of Spain, or for over a century,
it does not appear to have been applied by the Supreme Court thereof to crimes of murder
committed in furtherance of an insurrection.
Incidentally, we cannot accept the explanation that crimes committed as a means necessary
for the success of a rebellion had to be prosecuted separately under the provisions of Article
259 of the Penal Code of Spain, which is the counterpart of Article 244 of our old Penal
Code. To begin with, these articles are part of a substantive law. They do not govern the
manner or method of prosecution of the culprits. Then again, said precepts ordain that
common crimes committed during a rebellion or sedition, or on the occasion thereof, “shall
be respectively punished according to the provisions of this Code.” Among such provisions
was Article 90 (later Article 71, then Article 75) of the Spanish Penal Code, and Article 89
of our old Penal Code, of which Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines is
a substantial reproduction. Hence, had the Supreme Court of Spain or the Philippines
believed that murders committed as a means necessary to attain the aims of an uprising
were “common” crimes, the same would have been complexed with the rebellion or
sedition, as the case may be.
The cases of People vs. Cabrera (43 Phil., 64) and People vs. Cabrera (43 Phil., 82) have
not escaped our attention. Those cases involved members of the constabulary who rose
publicly, for the purpose of performing acts of hate and vengeance upon the police force
of Manila, and in an encounter with the latter, killed some members thereof. Charged with
and convicted of sedition in the first case, they were accused of murder in the second case.
They pleaded double jeopardy in the second case, upon the ground that the facts alleged in
the information were those set forth in the charge in the first case, in which they had been
convicted. This plea was rejected upon the ground that the organic law prohibited double
jeopardy for the same offense, and that the offense of sedition is distinct and different from
that of murder, although both were the result of the same act.
The question whether one offense was inherent in, or identified with, the other was not
discussed or even considered in said cases. Besides, the lower court applied, in the murder
case Article 89 of the old Penal Code — which is the counterpart of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code — but this Court refused to do so. Again, simply because one act may
constitute two or more offenses, it does not follow necessarily that a person may be
prosecuted for one after conviction for the other, without violating the injunction against
double jeopardy. For instance, if a man fires a shotgun at another, who suffers thereby
several injuries, one of which produced his death, may he, after conviction for murder or
homicide, based upon said fatal injury, be accused or convicted, in a separate case, for the
non-fatal injuries sustained by the victim? Or may the former be convicted of the complex
crime of murder or homicide with serious and/or less serious physical injuries? The mere
formulation of these questions suffices to show that the limitation of the rule on double
jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense does not constitute a license for
the separate prosecution of two offenses resulting from the same act, if one offense is an
essential element of the other. At any rate, as regards this phase of the issue, which was not
touched in the Cabrera cases, the rule therein laid down must necessarily be considered
modified by our decision in the cases of People vs. Labra (46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p.
159) and Crisologo vs. People and Villalobos (supra), insofar as inconsistent therewith.
The main argument in support of the theory seeking to complex rebellion with murder and
other offenses is that “war” — within the purview of the laws on rebellion and sedition —
may be “waged” or “levied” without killing. This premise does not warrant, however, the
conclusion — drawn therefrom — that any killing done in furtherance of a rebellion or
sedition is independent therefrom, and may be complexed therewith, upon the ground that
destruction of human life is not indispensable to the waging or levying of war. A person
may kill another without inflicting physical injuries upon the latter, such, for instance, as
by poisoning, drowning, suffocation or shock. Yet it is admitted that he who fatally stabs
another cannot be convicted of homicide with physical injuries. So too, it is undeniable that
treason may be committed without torturing or murdering anybody. Yet, it is well-settled
that a citizen who gives aid and comfort to the enemy by taking direct part in the
maltreatment and assassination of his (citizen’s) countrymen, in furtherance of the wishes
of said enemy, is guilty of plain treason, not complexed with murder or physical injuries,
the later being — as charged and proven — mere ingredients of the former. Now then, if
homicide may be an ingredient of treason, why can it not be an ingredient of rebellion? The
proponents of the idea of rebellion complexed with homicide,. etc., have not even tried to
answer this question. Neither have they assailed the wisdom of our aforementioned
decisions in treason cases.
The Court is conscious of the keen interest displayed, and the considerable efforts exerted,
by the Executive Department in the apprehension and prosecution of those believed to be
guilty of crimes against public order, of the lives lost, and the time and money spent in
connection therewith, as well as of the possible implications or repercussions in the security
of the State. The careful consideration given to said policy of a coordinate and co-equal
branch of the Government is reflected in the time consumed, the extensive and intensive
research work undertaken, and the many meetings held by the members of the court for the
purpose of elucidating on the question under discussion and of settling the same.
The role of the judicial department under the Constitution is, however, — clear — to settle
justiceable controversies by the application of the law. And the latter must be enforced as
it is — with all its flaws and defects, not affecting its validity — not as the judges would
have it. In other words, the courts must apply the policy of the State as set forth in its laws,
regardless of the wisdom thereof.
It is evident to us that the policy of our statutes on rebellion is to consider all acts committed
in furtherance thereof — as specified in Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised: Penal Code chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
— as constituting only one crime, punishable with one single penalty — namely, that
prescribed in said Article 135. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that the penalties
provided in our old Penal Code (Articles 230 to 232) were much stiffer, namely: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Life imprisonment to death — for the promoters, maintainers and leaders of the
rebellion, and, also, for subordinate officers who held positions of authority, either civil or
ecclesiastical, if the purpose of the movement was to proclaim the independence of any
portion of the Philippine territory;
2. Reclusion temporal in its maximum period — for said promoters, maintainers and
leaders of the insurrection, and for its subordinate officers, if the purpose of the rebellion
was any of those enumerated in Article 229, except that mentioned in the preceding
paragraph;
3. Reclusion temporal: (a) for subordinate officers other than those already adverted to;
and (b) for mere participants in the rebellion falling under the first paragraph of No. 2 of
Article 174; and chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
4. Prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period — for
participants not falling under No. 3.
After the cession of the Philippines to the United States, the rigors of the old Penal Code
were tempered. Its aforementioned provisions were superseded by section 3 of Act No.
292, which reduced the penalty to imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years and a fine
not exceeding $10,000, or P20,000, for “every person who incites, sets on foot, assists or
engages in any rebellion or insurrection or who gives aid and comfort to any one so cralaw
engaging in such rebellion or insurrection.” Such liberal attitude was adhered to by the
authors of the Revised Penal Code. The penalties therein are substantially identical to those
prescribed in Act 292. Although the Revised Penal Code increased slightly the penalty of
imprisonment for the promoters, maintainers and leaders of the uprising, as well as for
public officers joining the same, to a maximum not exceeding twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, it reduced the penalty of imprisonment for mere participants to not more than eight
(8) years of prision mayor, and eliminated the fine.
This benign mood of the Revised Penal Code becomes more significant when we bear in
mind it was approved on December 8, 1930 and became effective on January 1, 1932. At
that time the communists in the Philippines had already given ample proof of their
widespread activities and of their designs and potentialities. Prior thereto, they had been
under surveillance by the agents of the law, who gathered evidence of their subversive
movements, culminating in the prosecution of Evangelista, Manahan (57 Phil., 354; 57 chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
Phil., 372), Capadocia (57 Phil., 364), Feleo (57 Phil., 451), Nabong (57 Phil., 455), and
others. In fact, the first information against the first two alleged that they committed the
crime of inciting to sedition “on and during the month of November, 1930, and for
sometime prior and subsequent thereto.”
As if this were not enough, the very Constitution adopted in 1935, incorporated a formal
and solemn declaration (Article II, section 5) committing the Commonwealth, and, then
the Republic of the Philippines, to the “promotion of social justice”. Soon later,
Commonwealth Act No. 103, creating the Court of Industrial Relations, was passed. Then
followed a number of other statutes implementing said constitutional mandate. It is not
necessary to go into the details of said legislative enactments. Suffice it to say that the same
are predicated upon a recognition of the fact that a good many of the problems confronting
the State are due to social and economic evils, and that, unless the latter are removed or,
least minimized, the former will keep on harassing the community and affecting the well-
being of its members.
Thus, the settled policy of our laws on rebellion, since the beginning of the century, has
been one of decided leniency, in comparison with the laws enforce during the Spanish
regime. Such policy has not suffered the slightest alteration. Although the Government has,
for the past five or six years, adopted a more vigorous course of action in the apprehension
of violators of said law and in their prosecution the established policy of the State, as
regards the punishment of the culprits has remained unchanged since 1932. It is not for us
to consider the merits and demerits of such policy. This falls within the province of the
policy-making branch of the government the Congress of the Philippines. However, the
following quotation from Cuello Calon indicates the schools of thought on this subject and
the reason that may have influenced our lawmakers in making their choice: chanroble svirtuallawlibrary
“Durante muchos siglos, hasta tiempos relativamente cercanos, se reputaban los hechos
que hoy llamamos delitos politicos como mas graves y peligrosos que los crimenes
comunes. Se consideraba que mientras estos solo causan un daño individual, aquellos
producen profundas perturbaciones en la vida collectiva llegando a poner en peligro la
misma vida del Estado. En consonancia con estas ideas fueron reprimidos con
extraordinaria severidad y designados con la denominacion romana de delitos de lesa
majestad se catalogaron en las leyes penales como los crimenes mas temibles.
“Pero desde hace poco mas de un siglo se ha realizado en este punto una transformacion
profunda merced a la cual la delincuencia politica dejo de apreciarse con los severos
criterios de antaño quedando sometida a un regimen penal, por regla general suave y
benevolo.
“El origen de este cambio se remonta, segun opinion muy difundida, a la revolucion que
tuvo lugar en Francia en el año 1830. El gobierno de Luis Felipe establecio una honda
separacion entre los delitos comunes y los politicos, siendo estos sometidos a una penalidad
mas suave y sus autores exceptuados de la extradicion. Irradiando a otros paises tuvieron
estas tan gran difusion que en casi todos los de regimen liberal-individualista se ha llegado
a crear un tratamiento desprovisto de severidad para la represion de estos hechos. No solo
las penas con que se conminaron perdieron gran parte de su antigua dureza, sino qua en
algunos paises se creo un regimen penal mas suave para estos delicuentes, en otros se abolio
para ellos la pena de muerte. Tan profundo contraste entre el antiguo y el actual tratamiento
de la criminalidad politica en la mayoria de los paises solo puede ser explicado por las
ideas nacidas y difundidas bajo los regimenes politicos liberalesacerca de estos delitos y
delincuentes. Por una parte se ha afirmado que la criminalidad da estos hechos no contiene
la misma inmoralidad que la delincuencia comun, que es tan solo relativa, qua depende del
tiempo, del lugar, da las circumstancias, de las instituciones del pais. Otros invocan la
elevacion de los moviles y sentimientos determinantes de estos hechos, el amor a la patria,
la adhesion ferviente a determinadas ideas o principios, el espiritu de sacrificio por el
triunfo de un ideal.
“Contra su trato benevolo, del que no pocas veces se han beneficiado peligrosos
malhechores, se ha iniciado hace algun tiempo una fuerte reaccion (vease Cap. XV, 3.°, b),
que llego a alcanzar considerable severidad en las legislaciones de tipo autoritario, y que
tambien ha hallado eco, en forma mas suave, en las de otros paises de constitucion
democratica en los que, especialmente en los ultimos años, la frecuencia de agitaciones
politicas y sociales ha originado la publicacion de numerosas leyes encaminadas a la
proteccion penal del Estado.” (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Tomo 1, pp. 250-252.)
Such evils as may result from the failure of the policy of the law punishing the offense to
dovetail with the policy of the law enforcing agencies in the apprehension and prosecution
of the offenders are matters which may be brought to the attention of the departments
concerned. The judicial branch cannot amend the former in order to suit the latter. The
Court cannot indulge in judicial legislation without violating the principle of separation of
powers, and, hence, undermining the foundation of our republican system. In, short, we
cannot accept the theory of the prosecution without causing much bigger harm than that
which would allegedly result from the adoption of the opposite view.
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against
Defendant-Appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described
therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said
Defendants, as means “necessary” 4 for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple
rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; chan
that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years
roblesvirtualawlibrary
of prision mayor and a fine of P20,000; and that, in conformity with the policy of this
chan roblesv irtualawlibrary
court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said Defendant
may be allowed bail.
It is urged that, in the exercise of its discretion, the Court should deny the motion under
consideration, because the security of the State so requires, and because the judgment of
conviction appealed from indicates that the evidence of guilt of Amado V. Hernandez is
strong. However, as held in a resolution of this court, dated January 29, 1953, in the case
of Montano vs. Ocampo (G.R. L-6352): chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“ to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of guilt is strong; it must also appear
cralaw chan rob lesvirtualawlibrary
that in case of conviction the Defendant’s criminal liability would probably call for a capital
punishment. No clear or conclusive showing before this Court has been made.”
In fact, in the case at bar, Defendant Amado V. Hernandez was sentenced by the lower
court, not to the extreme penalty, but to life imprisonment. Furthermore, individual
freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours, to be
denied upon mere general principles and abstract consideration of public safety. Indeed,
the preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political system that, not
satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of section (1) of the
Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8),
(11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1) to the protection of
several aspects of freedom. Thus, in line with the letter and spirit of the fundamental law,
we said in the aforementioned case of Montano vs. Ocampo: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Exclusion from bail in capital offenses being an exception to the otherwise absolute right
guaranteed by the constitution, the natural tendency of the courts has been toward a fair
and liberal appreciation, rather than otherwise, of the evidence in the determination of the
degree of proof and presumption of guilt necessary to warrant a deprivation of that right.”
xxx xxx xxx
“In the evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is one other important factor to
be taken into account. The sole purpose of confining accused in jail before conviction, it
has been observed, is to secure his presence at the trial. In other words, if denial of bail is
authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the
Defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury.
Hence, the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio
to the extent of the probability of evasion of prosecution.
“The possibility of escape in this case, bearing in mind the Defendant’s official and social
standing and his other personal circumstances, seem remote if not nil.”
This view applies fully to Amado V. Hernandez, with the particularity that there is an
additional circumstance in his favor — he has been detained since January 1951, or for
more than five (5) years, and it may still take some time to dispose of the case, for the same
has not been, and is not in a position to be, included, as yet, in our calendar, inasmuch as
the briefs for some Appellants — other than Hernandez — as well as the brief for the
Government, are pending submission. It should be noted, also, that the decision appealed
from the opposition to the motion in question do not reveal satisfactorily and concrete,
positive act of the accused showing, sufficiently, that his provincial release, during the
pendency of the appeal, would jeopardize the security of the State.
Wherefore, the aforementioned motion for bail of Defendant- Appellant Amado V.
Hernandez is hereby granted and, upon the filing of a bond, with sufficient sureties, in the
sum of P30,000, and its approval by the court, let said Defendant-Appellant be
provisionally released. It is SO ORDERED.
Paras, C.J., Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo and Reyes. J.B.L., JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J., concurs in the result.
EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 160792 : August 25, 2005]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT.

GARY ALEJANO, PN (MARINES) CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN
(MARINES) CAPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, PA LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN
CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN
HOMOBONO ADAZA, and ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO, Petitioners, v.
GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES, and
SEC. ROILO GOLEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review 1 seeks to nullify the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 17
September 2003 and Resolution dated 13 November 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78545. The
Court of Appeals' Decision and Resolution dismissed the petition for habeas corpus filed
by lawyers Homobono Adaza and Roberto Rafael Pulido ("Petitioners") on behalf of their
detained clients Capt. Gary Alejano (PN-Marines), Capt. Nicanor Faeldon (PN-Marines),
Capt. Gerardo Gambala (PA), Lt. SG James Layug (PN), Capt. Milo Maestrecampo (PA),
and Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (PN) ("detainees").
Petitioners named as respondent Gen. Pedro Cabuay ("Gen. Cabuay"), Chief of the
Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines ("ISAFP"), who has custody
of the detainees. Petitioners impleaded Gen. Narciso Abaya ("Gen. Abaya"), Sec. Angelo
Reyes and Roilo Golez, who are respectively the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines ("AFP"), Secretary of National Defense and National Security Adviser,
because they have command responsibility over Gen. Cabuay.
Antecedent Facts
Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior
officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments
("Oakwood"), an upscale apartment complex, located in the business district of Makati
City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive
devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their
support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.
Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities
after several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the
explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks.
On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all
the Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP
Detention Center. The transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were
investigating the soldiers' involvement in the Oakwood incident.
On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup-d-etat with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27
July 2003 Oakwood incident. The government prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup d
etat as defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines, as amended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The trial
court later issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG
Antonio Trillanes IV ("Trillanes") and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding
Officers of ISAFP.
On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to
take into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the
Oakwood incident except the detained junior officers who were to remain under the
custody of ISAFP.
On 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme
Court.
On 12 August 2003, the Court issued a Resolution, which resolved to:
(a) ISSUE the WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; (b) require respondents to make a
RETURN of the writ on Monday, 18 August 2003, at 10:00 a.m. before the Court of
Appeals; (c) refer the case to the Court of Appeals for RAFFLE among the Justices
thereof for hearing, further proceedings and decision thereon, after which a REPORT
shall be made to this Court within ten (10) days from promulgation of the decision.3
Thus, the Court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus dated 12 August 2003 directing
respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the
detainees before the Court of Appeals on the scheduled date for hearing and further
proceedings.
On the same date, the detainees and their other co-accused filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the trial court
granted.
On 18 August 2003, pursuant to the directives of the Court, respondents submitted their
Return of the Writ and Answer to the petition and produced the detainees before the
Court of Appeals during the scheduled hearing. After the parties filed their memoranda
on 28 August 2003, the appellate court considered the petition submitted for decision.
On 17 September 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing the
petition. Nonetheless, the appellate court ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of
implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the
rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04.
The appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in court
regarding visiting hours and the detainees' right to exercise for two hours a day.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The appellate court pointed out
that the detainees are already charged of coup d etat before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees' confinement is under a
valid indictment, the legality of which the detainees and petitioners do not even question.
The Court of Appeals recognized that habeas corpusmay also be the appropriate remedy
to assail the legality of detention if there is a deprivation of a constitutional right.
However, the appellate court held that the constitutional rights alleged to have been
violated in this case do not directly affect the detainees' liberty. The appellate court ruled
that the regulation of the detainees' right to confer with their counsels is reasonable under
the circumstances.
The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes' letter is an
abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint,
which is the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed the petition and ordered Gen. Cabuay to fulfill the
promise he made in open court to uphold the visiting hours and the right of the detainees
to exercise for two hours a day. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Respondent Cabuay is hereby ORDERED to faithfully adhere to his commitment to
uphold the constitutional rights of the detainees in accordance with the Standing
Operations Procedure No. 0263-04 regarding visiting hours and the right of the detainees
to exercise for two (2) hours a day.
SO ORDERED.4
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVIEWING AND REVERSING A

DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACKNOWLEDGING THE

APPROPRIATENESS OF THE REMEDY PETITIONERS SEEK; and cralawlibrary
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASSERTING THE LEGALITY OF THE

CONDITIONS OF THE DETAINED JUNIOR OFFICERS' DETENTION.5
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners claim that the Court's 12 August 2003 Order granted the petition and the Court
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals only for a factual hearing. Petitioners thus
argue that the Court's Order had already foreclosed any question on the propriety and
merits of their petition.
Petitioners' claim is baseless. A plain reading of the 12 August 2003 Order shows that the
Court referred to the Court of Appeals the duty to inquire into the cause of the junior
officers' detention. Had the Court ruled for the detainees' release, the Court would not
have referred the hearing of the petition to the Court of Appeals. The Court would have
forthwith released the detainees had the Court upheld petitioners' cause.
In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court is a
preliminary step in the hearing of the petition.6 The respondent must produce the person
and explain the cause of his detention.7 However, this order is not a ruling on the
propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters covered by the remedy. Thus, the
Court's order to the Court of Appeals to conduct a factual hearing was not an affirmation
of the propriety of the remedy of habeas corpus.
For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes
the determination of the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the
detention unlawful, then it should issue the writ and release the detainees. In the present
case, after hearing the case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is
inapplicable. After actively participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals,
petitioners are estopped from claiming that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to
inquire into the merits of their petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper
remedy to address the detainees' complaint against the regulations and conditions in the
ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into
the cause of detention of a person.8 The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a
person is being illegally deprived of his liberty.9 If the inquiry reveals that the detention is
illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven
lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus
very limited. It is not a writ of error.10 Neither can it substitute for an appeal.11
Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writ's application to circumstances where there is
deprivation of a person's constitutional rights. The writ is available where a person
continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where
there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are also
unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become
arbitrary.12
However, a mere allegation of a violation of one's constitutional right is not sufficient.

The courts will extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is
present: (a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the unlawful
restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an
excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the excess.13 Whatever
situation the petitioner invokes, the threshold remains high. The violation of
constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings.14
Petitioners admit that they do not question the legality of the detention of the detainees.
Neither do they dispute the lawful indictment of the detainees for criminal and military
offenses. What petitioners bewail is the regulation adopted by Gen. Cabuay in the ISAFP
Detention Center preventing petitioners as lawyers from seeing the detainees - their
clients - any time of the day or night. The regulation allegedly curtails the detainees' right
to counsel and violates Republic Act No. 7438 ("RA 7438").15 Petitioners claim that the
regulated visits made it difficult for them to prepare for the important hearings before the
Senate and the Feliciano Commission.
Petitioners also point out that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the
detainees' right to privacy of communication when the ISAFP officials opened and read
the personal letters of Trillanes and Capt. Milo Maestrecampo ("Maestrecampo").
Petitioners further claim that the ISAFP officials violated the detainees' right against cruel
and unusual punishment when the ISAFP officials prevented the detainees from having
contact with their visitors. Moreover, the ISAFP officials boarded up with iron bars and
plywood slabs the iron grills of the detention cells, limiting the already poor light and
ventilation in the detainees' cells.
Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement.16 However,
the fact that the detainees are confined makes their rights more limited than those of the
public.17 RA 7438, which specifies the rights of detainees and the duties of detention
officers, expressly recognizes the power of the detention officer to adopt and implement
reasonable measures to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape. Section
4(b) of RA 7438 provides:
Section 4. Penalty Clause. - a) x x x

b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the
immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any
medical doctor or priest or religious minister or by his counsel, from visiting and
conferring privately chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family with him,
or from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any
hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of
four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial
responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures
as may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape. (Emphasis supplied) ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
True, Section 4(b) of RA 7438 makes it an offense to prohibit a lawyer from visiting a
detainee client "at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night." However, the last
paragraph of the same Section 4(b) makes the express qualification that
"notwithstanding" the provisions of Section 4(b), the detention officer has the power to
undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety of the
detainee and prevent his escape.
The last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 prescribes a clear standard. The
regulations governing a detainee's confinement must be "reasonable measures x x x to
secure his safety and prevent his escape." Thus, the regulations must be reasonably
connected to the government's objective of securing the safety and preventing the escape
of the detainee. The law grants the detention officer the authority to "undertake such
reasonable measures" or regulations.
Petitioners contend that there was an actual prohibition of the detainees' right to effective
representation when petitioners' visits were limited by the schedule of visiting hours.
Petitioners assert that the violation of the detainees' rights entitle them to be released from
detention.
Petitioners' contention does not persuade us. The schedule of visiting hours does not
render void the detainees' indictment for criminal and military offenses to warrant the
detainees' release from detention. The ISAFP officials did not deny, but merely regulated,
the detainees' right to counsel. The purpose of the regulation is not to render ineffective
the right to counsel, but to secure the safety and security of all detainees. American cases
are instructive on the standards to determine whether regulations on pre-trial confinement
are permissible.
In Bell v. Wolfish,18 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court held that regulations must be
reasonably related to maintaining security and must not be excessive in achieving that
purpose. Courts will strike down a restriction that is arbitrary and purposeless.19
However, Bell v. Wolfish expressly discouraged courts from skeptically questioning
challenged restrictions in detention and prison facilities.20 The U.S. Supreme Court
commanded the courts to afford administrators "wide-ranging deference" in
implementing policies to maintain institutional security.21
In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides the standard to
make regulations in detention centers allowable: "such reasonable measures as may be
necessary to secure the detainee's safety and prevent his escape." In the present case,
the visiting hours accorded to the lawyers of the detainees are reasonably connected to
the legitimate purpose of securing the safety and preventing the escape of all detainees.
While petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they want, the fact that the
detainees still have face-to-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly
shows that there is no impairment of detainees' right to counsel. Petitioners as counsels
could visit their clients between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. with a lunch break at 12:00 p.m.
The visiting hours are regular business hours, the same hours when lawyers normally
entertain clients in their law offices. Clearly, the visiting hours pass the standard of
reasonableness. Moreover, in urgent cases, petitioners could always seek permission from
the ISAFP officials to confer with their clients beyond the visiting hours.
The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the detainees, giving
petitioners sufficient time to confer with the detainees. The detainees' right to counsel is
not undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in the hearings before the Senate and the
Feliciano Commission,22 petitioners were given time to confer with the detainees, a fact
that petitioners themselves admit.23 Thus, at no point were the detainees denied their right
to counsel.
Petitioners further argue that the bars separating the detainees from their visitors and the
boarding of the iron grills in their cells with plywood amount to unusual and excessive
punishment. This argument fails to impress us. Bell v. Wolfish pointed out that while a
detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due
process of law, detention inevitably interferes with a detainee's desire to live
comfortably.24 The fact that the restrictions inherent in detention intrude into the
detainees' desire to live comfortably does not convert those restrictions into punishment.25
It is when the restrictions are arbitrary and purposeless that courts will infer intent to
punish.26 Courts will also infer intent to punish even if the restriction seems to be related
rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction appears excessive in relation to that
purpose.27 Jail officials are thus not required to use the least restrictive security
measure.28 They must only refrain from implementing a restriction that appears excessive
to the purpose it serves.29
We quote Bell v. Wolfish:
One further point requires discussion. The petitioners assert, and respondents concede,
that the "essential objective of pretrial confinement is to insure the detainees' presence at
trial." While this interest undoubtedly justifies the original decision to confine an
individual in some manner, we do not accept respondents' argument that the
Government's interest in ensuring a detainee's presence at trial is the only objective that
may justify restraints and conditions once the decision is lawfully made to confine a
person. "If the government could confine or otherwise infringe the liberty of detainees
only to the extent necessary to ensure their presence at trial, house arrest would in the end
be the only constitutionally justified form of detention." The Government also has
legitimate interests that stem from its need to manage the facility in which the individual
is detained. These legitimate operational concerns may require administrative measures
that go beyond those that are, strictly speaking, necessary to ensure that the detainee
shows up at trial. For example, the Government must be able to take steps to maintain
security and order at the institution and make certain no weapons or illicit drugs reach
detainees. Restraints that are reasonably related to the institution's interest in maintaining
jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they
are discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had
he been released while awaiting trial. We need not here attempt to detail the precise
extent of the legitimate governmental interests that may justify conditions or restrictions
of pretrial detention. It is enough simply to recognize that in addition to ensuring the
detainees' presence at trial, the effective management of the detention facility once the
individual is confined is a valid objective that may justify imposition of conditions and
restrictions of pretrial detention and dispel any inference that such restrictions are
intended as punishment.30
An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action causes the inmate to suffer some
harm or "disability," and (2) the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate.31
Punishment also requires that the harm or disability be significantly greater than, or be
independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement.32
Block v. Rutherford,33 which reiterated Bell v. Wolfish, upheld the blanket restriction on
contact visits as this practice was reasonably related to maintaining security. The safety
of innocent individuals will be jeopardized if they are exposed to detainees who while not
yet convicted are awaiting trial for serious, violent offenses and may have prior criminal
conviction.34 Contact visits make it possible for the detainees to hold visitors and jail staff
hostage to effect escapes.35 Contact visits also leave the jail vulnerable to visitors
smuggling in weapons, drugs, and other contraband.36 The restriction on contact visits
was imposed even on low-risk detainees as they could also potentially be enlisted to help
obtain contraband and weapons.37 The security consideration in the imposition of blanket
restriction on contact visits was ruled to outweigh the sentiments of the detainees.38
Block v. Rutherford held that the prohibition of contact visits bore a rational connection
to the legitimate goal of internal security.39 This case reaffirmed the "hands-off" doctrine
enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish, a form of judicial self-restraint, based on the premise that
courts should decline jurisdiction over prison matters in deference to administrative
expertise.40
In the present case, we cannot infer punishment from the separation of the detainees from
their visitors by iron bars, which is merely a limitation on contact visits. The iron bars
separating the detainees from their visitors prevent direct physical contact but still allow
the detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited physical contact with their
visitors. The arrangement is not unduly restrictive. In fact, it is not even a strict non-
contact visitation regulation like in Block v. Rutherford. The limitation on the detainees'
physical contacts with visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to valid security
concerns.
The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security within the ISAFP
Detention Center. This measure intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the
detainees from passing on contraband and weapons from one cell to another. The boarded
grills ensure security and prevent disorder and crime within the facility. The diminished
illumination and ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the fact of detention, and do
not constitute punishments on the detainees.
We accord respect to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the conditions in the ISAFP
Detention Center are not inhuman, degrading and cruel. Each detainee, except for Capt.
Nicanor Faeldon and Capt. Gerardo Gambala, is confined in separate cells, unlike
ordinary cramped detention cells. The detainees are treated well and given regular meals.
The Court of Appeals noted that the cells are relatively clean and livable compared to the
conditions now prevailing in the city and provincial jails, which are congested with
detainees. The Court of Appeals found the assailed measures to be reasonable
considering that the ISAFP Detention Center is a high-risk detention facility. Apart from
the soldiers, a suspected New People's Army ("NPA") member and two suspected Abu
Sayyaf members are detained in the ISAFP Detention Center.
We now pass upon petitioners' argument that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center
violated the detainees' right to privacy when the ISAFP officials opened and read the
letters handed by detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo to one of the petitioners for
mailing. Petitioners point out that the letters were not in a sealed envelope but simply
folded because there were no envelopes in the ISAFP Detention Center. Petitioners
contend that the Constitution prohibits the infringement of a citizen's privacy rights
unless authorized by law. The Solicitor General does not deny that the ISAFP officials
opened the letters.
Courts in the U.S. have generally permitted prison officials to open and read all incoming
and outgoing mail of convicted prisoners to prevent the smuggling of contraband into the
prison facility and to avert coordinated escapes.41 Even in the absence of statutes
specifically allowing prison authorities from opening and inspecting mail, such practice
was upheld based on the principle of "civil deaths."42 Inmates were deemed to have no
right to correspond confidentially with anyone. The only restriction placed upon prison
authorities was that the right of inspection should not be used to delay unreasonably the
communications between the inmate and his lawyer.43
Eventually, the inmates' outgoing mail to licensed attorneys, courts, and court officials
received respect.44 The confidential correspondences could not be censored.45 The
infringement of such privileged communication was held to be a violation of the inmates'
First Amendment rights.46 A prisoner has a right to consult with his attorney in absolute
privacy, which right is not abrogated by the legitimate interests of prison authorities in
the administration of the institution.47 Moreover, the risk is small that attorneys will
conspire in plots that threaten prison security.48
American jurisprudence initially made a distinction between the privacy rights enjoyed
by convicted inmates and pre-trial detainees. The case of Palmigiano v. Travisono49
recognized that pre-trial detainees, unlike convicted prisoners, enjoy a limited right of
privacy in communication. Censorship of pre-trial detainees' mail addressed to public
officials, courts and counsel was held impermissible. While incoming mail may be
inspected for contraband and read in certain instances, outgoing mail of pre-trial
detainees could not be inspected or read at all.
In the subsequent case of Wolff v. McDonnell,50 involving convicted prisoners, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that prison officials could open in the presence of the inmates
incoming mail from attorneys to inmates. However, prison officials could not read such
mail from attorneys. Explained the U.S. Supreme Court:
The issue of the extent to which prison authorities can open and inspect incoming mail
from attorneys to inmates, has been considerably narrowed in the course of this litigation.
The prison regulation under challenge provided that '(a)ll incoming and outgoing mail
will be read and inspected,' and no exception was made for attorney-prisoner mail. x x x
Petitioners now concede that they cannot open and read mail from attorneys to inmates,
but contend that they may open all letters from attorneys as long as it is done in the
presence of the prisoners. The narrow issue thus presented is whether letters determined
or found to be from attorneys may be opened by prison authorities in the presence of the
inmate or whether such mail must be delivered unopened if normal detection techniques
fail to indicate contraband.
xxx
x x x If prison officials had to check in each case whether a communication was from an
attorney before opening it for inspection, a near impossible task of administration would
be imposed. We think it entirely appropriate that the State require any such
communications to be specially marked as originating from an attorney, with his name
and address being given, if they are to receive special treatment. It would also certainly
be permissible that prison authorities require that a lawyer desiring to correspond with a
prisoner, first identify himself and his client to the prison officials, to assure that the
letters marked privileged are actually from members of the bar. As to the ability to open
the mail in the presence of inmates, this could in no way constitute censorship, since the
mail would not be read. Neither could it chill such communications, since the inmate's
presence insures that prison officials will not read the mail. The possibility that
contraband will be enclosed in letters, even those from apparent attorneys, surely
warrants prison officials' opening the letters. We disagree with the Court of Appeals that
this should only be done in 'appropriate circumstances. 'Since a flexible test, besides
being unworkable, serves no arguable purpose in protecting any of the possible
constitutional rights enumerated by respondent, we think that petitioners, by acceding to a
rule whereby the inmate is present when mail from attorneys is inspected, have done all,
and perhaps even more, than the Constitution requires.51
In Hudson v. Palmer,52 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an inmate has no reasonable
expectation of privacy inside his cell. The U.S. Supreme Court explained that prisoners
necessarily lose many protections of the Constitution, thus:
However, while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many protections of the
Constitution, it is also clear that imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss
of many significant rights. These constraints on inmates, and in some cases the complete
withdrawal of certain rights, are "justified by the considerations underlying our penal
system." The curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to
accommodate a myriad of "institutional needs and objectives" of prison facilities, chief
among which is internal security. Of course, these restrictions or retractions also serve,
incidentally, as reminders that, under our system of justice, deterrence and retribution are
factors in addition to correction.53
The later case of State v. Dunn,54 citing Hudson v. Palmer, abandoned Palmigiano v.
Travisono and made no distinction as to the detainees' limited right to privacy. State v.
Dunn noted the considerable jurisprudence in the United States holding that inmate mail
may be censored for the furtherance of a substantial government interest such as security
or discipline. State v. Dunn declared that if complete censorship is permissible, then the
lesser act of opening the mail and reading it is also permissible. We quote State v. Dunn:
[A] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally

incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required
to ensure institutional security and internal order. We are satisfied that society would
insist that the prisoner's expectation of privacy always yield to what must be considered a
paramount interest in institutional security. We believe that it is accepted by our society
that "[l]oss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement."
The distinction between the limited privacy rights of a pre-trial detainee and a convicted
inmate has been blurred as courts in the U.S. ruled that pre-trial detainees might
occasionally pose an even greater security risk than convicted inmates. Bell v. Wolfish
reasoned that those who are detained prior to trial may in many cases be individuals who
are charged with serious crimes or who have prior records and may therefore pose a
greater risk of escape than convicted inmates.55 Valencia v. Wiggins56 further held that "it
is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the
purpose of maintaining jail security."
American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detainees' non-privileged
mail poses a genuine threat to jail security.57 Hence, when a detainee places his letter in
an envelope for non-privileged mail, the detainee knowingly exposes his letter to possible
inspection by jail officials.58 A pre-trial detainee has no reasonable expectation of privacy
for his incoming mail.59 However, incoming mail from lawyers of inmates enjoys limited
protection such that prison officials can open and inspect the mail for contraband but
could not read the contents without violating the inmates' right to correspond with his
lawyer.60 The inspection of privileged mail is limited to physical contraband and not to
verbal contraband.61
Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of the
detainees' letters in the present case violated the detainees' right to privacy of
communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded
letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for
the inspection of contraband.
The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential
letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters
from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees' personal
courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present
case, since the letters were not confidential communication between the detainees
and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters.
If the letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their
lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for
inspection in the presence of the detainees.
That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizen's privacy
rights62 is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who
are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4
of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment.
By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a
diminished expectation of privacy rights.
In assessing the regulations imposed in detention and prison facilities that are alleged to
infringe on the constitutional rights of the detainees and convicted prisoners, U.S. courts
"balance the guarantees of the Constitution with the legitimate concerns of prison
administrators."63 The deferential review of such regulations stems from the principle
that:
[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny

analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt
innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration.64
The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300 soldiers in
committing coup d etat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua.65 The junior officers
are not ordinary detainees but visible leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an
armed takeover of a civilian building in the heart of the financial district of the country.
As members of the military armed forces, the detainees are subject to the Articles of
War.66
Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons from the Abu
Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must give the military custodian a wider range of
deference in implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The military
custodian is in a better position to know the security risks involved in detaining the junior
officers, together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the
appropriate regulations depend largely on the security risks involved, we should defer to
the regulations adopted by the military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.
The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and convicted
prisoners from petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and
conditions in detention and prison facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the
detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts
could afford injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and prisoners subjected to
arbitrary and inhumane conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to
question conditions of confinement.67 The writ of habeas corpuswill only lie if what is
challenged is the fact or duration of confinement.68
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78545.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-5621. March 25, 1953.]
PHILIPPINE MOVIE PICTURES WORKERS’ ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v.

PREMIERE PRODUCTIONS, INC., Respondent.
Cipriano Cid for Petitioner.
Salvador C. Bayani for Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT TO LABOR; DUE PROCESS. — The right of a

person to his labor is deemed to be property within the meaning of constitutional
guarantees. That is his means of livelihood. He cannot be deprived of his labor or work
without due process of law.
2. EVIDENCE; LABOR DISPUTES; PROCEDURE; RULES OF EVIDENCE IN

LABOR CASES. — Although the Court of Industrial Relations, in the determination of
any question or controversy, may adopt its own rules of procedure and may act according
to justice and equity without regard to technicalities, and for that matter is not bound by
any technical rules of evidence (Comm. Act 103, sec. 20), this broad grant of power
should not be interpreted to mean that it can ignore or disregard the fundamental
requirements of due process in the trials and investigations of cases brought before it for
determination.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OCULAR INSPECTION. — An ocular inspection of the

establishment or premise involved is proper if the court finds it necessary, but such is
authorized only to help the court in clearing a doubt, reaching a conclusion, or finding the
truth. But it is not the main trial nor should it exclude the presentation of other evidence
which the parties may deem necessary to establish their case. It is merely an auxiliary
remedy which the law affords the parties or the court to reach an enlightened
determination of the case.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for review of two orders of the Court of Industrial Relations, one dated
November 8, 1951, and the other November 24, 1951, which give authority to respondent
to lay off forty- four (44) of its employees in accordance with its urgent petition on
condition that, in the event work is available in the future where their ability may be
required, the same workers should be reemployed and that, if after the termination of the
case, the court would find that at the time of their layoff work was available, the
respondent shall pay to them the back wages to which they are entitled. These two orders
were upheld by the court in banc in a resolution dated March 10, 1952, which is also
involved in the present petition for review.
On October 2, 1951, respondent filed with the Court of Industrial Relations an urgent
petition seeking authority to lay off 44 men working in three of its departments, the first
batch to be laid off thirty (30) days after the filing of the petition and the rest 45 days
thereafter, in order that in the intervening period it may finish the filming of its pending
picture. The ground for the lay off is the financial losses which respondent was allegedly
suffering during the current year.
Petitioner opposed the request alleging that the claim of financial losses has no basis in
fact it being only an act of retaliation on the part of respondent for the strike staged by the
workers days before in an attempt to harass and intimidate them and weaken and destroy
the union to which they belong.
On November 5, 1951, date when the urgent petition was set for hearing, at the request of
counsel for respondent, Hon. Arsenio C. Roldan, presiding judge of the Court of
Industrial Relations, held an ocular inspection of the studios and filming premises of
respondent in the course of which he interrogated about fifteen laborers who were then
present in the place. On the strength of the evidence adduced during the ocular inspection
Judge Roldan issued an order on November 8, 1951, allowing respondent to lay off the
workers mentioned in its petition with respect to Unit No. 2 and those assigned to the
Ground Maintenance Department subject to the condition that, in the event that work is
available in the future, they should be reemployed. With respect to the workers assigned
to Unit No. 1, the hearing was postponed.
A subsequent hearing was held in connection with the workers assigned to Unit No. 1 and
on the strength of the evidence submitted by respondent, Judge Roldan again found the
petition justifiable and authorized their lay off in an order dated November 24, 1951,
under the same condition as those contained in his previous order.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of both orders dated November 8 and November
24, 1951, which motion the court in banc denied in a resolution issued on March 10,
1952. Hence this petition for review.
The only issue submitted to this court for consideration is: May the Court of Industrial
Relations authorize the layoff of workers on the basis of an ocular inspection without
receiving full evidence to determine the cause or motive of such layoff?
It appears that when the case was called for hearing to look into the merits of the urgent
petition of respondent seeking to lay off 44 men who were working in three of its
departments on the ground of lack of work and because its business was suffering
financial losses during the current year, the court, which was then represented by its
presiding Judge, decided to make an ocular inspection of the studios and filming premises
of respondent following a request made to that effect by its counsel, and in the course of
said inspection Judge Roldan proceeded to interrogate the workers he found in the place
in the presence of the counsel of both parties. The testimony of those interrogated was
taken down and the counsel of both parties were allowed to cross-examine them. Judge
Roldan also proceeded to examine some of the records of respondent company among
them the time cards of some workers which showed that while the workers reported for
work, when their presence was checked they were found to be no longer in the premises.
And on the strength of the findings made by Judge Roldan in this ocular inspection he
reached the conclusion that the petition for layoff was justified because there was no
more work for the laborers to do in connection with the different jobs given to them. It is;
now contended that such a procedure is unfair to the labor union in that it deprived the
workers affected of the opportunity to disprove what apparently was represented to the
court during the ocular inspection which at best may only be the result of a
prearrangement devised by the company to justify its claim of lack of work and that what
the court should have done was to make a full-dress investigation if not a formal hearing
giving both parties all the time and opportunity to present their evidence before deciding
such an important matter which affects the position and the only means of livelihood of
the workers affected by the petition. In other words, the petitioning labor union claims
that with the procedure adopted by the court the workers were deprived of their
employment without due process of law.
The claim of petitioner that the laborers were not given an opportunity to present their
evidence to disprove the claim of lack of work is disputed by counsel for respondent
company who claims that the labor union had its day in court because its counsel was
present in the investigation or ocular inspection and even presented some witnesses to
protect its interest. The record before the court on this matter is not clear and for such
reason it has no way of determining the truth of both claims. The stenographic notes
taken during the ocular inspection have not been elevated for the reason undoubtedly that
this is a petition for review and the only issue before the court is one of law. In the face of
this confusing situation on an issue which is determinative of the controversy, the only
guide that the court finds is the order itself of the court of origin which happily contains a
reference to the evidence that it has considered and which has served as basis for its
conclusion resulting in the layoff of the workers in whose behalf the present petition was
brought before this court. We refer to the order of November 8, 1951, subject of the
petition for review, wherein Judge Roldan makes express mention of the evidence
adduced during the ocular inspection. We take it that such evidence can only refer to the
testimony given by the workers interrogated by him and to whatever documents he found
or examined in the course of such inspection. It is true, as counsel for respondent avers,
that hearings were conducted by the court a quo on October 8 and 15, 1951, and on
November 5, 6, 8, 15 and 21, 1951, but it is likewise true that those hearings do not
necessarily refer to the petition under consideration but to other matters and incidents
which were then before the court for determination such as the petition of the labor union
containing fourteen (14) demands and the petition of the same union to declare
respondent in contempt for having violated certain directives of the court. At any rate,
this matter does not appear clear and we are inclined to resolve the doubt in favor of labor
considering the spirit of our Constitution.
The right to labor is a constitutional as well as a statutory right. Every man has a natural
right to the fruits of his own industry. A man who has been employed to undertake
certain labor and has put into it his time and effort is entitled to be protected. The right of
a person to his labor is deemed to be property within the meaning of constitutional
guarantees. That is his means of livelihood. He cannot be deprived of his labor or work
without due process of law (11 Am. Jur., 333, pp. 1151-1153; 11 Am. Jur., section 344,
pp. 1168- 1171).
Although the Court of Industrial Relations, in the determination of any question or

controversy, may adopt its own rules of procedure and may act according to justice and
equity without regard to technicalities, and for that matter is not bound by any technical
rules of evidence (section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103), this broad grant of power
should not be interpreted to mean that it can ignore or disregard the fundamental
requirements of due process in the trials and investigations of cases brought before it for
determination. As aptly pointed out by this court, there are certain cardinal primary rights
which the Court of Industrial Relations must respect in the trial of every labor case. One
of them is the right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof (Manila Trading and Supply Co. v.
Philippine Labor Union, 71 Phil., 124, 129). An ocular inspection of the establishment or
premises involved is proper if the court finds it necessary, but such is authorized only to
help the court in clearing a doubt, reaching a conclusion, or finding the truth. But it is not
the main trial nor should it exclude the presentation of other evidence which the parties
may deem necessary to establish their case. It is merely an auxiliary remedy the law
affords the parties or the court to reach an enlightened determination of the case.
Considering the merits of the controversy before us, we are of the opinion that the
required due process has not been followed. The court a quo merely acted on the strength
of the ocular inspection it conducted in the premises of the respondent company. The
petition for layoff was predicated on the lack of work and of the further fact that the
company was incurring financial losses. These allegations cannot be established by a
mere inspection of the place of labor specially when such inspection was conducted at the
request of the interested party. As counsel for petitioner says, such inspection could at
best witness "the superficial fact of cessation of work but it could not be determinative of
the larger and more fundamental issue of lack of work due to lack of funds." This
fundamental issue cannot be determined without looking into the financial situation of the
respondent company. In fact, this matter is now being looked into by the court a quo in
connection with the fourteen demands of the labor union, but before finishing its inquiry
it decided to grant the lay-off pending final determination of the main case. This action is
in our opinion premature and has worked injustice to the laborers.
Wherefore, the orders subject of the present petition for review are hereby set aside, and
it is ordered that the case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings
giving to petitioner an opportunity to present its evidence in support of its opposition to
the urgent petition for layoff of respondent company. No pronouncement as to costs.
Paras C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. L-20387. January 31, 1968.]
JESUS P. MORFE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMELITO R. MUTUC, as Executive

Secretary, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.
Jesus P. Morfe for his own behalf as Plaintiff-Appellee.
Solicitor General, for Defendants-Appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; NULLIFICATION OF; FACTUAL

FOUNDATION NECESSARY TO OVERCOME PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY. —
The lower court’s decision declaring as unconstitutional Section 7, Republic Act No.
3019, insofar as it required periodical submittal of sworn statements of financial
conditions, assets and liabilities of an official or employee of the government after he had
once submitted such a sworn statement upon assuming office, contained no factual
foundation on which the nullification of this section of the statute could be based. In the
absence of such a factual foundation, the presumption of validity must prevail (Ermita-
Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. The Mayor of Manila, L-24693, July
31, 1967). On this ground alone, the lower court decision could be reversed.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE LESS RIGID IN CONSTITUTIONAL THREATS TO

FREEDOM OF THE MIND. — Where the nullity of a statute, executive order, or
ordinance may not be readily apparent and the threat to constitutional rights, especially
those involving the freedom of the mind, is present and ominous, there should not be a
rigid insistence on the requirement that evidence be presented.
3. ID.; ID.; ANTI-GRAFT ACT OF 1960; PURPOSE THEREOF. — The Anti- Graft
Act of 1960 was aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to
further promote morality in public administration. A public office must indeed be a
public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the
assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character. The times
demanded such a remedial device. By the provisions of the challenged section, it
becomes much more difficult by those disposed to take advantage of their position to
commit acts of graft and corruption. While in the attainment of such public good, no
infringement of constitutional rights is permissible, there must be a showing, clear,
categorical, and undeniable, that what the Constitution condemns, the statute allows.
4. ID.; POLICE POWER; DEFINITION OF. — Police power is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order, safety, or the general
welfare of the people. It has been negatively put forth by Justice Malcolm as "that
inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to
the comfort, safety and welfare of society."cralaw virtua1aw library
5. ID.; ID.; STATUTE ENACTED UNDER THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE;
PUBLIC OFFICIAL ADVERSELY AFFECTED MAY INVOKE THE PROTECTION
OF DUE PROCESS. — Any public official claiming to be adversely affected by a statute
enacted under the police power of the state to promote morality in public service and
thereby limited in scope to officialdom may rely on the due process clause to annul such
statute or any portion thereof. Since the police power extends to regulatory action
affecting persons in public or private life, then anyone with an alleged grievance can
invoke the protection of due process or liberty as long as such requirement is observed.
To the extent then that the questioned section of the statute compels public officials to do
a certain act, there is an infringement on their liberty. However, under the Constitution,
such a restriction is allowable as long as due process is observed.
6. ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS; STANDARD TO BE OBSERVED. — The standard of due

process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free a
challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of
legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom is its responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason, and obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out
and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression.
Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 7, R.A. 3019 NEITHER ARBITRARY NOR OPPRESSIVE.
— It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and
compelling realities of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of
greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that imposed
on public officials and employees to file such sworn statement of assets and liabilities
every two years after having done so upon assuming office. The due process clause is not
susceptible to such a reproach. There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police
power.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO PRIVACY NOT VIOLATED. — The challenged
statutory provision does not call for disclosure of information which infringes on the right
of a person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a
requirement possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding
assent to an objection of such character. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue
of the position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that
in subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities,
including the statement of the amounts and sources of income, the amounts of personal
and family expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what would otherwise be a
private sphere.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE GUARANTEE AGAINST

UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE. — No violation of the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure has been shown to exist by such requirement of further
periodical submission of one’s financial condition as set forth in the Anti-Graft of 1960.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROTECTION AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; WHEN IT

MAY BE INVOKED. — The protection which the guarantee against self- incrimination
affords will have to await, in the language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, for the existence of
actual cases, "be they criminal, civil or administrative." Prior to such a stage, there is no
pressing need to pass upon the validity of the fear sincerely voiced that there is an
infringement of the non-incrimination clause.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ITS WISDOM CANNOT BE INQUIRED INTO. — The
questioned section of the statute cannot be nullified on the allegation that it constitutes an
insult to the personal integrity and official dignity of public officials. Such action would
in effect question the wisdom of the statute which is not allowable under the principle of
separation of powers. There would be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on
a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its
own.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 1 to deter public
officials and employees from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of
morality in public service. It was declared to be the state policy "in line with the principle
that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private
persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto." 2
Nor was it the first statute of its kind to deal with such a grave problem in the public
service that unfortunately has afflicted the Philippines in the post-war era. An earlier
statute decrees the forfeiture in favor of the State of any property found to have been
unlawfully acquired by any public officer or employee. 3
One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is that
every public officer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval or after his
assumption of office "and within the month of January of every other year thereafter," as
well as upon the termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the
office to which he belongs, a "true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities,
including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his
personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar year: . . ." 4
In this declaratory relief proceeding, the periodical submission "within the month of
January of every other year thereafter" of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities
after an officer or employee had once bared his financial condition upon assumption of
once was challenged for being violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of
police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in
the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition
against self-incrimination. The lower court in the decision appealed from sustained
plaintiff, then as well as now, a judge of repute of a court of first instance. For it, such
requirement of periodical submission of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities
exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to the due process
clause.
We do not view the matter thus and accordingly reverse the lower court.
1. The reversal could be predicated on the absence of evidence to rebut the presumption
of validity. For in this action for declaratory relief filed with the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan on January 31, 1962, plaintiff, after asserting his belief "that it was a
reasonable requirement for employment that a public officer make of record his assets
and liabilities upon assumption of office and thereby make it possible thereafter to
determine whether, after assuming his position in the public service, he accumulated
assets grossly disproportionate to his reported incomes, (sic) the herein plaintiff [having]
filed within the period of time fixed in the aforesaid Administrative Order No. 334 the
prescribed sworn statement of financial condition, assets. income and liabilities, . . ." 5
maintained that the provision on the "periodical filing of sworn statement of financial
condition, assets, income and liabilities after an officer or employee had once bared his
financial condition, upon assumption of office, is oppressive and unconstitutional." 6
As earlier noted, both the protection of due process and the assurance of the privacy of
the individual as may be inferred from the prohibition against unreasonable search and
seizure and self-incrimination were relied upon. There was also the allegation that the
above requirement amounts to "an insult to the personal integrity and official dignity" of
public officials, premised as it is "on the unwarranted and derogatory assumption" that
they are "corrupt at heart" and unless thus restrained by this periodical submission of the
statements of "their financial condition, income, and expenses, they cannot be trusted to
desist from committing the corrupt practices defined . . ." 7 It was further asserted that
there was no need for such a provision as "the income tax law and the tax census law also
require statements which can serve to determine whether an officer or employee in this
Republic has enriched himself out of proportion to his reported income." 8
Then on February 14, 1962, came an Answer of the then Executive Secretary and the
then Secretary of Justice as defendants, where after practically admitting the facts
alleged, they denied the erroneous conclusion of law and as one of the special affirmative
defenses set forth: "1. That when a government official, like plaintiff, accepts a public
position, he is deemed to have voluntarily assumed the obligation to give information
about his personal affair, not only at the time of his assumption of office but during the
time he continues to discharge public trust. The private life of an employee cannot be
segregated from his public life . . ." 9 The answer likewise denied that there was a
violation of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination as well as unreasonable
search and seizure and maintained that "the provision of law in question cannot be
attacked on the ground that it impairs plaintiff s normal and legitimate enjoyment of his
life and liberty because said provision merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of
insuring the interest of general welfare in honest and clean public service and is therefore
a legitimate exercise of the police power." 10
On February 27, 1962, plaintiff filed a Motion for judgment on the pleadings as in his
opinion all his material allegations were admitted. Then on March 10, 1962, an order was
issued giving the parties thirty days within which to submit memoranda, but with or
without them, the case was deemed submitted for decision the lower court being of the
belief that "there is no question of facts, . . . the defendants [having admitted] all the
material allegations of the complaint." 11
The decision, now on appeal, came on July 19, 1962, the lower court declaring
"unconstitutional, null and void Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, in so far as it required
periodical submittal of sworn statements of financial conditions, assets and liabilities of
an official or employee of the government after he had once submitted such a sworn
statement upon assuming office; . . ." 12
In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. The Mayor of Manila, 13 it

was the holding of this Court that in the absence of a factual foundation, the lower court
deciding the matter purely "on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption
of validity must prevail." In the present case likewise there was no factual foundation on
which the nullification of this section of the statute could be based. Hence as noted the
decision of the lower court could be reversed on that ground.
A more extended consideration is not inappropriate however, for as likewise made clear
in the above Ermita-Malate Hotel case: "What cannot be stressed sufficiently is that if the
liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed
affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is
wider."cralaw virtua1aw library
Moreover, in the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration in the above case,
we expressly affirmed: "This is not to discount the possibility of a situation where the
nullity of a statute, executive order, or ordinance may not be readily apparent but the
threat to constitutional rights, especially those involving the freedom of the mind, present
and ominous." 14 In such an event therefore, "there should not be a rigid insistence on the
requirement that evidence be presented." Also, in the same Resolution, Professor Freund
was quoted thus: "In short, when freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom
that commands a momentum of respect; when property is imperiled, it is the lawmakers’
judgment that commands respect. This dual standard may not precisely reverse the
presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a
hierarchy of values within the due process clause." 15
2. We inquire first whether or not by virtue of the above requirement for a periodical
submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities, there is an invasion of liberty
protected by the due process clause.
Under the Anti-Graft Act of 1960, after the statement of policy 16 and definition of
terms, 17 there is an enumeration of corrupt practices declared unlawful in addition to
acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law. They include
persuading, inducing, or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting
a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an
offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be
persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense; requesting or
receiving directly or indirectly any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself,
or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity, has to
intervene under the law; requesting or receiving directly or indirectly any gift, present, or
other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom
the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or
obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be
given; accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private
enterprise which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or
within one year after its termination; causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; neglecting or
refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a
reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly
or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit
or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in
favor of or discriminating against any other interested party; entering, on behalf of the
Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby; having directly
or indirectly financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he
is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interests; becoming
interested directly or indirectly, for personal gain, or having a material interest in any
transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a
member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the
same or does not participate in such action; approving or granting knowingly any license,
permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled
to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of
one who is not so qualified or entitled and divulging valuable information of a
confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position
to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its authorized
release date. 18
After which come the prohibition on private individuals, 19 prohibition on certain

relatives, 20 and prohibition on Members of Congress. 21 Then there is this requirement
of a statement of assets and liabilities, that portion requiring periodical submission being
challenged here. 22 The other sections of the Act deal with dismissal due to unexplained
wealth, reference being made to the previous statute, 23 penalties for violation, 24 the
vesting of original jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance as the competent court, 25
the prescription of offenses, 26 the prohibition against any resignation or retirement
pending investigation, criminal or administrative or pending a prosecution, 27 suspension
and loss of benefits, 28 exception of unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant
value as well as recognition of legitimate practice of one’s profession or trade or
occupation, 29 the separability clause, 30 and its effectivity. 31
Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the Anti-Graft Act of 1960 like the earlier
statute 32 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to
further promote morality in public administration. A public office must indeed be a
public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the
assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character. The times
demanded such a remedial device.
The statute was framed with that end in view. It is comprehensive in character,
sufficiently detailed and explicit to make clear to all and sundry what practices were
prohibited and penalized. More than that, an effort was made, so evident from even a
cursory perusal thereof, to avoid evasions and plug loopholes. One such feature is the
challenged section. Thereby it becomes much more difficult by those disposed to take
advantage of their positions to commit acts of graft and corruption.
While in the attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is

permissible, there must be a showing, clear, categorical, and undeniable, that what the
Constitution condemns, the statute allows. More specifically, since that is the only
question raised, is that portion of the statute requiring periodical submission of assets and
liabilities, after an officer or employee had previously done so upon assuming office, so
infected with infirmity that it cannot be upheld as valid?
Or, in traditional terminology, is this requirement a valid exercise of the police power? In
the aforesaid Ermita-Malate Hotel decision, 33 there is a reaffirmation of its nature and
scope as embracing the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
education, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. It has been negatively
put forth by Justice Malcolm as "that inherent and plenary power in the state which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." 34
Earlier Philippine cases refer to police power as the power to promote the general welfare
and public interest; 35 to enact such laws in relation to persons and property as may
promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare of each
inhabitant; 36 to preserve public order and to prevent offenses against the state and to
establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen those rules of good manners and good
neighborhood calculated to prevent conflict of rights. 37 In his work on due process, Mott
38 stated that the term police power was first used by Chief Justice Marshall. 39
As currently in use both in Philippine and American decisions then, police power
legislation usually has reference to regulatory measures restraining either the rights to
property or liberty of private individuals. It is undeniable however that one of its earliest
definitions, valid then as well as now, given by Marshall’s successor, Chief Justice
Taney, does not limit its scope to curtailment of rights whether of liberty or property of
private individuals. Thus: "But what are the police powers of a State? They are nothing
more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of
its dominions. And whether a State passes a quarantine law, or a law to punish offenses,
or to establish courts of justice, or requiring certain instruments to be recorded, or to
regulate commerce within its own limits, in every case it exercises the same power; that
is to say, the power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits
of its domain." 40 Text writers like Cooley and Burdick were of a similar mind. 41
What is under consideration is a statute enacted under the police power of the state to
promote morality in public service necessarily limited in scope to officialdom. May a
public official claiming to be adversely affected rely on the due process clause to annul
such statute or any portion thereof? The answer must be in the affirmative. If the police
power extends to regulatory action affecting persons in public or private life, then anyone
with an alleged grievance can invoke the protection of due process which permits
deprivation of property or liberty as long as such requirement is observed.
While the soundness of the assertion that a public office is a public trust and as such not
amounting to property in its usual sense cannot be denied, there can be no disputing the
proposition that from the standpoint of the security of tenure guaranteed by the
Constitution the mantle of protection afforded by due process could rightfully be
invoked. It was so implicitly held in Lacson v. Romero, 42 in line with the then pertinent
statutory provisions 43 that procedural due process in the form of an investigation at
which he must be given a fair hearing and an opportunity to defend himself must be
observed before a civil service officer or employee may be removed. There was a
reaffirmation of the view in even stronger language when this Court through Justice
Tuason in Lacson v. Roque, 44 declared that even without express provision of law, "it is
established by the great weight of authority that the power of removal or suspension for
cause can not, except by clear statutory authority, be exercised without notice and
hearing." Such is likewise the import of a statement from the then Justice, now Chief
Justice, Concepcion, speaking for the Court in Meneses v. Lacson; 45 "At any rate, the
reinstatement directed in the decision appealed from does not bar such appropriate
administrative action as the behaviour of petitioners herein may warrant, upon
compliance with the requirements of due process." cralaw virtua1aw library
To the same effect is the holding of this Court extending the mantle of the security of
tenure provision to employees of government-owned or controlled corporations entrusted
with governmental functions when through Justice Padilla in Tabora v. Montelibano, 46
it stressed: "That safeguard, guarantee, or feeling of security that they would hold their
office or employment during good behavior and would not be dismissed without
justifiable cause to be determined in an investigation, where an opportunity to be heard
and defend themselves in person or by counsel is afforded them, would bring about such
a desirable condition." Reference was there made to promoting honesty and efficiency
through an assurance of stability in their employment relation. It was to be expected then
that through Justice Labrador in Unabia v. City Mayor, 47 this Court could categorically
affirm: "As the removal of petitioner was made without investigation and without cause,
said removal is null and void . . ."
cralaw virtua1aw library
It was but logical therefore to expect an explicit holding of the applicability of due
process guaranty to be forthcoming. It did in Cammayo v. Viña, 48 where the opinion of
Justice Endencia for the Court contained the following unmistakable language:
"Evidently, having these facts in view, it cannot be pretended that the constitutional
provision of due process of law for the removal of the petitioner has not been complied
with."cralaw virtua1aw library
Then came this restatement of the principle from the pen of Justice J.B.L. Reyes: "We are
thus compelled to conclude that the positions formerly held by appellees were not
primarily confidential in nature so as to make their terms of office co-terminal with the
confidence reposed in them. The inevitable corollary is that respondents-appellees, Leon
Piñero, Et Al., were not subject to dismissal or removal, except for cause specified by law
and with due process . . ." 49 In a still later decision, Abaya v. Subido, 50 this Court,
through Justice Sanchez, emphasized "that the vitality of the constitutional principle of
due process cannot be allowed to weaken by sanctioning cancellation" of an employee’s
eligibility or "of his dismissal from service — without hearing — upon a doubtful
assumption that he has admitted his guilt for an offense against Civil Service rules."
Equally emphatic is this observation from the same case: "A civil service employee
should be heard before he is condemned. Jurisprudence has clung to this rule with such
unrelenting grasp that by now it would appear trite to make citations thereof." cralaw virtua1aw library
If as is so clearly and unequivocally held by this Court, due process may be relied upon
by public official to protect the security of tenure which in that limited sense is analogous
to property, could he not likewise avail himself of such constitutional guarantee to strike
down what he considers to be an infringement of his liberty? Both on principle, reason
and authority, the answer must be in the affirmative. Even a public official has certain
rights to freedom the government must respect. To the extent then, that there is a
curtailment thereof, it could only be permissible if the due process mandate is not
disregarded.
Since under the constitutional scheme, liberty is the rule and restraint the exception, the
question raised cannot just be brushed aside. In a leading Philippine case, Rubi v.
Provincial Board, 51 liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice
Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical
restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy
the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such
restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." In accordance with this case
therefore, the rights of the citizens to be free to use his facilities in all lawful ways; to live
and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any
avocation, are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty. This Court in the same case,
however, gave the warning that liberty as understood in democracies, is not license.
Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater
good, the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No one can do exactly as
he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. In the words of Mabini as quoted
by Justice Malcolm, "liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by
reason and the upright and honorable conscience of the individual." cralaw virtua1aw library
The liberty to be safeguarded is, as pointed out by Chief Justice Hughes, liberty in a
social organization, 52 implying the absence of arbitrary restraint not immunity from
reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interest of the community. 53 It
was Linton’s view that "to belong to a society is to sacrifice some measure of individual
liberty, no matter how slight the restraints which the society consciously imposes." 54
The above statement from Linton, however, should be understood in the sense that
liberty, in the interest of public health, public order or safety, of general welfare, in other
words through the proper exercise of the police power, may be regulated. The individual
though, as Justice Cardozo pointed out, has still left a "domain of free activity that cannot
be touched by government or law at all, whether the command is specially against him or
generally against him and others." 55
Is this provision for a periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities
after he had filed one upon assumption of office beyond the power of government to
impose? Admittedly without the challenged provision, a public officer would be free
from such a requirement. To the extent then that there is a compulsion to act in a certain
way, his liberty is affected. It cannot be denied however that under the Constitution, such
a restriction is allowable as long as due process is observed.
The more crucial question therefore is whether there is an observance of due process.
That leads us to an inquiry into its significance. "There is no controlling and precise
definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action
should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate
case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a
procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any
governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to
spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates
of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the
due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the
bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official
action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedom from
arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty ‘to
those strivings for justice’ and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch ‘in the
light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions
of legal and political thought.’ It is not a narrow or ‘technical conception with fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,’ decisions based on such a clause
requiring a ‘close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society.’
Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form
or phrases." 56
It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling
realities of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and
avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that imposed on public
officials and employees to file such sworn statement of assets and liabilities every two
years after having done so upon assuming office. The due process clause is not
susceptible to such a reproach. There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of the
police power.
4. The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved
goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the
periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the
constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas:
"Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful
governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of
freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom." 57 As a matter
of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." 58
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his
personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands
respect. As Laski so very aptly stated: "Man is one among many, obstinately refusing
reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so
fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He cannot
abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his
experience is private, and the will built out of that experience personal to himself. If he
surrenders his will to others, he surrenders his personality. If his will is set by the will of
others, he ceases to be master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer master of
himself is in any real sense free." 59
Nonetheless, in view of the fact that there is an express recognition of privacy,

specifically that of communication and correspondence which "shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of Court or when public safety and order" 60 may otherwise require,
and implicitly in the search and seizure clause, 61 and the liberty of abode, 62 the alleged
repugnancy of such statutory requirement of further periodical submission of a sworn
statement of assets and liabilities deserves to be further looked into.
In that respect the question is one of first impression, no previous decision having been
rendered by this Court. It is not so in the United States where, in the leading case of
Griswold v. Connecticut, 63 Justice Douglas, speaking for five members of the Court,
stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in
the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in
its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of peace without
the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment
explicitly affirms the ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The Fifth Amendment in its
Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment
provides: ‘The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." ‘ After referring to various American
Supreme Court decisions, 64 Justice Douglas continued: "These cases bear witness that
the right of privacy which presses for recognition is a legitimate one." cralaw virtua1aw library
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of
contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional
invasion of the right of privacy of married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship
lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees." 65 It has wider implication though. The constitutional right to privacy has
come into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition

independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept
of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short
of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic
distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of
the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a
system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control.
Protection of this private sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity
of the individual — has become increasingly important as modern society has developed.
All the forces of a technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization
— operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms,
the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference
between a democratic and a totalitarian society." 66
Even with due recognition of such a view, it cannot be said that the challenged statutory
provision calls for disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a person to
privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a requirement possesses
with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding assent to an objection of
such character. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of a position he holds, is
bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such a
further compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the statement of the
amounts and sources of income, the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no
unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private sphere.
5. Could it be said, however, as plaintiff contends, that in so far as the challenged

provision requires the periodical filing of a sworn statement of financial condition, it
would be violative of the guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure and against
self-incrimination?
His complaint cited on this point Davis v. United States. 67 In that case, petitioner Davis
was convicted under an information charging him with unlawfully having in his
possession a number of gasoline ration coupons representing so many gallons of gasoline,
an offense penalized under a 1940 statute. 68 He was convicted both in the lower court
and in the Circuit Court of Appeals over the objection that there was an unlawful search
which resulted in the seizure of the coupons and that their use at the trial was in violation
of Supreme Court decisions. 69 In the District Court, there was a finding that he
consented to the search and seizure. The Circuit Court of Appeals did not disturb that
finding although expressed doubt concerning it, affirming however under the view that
such seized coupons were properly introduced in evidence, the search and seizure being
incidental to an arrest, and therefore reasonable regardless of petitioner’s consent.
In affirming the conviction the United States Supreme Court, through Justice Douglas
emphasized that the Court was dealing in this case "not with private papers or documents,
but with gasoline ration coupons which never became the private property of the holder
but remained at all times the property of the government and subject to inspection and
recall by it." 70 He made it clear that the opinion was not to be understood as suggesting
"that officers seeking to reclaim government property may proceed lawlessly and subject
to no restraints. Nor [does it] suggest that the right to inspect under the regulations
subjects a dealer to a general search of his papers for the purpose of learning whether he
has any coupons subject to inspection and seizure. The nature of the coupons is important
here merely as indicating that the officers did not exceed the permissible limits of
persuasion in obtaining them." 71
True, there was a strong dissenting opinion by Justice Frankfurter in which Justice
Murphy joined, critical of what it considered "a process of devitalizing interpretation"
which in this particular case gave approval "to what was done by arresting officers" and
expressing the regret that the Court might be "in danger of forgetting that the Bill of
Rights reflects experience with police excesses." cralaw virtua1aw libr ary
Even this opinion, however, conceded that the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure "does not give freedom from testimonial compulsion.
Subject to familiar qualifications every man is under obligation to give testimony. But
that obligation can be exacted only under judicial sanctions which are deemed precious to
Anglo-American civilization. Merely because there may be the duty to make documents
available for litigation does not mean that police officers may forcibly or fraudulently
obtain them. This protection of the right to be let alone except under responsible judicial
compulsion is precisely what the Fourth Amendment meant to express and to safeguard."
72
It would appear then that a reliance on that case for an allegation that this statutory
provision offends against the unreasonable search and seizure clause would be futile and
unavailing. This is the more so in the light of the latest decision of this Court in Stonehill
v. Diokno, 73 where this Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, after stressing that the
constitutional requirements must be strictly complied with, and that it would be "a legal
heresy of the highest order" to convict anybody of a violation of certain statutes without
reference to any of its determinate provisions delimited its scope as "one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution," safeguarding "the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence . . ." Such is precisely
the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw
the so-called general warrants.
It thus appears clear that no violation of the guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure has been shown to exist by such requirement of further periodical submission of
one’s financial condition as set forth in the Anti-Graft Act of 1960.
Nor does the contention of plaintiff gain greater plausibility, much less elicit acceptance,
by his invocation of the non-incrimination clause. According to the Constitution: "No
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." 74 This constitutional
provision gives the accused immunity from any attempt by the prosecution to make easier
its task by coercing or intimidating him to furnish the evidence necessary to convict. He
may confess, but only if he voluntarily wills it. He may admit certain facts but only if he
freely chooses to. 75 Or he could remain silent, and the prosecution is powerless to
compel him to talk. 76 Proof is not solely testimonial in character. It may be
documentary. Neither then could the accused be ordered to write, when what comes from
his pen may constitute evidence of guilt or innocence. 77 Moreover, there can be no
search or seizure of his house, papers or effects for the purpose of locating incriminatory
matter. 78
In a declaratory action proceeding then, the objection based on the guaranty against self-
incrimination is far from decisive. It is well to note what Justice Tuason stated: "What the
above inhibition seeks to [prevent] is compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts." 79
Necessarily then, the protection it affords will have to await, in the language of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, the existence of actual cases, "be they criminal, civil or administrative." 80
Prior to such a stage there is no pressing need to pass upon the validity of the fear
sincerely voiced that there is an infringement of the non-incrimination clause. What was
said in an American State decision is of relevance. In that case, a statutory provision
requiring any person operating a motor vehicle, who knows that injury has been caused a
person or property, to stop and give his name, residence, and his license number to the
injured party or to a police officer was sustained as against the contention that the
information thus exacted may be used as evidence to establish his connection with the
injury and therefore compels him to incriminate himself. As was stated in the opinion: "If
the law which exacts this information is invalid, because such information, although in
itself no evidence of guilt, might possibly lead to a charge of crime against the informant,
then all police regulations which involve identification may be questioned on the same
ground. We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a man’s
conduct from judicial inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from justice. But, even if a
constitutional right be involved, it is not necessary to invalidate the statute to secure its
protection. If, in this particular case, the constitutional privilege justified the refusal to
give the information exacted by the statute, that question can be raised in the defense to
the pending prosecution. Whether it would avail, we are not called upon to decide in this
proceeding." 81
6. Nor could such a provision be nullified on the allegation that it constitutes "an insult to
the personal integrity and official dignity" of public officials. On its face, it cannot thus
be stigmatized. As to its being unnecessary, it is well to remember that this Court, in the
language of Justice Laurel, "does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation." 82 As expressed by Justice Tuason: "It is not the province of
the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common
sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern." 83 There can be no
possible objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor: "As long as laws do
not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them
regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary." 84 For they, according to Justice
Labrador, "are not supposed to override legitimate policy and . . . never inquire into the
wisdom of the law." 85
It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on

Elections, 86 that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action
taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The
principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority
of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be
intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a
coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule
of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly
litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of
legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision
likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent, on its wisdom
cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of July 19, 1962 "declaring
unconstitutional, null and void Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it requires
periodical submittal of sworn statements of financial conditions, assets and liabilities of
an official or employee of the government after he had once submitted such a sworn
statement . . . is reversed." Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Angeles, JJ.,
concur.
Sanchez, J., reserves his vote.
Dizon and Castro, JJ., concur in the result.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 162994 : September 17, 2004]
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and PEDRO A. TECSON,

Petitioners, v. GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Confronting the Court in this petition is a novel question, with constitutional overtones,
involving the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its
employees from marrying employees of any competitor company.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated May 19, 2003
and the Resolution dated March 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
62434.2
Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome

Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had
undergone training and orientation.
Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that
he agrees to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any
existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or
employees of competing drug companies and should management find that such
relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee is

expected to inform management of any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or
affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies. If management
perceives a conflict of interest or a potential conflict between such relationship and the
employee's employment with the company, the management and the employee will
explore the possibility of a "transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking
position" or preparation for employment outside the company after six months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-
Camarines Norte sales area.
Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of

Astra Pharmaceuticals3 (Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astra's Branch
Coordinator in Albay. She supervised the district managers and medical representatives
of her company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra in that area.
Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his District
Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might
engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy in September 1998.
In January 1999, Tecson's superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to
a conflict of interest. Tecson's superiors reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide
which one of them would resign from their jobs, although they told him that they wanted
to retain him as much as possible because he was performing his job well.
Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy against entering into a
relationship with an employee of a competitor company. He explained that Astra, Bettsy's
employer, was planning to merge with Zeneca, another drug company; and Bettsy was
planning to avail of the redundancy package to be offered by Astra. With Bettsy's
separation from her company, the potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. At
the same time, they would be able to avail of the attractive redundancy package from
Astra.
In August 1999, Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem. In September
1999, Tecson applied for a transfer in Glaxo's milk division, thinking that since Astra did
not have a milk division, the potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. His
application was denied in view of Glaxo's "least-movement-possible" policy.
In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan

del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was
denied.
Tecson sought Glaxo's reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the matter to
Glaxo's Grievance Committee. Glaxo, however, remained firm in its decision and gave
Tescon until February 7, 2000 to comply with the transfer order. Tecson defied the
transfer order and continued acting as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-
Camarines Norte sales area.
During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson was paid his salary, but was
not issued samples of products which were competing with similar products
manufactured by Astra. He was also not included in product conferences regarding such
products.
Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery level, they
submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration. Glaxo offered Tecson a separation pay of
one-half (' ) month pay for every year of service, or a total of P50,000.00 but he declined
the offer. On November 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxo's policy on relationships between
its employees and persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo's
right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory.
Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals assailing the
NCMB Decision.
On May 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision denying the Petition for
Review on the ground that the NCMB did not err in rendering its Decision. The appellate
court held that Glaxo's policy prohibiting its employees from having personal
relationships with employees of competitor companies is a valid exercise of its
management prerogatives.4
Tecson filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court's Decision, but the
motion was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution dated March 26, 2004.5
Petitioners filed the instant petition, arguing therein that (i) the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the NCMB's finding that the Glaxo's policy prohibiting its employees from
marrying an employee of a competitor company is valid; and (ii) the Court of Appeals
also erred in not finding that Tecson was constructively dismissed when he was
transferred to a new sales territory, and deprived of the opportunity to attend products
seminars and training sessions.6
Petitioners contend that Glaxo's policy against employees marrying employees of

competitor companies violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it
creates invalid distinctions among employees on account only of marriage. They claim
that the policy restricts the employees' right to marry.7
They also argue that Tecson was constructively dismissed as shown by the following
circumstances: (1) he was transferred from the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales
area to the Butuan-Surigao-Agusan sales area, (2) he suffered a diminution in pay, (3) he
was excluded from attending seminars and training sessions for medical representatives,
and (4) he was prohibited from promoting respondent's products which were competing
with Astra's products.8
In its Comment on the petition, Glaxo argues that the company policy prohibiting its
employees from having a relationship with and/or marrying an employee of a competitor
company is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives and does not violate the
equal protection clause; and that Tecson's reassignment from the Camarines Norte-
Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City and Agusan del Sur sales area
does not amount to constructive dismissal.9
Glaxo insists that as a company engaged in the promotion and sale of pharmaceutical
products, it has a genuine interest in ensuring that its employees avoid any activity,
relationship or interest that may conflict with their responsibilities to the company. Thus,
it expects its employees to avoid having personal or family interests in any competitor
company which may influence their actions and decisions and consequently deprive
Glaxo of legitimate profits. The policy is also aimed at preventing a competitor company
from gaining access to its secrets, procedures and policies.10
It likewise asserts that the policy does not prohibit marriage per se but only proscribes
existing or future relationships with employees of competitor companies, and is therefore
not violative of the equal protection clause. It maintains that considering the nature of its
business, the prohibition is based on valid grounds.11
According to Glaxo, Tecson's marriage to Bettsy, an employee of Astra, posed a real and
potential conflict of interest. Astra's products were in direct competition with 67% of the
products sold by Glaxo. Hence, Glaxo's enforcement of the foregoing policy in Tecson's
case was a valid exercise of its management prerogatives.12 In any case, Tecson was
given several months to remedy the situation, and was even encouraged not to resign but
to ask his wife to resign form Astra instead.13
Glaxo also points out that Tecson can no longer question the assailed company policy
because when he signed his contract of employment, he was aware that such policy was
stipulated therein. In said contract, he also agreed to resign from respondent if the
management finds that his relationship with an employee of a competitor company would
be detrimental to the interests of Glaxo.14
Glaxo likewise insists that Tecson's reassignment to another sales area and his exclusion
from seminars regarding respondent's new products did not amount to constructive
dismissal.
It claims that in view of Tecson's refusal to resign, he was relocated from the Camarines
Sur-Camarines Norte sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City and Agusan del Sur sales
area. Glaxo asserts that in effecting the reassignment, it also considered the welfare of
Tecson's family. Since Tecson's hometown was in Agusan del Sur and his wife traces her
roots to Butuan City, Glaxo assumed that his transfer from the Bicol region to the Butuan
City sales area would be favorable to him and his family as he would be relocating to a
familiar territory and minimizing his travel expenses.15
In addition, Glaxo avers that Tecson's exclusion from the seminar concerning the new
anti-asthma drug was due to the fact that said product was in direct competition with a
drug which was soon to be sold by Astra, and hence, would pose a potential conflict of
interest for him. Lastly, the delay in Tecson's receipt of his sales paraphernalia was due to
the mix-up created by his refusal to transfer to the Butuan City sales area (his
paraphernalia was delivered to his new sales area instead of Naga City because the
supplier thought he already transferred to Butuan).16
The Court is tasked to resolve the following issues: (1) Whether the Court of Appeals
erred in ruling that Glaxo's policy against its employees marrying employees from
competitor companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution; (2) Whether Tecson was constructively dismissed.
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
The stipulation in Tecson's contract of employment with Glaxo being questioned by

petitioners provides:
10. You agree to disclose to management any existing or future relationship you may
have, either by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing
drug companies. Should it pose a possible conflict of interest in management discretion,
you agree to resign voluntarily from the Company as a matter of Company policy.
' 17
The same contract also stipulates that Tescon agrees to abide by the existing company
rules of Glaxo, and to study and become acquainted with such policies.18 In this regard,
the Employee Handbook of Glaxo expressly informs its employees of its rules regarding
conflict of interest:
1. Conflict of Interest
Employees should avoid any activity, investment relationship, or interest that may run
counter to the responsibilities which they owe Glaxo Wellcome.
Specifically, this means that employees are expected:
A. To avoid having personal or family interest, financial or otherwise, in any competitor

supplier or other businesses which may consciously or unconsciously influence their
actions or decisions and thus deprive Glaxo Wellcome of legitimate profit.
b. To refrain from using their position in Glaxo Wellcome or knowledge of Company

plans to advance their outside personal interests, that of their relatives, friends and other
businesses.
c. To avoid outside employment or other interests for income which would impair their
effective job performance.
d. To consult with Management on such activities or relationships that may lead to

conflict of interest.
1.1. Employee Relationships
Employees with existing or future relationships either by consanguinity or affinity with

co-employees of competing drug companies are expected to disclose such relationship to
the Management. If management perceives a conflict or potential conflict of interest,
every effort shall be made, together by management and the employee, to arrive at a
solution within six (6) months, either by transfer to another department in a non-counter
checking position, or by career preparation toward outside employment after Glaxo
Wellcome. Employees must be prepared for possible resignation within six (6) months, if
no other solution is feasible.19
No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Glaxo's
policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship with an employee of a
competitor company is a valid exercise of management prerogative.
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies
and other confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it
and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor

companies upon Glaxo's employees is reasonable under the circumstances because
relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying
down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the
possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less
than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a
policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and
growth.20 Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on
social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be
decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights
which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.21
As held in a Georgia, U.S.A case,22 it is a legitimate business practice to guard business

confidentiality and protect a competitive position by even-handedly disqualifying from
jobs male and female applicants or employees who are married to a competitor.
Consequently, the court ruled than an employer that discharged an employee who was
married to an employee of an active competitor did not violate Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.23 The Court pointed out that the policy was applied to men and
women equally, and noted that the employer's business was highly competitive and that
gaining inside information would constitute a competitive advantage.
The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands
of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under color
of its authority.24 Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of U.S. Supreme Court
decisions that the equal protection clause erects no shield against merely private conduct,
however, discriminatory or wrongful.25 The only exception occurs when the state29 in any
of its manifestations or actions has been found to have become entwined or involved in
the wrongful private conduct.27 Obviously, however, the exception is not present in this
case. Significantly, the company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to
the employee to comply with the policy. Indeed, the application of the policy was made
in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.
In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its
employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against
relationships between its employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees
are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing. What the
company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the
company that may arise out of such relationships. As succinctly explained by the
appellate court, thus:
The policy being questioned is not a policy against marriage. An employee of the
company remains free to marry anyone of his or her choosing. The policy is not aimed at
restricting a personal prerogative that belongs only to the individual. However, an
employee's personal decision does not detract the employer from exercising management
prerogatives to ensure maximum profit and business success. . .28
The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the assailed company policy which forms
part of respondent's Employee Code of Conduct and of its contracts with its employees,
such as that signed by Tescon, was made known to him prior to his employment. Tecson,
therefore, was aware of that restriction when he signed his employment contract and
when he entered into a relationship with Bettsy. Since Tecson knowingly and voluntarily
entered into a contract of employment with Glaxo, the stipulations therein have the force
of law between them and, thus, should be complied with in good faith."29 He is therefore
estopped from questioning said policy.
The Court finds no merit in petitioners' contention that Tescon was constructively
dismissed when he was transferred from the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area
to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area, and when he was excluded
from attending the company's seminar on new products which were directly competing
with similar products manufactured by Astra. Constructive dismissal is defined as a
quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes
impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in
pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee.30 None of these conditions are present in the instant case.
The record does not show that Tescon was demoted or unduly discriminated upon by
reason of such transfer. As found by the appellate court, Glaxo properly exercised its
management prerogative in reassigning Tecson to the Butuan City sales area:
. . . In this case, petitioner's transfer to another place of assignment was merely in keeping
with the policy of the company in avoidance of conflict of interest, and thus valid Note
that [Tecson's] wife holds a sensitive supervisory position as Branch Coordinator in her
employer-company which requires her to work in close coordination with District
Managers and Medical Representatives. Her duties include monitoring sales of Astra
products, conducting sales drives, establishing and furthering relationship with
customers, collection, monitoring and managing Astra's inventory'she therefore takes an
active participation in the market war characterized as it is by stiff competition among
pharmaceutical companies. Moreover, and this is significant, petitioner's sales territory
covers Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte while his wife is supervising a branch of her
employer in Albay. The proximity of their areas of responsibility, all in the same Bicol
Region, renders the conflict of interest not only possible, but actual, as learning by one
spouse of the other's market strategies in the region would be inevitable. [Management's]
appreciation of a conflict of interest is therefore not merely illusory and wanting in
factual basis'31
In Abbott Laboratories (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,32 which

involved a complaint filed by a medical representative against his employer drug
company for illegal dismissal for allegedly terminating his employment when he refused
to accept his reassignment to a new area, the Court upheld the right of the drug company
to transfer or reassign its employee in accordance with its operational demands and
requirements. The ruling of the Court therein, quoted hereunder, also finds application in
the instant case:
By the very nature of his employment, a drug salesman or medical representative is

expected to travel. He should anticipate reassignment according to the demands of their
business. It would be a poor drug corporation which cannot even assign its
representatives or detail men to new markets calling for opening or expansion or to areas
where the need for pushing its products is great. More so if such reassignments are part of
the employment contract.33
As noted earlier, the challenged policy has been implemented by Glaxo impartially and
disinterestedly for a long period of time. In the case at bar, the record shows that Glaxo
gave Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict of interest brought about by his
relationship with Bettsy. When their relationship was still in its initial stage, Tecson's
supervisors at Glaxo constantly reminded him about its effects on his employment with
the company and on the company's interests. After Tecson married Bettsy, Glaxo gave
him time to resolve the conflict by either resigning from the company or asking his wife
to resign from Astra. Glaxo even expressed its desire to retain Tecson in its employ
because of his satisfactory performance and suggested that he ask Bettsy to resign from
her company instead. Glaxo likewise acceded to his repeated requests for more time to
resolve the conflict of interest. When the problem could not be resolved after several
years of waiting, Glaxo was constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales area different from
that handled by his wife for Astra. Notably, the Court did not terminate Tecson from
employment but only reassigned him to another area where his home province, Agusan
del Sur, was included. In effecting Tecson's transfer, Glaxo even considered the welfare
of Tecson's family. Clearly, the foregoing dispels any suspicion of unfairness and bad
faith on the part of Glaxo.34
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 164774 : April 12, 2006]
STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO & SEBASTIAN

CHUA, Petitioners, v. RONALDO D. SIMBOL, WILFREDA N. COMIA & LORNA
E. ESTRELLA, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
We are called to decide an issue of first impression: whether the policy of the employer
banning spouses from working in the same company violates the rights of the employee
under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid exercise of management
prerogative.
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated August 3, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 reversing the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioner Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a corporation engaged in trading -

principally of paper products. Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the Personnel and
Administration Department while Sebastian Chua is its Managing Director.
The evidence for the petitioners show that respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol (Simbol),
Wilfreda N. Comia (Comia) and Lorna E. Estrella (Estrella) were all regular employees
of the company.1
Simbol was employed by the company on October 27, 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also an
employee of the company, whom he married on June 27, 1998. Prior to the marriage,
Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one of them should
resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995,2 viz.:
1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a] relative, up to
[the] 3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the company.
2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one male and another female)
developed a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decided
to get married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above.3
Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998 pursuant to the company policy.4
Comia was hired by the company on February 5, 1997. She met Howard Comia, a co-
employee, whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded them that
pursuant to company policy, one must resign should they decide to get married. Comia
resigned on June 30, 2000.5
Estrella was hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuñiga (Zuñiga), also a co-worker.
Petitioners stated that Zuñiga, a married man, got Estrella pregnant. The company
allegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign on
December 21, 1999.6
The respondents each signed a Release and Confirmation Agreement. They stated therein
that they have no money and property accountabilities in the company and that they
release the latter of any claim or demand of whatever nature.7
Respondents offer a different version of their dismissal. Simbol and Comia allege that
they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal
company policy. As to respondent Estrella, she alleges that she had a relationship with
co-worker Zuñiga who misrepresented himself as a married but separated man. After he
got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated. Thus, she severed her
relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to the company policy. On November 30,
1999, she met an accident and was advised by the doctor at the Orthopedic Hospital to
recuperate for twenty-one (21) days. She returned to work on December 21, 1999 but she
found out that her name was on-hold at the gate. She was denied entry. She was directed
to proceed to the personnel office where one of the staff handed her a memorandum. The
memorandum stated that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct. She refused to
sign the memorandum because she was on leave for twenty-one (21) days and has not
been given a chance to explain. The management asked her to write an explanation.
However, after submission of the explanation, she was nonetheless dismissed by the
company. Due to her urgent need for money, she later submitted a letter of resignation in
exchange for her thirteenth month pay.8
Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal,
separation pay and attorney's fees. They averred that the aforementioned company policy
is illegal and contravenes Article 136 of the Labor Code. They also contended that they
were dismissed due to their union membership.
On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol del Rosario dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit, viz.:
[T]his company policy was decreed pursuant to what the respondent corporation
perceived as management prerogative. This management prerogative is quite broad and
encompassing for it covers hiring, work assignment, working method, time, place and
manner of work, tools to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of workers,
working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the
discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. Except as provided for or limited by special
law, an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment all the
aspects of employment.9 (Citations omitted.)
On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter on
January 11, 2002.10
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC in a
Resolution11 dated August 8, 2002. They appealed to respondent court via Petition for
Certiorari.
In its assailed Decision dated August 3, 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC
decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the May 31, 2002 (sic)12 Decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is
entered as follows:
(1) Declaring illegal, the petitioners' dismissal from employment and ordering private
respondents to reinstate petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority
rights with full backwages from the time of their dismissal until actual reinstatement;
andcralawlibrary
(2) Ordering private respondents to pay petitioners attorney's fees amounting to 10% of
the award and the cost of this suit.13
On appeal to this Court, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that:
1. x x x the subject 1995 policy/regulation is violative of the constitutional rights towards

marriage and the family of employees and of Article 136 of the Labor Code; and cralawlibrary
2. x x x respondents' resignations were far from voluntary.14
We affirm.
The 1987 Constitution15 states our policy towards the protection of labor under the
following provisions, viz.:
Article II, Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
xxx
Article XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance
with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a
living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and
employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and
the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and
growth.
The Civil Code likewise protects labor with the following provisions:
Art. 1700. The relation between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good.
Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective
bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor
and similar subjects.
Art. 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed
in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.
The Labor Code is the most comprehensive piece of legislation protecting labor. The case
at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides:
Art. 136. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or

continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise
prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.
Respondents submit that their dismissal violates the above provision. Petitioners allege
that its policy "may appear to be contrary to Article 136 of the Labor Code" but it
assumes a new meaning if read together with the first paragraph of the rule. The rule does
not require the woman employee to resign. The employee spouses have the right to
choose who between them should resign. Further, they are free to marry persons other
than co-employees. Hence, it is not the marital status of the employee, per se, that is
being discriminated. It is only intended to carry out its no-employment-for-relatives-
within-the-third-degree-policy which is within the ambit of the prerogatives of
management.16
It is true that the policy of petitioners prohibiting close relatives from working in the
same company takes the nature of an anti-nepotism employment policy. Companies adopt
these policies to prevent the hiring of unqualified persons based on their status as a
relative, rather than upon their ability.17 These policies focus upon the potential
employment problems arising from the perception of favoritism exhibited towards
relatives.
With more women entering the workforce, employers are also enacting employment
policies specifically prohibiting spouses from working for the same company. We note
that two types of employment policies involve spouses: policies banning only spouses
from working in the same company (no-spouse employment policies), and those
banning all immediate family members, including spouses, from working in the same
company (anti-nepotism employment policies).18
Unlike in our jurisdiction where there is no express prohibition on marital

discrimination,19 there are twenty state statutes20 in the United States prohibiting marital
discrimination. Some state courts21 have been confronted with the issue of whether no-
spouse policies violate their laws prohibiting both marital status and sex discrimination.
In challenging the anti-nepotism employment policies in the United States, complainants

utilize two theories of employment discrimination: the disparate treatment and the
disparate impact. Under the disparate treatment analysis, the plaintiff must prove that
an employment policy is discriminatory on its face. No-spouse employment policies
requiring an employee of a particular sex to either quit, transfer, or be fired are facially
discriminatory. For example, an employment policy prohibiting the employer from hiring
wives of male employees, but not husbands of female employees, is discriminatory on its
face.22
On the other hand, to establish disparate impact, the complainants must prove that a
facially neutral policy has a disproportionate effect on a particular class. For example,
although most employment policies do not expressly indicate which spouse will be
required to transfer or leave the company, the policy often disproportionately affects one
sex.23
The state courts' rulings on the issue depend on their interpretation of the scope of marital
status discrimination within the meaning of their respective civil rights acts. Though they
agree that the term "marital status" encompasses discrimination based on a person's status
as either married, single, divorced, or widowed, they are divided on whether the term has
a broader meaning. Thus, their decisions vary.24
The courts narrowly25 interpreting marital status to refer only to a person's status as
married, single, divorced, or widowed reason that if the legislature intended a broader
definition it would have either chosen different language or specified its intent. They hold
that the relevant inquiry is if one is married rather than to whom one is married. They
construe marital status discrimination to include only whether a person is single, married,
divorced, or widowed and not the "identity, occupation, and place of employment of
one's spouse." These courts have upheld the questioned policies and ruled that they did
not violate the marital status discrimination provision of their respective state statutes.
The courts that have broadly26 construed the term "marital status" rule that it
encompassed the identity, occupation and employment of one's spouse. They strike down
the no-spouse employment policies based on the broad legislative intent of the state
statute. They reason that the no-spouse employment policy violate the marital status
provision because it arbitrarily discriminates against all spouses of present employees
without regard to the actual effect on the individual's qualifications or work
performance.27 These courts also find the no-spouse employment policy invalid for
failure of the employer to present any evidence of business necessity other than the
general perception that spouses in the same workplace might adversely affect the
business.28 They hold that the absence of such a bona fide occupational qualification29
invalidates a rule denying employment to one spouse due to the current employment of
the other spouse in the same office.30 Thus, they rule that unless the employer can prove
that the reasonable demands of the business require a distinction based on marital status
and there is no better available or acceptable policy which would better accomplish the
business purpose, an employer may not discriminate against an employee based on the
identity of the employee's spouse.31 This is known as the bona fide occupational
qualification exception.
We note that since the finding of a bona fide occupational qualification justifies an
employer's no-spouse rule, the exception is interpreted strictly and narrowly by these
state courts. There must be a compelling business necessity for which no alternative
exists other than the discriminatory practice.32 To justify a bona fide occupational
qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1) that the employment qualification
is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and, (2) that there is a
factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification
would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.33
The concept of a bona fide occupational qualification is not foreign in our jurisdiction.
We employ the standard of reasonableness of the company policy which is parallel to
the bona fide occupational qualification requirement. In the recent case of Duncan
Association of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro Tecson v. Glaxo Wellcome
Philippines, Inc.,34 we passed on the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company
prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company. We held
that Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing
strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors. We
considered the prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of
competitor companies upon Glaxo's employees reasonable under the circumstances
because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of Glaxo. In laying
down the assailed company policy, we recognized that Glaxo only aims to protect its
interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets
and procedures.35
The requirement that a company policy must be reasonable under the circumstances to
qualify as a valid exercise of management prerogative was also at issue in the 1997 case
of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company v. NLRC.36 In said case, the
employee was dismissed in violation of petitioner's policy of disqualifying from work any
woman worker who contracts marriage. We held that the company policy violates the
right against discrimination afforded all women workers under Article 136 of the Labor
Code, but established a permissible exception, viz.:
[A] requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be justified as a
"bona fide occupational qualification," or BFOQ, where the particular requirements of
the job would justify the same, but not on the ground of a general principle, such as the
desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A requirement of that nature would be
valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job
performance.37 (Emphases supplied.)
The cases of Duncan and PT&T instruct us that the requirement of reasonableness must
be clearly established to uphold the questioned employment policy. The employer has
the burden to prove the existence of a reasonable business necessity. The burden was
successfully discharged in Duncan but not in PT&T.
We do not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar.
Petitioners' sole contention that "the company did not just want to have two (2) or more
of its employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity"38 is
lame. That the second paragraph was meant to give teeth to the first paragraph of the
questioned rule39 is evidently not the valid reasonable business necessity required by the
law.
It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were
found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee.
Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine
Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section, could be
detrimental to its business operations. Neither did petitioners explain how this detriment
will happen in the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in the Selecting
Department, who married Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-machine. The policy
is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient. If
we uphold the questioned rule without valid justification, the employer can create
policies based on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an
employee's right to security of tenure.
Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a co-
employee, but they are free to marry persons other than co-employees. The questioned
policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a
disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass
judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit
disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern
in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee's right to be free from
arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in
one company.40
Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our

jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. The protection given to labor in our
jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently draw inferences from the
legislature's silence41 that married persons are not protected under our Constitution and
declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of petitioners
to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that the
questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative. Corollarily, the issue
as to whether respondents Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become moot and
academic.
As to respondent Estrella, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their ruling on the
singular fact that her resignation letter was written in her own handwriting. Both ruled
that her resignation was voluntary and thus valid. The respondent court failed to
categorically rule whether Estrella voluntarily resigned but ordered that she be reinstated
along with Simbol and Comia.
Estrella claims that she was pressured to submit a resignation letter because she was in
dire need of money. We examined the records of the case and find Estrella's contention to
be more in accord with the evidence. While findings of fact by administrative tribunals
like the NLRC are generally given not only respect but, at times, finality, this rule admits
of exceptions,42 as in the case at bar.
Estrella avers that she went back to work on December 21, 1999 but was dismissed due
to her alleged immoral conduct. At first, she did not want to sign the termination papers
but she was forced to tender her resignation letter in exchange for her thirteenth month
pay.
The contention of petitioners that Estrella was pressured to resign because she got
impregnated by a married man and she could not stand being looked upon or talked about
as immoral43 is incredulous. If she really wanted to avoid embarrassment and humiliation,
she would not have gone back to work at all. Nor would she have filed a suit for illegal
dismissal and pleaded for reinstatement. We have held that in voluntary resignation, the
employee is compelled by personal reason(s) to dissociate himself from employment. It is
done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of
abandonment.44 Thus, it is illogical for Estrella to resign and then file a complaint for
illegal dismissal. Given the lack of sufficient evidence on the part of petitioners that the
resignation was voluntary, Estrella's dismissal is declared illegal.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73477
dated August 3, 2004 is AFFIRMED. ς ηαñrοblεš νιr†υ αl lαω lιbrαrÿ
SO ORDERED.

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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 164815 : September 3, 2009]

SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and

The facts are briefly stated as follows:

Now on the substantive aspect.

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

4. Consented warrantless search;

6. Stop and Frisk;

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.32

8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]

We answer in the negative.

As enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr.50 and People v. Leangsiri:51

Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers who

1. “engaging in war against the forces of the government”,

asesinato o las lesiones graves, se consideran como delitos independientes de la rebelion o

1. “Destronar al Rey, deponer al Regente o Regencia del Reino, o privarles de su libertad

la Sala sentenciadora los hechos referentes al Gobernador Civil de delito de asesinato,

Garcia, Vol. I, p. 623.)’

los sediciosos es accidente de la rebelion, 23 mayo 1890.

declarado en un fallo independiente de la perturbacion tumultuaria promovida para impedir

111.) (Italics supplied.)

hecho la Audencia de Gerona, de atentado , ha incurrido en error de derecho e infringido

— Gac. 12 Diciembre) (Enciclopedia Juridica Española, Tomo xxviii p. 250).

course of or furthering of civil war, insurrection, or political commotion.’ Hansard’s

act, that it be the outcome of or be in the outcome of or be in the execution of such, to be

los atentados punibles directamente ejecutados contra la existencia o la seguridad del

los hechos dirigidos a favorecer la ejecucion de un delito politico o a permitir al autor de

Article 174; and chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

[G.R. NO. 160792 : August 25, 2005]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT.

On 12 August 2003, the Court issued a Resolution, which resolved to:

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVIEWING AND REVERSING A

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACKNOWLEDGING THE

C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASSERTING THE LEGALITY OF THE

The Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

However, a mere allegation of a violation of one's constitutional right is not sufficient.

Section 4. Penalty Clause. - a) x x x

We quote Bell v. Wolfish:

[A] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally

[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny

PHILIPPINE MOVIE PICTURES WORKERS’ ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v.

Cipriano Cid for Petitioner.

Salvador C. Bayani for Respondent.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT TO LABOR; DUE PROCESS. — The right of a

2. EVIDENCE; LABOR DISPUTES; PROCEDURE; RULES OF EVIDENCE IN

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OCULAR INSPECTION. — An ocular inspection of the

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Although the Court of Industrial Relations, in the determination of any question or

JESUS P. MORFE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMELITO R. MUTUC, as Executive

Jesus P. Morfe for his own behalf as Plaintiff-Appellee.

Solicitor General, for Defendants-Appellants.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; NULLIFICATION OF; FACTUAL

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE LESS RIGID IN CONSTITUTIONAL THREATS TO

6. ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS; STANDARD TO BE OBSERVED. — The standard of due

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE GUARANTEE AGAINST

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROTECTION AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; WHEN IT

In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. The Mayor of Manila, 13 it

After which come the prohibition on private individuals, 19 prohibition on certain

While in the attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is

Nonetheless, in view of the fact that there is an express recognition of privacy,