Patterns of Democracy Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries Arend Lijphartcoutlized in Chapter 20. The ninth faderl system, Belgium, as one ofthe lowest indexes of bank independence, but Be. ‘ium did not become federal until 1993, and as dacussed in Chapter 3, made its canta bank much more indepandeat at shout the same time, Asis shown in the next choptey, contal bank independence i also strongly eorelted sith th other ‘noo variables ofthe fodersl-unitary dimension. CHAPTER sa The Two-Dimensional Conceptual Map of Democracy In thie chapter the main digs of Capa 8 trough 78. whieh have dealt with uch of hon basi maloiaran versus conenes varices, Iocan 9a specs of picre the tatinasional_ pare formed by tho rletonsbips song the ton rabies ortons of eech ofthe thy democrat In Cs tron Almeaioel torn. tn eaton explore tw chngo in thse tions rom 0-170 to th poxt-1071 ped ef troy Shc of tho tits demecarioS wheh walBelenyTg ‘ime spans sven th fit prod ‘The Two Dimensions J Chapter 1, I previewed one ofthe most important gen rel findings of his book the clustering ofthe ten nstittional "bes hog tus clouly opts Louaaay WHE TS ‘str is tanto pt a danny amet though as expainedin Chapter 3, it might be more securate ‘and theoretically moro meaningful fo call the two dimensions the joiat-power and deided-power dimensions, Chapters 3 throigh 18, 19, Ibeve ropestediy called alction tothe close links among some of th variables within sich cluster Table ‘4.1 now presents the over patteraby means of the correlationsss for al te variables It shoes stog restonships within user and only weak connections batweon vaibles br: longing to diferent castors. lof the culations whine wo luster are statistically sila sven feat aS | percant owt aid hn remaaing four at the § percat lve the eration oefcent ee own nthe to highlighted ingle: in Table 142. one ofthe twenty ie come: Inions between variable inthe diferent casas a | oko Tat oF table, statistically sgalcantat ero “Theft cluster of variables bas somowiat stoager inter connections than the sacondclutr the average ofthe aor {te vals ofthe colton coefficients are 0.58 and 5, spectively. Within the Gut ctr, the percentage of mink ‘ono-party cabinet 8 iy strong element hae the ghost comelations with | GREIF a ret hoot interes | the beginning of Chapter 8), his variable can also be sen oncepluly close tothe exsonce of tho distinction between ‘concenteation of povter and the jint exercise of power: Th | Gtetive muntber of parliamentary parties iw secon ey oom, 1 fonent inthis lure Inthe scond cluster, the federalism and’) Teconirlzation variable morgesasthe strongest lament This ‘Ending Is theoatically sgificant, to, because this variable | fan seen ab conceptually a he oar ofthe federa-nitary, dimension. iso) oT i ier 1 vriblesdlstingulshing majostaian ftom consensus Tables. Convlation matrix af omocracy in tirtyix demnocrcioe, 1945-06 ro “Am even bttr and more suecnct summary ofthe relaton- stipe mong th on variable cam bo achieved by means of fo: toranalysis The genral purpose of factor analyals st ‘eBnthor her are one or or comin underying dimensions faring sovorel variables the } ‘en as“averages”ofthncnslsaated variables. able 14.2pre- ‘onthe enlist factor analy fou en base vals ‘The values that ar shown fr onch veriabe ar the factor loed- ‘ng hich may bo interpreted e the comslation eae ‘obvoon the variable and the Sra and sacond factors detocted by eet [estnlton Variable 6: Federal. Yerble:Bcameraiem ‘ernie: fective mamber of parent Webi Misieal wimnopece pesca ‘ar Vesuble a: xacutvedominines ‘eruble¢ ocr dap ‘aria tert ‘Varuble :Goaatutous ity ‘Venable: adel review ‘anable for Cnntal beck indopondense ¥‘Tahle142. Varimaxorthogona rotated factor mats ofthe ten ‘variables distinguishing msjoiarian from consensus Aermocrey in they. democrtlee, 2945-96 Verale Peete Factor ‘Hisaive number ofpartiamontary panies |-099) a2 ‘Minima wining one-party edicts ‘03/27 active deminenoe or] a0 $corl isropertionalty on] “oon Intra group plat: nz) oot Fenllm dtetalzton “028 ‘Bicamerlon 0s | ave Contin igiity -00s | an Judi tow om | an (Cental bank independence moor Lan 2 The eer sai alcool els wih les the factor nas: Te ten prominnly this analysis; fom ‘also clearly se cause he dor ties ind as oon aon whe ‘arn ani ads ae Soop teal “hfe longs ee wey igh with eco he two clusters ad sch oner—n ft ceo ern ow ese cvtlafth chnere = Foam nat map aaa a ccc wie coe Th ftv nner of prs nos ‘nom equal stone slamet wih «cer ding of, ‘gata mec mae ingot Oat ‘Therealing fcr lodge willn ho wench Dats ipreialy song between 070 end ‘The Conceptual Map of Democracy ‘The two-dimensional patter formed by the ten basle varie bls allows ws to summatizn where the thirty-six individual ‘countries ae situated betwoen msjoritaran and contensus de- rmocracy. Tir characerstio on each ofthe two sats of five ‘arlabies can Denveragod so eto form ust wo summary charac toristes,and those canbe usnd to place each ofthe democrecios ‘on the two-dimonsional conceptual map of democracy shown, ‘in Figuze 141° The horizontal axis represents the wxscutivas- partes and ho vertical axe the fodetl-unitay dznension, Each ‘nit on those axes roprevents one standard deviation; high vl- ues indicate majoritarianism end low values conseneus. On tha seculive parties dimension, ll countie aro within to stan- dard deviations om the mide; onthe fderab-unitry dima sion, tw countrss~—Germany and the United States—are at the rater distance of almost two and a half standard devintons b= low the mide. The exact scores ofeach of tho thisy-sx coun- ‘wieson thetwo dimensions can be found in Appanilis A? ‘Most of the prototypical cases of majoritarian and consensus desocracy discussed in Chaps 2 and 3 ar nthe expected positions on the map. The United Kingdom and New Zealand ‘se inthe top right cormr. Tho United Kingdom i lightly more _mafortarian onthe executives parties dimension, but Now Zot Tand isa gost deal mare so on the federal-unitary dimension, and its overall position is therfore more extremes Line with ‘the proposition tha, until 1996, New Zealand was the purer Inet eerie a th tw caste age ‘hy en sacar oo hea Osea eration sin we tla ne te, orowe a gett sed nage aro hve "orm er mourn eno a ow ase eps Sees ogee mp. {Sees muah oie nfm yal he ray ‘Shin Abu erage dane ust, al op rs ‘Sancti ere otc nt he pete n ‘scone, Ret bowels Apel aot oh po inne ceqrend nara of Soper fcansns moc fereateenesed SSivine davon tsa ccy prong Soez dot fm i oe 7 musa Fig. 14. Thetwosdimensional concepesal map of democracy ‘rcamplo ofthe Westminster model. Chapter 2 used Barbados 4s an exomplar of msjritarian democracy on the executives: Dries dimension only and not as typeally maortarian onthe federa-unitary dimension its location bolow the Ualted King- dom end Nov Zealand butelso somewhat farther tothe right fit this description well. Switeerind ie, as expoctd, in he bottom Jef comer but not quite 36 fr down a8 several other countries, ‘tainly duetoits onononconsensualcharactristic—thesbsence cf judi soviw 1a stil he lorest consensual prottye however besa it s more than one end half standard dvi tons sway from the canter on both dimensions, wheress Gor ‘mamy—which th map suggests could also ave servod as tho prototypis located far down but Iss than one standard dovin- tion of ofthe cener® Belg s the one exomplar cate not be in an extreme position, but thisis not unexpetedaltharbo- ‘ens it only came fally federal in 198% it doos, however, have a srong consensus! postion on the executive parties dimension, “The wo-dimencional map also reveal prototypes ofthe two combinations of consensus and majoras characte. In the top loft comer,Jsae presets the combjpation of can- senna dma oe eects pie dmaneen (in por tielar, frequent overt calon cabinets, multipart, highly proportional PR lotions and interest group corporat {in} bu, lbelt somewhat loss strongy, mgjoctrianism on the {edecal-unitary dimension (en unweten constitution anda uni cineal parla odsatd, however by intameit cha tei with zgard to federlism mud contra bank ndepen- ‘once. Jn he bottoms ghthand corner, Canadas ths tongnt ‘antidste forthe oppolt prototype of mejoitasinism on the ‘xocatves pardon wid wns othe fedorel unitary dimen. Sinn: on one hand ominnntono-paty abies, roughly to ‘tndthird party system, plurality elortons, aad interest roup Dhiraism,buton the ether hand, strong federaim and judicial Fevlew agi costtaton, a independant canta ban, and {bicameral parliament (alieit of only medium strength). The Tod States is Tocated Inthe seme corner and is stronger on owe. Camano al ease ie tet smelled Sam fu cme ‘Semper puncte asbestos in {iepelselnmeltent nb nests soar thral Grnd atinn ‘Favor wie pede hel orden Grd Gato of ‘flgowtonenand ott pment” ?the fderal-unitary dinensfon—but nat exceptionally majoritar- fn on the executives-parties dimension, especially dine tothe ‘xacutivologilstive balance nits prosidentiel system, Bxplanations ‘Aovay growl pte ready dnston of ho inysdamcncan dempt atin ieee ‘penton bee ho cone en gat et Bardot sppnr booed rantipes ectneoeee ‘lista rie dearer ‘etn Hope uae os ee tem: Tndudlacis he atuccaaas Ich eos oaiod "he convnrad dono wit sie Snavocattrsfemasnnatad. soecurinee sen ‘od wbistin’ ey Thoms, an Ser ge S28 Oe sands celatn Rea deaoeice le contests reat ae ar ae onsanoty yt most ofa coualieg on hevih-band side of ecueniad saaepagesioa eee ‘anger acy tng how tn tn ebb, hee om ‘omer ti cio, nthe womesee ee Sn MEF nt ppc notes nie Wt ant rit sof Uo aoa te ear han ny gpa acer “hss chins ecopont hi of dvson tad on he noc «Beth Seog ee ‘Atco countn cons one espn ta er ‘sepin. nneetny ae ooted ere te con ag on gh Harn te were ae Spe ea ‘Ssesrmily tment ether endorse ely bt ed fee ommeed gn eataee ‘anglo-saxons, its ironie thatthe republic he crated isthe most Anglo-Saxon of any f the continental European democrocies- ‘There ace excoptions on the left side of tis dimension, too Jnl, sae, end Mauritius emerged ftom British colonial rls, and Papua New Guinea was ruled by Austlis (alfa former British colony), Howover, what also nites thse fous countries is hat they are plural socitins—suggesting hat it isthe degree ‘of pluralism that explaine why counties ar consensual rather than majortarian onthe executives parties dimension. Of the ghoen pl and seiplaal soclaten ltt in Moa n anal yols CORA UA DOU pl ~Rogresion anal yas Manse To cerlaton beeen Ssh berger? ect with aun of one for tain elfen re Bera outer a, aso fr te le: went err ‘torent muon democracy on theories prod ‘nonsion ho conic of 0.94 egicant at thot Pescont lech colton with dope of lund ssi plrl ver fe semipr! venue nonpunl-ie “Oa (agin at he 8 pacnt Ileal) When tho th independent vrai ae entard int te repreon equation, te multlecomlaon ‘oft i 85, and both varabls renovate nny vais he 3 port ove inal ta spe Fegreson acayt, rh ba 28 pact th ‘utes iaorran demoed hedges of a 1 prc ars of 9 perso Cxplaned noased itera ofthese? Rsquredh 4m be pitt th boa nen Aas, Gamay. and pana alee dnd aang ad og dog Be bt ‘Aes Ameen ninco ht ptiod ston Ts pst poe ‘oe wa aly Gee Deel Masti a and was ay Si iil Aneel th eopt ce ern cabs of Garry in rayne ad ey ‘Slept song ed eat nnd apn eh ots nes i } | }‘hw dort o hich outs mpl cosines op te B-Spln the locaton ofthe ry demoeaces oa the federal unitery dimension, OP ie itor SoUNnTE eM [NOUBA i lll including Belg, which, wb cme ‘of ~0.01, is barely below the midi), on are plural or sie plural societies, Ap ada jon suggested by the ation siz. The tho largest coustiiostalia, ho United States, and Japaaare al located inthe bottom part of tho map, and of he floen counties with popsatons geste than en million, ex arein the bottom pat. This potential exple- ration i bolstered by Robert A-Datl-ang Reward R Tutt (4973, 37) finding tat a fs rolte to federline docen- walizaian, tho Koy variable in The Tedera-unnary dimension: “bo larger the country, the more decentalizad ils government, ‘whether der orn i contnns both of tas impr fens: Thecomsation eect ae 0.50 Tr popslaton se (Usage) end ~0.40 for degre of pluralism (oth significant st thn poet Inve) Tn the tiple ngetin, bok remain niet explanstory vals (altho prim only at the S pect evel, ua the mutipleconalationcoeficiot a Some Cpa to a {Taker ubl bt cn ogre sooner rl ‘Spinone ten exact pen oe ‘ion eon of yo deme on bh eros" Atoagh be alacpowar ond Sd ower eth pole brings cated ln secon ma Nabe ‘opetion i ated th fo Smerlon-coneising Dw Tae {era ai epson tht "be eal ten, bem bomopnos pect of consensus democracy ae concoptully and empirically Aisne dimensions, they represent complementary institu ‘Sonal mechanisms fr the accommodation of deep societal divi- sons. Tis finding strengthens Sic Arthur Lewis's recommenda- ton, stated in Chapter 3, that both dimensions of consensus democracy~in particular. Lawis advocates powoosharing bie nels en fodoralism are neaded in pluelsocietles. ‘Shs onthe Conceptual Map “The locations ofthe thirty-six democracies am the concop- ‘ual map are avernge locations ove long period clove to ty ‘pears forthe went older democracies and a minimum of nine- ‘een yeas for the three newert democracos (soo Table 4.2, ‘These averagas conoosl any lange or small changes that may have taken place, Obviously politcal systems can and do ‘change for istanc, in provious chaptrs I clled alention to ‘changes in the pat, electoral, ad intrest group eystoms ofthe Uainyabc democrcios wx wll a8 in thle dogross of docental- leation, the cameral structure oftheir legislatures, and thectiv- {am of thes jal reviow. To what extent have these changes ‘added upto shifts in tho direction of greater msjritaranst or ‘rotor consensus on either or both af the dimensions? ‘hie quertion [divided tho period 1945—00 in 8 iy onal para parfod wall Goon oT 97OanaTo Fite the middle of 1006. For counvios witi'a ‘ficiently Ing time span in he first period, scores on bath of {he dimensions were calculated for each pesiod, This could be ane for he twenty countries covered snc int emo tena od tal the no em ng oe Rate mou ol te mie sont asthe dene sh {Etre with oe orl of dvlpmse tas eatin ‘ted fetms ther Gat in rae eld eet1240s and for six adattonl counts Costa Rca, France, Co- Jombia, Venezuela, THinidad, and jamaica Figire 102 abows ‘he BERS that took plac in thas Twenty-six democracies trom ‘the pro-1970 period tothe pos-1971 period, The arows point to ‘ha ost te hpi To psc ena samy relate anal ete, bat eel tensor Sat oS leary CONIA are a er wre. THANE ts la igi or vss ee Das tom eer oe 2 ‘time arseseant ice rar sr iy oft Bena onc cisely ernest an ser eer enna vai ts Sone ee na a ir Sima eee tetany ane Sl eae te tou ence a a {croton etter se scoala rare ang Sh on eset ao greiner pacee indi a sess st Ie Sn ae aa ee Se ae im et rind tes ps ak sind wn a he ad ec «neta rani AS Sea ese bexonig oth covmgein 15nd ul oro wens ser he my ments ass 2. Reo es ate ond prod 383-86) my be felt ‘nce ie aces ny ne Appel Pow a + ° 1 Exacuves-Partes Dimenon Fig. 14.2 Shits on tho two-dimensional map by twenty-six ‘democracies from the period before 1971 tothe priod 1971-90 live to longer-tved cabinets, and toa slight reduction inthe fective number of parties—only slighty counterbalanced by ‘mors proportional slectién rerultin the second period. Jamaica ‘moved in the same diction and shout the sare ditance it ‘bom on alreny strongly maortarian early period ite party eye tem changed from roughly s two-party systema to q one-and- ‘half party system, and the dlproportionality ofits elections ‘escalated from about 9 peccant to mare then 24 peroent, Norweyand Sweden moved in the other dleetion: more minority and ‘coalition cabinets, shorter cabinet duration, increase fn the o- fective numbor of parties, and lower disproporlonality; Swe- dn’ slight sift on tho federeluniary dimension mainly 1e- ‘ects its adaption of unleamereliem in 1070, Telgium, France, and Veneziola experienced slalficant changes both dimensions. Belgium moved dawn, mainly duo ‘etheadoptonof ula view and Sts i Tage an ines aan caine aa Walp cee uliuior fon Seat Germay aetna estoy Met of rence rove wes Lo ea Oo kr on te fedora dimension oflactng is ore {ld conston and at Jui vow rm 1974 on and its dentition air 081-countrbalazod, homes, 8 deers in indapendenc ofthe Ben of rnc the {Rta tholet wes prance y sna cece ole tpt end propronall, Fly, Vener ora re Iolo onthe ennai pres ditnaon manly « ‘ult hevig fever onion and overand ces athe ‘Senge tom en epproinaalyfurpary othe payne {ome sit eva rom maoraraniom on th fealty dmenlon fects to eubtn nconnathlepl indep Anoeofihe cont beak aloft car countsisn xproned leeching, tough {hoe changes myo ager when compared with changes Sheutherdeconin aighorng coon, For inane, ator Mr (904, o0) hs ned hn wl hy pnw leu consensus democracy in the Netherlands on_the executives aries dlmensisn since the andy 19208 may not have been all ‘hat inprosive by itself, “many ofthe atbor European domocra- clas seem to havo adopted amore consensus styaof politics" ‘wndesing the Dutch shit way for consonsus amonenotable development in slate terms. Figure 14.2 beers out Mair's point-especely compan with hesbifs toward consensus by, til ofthe emallar democracies in norhwester Europe (excopt ‘Laxembourg), tho change in te other direction by the Nother Jas presents sizable conse ee ‘qgused again “ith The scores ae a Sera ‘democrtic character, and goneral policy orientation of govern: ‘ments, Rllble data on to variables are generally available nly or sat Tit moreover acing on ie wos at bd sels uo acide wty of te ey ae Ome ‘racios as possible In the analyaig, 1 therwtore a1 THAKGT sense (Smuts dogos of conser otaanism ft ‘weatysix longentenn democracies in tans ofthe charac: teriates nth sacond period.CHAPTER IS Macro-Economic Management and the Control of Violence ‘Does Consensus Democracy Make a Difference? Inthischparandtha est nwt" what” usin: don he dite ten serena om Sens denocay mais irene an peti of democ ‘ey epell fr ho wall decoy wo? The es “opal wem—wbichi ten sated i ome of be STS sdvanags of FR vers lay and majry secon bt ‘hich ean be ended tthe roder conta! betwee co avsandsjrtarin demons lng toca pts imine ea ada ood Si fc uc goverment. Once bans the onvetzl wisdom concdis tat Pt camsenan demo ty provide mors ect col pear ity beter ney rpsnntion and proces of ne Intra well broader prtpton in decison naling (gh tern, th cntetonl van attains at th Onn fi poo lla et slections aze more decisive effective “4 racine gy rot eed y tml Br, 5, at "orc greta toto sn i pron=witocurip ce tht pene omar pects government, (Gonventonal wisdom has long bean widely accapted with- out eqs empia examination paths bce tle tppecntabn soon tatters hub aed For {Star The aed cl atenton Gn Chapter) tae Sis) emma seer ht one parma eatin werennde rote py aig oa ly edged Sear Se rae quly. lected in beac apter) Ty Svamine the second par, which posits alink baween _ tain derpragyand fete derision “Hypotheses and Preliminary Evidence ‘he theoretical bal for Lowell's exiom i cartanly not ene et bbe soy cn poate allel dow ‘percocet sl arson sodomy ert SSS creo {DUST deco nser tn consensus goverment bt ft dao reat nace wn cons Io te pps ny be cre aldo rnny pall dtts-noe Sifts venrbl autora the Fadl Popes alton, Inet Nano 708)-bav log ern. Te rion of {Rpsocaled pol tax anew led goverment xn Brain a theo, ise cles ample oe palicy. now ultra ae Tnowldged obuve eons nto peli hatred tctota deion akng inal pote pol xl Sever hv tern toda ad ben tor eel ed Sore slowly, etd Dut, Adonis ond Teves 108). nin gvectment mn ngatt yr aon “iese gavarimte Us aemation ros Tl To ight and Vice ona a in sap anges tn comanie ple that a0 Enq tov ire in pier 5 ae 275) hs feet aud th css poconoe anagem teqie nutso tude dnghand se stood one ed tat PRand coulition governments arobstter she to provide steady, con- ‘ist poliey making Policies 2x suocossfully and ‘uth srasnoce aly acai nt soot and to ‘emain on course than policies imposed by a "decisive gOveEr- Sin oi iva ainiantatsanes ctor Peay ‘Tr taining civil pecs in divided societies, conliation ‘and compromise—goais that require the grstest peaibeinli- son f contending groups int decision making proceso Pobably much more important then making map decisions. ‘Those countrarguments appea oe atlas slightly stronger tha tho angumet i fever of majoritsan governmtat Ut s ‘ase narowly onthe sped and cerence of decisionmaking ‘The empirical evidence asin. Poter Kaeanstain (1965) and Ronald Rogowski (1997) have shawn tht amalTZountries ‘opted PR and corporis pacics to compensate forthe d- _sdvantagos of the in inet trad; tht ores elements served as aourees of strength instead ‘of weakness. Richard Ros (1992) and Fanci , Caste (1908) find no significant diffrnces in econamc owt, ination, snd unemployment betwoon PR and nos-PR systems among the {ndustntized democracies. Nouriel Roubini and Jofey D. Sachs (1980) do find cleerconnocion between mulpery coalition government and governments with a short average tonore—both characteristics of consensus democney—on one >and alg budget defies onthe ther; haf mato and conchisions, however, have been challenged by Staph A. Bor roll nd Try J Royed (1098) and by Sung Deuk Hb, Mark S. Kamlt, and David . Mowery (1906). Maku M. L Graz (1996) finds that, in the ies, consensual Tnsill- ties a aot lee To coonomiegrovih but do have gi ‘Finally, G Bingham Powel (1962 Bods Ut "epentationl” 1, Tat Palo role pet alate Triape sence enecniy—sinrt wht {all cnsnes deere israel afta democi wi SF eaalnglencn The above ox alhad todo with macrooconomic manage- met andthe sono of vielanc. The St exalt pet ‘Banco indica Both boas Way aval cri] fnetoneof stand beomse precise quaniatve data afosralable. SEEPS Ee onus eat otomnie Benuete sant Dscoptial olor weno it oa light edge to consensus democracy. uy working hypall: Tee a arr lnnurgy pede ie ert rooms arctan wil bres EeRpult Antero ut epee fie Nemicousss end te mints ‘ee iy dtc by aveest py. a Ds mets ply emer, azar Row (99, eet hat ny infec Upon thn sem a A Eeteconel ofte prema. Drosees ning Seutady of goers y Bh ive, ae cod ota xn butte te ntetons fo ‘Sinn oyna ope ners enon, Drala ray ntuenad os by dacon taken ag, War ‘Sgn New Yn Brel ork” sah ca aout ot be aged th ft ustginelnmna until cus! ow toss hae) yon sal Went wcmny pene were owt sgh ed nn, coemploymet ole ami pratt ige pte reel and gowarmment stability. Ho fs that voter peietpain 1 sect ramen rs epee bantee SS Ree meine lancer ee Spe ora c eee ay me Nae are ate ra ee ee si a casera oa hari et ea aliepooetea Seat iateseceat abudget deficits are low —goveramens routinely claim cre for this happy sat af afr. And voters are known to reward gow. ‘ernment partis in good economictimes and to punish them ‘when the economy isin poor shape, The Mastic Trt, com. laden 1902 among the member ofthe Buropeaa Unton, was lio based on the atsumption that governments do have toca city t contol macroocnomic free becuse it obligated the stgnaores inte alia to keep infaon low-—defined as not ox. craig ve fe hs cue wh he vetini fom ates by more than 1.5 peroont—and to keep the natonal budget ects Below 2 pact of gone deme pad 3, howevt, dose pot up the nood a take hese 0 ETOTHS eet that they are ‘Menthe mametsblaradabes, ie shouldbe conselied axa the statistical enslyses. For econamie perfarmanes, the ie development is euch a potentially important ‘lantory vars Forte contol of viene th naan sal dlvislon should be controlled for, because dop aiv- ions minke te inaintsnance of public onder and peace more Aifficul. A hid variable whose influence must be checked i _Bopulation, it only because our democracies dar widsy in thier! rma ln ehyothaind tht lrg lee ‘ester problems of public oer tan scl ones, Is ber te ‘pets, Its not class whether sz is favorable or an uafaver ‘able thtor. Lange countries obviously have greatar power in international relations, which they can use, for instance, to ‘tin economic banefits for thei citizans. And yet grater inter ‘atonal in lute also moans more responsibilty and hence higher expensos, specially formality purposes. Raul events may alo eect canomic succss, such as the good lack exporienced by Britain and Norway when they ysis, tho relationships are no longer significant. Controlling for the level of development and population sin strengthens al of ‘he comeltios slighty bat ast enough to give them etatitcal significance. However al of the relationships remain negative, {ndlcatiog tat he consneus democracies prforned et eat east ismeneedn na of orig dyes pr tutend works pr yor Th direc etorn cous ‘onthin visible are bugs intbe period 167-98 feast. ‘rmbers for aly ndCanada vere 70and47 compared with {ns fr Swit and Arn. Thou ctded ine yr 1970-54 ere mainly OECD counties bat also lal. For the period 3980-04, not nly Spain, Fortul,and Greece bat lot, Conta Ries Maurin ndTnide wera. The Setnatd ogresion contin gv the impression of con $Terbl treed fort conteus democracies compared ‘wth th osoaran counts tayo about 78 and 34 fewer Jwonking days por thousnd wrkas inthe two periods, The {erences ave ot ttl sigifcnt, however, ily be uonthere ar nv! big exertions to th tendency of con tz coun ol rons hn rin dor teocace: especially majotasan Pranc with rately Ses nd maa consensual island and aly witshigh tik Invls oo aso Cowal 1090, 120-23. Contrling fo he level of development and population sas barely aft thee siionshps?| : Thr also lag ifn vo oie wth to Yadet deft Hal bd the highest annul df on pret tal Tos pet pou dame ‘whereas Norvay end Finland on avrage ght budgets ‘phases, Qual i consenaus democracies sow somewhat a ot at pf Sec ade a a stn ply indy of se eds St 2M ‘St of sg fret poy una wo aura, wh Ts ptonatBemcie ile oe wet Estep th agen commen Sse or Jonette mange be nse nly oe {sore gis oe neocons Some, SEE Be poco be pee omnes ee (Sn finale‘out the diforencs ore not gest and not ‘tats significant. Contlling forthe level of development and populition size strengthens the correlations considerably. ‘butnot enough tomake them statistically significant. ‘Table 15.1 also reports the correlations between consensus imoerecy an ha seam foe inden ns tocace sconomi vadmn sl san appopase teen of moaos economic prormance bit bens many economists blir that loner economic goth depends on Th Tee dere wre tndepenoty develope by fame Gernay, Rod. a Lavo, end Water Bloc (1000) andy Kin R. Helen, Bryan TJohoson, and Melanie Rikpatek (20) or not of the count of the word, inching most of ory ds ‘crc and by Fronds Howe fo te ter ots ier $k 1999) Taare ar mind conn democracy age Sly comlato a “nda and postvely wih be throbs itive conlton th Seong Howeves, ‘vn isco rom stately gant “Tren oftnstot of macrnconoemanageneat ah ‘be cummaritd ot fellows the evidence wll gard to | sumie growth and acon fed iin, ut wih rep | oal ofthe oth atest of ennomisprtrmance, hen | seas democacies have ade aa (cantly better ecard as far as inflation ie concerned Consensus Democracy and the Contrl of Violence ‘The lest four performance variables shown in Table 15.2 are ‘mossunes of vilonce: numbers of rote and mmbers of date cuit nnmenr cuneate rete fiat revs ecenatiees eee Siocon mnicertan mcr Shinanaimacreae from pli! violence per milion pope These dt oly fale ote period to 10401082, A soperate shove rid ons 1863 o 1082, as contacted tote bet nade Count tat wore ott Independent and demote alee Sen Bath ih nger aad sora paid ovrap ho wo see. Int priods (104570 and 1071-O8) fr which day of con teovss democracy were cused rf, the independent ‘esol ir is pat fhe nay the dogs ofconsenus nmocncy in voto peed The sinpl variate raonsip all show tht cose democary besiciate et lence and ue of te ot Conlon esata sgicant, Tis vdencla weak toed, however when contolsaeinoduoe! end ro ere Gollow ore omovel. Yenc end occa a ll, {opus and os developed sito, Teng Sai AREGaRp.sigifinnt tte peak eel, a betwen aS ‘Sasa domcracy and HOW Ts Ts pon Tee=¥2 Wen Te Savages gre of oct pluton. and Popa Sroanenet care seis oT pean aro esos Botwsn consis doce and huts fom glial vee tbe United Kingdom tf fro ollesin the pvod 104-0 as a ssl te Nahe Tan prblem end Jomaca isan cen ceri prod 1503-52 mally ae ral of tngovte lence maroeading the ot clon, Wes uae tne conse ator lie removed, the satisteald ap: eta orTations romain negative— showing at least slightly bilar performance TMF onseasus democrci. {Sess in mt ema i tn cay spe sled snus am the sleeve tho Sa of ‘ir rine a mpatcst rl, od ese ne ‘Salonen Uist ego wa none a Norbord, ‘Utd Knee reat orally pps oss.‘The iic ofthe Federalist Dimension ‘ube 15.2 Bvesiste reson aslo ofthe of conse (€Caneearee Democracy | democrany Undarlsnitery dimension) en hve mewrizeroftatetion tn tis alr 1 hve concent fron the conse a oe ae quencs ofthe executives pis dimension of eonsensusde- Conicent Saiicnt_traue™ 18 ‘mccracy. Those are the eflets thatthe convontional wisdom A ce cance oar rao ‘dean palo bo ufone ‘Ee conven mi a a ar fom doesnot concer ive explicitly with ihe federsaniary |= GbPdbar(iounas) “hares woas RD lesson, i cng 00" ia erlsm, econd eee id conttonystoe8 Ci espa ka judi review, uadIndependon cents banks cn al we ae saod fait the decnvner, sped, nt eabarnen othe 9 EM : Baal iia 0 pre one ‘ental governments policymaking compared wit unitary s+ usb Speen uns pce! tad tom, unicamerlism, Nexble constitutions, wank judicial 19- “Stal cant! pec tne et vate | sour: Bs ond in United Nilo Derlepa! Fern 185, 18-87, 2 {egy he earesion anaes pore in Tele 38.3 Dy ‘opp one? A10 seth cones demicrcy oF We deal vary dimen oe independent t | chapar, te Tavel of development end to some extent, PoP shorty al of he relonsips are extremely week. Consensus Intion size xe inversely slated to afation, but when these deporcy spin bt oleh es ov mabtianem ls | ar cota lB comeans ra “e _posllvely Felted Wo Ue somone pew variables and nope Strong and significant atthe bivariate cavelatons, Whe 12 yoy vey tostrk acy endo desta rom plitcal voles saan dcter ly esamoved bom the bro 1970-25 ogre sonal for budget dts, unemployment, and tsar mod. Son snaoes and outer Grooo i removed from the 1960-98 (Piksiecet cases cetera a ee etiasaye reasoned eras \_ allow any substantive conclusion in favor of ne or te other sfsgucancs. — . “This important finding is obviously not surprising. One of exponent Fr al ive ndatr of inf the iv ingroints-OF cones of L resus democracy re very song en i epodence, and to most aa ‘significant (at the 1 and 5 percent levels), The results of zc aes aaa ee oo preston analyses are shown in Table 152. Consens de tstogivethen the ols to conta nian. shouldbe, ‘acny infra socad with owe eels ofa: ertod tha the underlying logic of conte bork independance Among oF EI iF ily at odds wit {cof the conventional cal consensus democracy ba alos 3 perenge pola es rong and coherent policy lise Ries poe inflation (twice the estimated regression coecient) than the eam need ols cesar ‘ypleal majotaran democracy, As mentonad ese in his ‘ haps waret thre conclusions. Pit, tre conclusions. Pitbalance, con wv abuts parlormance ajoritran democracies, pecially with the controTormmation but also, elbet much more weekly with SU RSET ve. hls sd te coo of wolnce msoraran democrats 36 rataoran or TF recrdom any ofthe six groupe frre ri Sendo he el sae lively weak and mised; when conta wre Tarodaced aroma were moved, Tsai sigcant core Intions were found Hone, he empl sults do net per ‘he definveconlsion that consensus demecrets ae bot, Aucisionmmaker: and beter policy-makers then majortxan ‘ysoms. Thorefr thd, the moet important concloion of lapterinogitive: ajrlran democracls ar oS GET Geen democreces in aneping he econony thd _Asalaialsng dell poses Tas moan a ‘raventional wisdom dons not—or not yet—-noed to becom. pel revesed:itisnot proven tl consenvus dracon sctuly beta at governing What proven beyond ay dot, however, is thatthe soond pact fh conventional wisdom i lel wrong in claiming tht mjortrian domocteclos are the ber governs. The Sst prt ofthe conventional wisdom, ‘hich concedes that consents democracios ae batter t ep. senting. isthe sbjoct ofthe nxt chapter CHAPTER Ie The Quality of Democracy anda “Kinder, Gentler” Democracy ‘Consensus Democracy Makes aDifference Thacotveon wtdom saline poiutcap- sm egon-sranou Te Sn eerstn ‘mocracy is betier AT governing, but admits That Consenvas de- Seyi bra peeing pal BPO zo TER pret eves row acum ad prety ppl ede noes ‘ow nll nth a ptf archer outs so tral rane otha dep denocacatn® Att at WH aceon ae fe ber an afr democrats erg ae ‘oar nh cipro hpi Sone dfercee Setwan to per of dansrcy in eon poly oten tions Hore 1 abow tat conten demoarcy tn “Madr get andes Throw sera ‘apoech atthe Republican presidential nominating convention i August 198 in which ‘souted:“Ioant inet and alr ation” (New ork Tes, ‘August 19, 1988, 24). Cantnsus democracies domonstete those kinder end gentler uals inthe lowing wap: they a ‘mom Blob sels hey havea bor scond with regi othe poten they pat ewer poo: ection of the environment; le ngs andere lesley tus tdenth penal andths‘consensus democracies inthe developed world ae more genes ‘our with thei economic assistance tothe developing naloRR (Consensus Democracy and Democratic Quality ‘Table 16.1 presents the results of bivsiate rogrssionanaly- ses ofthe alo: ofconsensus democracy on sight sts finch ‘oraftbe quality of damocacy. The organization ofthe tae is simula to that of Tables 15:1 and 15.2 inthe previous chapter. ‘Thoindepondon veriable isthe degra of consensus democracy on tio erica pI dimension, gecerally inthe period el same gene indeatore of democratic quality. Many studios have sttompted to distinguish between democracy and nondamocr- Aicforms of goverment ot in tm of dichotomy but in tax suovr4 ofa scale with degra of democracy fam perfct ds ©» SE te comple abience of de These dagoes of democ- 1p: gists TE ean also bo interpreted as dogroe ofthe quai damoe Fs SS yey bow denice aun sweets the doar whlch ‘pplixitates pecictdamocrecy. Unfortunately, mos of thesa Indexes cnt Una 6 Hire diferent dors of demo- crate quality asiong our stax docreciosbacnuee thee e Sputcient verison’ all or mos of our democracies ae given *boFIGNRETASHE.Forinstance, both tings ofthe Fresiom ous Survey Toes (1900) and those by Kei ages and Tod Robert Gre (1005), eich sod n Chapa 40 defend these Joclon oft tity demorace forthe analyse in tha bok, ca slimosall fase counsas in tht highest catpey. “There are fo exceptions. One ie Robe A. Dab’ (1973, 231-48) Polyrlyin which 114 counties are placed iat one scale types rom the highest type of demceracy tothe lowest. ‘ype ofaondemonacy a af pprosdnataly 1080 All four de- rmocrcie that wer ndependent and democrat hat tine ‘except Barbados, Botswana, and Malla were rated by Datla toa of wnt of our hiya democraces~and halt ‘ngs span nine sale types. To give afew examples, the highest ‘summary ranking goo to Belg, Donssark and Faland: Aus- ‘ein end Gormany ae inthe mile; and Colombia and Vanozi- claatthobotiom. Table 1.1 shows that consonnus democracy is Stongy and sgt Consett pasate th ‘ES BUSTS a meter quay Te ditsaaas Seen onan aja meray consists smother pois {Coie th inated eresion covflon) on thn nine pola Sela Dat ting contin light bis in vor of cmsoous ore hows sporty Bnd on» Biher ranking of tmulpry compared witht psty systems. Howorer hie Ferenc epresent aly atid ofthe variation on oom of en Componontson whic tho rafingis bed could somehow tincountd, he vary rong creltonbtwoon cones Go imoccy andthe ting of denote uty would only be ‘ced mpl. A more serous ptt eure of isi tht the Third World domocacias wall pact inthe owes thes enlogoroe, However wen the level of development i tod ra conte vue tw etinotodrigrtsoncofiiot oo dows only sigh (1.20 point) nd th crlton talnsstatatcalegicat at tht pron lve The sncond ating of democratic quality i he overage of “ut Vathanon (190, 17-71 nds of democrat or curhyoat Fos 1500108 for alestalof th countries ‘world, including all thirty-six of our democracies, Vanhanen dete his index onto slament the dno of eampeto, Getz ate haw favo led a fi po Inet party, nd participation, defined ah arcana oft {ctl population a tad ath meat emt lion: Tew ear mip io arive aan oval inex: Th velun tthe Inde sange tom high of 422 fr Bla, alow fo for our yi once the lowest ale 5:7 for 4, The edged vile cotes ech 1945-7 ‘ed Davita below pt err ia ‘reo me kg atneromshighr epesof ecrt gai‘oeowap jo Ayqenb ojo Geieypur eowuaaeT wo (sop sem -stapnae) fosiowmop sisussan0 J jj tj ssKouw Rosas OIe|OsIg OE SLE,ae = ‘Quatity oF pemoceacr Botswana, Te fist slement fective dsngushes one-party fale fom democrat lacorl conten Dut ils necs- fev fs or the bis sty syste wad oe (a at tay male se Nore i ar EG essartare componenee Venen ads and there fore bos a much geotr ipa tan height bas in Dahl's tnd eons {tisavallale forall four democrctes, report ths oral of reeusi o comcnaie. doors Heaven, TH Corolaton fs npresvely song and reins song st the fame level of evel of development is Conolied for and when Botswana, wich is somewhat of an Sule romoved fom the eoalyes However, zal las ‘in favor ofmaltiprty systems makes te Vanhanen Indo ess ‘codble indo of danocrate quality tan tho Dal ind ‘Women's Represntation ‘The next three indicators in Table 16.1 measure women's political presentation and the protection of women’ interest "Theo ane important measures ofthe qulity of democratic p- seaentatioa in thelr own right, and they cen also servo a id rect proxies of how well minorities are roprecented generally. “That there era eo many Kinds of ethnic and roligiowsrinox!- ties ia diferent counties makes comparisons extremaly diff. tut, and it therefore makes sente to focus onthe "minorty® of ‘women politcal rather than a mamerical minorty~that found everywhere and that can be compared systematically ‘cross countries. A Rein Teagepera (1908, 243) states, "What ‘ve know about women's ropresentaion shoul [leo} be applic cable tothnoracal minoiin.” "The average pecontagp of women slected to the lower oF ‘only houses of parliament in all letions fom 1971 to 1995s ‘our thirty democraclae ranges from s high of 90. percent in ‘Sweden toa love of 0.9 peoent In Papua New Guinea, These Aiferences ee strongly and siguiicantly elated to the degre of ‘Srna dency The povanng fens pre oy seein t/a nage San ie catalan ooclen oc Geneon Shania tren stems. Women nd fo tripe ‘Sod aap Taping cunts nt whos Ie of develo is conto roe sions een ‘GincnesSenperey tad ‘womens ingle mpesaton ‘covey gy and a gin he 1 port Treen be nur th nsdn ren port {et womens prevention should notte tad only 00 Se deco the oglu ates, pep equal. ca Tir eloton oth prsdeney tl were done ta aon ‘Bip bcweo ons demos) end womes pata ‘one beef bc no la Praldent wes elected In Clonbl, Ose Ri, Price, ‘United States, and Venezuola in the ele period under consid tcalenea en a ef Semncrncir a to nrc ste oftho peorun (Figures TC end 142 be pu SM Tre oprivaation of omen catnip two rcnt uss 1000 an T085-alhogh he co ‘loon tute nyo the percent vl? The pce ‘oe rang tm £21 prety topcoat 2 Ppen Mew Gules, Hove nun tho loel of developnt i also a ‘ong orplntry etal bt eteig nose aft ‘fe wlan Naor conbennas emetray tnd women's cata opreentation ‘A smurf the protein and pomaton af women's ‘nt examined Held Wiles’ G0) ating the Indus amc wil ged toe nsoravess {ht estonia plir-a mater of pe ‘Sou to women. On Wena hte pint sos om Th peng wd i noid Hei of de on, a lr 8 0 sb Be “TRUS Serotec npo tn gsour often‘maximum of twelve toa minimum of aro, France and Sweden ‘have the highest score of elevan polnts and Australia and Ie- land the lowost scare of one point” Consensus democracies ‘score more than two points higher onthe sale, and the corrla- Hons sgnifiant atthe 10 percent oval and unaffcted by level ‘ofdevelopment, France sen unusual avian case: tisamaialy rmajeritarian system but recelvae one af the highest family- polie score. When It eumoved from the analyse the comela- tion becomes stronger and is statistically significant at the 5 of politica gia cic quality Political equality dist measur dine, ‘economic equality can serve asa valid prox, since pital squat is more likely to prevail i the absence of great eco- ‘nomic inequalities: "Many resources that low directly or nd. realy frm one's positon in the economic oda can be cone ‘reed into poltieal souras” (Dahl 1906, 68). The ich-poor ‘ois the tio of tho income share of the highest 20 peronnT3 {hat ofthe towest 2 percnt of housbolds. The United Nations Dovelopment Programme (1906) has collected the relevant sa- tists for twenty-four of our dtmormacies, including ae ofthe developing countries: Botswans, Colombia, Costa Rice, Inia, Jamies, and Venaruela, Tao ratio vais baton 1.4 in hlghiy ‘egalitarian Botswana and 4.3 in oplitarian Jepan.Congensus democracy and inequality as measured by therich-poor tia 1, Wes 00, 2s an ob tr pot ela, om re ert of ply carry mara gh ott [oguneed pet tt xpnd oan ky ores ‘ese Tuy name oem sen cone ov efile ‘lou nance anyon eye” ‘quatzrs oF pewoceacy a ery strona related etatisticlly significant at the percent level and almost tthe peoent vel The diter ‘enoeblween the average consensus democracy and the average _msjritarian democracy isabout2.8, The mere developed coun- toes have loss inequality than the developing countiw: whan the level. of development i controlled for, the coreation be- tween Gonstt amoetaay and aqalty weakens nly lightly and isi igifiant atthe s percent level. Whoa, in adlton, ‘he most extreme case of Botswana fs removed from the anal: 3th lationship remains signin ttn sae vel ‘The decile ato asim ratio of income dffermoes: the income ratio ofthe top tothe bottom dete, Ts avallale for mostoftho OPCD counties, based on the mos painstaking com ‘artive study of income diferonces that has boon done o far {Atkinson Rainwato, and Smeoding 1995). Consensus demoo- recis are aga the more egalitarian the comelation is sgn cant at tho § percent lovel end isnot affectd when love of evelopment is contolled for. Fintand bas the Tow lo, 259, and the United Staton Bas the highest, 504. The ane Sur antares one eat oT ee ‘nd tat of Fniand is 425, andthe sateen other democracies ‘uoall below chs midpeints the country withthe nex highest decile ratioaer the United State is eland with erati of 4.23. ‘When the Unite Stats e removed fom th analysis, tho cor relation between consensus democracy endincome equality be- comes even stronger although not enough to become significant st the higher ove Vanhanon’ (1997, 48, 46) Index of Power Resources ie an {ndzatr of quality besed on several dec iasures such a3 the dae of iezacy thw higher the percentag ofiterae pop alton, tbo mors widaly baste iatllcslresoureas are i+ tributed) and the permntage of urbes population (the hier [hin percentage, the mare diversified economic activities ‘nd economic interest groups thar are and, consequently, thea QuaLery oF pEwoceacy ‘mor economic power esouves are distributed among vaio ‘roup) Although Venbanens index i an nde and ob ‘unl rough sence asthe gent advantage tat it can bo Cleulatod Tor weny countries, including all of our tiny. ‘democracies. The highot va, 58.5 posts, i found fs the Netherlands, andthe lowest, 3.9 points, in Papua New Gaines, Ygumau demomexicpstily cole wh inn ‘hse asus but ony ae 10 parca vel fiance. However, when level of development, which i ls strongly correlated with Venhann'sndex is contll fr the relaton- ‘hip comes suongor andl sgfcant tthe percent vel ltoral Participation 5 ‘Voter turnout isan excellent ind zaticquality fn! FBBBIDE FBT Tao tho oxtent to which lions ao actually interested ia being roprosonted. Second, turnout is strongly coelated with socioeconomic statusand can therefore flto carve a an indirect indiator of political equality: high ‘umnout meens more ogusl participation end hence greater po- ‘tial equally; low tamout spells unequal participation and hhence more inequality Ljphart 19974), Tals 16.1 uses the ‘turnout porcentagos in national elections that attract the largest rumbers of voters loglsatveolections in paliamentary sys- toms and, prosidential systems, whichever eletions had the highest urnaut—generallytheprosdantial atherthan the lags Tntve elections and, seheteproidents are chosen by maority- unoff, gonerlly dhe runoff instead of the frstballt elections “aa basle menue isthe number of voters asa perontege of cut cf eget von, tcmon voter mtn raced ad relay ‘Ec py oe aay nay ely es ogee ‘Soin tale sin ed pn esau ofa oop mes pps ene van oF pacocesce Pa Intho period 1071-06, talyhad the highest average turnout, 9244 percent, and Switzerland tho lowest, 40.9 percent. Con snsus democracy and voter tumout ao positively correla” ‘bat Wis comolation ip sigan oly ar the 1 pareaat lve. However, se ‘Iniiodacod. Fist of ell, ‘compulsory voting, which is somewhat more common incon. SEA rrr Smscarien soon alone turnout® Second turnouts sovarly doprssad by the high fe- {quency and the multitude of electorel choices tobe made bots ‘in cangonsul Switzerland mas Uae St ‘Third, turnout tends to Bs higher in more developed coun. ‘When compulsory voting and the Requaacy ofections (both in the fr of GY Vln) ee Wal ws aT dal ‘ment are controlled forthe effect of consensus democrecy ‘i maa a cantat ova With hes contol Suey de omc ‘ipproximately 7.5 percentage points higher ‘tumnout than msjortrian democracios ‘The rogieseow aMRIVS Was posted with the average tum- cout figures collcted by C. Bingham Powell (1080 for an calor ‘period, 1900-78 Both ch bivariate and multivariate relation ‘lps ere very slilar tothe pattern reported in the previous ‘paragasph. The bivariate corelation ie agaificant a he 10 per- ‘ont level, but when the threo contol varabls are added, tho comelation between consensus democracy and tumoutbecomes Im ames seme proparton a Lnbosr with alten a rata og nti popu ian asin ated ‘God the tin peostgrtmedon gs tre Tin dame with compar voting inh 1871-8 paid ae ssi nig Cr is Grn codons Com. ‘nor tng wae hab au Naren 0. Forbes hu no th 80-70 Powel fal, oped now te Neer ‘hanna ring conguery wana th srg hart pret ‘rise eth cos wh tng we ll apy ‘hedeapecn varie the dere af cosas Sami ft esti ts pcos.strong and significant atthe 1 percant level. The difarncs in fturout betwoen consansus and majoritrian democracies is shout 7. percentage points—vary close tothe 7.5 percent difer ‘coin the period 1971-067 Satisfaction with Democracy Does tha ype of doc aft cin alison with Aimnoceey? HansDice Klingeann (100) Tops ho te ‘pone oth floring suey qusin asd tn many cu ‘is inchdigwighoen of ur domocrci In 100 ant 1000 “On the whol, ar you vey std ay sated. not very taint ott lets withthe way damocrecy wos ts Gour cus)” The Danes and Novweane expe he ght ecelae of SHEN wi dan ey. Rod m2 pect opetly sid that ther we oy ati fd, The talins and Colombians were hn least steet only 19g 26 pecomnt senpectively expres sal faction. Caner allyas Table 16:1 shows, ctzans in consensus democracies are ‘or anid wis Sameee ptine i thet oot ano merino Aitfrence is approximately 17 perentage potas Te euler sty of loves Surapianfanocaces, Christo ‘her). Anderson and Christine A, Guillory (1097) found eat, ix ‘ach f these onnirie, respondents who id voted forthe win- ning party or parties were mor likely tobe sats ith bow ‘wall damocracy worked in thee county than respondents who ‘had votad forthe losing party or patios. Because ts a5) tobe setisfiod whan on ison the winning side, hedge to whieh ‘winners and losers have siilar responses can be eguded as 7.PRla pba etna nto cmon yoo te son aoe en cna ec ol a wt ‘Soutset wna pions Gn bee PR ue melds ‘ecrncasamn dotnet tntonn bind oboe ‘Slaw pron nd we apres Baar 900 ke ‘eizinoeram 0) vauiry oF seocxncr Pa ‘more sensitive measure of the breadth of satisfaction than sien ply the number of poople who say they ar very or fairly sat fafled, The largest diference, 375 percentage points, was in Gece, witere 70. percent of th respandents onthe winning side expressed satisfaction compared with only 82.8 percent of {he losers the smallest ilforenee oceurred in Balginn, where 651.5 percen ofthe winners were satisfied compared with 58.8 percent of the iosors—a diffrence af only 4.7 percentage points, ‘The general pater discovared by Anderson and Guillory was ‘hatin cons asthe diflerenco betwoon winners sod lear were igen smaller tas ip suo a isa: My rolcation of Aadasaw ana Calor’ analysis, Ausng the Togroo of consensus democracy on the executives: ‘partes dimension in tho period 1971-96, stomgly confirms ‘thelrconclasion, As Table 16. shows, the difeence i satiefac fn snore thes 18 pecentnge pots smaller spel consti han she pl fran democracy. The oF relation is high slgafcant atthe {percent Tove)” Government-Voter Proximity ‘The next two varabos ean be used to test the following key Claim that is often radeon behalf of majortarian democracy: ‘acs inthe typical two-party system tha two taj partes se both kay to be moderte,thegoverament’s policy position fs ikely to be clase to that ofthe bulk ofthe voters. John D. Huber and G. Bingham Powell (1904) compared the govern: ‘ment’s position on a ten-peintlaf-sight scale vith the voters positions onthe same scale in tvelve Western democracis in {tn Anda sn unsere ous ht alto ste, scence ais oma oy n Peg pens epg sin wt “iow ‘wet ay i inc 7 para on at ecm Garay 44 proline hes once re ‘eth asa th maine ce ganas th spreoo QUALITY oF pawocxacy the period 1976-05, One measure of th distance between gor ‘emmont and voter is sizply the distance between th ‘man’s poston on the lefesight sale aad the ie median voter: tis measure scaled stance" in ‘le 105 Ther mais he pss fais bx ‘oun the goverment end th dit clzen, called “Ytit iene inthe ible, Tho aller tee wo diteoos a, th tao Tepresentstive the goverment sof the zane” ply preferences Government distance ranges fom «high of 2:39 points. on ‘he em point eal inthe United Kingdom To a ow of 047 ix Eland Vor tance WO FANON WO MUON, 97 povo, nd ie small inland, 13 pete. Contry to the major {tan ca, both clatancs a actually smaller in coneonns than in octane th dereacer in ipo: tive dsanes ee about fehizde of point on the tn-polnt sealoand more than 10 pereantf the citzes, Both coelations tresigifcnnt atthe 5 prcnt evel. Accountability and Corruption Another important claim in favor of majoritarian democracy fs thtitetypictlly one pay mafority governments offer leave reeponsibility for policymaking and bonce better accountabll- ty ofthe goverament to tho etzens—vwho can use elections ther to “renew the tenn of tho incumbant government” or to “throw the rascals out” (Powell 1089, 120). Tho claim is un> oubtedly valid for majortcian systems with pure two-party competition. However, in two-party systems with significant third parton, “rascal may be repetedlyrotured to office in ‘spite of clear majorities ofthe voters voting for other parti and Ihence aginst the incumbent government ll reelected British ‘cabinets since 1945 fit this dascrption, Moreover, itis actually ‘ssi tachege since as domocrcir ean join dere a OWE OY CHRON TN cle cn nmi St 0 of {BRD Atty of ouno, hangs in conenmu demo "cise a be patil changes in the componion of abnats, incontast with he more fen compat toroves inj isin dries. ‘Araaed meee ithe incidence of compton ny bo “hypotheslzed That the greater clarity of responsibility in major- {iran democraco ikl erpin and tha he Consens ‘etn’ tendency to compromise ant “deal-making fosters oraptpactces Tender of pacnived corupton nee frusbur of counts, tnlulngtonysevn of our deme ‘les by Dngpceny Intron [209 enb sed ots thie bypoters An indox of 1 bans “oally coup” and ‘mens “lly Coun Aong our coca, Ine a Co Tembia athe moet corp, wih cre betwoen 7nd athe te en af ho sale, scouts ar clos ln” Sith cores betvoon Gand 1 Denmark alan, Sweden, New Zoaand, Canad, and th Netharlnds Conny oth yp tsi thon font reltonhip btwer conan ‘nocacj and compton, MoroveU W RUATONE lar apper ix actly nepatives consensus democracies ‘igh lv lay fob erupt than nfosaianeytre Cy {ent twothids pont on he inde, This alaonehip bo omos tit songy txt i il ot stay sgt, ‘when the level of development, which is strongly and nega- Urey cola with he eo comaption, incon for Jolin Stuart it's iypotneses ‘The final two variables that measure the quality of dmoc- racy are inspired by John Start Mil (1061, 124) argument that tof leo aut sds amet doe tapes tenn ig eh “cand hort fea cage tose 2 rosa igh er won nen or tp‘cy and thatthe combination of plurality or majority elctlons and parliamentary government may loud to minority rule, He proves ‘his point by examining the most oxtrme case: “Suppose... that, ina country governed by equal and universal surge, ther isa contested elation in evry constituency, and covery election is caried by e smell majority. The Palioment ‘tus brought togothor represents ile more then abers majority of tho people. This Parliament procned o legisla, and adopts ‘important moasures bya bre majority of itself” Although Mill ‘oes not sat so explicitly, the most important ofthese “impon ‘at messues" ithe formation of cabinet supported by 2m Jorit ofthe legisators. Mil cominues: "itis possible, therefore, ‘nd oven probable” that tis two-stage majoritrian sytem do livers power “nt toa majority but toa minor." MA's point ie ‘wel lusated by the fact that, 2 I showod in Chapter 2, the Unltd Kingdom and New Zealand bev tended tobe pluralita jn instead of maostrian democracies since 1945 because ‘ir parliamentary majriios ad the one-party cabinats based them havo usualy been sported by only a plarity—the Inxgest minortyof tho voters otters hat th es slution into ute PR forthe alston tthaleilatre,and'hels obviously right tat aadere perfectly proportional syst the problem ofminarty contol canna oc: ‘cr His egument farther mesns that consensus democracies ts nadsition tend t Ba ‘mar inclusive colton cabins, re more oly to prt ‘an be used to test this hypothesis darived from Ml popular cabinet support: the averego parcontage ofthe voters “erste ae pery spate med he ot, in presidential ystems, the perconteg ofthe voters who voted far the winning providential candidate, wghted bythe time that each cabinet or prosident was in offic. Tha bcs measure a a TEI Griteron: the por measure may be called Ws Jolin Stuart Mall Grit ttn in bins or psa pare by polars jun le RIRTY Retr etrre cat caer The CRIs paOE TO oy al dno xp Papa New Chie toe large suber of independent edt Intra eet atipating nctint™ im bighe eee popaae akin soporte sorta (70.0 pert Dts (7.2 pee, a8 Aa nr pce od telowet Denar en peated Spin 0 prt Teoh Sot il erion wr abye SSinbo100 prt fh nota te Beara, ote, Jamis Leaticryndvieandend unr=prente Uhotinevin Nery, Spun and te Untied Haga, Tse triples aye tnt th at nthe poor Poe ‘meron tn ars elu oth conse ad ao Tasondemecrco, Wo shuld href nt ene son St conletons betwee comenras demoed either Sarre, 109 shown at though Sothern ae poste ny av weak oy creel ‘wanes hs ants estes "Sea ara nd amas on oN ago shaking forts coe One he salt erin omowtciy~Bosanm he Baas, al, rata, nd abeder-hav igh ppsinrehin suppor arent he ‘nn pr pry tein whi eng pr tly ao wins poplar uj o a oe ane por ai. Thie hang inne wi Rob Dbl end Ee ‘ward R Tate's (1973, 9-108) conclusien that smaller units hs have awe oti mua crnahen thy uP Dag Asche (1006 argues tha, in adtion to sae, neler plays aol in ‘in orem ilar peta or ‘anc eps ton Pansat at foeliy SS peer cont ree ‘Soe gectonr Moree ompetinssines eects cae oe jot decane aio |ducing the nose of patio, Th cn of ho eal inn at of Mat, with PR octane bt vial pure two pay compotion brsoutboth rgunents When epulon as ‘ttle ihe. ction brtwoe-consanun Seneca. ‘and popular cabinet support becomes statistically signiicantat ‘Ee obent vel Contallag for population hasan oven mae Aruna Aba he comes bebren conrenns donee racy andthe ohn Sta Mil Gteron iis now bth rongand gly sgt th 3 percent eval). "he vecond explanation it heptane re on the fortran half the petra bu tha tytn odo wellinvctng popular upper forthe recut. cmptiton tends to be between two song point candies, ond Ino suport i uaestesd ox pebaps are litilly {peaking contivod “when te majority mated i wed Thr, comoasusdomeces with quent minut a. sets cipal le Scandineian rote hav relay lw popuarcshnet sport Tae lbig difrence corse, Freres cabins ih enly minority poplar spor but ale ‘monly stint logit. sin Sandinai,and ex tots ith minesty pop suport but vith nf suport in Folament sin Brin ed Rew Zedend tr lak of opus ‘upperticlaly mor serous intelter cave Morera Pop- Sar rbot support i bod on actu vte cast and dove nat tn into scout stale vtn that yh tendency whch i Siupunlifaictoneiovotofor apart aot tocxuritis he vot ral pefrnce ut berate ieppert ‘have chance to win. Hence, if popular cabinet support auld “be.cloalated on the bass of the voters sincere preferences in~ to oftheir actual vte,thncomsensts democracies would Go i el domoaie quali. ‘The general coiichision ip that cies have abottar isjorarian democracy on all of the men. ‘SIeE ST democrtc quay is Title et that al eeopt to conelation ao statistically significant nd that most of the ‘Conlation are signicnt athe 2 oF 9 percent level: For 64 sons of epee Tass not presenting ale smilrto Table 18.2, {wth the iverltecorlations betwen consenrus democracy Sn he federal ‘nd the seventeen inal tf democrats quality. The roaton shat cere are no interesting ‘onli te pot the only sony estan vet elaton- ship ot he $ pera lev) ea negative covelaon basen ‘Coneasus democracy wd votes trmoat as pao 187186, ‘wove wen compalsory von, to Requoncy of elections, tnd level of development te conollod fr, the comelation be ‘amos very won andi no longer significant. CCoosensus Democracy and Is Kinder, Genter Qualities “Th democratic quali dscusted so far a thie chapter should appeal democrat Sl alt wit Sons's pretation, greater politcal equality higher pate~ Ipution in lotion, clover proxi between government pole yen eo rene nde i abbr eho ‘Start Milfs majority principle. Inadon, conse damoe- ‘acy (on the exocutives-parties dimension). “aavoclated with ea Bat Tinie mast ough not ‘Sigal statesman ‘alton and soca corloueness—Bp Kinder, go ANTES ‘Soitotod in th bepaningeFis chapter Thon chrctrtes treaso consonant with feminist concoptions of democracy hat trope in jane Mansbridge’ (096,123) words, “comnect- stan en ntl pron? in of ites nd ‘ower pales“ Tho proses of persutsion may belted to Rp consuatv,puctipatny seth soant carte ‘Nomen moran te” Mantidge furercltos ter dir ree to er dtincion btwoen “adversary” and “wniary” dor ‘ocrecy, whlch is sila tothe majortaray-cnsensua comSee tne ost ‘more masculine modal of democracy. ns Th ee Ea Sa Ppt scl in whch the ‘adored eter of onsennsdemerscy a ay ‘omnaaift hemsele stl we, mnt he gonment, coiminal justin, and foelgn eid. My ‘Se cits dear ile aeied wih ado po te nd nore ross pole Tit 162 Prensa ofthe hvu rgesion ayn oh ea ono kc on te nt oft ply ene nts inraon The npn vero nalleunste eget Cansoesdnrcy ont rcv pr dart SSepeod tries, hm Sa tor ofthe dagaeo which democci re vl sns i Gata Erg dns (90) copra, Sve msi of commotion’ tot i te dope ‘which welfare policies with regard fo unemployment, disabil- "ls eed age prt ppl tomate eng ‘anda indent of pare erat cae nog no teen OBCD counter srry by Eoin ans in 100, Sweden ben ig scr of 38 ots end Sure oUt Stn olan and oa pemtscmeeteis ‘Guscren dency bar g son pst cae th thane tall Goro Ths diiron beones eee ttrs dense tad he erengs maaan ene ‘Sos ten ite, Wen count ce ef tb mae srs with wr thn le aly nut, et he a ‘Saf deeapmentiscomte fr camition tree ‘Stns cry and wee oan crn i sgar ping Andres ear arnen sevey seed oe dstating hedge och Asso Ne and and Se United King a wee stats (ann an itl 1043) acme hse stone so er ses aly QUALITY OF DEWoCRAGY = ronan spams, tis elem throes doubt om the Link Seren consearis cemocrcy and well statism. In ordor to tos whether the rial finding was entirely driven by Eoping- ‘desen’s clssifition of Austrlla, Now Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Irozanthe rgrestion without these hoods tod can, Thr rl ereportd in the socond row of Tabla 4362. The relationship beweenconsenss democracy andthe swale stato is weakened ony igh, and ites statistically Sgifcnt the 5 parce lvl. ‘Aualher indicator of wll tatsm socal expenditure as 4 poreenigs of gost domestic product lathe stneelghteen (ECD counts in 1092, alyzed by Mand 6. Sehnit (2907. Sweden lesan he most welfro-criented democracy ‘with 972 perent socal expenditure, but Japan now has the lowest percntage, 12.4 penn, followed bythe United Sats ‘wth 186 pee The coalation with consensus democracy is sin strong and siglo, and te not acted won Tol of developnsn contol for. Consens demoeroio dle ‘om majoritasiancemecracas in that they epend on atinal SSplcontfthirges dee proficton live Enuzaumanal performance cen be meesured by mans of ‘walndictors hates alate forall oralmoctall of ourthy- six domocacis. The frst is Monte Pale (1987) composite indo of concer forthe exvironminay, based manly on cabs nideamisina, flies conmimptin, and deforsttion ‘his index ranges Goma high ofone unde paints, Indicating the bst sovironmental performance to & low of oo points othe ort porfonmance The highest sore among tur democracies I forte Netherlands, sventy-seven points, ‘hd the lowe soo fe Botrwena', zoo pont Consenss emozrcins sce slo en point higher than majoring -tamar(167 1) gs nies oho eee ‘wna lenge is 00 suo» 20-9 oat MDA ‘Ste woll indo ete iol partes‘quatiry oF prmoceacr ” Bemocracie; the coreltion staal significant at he 10 fercentIbVl ond isnot affected whan level of evelopment is ‘contolld for usu hater overall mea of entree pon sibility is snargy efficiency. 16.2 uses the World Bank's gure forte rose dome produc ide by total energy Cenmumpton for tho yar fom 0000 1094, The ost nvion- Stentlly responsible counzis produce geeds and services ‘wih the lowest relive consumption of energy: th Test r= pone countoe waste «great del of enagy. Among ou thers democracie,Swandand bas the highest value an tnnval average of $8.70, and ‘Riidad the lowest, $080. Che onion between consensus domocacy end eo) Gene sorely tong giant ie Tpercant Tove ena inafedsd Ty ti troduction oflavel af development at con- teslvanble (oe weuld als expec the quails of kindness nd gone ans in consensus democracies osbow up in ciminaljutior Syotems tat are aa punitive tan hose of majrtarian ‘Reln,with liaprope Ts pison and wth a or no woof ‘iit pnicant To eth bypotheis with gard E- Er an TWN th average le in 1902-99 ond 1095 tolled by to Sentencing Project (Mave: 2004, 1997) Theso {ater reprovent the nunber of mates per hundred thovsend opolatin. The higher and lowest rts erothose forthe United. Sigg and ind 860 Tabaisend opelatlon rpctely. Coneneus democracy is ngeBely lind wih scaation, but only at he mode ESTE Tees ofmicance However, thine strongly acd by {Goeiemo cs ofthe United Sato: 960 prisoners ot bun | Ged thousand popleis sone than fur tines saan othe 131 {imate in he next ost pnitive country, New Zonand, When, {he United States is removed fom th nays, the nega cor {elon betwonn consensus democracy andthe ineaceration {ates lgificnt at the 5 percent level: whon in adios the % ¥ ronmental Contos Awolute ‘entue ser 30 ‘Sandra simated ees coetcient ‘Table 16.2__Bivarite regression analyses ofthe effot of consensus democtar {ccecutives-partis dimansion) on ten indicators of wolfaestatsn, env performance, cml justice, and foreign aid Paimerindex 1990) See fone 1900-94)level of development ia contoled for, the carla becomos significant atthe 1 percot level. Tho remaining twenty-one ‘counties rang fom 24to 121 inmates per humdred thousand opultn wit nlf evelopment cna on “petal att pps Se Snipouhion apie Scermeaatae od se dnt ay ry cine uhm Bee. ton Bours tana, eps adn and Ua Stn Th twenty eon dnt providers enh penal ys. Tha naling sneer ‘sod loser th death pnaly oly torewcepionl ie ch wen ine” Cane, el Nain ad Unto Kingand erased th ath Pony bt hadnt an ifr isto ure Sela sd Pps Ne Gunn Bod 107 7a) On eben of hss {Gdrnca contracted ner plat sale wih enn fre forthev une ttn pyaar caean ee Sah penal anon tind cnn Poosoging etwwn consent damcny en hr ai pas, cane a tsttaetdy contig or rloasvoaet In the field of: policy, one might plausibly expect the id nd gate so coears damocy tbe ted by greeny wih lon dena aactnce ‘iy only power Rl tee te dr ‘brenty-one OBCD countries: average annual frelmnaldThat i, ‘conone deeper anienoe a iting tat p of gross national product in the period 1982~85 balore ‘heen oes War area cd ee pn sizes teeter ‘enti wih eth thy tn aendemecrace seine ene chime pena osthaddomescae ease ‘cle tabs een more psc loving thas ara domes, ‘Cold War years fom 1992 1 1905; and feign af the at sin tipera oo 25 afin tures fa tho park 15 Tarlgn ald ranged fom TOF parcent of goss ne ‘ional profuct (Norway) to low of 0.08 poront (Portal: the period 1982-95, the highest percentage was 1.02 perceat (Denmaricand Norway) and the lowes 0.14 parcant tho United Stato) Te higher orig id spect of dlensn expend {ecg DanasP ET pC athe lowest oi Uta ‘Sue pte ine iii rreation nag consensus democracy is signtcantycorelated with all he tds, bel ot feel evs owever vo torn contol sed ot ne ica: Pet teens weer cote cantata ard five frig id than sweaty cute, th velo devel. {ronnt shoud bs controled oe Second, bacoute lnge coun ‘tnd sec reser lary spose and ees tend to ave lager dfnto expenditures, whieh ca bo x etd init thi ality and lings to provide foreign population esos be unt ara contel esas Del fn Tube (273, 252-20 found stg link betwen popala: ton and defen sending When tae two contol a0 ded the ctvnons been conn emery sot three massrofforsign it remsin signin al tthe per ‘ont Level, Vth hn contol in plow the tial conansas ‘pdt a fey 3 Ua ti pia noarendamocrcy Intute Catrarane post-Cold War periods and sidan pes Ses eng ware Te PETG POS aan “Salar roesion anaes can be performed fo tt the of uct the ck (oder dimesion of connate tnoccyn the lov lan nde Ban interning als {ne The oly to gallant ves SSDS a {ween cnsonus dersocrcy on on band en be ineceon ‘nvod sure expentin on he bey, a th peroa QUALI oF DewocKacy level. The nogatve correlation with socal expenditure ie not Affected when the level of developmen ie contralled fr the we planstion is that throefodealsystoms— Australia, Canada, and ‘he United Sttes—are among the only four countries with social spending below 20 percent of goss domestic produc. The pos- tive corelation withthe rte of incarceration je eotrly driven by theprtramo csp ofthe United Stats; whon the United States Sssemoved ftom the analysis, th olatinship dippers ‘As the subtitle of this chapter states: consensus democ: ‘cy makos a dtferenc. Indeed, consensus democrecy—on the ‘xocutivar partes dimension—makee «big difference with r= tird to almost all ofthe indicators of democratic quality and ‘wih regard to allo the Kindor nd geatlor qualities. Further- ‘more, when the ppropatecontols ar introdcad, tho post ‘ivediferencethat consensus democracy makes generally tends tobecome even more impresive, CHAPTER 17 Conclusions and Recommendations ‘Two conclusions ofthis book stand out as most im- portant. The fist i hat the eabtizous vsiety Of formal and |Sfvmal les end institutions at we Hida demourecas xn ‘lsh ee contrasts between inajoritarian and consensus govecame ‘second important conclusion has to do with the policy per ee Ee canis aie eee ee ‘ocicies Wo Hot Bitfetonn Wie consaasus Memoeraciey on aaSRCMONAC ARABS Un Use CNET CTC ee democratic representation as well s with regard to what bave called tie Hindnoss papal ae, consensus democracy have obvious advantages for large coun toes, and the independent central banks that are part of this same set of consensus charactristics effectively serve the Pur ‘poe of controlling ifation “Theso conclusions have an extemely Important prectical Jmplicaton: because the overall perfomance record of te con sensus democracies iclosry superta