A.C. No.

10583 February 18, 2015

[Formerly CBD 09-2555]

ROBERTO BERNARDINO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

A.C. No. 10584

[Formerly CBD 10-2827]

ATTY. JOSE MANGASER CARINGAL, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

These cases involve administrative Complaints1 against Atty. Victor Rey Santos for violation of Canon 10, Rule
10.012 and Canon 15, Rule 15 .033 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In A.C. No. 10583, complainant Roberto C. Bernardino (Bernardino) filed a Letter-Complaint4 against Atty. Victor
Rey Santos (Atty. Santos) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, praying that Atty. Santos be investigated and
subjected to disciplinary action.5

Bernardino alleged that the death certificate of his aunt, Rufina de Castro Turla, was falsified by Atty. Santos. Atty.
Santos made it appear that Rufina Turla died in 1992, when in fact, she died in 1990. 6

Atty. Santos used the falsified death certificate to -support the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication7 executed by Mariano
Turla, husband of Rufina Turla.8 Paragraph 6 of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication prepared by Atty. Santos states:

Being her surviving spouse, I am. the sole legal heir entitled to succeed to and inherit the estate of said deceased
who did not leave any descendant or any other heir entitled to her estate. 9 (Emphasis in the original underscoring
supplied)

Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla, daughter of Rufina and Mariano Turla, 10 filed a Complaint11 for
sum of money with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and temporary restraining order against Bernardino,
docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269.12

The Complaint in Civil Case No. 09-269 alleged that Marilu Turla is an heir of Mariano Turla, 13 which allegedly
contradicts the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication that Atty. Santos drafted.14 Hence, Atty. Santos represented clients
with conflicting interests.15

In Civil Case No. 09-269, Atty. Santos testified during cross-examination:

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY:

ATTY. CARINGAL
 ....

Q : In your Judicial Affidavit[,] you mentioned that you know Marilu C. Turla[,] the plaintiff[,] since she was about
four years old.

A : Yes, sir.

Q : As a matter of fact[,] you know her very well[,] considering that you are a Ninong of the plaintiff, isn’t it?

A : I was not a Ninong when I first knew Marilu Turla, I was just recently married to one of her cousins.

....

Q : Now, the parents of Marilu Turla are Mariano C. Turla and Rufina C. Turla?

THE WITNESS

: Yes, sir. As per my study and as per my knowledge of her relationship[s].

THE COURT

: What’s the name of the mother?

ATTY. CARINGAL

: Rufina, your Honor. Rufina Turla.

Q : And wife died ahead of Mariano, isn’t it?

THE WITNESS

: Yes, sir.

Q : And of course, being the daughter of Rufina Turla, Marilu is also an heir of Rufina Turla, isn’t it?

A : Of course.

Q : Now, we go by the ethics of the profession, Mr. Witness.

You recall[,] of course[,] and admitted [sic] in court that you drafted this document which you requested to be
marked as Exhibit B.

THE COURT

: Exhibit?

ATTY. CARINGAL
: "B", your Honor, in particular reference to the Affidavit of Adjudication for the extra judicial settlement of the
intestate estate of the late Rufina De Castro Turla[,] and I have just learned from you as you just testified. Rufina is
the mother of the plaintiff here[,] Marilu Turla.

THE WITNESS

: Yes, sir.

Q : And as you admitted, you prepared you drafted [sic] this Extra Judicial.

A : Yes, sir.

Q : Or this Affidavit of Adjudication.

ATTY. REY SANTOS

: At this point in time, your Honor, I would object to the question regarding my legal ethics because it is not the
issue in this case.

....

ATTY. CARINGAL

....

Q : . . . In this document consisting of one, two, three, four and appearing to have been duly notarized on or about
29th [of] June 1994 with document number 28, page number 7, book number 23, series of 1994 before Notary
Public Hernando P. Angara. I call your attention to the document[,] more particularly[,] paragraph 6 thereof and
marked as Exhibit 7-A for the defendants[.] I read into the record and I quote, "Being her surviving spouse, I am the
sole legal heir entitled to succeed to and inherit the estate of the said deceased who did not leave any descendant,
ascendant or any other heir entitled to her estate."16 Mr. Witness, is this particular provision that you have drafted
into this document . . . true or false?

ATTY. REY SANTOS

: Your Honor, I would like to reiterate that any question regarding the matter that would impugn the legitimacy of
the plaintiff, Marilu Turla[,]is impertinent and immaterial in this case[.] [I]t was only the wife Rufina Turla [who]
ha[s] the right to impugn the legitimacy of the plaintiff[,] and that has been the subject of my continuing objection
from the very beginning.

THE COURT

: But then again[,] you have presented this document as your Exhibit B[.] [Y]ou have practically opened the
floodgate to . . . questions on this document.

ATTY. REY SANTOS

: Only for the purposes [sic] of showing one or two . . . properties owned by the late Mariano Turla, your Honor.
That is why that’s only [sic] portion I have referred to in marking the said documents, your Honor.
THE COURT

: So, you now refused [sic] to answer the question?

ATTY. REY SANTOS

: No, I am not refusing to answer, I am just making a manifestation.

ATTY. CARINGAL

: What is the answer, is it true or false, your Honor[?]

ATTY. REY SANTOS

: My answer regarding the same would be subject to my objection on the materiality and impertinency and
relevancy of this question, your Honor[,] to this case.

THE COURT

: So anyway, the court has observed the continuing objection before[,] and to be consistent with the ruling of the
court[,] I will allow you to answer the question[.] [I]s it true or false?

THE WITNESS

: No, that is not true.

ATTY. CARINGAL

: That is not true. Mr. Witness, being a lawyer[,] you admit before this court that you have drafted a document that
caused the transfer of the estate of the decease[d] Rufina Turla.

THE WITNESS

: Yes, sir.

....

ATTY. CARINGAL

Q : This document, this particular provision that you said was false, you did not tell anybody[,] ten or five years
later[,] that this is false, is it not?

THE WITNESS

: I called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him what about Lulu 17 she is entitled [sic] to a share of
properties and he . . . told me, "Ako na ang bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan". So, he asked me to
proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he claimed the whole [sic]properties for himself. 18 (Emphasis
supplied)
Another Complaint19 was filed against Atty. Santos by Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal (Atty. Caringal). This was
docketed as A.C. No. 10584.20 Similar to Bernardino’s Complaint, Atty. Caringal alleged that Atty. Santos
represented clients with conflicting interests. 21 He also alleged that in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos
would necessarily go against the claims of Mariano Turla. 22

Also, in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos was allegedly violating the so-called "Dead Man’s
Statute"23 because "he [would] be utilizing information or matters of fact occurring before the death of his
deceased client. Similarly, he . . . [would] be unscrupulously utilizing information acquired during his professional
relation with his said client . . . that [would] constitute a breach of trust . . . or of privileged communication[.]" 24

Atty. Caringal further alleged that Atty. Santos violated Canon 1225 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when
he filed several cases against the other claimants of Mariano Turla’s estate.26 In other words, he engaged in forum
shopping.27

In addition, Atty. Santos allegedly violated Canon 10, Rule 10.0128 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when
he drafted Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. The Affidavit states that Mariano Turla is the sole heir of
Rufina Turla, but Atty. Santos knew this to be false. 29 Atty. Santos’ wife, Lynn Batac, is Mariano Turla’s niece.30 As
part of the family, Atty. Santos knew that Rufina Turla had other heirs. 31 Atty. Caringal further alleged:

14.4 Being the lawyer of Mariano Turla in the drafting of the document some fifteen years ago, he is fully aware of
all the circumstances therein recited. Moreover at that time, the [sic] Lynn Batac Santos was then employed at the
BIR[sic] who arranged for the payment of the taxes due. There is some peculiarity in the neat set up [sic] of a
husband and wife team where the lawyer makes the document while the wife who is a BIIR [sic] employee
arranges for the payment of the taxes due the government;

14.5 Respondent attorney could not have been mistaken about the fact recited in the Affidavit of Adjudication, etc.
that said deceased (Rufina de Castro Turla) "did not leave any descendant, xxx, or any other heir entitled to her
estate’ [sic] . . . [.]32 (Emphasis in the original)

Atty. Caringal argued that Atty. Santos was bound by the statement in Mariano Turla’s affidavit that Rufina Turla
had no other heir.33

Moreover, Atty. Santos allegedly converted funds belonging to the heirs of Mariano Turla for his own benefit. The
funds involved were rental income from Mariano Turla’s properties that were supposed to be distributed to the
heirs. Instead, Atty. Santos received the rental income.34 Lastly, Atty. Caringal alleged that Atty. Santos cited the
repealed Article 262 of the Civil Code in his arguments.35

In his Answer,36 Atty. Santos denied having falsified the death certificate.37 He explained that the death certificate
and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were given to him by Mariano Turla and that he was not aware that there
was a falsified entry in the death certificate.38

As regards the issue on conflict of interest, Atty. Santos argued that he did not represent and was not representing
conflicting interests since Mariano Turla was already dead.39 Further, "he [was] representing Marilu Turla against
those who ha[d] an interest in her father’s estate."40 Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication never stated
that there was no other legal heir but only "that Mariano Turla was the sole heir of Rufina Turla."41

Regarding the allegations of Atty. Caringal, Atty. Santos insisted that he did not commit forum shopping because
the various cases filed had different issues.42

As to the conversion of funds, Atty. Santos explained that the funds used were being held by his client as the
special administratrix of the estate of Mariano Turla. 43 According to Atty. Santos, payment of attorney’s fees out of
the estate’s funds could be considered as "expenses of administration."44 Also, payment of Atty. Santos’ legal
services was a matter which Atty. Caringal had no standing to question. 45

On the allegation that Atty. Santos cited a repealed provision of law, he discussed that Article 262 of the Civil Code
is applicable because it was in force when Marilu Turla’s birth certificate was registered.46

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended that Atty. Santos be
suspended for three (3) months.47

It found that Bernardino failed to prove his allegation that Atty. Santos knew that the death certificate was falsified
and used it to support Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.48 Likewise, Atty. Caringal failed to prove that
Atty. Santos converted funds from Mariano Turla’s estate.49

With regard to the citation of a repealed provision, the Commission on Bar Discipline stated that the evidence
presented did not prove that Atty. Santos "knowingly cited a repealed law." 50 Further, Atty. Santos did not engage
in forum shopping. The various cases filed involved different parties and prayed for different reliefs. 51

However, the Commission on Bar Discipline agreed with Bernardino and Atty. Caringal that Atty. Santos
represented clients with conflicting interests. 52 The Report and Recommendation53 of the Commission on Bar
Discipline stated:

. . . Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Rule 15.03 specifically proscribes members of
the bar from representing conflicting interests. The Supreme Court has explained that "the proscription against
representation of conflicting interest finds application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the
same general matter and is applicable however slight such adverse interest may be; the fact that the conflict of
interests is remote or merely probable does not make the prohibition inoperative."

....

. . . In the case at bar, the fact that the respondent represented Mariano Turla is no secret. The respondent has in a
number of pleadings/motions/documents and evenon the witness stand admitted that he drafted Mariano Turla’s
Affidavit of Adjudication which expressly states that he was the sole heir of Rufina Turla.

And then he afterwards agreed to represent Marilu Turla who claimed to be Mariano Turla’s daughter. To
substantiate her claim that she is Mariano Turla’s daughter, the respondent admitted that he relied on the birth
certificate presented by Marilu Turla[,] which indicates that she is not only the daughter of Mariano Turla but also
of Rufina Turla as evidenced by the Birth Certificate presented stating that Rufina Turla is Marilu Turla’s mother.
This means that Marilu Turla was also a rightful heir to Rufina Turla’s inheritance and was deprived of the same
because of the Affidavit of Adjudication which he drafted for Mariano Turla[,] stating that he is his wife’s sole heir.

. . . To further explain, the respondent[,] in agreeing to represent Marilu Turla[,] placed himself in a position where
he is to refute the claim in Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Adjudication that he is the only heir of Rufina
Turla.54 (Citations omitted)

In the Resolution55 dated May 10, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP Board
of Governors) adopted and approved the findings and recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline.

Atty. Santos filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,56 which was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in the
Resolution57 dated March 22, 2014.
This administrative case was forwarded to this court through a letter of transmittal dated July 15, 2014, 58 pursuant
to Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court which provides:

RULE 139-B
DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS

SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.—

....

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action.

The issues in this case are: (1) whether respondent Atty. Santos violated the Code of Professional Responsibility;
and (2) whether the penalty of suspension of three (3) months from the practice of law is proper.

This court accepts and adopts the findings of fact of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution. However, this court
modifies the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law from three (3) months to one (1) year.

Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.

....

Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.

The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client relationship. Lawyers must
treat all information received from their clients with utmost confidentiality in order to encourage clients to fully
inform their counsels of the facts of their case.59 In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,60 this court explained what conflict of
interest means:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The
test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty
to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he
argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance thereof.61 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists, respondent would necessarily refute Mariano
Turla’s claim that he is Rufina Turla’s sole heir when he agreed to represent Marilu Turla. Worse, he knew that
Mariano Turla was not the only heir. As stated in the Report of the Commission on Bar Discipline:
Worse[,] the respondent himself on the witness stand during his April 14, 2009 testimony in the Civil Case for Sum
of Money with Prayer of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order docketed as Civil Case
No. 09-269 filed with the RTC of Makati City admitted as follows: "I called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . .
. asked him what about Lulu she is entitled [sic] to a share of properties and he . . . told me, ‘Ako na ang bahala kay
Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan.’ So he asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he claimed
the whole [sic] properties for himself." This very admission proves that the respondent was privy to Marilu Turla’s
standing as a legal and rightful heir to Rufina Turla’s estate. 62 (Citation omitted)

However, Rule 15.03 provides for an exception, specifically, "by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts."63 Respondent had the duty to inform Mariano Turla and Marilu Turla that there is a conflict
of interest and to obtain their written consent.

Mariano Turla died on February 5, 2009,64 while respondent represented Marilu Turla in March 2009. 65 It is
understandable why respondent was unable to obtain Mariano Turla’s consent. Still, respondent did not present
evidence showing that he disclosed to Marilu Turla that he previously represented Mariano Turla and assisted him
in executing the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Thus, the allegation of conflict of interest against respondent was
sufficiently proven.

Likewise, we accept and adopt the IBP Board of Governors’ finding that respondent violated Canon 10, Rule10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states:

CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or
allow the court to be mislead by any artifice.

In the Report, the Commission on Bar Discipline explained:

Corollary to the foregoing, the Commission by virtue of the doctrine res ipsa loquitor[sic] finds that the
respondent’s act of failing to thwart his client Mariano Turla from filing the Affidavit of Adjudication despite . . . his
knowledge of the existence of Marilu Turla as a possible heir to the estate of Rufina Turla, the respondent failed to
uphold his obligation as a member of the bar to be the stewards of justice and protectors of what is just, legal and
proper. Thus in failing to do his duty and acting dishonestly[,] not only was he in contravention of the Lawyer’s
Oath but was also in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 66 (Emphasis in
the original)

As officers of the court, lawyers have the duty to uphold the rule of law. In doing so, lawyers are expected to be
honest in all their dealings.67 Unfortunately, respondent was far from being honest. With full knowledge that
Rufina Turla had another heir, he acceded to Mariano Turla’s request to prepare the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication.68

This court notes that the wording of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolutions dated May 10, 2013 and March 22,
2014 seems to imply that it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that has the authority to impose sanctions on
lawyers. This is wrong.

The authority to discipline members of the Bar is vested in this court under the 1987 Constitution: ARTICLE VIII

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

....
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

....

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan69 elucidated on this court’s "plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys" 70 and
discussed:

We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and members of the
court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regular and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary
disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court’s constitutional
mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice
itself of law. Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over
members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to an
orderly discharge of judicial functions. . . .

. . . The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court’s exclusive power
of admission to the Bar. A lawyers [sic] is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he
is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in
society.71 (Citations omitted)

This court’s authority is restated under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, specifically:

RULE 138
ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO BAR

....

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.—A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis supplied)

In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo,72 this court emphasized the authority of this court to impose disciplinary action
on those admitted to the practice of law.

Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers. 73 Under the
current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The findings
of the Integrated Bar, however, can only be recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional powers of this
court.

Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory.74

The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is based on Rule 139-B, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,
which provides that "[p]roceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines . . . upon the verified complaint of any
person." However, this authority is only to assist this court with the investigation of the case, to determine factual
findings, and to recommend, at best, the penalty that may be imposed on the erring lawyer.

We reiterate the discussion in Tenoso v. Atty. Echanez:75

Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that "a lawyer
owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the
nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State—the administration of justice—as an
officer of the court." Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency,
but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing."76 (Citations omitted)

Only this court can impose sanctions on members of the Bar.1âwphi1 This disciplinary authority is granted by the
Constitution and cannot be relinquished by this court. 77 The Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
are, at best, recommendatory, and its findings and recommendations should not be equated with Decisions and
Resolutions rendered by this court. WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Victor Rey Santos guilty of violating
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The findings of fact and
recommendations of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated May 10, 2013 and
March 22, 2014 are ACCEPTED and ADOPTED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year is imposed upon Atty. Victor Rey Santos. He is warned that a repetition of the same
or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal
record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country for the information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 8168, October 12, 2016

SPOUSES EDWIN B. BUFFE AND KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE, Complainants, v. SEC. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, USEC.
FIDEL J. EXCONDE, JR., AND CONGRESSMAN ELEANDRO JESUS F. MADRONA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, ACTING C.J.:

The Case

Before this Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Spouses Edwin B. Buffe and Karen M. Silverio-Buffe
(complainants) against former Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez, 1 former Undersecretary of Justice Fidel J.
Exconde, Jr., and former Congressman Eleandro Jesus F. Madrona (respondents), for committing an unethical act
in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath, particularly the willful violation of
Republic Act Nos. (RA) 6713, 3019, and civil service law and rules.

The Facts

The undisputed facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryOn 15 July 2008, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed Karen M.
Silverio-Buffe (Silverio-Buffe) as Prosecutor I/Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon province. On 15 August
2008, Silverio-Buffe took her oath of office before Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 24, Judge Jesusa P.
Maningas (Judge Maningas). She, then, furnished the Office of the President, Civil Service Commission and
Department of Justice (DOJ) with copies of her oath of office. On 19 August 2008, Silverio-Buffe informed the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon that she was officially reporting for work beginning that day.

In a letter dated 26 August 2008, Romblon Provincial Prosecutor Arsenio R.M. Almadin asked former Secretary of
Justice Raul M. Gonzalez (Gonzalez) to confirm the appointment of Silverio-Buffe since the Provincial Prosecution
Office did not receive any official communication regarding Silverio-Buffe's appointment.

In a Memorandum Order dated 19 December 2008, Gonzalez ordered Silverio-Buffe "to cease and desist from
acting as prosecutor in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon, or in any Prosecutor's Office for that
matter, considering that [she has] no appointment to act as such, otherwise [she] will be charged of usurpation of
public office."2chanrobleslaw

On 11 February 2009, Silverio-Buffe, together with her husband Edwin B. Buffe, filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a Joint Complaint-Affidavit3 alleging that former Congressman Eleandro Jesus F. Madrona
(Madrona), acting out of spite or revenge, persuaded and influenced Gonzalez and Undersecretary Fidel J.
Exconde, Jr. (Exconde) into refusing to administer Silverio-Buffe's oath of office and into withholding the
transmittal of her appointment papers to the DOJ Regional Office. Madrona allegedly acted out of spite or revenge
against Silverio-Buffe because she was one of the plaintiffs in a civil case for enforcement of a Radio Broadcast
Contract, which was cancelled by the radio station due to adverse commentaries against Madrona and his allies in
Romblon.

In their Joint Complaint-Affidavit, they narrated that: (1) on 1 August 2008, the Malacanang Records Office
transmitted Silverio-Buffe's appointment papers to the DOJ and they were received by a clerk named Gino Dela
Pena; (2) on 13 August 2008, a certain Cora from the Personnel Division of the DOJ asked Silverio-Buffe if she had
any "connection" in the Office of the Secretary because her papers were being withheld by Exconde, and when she
said none, Cora told her to come back the following day; (3) on 14 August 2008, Silverio-Buffe was introduced to
Gonzalez, who informed her that Madrona strongly opposed her appointment and advised her to work it out with
Madrona; (4) since Gonzalez refused to administer her oath of office, Silverio-Buffe took her oath before Judge
Maningas on 15 August 2008; (5) Silverio-Buffe twice wrote a letter to Gonzalez pleading for the transmittal of her
appointment papers, but Gonzalez never replied; and (6) on 13 November 2008, they went to the DOJ and met
Exconde, who informed them that they should think of a solution regarding Madrona's opposition to her
appointment. Exconde asked for the reason of Madrona's opposition and Silverio-Buffe replied that she supported
Madrona's rival, Eduardo Firmalo, during the elections. Exconde persuaded Silverio-Buffe to talk with Madrona,
but she insisted on not approaching Madrona because of their diverse principles. Exconde, then, suggested that
Silverio-Buffe write Gonzalez a letter stating that she already approached Madrona yet the latter ignored her plea,
but Silverio-Buffe refused the suggestion.

In a Resolution dated 15 April 2009,4 the Court, through the First Division, required the respondents to comment
on the complaint.

In his Comment with Counter-Complaint dated 23 June 2009,5 Madrona denied that he acted out of spite or
revenge against Silverio-Buffe or that he persuaded, induced, or influenced anyone to refuse to administer oath to
Silverio-Buffe and to withhold the transmittal of her appointment papers. Madrona insisted that the allegations
against him are without proof, and based on general conjectures and hearsay. On the other hand, Madrona alleged
that complainants should be accountable for their dishonest and deceitful conduct in submitting to the Court as
annexes a complaint without its last two pages and a contract altered by Silverio-Buffe.

In a joint Comment dated 1 July 2009,6 Gonzalez and Exconde claimed that: (1) the complaint is unfounded and
purely for harassment because Silverio-Buffe's appointment papers were not endorsed by the Office of the
President to the DOJ for implementation; (2) the Court has no jurisdiction over the complaint because a case for
violation of RA 6713 and civil service rules should be filed with the Civil Service Commission and a case for violation
of RA 3019 should be filed with the Sandiganbayan; (3) the proper venue for her grievance is with the Office of the
President; (4) assuming that her appointment papers were withheld, such act was presumed to be the act of the
President herself, with the presumption of regularity of official functions; and (5) Exconde was erroneously
impleaded since he never signed any document relating to Silverio-Buffe's appointment.

In her Reply dated 17 July 2009,7 Silverio-Buffe insisted that her appointment papers were endorsed by the Office
of the President to the Office of the Secretary of Justice, as evidenced by the Endorsement Letter of then Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita. However, Exconde, as Chief of Personnel Management and Development under the
Office of the Secretary of Justice, refused to forward her appointment letter to the Personnel Division of DOJ for
implementation.

In a Resolution dated 21 October 2009,8 the Court, through the Third Division, referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

In a Memorandum dated 12 July 2010,9 then DOJ Secretary Leila M. De Lima transmitted Silverio-Buffe's
appointment papers to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon.

In a Resolution dated 20 October 2010,10 the Court, through the Second Division, referred the Motion to
Dismiss11 filed by Madrona to the IBP. Madrona sought to dismiss the present administrative complaint on the
ground of forum-shopping, because he received an order from the Office of the Ombudsman directing him to file a
counter-affidavit based on the same administrative complaint filed before the OBC.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation dated 5 October 2011,12 Investigating Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero
(Investigating Commissioner) found the complaint impressed with merit, and recommended the penalty of censure
against the respondents.13 The Investigating Commissioner found respondents' united action of stopping the
appointment of Silverio-Buffe unethical.

In Resolution No. XX-2012-21514 issued on 28 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors reversed the Investigating
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, to wit:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to REVERSE as it is hereby unanimously REVERSED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and
considering that the complaint lacks merit the case against Respondents is hereby DISMISSED.

Complainants then filed a motion for reconsideration.

In Resolution No. XX-2013-30715 issued on 21 March 2013, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for
reconsideration, to wit:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Complainants' Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to
reverse the Resolution and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and
taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2012-215 dated June 28, 2012 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Hence, complainants filed a petition before this Court.

The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Gonzalez, Exconde, and Madrona should be administratively disciplined based on
the allegations in the complaint.

The Ruling of the Court

We dismiss the administrative case against Exconde and Madrona for lack of jurisdiction. The present
administrative case should be resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman, considering that complainants have filed
a complaint before it on 12 February 2009.16 In the case of Gonzalez, his death on 7 September 2014 forecloses
any administrative case against him.17chanrobleslaw

The authority of the Ombudsman to act on complainants' administrative complaint is anchored on Section 13(1),
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that: "[t]he Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions, and duties: (1) investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient."

Under Section 1618 of RA 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by any public
officer or employee during his or her tenure.19 Section 1920 of RA 6770 also states that the Ombudsman shall act
on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, or
discriminatory.

Considering that both Exconde and Madrona are public officers being charged for actions, which are allegedly
unfair and discriminatory, involving their official functions during their tenure, the present case should be resolved
by the Office of the Ombudsman as the appropriate government agency. Indeed, the IBP has no jurisdiction over
government lawyers who are charged with administrative offenses involving their official duties. For such acts,
government lawyers fall under the disciplinary authority of either their superior21 or the Ombudsman.22 Moreover,
an anomalous situation will arise if the IBP asserts jurisdiction and decides against a government lawyer, while the
disciplinary authority finds in favor of the government lawyer.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the administrative complaint against now deceased Secretary of Justice Raul M.
Gonzalez for being moot. We also DISMISS the administrative complaint against respondents, former
Undersecretary of Justice Fidel J. Exconde, Jr. and former Congressman Eleandro Jesus F. Madrona, for lack of
jurisdiction.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Ombudsman for whatever appropriate action the
Ombudsman may wish to take with respect to the possible administrative and criminal liability of respondents
Fidel J. Exconde, Jr. and Eleandro Jesus F. Madrona.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 11238, September 21, 2016

ATTY. MYLENE S. YUMUL-ESPINA, Complainant, v. ATTY. BENEDICTO D. TABAQUERO, Respondent.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

Before us is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Arty. Mylene S. Yumul-Espina (complainant) against Atty.
Benedicto D. Tabaquero (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant charged
respondent with violating Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), specifically Rules
1.01,3 1.024 and 1.03.5chanrobleslaw

Facts

Shirley Atkinson (Shirley) is married to Derek Atkinson (Derek), a British Citizen. She purchased two properties
(covered by Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 142730 and TCT No. 151683), both of which she intended to
mortgage. In order to facilitate the mortgage on TCT No. 142730, Derek allegedly executed an Affidavit of Waiver
of Rights which he subscribed before complainant (as a notary public) on October 25, 1999. Thus, Shirley was able
to mortgage TCT No. 142730 without the signature of marital consent of Derek Atkinson. 6chanrobleslaw

Derek, however, claims that he could not have executed the Affidavit of Waiver of Rights because he was out of
the country on October 25, 1999, and therefore, could not have personally appeared before complainant on that
date.7 Thus, he filed falsification cases against complainant and Shirley, respectively. 8chanrobleslaw

During the pendency of these criminal cases, complainant filed a complaint-affidavit before the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline against respondent.9 She alleges that in representing Derek in the criminal cases against her for
"Falsification of Document by a Notary Public," and against Shirley for "Falsification of Public Document,"
respondent violated the CPR.10 She claims that respondent prosecuted the criminal complaints against her and
Shirley in order to assert his client's non-existent rights and interest as owner of the property, blatantly
disregarding the constitutional prohibition on foreigners from acquiring private lands in the
Philippines.11chanrobleslaw

In his Answer,12 respondent argues that he was engaged as counsel for Derek long after the acquisition of the
disputed properties. He never had any participation with respect to the purchase of the two properties.13 Upon
Derek's instruction, direction and decision, respondent filed the cases (against Shirley and complainant) after
Derek learned about the mortgages and the execution of the Affidavits of Waiver of Rights he allegedly subscribed
before complainant.14chanrobleslaw

According to respondent, the issue being raised by complainant in the disbarment proceeding is the same issue
raised by Maria Luisa Tanghal, one of the defendants in the petition for annulment of the extra-judicial foreclosure
filed by Derek.15 In that case, Tanghal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Derek cannot own lands in the
Philippines. The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City denied Tanghal's motion, and ruled that Derek's claim is not
actually a claim of ownership over the said property but a claim on his funds. 16 Respondent also denied committing
any violation of the canons of the CPR. He countered that the complainant is bitter and vengeful on account of
Derek's filing of the criminal complaint against her.17chanrobleslaw

Investigation ensued and the IBP issued a Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing 18 on June 19, 2014.
Respondent submitted his Mandatory Conference Brief 19 on July 10, 2014. In his brief, he alleged (as a counter-
complaint) that complainant violated her duties under the Notarial Law. 20 Complainant submitted her Mandatory
Conference Brief21 on July 15, 2014 reiterating the salient points in her complaint.

In respondent's Rejoinder to Reply,22 he submitted that the constitutional prohibition is not germane, material or
relevant to the criminal complaints his client filed against complainant and Shirley. The basis of these criminal
complaints is the falsified signature in the affidavit allegedly executed by Derek.23 As in his counter-complaint,
respondent, citing Social Security Commission v. Corral,24 reiterated complainant's breach of the notarial
law:25cralawredcralawred
x x x A notary public is duty bound to require the person executing a document to be personally present, to swear
before him that he is that person and ask the latter if he has voluntarily and freely executed the same x x
x.26chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Meanwhile, pending resolution of the case by the Investigating Commissioner, complainant executed and filed an
Affidavit of Desistance27 which recited, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
3. Moreover, consistent with charity, goodwill and the Christmas spirit, I hereby desist and withdraw the
averments I alleged in my Complaint-Affidavit which I filed in connection with above-captioned case. I further
request this Honorable Commission to consider my Complaint-Affidavit as withdrawn from the records of above-
captioned case, with full knowledge of the legal and other consequences thereof;

4. This Affidavit of Desistance may be pleaded as a bar to any existing and/or future criminal, civil and/or
administrative cases filed or will be filed against Respondent for the same acts subject of the present Complaint;
and cralawlawlibrary

5. I am hereby executing this Affidavit for the purpose of attesting to the truth of the foregoing averments, for the
purpose of dismissing above-captioned case and for other legal intents and purposes.
Respondent also filed and executed his Affidavit of Desistance/Withdrawal28 which stated,
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
2. I hereby desist and/or withdraw my [unsworn] Counter-Complaint mentioned in my Mandatory Conference
Brief dated [July 9,] 2014 and my [unsworn] averments/allegations in my Rejoinder to Reply dated [September 10,]
2014 regarding the alleged violation of duties and/or non-compliance of the Notarial Law by Complainant and
request this Honorable Office to consider the same as withdrawn from the records of [the] above-captioned case,
with full knowledge of the legal and other consequences thereof;

3. I expressly declare that the incident was the result of a misapprehension of facts and a simple misunderstanding
between Complainant and me;

4. This Affidavit of Desistance and/or Withdrawal may be pleaded as a bar to any existing and/or future criminal,
civil and/or administrative cases filed or will be filed against Complainant for the same acts subject of above-
captioned case[.]
Thus, Investigating Commissioner Eduardo R. Robles, in his Report and Recommendation,29 recommended that the
complaint and counter-complaint be dismissed upon the "prodding of the parties." He reasoned that the
Commission cannot possibly resolve the controversies after the revelations made by the parties in their Affidavit of
Desistance and Affidavit of Desistance/Withdrawal. 30chanrobleslaw

On April 18, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-283,31 adopting and
approving the recommendation to dismiss the complaint and counter-complaint against the parties.

Our Ruling

We do not agree with the ruling of the IBP Board. The cases should not have been dismissed on the basis of the
affidavits of desistance.

Disbarment proceedings are sui generis.32 Their main purpose is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to
continue acting as an officer of the court and as participant in the dispensation of justice. 33 Hence, the underlying
motives of the complainant are unimportant and of little relevance. 34chanrobleslaw

We have consistently looked with disfavor upon affidavits of desistance filed in disbarment
proceedings.35 Administrative proceedings are imbued with public interest. 36 Hence, these proceedings should not
be made to depend on the whims and caprices of complainants who are, in a real sense, only
witnesses.37 In Garrido v. Garrido,38 we held:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure—such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial
questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant—do
not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in the
Bar.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We emphasize that a case for disbarment or suspension is not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil
case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the
public and the courts.40chanrobleslaw
Although there are times when we dismissed the case after the complainant withdrew his complaint,41 the
dismissal was not due to our acquiescence to the complainant's wish but because of the absence of any competent
and credible evidence by reason of the desistance.42chanrobleslaw

In Gaviola v. Salcedo,43 we clarified that the filing of an affidavit of desistance by the complainant for lack of
interest does not ipso facto result in the termination of an administrative case for suspension or disbarment of an
erring lawyer.44 However, we were constrained to dismiss the case against respondent Salcedo because the
charges cannot be proved without the evidence of the complainant and her witnesses. 45chanrobleslaw

In Firman v. Crisanto,46 the complainant alleged that respondent lawyer had carnal relations with her when she
was below 18 years of age although he was a married man.47 Since the only evidence available is the complainant's
testimony and the complaint was withdrawn before any investigation was made, the charge can no longer hold
water. In the absence of any evidence, it is of course inevitable that the case should be dismissed.48chanrobleslaw

The foregoing decisions reflect the principle that in disbarment cases, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant,49 and the legal presumption that a lawyer is innocent of the charges proferred against him until the
contrary is proved; and that he regularly performed his duty as an officer of the Court in accordance with his
oath.50 It follows therefore that if the complaint was withdrawn (in this case through desistance) immediately after
it was filed, it would be difficult to investigate, or prove the charge.

However, the facts of these cited cases differ from the case before this court. Unlike in the cited cases, the
affidavits of desistance in this case were submitted after the investigation was completed: Thus, the issues in the
complaint and in the counter-complaint (with their corresponding evidentiary Support) have been duly ventilated
in the pleadings submitted by the parties,51 and during the conferences and hearings52 held before the
Investigating Commissioner. In fact, the only matter lacking in the proceeding is the Investigating Commissioner's
report and recommendation. We also note one peculiarity in this case, in contrast to the cited cases. In this case,
there is already a finding of probable cause against complainant for falsification of public document. 53 Therefore,
unlike the aforementioned cases, it cannot be said that the complaint and counter-complaint should be dismissed
for lack of evidence to investigate or prove the charge.

Further, Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Sec. 5. Service or dismissal. - x x x

No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,

restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, unless the Supreme
Court motu propio or upon recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, determines that there is no
compelling reason to continue with the disbarment or suspension proceedings against the respondent. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The report and recommendation did not find that there is no compelling reason to continue the proceedings
against petitioner and respondent. It merely stated that "[b]esides, this Commission cannot possibly resolve the
controversies after the revelations made by the parties in their Affidavit of Desistance and Affidavit of
Desistance/Withdrawal. Accordingly, it is hereby recommended that, upon the prodding of the parties themselves,
the complaint and the counter-complaint be dismissed."54chanrobleslaw

The IBP Board should not have dismissed the cases on the basis of the affidavits of desistance filed by the parties.

We now come to the merits of the complaint and the counter-complaint.

We find respondent not guilty of violations of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant
cannot argue that the intention behind the falsification cases filed by respondent (as counsel of Derek) against her
and Shirley, respectively, was to circumvent the constitutional prohibition on foreign ownership of lands in the
Philippines. In these cases, Derek did not seek that the ownership of the lands be conveyed to him. 55 The basis of
these criminal complaints is complainant's act of making it appear that Derek was present, or participated in the
execution of the affidavits. The constitutional prohibition is therefore irrelevant in these criminal complaints.

However, the counter-complaint against complainant, for violation of the Notarial Law, is meritorious. The
evidence on record sufficiently showed that Derek could not have appeared before complainant on October 25,
1999, the day the Affidavit of Waiver was notarized. Derek's passport entries 56 and the certification57 from the
Bureau of Immigration show that after Derek departed from the Philippines for United Kingdom on September 27,
1999, his next arrival in the Philippines was on December 17, 1999.

Records show that complainant failed to address this issue in any of the pleadings she filed in the proceedings
before the IBP. The failure is despite the opportunities where complainant could have refuted the allegation. 58 We
note that the only instance where it appeared that complainant may have addressed this issue was when
respondent referred59 to complainant's claim in his Comment/Opposition to the Petition for Review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ).60 We further note that the Comment/Opposition was an attachment to complainant's
complaint-affidavit to prove merely that respondent continued to represent Derek in the proceedings before the
DOJ.61 The relevant portion provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x [A]bout the claim of [complainant] that all what she could remember is that there was a man who appeared a
foreigner (sic) and claimed to be [Derek]. Noticeably and conformably to the Notarial Law, there is need for
personal appearance, positive proofs of identity for the notarization of the document.

What was presented as identification and the claim that a foreigner appeared before her is largely on the basis of a
Community Tax Certificate. The Community Tax Certificate that appeared on the Affidavit of Waiver of Rights, and
surprisingly obtained by a foreigner who is not qualified to have a Community Tax Certificate, not being a Filipino
citizen but a visitor, is entered as having been paid for and issued on September 28, 1999.

This is preposterous in that as the Community Tax Certificate was procured, issued and released on September 28,
1999, [Derek] was not also in the Philippines. x x x62chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Thus, complainant's act of notarizing the document without the presence of the affiant is prohibited by the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice63 which provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule IV. Powers and Limitations of Notaries Public

xxx

Sec. 2. Prohibitions. x x x

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document -

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public or otherwise
identified by the notary public throug competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
This is the most common violation committed by lawyers. To deter further violations, and in line with existing
jurisprudence, we impose the penalties of suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months, revocation of
incumbent commission as a notary public, and disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a
period of two (2) years.

Further, we note that the result of this case cannot affect the pending criminal cases involving the parties.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases. 64chanrobleslaw

Finally, we remind complainants, especially members of the bar, to be more circumspect in filing disbarment
complaints. A complaint filed solely as a retaliatory measure65 or by reason of mistake, lack of communication66 or
a misapprehension of facts as in this case, achieves nothing except to waste the time of the IBP and this Court.

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE Resolution No. XXI-2015-283 of the IBP Board of Governors insofar as it dismissed the
cases against complainant and respondent because of the affidavits of desistance. Based on the merits of the cases
filed against the parties, we hold that:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) The complaint agamst respondent Atty. Benedicto D. Tabaquero is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

(2) Complainant Atty. Mylene S. Yumul-Espina is GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Accordingly, the Court hereby SUSPENDS her from the practice of law for six (6) months; REVOKES her
incumbent commission as a notary public; and PROHIBITS her from being commissioned as a notary public for
two (2) years, effective immediately. She is WARNED that a repetition of the same offense or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.67

SO ORDERED.

March 24, 2015

A.C. No. 10132

HEIRS OF PEDRO ALILANO represented by DAVID ALILANO, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO E. EXAMEN,Respondent .

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by the heirs of
Pedro Alilario against Atty. Roberto E. Examen for misconduct and malpractice for falsifying documents and
presenting these as evidence in court thus violating the Lawyer's Oath, 2 Canons 1,3 104 and 19,5 and Rules
1.01,6 1.02,710.01,8 and 19.019 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Pedro Alilano and his wife, Florentina, were the holders of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-23261 covering a
98,460 sq. m. parcel of land identified as Lot No. 1085 Pls-544-D located in Paitan, Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat.
Pedro and Florentina died on March 6, 1985 and October 11, 1989, respectively.

It appears that on March 31, 1984 and September 12, 1984 Absolute Deeds of Sale10 were executed by the
Spouses Alilano in favor of Ramon Examen and his wife, Edna. Both documents were notarized by respondent Atty.
Roberto Examen, brother of the vendee. Sometime in September 1984, Spouses Examen obtained possession of
the property.

On January 12, 2002, the heirs of Alilano filed a suit for recovery of possession before the Regional Trial Court of
Sultan Kudarat against Edna Examen and Atty. Roberto Examen. 11 It was during this proceeding that Atty. Examen
introduced into evidence the March 31, 1984 and September 12, 1984 Absolute Deeds of Sale.
On November 15, 2003,12 the heirs of Alilano filed this complaint alleging that Atty. Examen, based on Barretto v.
Cabreza,13 violated the notarial law when he notarized the absolute deeds of sale since a notary public is
prohibited from notarizing a document when one of the parties is a relative by consanguinity within the fourth civil
degree or affinity within the second civil degree. It is also alleged that Atty. Examen notarized the documents
knowing that the cedula or residence certificate number used by Ramon Examen was not actually his but the
residence certificate number of Florentina. Atty. Examen also falsely acknowledged that the two witnesses
personally appeared before him when they did not. Lastly, it is alleged that despite knowing the infirmities of these
documents, Atty. Examen introduced these documents into evidence violating his oath as a lawyer and the CPR.

In his defense, Atty. Examen pointed out that there was no longer any prohibition under the Revised
Administrative Code for a notary public to notarize a document where one of the parties is related to him by
consanguinity and affinity.14 With regard to the use of Florentina’s residence certificate as Ramon’s, Atty. Examen
said that he was in good faith and that it was office practice that the secretary type details without him personally
examining the output.15 In any event, he reasoned that the use of another’s residence certificate is not a ground
for disbarment and is barred by prescription based on IBP Resolution No. XVI-2004-13 dated January 26, 2004
where it was proposed that the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Section 1, Rule VIII, be revised to include a prescription period for professional misconduct: within two
years from the date of the act.16

In its Report and Recommendation,17 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty. Examen liable for
breach of the Notarial Law and introducing false Absolute Deeds of Sale before court proceedings. It stated that
there was ample evidence to support the complainants’ contention that the Spouses Alilano did not voluntarily
and knowingly convey their property, i.e. denials under oath by attesting witnesses and NBI Report by Handwriting
Expert Jennifer Dominguez stating that Pedro Alilano’s signature in the September 1984 Absolute Deed of Sale was
significantly different from the specimen signatures. It also noted that Ramon Examen’s residence certificate
number, date and place of issue were also falsified since the residence certificate actually belonged to Florentina
Pueblo. It thus recommended that the penalty of disbarment be imposed.

The IBP Board of Governors (BOG) in its June 26, 2007 Resolution18 adopted the IBP CBD’s report but modified the
penalty to suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years and a suspension of Atty. Examen’s
Notarial Commission for a period of two years.

Atty. Examen moved for reconsideration. In its Notice of Resolution, the IBP BOG denied the motion for
reconsideration. It also modified the penalty imposed to suspension from the practice of law for a period of one
year and disqualification from re-appointment as Notary Public for a period of two years. 19

We agree with the IBP that Atty. Examen is administratively liable and hereby impose a modified penalty.

In disbarment cases the only issue that is to be decided by the Court is whether the member of the bar is fit to be
allowed the privileges as such or not.20 It is not therefore the proper venue for the determination of whether there
had been a proper conveyance of real property nor is it the proper proceeding to take up whether witnesses’
signatures were in fact forged.

NO PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS FOR

ACTS OF ERRING MEMBERS OF THE BAR

In Frias v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada,21 the Court En Banc opined that there can be no prescription in bar discipline
cases. It pointed out this has been the policy since 1967 with the Court’s ruling in Calo, Jr. v. Degamo 22 and
reiterated in Heck v. Santos23 where we had the chance to state:
If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as
lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they
stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. It
is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No
matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the
institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.
This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to deter them from
committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the
Lawyer’s Oath. x x x

Thus, even the lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the
administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer…. (Italics supplied) 24

We therefore ruled in Frias, that Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the IBP CBD was void and had no
legal effect for being ultra vires and thus null and void.25

This ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Bengco v. Bernardo, 26 where the Court stated that putting a
prescriptive period on administrative cases involving members of the bar would only serve to embolden them to
disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant
would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever
administrative liability they ought to answer for.

Atty. Examen’s defense of prescription therefore is of no moment and deserves scant consideration.

THE SPANISH NOTARIAL LAW OF 1889 WAS REPEALED BY THE

REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917

Prior to 1917, governing law for notaries public in the Philippines was the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889. However,
the law governing Notarial Practice is changed with the passage of the January 3, 1916 Revised Administrative
Code, which took effect in 1917. In 2004, the Revised Rules on Notarial Practice27 was passed by the Supreme
Court.

In Kapunan, et al. v. Casilan and Court of Appeals,28 the Court had the opportunity to state that enactment of the
Revised Administrative Code repealed the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889. Thus:

It is petitioners’ contention that Notary Public Mateo Canonoy, who was related to the parties in the donation
within the fourth civil degree of affinity, was, under Articles 22 and 28 of the Spanish Notarial Law, incompetent
and disqualified to authenticate the deed of donation executed by the Kapunan spouses in favor of their daughter
Concepcion Kapunan Salcedo. Said deed of donation, according to petitioners, became a mere private instrument
under Article 1223 of the old Civil Code, so that under the ruling laid down in the case of Barretto vs. Cabreza (33
Phil., 413), the donation was inefficacious. The appellate court, however, in the decision complained of held that
the Spanish Notarial Law has been repealed with the enactment of Act No. 496. We find this ruling to be correct. In
the case of Philippine Sugar Estate vs. Poizart (48 Phil., 536), cited in Vda. de Estuart vs. Garcia (Adm. Case No. 212,
prom. February 15, 1957), this Court held that "The old Spanish notarial law and system of conveyance was
repealed in the Philippines and another and different notarial law and system became the law of the land with the
enactment of Act No. 496."29 (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the heirs of Alilano stated that Atty. Examen was prohibited to notarize the absolute deeds of sale
since he was related by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree with the vendee, Ramon. The prohibition
might have still applied had the applicable rule been the Spanish Notarial Law. However, following the Court’s
ruling in Kapunan, the law in force at the time of signing was the Revised Administrative Code, thus, the
prohibition was removed. Atty. Examen was not incompetent to notarize the document even if one of the parties
to the deed was a relative, his brother. As correctly observed by the IBP CBD:

At the time of notarization, the prevailing law governing notarization was Sections 231-259, Chapter 11 of the
Revised Administrative Code and there was no prohibition on a notary public from notarizing a document when
one of the interested parties is related to the notary public within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
second degree of affinity.30

Note must be taken that under 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule IV, Section 3(c), a notary public is disqualified
among others to perform the notarial act if he is related by affinity or consanguinity to a principal within the fourth
civil degree, to wit:

SEC. 3. Disqualifications. – A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:

xxxx

(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal
within the fourth civil degree.

That Atty. Examen was not incompetent to act as a notary public in the present case does not mean that he can
evade administrative liability under the CPR in conjunction with the provisions of the Notarial Law.

NOTARIES PUBLIC MUST PERFORM

THEIR DUTIES DILIGENTLY AND
WITH UTMOST CARE

In Nunga v. Atty. Viray,31 this Court stated:

…[N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest
necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the
public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that the notarization by a
notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of the authenticity thereof. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties.32(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Thus under the prevailing law at the time of notarization it was the duty of the notary public to comply with the
requirements of the Notarial Law.1âwphi1 This includes the duty under Chapter 11, Section 251 of the Revised
Administrative Code:

SEC. 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of cedula [residence] tax. – Every contract, deed, or other
document acknowledged before a notary public shall have certified thereon that the parties thereto have
presented their proper cedula [residence] certificates or are exempt from the cedula [residence] tax, and there
shall be entered by the notary public as a part of such certification the number, place of issue, and date of each
cedula [residence] certificate as aforesaid.

Under Chapter 11, Section 249 of the Revised Administrative Code provided a list of the grounds for
disqualification:
SEC. 249. Grounds for revocation of commission. – The following derelictions of duty on the part of a notary public
shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his
commission:

xxxx

(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula certificates.

xxxx

In Soriano v. Atty. Basco,33 the Court stated that notaries public are required to follow formalities as these are
mandatory and cannot be simply neglected. Thus, the Notarial Law requires them to certify that a party to the
instrument acknowledged before him has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the
residence certificate) and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of the certification. Failure to
perform his duties results in the revocation of a notary’s commission. The Court said:

As a lawyer commissioned as a notary public, respondent is mandated to discharge with fidelity the sacred duties
appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. Faithful
observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment are sacrosanct. He cannot
simply disregard the requirements and solemnities of the Notarial Law. 34 (Emphasis supplied)

Here, based on the submission of the complainants, it is clear that the residence certificate number used by
Ramon Examen and as notarized by Atty. Examen in both Absolute Deeds of Sale was not in fact the residence
certificate of Ramon but Florentina’s residence certificate number.35 Atty. Examen interposes that he was in good
faith in that it was office practice to have his secretary type up the details of the documents and requirements
without him checking the correctness of same.

A notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and
fidelity.36 Good faith cannot be a mitigating circumstance in situations since the duty to function as a notary public
is personal. We note that the error could have been prevented had Atty. Examen diligently performed his
functions: personally checked the correctness of the documents. To say that it was his secretary’s fault reflects
disregard and unfitness to discharge the functions of a notary public for it is he who personally acknowledges the
document. He was behooved under Section 251, Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code to check if the
proper cedulas were presented and inspect if the documents to be acknowledged by him reflected the correct
details. This Court cannot stress enough that notarization is not a routinary act. It is imbued with substantive public
interest owing to the public character of his duties37 .

Atty. Examen posits that the failure of a notary to make the proper notation of cedulas can only be a ground for
disqualification and not the proper subject for a disbarment proceeding. We disagree.

In violating the provisions of the Notarial Law, Atty. Examen also transgressed the his oath as a lawyer, provisions
of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
By his negligent act of not checking the work of his secretary and merely perfunctorily notarizing documents, it
cannot be said that he upheld legal processes thus violating Canon 1 of the CPR. Neither can it be said that he
promoted confidence in the legal system. If anything, his acts serve to undermine the functions of a diligent
lawyer. He thus ran afoul Rule 1.02 of the CPR. We cannot stress enough that as a lawyer, respondent is expected
at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal

SEC. 241. Powers of notary public. – Every notary public shall have power to administer all oaths and affirmations
provided for by law, in all matters incident to his notarial office, and in the execution of affidavits, depositions, and
other documents requiring an oath, and to receive the proof or acknowledgment of all writings relating to
commerce or navigation, such as bills of sale bottomries, mortgages, and hypothecations of ships, vessels, or
boats, charter parties of affreightments, letters of attorney, deeds, mortgages, transfers and assignments of land
or buildings, or an interest therein, and such other writings as are commonly proved or acknowledged before
notaries; to act as a magistrate, in the writing of affidavits or depositions, and to make declarations and certify the
truth thereof under his seal of office, concerning all matters done by him by virtue of his office. profession and
refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity
of the legal profession.38A lawyer’s mandate includes thoroughly going over documents presented to them typed
or transcribed by their secretaries.39

The Court notes that the case between the parties is not the first that reached this Court. In Edna Examen and
Roberto Examen v. Heirs of Pedro Alilano and Florentina Pueblo, 40 Atty. Examen and his sister-in-law questioned
via a petition for certiorari41 the propriety of three Court of Appeals’ Resolutions relating to a case involving Lot
No. 1085 Pls-544-D this time with respect to its fruits. There the Court of Appeals (CA) after giving Atty. Examen 90
days to file his appellant’s brief, denied a second motion for extension of time merely on the basis of a flimsy
reason that he had misplaced some of the transcript of the witnesses’ testimonies. The CA did not find the reason
of misplaced transcript as good and sufficient cause to grant the extension pursuant to Section 12, 42 Rule 44 of the
Revised Rules of Court. It stated that it was a "flimsy and lame excuse to unnecessarily delay the
proceedings."43 The CA was of the opinion that defendant-appellant’s, herein respondent, motion was "a mockery
of the procedural rules."44This Court denied the petition for various procedural defects.45

With respect to the penalty imposed, given that Atty. Examen not only failed to uphold his duty as a notary public
but also failed to uphold his lawyer’s oath and ran afoul the provisions of the CPR, the Court deems it proper to
suspend Atty. Examen from the practice of law for a period of two years following this Court’s decision in Caalim-
Verzonilla v. Pascua.46

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto E. Examen is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO (2)
YEARS. In addition, his present notarial commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as a notary public for a period of two (2) years from finality of this Decision. He is further WARNED
that any similar act or infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal
record as an attorney, the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6738, August 12, 2015

GABRIELA CORONEL, Petitioner, v. ATTY. NELSON A. CUNANAN, Respondent.

 DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A lawyer who proposes to his client a recourse or remedy that is contrary to law, public policy, public order and
public morals, or that lessens the public confidence in the legal system is guilty of gross misconduct, and should be
suspended from the practice of law, or even disbarred.

Antecedents

On May 17, 2005, the complainant initiated this disbarment case against Atty. Nelson A. Cunanan, alleging that he
had advised and convinced her to engage him for the transfer of Original Certificate of Title No. 9616 and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-72074, which were both registered in the name of their deceased grandparents, to her
name and to the names of her co-heirs by direct registration with the Office of the Register of Deeds in violation of
the proper legal procedure; that following the engagement, he had received from her the amount of P70,000.00
for the payment of the transfer and other fees, and had misappropriated the same; and that he had not returned
the money and the owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-72074.1cralawrednad

The Court ordered the respondent to comment on the complaint on July 11, 2005, 2 but he complied only on March
7, 2006.3 In turn, the complainant submitted her reply on March 20, 2006. 4cralawrednad

Proceedings before the IBP

On July 31, 2006, the Court referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.5cralawrednad

On February 21, 2007, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set the mandatory conference on April 11, 2007, and
notified the parties thereof.6 At the hearing, the parties defined the issues upon which they would submit their
position papers. The complainant stated the issue to be whether or not the actions of the respondent constituted
malpractice, deceit or gross misconduct. The respondent defined the issue to be whether or not he had acted in a
deceitful manner or committed any misconduct by entering into the contract of legal services with the
complainant based on terms mutually agreed upon between them. Only the complainant submitted her verified
position paper.7cralawrednad

On February 20, 2008, the complainant requested the early resolution of her complaint. 8 On September 1, 2009,
however, she submitted an affidavit of desistance,9 whereby she stated that she had meanwhile made amends
with the respondent, and that the disbarment complaint had been due to a misunderstanding between them. A
few days later, the parties also submitted their Joint Motion To Dismiss dated September 15, 2009,10 which the
Court referred to the IBP on November 18, 2009.11cralawrednad

On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued its resolution adopting and approving, with modification, the
report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner finding the respondent guilty of malpractice and
negligence; recommending his suspension from the practice of law for six months; and requiring his return of the
P70,000.00 to the complainant.12cralawrednad

On August 8, 2011, the respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 citing the affidavit of desistance executed
by the complainant and their Joint Motion to Dismiss. The IBP Board of Governors denied the Motion for
Reconsideration on December 15, 2012.14cralawrednad

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

The report of the Investigating Commissioner recited the following summary of the factual antecedents, to
wit:cralawlawlibrary
Complainant recounts that sometime in October 2003, she engaged the services Respondent to transfer to her
name and her co-heirs the parcels of land covered under TCT No. T-72074 and OCT. No. 9616, which certificates of
title are both registered under the name of Complainant's deceased grandparents. Respondent advised
Complainant that for the registration of TCT. No. T-72074, the transfer may be effected by two means namely:
first, by way of "ordinary procedure"; and second, by way of "direct registration". Ordinary procedure involves
transfer by way of execution of Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, publication, payment of capital gains tax, etc.,
and registration with the Register of Deeds. Transfer by this means will cost Complainant an estimate of
Php56,000.00 with the amount of Php50,000.00 more or less to be spent for the payment of taxes. Transfer by this
means may take a period of at least five (5) months. Direct registration, on the other hand, involves preparing
documents upon advise of the Register of Deeds and will involve an estimated cost to be negotiated with the
officials or employees of the Register of Deeds to a flat amount of Php50,000.00. Transfer by this means will take
only one (1) month or less. As for the transfer of OCT No. 9616, Respondent advised Complainant of the filing of a
petition for issuance of Owner's Duplicate Copy and thereafter, to proceed with the transfer in the same manner
as that outlined in the transfer of TCT. No. T-72074.

It appears that Complainant and Respondent agreed on the direct registration approach because sometime
thereafter, Respondent billed Complainant with the following fees: Php50,000.00 as package deal for the direct
transfer of title for TCT. No. T-72074; another Php50,000 as package deal for the transfer of title for OCT No. 9616;
Php5,000 for litigation expenses for issuance of duplicate copy of OCT 9616 and another Phpl5,000 as professional
fees, to which Complainant agreed.

On October 28, 2003, Complainant paid Respondent Php70,000.00 pesos [sic].

According to Complainant, she thereafter tried to contact Respondent but the latter cannot be contacted. Thus,
she was constrained to write Respondent a letter dated March 5, 2004 asking the latter to contact her.

Subsequently, Respondent sent to Complainant an Extra-judicial Settlement Agreement. Complainant had it signed
and sent back to Respondent. Thereafter, Respondent asked Complainant for the owner's duplicate copy of TCT.
No. T-72074, which complainant, likewise, sent to Respondent.

Afterwards, Complainant heard nothing from Respondent. When her request for a call from Respondent was not
heeded, Complainant wrote Respondent demanding that the amount of Php70,000 which she paid to Respondent
be returned to her as well as the owner's duplicate copy of TCT. No. 72074. When Respondent refused,
Complainant filed the instant disbarment case charging the former with deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct.

In his Comment, Respondent admitted most of the allegations of Complainant. However, he denied that there was
deceit on his part insisting that he clearly outlined to Complainant the available procedures for the transfer of title
and afforded Complainant the opportunity to think about the options. He claimed that there was nothing illicit in
suggesting the direct registration scheme as the same was advised to him by the officials and employees of the
Register of Deeds upon his inquiry thereto. Respondent further argued that he was in constant communication
with Complainant and that he processed the transaction for the transfer of registration but that the transfer could
not be effected because the documents were inadequate and due, also, to the fact that several officials and
employees of the Register of Deeds with whom he was transacting were transferred to other offices due to a
revamp in the said office. Respondent added that he continued with the processing of the transfer and that he
submitted the matter anew for the approval of the new officials of the Register of Deeds. However, the new
officers have not yet approved the same.15
Ruling of the Court

We AFFIRM the findings and recommendations of the IBP.

A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.16 He shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct;17 or counsel or abet
activities aimed at a defiance of the law or at a lessening of confidence in the legal system. 18 He should advise his
client to uphold the law, not to violate or disobey it. Conversely, he should not recommend to his client any
recourse or remedy that is contrary to law, public policy, public order, and public morals.

Although the respondent outlined to the complainant the "ordinary procedure" of an extrajudicial settlement of
estate as a means of transferring title, he also proposed the option of "direct registration" despite being fully
aware that such option was actually a shortcut intended to circumvent the law, and thus patently contrary to law.
The transfer under the latter option would bypass the immediate heirs of their grandparents (i.e., the
complainant's parent and her co-heirs parents), and consequently deprive the Government of the corresponding
estate taxes and transfer fees aside from requiring the falsification of the transfer documents. He assured that he
could enable the direct transfer with the help of his contacts in the Office of the Register of Deeds and other
relevant agencies of the Government, which meant that he would be bribing some officials and employees of
those offices. The proposal of "direct registration" was unquestionably unlawful, immoral and deceitful all at once.

The respondent argues that his proposal did not deceive the complainant because he had informed her on all the
"steps" to be taken on her behalf. His argument misses the point, which is that he made the proposal despite its
patent illegality in order to take advantage of the complainant's limited legal knowledge of the regular procedures
for the transfer of title under circumstances of intestacy. In other words, he made her agree to the "direct
registration" through deceitful misrepresentation. He then ignored the written demands from her, which forced
her in the end to finally charge him with disbarment. He thereby abused his being a lawyer to the hilt in order to
cause not only his client but also the public in general to doubt the sincerity of the members of the Law Profession,
and consequently diminish the public's trust and confidence in lawyers in general.

Lastly, the respondent pleads for the Court to consider in his favor the fact that the complainant subsequently
executed the affidavit of desistance, and later on the Joint Motion To Dismiss.

His plea is unworthy of consideration.

An administrative case proceeds independently from the interest, or lack thereof, of the complainant, who only
sets the case in motion through the filing of the complaint. Upon her doing so, she becomes a witness to testify
against the respondent lawyer. The disciplinary proceedings against the lawyer do not involve private interests, but
only how the lawyer conducts himself in his public and private lives. Accordingly, neither the affidavit of desistance
nor the Joint Motion To Dismiss should bear any weight, or be relevant in determining whether or not the
respondent was fit to remain as a member of the Law Profession. The desistance by the complainant was a matter
that was the concern only of the parties, and was non-binding on the Court. What will be decisive in this
administrative proceeding are the facts borne out by the evidence competently adduced herein.19cralawrednad

The complainant testified that the respondent had proposed to her two methods to transfer title, and one was
patently contrary to law. She presented documentary proof to her testimony against him. She established that he
had not communicated with her after receiving the money and the documents. The affidavit of desistance and
the Joint Motion To Dismiss only came about after the complainant had completed her testimony, a true indication
that their submission was done in hindsight and insincerely. His remorse, if it was that, came too late.

In Bengco v. Bernardo,20 the respondent lawyer was suspended for one year from the practice of law because he
had represented that he could expedite the titling of the clients' property with the help of his contacts in various
government offices, including the Department of Natural Resources, the Community Environment Office, and
Register of Deeds. After convincing his clients through such representations, and taken their money for that
purpose, he did not bother to even update them on the progress of the undertaking. In that regard, he was also
convicted of estafa.

In Espinosa v. Omaña,21 the respondent lawyer was also suspended for one year from the practice of law for
advising her clients that they could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage by executing the Kasunduan
ng Paghihiwalay (Agreement to Separate) that she had drafted. Her advice was blatantly contrary to law and public
policy.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court ADOPTS and AFFIRMS the Resolution dated May, 14, 2011 of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors, WITH MODIFICATION as to the recommended penalty by suspending respondent
Atty. Nelson A. Cunanan from the practice of law for one year effective immediately upon his receipt of this
decision.

The Court ORDERS respondent Atty. Cunanan to RETURN to the complainant the amount of P70,000.00 within 10
days from receipt of this decision, and to report on his compliance within five days thereafter.

Let copies of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent Atty. Cunanan in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

A.C. No. 8638, October 10, 2016

DATU BUDENCIO E. DUMANLAG, Complainant, v. ATTY. WINSTON B. INTONG, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a complaint1 dated March 19, 2010 filed by complainant Datu Budencio E. Dumanlag
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Winston B. Intong (respondent) for gross misconduct and negligence.

The Facts

Complainant claims to be a leader of the Indigenous People of Bangcud, Malaybalay and the President of the
Philippine Datus Cultural Minorities Assistance, Inc. and the Frontier's Mining Prospectors and Location
Corporation.2 On March 12, 2010, complainant received a letter3 from respondent,4 which is reproduced in full
hereunder:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
February 08, 2010

TO: DATU BUDENCIO DUMANLAG

Infront Mac Feedmill, San Jose
P-1, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon

Sir:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPlease consider this as a letter request for your presence on 12 February 2010 at 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon located at Purok 11, Poblacion, Valencia City, Bukidnon.

This is for the settlement and pre-litigation conference prior to any legal action against you as complainant by my
client JAIME AJOC & ENCARNACION DUMANLAG-AJOC of Lapu-lapu St., Valencia City.
Hoping for your preferential and positive action on this matter. Thank you very much. My highest esteem.

Very truly yours,

(SGD) ATTY. WINSTON B. INTONG

For and in behalf of Mr. & Mrs. Ajoc

Complainant took offense with the aforequoted letter as it was allegedly intended "to FORCE, COMPULSORY (sic),
to investigate, or fiscalize, in the moment (sic) [complainant] in his LAW OFFICE at Purok 11 Poblacion Valencia
City, Bukidnon. [Respondent] intend (sic) for particular purpose that HIS LAW OFFICE in Valencia City is one of the
COURTS in the Philippines as to investigate [complainant] thereat." 5 To bolster his indignation, complainant cited
Republic Act No. (RA) 8371,6 otherwise known as "The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997," specifically Section
21 which accords equal protection and non discrimination of Indigenous Cultural Communities and Indigenous
Peoples (ICCs/IPs), as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 21. Equal Protection and Non-discrimination of ICCs/IPs. Consistent with the equal protection clause of the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights including the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and International
Human Rights Law, the State shall, with due recognition of their distinct characteristics and identity, accord to the
members of the ICCs/IPs the rights, protections and privileges enjoyed by the rest of the citizenry. It shall extend to
them the same employment rights, opportunities, basic services, educational and other rights and privileges
available to every member of the society. Accordingly, the State shall likewise ensure that the employment of any
form of force or coercion against ICCs/IPs shall be dealt with by law.

xxxx

He likewise quoted an Evaluation Report7 of the Office of the Ombudsman dated October 11, 2001 where he, as
complainant, stressed that "[n]o court in the Philippines, therefore, should punish any member of a cultural
community but shall extend to them courtesies in accordance with [the aforesaid] law." 8chanrobleslaw

Complainant averred further that the incorporation papers of the Philippine Datus Cultural Minorities Assistance,
Inc. and the Frontier's Mining Prospectors and Location Corporation were supposed to be notarized at
respondent's law office, but the charge for notarization amounting to P10,000.00 was "very dear, very expensive,"
and complainant could not afford the same. 9 He then accused respondent of soliciting cases for purposes of gain,
which act constitutes malpractice, citing Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, 10 to wit:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

In a Resolution11 dated July 19, 2010, the Court required respondent to file his comment on the complaint, which
he failed to do. Consequently, in a Resolution12 dated March 9, 2011, the Court issued a show cause order against
respondent reiterating compliance with Resolution dated July 19, 2010. On September 28, 2011, the Court
imposed a fine of P1,000.00 upon respondent for his continued failure to comply with the directive to file
comment.13 However, respondent still failed to pay said fine,14 or to file his comment. Thus, in a Resolution15 dated
July 1, 2013, the Court dispensed with the filing of respondent's comment, and referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
On January 21, 2014, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) issued a Notice of Mandatory
Conference/Hearing16 directing the parties to submit their respective mandatory conference briefs. In compliance
therewith, respondent filed his brief17 on March 11, 2014 claiming that the letter dated February 8, 2010 merely
invited complainant "for his presence and to confront, if not, sit and resolve any issue/s that he x x x may have
against JAIME AJOC and his wife ENCARNACION";18 and that such effort at conflict resolution in the hope of
avoiding costly and cumbersome litigations is not an act of malpractice, and does not constitute gross
misconduct.19chanrobleslaw

The IBP's Findings

In his Report and Recommendation20 dated May 27, 2014, the IBP CBD Investigating Commissioner Cecilia A. C.
Villanueva (Commissioner Villanueva) proposed the dismissal of the complaint for failure of the complainant to
substantiate his accusations against respondent. Commissioner Villanueva found no force, threat or intimidation in
the tenor of the letter sent by respondent, and described the same as a "mere request" that was "carefully
worded, done in a respectful manner."21 He pointed out, however, the demeanor of the complainant at the
mandatory conference as that of a senior citizen who was "very sensitive and demanding of his reputation as a
leader of cultural group. People should be careful of things to say to him lest he gets offended or even get mad."
Commissioner Villanueva almost cited complainant in contempt when the latter threatened him and the
stenographer with a lawsuit before the Commission on Human Rights, this Court, and the United
Nations.22chanrobleslaw

Be that as it may, Commissioner Villanueva recommended23 that respondent be reprimanded for his disrespectful
actuations before the Court and the IBP-CBD committed as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Respondent's propensity to ignore the lawful orders of the [Court] as well as those of the IBP[-CBD] is manifest
from the record. The [Court] issued three resolutions requiring respondent to comment on the complaint filed by
complainant, but he simply ignored the Court's orders and did not file his comment. Consequently, the [Court]
resolved to dispense with the filing of the comment but referred the matter to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation so as not to deprive respondent of his right to due process.

Again, respondent was given several opportunities to express his side on the charge during the investigation
thereof by the IBP. Neither did he file a position paper as required by the Commission on Bar Discipline. Again, he
merely ignored the Commission's directives.24

On April 19, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution 25cwhich adopted and approved with
modification the aforesaid Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva. In view of respondent's
propensity to ignore the lawful orders of the Court, as well as the IBP-CBD, which was found to be unbecoming of
him as officer of the court, respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.26chanrobleslaw

Thereafter, the IBP forwarded the case to the Court as provided under Rule 139-B, Section 12 (b)27 of the Rules
ofCourt.28chanrobleslaw

The Court's Ruling

The Court sustains the findings of the IBP Board of Governors, except as to the penalty.

It has been consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges
against him until the contrary is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his
duties in accordance with his oath.29 Thus, in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.30 However, in this case, complainant failed to discharge the
burden of proving his accusations of gross misconduct on the part of the respondent.

Complainant's allegation of force and compulsion accompanying the letter dated February 8, 2010 is negated by
the very words used therein. Respondent described said letter in the opening paragraph as a "letter request for
[complainant's] presence."31 He then went on to close the letter with "[h]oping for your [(complainant's)]
preferential and positive action on this matter" and "[m]y highest esteem." 32 As aptly pointed out by
Commissioner Villanueva in his Report and Recommendation, the letter was "carefully worded, done in a
respectful manner."33 There was absolutely nothing on the face of the letter that would justify complainant's
indignation against any discourtesy or discrimination against him. The letter was a mere invitation for complainant
to attend a settlement and pre-litigation conference, which respondent, as a lawyer, is obligated to pursue. Under
Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), "[a] lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid,
end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement." There was nothing wrong, therefore, with
respondent's efforts to set up a conference between complainant and his clients.

With respect to the claim of exorbitant notarization fees, the same deserves scant consideration in view of
complainant's failure to offer corroborative proof to support his bare allegations. While a lawyer is mandated
under Canon 20 of the CPR to charge only fair and reasonable fees, and that he may be penalized, even disbarred
or suspended from his office as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
CPR,34 such violation must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof, which was not done in this
case.

Respondent cannot, however, escape accountability for his repetitive disregard of the resolutions of the Court
requiring him to file his comment to the complaint and to pay the fine imposed upon him for his failure to do so.
As correctly pointed out by Commissioner Villanueva, the Court issued three resolutions dated July 19, 2010,
March 9, 2011, and September 28, 2011, requiring respondent to file his comment, to show cause for his failure to
file, and to pay a fine of P1,000.00 for such failure. But all three were left unheeded. Respondent ought to know
that orders of the court are "not mere requests but directives which should have been complied with promptly and
completely." "He disregarded the oath he took when he was accepted to the legal profession 'to obey the laws and
the legal orders of the duly constituted legal authorities.' x x x His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is
called upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying with court
directives as an officer of the court,"35 pursuant to Canon 11 of the CPR, which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers x x x."

It has been stressed that the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for a
period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion. The penalties for a lawyer's failure to file a brief or other
pleading range from reprimand, warning with fine, suspension, and, in grave cases, disbarment.36 In the present
case, the Court finds too harsh the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of six months. After all, respondent did file his mandatory conference brief
before the IBP where he cited the Resolution dated July 19, 2010 of the Court, requiring him to file his comment to
the complaint. He also attended the mandatory conference/hearing scheduled by the IBP, although he failed to file
his position paper despite the directive to do so. Under the circumstances, and considering that this appears to be
respondent's first infraction, the Court finds it proper to reprimand him with warning that commission of the same
or similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. This is consistent with the ruling in the recent case of Andres
v. Nambi,37 where respondent therein was found to have ignored the Court's resolution directing him to file
comment, and to have failed to attend the mandatory conference before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
despite notice, as well as to file his position paper. Since it was also his first infraction, respondent therein was
merely reprimanded by the Court, as in this case.

WHEREFORE, the Court REPRIMANDS respondent Atty. Winston B. Intong (respondent) for refusing to obey lawful
orders of the Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act or offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal
record as a member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.ch

A.C. No. 9912, September 21, 2016

DATU REMIGIO M. DUQUE JR., Complainant, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES,
JR., COMMISSIONERS LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, AND CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM; ATTYS. MA.
JOSEFINA E. DELA CRUZ, ESMERALDA A. AMORA-LADRA, MA. JUANA S. VALLEZA, SHEMIDAH G. CADIZ, AND
FERNANDO F. COT-OM; AND PROSECUTOR NOEL S. ADION, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Datu Remigio M. Duque, Jr., (Duque) against former
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R.
Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim; Attys. Ma. Josefina E. Dela Cruz, Esmeralda A. Amora-Ladra, Ma. Juana S.
Valleza, Shemidah G. Cadiz, and Fernando F. Cot-om; and Prosecutor Noel S. Action for Conduct Unbecoming a
Lawyer, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Gross Misconduct.

The case stemmed from a Complaint dated May 26, 2011 filed by Duque against respondents Sheila D. Mabutol,
Cleotilde L. Balite, Camilo M. Labayne, Reynaldo P. Erese, Jr., Ruth Joy V. Gabor, Luzviminda V. Galanga, Esmeraldo
Galanga, Jr., Gavino V. Rufino, Jr., Zenaida T. Rufino, Melanie M. Tagudin-Cordova, Alona D. Rocacorba, Alma P.
Bunag, Joey G. Lomot and Nena G. Bactas, docketed as I.S. No. 111-18-INV-11-D-0390, for alleged violation of
election laws, particularly Sections 223, 224, Article 19, Section 261 (y) (17), (z) (21), and Article 22 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881.

Duque, who ran for Punong Barangay of Lomboy, La Paz, Tarlac but lost, filed a petition for recount contesting the
results in a number of precincts where respondents were chairman and members of the Board or Election Tellers
(BETs), respectively. Duque alleged that there were several irregularities in the canvassing of the ballots, i.e., the
discovery of alleged crumpled official ballots during the recount proceedings and unsigned election returns.
Respondents, however, vehemently denied said allegations.

On June 13, 2011, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Noel S. Adion recommended that the complaint for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as the COMELEC has the exclusive power to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses, and to prosecute the same. Duque moved for
reconsideration but was denied m a Resolution1 dated September 21, 2011.

The records of the case were forwarded to the COMELEC.

On March 14, 2013, in its disputed Decision,2 as recommended by the Law Department of the COMELEC, the
COMELEC En Banc3 dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. It found no violation of any of the pertinent
election laws. It likewise pointed out that Duque failed to substantiate the complaint by clear and convincing
evidence.

Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant disbarment complaint against Commissioners Brillantes, et al.

On July 1, 2013, the Court resolved to require respondents to Comment on the complaint against
them.4chanrobleslaw
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment 5 dated October 24, 2013, pointed out
that respondents, being COMELEC Commissioners may only be removed from office solely by impeachment. As
impeachable officers who are at the same time members of the Bar, respondent Commissioners must be removed
from office by impeachment before they may be held to answer administratively for their supposed erroneous
resolutions and actions.

Respondents likewise maintained that there exists no valid ground for their disbarment. While complainant insists
that respondents conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights by dismissing his complaint despite
"voluminous evidence," complainant, however, failed to establish said allegation of conspiracy by positive and
conclusive evidence. Other than his bare allegations of conspiracy, complainant failed to show how respondents
acted in concert to deprive him of his constitutional rights or even specify the particular acts performed by
respondents in the supposed conspiracy.

In his separate Comment6 dated September 10, 2013, respondent Prosecutor Adion averred that the complaint
against him has no legal and factual basis.

For his part, respondent Commissioner Lim, through his counsel, echoed the other Commissioners' contention that
as an impeachable officer, he must first be removed from office through the constitutional route of impeachment
before he may be held administratively liable for his participation in the disputed Resolution. He added that Duque
miserably failed to allege, much less submit a clear, convincing and satisfactory proof of any act of Lim which may
be construed as a ground for disbarment. Respondent further pointed out that the COMELEC En Banc, in
dismissing the complaint of Duque, properly applied paragraph (m), Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which
states that "it is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed;" hence, the members of the BETs enjoy
the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties unless a clear and convincing evidence is
shown to the contrary.

RULING

To begin with, the Court takes notice that respondents Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph,
all retired from the COMELEC on February 2, 2015. However, it does not necessarily call for the dismissal of the
complaint, considering that the very thrust of the instant disbarment complaint is the issuance of a Resolution
dated March 14, 2013 which dismissed E.O. Case No. 12-003,7 where respondents Brillantes, Tagle and Yusoph
concurred in, when they were still members of the COMELEC's En Banc.

Be that as it may, after a careful perusal of the facts of the case, the Court, however, finds no merit in the instant
petition.

This Court, guided by its pronouncements in Jarque v. Ombudsman,8In Re First Indorsement from Raul M.
Gonzales9 and Cuenco v. Hon. Fernan,10 has laid down the rule that an impeachable officer who is a member of the
Bar cannot be disbarred without first being impeached. At the time the present complaint was filed, respondents-
commissioners were all lawyers. As impeachable officers who are at the same time the members of the Bar,
respondents-commissioners must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment before
they may be held to answer administratively for their supposed erroneous resolutions and actions.

Nevertheless, even if the Court were to look into the assailed actions of respondents-commissioners as well as
respondents-lawyers under the Code of Professional Responsibility, We find no specific actuations and sufficient
evidence to show that respondents did engage in dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in their capacity as
lawyers.

The appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents involves a question of fact best left to the
determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country.
It is the constitutional commission vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over election contests involving
regional, provincial and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over election protests involving elective
municipal and barangay officials. Consequently, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional
infirmity or error of law, the factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered by the said Commission
on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by this Court.11chanrobleslaw

It must likewise be emphasized that the assailed actions of the respondents pertain to their quasi-judicial
functions. The quasi-judicial function of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from
the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications.12 Thus, the COMELEC, in resolving the subject
complaint, was exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations in the complaint.
The fact that the COMELEC's resolution was adverse to the complainant, in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion, does not make a case for disbarment.

It is settled that a judge's failure to interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not
necessarily render him administratively liable. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance,
bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. To hold otherwise would be to
render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.13 As we held in Balsamo v. Judge Suan:14
It should be emphasized, however, that as a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the
acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. He
cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal or administrative for any of his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. In such a case, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an
administrative complaint against the judge but to elevate the error to the higher court for review and correction.
The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the
latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. Thus, not every error or mistake that a judge commits
in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate
intent to do an injustice. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are
sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.
If at all, complainant felt aggrieved and wanted to properly proceed against the COMELEC, the remedy of an
aggrieved party against a judgment or final order or resolution of the COMELEC is a petition under Rue 64 in
relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court brought before this Court, 15 and not a disbarment proceeding. There being
no evidence whatsoever tending to prove unfitness of respondents to continue in the practice of law and remain
officers of the court, and there being no showing that respondents were motivated by bad faith or ill motive in
rendering the assailed decision, the charges of conduct unbecoming a lawyer, gross ignorance of the law and gross
misconduct against them, thus, must be dismissed.

We must reiterate that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is on the complainant; the Court exercises
its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes her case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence.
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has a
greater weight than that of the other party. When the pieces of evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or
when doubt exists on the preponderance of evidence, the equipoise rule dictates that the decision be against the
party carrying the burden of proof.16chanrobleslaw

The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard
the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court,
and to remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit
to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. Thus, the power to disbar attorneys
ought always to be exercised with great caution, and only in clear cases of misconduct which seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar.17chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the instant disbarment complaint against respondents former COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,
Jr., Commissioners Lucento N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim, Attys. Ma. Josefina E. Dela Cruz,
Esmeralda A. Amora-Ladra, Ma. Juana S. Valleza, Shemidah G. Cadiz, and Fernando F. Cot-Om, and Prosecutor Noel
S. Adion is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9259 August 23, 2012

JASPER JUNNO F. RODICA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MANUEL "LOLONG" M. LAZARO, ATTY. EDWIN M. ESPEJO, ATTY. ABEL M. ALMARIO, ATTY. MICHELLE B.
LAZARO, ATTY. JOSEPH C. TAN, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*

PERLAS-BERNABE,**

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

"The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons." 1

This is a Complaint2 for disbarment filed by Jasper Junno F. Rodica (Rodica) against Atty. Manuel "Lolong" M.
Lazaro (Atty. Manuel), Atty. Edwin M. Espejo (Atty. Espejo), Atty. Abel M. Almario, (Atty. Almario), Atty. Michelle B.
Lazaro (Atty. Michelle), and Atty. Joseph C. Tan (Atty. Tan) for gross and serious misconduct, deceit, malpractice,
grossly immoral conduct, and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Factual Antecedents

On May 5, 2011, William Strong (Strong), an American, was arrested and detained by the operatives of the Bureau
of Immigration. Strong sought the assistance of Philip 3 G. Apostol (Apostol), a friend and neighbor, to secure the
services of a lawyer. Apostol referred him to Atty. Manuel, who is a partner at the M.M. Lazaro and Associates Law
Office (Lazaro Law Office).

Atty. Manuel initially declined because his law office only handles cases of its retained clients and those known to
him or any of the associate lawyers.4 However, he was eventually prevailed upon by Apostol who would consider it
as a special favor if Atty. Manuel would handle Strong’s case. Hence, Atty. Manuel, together with Atty. Almario and
Atty. Espejo, senior and junior associates, respectively, at the Lazaro Law Office, agreed to meet Strong at the
Taguig Detention Center of the Bureau of Immigration.5

During the meeting, Atty. Manuel explained to Strong the terms of the Lazaro Law Office’s engagement as well as
the fees. Strong assured him of his capacity to pay and offered to pay a success fee of US$100,000.00 should the
said law office be able to expedite his release from detention as well as his departure from the Philippines. 6 Finding
Strong to be believable and trustworthy, Atty. Manuel agreed to handle his case. 7

During the course of their meeting, Strong casually mentioned that he has a property in Boracay and that he
suspected his neighbors as the persons who caused his arrest. According to Strong, his live-in partner Rodica filed a
Complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan, for recovery of possession and damages8(against
Hillview Marketing Corporation9 (Hillview), Stephanie Dornau (Dornau) as President of Hillview, the Alargo Park
Neighborhood Association, Inc. and spouses Robert and Judy Gregoire) in connection with the 353-square meter
property they bought in Boracay. He disclosed that he and Rodica had been trying to sell the Boracay property to
rid themselves of the problems but could not find buyers because of the said case. They even offered the property
to Apostol but the latter was hesitant because of the said pending case. Atty. Manuel averred that towards the end
of the interview with Strong, Rodica arrived. Strong described Rodica as his "handyman" who will act as his liaison
in the case.

Upon inquiry with the Bureau of Immigration, it was discovered that Strong’s arrest was made pursuant to an
Interpol Red Notice; and that Strong is wanted in Brazil for Conspiracy to Commit Fraud, Setting Up a Gang and
Other Related Crimes. Specifically, Strong is being indicted for his alleged involvement in "an international gang
involved in shares fraud which led to the creation of hundreds of millions of dollars in illegal securities." 10 Strong
denied any participation in the alleged crime. Strong then pleaded with Atty. Manuel to expedite his deportation
to any country except Brazil and reiterated his willingness to pay the success fee of US$100,000.00.

In her Complaint, Rodica alleged that in one of her meetings with the lawyers of the Lazaro Law Office, she hinted
that Atty. Tan, a senior partner at the Marcos Ochoa Serapio Tan and Associates (MOST Law) and who is also the
lawyer of Hillview and Dornau, was instrumental in the immigration case of Strong. According to Rodica, Atty.
Manuel called up Atty. Tan. Thereafter, Atty. Manuel allegedly informed Rodica that Atty. Tan admitted having
initiated the immigration case resulting in the detention of Strong; that Atty. Tan threatened to do something bad
against Rodica and her family; and that Atty. Tan demanded for Rodica to withdraw the RTC case as part of a
settlement package.

On May 25, 2011, the Bureau of Immigration, rendered its Judgment 11 granting the motion of Strong to voluntarily
leave the country. On May 31, 2011, Strong left the Philippines. Subsequently, or on June 6, 2011, Rodica filed with
the RTC a motion effectively withdrawing her complaint.

Rodica alleged that after the deportation of Strong and the withdrawal of the RTC case, she heard nothing from
the Lazaro Law Office. She also claimed that contrary to her expectations, there was no "simultaneous over-all
settlement of her grievances x x x [with] the defendants [in the RTC] case. 12 Thinking that she was deceived, Rodica
filed the instant administrative case. In sum, she claimed that:

21. RESPONDENT ATTORNEYS (MANUEL, MICHELLE, EDWIN and ABEL) of M.M. LAZARO & ASSOCIATES,
furthermore, committed GRAVE MISCONDUCT & DECEIT to complainant and the courts when (among other
things):

(a.) they mis-represented to complainant that the withdrawal of her case at the Regional Trial Court at
Kalibo (Branch VI-Civil Case No. 8987) was only the first step in an over-all settlement package of all her
differences with her legal adversaries (i.e. Hillview Marketing Corporation and the latter’s officials /
Stephanie Dornau / Atty. Joseph Tan etc.), which respondent Manuel M. Lazaro had allegedly already
taken care of ;

(b.) they extorted from her more than ₱ 7 MILLION for alleged professional / legal fees and PENALTIES
involved in William Strong’s immigration case, when what actually happened was -

(c.) as complainant came to know later, almost all of said amount was allegedly used as "pay-off" to
immigration, police and Malaca[ñ]ang officials as well as Atty. Joseph Tan, and as ‘graft money’/ ‘kotong’ /
‘lagay’ / "tong-pats", for the expeditious approval of Mr. William Strong’s voluntary deportation plea with
the Bureau of Immigration ;

(d.) they even shamelessly denied the status of the complainant as their client, just so that they can evade
their responsibility to her ;
 (e.) they even submitted concocted stories (re Mr. Apostol’s purchase bid for the Boracay villa of
complainant; Atty. Espejo’s attempt to cover-up for Lolong Lazaro and accept sole responsibility for
signing the questioned manifestation and withdrawal documents last May 24, 2011, and many others)
with the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo (Branch VI) just so that they can hide the truth, hide their crimes
and go scot free ;

22. RESPONDENT Atty. JOSEPH C. TAN on the other hand performed as a willing partner of ATTY. MANUEL M.
LAZARO by acting as ‘conduit’ to his Malacañang patron ("JOHN DOE") in causing the arrest of William Strong last
May 5, 2011, and in packaging with Lolong Lazaro of the ‘magic formula’ regarding William Strong’s voluntary
deportation bid and the conditions attached thereto as sufficiently explained ;

xxxx

23. RESPONDENTS also violated THEIR OATH AS x x x ATTORNEYS, especially with the phrases ". . . I will obey the
laws . . . I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court ; . . . I will delay no man for money or
malice . . . with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients . . . " ; 13

Otherwise stated, Rodica claimed that she is a client of the Lazaro Law Office and that she was deceived into
causing the withdrawal of the RTC case. Further, she claimed that the Lazaro Law Office collected exorbitant fees
from her.

In their Comment, Atty. Almario and Atty. Espejo admitted being present in the May 13, 2011 meeting with Rodica.
They denied, however, that Atty. Manuel talked with Atty. Tan during the said meeting, or conveyed the
information that Atty. Tan and the group of Dornau were the ones behind Strong’s arrest and detention.

Atty. Almario and Atty. Espejo disputed Rodica’s assertion that the withdrawal of the RTC case was a condition sine
qua non to Strong’s departure from the country. They pointed out that the Manifestation with Motion to
Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration14 was filed only on June 3, 2011,15 or nine days after the May 25, 2011
Judgment of the Bureau of Immigration was issued, and three days after Strong left the country on May 31, 2011.
They insisted that Rodica withdrew the RTC case because it was one of the conditions set by Apostol before buying
the Boracay property.

As to the preparation of Rodica’s Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration relative to the RTC case, Atty.
Espejo claimed that the former begged him to prepare the said motion. Since the two already became close
friends, Atty. Espejo accommodated Rodica’s request. He admitted to acceding to Rodica’s requests to put the
name of the Lazaro Law Office, the names of its partners, as well as his name, in the motion and into signing the
same, without the prior knowledge and consent of the other senior lawyers of the firm. Atty. Espejo claimed that
he did all of these out of his good intention to help and assist Rodica in making the Boracay property more saleable
by freeing it from any pending claims.

In his Comment,16 Atty. Manuel contended that none of the lawyers of the Lazaro Law Office communicated with
Atty. Tan relative to the deportation proceedings or the RTC case. He claimed that it was highly improbable for the
Lazaro Law Office to impress upon Rodica that it will coordinate with Atty. Tan for the withdrawal of the RTC case
to expedite the deportation proceedings as the RTC case was already dismissed as early as March 29, 2011 for
failure to state a cause of action. Atty. Manuel averred that the two cases are incongruous with each other and
one cannot be used to compromise the other.

Atty. Joseph Tan’s Arguments

For his part, Atty. Tan asserted that the allegations against him are "double hearsay" because the same were based
on information allegedly relayed to Rodica by Atty. Manuel, who, in turn, allegedly heard it from Atty. Tan. 17 He
denied any participation in the withdrawal of the RTC case and the arrest and deportation of Strong.

Atty. Tan stressed that Strong was deported on May 31, 2011. Three days thereafter, or on June 3, 2011, Rodica,
with the assistance of her counsel of record, Atty. Joan I. Tabanar-Ibutnande (Atty. Ibutnande), filed the
Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration. He averred that if it is indeed true, as Rodica
alleged, that the filing of the said motion was a pre-condition to Strong’s voluntary deportation, then the filing of
the same should have preceded Strong’s deportation. However, it was the reverse in this case.

Atty. Tan also pointed out that it would be inconceivable for him to participate in Strong’s arrest as he had already
obtained a favorable ruling "on the merits" for his clients in the RTC case even before Strong was arrested and
incarcerated. Besides, Strong is not a party and had nothing to do with the RTC case. Atty. Tan likewise denied
having any dealings with the rest of the respondents insofar as the arrest and voluntary deportation of Strong are
concerned. Neither did he receive any phone call or message from his co-respondents nor did he communicate
with them in any manner regarding Strong’s case.

Issue

The sole issue to be resolved is whether the allegations in Rodica’s Complaint merit the disbarment or suspension
of respondents.

Our Ruling

In Siao v. Atty. De Guzman, Jr.,18 this Court reiterated its oft repeated ruling that in suspension or disbarment
proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to
clearly prove her allegations by preponderant evidence. Elaborating on the required quantum of proof, this Court
declared thus:

Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater
weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than
that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is
preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case;
(b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to
which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is
necessarily with the greater number. (Citations omitted.)

In the absence of preponderant evidence, the presumption of innocence of the lawyer continues and the
complaint against him must be dismissed.19

In the present case, the totality of evidence presented by Rodica failed to overcome the said presumption of
innocence.

Rodica’s claim of "settlement package"

is devoid of merit.

Rodica’s assertions that Atty. Tan orchestrated Strong’s arrest and that Atty. Manuel proposed the withdrawal of
the RTC case to facilitate the deportation of Strong, are mere allegations without proof and belied by the records
of the case. "The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to proof." 20 Aside from her
bare assertions, Rodica failed to present even an iota of evidence to prove her allegations. In fact, the records belie
her claims. The documents issued by the Bureau of Immigration showed that Strong was the subject of the Interpol
Red Notice for being a fugitive from justice wanted for crimes allegedly committed in Brazil. 21 His warrant of arrest
was issued sometime in February 2008. Significantly, even before Strong was arrested and eventually deported,
Atty. Tan had already obtained a favorable judgment for his clients.

We also agree that it is highly inconceivable for Atty. Tan and the Lazaro Law Office to concoct the scheme of
"pressuring" Rodica to withdraw the RTC case for the purpose of expediting the deportation proceedings of Strong.
The following facts are undisputed: (1) Rodica’s counsel of record in the RTC is Atty. Ibutnande; (2) the RTC case
was already dismissed in the Order22 of March 29, 2011 for failure to state a cause of action; (3) on April 18, 2011,
Rodica through her counsel of record filed a Motion for Reconsideration; (4) on May 5, 2011, Strong was arrested
and detained pursuant to an Interpol Red Notice; (5) Strong hired the Lazaro Law Office to handle his deportation
case; (6) on May 19, 2011 Strong filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion to voluntarily leave the country; (7)
the Bureau of Immigration rendered a Judgment 23 dated May 25, 2011 granting Strong’s motion to voluntarily
leave the country; (8) Strong left the country on May 31, 2011; (9) Rodica’s Manifestation with Motion to
Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration was filed on June 6, 2011; and, (8) acting on the said Manifestation with
Motion, the RTC on June 14, 2011 issued an Order24 granting the same.

Given the chronology of events, there appears no relation between the deportation case and the withdrawal of
the RTC case. Thus, it would be specious if not far-fetched to conclude that the withdrawal of the RTC case was a
pre-condition to Strong’s deportation.

As regards the alleged participation of Atty. Manuel in the "settlement package" theory of Rodica, suffice it to say
that Atty. Manuel has in his favor "the presumption that, as an officer of the court, he regularly performs the
duties imposed upon him by his oath as a lawyer and by the Code of Professional Responsibility." 25 Hence, absent
any competent evidence to the contrary, Atty. Manuel, as Strong’s counsel, is presumed to have worked out the
release and subsequent deportation of his client in accordance with the proper procedures.

Preponderance of evidence shows that

Rodica caused the withdrawal of the
RTC case to facilitate the sale of the
Boracay property to Apostol.

We cannot lend credence to Rodica’s allegation that she was deceived by Atty. Manuel, Atty. Espejo, Atty. Almario
and Atty. Michelle, another senior associate at the Lazaro Law Office, into believing that the withdrawal of the RTC
case was part of a settlement package to settle her differences with her legal adversaries. We accord more
credence to the explanation of the respondents, particularly Atty. Espejo, that in the course of rendering legal
services to Strong, he had become close to Rodica so much so that he accommodated Rodica’s request to cause
the withdrawal of the RTC case to facilitate the sale of the Boracay property to Apostol.

In their Joint Comment,26 respondents Attys. Almario, Espejo and Michelle debunked the opinion of Rodica’s "well-
meaning lawyer friends" that the withdrawal of the RTC case "absolve[d] all defendants from any wrong-doing"
and made "the contents of her original complaint practically meaningless." Atty. Almario and Atty. Espejo opined
that since the dismissal of Rodica’s complaint was based on her failure to state a cause of action and without
prejudice, the same may simply be re-filed by revising her complaint and ensuring that it states a cause of action.

As argued by Atty. Manuel, he and his lawyers only acted in the best interest of their client Strong and rendered
services in accordance with the latter’s objective of leaving the country and not being deported to Brazil. The
Lazaro Law Office cannot be faulted for the dismissal of the RTC case because it had already been dismissed even
before the Lazaro Law Office was engaged to handle Strong’s immigration case. Besides, Rodica admittedly agreed
to withdraw her RTC case to meet Apostol’s condition and to make the property marketable.
Apostol corroborated Atty. Manuel’s statement in his Affidavit27 of July 21, 2011. He affirmed that he told Rodica
that he would only consider purchasing the Boracay property if it is cleared of any pending case so that he can
protect himself, as a buyer, from any possible issues that may crop up involving the said property. According to
him, Rodica assured him that she would work for the termination of the RTC case and consult her lawyers in
Boracay on the matter so she could already sell the property.

It is difficult to imagine that Rodica was deceived by some of the respondent lawyers into believing that the
withdrawal of the RTC case was only the initial step in the settlement of her differences with her adversaries. 28 We
went over the said Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration 29 and we note that
paragraph 6 thereof specifically states:

6. However, the Plaintiff respectfully manifests that after much serious thought and deliberation, and considering
the anxieties caused by the pendency of the instant case, Plaintiff is no longer interested in pursuing the case.
Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully moves for the withdrawal of the Motion for Reconsideration dated April 14, 2011
of the Order dated March 29, 2011 dismissing the instant Complaint filed on April 18, 2011. 30

As already noted by the RTC, Branch 6, Kalibo, Aklan in its Order31 dated April 4, 2011, in the case for recovery of
possession with damages:32

This Manifestation was signed by plaintiff, her Manila lawyers and Atty. Joan Ibutnande, plaintiff’s counsel on
record. From the statements made by plaintiff in her Manifestation to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration that
she had made serious thoughts and deliberation she cannot now say that she was manipulated and forced in
signing the same. The Court perceives plaintiff to be an intelligent woman not to be swayed of her principles and
beliefs and manipulated by others, she may have a fickle mind when it comes to other things but definitely it can
not be applied to the Court.

The Court does not see the connection between the instant case and that of William Strong as alleged by the
plaintiff. Mr. Strong is not a party in this case, even plaintiff’s counsel thought so too. From the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Atty. Joan Ibutnande, it was stated in paragraph 5: "That the undersigned counsel was
baffled as she did not see any connection [between] the incident surrounding the arrest of Mr. William Strong and
the above-entitled case filed by the [plaintiff], and told the plaintiff about it x x x." As Mr. Strong is not a party in
the instance case, his affairs whatever they are can not dictate the outcome of this case. 33

Moreover, it would appear from her own narration that Rodica is not someone who is naïve or ignorant. In her
complaint, she claimed to be an astute businesswoman who even has some business in Barcelona, Spain. 34 Thus,
the more reason we cannot lend credence to her claim that she was tricked into believing that the withdrawal of
the RTC case was only preliminary to the complete settlement of all her differences with her perceived adversaries.
If such had been the agreement, then a Compromise Agreement enumerating all the terms and conditions should
have been filed instead of the Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration. In
addition, the withdrawal should not have been limited to the RTC case as it appears that there are other cases
pending with other tribunals and agencies35 involving the same parties. If Rodica is to be believed, then these cases
should likewise have been dismissed in order to achieve the full and complete settlement of her concerns with her
adversaries.

From the above and by preponderance of evidence, it is clear that Rodica’s purpose in withdrawing the RTC case is
to pave the way for Apostol to purchase the Boracay property. In fact, Rodica eventually executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Apostol over the Boracay property. 36

Rodica’s claim of paying more than ₱ 7

million to the Lazaro Law Office is not
substantiated.
There is likewise no merit in Rodica’s allegation that the Lazaro Law Office extorted from her more than ₱ 7 million
for alleged professional and legal fees and penalties relative to Strong’s immigration case. To support her claim,
Rodica attached four statements of account issued by the Lazaro Law Office for US$2,650.00 under Statement of
Account No. 13837,37 US$2,400.00 under Statement of Account No. 13838,38 US$1,550.00 under Statement of
Account No. 1383939 and US$8,650.00 under Statement of Account No. 13835,40 or for a total amount of
US$15,250.00. She likewise presented photocopies of portions of her dollar savings account passbook to show
where the aforesaid funds came from.

Considering the prevailing exchange rate at that time, the Court notes that the sum total of the abovementioned
figures in its peso equivalent is far less than ₱ 7 million. In fact, the statements of account even support the
contention of Atty. Manuel that Strong failed to fully pay the amount of US$100,000.00 as success fee. Anent the
alleged withdrawals from Rodica’s dollar savings account, the same merely established that she made those
withdrawals. They do not constitute as competent proof that the amounts so withdrawn were indeed paid to
Lazaro Law Office.

Rodica was not the client of the Lazaro

Law Office.

Rodica also faulted the Lazaro Law Office lawyers for disclaiming that she is their client. However, Rodica admitted
in paragraph 5 of her unnotarized Sworn Affidavit 41 that Atty. Manuel and his lawyer-assistants were "engaged by
William Strong to handle his case with the Philippine immigration authorities." Thus, this Court is more inclined to
believe that the Lazaro Law Office agreed to handle only the deportation case of Strong and such acceptance
cannot be construed as to include the RTC case. In fact, all the billings of Lazaro Law Office pertained to the
immigration case, and not to the RTC case. To reiterate, the RTC case has nothing to do with Strong’s deportation
case. Records also show that the RTC case was filed long before Strong was arrested and detained. In fact, it had
already been dismissed by the trial court long before Strong engaged the legal services of the Lazaro Law Office.
More importantly, Strong is not a party to the RTC case. Also, the counsel of record of Rodica in the RTC case is
Atty. Ibutnande, and not the Lazaro Law Office. There is nothing on record that would show that respondent Attys.
Manuel, Michelle, and Almario had any participation therein.

Atty. Espejo’s participation in the RTC

case.

However, we cannot say the same as regards Atty. Espejo. He admitted drafting Rodica’s Manifestation and
Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration indicating therein the firm name of the Lazaro Law Office as well
as his name and the names of Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle without the knowledge and consent of his
superiors, and in likewise affixing his signature thereon.

Atty. Espejo acknowledged committing the abovementioned acts as a way of assisting Rodica who had already
become his close friend. Atty. Espejo’s admissions are as follows:

11. Atty. Espejo further recounts that after being advised to simply withdraw her Motion for Reconsideration
("MR"), Rodica pleaded with Atty. Espejo to prepare the documents required to be filed with the RTC x x x to spare
her Boracay lawyers from preparing the same. Atty. Espejo accommodated Jasper and drafted the Manifestation
with Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration ("Motion to Withdraw MR") to be given to Rodica’s Boracay
counsel, Atty. Joan I. Tabanar-Ibutnande, who is in a better position to evaluate the merit of the withdrawal of the
MR.

11.1. Upon seeing Atty. Espejo’s initial draft, Rodica requested Atty. Espejo to include x x x the name of the Lazaro
Law Office as signatory allegedly to give more credence and weight to the pleading and to show the defendants in
the RTC case her sincere intention to terminate the case.
Due to Rodica’s pleas and insistence, Atty. Espejo, who among all lawyers of the Lazaro Law Office, became the
most familiar and "chummy" with Rodica, agreed to include the Lazaro Law Office and put his name as the
signatory for the Office. Still not satisfied, Rodica pleaded with Atty. Espejo to further revise the Motion to
Withdraw MR to include the names of Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle as signatories and represented that she
herself will cause them to sign it. Relying on Rodica’s representations that she would speak to Atty. Manuel about
the matter, Atty. Espejo obliged to include the name of Atty. Michelle and Atty. Manuel. Rodica repeatedly
reminded Atty. Espejo not to bother Atty. Manuel on the matter and that she herself will take it up with Atty.
Manuel at the proper time.

11.2 Atty. Espejo has a soft heart. He signed the pleading only with good intentions of helping and assisting Rodica,
the common law wife of a client, whom he had learned to fancy because of being constantly together and
attending to her. He never thought ill of Rodica and believed her when she said she would speak to Atty. Lazaro
about the matter as represented. Atty. Espejo only agreed to sign the pleading for purposes of withdrawing
Rodica’s MR to attain Rodica’s purpose or desired result and objective – to convince or facilitate the sale to
Apostol and/or to make the property more marketable to interested buyers and to attain peace with the
defendants in the RTC case. Evidently, Rodica took advantage of Atty. Espejo’s youth and naivete and manipulated
him to do things on her behalf, and deliberately excluded Atty. Almario the senior lawyer. Rodica preferred to
discuss matters with Atty. Espejo than with Atty. Almario as the latter often contradicts her views. Atty. Espejo
apologized to Atty. Manuel for allowing himself to be manipulated by Rodica.42

At the outset, Atty. Espejo was well aware that Rodica was represented by another counsel in the RTC case. As a
practicing lawyer, he should know that it is the said counsel, Atty. Ibutnande, who has the duty to prepare the said
motion. In fact, he himself stated that it is Atty. Ibutnande who is in a better position to evaluate the merit of the
withdrawal of the Motion for Reconsideration.

Atty. Espejo’s claim that he drafted and signed the pleading just to extend assistance to Rodica deserves scant
consideration. It is true that under Rules 2.01 and 2.02, Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed, and in such cases,
even if he does not accept a case, shall not refuse to render legal advise to the person concerned if only to the
extent necessary to safeguard the latter’s right. However, in this case, Rodica cannot be considered as defenseless
or oppressed considering that she is properly represented by counsel in the RTC case. Needless to state, her rights
are amply safeguarded. It would have been different had Rodica not been represented by any lawyer, which,
however, is not the case.

Moreover, the Court wonders why Atty. Espejo, knowing fully well that Rodica is not their law firm’s client and
without the knowledge and consent of his superiors, gave in to Rodica’s request for him to indicate in the said
motion the names of his law firm, Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle for the purpose of "giving more weight and
credit to the pleading." As a member of the bar, Atty. Espejo ought to know that motions and pleadings filed in
courts are acted upon in accordance with their merit or lack of it, and not on the reputation of the law firm or the
lawyer filing the same. More importantly, he should have thought that in so doing, he was actually assisting Rodica
in misrepresenting before the RTC that she was being represented by the said law firm and lawyers, when in truth
she was not.

It is well to remind Atty. Espejo that before being a friend to Rodica, he is first and foremost an officer of the
court.43Hence, he is expected to maintain a high standard of honesty and fair dealings and must conduct himself
beyond reproach at all times.44 He must likewise ensure that he acts within the bounds of reason and common
sense, always aware that he is an instrument of truth and justice. 45 As shown by his actuations. Atty. Espejo fell
short of what is expected of him. Under the circumstances, Atty. Espejo should have exercised prudence by first
diligently studying the soundness of Rodica’s pleas and the repercussions of his acts.

We note that on August 5, 2011, or even before the filing of the disbarment complaint, Atty. Espejo already caused
the filing of his Motion to Withdraw Appearance46 before the RTC. Therein, Atty. Espejo already expressed remorse
and sincere apologies to the RTC for wrongly employing the name of the Lazaro Law Office. Considering that Atty.
Espejo is newly admitted to the Bar (2010), we deem it proper to warm him to be more circumspect and prudent
in his actuations.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Complaint for disbarment against respondents Atty. Manuel
"Lolong" M. Lazaro, Atty. Edwin M. Espejo, Atty. Abel M. Almario, Atty. Michelle B. Lazaro and Atty. Joseph C. Tan
isDISMISSED. Atty. Edwin M. Espejo is WARNED to be more circumspect and prudent in his actuations.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10465, June 08, 2016

SPOUSES LAMBERTO V. EUSTAQUIO AND GLORIA J. EUSTAQUIO, Complainants, v. ATTY. EDGAR R.

NAVALES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court's resolution is a Complaint1 dated January 16, 2010 filed by complainants spouses Lamberto V.
Eustaquio and Gloria J. Eustaquio (complainants) against respondent Atty. Edgar R. Navales (respondent), praying
that respondent be meted the appropriate disciplinary sanction/s for failing to pay rent and to vacate the
apartment he is leasing despite demands.

The Facts

Complainants alleged that they are the owners of an apartment located at 4-D Cavite St., Barangay Paltok, SFDM,
Quezon City, which they leased to respondent under a Contract of Lease 2 dated April 16, 2005. However,
respondent violated the terms and conditions of the aforesaid contract when he failed to pay monthly rentals in
the aggregate amount of P139,000.00 and to vacate the leased premises despite repeated oral and written
demands.3 This prompted complainants to refer the matter to barangay conciliation, where the parties agreed on
an amicable settlement, whereby respondent promised to pay complainants the amount of P131,000.00 on July
16, 2009 and to vacate the leased premises on July 31, 2009. Respondent eventually reneged on his obligations
under the settlement agreement, constraining complainants to file an ejectment case 4 against him before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 40 (MeTC-Br. 40), docketed as Civil Case No. 09-39689.
Further, complainants filed the instant case before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), contending that respondent miserably failed to exemplify honesty, integrity, and respect for the
laws when he failed and refused to fulfil his obligations to complainants. 5chanrobleslaw

Despite notices,6 respondent failed to file his Answer, to appear in the mandatory conference, and to file his
position paper.

Meanwhile, the MeTC-Br. 40 promulgated a Decision7 dated December 8, 2009 in the ejectment case in favor of
the complainants and, accordingly, ordered respondent to vacate the leased premises and to pay complainants the
following amounts: (a) P139,000.00 representing unpaid rentals as of July 2009; (b) further rental payments of
P8,000.00 per month starting August 17, 2009 until the actual surrender of said premises to complainants; (c)
attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00; and (d) cost of suit.8chanrobleslaw
During the pendency of the case, respondent was appointed as an Assistant City Public Prosecutor of Quezon
City.9chanrobleslaw

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation10 dated February 8, 2011, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent
administratively liable and, accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with
more severely.11 It was found that respondent displayed unwarranted obstinacy in evading payment of his debts,
as highlighted by his numerous promises to pay which he eventually reneged on. In this light, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner concluded that respondent violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) and, thus, should be held administratively liable. 12chanrobleslaw

In a Resolution13 dated September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid
report and recommendation. Thereafter, the Court issued a Resolution 14 dated September 15, 2014 adopting and
approving the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations of the IBP and, accordingly, meted
respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.

As per Registry Return Card No. 957,15 respondent received the Court's order of suspension on October 16,
2014.16 Records are bereft of any showing that respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and, thus, the Court's
order of suspension against him became final and executory.

Events Following the Finality of Respondent's Suspension

On September 7, 2015 and upon request from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), a Certification 17 was
issued by the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 38 (MeTC-Br. 38) stating that respondent has been appearing before it
as an Assistant City Prosecutor since September 2014 up to the present. In connection with this, the MeTC-Br. 38
wrote a letter18 dated September 8, 2015 to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), inquiring about the details of
respondent's suspension from the practice of law. In view of the foregoing, the OCA indorsed the matter to the
OBC for appropriate action.19chanrobleslaw

Despite due notice from the Court,20 respondent failed to file his comment to the aforementioned Certification
issued by MeTC-Br. 38.

The OBC's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation21 dated February 10, 2016, the OBC recommended that respondent be further
suspended from the practice of law and from holding the position of Assistant City Prosecutor for a period of six (6)
months, thus, increasing his total suspension period to one (1) year, effective immediately. 22 It found that since
respondent received the order of suspension against him on October 16, 2014 and did not move for its
reconsideration, such order attained finality after the lapse of 15 days therefrom. As such, he should have already
served his suspension. In this relation, the OBC ratiocinated that since respondent was holding a position .which
requires him to use and apply his knowledge in legal matters and practice of law, i.e., Assistant City Prosecutor, he
should have ceased and desisted from acting as such. However, as per the Certification dated September 7, 2015
of the MeTC-Br. 38, respondent never complied with his order of suspension. In view thereof, the OBC
recommended to increase respondent's suspension from the practice of law and from holding the position of
Assistant City Prosecutor for an additional period of six (6) months. 23chanrobleslaw

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue presented for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable.
 The Court's Ruling

After due consideration, the Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the OBC and adopts the same in
its entirety.

It is settled that the Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. As such, when the Court
orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, he must desist from performing all functions requiring the
application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes desisting from holding a position in
government requiring the authority to practice law.24 The practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. It includes performing
acts which are characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering any kind of service which requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill.25cralawredchanrobleslaw

In the instant case, the OBC correctly pointed out that the Court's Resolution26 dated September 15, 2014
suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months became final and executory fifteen
(15) days after respondent received a copy of the same on October 16, 2014. Thus, respondent should have
already commenced serving his six (6)-month suspension. However, respondent never heeded the suspension
order against him as he continued discharging his functions as an Assistant City Prosecutor for Quezon City, as
evidenced by the Certification27 issued by MeTC-Br. 38 stating that respondent has been appearing before it as an
Assistant City Prosecutor since September 2014 up to the present.

Section 9 of Republic Act No. (RA) 10071,28 otherwise known as the "Prosecution Service Act of 2010," provides the
powers and functions of prosecutors, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 9. Powers and Functions of the Provincial Prosecutor or City Prosecutor. - The provincial prosecutor or the
city prosecutor shall:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) Be the law officer of the province of the city officer, as the case may be;

(b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of penal laws
and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions, and have the necessary information or complaint prepared
or made and filed against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he/she or any of his/her
assistants shall receive the statements under oath or take oral evidence of witnesses, and for this purpose may
by subpoena summon witnesses to appear and testify under oath before him/her, and the attendance or evidence
of an absent or recalcitrant witness may be enforced by application to any trial court; and cralawlawlibrary

(c) Have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal ordinances in
the courts at the province or city and therein discharge all the duties incident to the institution of criminal actions,
subject to the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 5 hereof.
Verily, a plain reading of the foregoing provision evidently shows that the government office of Assistant City
Prosecutor requires its holder to be authorized to practice law. Hence, respondent's continuous discharge of his
functions as such constitutes practice of law and, thus, a clear defiance of the Court's order of suspension against
him.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court and
wilfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so - acts which respondent is guilty of in this case - are
grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, the Court, in Lingan v. Calubaquib,29Feliciano v. Bautista-
Lozada30 and Ibana-Andrade v. Paita-Moya31 consistently imposed an additional six (6)-month suspension from the
practice of law to erring lawyers who practiced law despite being earlier suspended. Under the foregoing
circumstances, the Court deems it proper to mete the same penalty to respondent in addition to the earlier six (6)-
month suspension already imposed on him, as recommended by the OBC. Thus, respondent's total period of
suspension from the practice of law - and necessarily, from the holding the position of Assistant City Prosecutor as
well - should be fixed at one (1) year.

As a final note, it must be stressed that "[d]isbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law
profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal
profession. While the Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of
proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its preservative principle. The Court, in
the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe punishment if, through it, the end
desire of reforming the errant lawyer is possible."32chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar R. Navales is found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for an additional period of six (6) months from his
original six (6)-month suspension, totalling one (1) year from service of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal
record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Department of Justice, and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

LIGAYA MANIAGO, A.C. No. 7472

Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,*
CARPIO,**
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

ATTY. LOURDES I. DE DIOS, March 30, 2010

Respondent.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated April 2, 2007 filed by Ligaya Maniago, seeking

the disbarment of Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios for engaging in the practice of law despite having been suspended by the

Court.

Complainant alleged that she filed a criminal case against Hiroshi Miyata, a Japanese national, before the

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Olongapo City, Branch 73, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 603, docketed as

Criminal Case No. 699-2002. The accused was represented by Atty. De Dios, with office address at 22 Magsaysay

Drive, Olongapo City.Complainant then learned from the RTC staff that Atty. De Dios had an outstanding

suspension order from the Supreme Court since 2001, and was, therefore, prohibited from appearing in court.

Complainant further alleges that there is a civil case (Civil Case No. 355-0-2005) and another case (Special

Proceeding No. M-6153) filed against Miyata before the RTC, Makati City, Branch 134, where Atty. De Dios

appeared as his counsel. Complainant averred that Atty. De Dios ought to be disbarred from the practice of law for

her flagrant violation and deliberate disobedience of a lawful order of the Supreme Court.

In her Comment, Atty. De Dios admitted that there were cases filed against her client, Miyata. She, however,

denied that she was under suspension when she appeared as his counsel in the cases.

Respondent explained that an administrative case was indeed filed against her by Diana de Guzman,

docketed as A.C. No. 4943, where she was meted the penalty of 6-month suspension. She served the suspension

immediately upon receipt of the Courts Resolution on May 16, 2001 up to November 16, 2001. In a Manifestation

filed on October 19, 2001, respondent formally informed the Court that she was resuming her practice of law on

November 17, 2001, which she actually did.

A problem arose when Judge Josefina Farrales, in her capacity as Acting Executive Judge of the RTC, Olongapo City,

erroneously issued a directive on March 15, 2007, orderingrespondent to desist from practicing law and revoking

her notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008. Knowing that the directive was rather questionable,

respondent, nonetheless, desisted from law practice in due deference to the court order. Thereafter,

respondent filed a Motion for Clarification with the Supreme Court on account of Judge Farrales letters to all
courts in Olongapo City and to some municipalities in Zambales, which gave the impression that Atty. De Dios is

not yet allowed to resume her practice of law and that her notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008 is

revoked. Acting on the said motion, the Court issued a resolution on April 23, 2007 in this wise:

A.C. No. 4943 (Diana de Guzman v. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios) Respondents Urgent Motion for
Clarification dated 14 March 2007 praying that the Court declare her to have served her six (6)
months (sic) suspension and her resumption of law practice on 17 November 2001 onwards as
proper is NOTED.

Considering the motion for clarification, the Court resolves to DEEM Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios to
have SERVED her six (6) month suspension and her recommencement of law practice on 17
November 2001 as PROPER pursuant to the Resolution dated 30 January 2002.

Respondent averred that for the period stated in the affidavit of complainant Maniago, during which she

allegedly practiced law, she was neither suspended nor in any way prohibited from practice. The complaint, she

added, was baseless and malicious, and should be dismissed outright.

In the Resolution dated September 12, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the Office of the Bar

Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation. Initially, the OBC directed the complainant to file a

supplemental affidavit, stating therein the exact period of appearances of Atty. De Dios and the particular courts

where respondent appeared as counsel in the following cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 699-2002; (2) Civil Case No.

355-0-2005; and (3) Sp. Proc. No. M-6153.

In compliance therewith, complainant submitted a Supplemental Affidavit in the vernacular, which reads:

2. Sa Criminal Case No. 699-2002 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Hiroshi Miyata ay
[nagsimulang] mag[-]appear si Atty. Lourdes de Dios mula April 9, 2003, na [naka-]attach ang
Certification mula sa Branch 73[,] Regional Trial Court[,] Olongapo City.

3. Sa Civil Case No. 355-0-2006 ay [nagsimulang] mag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios noong

October 10, 2005, nakasaad din ito sa Certification mula sa Branch
73, Regional Trial Court ofOlongapo City. At sa Sp. Proc. No. M-6153 ay ito ay na[-]ifile ni Atty. de
Dios noong September 26, 2005 at hanggang ngayon ay pending pa sa Court of Appeals.

4. Bilang karagdagan po ay naka[-]attach ang Certified Xerox Copy ng Minutes of the

Session ng Subic Municipal Trial Court na kung saan ay nag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios sa Civil Case
No. 042-01 entitled Andrea Lorenzo, plaintiff, -versus- Simeon Pullido noong December 14, 2001.

5. At makikita rin po sa Annex A-5 ng Comment ni Atty. de Dios, x x x -

5.[a.] Nag file ng kaso si Atty. Lourdes de Dios noong May 17, 2001 entitled
Shirley Pagaduan vs. Danilo Pagaduan[,] Civil Case No. 234-0-2001. Ito ay
 ginawa ni Atty. de Dios isang (1) araw pa lamang mula magsimula ang kanyang
suspension noon[g] May 16, 2001.

5.b. Nag file din ng kaso si Atty. de Dios noong May 18, 2001 entitled Filmixco
versus Dr. Ma. Perla Tabasondra-Ramos and Dr. Ricardo Ramos Civil Case No.
236-0-2001. Ito ay dalawang (2) araw mula magsimula ang suspension ni Atty.
de Dios noong May 16, 2001.

5.c. At nag notaryo si Atty. de Dios ng isang (a) affidavit executed by Carolina C.
Bautista noong May 16, 2001, (b) Affidavit executed by Jessica Morales-Mesa
on May 17, 2001 at (c) isang Statement of non-liability of Alfredo C. Diaz on
May 16, 2001. Ang mga pag notaryo na ito ay ginawa noong nagsimula na ang
suspension ni Atty. de Dios noong May 16, 2001.

6. Ginawa ko ang Supplemental Affidavit na ito bilang patunay sa mga nakasaad base sa
aking personal na kaalamanan at mga dokumentong hawak ko upang ipakita na nilabag ni Atty.
de Dios ang kanyang suspension base sa sulat ni Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Ma.
Cristina B. Layusa na may petsang 12 February 2007 at sa admission ni Atty. de Dios na nagsimula
ang kanyang suspension noong May 16, 2001.

A Supplemental Comment was thereafter filed by respondent, stating that there were no new matters raised in the

Supplemental Affidavit, and asserting that the opinion of Bar Confidant, Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa, as contained

in her letter dated 12 February 2007, cannot supersede the Resolution dated April 23, 2007 of this Honorable

Court. According to her, the resolution should be the final nail to the coffin of this case.

On November 18, 2008, the OBC submitted its Memorandum for the Courts consideration.

The OBC explained that the letter adverted to by complainant in her affidavit was the OBCs reply to an

inquiry made by the Office of the Court Administrator regarding the status of Atty. De Dios. [1] Therein, the OBC

made it clear that the lifting of the suspension order was not automatic, following the pronouncement of the Court

in J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. and Spouses Jesus and Rosario K. Mercado, complainants v.

Atty. Eduardo de Vera and Jose Rongkales Bandalan, et al. and Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera v. Atty. Mervyn G. Encanto,

et al., which states:

The Statement of the Court that his suspension stands until he would have satisfactorily
shown his compliance with the Courts resolution is a caveat that his suspension could thereby
extend for more than six months. The lifting of a lawyers suspension is not automatic upon the
end of the period stated in the Courts decision, and an order from the Court lifting the suspension
at the end of the period is necessary in order to enable [him] to resume the practice of his
profession.[2]
 Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyer must first present proof(s) of his compliance by

submitting certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and from the Executive Judge that he has

indeed desisted from the practice of law during the period of suspension. Thereafter, the Court, after evaluation,

and upon a favorable recommendation from the OBC, will issue a resolution lifting the order of suspension and

thus allow him to resume the practice of law. The OBC alleged that it was unfortunate that this procedure was

overlooked in A.C. No. 4943, where Atty. De Dios was able to resume her practice of law without submitting the

required certifications and passing through the OBC for evaluation. In order to avoid confusion and conflicting

directives from the Court, the OBC recommended that the Court adopt a uniform policy on the matter of the lifting

of the order of suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law.

The Court notes the Report and Recommendation of the OBC.

It must be remembered that the practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege and, as such, must bow

to the inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public

responsibilities.[3] Whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence

of his clients and of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Supreme Court, which made

him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw that

privilege.[4] However, as much as the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer, it should, at the same

time, also ensure that a lawyer may not be deprived of the freedom and right to exercise his profession

unreasonably.

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED that the following guidelines be observed in the

matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:

1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the

Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;

2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt

thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration

thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement

with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has

desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his

or her suspension;

4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to

the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or

her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;

5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondents compliance with the

order of suspension;

6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be

a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be

warranted.

SO ORDERED.