GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW

1. Definition of Criminal Law

BUSTOS v. LUCERO

(81 Phil 640)

FACTS:

The petitioner in the case appeared at the preliminary investigation before the Justice of Peace of
Masantol, Pampanga, and after being informed of the criminal charges against him and asked if he
pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that
the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-
examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected,
invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel
announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence," and the justice of the peace
forwarded the case to the court of first instance. The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion
with the CFI praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of peace of Masantol, on order
that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their
testimony. The motion was denied and for that reason the present special civil action of mandamus was
instituted. Petitioner squarely attacks the validity of the provision of section 11 or Rule 108, on the ground
that it deprives him of the right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the
prosecution, contrary to the provision of section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 11, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is an infringement to the provision of section
13, Article VIII, of the Constitution hence the decision of the majority is judicial legislation that diminishes
the right of the accused.

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors is an adjective law and not
a substantive law or substantive right. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this
respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights are a term which includes those rights which
one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that
part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which
give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed
to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their
invasion. As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and
prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides
or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished Preliminary investigation is
eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution.

As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence — which is the "the mode and
manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact in
dispute in judicial proceedings" — is identified with and forms part of the method by which, in private
law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal
procedure refers to pleading, evidence and practice. The entire rules of evidence have been incorporated
into the Rules of Court. We cannot tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without
throwing out the whole code of evidence embodied in these Rules. We do not believe that the curtailment
of the right of an accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-examine the witnesses who had given
evidence for his arrest is of such importance as to offend against the constitutional inhibition. As we have
said in the beginning, preliminary investigation is not an essential part of due process of law.

It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed
thereunder cannot be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition. While section 11 of Rule 108 denies
to the defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to present
his witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him
both at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the proceedings, the only
stage where the guaranty of due process comes into play, he still enjoys to the full extent the right to be
confronted by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. The degree of importance of a preliminary
investigation to an accused may be gauged by the fact that this formality is frequently waived. It is
inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should step on substantive rights, and the Constitution
must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and
arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to
his disadvantage. For the Court's power is not merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure
existing at the time of the Constitution's approval. This power is "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts," which is a power to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive
system of procedure, adding new and different rules without regard to their source.

2. Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege

EVANGELISTA v. PEOPLE

(G.R. No. 108135-36, Aug. 14, 2000)

FACTS:

Tanduay Distillery, Inc, filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) an application for tax credits for
allegedly erroneous payments of ad valorem taxes (taxes based on value of property). Tanduay claimed
that a previous BIR ruling only made Tanduay liable to pay specific taxes and not ad valorem taxes. Thus,
Tanduay requested the BIR to check and verify whether Tanduay previously paid ad valorem taxes. After
making necessary verification, a certification was issued, stating that Tanduay was a rectifier not liable ad
valorem tax with a recommendation that the application for tax credit be given due course. Sometime
thereafter, BIR received a complaint, alleging that the grant of tax credit was irregular and anomalous.
Due to this, petitioner, along with three other officers of BIR, was charged before the Sandiganbayan for
violation of the NIRC and RA 3019. They were convicted, except for one officer, of crimes pursuant to said
violations.

In a consolidated petition for review, the two officers were acquitted, except for Evangelista, who was
found guilty of gross negligence in the exercise of his duty; thus, this Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner violated Section 3(e) of RA 3019?

RULING:

“Motion for Reconsideration is well-taken.”

The certification issued by petitioner did not endorse approval of said application for tax credit but actually
showed that Tanduay was not entitled to such. Contrary to allegations, petitioner did not cause any undue
injury to the Government, give unwarranted benefits or preference to Tanduay, display manifest partiality
to Tanduay, and act with evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Furthermore, the acts from
which her conviction was based on were different from those described in the Information under which
she was charged with. It is a well settled rule that an accused cannot be convicted of an offence unless it
is clearly charged in the complaint of information. Finally, petitioner’s act of issuing the certification did
not constitute corrupt practices as defined in Section 3(e) of RA 3019; thus, the maxim nullum crimen
nulla poena sine lege (there is no crime where there is no law punishing it) is applicable.

“WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. This Court’s Decision dated September 30,
1999 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED of the charge against her.”

PEOPLE V. CABURAL

(GR No. 34105, February 4, 1983)

FACTS:

At about 2am, 3 masked men entered the building of Kim thru an opening of the roof above the kitchen
that was being repaired and forced themselves inside a room where Pua, Sy and Siao were sleeping. The
masked men hogtied the three and began to ransack the place. One of the men also asked Sy to open the
safe and threaten to kill them if he did not. In the next room, the maids Restituta and Agripina were
awakened by 2 masked men(one holding a knife, the other a gun). The 2 maids were also hogtied. Later,
Agripina was able to free her hands but was discovered by one of the masked men. The latter raped
Agripina in anger.

When all the masked men left, Agripina identified her rapist to be Cabural. Furthermore, upon
investigation of the Constabulary, 2 guns were found in Benjamin’s house. The latter admitted to
committing the crime and pointed to his companions. All the accused were charged with the crime of
Robbery in Band with Rape. The lower court convicted them but only Cabural and 2 co-accused appealed.
ISSUE:

Whether or not all the accused are guilty of robbery with Rape.

HELD:

Yes, with qualifications.

Cabural alone was responsible for the rape on Agripina. There is no evidence that his co-appellant
Yangyang and the other male factors made advances on her. The extrajudicial confessions of Benjamin
and Leonide point to Cabural as the mastermind and the role each of them would play in the commission
of the crime. Their interlocking confessions indicate how they would go to the scene of the crime, the
manner by which they would enter into the premises of Kim.

Fiscal Magsalin testified that said accused readily and without hesitation signed their respective extra-
judicial confessions. The alibi of the accused has no merit since there is still no guarantee that he could
not be at the scene of the crime. Furthermore, the crime is aggravated by dwelling and nighttime. In
People v. Perello, it was mentioned that the Chief Justice and therein ponente (Justice Ramon C. Aquino)
are of the opinion that article 335 cannot be applied to robbery with rape and that that offense should be
penalized under article 294(2) in which case reclusion perpetua should be imposed. As the accused was
charged with a crime against property, he should not be convicted of a crime against chastity, a private
offense. The writer of this decision is of the opinion that in robbery with rape, the accused should be
penalized under Article 294(2) of the Revised Penal Code because it is a crime against property and not a
crime against chastity a private offense.

CORPUZ V. PEOPLE

(GR No. 180016, April 29, 2014)

FACTS:

Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with an obligation to sell the same
and remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold, after the expiration of 30 days. The
period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy. When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz
promised that he will pay, but to no avail. Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against
Corpuz.

Corpuz argued as follows:

a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere photocopy.
b. The information was defective because the date when the jewelry should be returned and the date
when crime occurred is different from the one testified to by Tangcoy.

c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.

d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction

ISSUE:

1. Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best evidence rule
(only original documents, as a general rule, is admissible as evidence)?

2. Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse of confidence?

3. May a sole witness be considered credible?

RULING:

1. Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at
the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. Here, Corpuz never
objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon
in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution’s formal
offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt.

2. No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315,
paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property
received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the
crime. Hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected
in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.

Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information:

1. The designation of the offense by the statute;

2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;

3. The name of the offended party; and

4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed. The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information indicates that the time of offense
was committed “on or about the 5th of July 1991,” such is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause considering
that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material
ingredient of the offense.

What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of confidence? Note first that the elements of
estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows:

(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return
the same;
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on
his part of such receipt;

(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and

(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even be formal;
it may be verbal. The specific word “demand” need not even be used to show that it has indeed been
made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this
case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.

In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the
accused, the query was tantamount to a demand.

3. Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, SC gives great respect
to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses
and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely
rely on the records of the case. The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially
when such finding is affirmed by the CA. Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the
quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to
be weighed not numbered.

3. State authority to punish crimes

PEOPLE V. SANTIAGO

(43 Phil 120)

FACTS:

Petitioner Gregorio Santiago caused the death of a 7year old boy by striking him with an automobile that
he was driving. Santiago was prosecuted for the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, Santiago does
not agree with the courts sentence, questioning the constitutionality of act no. 2886 amending order no.
58 stating that all prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the U.S... Act no. 2886stating
that all prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the Philippine islands.

ISSUE:

Whether the procedure in criminal matters is incorporated in the constitution of the state?

HELD:

NO, procedure in criminal matter is not incorporated in the constitution of the states, but it is left in the
hand of the legislature, so that it falls within the realm of public statutory law. It is limited to criminal
procedure and its intention is to give to its provision the effect of law in criminal matters. In pursuance of
the constitution of the US each state has the authority, under its police power rule to
define and punish crimes and to lay down the rules of criminal procedure. The delegation to our
government needs no demo, the crimes committed within our territory even before sec 2 of general
orders no.58 was amended, were prosecuted and punish jurisdiction. Act No. 2886 (Feb 24 1920) criminal
complainant was filed May 10 1920. The silence of congress regarding those laws amendatory of the said
general orders must be considered as an act of the approval.

U.S. V. PABLO

(35 Phil 94)

FACTS:

In compliance to an order from his chief, Andres Pablo, a policeman of the municipality of Balanga, went
to the barrio of Tuyo to raid a jueteng game; but before the said officer arrived there the players left and
ran away. He was able to recover on his arrival a low table, a tambiolo (receptacle) and 37 bolas (balls).
Said officer also saw the men Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo left but only Francisco Dato was
arrested. This information was contained in his report to his chief who immediately filed a complaint in
the court of justice of the peace against Rodrigo, Malicsi, and Dato for illegal gambling in violation of
municipal ordinance No. 5.

Pablo testified under oath that on a particular date he and a companion raided a jueteng game, that when
they arrived in the place they saw Dato and a low table that made them suspect that a jueteng game was
being held; that they did find a tambiolo and 37 bolas, but that they did not see Rodrigo and Malicsi on
the scene nor did they see them scamper; and that only after the incident that they learned of Rodrigo
and malicsi as being the ringleaders of the said jueteng game according to a source. This testimony was
acted upon by the court acquitting the defendants Rodrigo and Malicsi and sentenced only Dato.

The provincial fiscal investigated further on the case and found out that before the case came to trial in
the justice of the peace court, the policeman Pablo had conference with the accused Malicsi and ROdrigo
and agreed that he would exclude the involvement of the two in the case in exchange of a bribe of fifteen
pesos. Because of this development, the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance
charging Andres Pablo with the crime of perjury in violation of section 3 of Act No. 1697 declaring that he
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously affirmed and swore under oath in legal form before the justice of the
peace during the hearing of the case of Rodrigo and Malicsi for violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 5 of
the municipality of Balanga when he excluded the two accused from involvement in the incident despite
being utterly false and material to the decision of the case. When the court found him guilty and
sentenced to suffer years imprisonment, a fine, and disqualification to hold public office as well as from
testifying in Philippine courts, he appealed for such judgment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is guilty of the crime of perjury or of false testimony under art. 318 to 324
of the Revised Penal Code
HELD:

Yes. The respondent is guilty of such crime under Article 318 to 324 of the penal code since such articles
are not expressly repealed by the Administrative code when it repealed Act No. 1697. Law 11, Title 2,
Book 3, of the Novisima Recopilacion states that, “All laws… not expressly repealed by other subsequent
laws, must be literally obeyed and the excuse that they are not in use cannot avail.” Said articles of the
Penal Code are in force and are properly applicable to crimes of false testimony. In the present case, the
proven evidence showed that Andres Pablo falsely testified before the court by perverting the truth in
favor of the alleged gamblers, Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo and in receiving bribe from the said
accused which aggravated the crime – proof showed he received P15 in order that he exclude the two
ringleaders in his sworn testimony. The court held that, “ … in the commission of the crime of false
testimony, there concurred the aggravating circumstance of price or reward, No. 3 of article 10 of the
Code, with no mitigating circumstance to offset the effects of the said aggravating one; wherefore the
defendant has incurred the maximum period of the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree to
prision correccional in its medium degree, and a fine.”

4. Effectivity of Penal Laws

PESIGAN V. ANGELES

(129 SCRA 174)

FACTS:

Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in a 10-wheeler truck in April
1982, 26 carabaos and a calf, from Camarines Sur to Batangas. Despite the health certificate, permit to
transport, and certificate of inspection issued to them by the provincial veterinarian, provincial
commander and constabulary command, respectively, while petitioners were negotiating the town of
Basud, Camarines Norte, the carabaos were confiscated by private respondents, Police Station
Commander Lt. Zanarosa, and provincial veterinarian Dr. Miranda. The confiscation was based on
Executive Order 626-A which prohibited the transport of carabaos from one province to another.
Pursuant to EO 626-A, Dr Miranda distributed the carabaos to 25 farmers of Basud. Petitioners filed for
recovery of the carabaos and damages, against private respondent Judge Angeles who heard the case in
Daet and later transferred to Caloocan City, and dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not EO 626-A be enforced before its publication in the Official Gazette.

HELD:

Said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already
noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14,
1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section
11 of the Revised Administrative Code. The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes
circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the
contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.

TAÑADA V. TUVERA

(136 SCRA 27)

FACTS:

Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents,
through the Solicitor General would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have
no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of
any showing that the petitioner is personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged
nonpublication of the presidential issuances in question.

Respondent further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for
the effectivity of the law where the law themselves provides for their own effectivity dates.

ISSUES:

Whether the presidential decrees in question which contain special provisions as to the date they are to
take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity?

RULING:

Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide
for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity,
which is the 15th day following its publication, but not when the law itself provides for the date when it
goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if
the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The publication of all presidential issuances of a public
nature or of general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for
fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose burdens on the people, such as tax
revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular
persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concern. The Court therefore declares that presidential
issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Emeterio
Cui vs. Arellano
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

1. Due process and equal protection - Void for Vagueness

PEOPLE V. ROSENTHAL AND OSMEÑA

(68 Phil 328)

FACTS:

Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmeña were founders and shareholders of the O.R.O. Oil Company. The
main objects and purposes of the company are to mine, refine, market, buy and sell petroleum, natural
gas and other oil products. Rosenthal and Osmeña were found guilty by the RTC in two cases of selling
their shares to individuals without first obtaining the corresponding written permit or license from the
Insular Treasurer of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. This is in violation of Sections 2 & 5 of Act No.
2581, commonly known as the Blue-Sky Law. Section 2 of said law provides that every person, partnership,
association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines speculative securities of any kind
or character whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the Insular Treasurer the various
documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-pesos. Sec 5, on the
other hand, provides that “whatever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is satisfied, either with or
without the examination herein provided, that any person, partnership, association or corporation is
entitled to the right to offer its securities as above defined and provided for sale in the Philippine Islands,
he shall issue to such person, partnership, association or corporation a certificate or permit reciting that
such person, partnership, association or corporation has complied with the provisions of this act, and that
such person, partnership, association or corporation, its brokers or agents are entitled to order the
securities named in said certificate or permit for sale”; that “said Treasurer shall furthermore have
authority, whenever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said certificate or permit”, and
that “an appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may be had within the period of thirty days to
the Secretary of Finance.” The shares are said to be speculative because their value materially depended
upon a promise of future promotion and development of the oil business, rather than on actual tangible
assets.

On appeal, Rosenthal & Osmena argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional on three grounds:

1) That it constitutes undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular treasurer

2) that it does not afford equal protection before the law

3) that it is vague and ambiguous

ISSUE:

Whether or not the law is unconstitutional in any of the three grounds.

HELD:

The law is CONSTITUTIONAL on all grounds alleged by the appellants.

RATIO:

1. That it constitutes undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular treasurer:

The Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding the
issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act
must recite that the person ,partnership, association or corporation applying therefor “has complied with
the provisions of this Act”, and this requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions of the law,
means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act 2581
have been complied with. Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a
certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation “is in the public
interest.” In view of the intention and purpose of Act 2581 to protect the public against “speculative
schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky” and against the “sale of stock infly-by-
night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations”, we hold
that “public interest” in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a
decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits. Act 2581 allows
appeal from the decision of the Treasurer to the Sec of Finance. Hence, it cannot be contended that the
Treasurer can act and decide without any restraining influence. The theory of the separation of powers is
designed by its originators to secure action and at the same time to forestall over action which necessarily
results from undue concentration of powers, and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent despotism.
Thereby, the “rule of law” was established which narrows the range of governmental action and makes it
subject to control by certain legal devices. As a corollary, we find the rule prohibiting delegation of
legislative authority, and from the earliest time American legal authorities have proceeded on the theory
that legislative power must be exercised by the legislative alone. It is frankness, however, to confess that
as one delves into the mass of judicial pronouncements, he finds a great deal of confusion. The maxim
“delegatus non potest delegare or delegata potestas non potest delegare” has been made to adapt itself
to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the
principle of “subordinate legislation”, in practically all modern governments. Difficulty lies in fixing the
limit and extent of the authority. While courts have undertaken to laydown general principles, the safest
is to decide each case according to its peculiar environment, having in mind the wholesome legislative
purpose intended to be achieved.

Hall v Geiger-Jones: it is well-settled principle of law in this state that by legislative act a commission or
board may be empowered to ascertain the existence of facts, upon the finding of which may depend the
right to continue in the practice of a profession or a regulated business.

2. That it does not afford equal protection before the law:

o Another ground relied upon by appellants in contending that Act No. 2581 is unconstitutional is that
it denies equal protection of the laws because the law discriminates between an owner who sells his
securities in a single transaction and one who disposes of them in repeated and successive transactions.

o Hall vs. Geiger-Jones Co: "Prominent among such discriminations are . . . between an owner who sells
his securities in a single transaction and one who disposes of them in successive transactions; . . . " If a
class is deemed to present a conspicuous example of what the legislature seeks to prevent, the 14th
Amendment allows it to be dealt with although otherwise and merely logically not distinguishable from
others not embraced in the law

3. That it is vague and ambiguous:

o People vs. Fernandez and Trinidad. An Act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of
vagueness and uncertainty only upon a showing that the defect is such that the courts are unable to
determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intended.

o in this connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule that “legislation should not be held invalid
on the ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support and give it
effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no adequate
means to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise and
provide the means, and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the reach of those
in trusted therewith.”

Judgement of lower court is affirmed, with modifications that the fines are reduced.

Rosenthal: from P500 -> P200 in each case

Osmena: from P1000 -> P500, from P2000 -> P1000

Subsidiary imprisonment for both in case of insolvency, and costs.

ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN

(421 Phil 290)

FACTS:

Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659. On the information, it was alleged that Estrada
have received billions of pesos through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar
schemes or means thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of
the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:

1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness

2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions

3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code.

Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Information against petitioner.
Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but was
denied. Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a probable
cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused.
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged
therein did NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional
for vagueness and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one offense. Same was
denied.

The questioned provisions of the petitioners are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 of the Plunder Law which states
that:

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material
possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;

(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form
of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project
or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned;

(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government
or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries;

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form
of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking;

(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or

implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and
the Republic of the Philippines. Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer
who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime
of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the
said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be
punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance
of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered
by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes
and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof
forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied).

Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary
to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt
a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring
supplied).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?

HELD:

NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are
subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The
amended information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the
various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed. We discern nothing in
the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Petitioner, however,
bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms “combination” and
“series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These omissions, according
to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad
and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence
violative of his fundamental right to due process. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely
because general terms are used herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them. A
statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute
is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others
may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE V. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL

(632 SCRA 146)

FACTS:
Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372,
otherwise known as the Human Security Act. Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the
Anti-Terrorism Council composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary
Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and
Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members.

All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of
Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.

ISSUE:

Should the petition prosper?

HELD:

Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. Parenthetically, petitioners do not even
allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their respective
jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In constitutional
litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of
the case.

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders
the discussion of the last two superfluous. Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. For a
concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government,
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action. Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected "communist
fronts" by the government, especially the military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the
"transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers. Petitioners in G.R. No.
178890 allege that they have been subjected to "close security surveillance by state security forces," their
members followed by "suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices
monitored by "men with military build." They likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies of
the State. Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly
points out that petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported "surveillance" and
the implementation of RA 9372.

Petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581 would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondent's
alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples Army (NPA). The tagging, according to
petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one
of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1)
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable. No ground was
properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice. Petitioners apprehension is insufficient
to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against
them, three years after its effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating
from the so-called tagging. The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554,
who merely harp as well on their supposed "link" to the CPP and NPA. They fail to particularize how the
implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their organization and
members.

The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary
Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP and
NPA as terrorist organizations. Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts
an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations
under RA 9372. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities
fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372. RA
9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its
implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal
interest in the implementation of the law. It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied
by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest
is key. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion. Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly being tagged as
"communist fronts" in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the
Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its function. Without any justiciable
controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both the
activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely
theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness. Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and
impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread
and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the
prohibited acts.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant
to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The
overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. As distinguished from the vagueness
doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and
will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected. Distinguished from an as-
applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual
operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others
not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities. Justice Mendoza
accurately phrased the subtitle in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines,
as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount
a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds. Since a penal
statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the
definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against
them. In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners
contend that the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism must necessarily be
transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free speech clause. Before a charge for
terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger
the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of
the government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first element, any attempt
at singling out or highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the
unprotected conduct into a protected speech. Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is
entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every
commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to launch
overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating
a deceitful transaction. As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a
credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition
of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither
contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the
courts to be used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress. DISMISSED.

Void for overbreadth and Freedom of Expression

BIO UMPAR ADIONG V. COMELEC (207 SCRA 712)

FACTS:

On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by
the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.
Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:

Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda:

(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.

Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides: Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.

It is unlawful:

(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether
public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELEC’s
Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in “mobile” places like cars and other
moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code
and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places, public
or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.

HELD:

The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC
providing that “decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in
paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof” is DECLARED NULL and VOID. The COMELEC’s prohibition on posting
of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or private except in designated areas provided
for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on
the citizen’s fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III).
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the
candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his
preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. Also, the questioned
prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth.
The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even
the citizen’s private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing
regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one’s
living room or bedroom.) In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the
Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due process of law. (The right to property may be subject to a greater
degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a “liberty” interest, the burden of justification on the
part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this
case.) Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal
opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and
Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting
decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and
stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of
the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not
the financial resources of the candidate. In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on
“mobile” places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC
becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.

Equal Protection

PEOPLE V. CARLOS (78 Phil 535)

FACTS:

The appellant was found guilty of treason by the People's Court and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to
pay a fine of P7,000, and costs. The lower court found that one day in July or August, 1944, about two or
three o'clock in the morning, a truck pulled up to the curb in front of a house on Constancia Street,
Sampaloc, Manila, where one Martin Mateo lived. From the truck the accused, a Japanese spy, alighted
together with members of the Japanese military police and pointed Martin Mateo's house and Fermin
Javier's house to his Japanese companions, whereupon the Japanese soldiers broke into Martin Mateo's
dwelling first and Fermin Javier's afterwards. In those houses they seized Martin Mateo, Ladislao Mateo
and Fermin Javier, bound their hands, and put them in the truck. Along with other persons who had been
rounded up in the other places and who had been kept in the truck while it was parked, they were taken
to Fort Santiago where the two Mateos and Fermin Javier were tortured and from which they were
released six days later. The reason for the arrest and maltreatment of Martin and Ladislao Mateo was that
they had refused to divulge the whereabouts of their brother, Marcelino Mateo, who was a guerrilla and
who had escaped from the Japanese. And Fermin Javier was arrested and tortured because he himself
was a guerrilla, a fact which Carlos knew or at least suspected. Carlos alleged that the law creating the
People's Court is unconstitutional; that numerous provisions of the People's Court Act are singled out as
contrary to the Organic Law
ISSUE:

Whether or not the People's Court Act (PCA) is unconstitutional.

HELD:

No. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed with costs against appellant.

RATIO:

Carlos argued that The PCA contained provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject
matter expressed in its title, such as:

(1) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance;

(2) a provision which adds to the disqualification of Justices of the Supreme Court and provides a
procedure for their substitution;

(3) a provision which changed the existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail, and

(4) a provision which suspends Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Municipality of Binalonan: The People's Court was intended to
be a full and complete scheme with its own machinery for the indictment, trial and judgment of treason
case. The various provisos mentioned, in our opinion, are allied and germane to the subject matter and
purposes of the People's Court Act; they are subordinate to its end. The multitude of matters which the
legislation, by its nature, has to embrace would make mention of all of them in the title of the act
cumbersome. It is not necessary, and the Congress is not expected, to make the title of an enactment a
complete index of its contents.

SC: The constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title.

Carlos also argued that PCA deprives persons similarly situated of the equal protection of the laws
inasmuch as:

(1) Only those political offenders against whom cases are filed within six months from the passage of the
law are to be tried in the People's Court, while others are to be tried in the Courts of First Instance;

SC: The People's Court is a court of special and restricted jurisdiction created under the stress of an
emergency and national security. It was devised to operate for a limited period only, a limitation imposed
by economic necessity and other factors of public policy. Obviously, the main concerning the creation of
a special court was the trial and disposition of the cases, numbering over 6,000, of accused who were
being held by the United States military authorities and who were to be turned over to the
Commonwealth Government.

(2) Political offenders accused in the People's Court are denied preliminary examination and/or
investigation whereas the others who shall be entitled thereto;
SC: Section 22 in denying preliminary investigation to persons accused before the People's Court is
justified by the conditions prevailing when the law was enacted. In view of the great number of prisoners
then under detention and the length of time and amount of labor that would be consumed if so many
prisoners were allowed the right to have preliminary investigation, considered with the necessity of
disposing of these cases at the earliest possible dates in the interest of the public and of the accused
themselves, it was not an unwise measure which dispensed with such investigation in such cases.
Preliminary investigation, it must be remembered, is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution.

(3) Political offenders accused in the People's Court have limited right to appeal, while those who may be
accused of the same crimes in the Courts of First Instance have absolute right of appeal inasmuch as under
section 13 of the law, Rules 42 and 46 of the Rules of Court are made applicable to the latter;

SC: The People's Court is a collegiate court whereas the Court of First Instance is presided over by a single
judge. Appeal is not a constitutional but statutory right. The admitted fact that there is no discrimination
among appeals from the same court or class of court saves the provision objected to from being
unconstitutional.

(4) Appeals in the case involving persons who held any office or position under either or both the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine Republic or any branch, instrumentality and/or
agency thereof are to heard and decided by a substantially different Supreme Court, thus causing lack of
informity in rulings over the same subject;

SC: This objection does not seem to fall within the subject of constitutional guarantee against deprivation
of equal protection of the laws. Be that as it may, we find no merit in the appellant's contention.

SC: The disqualification under the People's Court Act of some or a majority of the members of this Court
and their substitution by justices of the Court of Appeals or judges of the Courts of First Instance do not
make the Supreme Court, as thus constituted, a new court in the eyes of the law. SC: A court is an entity
possessing a personality separate and distinct from the men who compose or sit on it. This objection is no
more valid than that of a party in an ordinary action who protests that his case is heard by a Supreme
Court which, by reason of disability of a majority of its regular members, is made up mostly of judges from
outside.

SC: As to the "lack of uniformity in rulings over the same subject," it need only be said that the Constitution
does not insure uniformity of judicial decisions; neither does it assure immunity from judicial error.

(5) The first proviso of section 19 thereof prescribes a different rule as to the granting of release on bail
only with respect to the political offenders detained by the United States Army and released to the
Commonwealth of the Philippines but not as to others political offenders accused or accusable of the
same crimes; and

(6) The second proviso of section 19 thereof suspends article 125 of the Revised Penal Code only as to
those political detainees released by the United States Army to the Commonwealth of the Philippines or,
at most, only to those accused or accusable of the crimes specified in the law and not as to all persons
accused or accusable of crimes against national security committed during the second world war, much
less to all offenders, notwithstanding the fact that there is no reasonable and real difference among said
groups of offenders.

SC: (5) and (6) The two provisos in section 19 do no constitute denial of equal protection of the laws. The
distinction made by these provisos between two sets of accused in the "granting or release on bail" and
in the application of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code are not arbitrary or fanciful calculated to favor
or prejudice one or the other class.

Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372): this Court explained the reasons which necessitated the extension to six
months of the authorized detention of persons charged with treason before filing of information. The
provisos rest "on some real and substantial difference or distinction bearing a just and fair relation to the
legislation." Carlos argued that (c) It is a bill of attainder in that it virtually imposes upon specific, known
and identified individuals or group of individual, the penalty of detention and imprisonment for a period
not exceeding six months without any form of judicial trial or procedure

Cummings vs. Missouri: The bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial
trial."

SC: Detention of a prisoner for a period not exceeding six months pending investigation or trial is not a
punishment but a necessary extension of the well-recognized power to hold the criminal suspected for
investigation

3. Freedom of religion (NO CASE FROM THE LIST)

4. Neither excessive fines not cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment

PEOPLE V. DE LA CRUZ (92 Phil 906)

FACTS:

Pablo Dela Cruz sold a can of milk for 30 centavos. He violated Executive Order No. 331 (issued by authority
of Republic Act No. 509) which fixed 20 centavos as the maximum price for that kind of commodity. Dela
Cruz was sentenced to imprisonment for 5 years and to pay a fine of P5,000.00 plus costs. He was also
barred from engaging in wholesale and retail business for 5 years.

He questioned the penalties imposed.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Executive Order No. 331 prescribes excessive penalties.

- Whether or not the penalties imposed too excessive for a merchant who sells good at prices beyond the
ceilings established in the Excecutive Order.
- Whether or not the penalties imposed cruel and unusual for a violation that merely netted a ten-centavo
profit to the accused.

HELD:

No, but decreased the penalties because Dela Cruz has a family to support.

RATIO:

In overstepping the price barriers, he might derive profits amounting to thousands of pesos. Thus, the
penalties imposed were within the statutory limits. The damage caused to the state is not measured
exclusively by the gains obtained by the accused, inasmuch as one violation would mean others, and the
consequential breakdown of the beneficial system of price controls.

5. Bill of Attainder

PEOPLE V. FERRER (48 SCRA 382)

FACTS:

On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed
against the respondent Feliciano Co, as he became an officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines,
an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the government. Co moved to quash on the
ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. Meanwhile, on May 25, 29170, another criminal
complaint was filed with before Nilo Tayag and fiver others with subversion, as they were tagged as
officers of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization instigating and inciting the people to
organize and unite for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
Tayag also moved to quash the complaint on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3)
it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied him the equal
protection of the laws.

ISSUE:

Whether RA 1700 otherwise known as Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.

RULING:

No, the Supreme Court said it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial
does it become a bill of attainder.

In this case, when the act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the
Communist Party of the Philippines or the member thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does
is simple to declare the party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the
purposes of the prohibition. The term "Communist Part of the Philippines" issues solely for definitional
purposes. In fact the act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any
organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.

6. Ex-post facto law

U.S. V. DIAZ-CONDE (42 Phil 766)

FACTS:

On December 30, 1915, Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco accomplished and delivered to the
defendants a contract (named ‘Exhibit B’) which stated that the Oliveros and Lianco had borrowed from
the latter a sum of three hundred pesos (Php 300), and by virtue of the terms of said contract, Oliveros
and Lianco obligated themselves to pay to the defendants interest at the rate of five percent (5%) per
month, payable within the first ten days of each and every month, the first payment to be made on the
January 10, 1916.

On May 1, 1916, Act no. 2655 or the Usury Law came into effect. The law stated that that the legal rate
of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits, […] shall be 12% per annum. Any
amount of interest paid or to be paid in excess of that fixed by law is considered usurious, therefore
unlawful. A complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on May 6, 1921, charging
the defendants with a violation of the Usury Law (Act No. 2655). Upon said complaint they were arrested,
charged, and pleaded not guilty. On September 1, 1921, the case was finally brought on for trial. At the
end of the trial, with consideration to the evidences cited in court, Hon. M. V. del Rosario, judge, found
that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged in the complaint and sentenced each of them to pay
a fine of P120 and, if they cannot meet their debt obligations, the defendants would suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of the law. From that sentence each of the defendants
made an appeal.

Contention of the State:

The lower court, in the course of its opinion, stated that at the time of the execution and delivery of said
contract, there was no law in force in the Philippine Islands that punishes usury. However, the defendants
had collected a usurious rate of interest after the adoption of the Usury Law in the Philippine Islands (Act
No. 2655), Therefore, they were guilty in the violation of that law and should be punished in accordance
with its provisions.

Contention of the Accused:

(a) The contract upon which the alleged usurious interest was collected was executed before Act No. 2655
was adopted.
(b) The time that the said contract was made (December 30, 1915), there was no usury law in force in the
Philippine Islands.

(c) Act No. 2655 did not become effective until the May 1, 1916, or four months and a half after the
contract was executed.

(d) The said law could have no retroactive effect or operation

(e) The said law impairs the obligation of a contract.

For all of said reasons the judgment imposed by the lower court should be revoked; that the complaint
should be dismissed, and that they should each be discharged from the custody of the law.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

The Supreme Court en banc promulgated on February 14, 1922 its ruling on the case of The United States
vs Vicente Diaz Conde and Apolinaria R. De Conde (G.R. No. L18208). The court has decided that the acts
complained of by the defendants did not constitute a crime at the time they were committed. A law
imposing a new penalty, liability or disability, or giving a new right of action, must not be construed as
having a retroactive effect. It is an elementary rule of contract that the laws in force at the time of the
contract was made must govern its interpretation and application. Laws must be construed prospectively
and not retrospectively. If a contract is legal at its commencement, it cannot be rendered illegal by any
subsequent legislation. If that were permitted, then the obligations of a contract might be impaired,
which is prohibited by Philippine law. Ex post facto laws, unless they are favorable to the defendant, are
prohibited in this jurisdiction. Every law that makes an action, done before the passage of the law, and
which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action, is an ex post facto law. The Legislature
is prohibited from adopting a law which will make an act done before its adoption a crime, as in the case
of Act No. 2655. A law may be given a retroactive effect in civil action, providing it is curative in character,
but ex post facto laws are absolutely prohibited unless its retroactive effect is favorable to the defendant.

The complaint was therefore dismissed, and the defendants were discharged from the custody of the law
with costs.

In Re: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc. (35 SCRA 429)

FACTS

Petitioner intends to pursue its purposes by supporting delegates to the Constitutional Convention who
will propagate its ideology. However, Under Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 states:

No candidate for delegate to the Convention shall represent or allow himself to be represented as being
a candidate of any political party or any other organization, and no political party, political group, political
committee, civic, religious, professional, or other organization or organized group of whatever nature shall
intervene in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy or give aid
or support, directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election…
A petition for a declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., claiming to be a duly recognized and
existing non-stock and non-profit corporation created under the laws of the land, and praying for a
determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's rights and duties
thereunder to pursue its purposes by supporting delegates to the Constitutional Convention.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not R.A. No. 6132 is an ex post facto law.

2. Whether or not the R.A No. 6132 is constitutional.

HELD:

1. No. R.A. No. 6132 is not an ex post facto law. Though Section 18 of R.A. No. 6132, provides for a penalty
clause, the penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the approval of the law and not those
perpetrated prior thereto.

2. Yes. It does not violate freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and equal
protection clauses. It is designed to prevent the clear and present danger of the prostitution of electoral
process and denial of the equal protection of the laws.

PEOPLE V. VILLARAZA (81 SCRA 95)

FACTS:

On December 3, 1975 an assistant city fiscal charged Caesar Puerto with estafa in the city court of Cagayan
de Oro City for having issued on October 16, 1974 two bouncing checks for the total sum of P4,966.63
(Criminal Case No. 32140). City Judge Rolando R. Villaraza in his order dated March 31, 1976 noted that
the accused had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. The Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City Branch VIII, in its order of February 3, 1977 returned the case to
the city court because in its opinion the case falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of the two courts...
and, the city court, as the first court which took cognizance of the case, should try it. The respondent city
judge in his order of April 21, 1977 directed the re elevation of the case.

ISSUES:

His view is that the case falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance because
estafa committed by the accused is punishable by prision mayor medium under Presidential Decree No.
818 which took effect on October 22, 1975 and which amended article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING:

We hold that the case was properly filed with the city court which has original jurisdiction over it. The city
court has original jurisdiction over the case because the penultimate paragraph of section 87 of the
Judiciary Law, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828, provides that "judges of city courts shall
have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try... parties charged with an offense committed
within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision
correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or
both". The order of the Court of First Instance, returning the case to the city court, is affirmed and the
two orders of the respondent city judge, elevating the case to the Court of First Instance, are set aside.
The city court is directed to try the case.

TERRITORIALITY

JESUS MIQUIABAS VS COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE-RYUKYUS COMMAND, UNITED STATES

ARMY
G.R. No. L-1988
February 24, 1948

Short Version:
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the Philippines.
Therefore, the General Court-Martial appointed by respondent has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for
the offense allegedly committed by him

Facts:
1. Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the Philippines.
He has been charged with disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things belonging to the United
States Army, in violation of the 94th Article of War of the United States.
2. He has been arrested for that reason and a General Court-Martial appointed by respondent tried
and found him guilty and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment.
3. This sentence, however, is not yet final for it is still subject to review. Thus, a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus was filed by petitioner against the Commanding General Philippine-Ryukyus
Command, United States Army, who is alleged to have petitioner under custody and to have
appointed a General Court-Martial to try petitioner in connection with an offense over which the
said court has no jurisdiction.

Issue:
1. Whether the General Court-Martial appointed by respondent has jurisdiction to try petitioner for
the offense allegedly committed by the petitioner? (NO)

Ruling:
It is ordered that petitioner be released immediately by respondent without prejudice to any
criminal action which may be instituted in the proper court of the Philippines.

Ratio:
1. The offense at bar cannot be considered as committed within a base that would bring the case
within the jurisdiction of the general court-martial.
 It may be stated as a rule that the Philippines, being a sovereign nation, has jurisdiction over all
offenses committed within its territory.
 But it may, by treaty or by agreement, consent that the United States or any other foreign
nation, shall exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses committed within certain portions of
said territory.
 On March 11, 1947, the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of
America, entered into an agreement concerning military bases.
 Under paragraph 1 (a) thereof, the General Court-Martial would have jurisdiction over the criminal
case against petitioner if the offense had been committed within a base.
 Paragraph 2, of Article XXI of the agreement, refers to the Port of Manila Reservation, which
will be available for use to the United States armed forces, also as a temporary quarters and
installations, its temporariness not being for a definite period of time, but "until such time as
other arrangements can be made for supply of the bases by mutual agreement of the two
Governments."
 There is in paragraph 2 absolutely nothing that may be construed as placing the Port of
Manila Reservation in the category of a permanent base.
 Paragraph 3, of Article XXI, provides "that offenses committed within the temporary quarters
and installations located within the present limits of the City of Manila shall not be
considered as offenses within the bases
 Therefore, the offense at bar cannot be considered as committed within, but without, a
base, since it has been committed in the Port of Manila Area, which is not one of the bases
mentioned in Annexes A and B to the Agreement, and is merely temporary quarters located
within the present limits of the City of Manila.
2. The offender is not a member of the armed forces of the United States
 Under paragraph 1 (b), if the offense had been committed outside a base, still the General Court-
Martial would have jurisdiction if the offense had been committed by a "member of the armed
forces of the United States" there being no question that the offended party in this case is the
United States.
 Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the Philippines.
 Under the terms of the Agreement, a civilian employee cannot be considered as a member of the
armed forces of the United States. Articles XI, XVI and XVIII of the Agreement make mention of
civilian employees separately from members of the armed forces of the United States, which is a
conclusive indication that under said Agreement armed forces do not include civilian employees.

U.S. V. Bull (1910)

U.S. v. Bull, 15 Phil. 7 G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910
FACTS:
• accused H. N. Bull, master of vessel, willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into
the port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, 677 head of cattle
and carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing the animals while in transit, so as to avoid
cruelty and unnecessary suffering. • animals to be tied by means of rings passed through their noses,
and allow and permit others to be transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without
being tied or secured in stalls, and all without bedding • neglect and failure of the accused to provide
suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said animals were
cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and
cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.
• All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission. Section 1 of Act
No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that — The owners or masters of steam, sailing,
or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the
Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall
carry with them, upon the vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for
the suitable sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage
from the port of shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided with
adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time that the
animals are embarked to the time of their final debarkation.
• Bull (Norweigan): Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the
Philippine Islands under the laws thereof, so it is not within the jurisdiction of the Philippines

ISSUE: W/N the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character when the neglect and omission
which constitutes the offense continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of the
United States

HELD: The defendant was found guilty

YES.
• No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on the high
seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line
drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters,
and a new set of principles became applicable. Note: when it comes in our territory it has the discretion
to prosecute or not. If it chooses to prosecute must be justified.
• 2 well-defined theories as to extent of the immunities ordinarily granted to them 1. French theory and
practice-matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the tranquility
of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the court of the country to which the
vessel belongs. The French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board
French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one member of the crew against another. 2. The United
States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is
subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence
or through treaty arrangements consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction.
• The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the completed offense, and
a reasonable construction of the language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the
port into which the animals are bought. They are then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and
the mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned.
• The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does not charge him
with failure to provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios suficientes" and
"medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the original complaint was prepared in English, and that
the word "suitable" is translatable by the words "adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente," according
to the context and circumstances, we determine this point against the appellant, particularly in view of
the fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and that the evidence clearly shows a
failure to provide "suitable means for the protection of the animals."

People v. Look Chaw, 18 Phil. 573

G.R. No.L-5887. December 16, 1910. ARELLANO, C. J.

Laws Applicable: Revised Penal Code Art. 2 and Opium Law (Crimes Relative to Opium & Other
Prohibitive Drugs Art. 190 - 194)

Facts: A steamship named Erroll, from Hong Kong bound for Mexico, was searched and inspected at the
port of Cebu where sacks of opium were found. A large sack of opium was discovered in the hold and a
smaller one in the cabin. Soon after, more cans of opium were identified around the firemen's sleeping
area.

The defendant, Look Chaw, acknowledged his ownership and control over the sacks of opium found in
the search of the vessel. Also, he sold prepared opium the day the vessel arrived at Cebu. The defendant
is charged for unlawful possession of opium and unlawful sale of opium at the Court of First Instance of
Cebu.

The court ruled that it has jurisdiction because the crime was committed on the wharf of Cebu; which is
within its district. The court sentenced the defendant to five years imprisonment, a fine of 10,000 pesos,
with further imprisonment in case of bankruptcy. The defendant filed an appeal.

Issues: Whether or not the Philippine Court has jurisdiction over a foreign vessel and crimes committed
within it.

Held: YES. Mere possession of things prohibited by the Philippines, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in
any port, does not constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country. But when the said prohibited
items, such as opium, are set on or brought into Philippine soil, it becomes a violation of the penal code
and the Philippine Court has appropriate jurisdiction over it, taking into account absence of international
treaties.
Imprisonment was reduced to six months and the fine to 1,000 pesos.

G.R. No. L-13005 | October 10, 1917

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AH SING, defendant-appellant.
Objective: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding the defendant guilty of
a violation of section 4 of Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law)
Facts:
 The defendant is a subject of China employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang. The Shun
Chang is a foreign steamer which arrived at the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage
direct from the port of Saigon.
 The defendant bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board the steamship, and
had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the
port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, the authorities on making a search found the eight cans of opium
hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine.
 The defendant confessed that he was the owner of this opium, and that he had purchased it in
Saigon. He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug into the Philippine
Islands.
 No other evidence direct or indirect, to show that the intention of the accused was to import
illegally this opium into the Philippine Islands, was introduced.

Issue: Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands has
been proven

Ruling: Yes, the crime of illegal importation of opium is proven. There was illegal importation of
opium from a foreign country into the Philippine Islands.
Rationale:
 Section 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited
drug into the Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring" are synonymous terms. The Federal Courts
 of the United States have held that the mere act of going into a port, without breaking bulk,
is prima facie evidence of importation.
 As applied to the Opium Law, [the Court] expressly holds that any person unlawfully imports or
brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is found under this
person's control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign country and is within the
jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands.
 The Court accordingly finds that there was illegal importation of opium from a foreign country
into the Philippine Islands. To anticipate any possible misunderstanding, let it be said that these
statements do not relate to foreign vessels in transit, a situation not present.

Pp vs Wong Cheng G.R. No. L-18924

October 19, 1922
FACTS:
The Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
sustaining the demurer presented by Wong Cheng who was accused of having illegally smoked opium,
aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay
two and a half miles from the shores of the city. The demurer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the lower court, which so held and dismissed the case.
ISSUE:
WoN the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crimes committed aboard a foreign vessel
anchored in our jurisdiction waters?
RULING:
Yes, the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction.
There are two fundamental rules as to jurisdiction over crimes committed aboard merchant vessels
while in territorial waters of another country; the French Rule; and the English Rule. Of these two rules
we observe the English Rule wherein crimes in merchant vessels are generally triable in that country
where it was perpetrated, unless if they merely affect things within the vessel or they refer to the
internal management thereof.
Mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by the court as not triable since it
is not considered a disturbance of the public order. But to smoke opium within our territorial limits,
even though aboard a foreign merchant ship is certainly a breach of public order because it causes such
drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our
legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.
Therefore, the order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded the court of origin for
further proceedings in accordance with law without special finding as to costs.
People v. Lol-lo & Saraw, 43 Phil. 19
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922. MALCOLM, J.
FACTS:
• 2 boats of Dutch possession left matuta. In 1 of the boats was 1 individual, a Dutch subject, and in
the other boat 11 men, women, and children, subjects of Holland. The 2nd boat arrived between the
Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by 6 vintas manned
by 24 Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves
all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated 2 of the women. All of the persons on
the Dutch boat, except the 2 young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea
that it would submerge. The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. 2 of the Moro
marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the 2 women were
able to escape.
• Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands.
There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy
• All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on
the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of
universal hostility.
• Pirates are in law hostes humani generis.
• Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried.
The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits.
• As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed
within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not
neutral to crimes."

ISSUE: W/N the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.

HELD: In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found
guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead.

YES. Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the
Philippines. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the
abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary
for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. At
least 3 aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately
augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of
superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the
act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.

PROSPECTIVITY

Gumabon v. Director of Prisons

G.R. No. L-30026 / January 30, 1971 / En Banc / Petition for Habeas Corpus
Mario Gumabon, Blas Bagolbagol, Gaudencio Agapito, Epifanio Padua and Paterno Palmares –
Petitioners
The Director of the Bureau of Prisons – Respondent
Decision by J. Fernando, Digest by Jason Jimenez

Short Version: Petitioners sought release from imprisonment through this petition for habeas corpus.
They were meted out life terms for the complex crime of rebellion with murder and other crimes. They
invoked the doctrine in People v. Hernandez which negated the existence of such an offense, a ruling
that was not handed down until after their convictions had become final. Their petition was granted.
Since judicial decisions form part of the legal system of the Philippines, the conclusion is that the
Hernandez decision once promulgated calls for a retroactive effect under the explicit mandate of the
RPC as to penal laws having such character even if at the time of their application a final sentence has
been rendered "and the convict is serving the same."

Facts: Petitioner Gumabon was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to suffer reclusion perpetua for the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping. Other petitioners were similarly
made to suffer the same penalty. Each of them has served more than 13 years. Subsequently, in People
v. Hernandez, SC ruled that the information against the accused was not warranted under Article 134 of
the RPC, there being no such complex offense. SC reaffirmed the ruling in People v. Lava.

Petitioners asserted the deprivation of the constitutional right of equal protection. According to them,
they were convicted by CFI for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez, Geronimo, and others were
convicted. The law under which they were convicted is the very same law under which the latter were
convicted. It had not and has not been changed. For the same crime, committed under the same law,
petitioners were allowed to suffer life imprisonment, while others suffered only prision mayor.

Petitioners likewise relied on Article 22 of the RPC which requires that penal judgment be given a
retroactive effect. Petitioner Gumabon contended that he has served more than the maximum penalty
that could have been imposed upon him. He is thus entitled to freedom, his continued detention being
illegal. Hence, this petition for habeas corpus.

Issues:
1. Should the Hernandez ruling be given retroactive effect? YES
2. Is the habeas corpus the appropriate remedy? YES

Ruling: Petition granted

Ratio:
1. The Hernandez decision once promulgated calls for a retroactive effect under the explicit mandate
of the RPC (Article 22) as to penal laws having such character even if at the time of their application
a final sentence has been rendered "and the convict is serving the same." The Hernandez case
negated the existence of the complex offense for which the petitioners were convicted.
2. Where a sentence imposes punishment in excess of the power of the court to impose, such
sentence is void as to the excess, and some of the courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but
the weight of authority sustains the proposition that such a sentence is void only as to the excess
imposed in case the parts are separable, the rule being that the petitioner is not entitled to his
discharge on a writ of habeas corpus unless he has served out so much of the sentence as was
valid." The only means of giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused ...
is the writ of habeas corpus."

Voting: Dizon, Zaldivar, Concepcion, concur. Castro and Makasiar, JJ., took no part.
People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983)

FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and
Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during
the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and
rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and
found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house and
asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go
ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who
was running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the
shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the
defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time
of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to
Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his
property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25,
defendant received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter.
Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that
Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense
of his person.

No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiseling of the walls of the house of the defendant was
indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first
issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts
referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land.

Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article because his
ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting ownership
into question. It is accepted that the victim was the original aggressor.

2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defense of his rights.

Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3
requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:
 Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards appellant's
property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace before
time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code
also provides that possession may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539
provides that every possessor has the right to be respected in his possession
 Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the case, killing was
disproportionate to the attack.
 Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no
provocation at all since he was asleep
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special mitigating circumstance of
incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary
surrender and passion and obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not
murder because treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also,
assault was not deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was
also no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is
reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be
lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arresto mayor.

3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay the civil indemnity due
to the offended party.
No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the
provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of
consequential damages and costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its conviction,
considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given
retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.

Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and extenuating circumstance
of incomplete self-defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto mayor and to indemnify
each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for moral damages.
Appellant has already been detained 14 years, so his immediate release is ordered.

Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with form of attack on
person defending property. In the case at bar, this was not so. Appellant should then be sentenced to
prision mayor. However, since he has served more than that, he should be released.

People vs. Ringor, 320 SCRA 342 (1999)

FACTS: The accused (Ringor) on the night of June 23, 1994 was seen entering People’s Restaurant. A
witness Fely Batanes saw the accused approach a table where the victim was sitting, pulled his hair, and
poked a knife at the latter’s throat. After, leaving the restaurant, the accused returned with a gun,
entered the kitchen of the restaurant, stealthily approached the victim from behind and shot him six
times successively. The defendant was later apprehended and caught in his possession was an
unlicensed weapon. Upon verification in Camp Crame, it was found out that Ringor is not a licensed
firearm holder and that the gun was not licensed. Ringor put up self-defense but he failed to prove
Florida’s unlawful aggression. He was found guilty of murder qualified by treachery and was sentenced
to death. He was found guilty of a separate charge of possession of an unlicensed firearm with a
sentence of 17 to 20 years.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the amendatory law RA 8294 (which took effect in 1997: crime occurred in 1994) is
applicable

No. At the time of the commission of the crime the use of an unlicensed firearm was still not an
aggravating circumstance in murder to homicide. To apply it to Ringor would increase
his penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Hence, RA 8294 cannot retroact as it is unfavorable to the
accused, lest it becomes an ex post facto law.

2. Whether or not RTC erred in convicting appellant for simple illegal possession of firearms and
sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 17 to 20 years.

Yes. In cases where murder or homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, there can
be no separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms under PD No. 1866. t is simply
considered as an aggravating circumstance, no longer as a separate offence.
According to the article 22 of RPC, retroactivity of the law must be applied if it is favorable to the
accused.

3. Whether or not trial court erred in convicting accused of murder

No. For self-defense to prosper, unlawful aggression, proportionality of methods to fend said
aggression, and lack of sufficient provocation from defender must be proven. In this case, defendant
failed to prove unlawful aggression. The statement that the victim approached him with a bolo was
inconsistent to the witness’ statement of the victim being in a prone position in the table. This does not
constitute the requisite quantum of proof for unlawful aggression. With the first requirement missing,
the last two requisites have no basis.

4. WON RTC erred in sentencing the accused to death for muder which was not proven and that the
alleged murder committed by the appellant, the appropriate penalty for the offense is reclusion
perpetua due to the absence of an aggravating circumstance.

Yes. In the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances to a crime of murder as described by art
248 of RPC, a lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed in according to article 63(2) of RPC

People vs. Pimentel, 288 SCRA 542 (1998)

FACTS: 1983. Tujan charged with subversions under RA 1700 with warrant of arrest issued. On June 5,
1990, Tujan was arrested and caught with .38 caliber revolver. On June 14, 1990, he was charged with
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance of subversion (PD 1866) Tujan filed motion
to quash invoking protection versus double jeopardy (Art. III, Constitution; Misolas v. Panga; and Enrile
v. Salazar: alleged possession absorbed in subversion. It was granted by the trial court and the court of
appeals.

ISSUE: WON charge under PD 1866 be quashed on ground of double jeopardy in view of the previous
charge under RA 1700.

Ratio: No.
1. Article III of the Constitution and Rule 117 Revised Rules of Court state that for double jeopardy to
occur, acquittal, conviction or dismissal in previous cases must have occurred. In this case, first case was
not even arraigned yet.
2. They are different offenses. R.A. 1700 punishes subversion while PD 1866 punishes illegal possession
of firearms.

However, since RA 7636 totally repealed subversion or RA 1700, and since this is favorable to the
accused, we can no longer charge accused with RA 1700 even if they didn’t raise this issue. PD 1866
should be amended to mere illegal possession of firearms without furtherance of subversion

Held: RTC and CA reversed and set aside. RA 1700 charge dismissed. PD 1866 change amended. Release
Tujan.

LIBERALITY IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Vs EUGENIO GARCIA Y MADRIGAL GR. No. L2873
Facts: Eugenio Garcia Madrigal was found guilty of the crime robbery. He was 17 yrs old at that time of
the commission of the crime. The lower court ignoring defendant’s minority, sentenced him to an
indeterminate penalty of from 4 yrs to 2 months and 1 days of prision correctional to 8 yrs of prison
mayor. He was also sentenced to pay the offended party, jointly and severally with the other accused,
the sum of P85 as indemnity.
Republic Act No. 47 which amended article 80 of the RPC by reducing 18 – 16 the age below which
accused to be committed to the custody or care of the public or private benevolent or charitable
institution, instead of being convicted and sentenced to prison has given rise to the controversy.

Issue: Whether Eugenio, being 17 yrs of age at the time of the commission of the crime was entitled to
the privileged mitigating circumstance of article 88, paragraph 2 of the RPC.

Ruling: All parts are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be given to each amd every part
thereof and that conflicting intentions in the same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded
unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous language.

Spanish text of the RPC prevails over its English translation

Aristotle Valenzuela v. People of the Philippines
G. R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner and Jovy Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the
ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security guard who was then
manning his post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing
an identification card with the mark Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU), hauling a pushcart with cases of
detergent of the well-known Tide brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space,
where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and after five (5)
minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same
area in the open parking space. When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner
and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards
of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise
recovered. Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated
theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the
articles stolen.

ISSUE:
Is the crime committed frustrated or consummated theft?

HELD:
The crime is consummated. The following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to
another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent
of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things. There was no need of an intent to permanently deprive the
owner of his property to constitute an unlawful taking.
So long as the descriptive circumstances that qualify the taking are present, including animo lucrandi
and apoderamiento, the completion of the operative act that is the taking of personal property of
another establishes, at least, that the transgression went beyond the attempted stage. Insofar as we
consider the present question, unlawful taking is most material in this respect. Unlawful taking, which is
the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which produces the felony in its
consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could
only be attempted theft, if at all. With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or
consummated.
People of the Philippines v. Manaba
Case No. 110 G.R. No. L-39037 (October 30, 1933)

FACTS: Defendant was charged for rape. The complaint was signed by the Chief of Police. After trial,
Defendant was convicted but the judgment was set aside and the case dismissed on his motion that the
court had no jurisdiction over his person or the subject matter, because the complaint was not signed by
the offended party. Subsequently, the offended party signed a complaint charging Defendant of rape.
Defendant asked for dismissal on the ground of double jeopardy, but it was denied and he was
convicted.

ISSUE: W/N the Defendant was placed in double jeopardy.

HELD: No. Whether or not Defendant was placed in double jeopardy depends on whether or not he was
tried on a valid complaint in the first case. Art. 334 of the Revised Penal Code requires the offended
party to file the complaint. As the first complaint was not signed by the offended party, it was not a valid
complaint in accordance with law, and the judgment of the court was void for lack of jurisdiction over
subject matter, and defendant was never in jeopardy. The Spanish equivalentof the word filedis not
bound in the Spanish text which is controlling, because it was the Spanish text approved by the
legislature.
Prescribed but undeserved penalties
PEOPLE vs. FORMIGONES G.R. No. L-3246 November 29, 1950 Parricide, Feeblemindedness, Imbecility,
Article 12 of the RPC
NOVEMBER 20, 2017
FACTS:
Late in the afternoon, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The accused, without any
previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his
wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting
in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground,
immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the house,
laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. In this position he was found by
the people who came in response to the shouts for help made by his eldest daughter, who witnessed
and testified to the stabbing of her mother by her father. Defendant admitted that he killed, motive was
admittedly of jealousy because according to his statement he used to have quarrels with his wife for the
reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias.
He appealed based on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal
liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Is the appellant imbecile and covered by Article 12 of the RPC?
RULING:
Dr. Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it was his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only from
feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong.
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. The Supreme Court of Spain
held that in order that this exempting circumstances may be taken into account, it is necessary that
there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be
deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least
discernment;1 that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total
deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time
of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will,
because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be equaled to imbecility or
insanity.The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that
the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law
are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in
order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence
of will are proved.
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to
stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid
mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife.
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. According to
the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself in
anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated
his farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his children of
school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a man who could
feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of
being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be
regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is
that he believed her faithless.
Appellant was found guilty of parricide.
Effects of repeal amendment of penal law
PRESCILLA TUATES v. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN, GR No. 138962, 2002-10-04

Facts:
Convicted by the MTC-Quezon City (Branch 38) of the crime of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772
or the Anti-Squatting Law, petitioners Prescilla Tuates and Andres de la Paz, appealed to the RTC of
Quezon City (Branch 96).
Pending resolution of their motion for reconsideration, however, Republic Act No. 8368, "An Act
Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772, entitled 'Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts'" was
enacted.
In its Order, dated January 28, 1998, the RTC ruled that only petitioners' criminal convictions were
extinguished by R.A. 8368, and the civil aspect, i.e., the removal of petitioners' illegally constructed
house and improvements, shall remain executory against... them
Petitioners argue that the repeal of P.D. 772 by R.A. 8368 carries with it the extinction of both the
criminal and civil aspects of the crime.
Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondents, agrees with petitioners that both the
criminal and civil liability were rendered extinct with the repeal of P.D. 772, and recommended that the
assailed issuances be reversed and set... aside.
Issues:
That petitioners, being charged with Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, the express repeal of said
decree absolves the petitioners of any criminal or civil liability;
Ruling:
In the same vein, the absolute repeal of P.D. 772 has the effect of depriving a court of its authority to
punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal. This is because an unqualified
repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of rendering... legal what had been previously declared
as illegal, such that the offense no longer exists and it is as if the person who committed it never did so.
Considering that prosecution for criminal as well as civil liability under P.D. 772 has been rendered
nugatory with the passage of R.A. 8368, both criminal and civil aspects of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-97-
70428 and Q-97-70429 in the RTC as well as Criminal Cases Nos. 38-0130 and
38-0131 in the MTC filed against petitioners should be dismissed.
Principles:
Republic Act No. 8368, otherwise known as the "Anti-Squatting Law Repeal Act of 1997," provides:
"SECTION 1. Title. -- This Act shall be known as the 'Anti-Squatting Law Repeal Act of 1997.'
"SEC. 2. Repeal. -- Presidential Decree No. 772, entitled 'Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts' is
hereby repealed.
"SEC. 3. Effect on Pending Cases. -- All pending cases under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 772
shall be dismissed upon the effectivity of this Act.
"SEC. 4. Effect on Republic Act No. 7279. -- Nothing herein shall be construed to nullify, eliminate or
diminish in any way Section 27 of Republic Act No. 7279 or any of its provisions relative to sanctions
against professional squatters and squatting... syndicates.
"SEC. 5. Effectivity. -- This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after its publication in two (2) newspapers
of national circulation.
"Approved, October 27, 1997."

ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO v. CA, GR No. 125359, 2001-09-04

Facts:
On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera were indicted for
violation of Section 10 of Circular No. 960[1] in relation to Section 34[2] of the Central Bank Act
(Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in five
Informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila
That same day, nine additional Informations charging Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto with the same
offense, but involving different accounts,... l
On January 3, 1992, eleven more Informations accusing Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto of the same offense,
again in relation to different accounts, were filed with the same court
On the same day that Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969 were filed, the Central Bank issued
Circular No. 1318[5] which revised the rules governing non-trade foreign exchange transactions. It took
effect on January 20, 1992.
On September 19, 1993, the government allowed petitioners Benedicto and Rivera to return to the
Philippines, on condition that they face the various criminal charges instituted against them, including
the dollar-salting cases. Petitioners posted bail in the latter cases.
On February 28, 1994, petitioners Benedicto and Rivera were arraigned. Both pleaded not guilty to the
charges of violating Central Bank Circular No. 960. Mrs. Marcos had earlier entered a similar plea during
her arraignment for the same offense on February 12, 1992.
On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash all the Informations filed against them
On September 6, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners' motion.
On November 21, 1994, petitioners moved for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration. The
trial court, in its order of November 23, 1994, denied petitioners' motion and set the consolidated cases
for trial on January 5, 1995.
The assailed
September 6, 1994 Order, in so far as it denied the Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 91-101884 is
hereby nullified and set aside, and said case is hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioners.
1. Allowed to return to the Philippines on September 19, 1993...on the condition that he face the
criminal charges pending in courts, petitioner-appellant Benedicto, joined by his co-petitioner
Rivera, lost no time in attending to the pending criminal charges by... posting bail in the above-
mentioned cases.
2. Not having been afforded a real opportunity of attending the preliminary investigation because
of their forced absence from the Philippines then, petitioners-appellants invoked their right to
due process thru motions for preliminary investigation
3. Thus, instead of remanding the Informations to the Department of Justice...respondent Judge
set the case for pre-trial in order to afford all the accused access to the records of the
prosecution.
In the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular No. 960, Circular No. 1353
retained the same reportorial requirement for residents receiving earnings or profits from non-trade
foreign exchange transactions.[26]
In the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular No. 960, Circular No. 1353
retained the same reportorial requirement for residents receiving earnings or profits from non-trade
foreign exchange transactions.[26] Second, even the... most cursory glance at the repealing circulars,
Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 shows that both contain a saving clause, expressly providing that the repeal
of Circular No. 960 shall have no effect on pending actions for violation of the latter Circular.
Issues:
the charge sheets alleged that the trio failed to submit reports of their foreign exchange earnings from
abroad and/or failed to register with the Foreign Exchange
Department of the Central Bank within the period mandated by Circular No. 960.
On the first issue, petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. They aver that the dollar-
salting charges filed against them were violations of the Anti-Graft Law or Republic Act No. 3019, and
the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive... jurisdiction over their cases.
first issue, petitioners next contend that the filing of the cases for violations of Circular No. 960 before
the RTC of Manila constitutes forum shopping.
With respect to the RTC cases, the receipt of the interest earnings violate Circular No. 960 in relation to
Republic Act No. 265 because the same was unreported to the Central Bank. The act to be penalized
here is the failure to report the interest earnings from the foreign... exchange accounts to the proper
authority.
on the first issue, petitioners contend that the preliminary investigation by the Department of Justice
was invalid and in violation of their rights to due process.
5. On the basis of disclosures at the pre-trial, the petitioners-appellants Benedicto and Rivera
moved for the quashing of the informations/cases...
On the second issue, petitioners contend that they are being prosecuted for acts punishable under laws
that have already been repealed.
Petitioners, however, insist that the repeal of Republic Act No. 265, particularly Section 34,[29] by
Republic Act No. 7653, removed the applicability of any penal sanction for violations of any non-trade
foreign exchange transactions previously penalized... by Circular No. 960.
Petitioners, however, point out that Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653, in reenacting Section 34 of the
old Central Act, increased the penalty for violations of rules and regulations issued by the Monetary
Board. They claim that such increase in the penalty would give Republic
Act No. 7653 an ex post facto application, violating the Bill of Rights.[
On the third issue, petitioners ask us to note that the dollar interest earnings subject of the criminal
cases instituted against them were remitted to foreign banks on various dates between 1983 to 1987.
The fourth issue involves petitioners' claim that they incurred no criminal liability for violations of
Circular No. 960 since they were exempted from its coverage.
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.[53] Laws of foreign jurisdictions must be
alleged and proved.
Anent the fifth issue, petitioners insist that the government granted them absolute immunity under the
Compromise Agreement they entered into with the government on November 3, 1990.
Ruling:
As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving a court of its authority to punish a
person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal.
Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except when they are favorable to the accused.[39]
Nowhere in Republic Act No. 7653, and in... particular Section 36, is there any indication that the
increased penalties provided therein were intended to operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex
post facto law in this case.
The offenses for which petitioners are charged are penalized by Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 "by a
fine of not more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and by imprisonment of not more than five
years."
During the pendency of this petition, counsel for petitioner Roberto S. Benedicto gave formal notice to
the Court that said petitioner died on May 15, 2000. The death of an accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability as well as the... civil liability based solely thereon.
Principles:
A comparison of the old Central Bank Act and the new Bangko Sentral's charter repealing the former
show that in consonance with the general objective of the old law and the new law "to maintain internal
and external monetary stability in the Philippines and preserve the... international value of the peso
In construing contracts, it is important to ascertain the intent of the parties by looking at the words
employed to project their intention.
FELONIES & CRIMINAL LIABILITY
PEOPLE v. ROMANA SILVESTRE, GR No. 35748, 1931-12-14
Facts:
Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo Joaquin by her second marriage, cohabited with her codefendant
Martin Atienza
On May 16, 1930,... Domingo Joaquin, filed with the justice of the peace for that municipality, a sworn
complaint for adultery... the two defendants begged... the municipal president of Paombong... to speak
to the complainant... urging him to withdraw the complaint
Domingo Joaquin acceded to it... and... the justice of the peace of Paombong dismissed the adultery
case commenced against the accused
About November 20, 1930, the accused Romana Silvestre met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas
de la Cruz, in the barrio of Santo Nino, and under pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves
On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas de la Cruz and his wife, Antonia de la Cruz, were...
gathered together
Martin Atienza told said couple to take their furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire
to it.
Upon being asked... why he wanted to set fire to the house, he... answered that that was the only way
he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery
against him and his codefendant
Alarmed at what Martin Atienza had said, the couple left the house at once to communicate with the
barrio lieutenant, Buenaventura Ania,... as to what they had just heard Martin Atienza say; but they
had hardly gone a hundred arms' length when they heard cries of "Fire! Fire!" Turning back they saw
their home in flames
The fire destroyed ... about forty-eight houses.
Tomas Santiago... and Tomas Gonzalez,... saw Martin Atienza... going away from the house where the
fire started, and Romana Silvestre leaving it.
With respect to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, the only evidence of record against her are:...
that Romana Silvestre listened to her co-defendant's threat without raising a protest, and did not give
the alarm when the latter... set fire to the house. Upon the strength of these facts, the court below
found her guilty of arson as accomplice.
Issues:
which previous or simultaneous acts complicate Romana Silvestre in the crime of arson committed by
her co-defendant Martin Atienza?
Ruling:
Article 14 of the Penal Code, considered in connection with article 13, defines an accomplice to be
one who does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to
commit it, nor cooperates in the... commission of the act by another act without which it would not
have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions
In the case of the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, there is no evidence of moral or... material
cooperation, and none of an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence
while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that
they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the... crime of arson; and as for her failure to give
the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice.
Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm,
without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do... not constitute the cooperation required by article
14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or with regard
to which one has kept silent.

People v Talingdan 84 SCRA 19, July 8, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.NEMESIO TALINGDAN, MAGELLAN TOBIAS, AUGUSTO BERRAS, PEDRO BIDES and TERESA
DOMOGMA,
accused-appellants.

Facts: Bernardo Bagabag was murdered in his own house in Abra on June 24, 1967 by Talingdan, Tobias,
Berras, Bides and Teresa Domogma, his alleged wife [whom cannot be charged with parricide because
no certificate or proof of marriage could be presented by the prosecution]. The murder was witnessed
by Corazon, the eldest child of Bernardo and Teresa. She testified to the crime committed by the
accused-appellants.

Crime Committed: Murder and the sentence of life imprisonment with indemnity to the offended party,
the heirs of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag, in the amount of P12,000.

Contention of the Accused: According to Teresa, there was no illicit affair between her and Talingdan.
She loved her husband. Contrary to the testimony of Corazon, they never quarreled nor did the former
maltreat her. She never left home for so long. And she was cooking for supper, and not Corazon, on the
night of the murder. She contends that her in-laws used her daughter to testify against her because they
don’t want Teresa from the start. She even added that Bernardo had some enemies during his lifetime.
Talingdan said that he escorted the Mayor as a bodyguard, while the other three accused also claimed
that they were at a certain Mrs. Bayongan’s house during the night of the murder.
Contention of the People: The sworn statement of the 13-year old Corazon was true. She
knew the accused because they live nearby their place. Besides, the accused-appellants
testimonies are indefensible and futile. Moreover, her mother claimed to have no suspect in mind
during the investigation in their house although she was in conspiracy with the other four accused.

Issue: Whether or not the appelants are guilty of the crime murder of killing Bernardo Bagabag?

Ruling: The court affirmed the decision held by the trial court with costs. There are two aggravating
circumstances present, treachery and evident premeditation, with no mitigating circumstances to offset
the accused-appellants. Talingdan, Tobias, Berras, and Bides are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder and are sentenced to DEATH to be executed in accordance with law. Teresa Domogma is guilty
as accessory to the same murder, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 5 years
prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties
of the law. What about Teresa’s conviction? Teresa was more or less passive in her attitude
regarding her co-appellants' conspiracy, known to her. After Bernardo was killed, she became
active in her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or
assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime" which makes her liable as an accessory --- paragraph
3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.
PEOPLE Vs GONZALES ET. AL. G.R. No.: 80762 Date: March 19, 1990
FACTS:
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of
Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and thus
would like to surrender to the authorities.
When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty. Before
trial, however, Jose Huntoria who claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, presented
himself to Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, and volunteered to testify for the
prosecution. He stated that he clearly saw all the accused ganging upon and takings turns in stabbing
and hacking the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform as the place was then
awash in moonlight. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of
Iloilo on the basis of which an Amended Information, dated March 3, 1982, naming as additional
accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant) Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and
Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her honor
as the deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused denied participation in the crime.
In the decision dated October 31, 1984 on the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo found all the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The case then was brought to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or Not the evidence are sufficient to convict the appellant of the crime of murder beyond
reasonable doubt
Ruling:
No, we find the same insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime charged. Huntoria testified that
he clearly saw all the accused, including the appellant, take turns in hacking and stabbing Lloyd
Peñacerrada. According to him, he recognized the six accused as the malefactors because the scene was
then illuminated by the moon. He further stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But
on cross-examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who among the six accused did
the stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon was used by each of them. Thus this principal
witness did not say, because he could not whether the appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact,
Huntoria does not know what specific act was performed by the appellant.
Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, under appropriate circumstances, like in the instant case in
which the participation of the appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered as exculpatory. Courts
should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken in the light of the other evidence
on record, it may be sufficient to acquit the accused.
In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the appellant is
hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.

DOLO CASES

US VS APOSTOL
General Criminal Intent
FACTS: Catalino Apostol together with four other men burned a house / hut in Nueva Ecija after
inquiring for carabaos with the dissatisfaction of answers from the dwellers and witnesses of the case.
They were sentenced 16 years and one day of Cadena Temporal together with his accessories to pay for
P1 fine to pay the damage cost. The defense appealed to the court that: the absence of proof of criminal
intent and in view of the fact the burnt hut was situated in an inhabited place.
ISSUE: Whether criminal intent as well as the will commit are always presumed to exist?
HELD: YES, Article 1 of Revised Penal Code provides, “Criminal intent as well as the will to commit a
crime are always presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law
punishes, unless the contrary shall appear”. As to the circumstances connected with the burning of the
hut, Pedro Tabilisima testified that he and his friends were in the same; that the accused and his
companions arrived at 8 p.m. and questioned them about carabaos that they said had been stolen from
them; that after they replied that they knew nothing, the former set fire to the house and they jumped
out of it. It is clear that intent was present by the time the executed the burning knowing there are
inhabitants that may harm and injured.

US VS CATOLICO

General and Specific Intent

Facts: The justice of peace of Cagayan had before him 16 separate civil cases initiated by Juan Canillas
for damages resulting from breach of contract. All cases were decided in favour of Canillas and all
defendants appealed the decision and deposited Php 16 and a bond of Php 50 as required by law. It
appears that the sureties of the bond were insolvent and new bonds were not presented on the
extension given. Canillas appealed. The justice of peace dismissed the appeals and ordered the sm of
money attached and delivered to Canillas in satisfaction of the judgment. The judge was prosecuted for
malversation of funds.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant is guilty of felony.
Decision: Judgment of conviction is reversed and defendant ordered to be discharged from custody.
The judge decided in good faith under the belief that he was acting judiciously and correctly. It was a
result of erroneous exercise of judicial function and not an intention to deprive any person of his
property feloniously. He acted that debts might be paid t those who they are legally and justly due and
not to enrich himself or another by criminal misappropriation. It was a mistake not a crime.

PEOPLE VS PUNO

(Dolo) - General and specific intent

Mental Element (Mens Rea)

Facts:
January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs.
Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election there)
arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC .He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver
Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so Isabelo will temporarily take his place . When it was
time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got into her husband's Mercedes Benz
with Isabelo driving. After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man,
accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver
Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to "get money" from her
.Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the accused. But the accused said that they
wanted P100,000 more. The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo asked
Mrs. Sarmiento to issue a check for P100,000. Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and
one P40,000 check. Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his
mind and turned the car again towards Pampanga. According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the
car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van,
her dress had blood because according to her, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she
jumped out of the car. The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that
according to Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step
out of the car. He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer
had gotten a ride. He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the
highway

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged?

Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No. 532 (Anti-Piracy
and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)?

HELD:
There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they
committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under
the compulsion of threats or intimidation.
 For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the
malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty
 In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the
commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders
 This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention

Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands
were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate
to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed (this is the origin of the law
on highway robbery)
 PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws
indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways and not acts of
robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim
 The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually operating
on a highway does not make PD No 532 applicable to the case
 This is not justified by the accused's intention

Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2 months or prision

correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor. Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento P7,000 as actual
damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)

PEOPLE VS DELIM
General and Specific Intent

FACTS:
It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46 (Urdaneta City) finding the
appellants, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to death for the murder of Modesto
Bantas.
Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and victim are “related” for modesto is an
adopted son of their father. On January 23,1999 Marlon, Robert and Ronald Delim charged into the
house and poked a gun at modesto and herded him outside the house. Leon and Manuel Delim both
armed stayed put and made sure that randy and rita stayed put.
Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon, Ronald, and Leon used denial and
alibi as their evidence against the charge.
*alibis are the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove
ISSUES:

Is conspiracy and treachery present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime?

Yes there is:

CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit
it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a
previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the
accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed.
appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So their acts were synchronized and executed
with precision evincing a preconceived plan to kill Modesto

There is no:
TREACHERY- there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove:
a. employment of means of execution which gives the person no opportunity
to defend himself
b. the means of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted
In the appellants case there are no evidence to the particulars on how Modesto was assaulted and killed
and this in fact does mean that treachery cannot be proven since it cannot be presumed that modesto
was defenseless during the time that he was being attacked and shot at by the appellants.
Sheer numbers by the appellants when they attacked modesto does not constitute proof that the three
took advantage of their numerical superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.

HELD:
APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE FELONY OF HOMICIDE (THE DECISION
OF THE LOWER COURTS WERE MODIFIED TO LOWER THE CRIME FROM MURDER TO HOMICIDE)
Nature: Appeal from the judgment of the CFI of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City.

PEOPLE VS TEMBLOR
Intent VS Motive

FACTS:
On 30 December 1980, 7:30 PM, Vicente Temblor alias “Ronald” (accused-appellant) went to Julius
Cagampang’s house in Agusan del Norte, to buy cigarettes. Cagampang, while opening a pack of
cigarettes, was shot! The accused (and another person, Anecito Ellevera) demanded Victorina Cagampang
(Julius’ wife) that she brings out her husband’s firearms. The accused fired two more shots at the fallen
victim. Victorina gave a suitcase to Temblor, who then took the .38 caliber which was inside, and fled.
In August 1981, Temblor, an NPA, surrendered (it was actually a mass surrender of NPA’s) after hiding in
the mountains. In 26 November 1981, he was arrested by Buenavista police at the public market and then
detained at municipal jail. Regarding the murder of Cagampang, Temblor’s alibi was that day until the
next, he was with his father for drinking and pulutan. On 8 June 1982, the accused was convicted and
sentenced to suffer reclusion perpertua, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim P12,000. He appealed.
*** In this appeal, the appellant alleges that the court a quo erred: (1) in finding that he was positively
identified by the prosecution witness as the killer, and (2) in rejecting his defense of alibi.

ISSUE:
WON the accused is guilty of murder.

HELD:
Yes, the accused is guilty of murder. Judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED in all respects and civil
indemnity increased to P30K. It was proven that he had motive in killing Cagampang: he had knowledge
that Cagampang possessed a firearm; this was motive enough to kill him, as part of NPA’s “agaw armas”
campaign or killings perpetrated by NPA for the purpose of acquiring more firearms. Moreover, proof of
motive is not essential when the culprit has been positively identified. Also, his flight implies guilt.
The prosecution witness, Victorina Cagampang, may have minor inconsistencies in her testimony but this
does not diminish her credibility – that is part of being human. What is important is that she had
positively identified the accused as the assailant and that her testimony is corroborated by other
witnesses.
Furthermore, the accused’s alibi was unacceptable because it was self-serving and uncorroborated. It
cannot overrule positive identification, it was merely 15-20 minutes away from crime scene and Perol was
at work.

PEOPLE VS HASSAN
Intent VS Motive
FACT: Usman Hassan, 15 yrs. Old of Samal Tribe in Zambo City was convicted of murder of Pichel. Pichel
was stabbed to death at fruit paradise while sitting at his red honda motorcycle, waiting for friend Jose
Samson who was buying fruits.

Issue: WON conviction is valid

Held: No. Conviction reversed. Acquitted. The Medico Legal found two stab wounds from front but the
Samson claimed that Pichel was stabbed once from behind. Procedure followed was also improper. The
accused was presented to the witness alone and in confrontation, not police line up. He was also denied
right to counsel, particularly when identification took place—this qualifies for uncounselled confession.
The witness was also questioned 2 days after incident and sworn 4 days after. The fruit vendor as well as
the companion of the accused was not investigated. In fact, they did not pursue other suspect. Also, the
knife was not tested. Further notable are the facts that the age of the accused was observed without
medical basis, that the accused did not run away and that he had no motive, which, in People vs. Verzo
was considered important when there is doubt in the identity of culprit and reiterated in People vs.
Pervelo which stated that identification is tenuous.

US vs. AH CHONG
Mistake of Fact

FACTS: Ah Chong was a cook in Ft. McKinley. He was afraid of bad elements. One evening, before going to
bed, he locked himself in his room by placing a chair against the door. After having gone to bed, he was
awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, “Who is there,” but received no answer.
Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed & called out again, “If you enter the room I
will kill you.” But at that precise moment, he was struck by the chair that had been placed against the door,
& believing that he was being attacked he seized a kitchen knife & struck & fatally wounded the intruder
who turned out to be his roommate.
HELD: Ah Chong must be acquitted because of mistake of fact.
Ratio: Had the facts been as Ah Chong believed them to be, he would have been justified in killing the
intruder under A11, par. 1, of the RPC, which requires, to justify the act, that there be:
 unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed,
 reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, &
 lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself

If the intruder was really a robber, forcing his way into the room of Ah Chong, there would have been
unlawful aggression on the part of the intruder. There would have been a necessity on the part of Ah
Chong to defend himself and/or his home. The knife would have been a reasonable means to prevent or
repel such aggression. And Ah Chong gave no provocation at all. Under A11 of the RPC, there is nothing
unlawful in the intention as well as in the act of the person making the defense.

PEOPLE VS OANIS

Mistake of Fact

FACTS:

Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta were instructed to arrest a notorious criminal and escaped convict,
Anselmo Balagtas, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. They went to the suspected house then
proceeded to the room where they saw the supposedly Balagtas sleeping with his back towards the
door. Oanis and Galanta simultaneously or successively fired at him which resulted to the victim’s death.
The supposedly Balagtas turned out to be Serepio Tecson, an innocent man.

ISSUE:

WON Oanis and Galanta incur no liability due to innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of
their official duties.

WON Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal liability in the performance of their duty.

HELD:

No. Innocent mistake of fact does not apply to the case at bar. “Ignorance facti excusat” applies only
when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. The fact that the supposedly suspect was
sleeping, Oanis and Galanta could have checked whether it is the real Balagtas.

No. Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable. A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the
fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are 2 requisites to justify this: (1)
the offender acted in teh perfomance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office, (2) that the
injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the
lawful exercise of such right or office. In this case, only the first requisite is present.

CULPA CASES
QUIZON VS JUSTICE OF HOPE CULPA
FACTS: Francisco Quizon was charged of damage to property by reckless prudence with fine amounting
of P125.00. Later on he filed a motion to quash the case on the ground that my be imposed form ART
365 of RPC from P125-P375. ART 327 of the penal code provides anyone who is liable for Malicious
Mischief, defined as the willful destruction of another’s property for vicious, want on or mischievous
purposes.
ISSUE: Whether Malicious Mischief can be committed through negligence?
HELD: No, it cannot be committed through negligence, because Culpa (Negligence) or Malice or
deliberateness) are not compatible. Reckless Imprudence is not a crime in itself by simply a way of
committing it and it determines a lower degree of criminal liability. It is the mental attitude or condition
behind the act is penalized by the law. Hence, the dangerous recklessness the lack of care and foresight
“Imprudencia Punible” and Penalties relating the case are under Mitigating Circumstance of Article 13 of
RPC.

PEOPLE VS CARMEN

CULPA

Facts: The trial court rendered a decision and the accused-appellants were all found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder after having performed a cultic healing pray-over which
resulted to the death of Randy Luntayao. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA.

Issue: WON accused-appellants can be held liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide,
considering that the information charges them with murder.

Held: Yes. Conviction modified to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Killing a person w/
treachery is murder even if there is no intent to kill. When death occurs, it’s presumed to be the natural
consequence of physical injuries inflicted. In murder qualified by treachery, it’s required only that there
is treachery in the attack, & this is true even if the offender has no intent to kill the person assaulted

One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally and
logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not.

Intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act. The presumption of criminal intent may
arise from the proof of the criminal act. Hence, they are liable for all the direct and natural
consequences of their unlawful act, even if the ultimate result had not been intended.

The strange procedure resulted in the death of the boy. Thus, accused-appellants had no criminal intent
to kill the boy. Their liability arises from their reckless imprudence because they ought that to know
their actions would not bring about the cure. They are, therefore, guilty of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide and not of murder.
PEOPLE VS PUGAY
CULPA

FACTS:
The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
murder of Bayani Miranda and sentencing them to a prison term ranging from 12 years (prison mayor)
as mimimum to 20 years (prison temporal) as maximum and for samson to be sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.
Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and they used to
sleep together. On the evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario
Cavite. Sometime after midnight accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived (they
were drunk), and they started making fun of Bayani Miranda. Pugay after making fun of the Bayani, took
a can of gasoline and poured its contents on the latter, Gabion (principal witness) told Pugay not to do
the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him. They were arrested the
same night and barely a few hours after the incident gave their written statements.

ISSUES:
Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime? If not what are the criminal
responsibilities of the accused?
There is no:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit
it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a
previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the
accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed.
Since there was no animosity between miranda and the accused, and add to the that that the meeting
at the scene of the incident was purely coincidental, and the main intent of the accused is to make fun
of miranda.
Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson
arising from different acts directed against miranda is individual NOT collective and each of them is
liable only for the act that was committed by him.
**Conspiracy may be implied from concerted action of the assailants in confronting the victim.
Criminal Responsibilities:
PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising
from any act committed by his companions who at the same time were making fun of the deceased. -
GUILTY OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE
SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient evidence that appears in the record establishing qualifying
circumstances (treachery, conspiracy). And granted the mitigating circumstance that he never INTENDED
to commit so grave a wrong. - GUILTY OF HOMICIDE
HELD:
JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. JUDGEMENT FOR GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR MURDER WAS LOWERED TO THE ABOVE JUDGEMENTS.

CRIMES MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA

February 23, 1988

Alexander Padilla, complainant
vs.
The Hon. Baltazar R. Dizon, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch
113, respondent.

Facts:
 Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the tourist and accused, Lo Chi Fai, saying
that Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention to violate the law. He also directed the release to Lo Chi Fai
of at least the amount of US$3,000.00 under Central Bank Circular No. 960.

 Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while attempting to
smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the country.

 An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank
Circular No. 960 with a penal sanction provided by Sec. 1, PD NO. 1883.

 Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides that no person shall take out or transmit or attempt
to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form out of the Philippines without an
authorization by the Central Bank. Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out
from the Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange
brought in by them. Tourists and non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than
US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in
the form prescribed by the Central Bank at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines.

 Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any person who shall engage in the trading or purchase and
sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and regulations of the Central Bank
shall be guilty of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion temporal (minimum of 12 years and 1 day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no
less than P50,000.00.
  At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to establish that he was a businessman from Hongkong, that he had
come to the Philippines 9 to 10 times to invest in business in the country with his business
associates, and that he and his business associates declared all the money they brought in and all
declarations were handed to and kept by him.

 Because of the revolution taking place in Manila during that time, Lo Chi Fai was urged by his
business associates to come to Manila to bring the money out of the Philippines.

 Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a complaint against Baltazar R. Dizon for
acquitting Lo Chi Fai.

Issue:
 Whether or not respondent Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance
of the law in holding that the accused, Lo Chi Fai, for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960,
the prosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law.
Held:
 Yes. Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign currency and foreign currency instruments
found in the possession of Lo Chi Fai when he was apprehended at the airport and the amounts
of such foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by Lo
Chi Fai at the trial, and that these currency declarations were declarations belonging to other
people.

 In invoking the provisions of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to justify the release of US$3,000.00
to Lo Chi Fai, Baltazar R. Dizon again diplayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of law.
There is nothing in the Central Bank Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial court
to release the said amount of US Currency to Lo Chi Fai.

G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992

ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:
 Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but
he did not have complete equipment... he lacked funds with which... to purchase the
necessary equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner, representing
 Ultra Sources International Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private
complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as Mancor)
for his needed... car repair service equipment of which Mancor was a distributor. (Rollo,
pp. 40-41)
 (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation (LS Finance
for brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey
 Gomez, that Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if
LS Finance could accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities.
 on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit equivalent to thirty per
centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting
to P29,790.00.
 unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on
condition that the same would be paid as... a short term loan at 3% interest.
 petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement
 After the documentation was completed, the equipment... were delivered to petitioner
who in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the
petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng.
Issues:
 four counts of the aforestated charges subject of... the petition... petitioner could not
pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage equipments. It was
then on this occasion that petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng was the one who
advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see
 Corazon Teng and promised to pay the latter but the payment never came and when
the four (4) checks were deposited they were returned for the reason "account closed."
Ruling:
 finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
violations of B.P. Blg. 22 and sentencing the accused to imprisonment for one year in
each Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693, Q-35695 and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant the
respective... amounts reflected in subject checks
 As the transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being
paid for the loaned equipment, which were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor) when the
petitioner failed to continue paying possibly... due to economic constraints or business
failure, then it is lawful and just that the warranty deposit should not be charged against
the petitioner.
 To argue that after the termination of the lease agreement, the warranty deposit should
be refundable in full to Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he did not cash out the
  "warranty deposit" for his official or personal use, is to stretch the nicety of the alleged
law (B.P. No. 22) violated.
 It would have been different if this predicament was not communicated to all the
parties he dealt with regarding the lease agreement the financing of which was...
covered by L.S. Finance Management.
 the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of
the crime charged.

G.R. No. L-63419 December 18, 1986

FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XX, Manila, and the HONORABLE JOSE B.
FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.

Facts

 Petitioners assail the validity of BP 22, also known as the Bouncing Check Law.
 BP 22 punishes a person “who makes or draws and issues any check on account for
value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank..”. It is aimed at putting a stop to the practice of issuing checks
that are worthless which causes injury to the public interest.
 Contentions on the law are that:

1) it offends constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt;

2) it impairs freedom of contract;

3) it contravenes the equal protection clause;

4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and

5) its enactment is flawed because the Interim Batasan violated the prohibition
on amendments in the Third Reading

Issue

 Whether or not BP 22 is a valid law (police power)

Held

 The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, not the
non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The effects of issuance of a worthless
 check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and
touches the interests of the community at large since putting valueless commercial papers
in circulation can pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system
and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. Hence, the enactment of
BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power and is not in conflict with the constitutional
inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
 There is no valid ground to sustain the contention the BP 22 impairs freedom of contract
since contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. The statute does not deny the
equal protection clause since it only penalizes the drawer of the check and not the payee.
Additonally, BP 22 does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative powers. Contrary
to the contention, the power to define the offense and to prescribe the penalty are not
delegated to the payee. On the last contention, the Interim Batasan investigated the matter
and reported that the clause in question was an authorized amendment of the bill. With all
the foregoing reasons, the constitutionality of BP 22 is upheld.

G.R. No. 4963 September 15, 1909

THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs. GO CHICO,Defendant-Appellant.

Facts:
 On or about the 4th day of August, 1908, appellant Go Chico displayed in one of
the windows and one of the show cases of his store in No. 89 Calle Rosario,
Manila, a number of medallions, in the form of a small button, upon which were
printed the miniature faces of Emilio Aguinaldo and the flag or banner or device
used during the late insurrection in the Phil. Islands to designate and identify
those in armed insurrection against the United States.

 On the day previous to the one set forth above, the appellant had purchased the
said medallion sold at a public sale under the authority of the sheriff of the city
of Manila.

 On the day in question, the appellant was arranging his stock of goods for the
purpose of displaying them to the public, and in doing so, he placed the
medallions in his showcase and on one of the windows of his store.

 The appellant was ignorant of any law against the display of such medallions and
had consequently no corrupt intention. The facts stated above are admitted.

 The appellant has two propositions for his acquittal: first is that before a
conviction can be had, a criminal intent upon the part of the accused must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Second is that the prohibition of law is
directed against the use of identical banners, devices or emblems actually used
 during the Philippine insurrection by those in armed rebellion against the United
States.

Issue:

 Whether or not criminal intent is necessary in crimes punishable by special laws.

Held:
 The court ruled that the act alone, irrespective of its motive, constitutes the crime. The
words “used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify
those in armed rebellion against the United States” mean not only the identical flags
actually used in the insurrection, but any flag which is of that type. The description
refers not to a particular flag, but to a type of flag. The literal interpretation of a statute
may lead to an absurdity, or evidently fail to give the real intent of the legislature.

ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 148560.

November 19, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080
(An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to
impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a
stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly
because, according to him,

1. (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness;

2. (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and,
3. (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised
Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the
accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.

 That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-
accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY,
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE
 ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR
INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire BY HIMSELF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or
TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less,
THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE
DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A
combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS.

 RESPECTIVELY OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY
REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY
NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM
THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE BANK
UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE'

Issue:
 R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following grounds:

1. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS VAGUENESS

2. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO KNOW THE NATURE AND
CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM

3. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF

INNOCENCE BY LOWERING THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR PROVING THE
COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER

4. IT IS BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO DELIMIT THE

REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD AND TO ABOLISH THE ELEMENT OF MENS REA IN
MALA IN SE CRIMES BY CONVERTING THESE TO MALA PROHIBITA, IN VIOLATION OF THE
DUE PROCESS CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.

Held:
 PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as
amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Constructive Intent, Transferred Intent, Praeter Intentionem

PEOPLE VS PUGAY
GR No. L-74324
November 17, 1988
FACTS

The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime of murder of Bayani Miranda and sentencing them to a prison term ranging
from 12 years (prison mayor) as mimimum to 20 years (prison temporal) as maximum
and for samson to be sentenced to reclusion perpetua

 Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and
they used to sleep together. On the evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in
the public plaza of Rosario Cavite. Sometime after midnight accused Pugay and Samson
with several companions arrived (they were drunk), and they started making fun of
Bayani Miranda. Pugay after making fun of the Bayani, took a can of gasoline and
poured its contents on the latter, Gabion (principal witness) told Pugay not to do the
deed. Then Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him. They were
arrested the same night and barely a few hours after the incident gave their written
statements.

ISSUES

 Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime? If not what
are the criminal responsibilities of the accused?

There is no:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and
decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as
the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential
that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is
sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose
and were united in its executed.
Since there was no animosity between miranda and the accused, and add to the that
that the meeting at the scene of the incident was purely coincidental, and the main
intent of the accused is to make fun of miranda
Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective criminal responsibility of
Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against miranda is individual NOT
 collective and each of them is liable only for the act that was committed by him.

**Conspiracy may be implied from concerted action of the assailants in confronting the
victim.

Criminal Responsibilities:
PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable
consequence arising from any act committed by his companions who at the same time
were making fun of the deceased. - GUILTY OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO
HOMICIDE

SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient evidence that appears in the record establishing
qualifying circumstances (treachery, conspiracy). And granted the mitigating
circumstance that he never INTENDED to commit so grave a wrong. - GUILTY OF
HOMICIDE

HELD:

 JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS.

JUDGEMENT FOR GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR MURDER WAS LOWERED
TO THE ABOVE JUDGEMENTS.

People v. Guillen
G.R. No. L-1477
January 18, 1950 | G.R. No. L-1477

FACTS:

 On March 10, 1947, in an event sponsored by the Liberal Party at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo,
Manila, Guillen planted a hand grenade near the stage and threw another one toward
then President Manuel Roxas in an apparent assassination attempt born out of Guillen's
spite for the President over the latter's perceived failure to fulfill his promises and his call
for the passage of the so-called parity measure. General Castaneda managed to kick the
grenade off the stage. However, its explosion caused the death of Simeon Varela
(Barrela). It also caused the injuries of Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carillo, and Emilio
Maglalang.

 Guillen pleaded not guilty to the consequent charges of murder and multiple frustrated
murder filed against him. At one point, he even tried to use the insanity excuse, but he
was found to have been mentally stable.
  Later on, by his own admission, he confessed to his crimes. He was subsequently found
guilty of all the charges and was sentenced to death.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the conviction of the accused was proper.

HELD:

 No, the SC ruled that Guillen's actions on March 10, 1947 and their penalties were covered
by Art. 48 of the RPC, not sub-section 1 of Art. 49. The Court said that by a single act --
throwing a hand grenade at President Roxas -- he committed two grave felonies:
(a) murder and (b) multiple attempted murder.

People v. Albuquerque

Appeal of Judgment of Homicide

FACTS:

 The accused appellant is a 55 year old widower, who is partially paralyzed and lacks
 control of his right arm and limps with his left leg. He has nine children, most of whom
live with one of his daughters, Maria, as well as himself.

 Pilar, a daughter of his who lives with Maria, had had intimate relations with the
deceased, and bore a child by him. When the appellant found out about this, he urged
the deceased to marry his daughter and support her and their child. Of note is that the
deceased had already agreed to give a monthly amount of money for the child but had
so far failed to carry it out.

 One day, the accused decided to visit the deceased at his place of work and confront
him regarding the situation with Pilar and the child. Upon the deceased‟s refusal of the
accused‟s proposal that the former marry Pilar, the latter whipped out his penknife and
stabbed the former at the base of the neck.

 The accused however maintains that it was not his intention to kill the deceased,
 as he only intended to cut his face and leave a scar, something he had threatened to do
in his letters to the deceased. He holds that killing the deceased would have served him
no purpose as he had in fact wanted him to marry his daughter and look after their child
 together. The reason given for the error in the blow stricken is the lack of control in the
 accused‟s arm owing to his paralysis.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the accused acted in self defense.
RATIO:
1. As the appellant was the one who first brandished a weapon, the penknife, and
proceeded to attack, he cannot claim self defense. However, praeter intentionem may be used
as a mitigating circumstance owing to lack of intent to kill.

HELD:

 Decision affirmed, with modifications due to the three mitigating circumstances

present, which are 1. lack of intention to cause so grave an injury (praeter intentionem),
2. appellant‟s voluntary surrender to the authorities, and 3) acting under the influence
of passion and obfuscation, as well as there being no aggravating circumstance.

OTHER EXCULPATORY CAUSES – INSTIGATION

PEOPLE VS LUA CHU G.R. No. 34917 September 7, 1931

Facts: Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng were convicted of the illegal importation of opium. On November, 1929,
Tieng wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong to send him a shipment of opium. Tieng went to Juan
Samson's house and told him that the opium shipment consisted of 3,000 tins for P2 a tin, and that
opium is in the vessel Kolambugan, awaiting shipment direct to Cebu. When the vessel arrived, Tieng
was told that he must pay over the Php6000 before the opium be taken out. The next day, Samson
informed of what had taken place to Colonel Francisco, who then instructed the Captain Buenconsejo,
to discuss the capture of the opium owners with Samson. Samson also went to the office of the
provincial fiscal, reported the same, and asked for a stenographer to note his conversation with Tieng
that night and in the presence of Captain Buenconsejo. On December 17, 1929, Buenconsejo, Fernando,
and the stenographer went to Samson's house and concealed themselves behind a curtain made of
strips of wood.
Samson asked Tieng where the opium was, and the latter answered that it was in the cases numbered 11
to 18 – a total of 3,252 tins. Tieng returned later that night with Lua Chu, who said he was not the sole
owner of the opium.Samson then interrogated Chu on when the former was going to get the opium, on
whether Chu had brought the money, on how he had come to bring in the opium; Chu would answer
them, while Buenconsejo listened in. As Tieng was handing certain papers over to his companion, Uy Ay;
Buenconsejo, who had been hiding, appeared and arrested the two men. After the two to the
Constabulary headquarters, and notified the fiscal, Buenconsejo and Samson went to Chu's home to
search it and arrest him, and took him to the Constabulary headquarters, and then went to the
customhouse to examine the cases marked.
Contention of the accused: The accused principal defense was that they were induced by Samson to
import the opium in question. Contention of the state: The state contends that the defendants do not
deny their participation in the act in question. Samson denied his connection with the offense for
purposes of gain; further contending that he smoothed the way for the introduction of the prohibited
drug, but he did not do so to help them carry their plan to a successful issue, rather to assure the seizure
of the imported drug and the arrest of the smugglers.
Issue: Whether or not the Samson instigated the accused to import opium

Ruling: Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein accused to import the opium in question, but
pretended to have an understanding with the collector of customs, Natividad; not to gain the Php2000
intended for him out of the transaction, but in order the better to assure the seizure of the prohibited
drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. There is certainly nothing immoral in this or against the
public good which should prevent the Government from prosecuting and punishing the culprits, for this
is not a case where an innocent person is induced to commit a crime merely to prosecute him, but it
simply a trap set to catch a criminal. The mere fact that the Samson pretended to agree a plan for
smuggling illegally imported opium through the customhouse, in order the better to assure the seizure of
said opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the latter.
Decision against the accused is affirmed.

US v. PHELPS 16 Phil 440 August 11, 1910

FACTS:
While in international saloon in Jolo, Homer G. Smith (the lone prosecution witness) heard
James O. Phelps (the accused) smokes opium in some occasions. Smith asked the accused if Phelps
smoke opium. Phelps answered yes. Smith said that he wanted to smoke opium. On the first
invitation by the accused Phelps, he was not able to prepare a room for smoking. They made
another agreement and went together at a certain house in Tulay. A Chinaman prepared the room
and the pipe for smoking. Smith gave the Chinaman P2.00. The Chinaman gave the pipe to Smith.
Smith then left, with the pipe, and reported the accused to the Justice of peace. Phelps was later
arrested. The Chinaman corroborated the testimony of the accused that Smith visits him (Phelps)
seeking where he (Smith) can smoke opium. Also, the attending doctor testified that Phelps was
a strong, robust man and presents no appearance of an opium smoker. The Court of First Instance
convicted Phelps of violating Act. No. 1761. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Phelps liable?

RULING:
No, because the commission of the crime was intended by Smith and Phelps was only
induced in its commission. Phelps is only charged with having smoked opium this one time in the
house of the Chinaman, and the prosecution rests its case solely upon the testimony of the
witness Smith, who was an employee of Bureau of Internal Revenue, secretly acting in that
capacity in Jolo. Smith stated to the accused that he (Smith) was desirous of smoking. He urged
the accused to have the Chinaman make arrangements so they both could smoke. If he had, by
those means, induced the appellant to sell opium or to exhibit in his possession either opium or
any of the prohibited paraphernalia, Smith’s testimony would be more reasonable, since the mere
possession of the drug or any of the prohibited paraphernalia is a violation of the law itself. It is
not contended that the accused had in his possession any of these things. Smith only suggested
the commission of this crime but he (Smith) stated that he desired to commit the same offense
and would pay his part of the expense necessary for the commission of the prohibited act. When
an employee of the government, as in this case, and according to his own testimony, encourages
or induces the persons to commit a crime in order to prosecute them, such conduct is
reprehensible. Appellant Phelps is found not guilty. Lower court judgment reversed and the
appellant acquitted.
AGE (UNDER 18 or OVER 70)

People vs. Doquena G.R. No. 46539 September 27, 1939

Facts:
Between 1-2 pm of Nov. 19, 1938, Juan Ragojos and Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of
their school in Sual, Pangasinan. Valentin Doquena, the accused, intercepted the ball, and threw it a
Ragojos, who was hit in the stomach. Miffed, Ragojos chased Doquena, and upon catching him, slapped
Doquena on the nape, and punched him in the face. After doing this, Ragojos went back to Rarang to
resume playing volleyball. Insulted, Doquena looked for something to throw at Ragojos, finding none, he
got his cousin's (Romualdo Cocal) knife, and confronted Ragojos. Ragojo's denied Doquena's request for
a fight and resumed playing. Doquena stabbed the unaware Ragojos in the chest, thereby killing the latter.
The court held that in committing the act, the accused acted with discernment and was conscious of the
nature and consequences of his acts, therefore his defense that he was a minor was untenable (given that
the Doquena was a 7th grade pupil, one of the brightest in his class, and was an officer in the CAT
program), and thus convicted him of the crime of homicide. The court ordered him to be sent to the
Training School for Boys until he reaches the age of majority. Thus, the appeal by the accused, stating that
to determine whether or not there was discernment on the part of the minor, the following must be taken
into consideration:
a) The facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed.
b) The state of mind at the time the crime was committed
c) The time he had at his disposal
d) The degree of reasoning of the minor
Issue: Whether or not the accused acted with discernment
Ruling:
Decision affirmed. Yes, the accused acted with discernment. Accused mistakes the discernment for
premeditation, or at least for lack of intention, as a mitigating circumstance. However, the DISCERNMENT
that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under 15 years but over
nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his MENTAL CAPACITY to understand the difference
between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance,
the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the
commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial.
LLAVE V PEOPLE G.R. No. 166040 April 26, 2006

Facts:
Neil Llave, 12 years old, raped Debbielyn. The victim was pulled from a vacant lot. The accused ordered
her to lie down on the cement. He removed her shorts and underwear and his own. He penetrated his
penis into the victim’s vagina and had a push and pull movement. Teofisto, the witness, saw the incident
and shouted. The accused fled the scence. During trial the accused argued that being a minor, he is
presumed that he acted without discernment under paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code
thus exempt from criminal liability.

Issue: Whether or not the accused acted with discernment

Ruling:
Yes, the accused acted with discernment. The factual circumstance which bolstered the he acted with
discernment is when the accused stated that he was an outstanding student. This allegation proves that
he acted with discernment with full knowledge and intelligence. He was possessed of intelligence well
beyond his years and thus was able to distinguish which conduct is right or wrong. Hence, the accused is
not exempt from criminal liability.
LACK OF INTENTION TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG
PEOPLE VS URAL G.R. NO. L-30801 MARCH 27 1974
FACTS:
- Alberio went to the municipal building and saw Ural, a policeman inside the jail where he was
boxing prisoner Napola (who was imprisoned for being drunk). When Napola fell to the ground
he U kicked him and poured some liquid on N and then ignited N’s body.
- Dr. Luzonia Bakil who treated the victim, said that he sustained 2nd degree burns on the arms,
neck, left side of the face and one half of the body including the back. She also testified that
without any medical intervention, the burns would have caused death
- Napola died on Aug 25 1966. Death certificate indicated burn as the cause of death.
- During the trial, the prosecutors failed to present the detention prisoners who saw the burning
of Napola as witnesses as well as the wife of the deceased
- Nevertheless, Ural was convicted of murder, was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and was
ordered to pay for costs
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence of the prosecution was sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:
TC did not err in convicting Ural for murder.
- Ural had his own version of the story. According to him he heard a scream for help from Napola
whose shirt was in flames when found by him, he removed the shirt, but did not summon the
doctor because he thought that the burns were not serious.
 SC: this statement cannot prevail over the testimony of Alberio
 This statement does not prove that he was not the one who burned Napola, at most this
could only mean that he was alarmed by the consequences of his evil act
- Ural assailed the credibility of Alberio as a witness, saying that he was not listed as a prosecution
witness and that he was convicted of murder in the past
 Wouldn’t preclude him from being a credible witness.
 Since there was no police investigation (accused a police officer), the investigation that
ensued was done by a special counsel of the fiscal’s office. A possible explanation of
alberio not being listed at first.
 The statements of the witnesses for the defense were not inconsistent with that of
Alberio’s.

Therefore, there is no reason to not believe in Alberio’s testimony.

- The present case is covered by article 4 (par.1-result greater than what was intended).
 Aggravating circumstance: art 14(1).
 TC erred in not appreciating the Mitigating circumstance “that the offender had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed”
 No intent to kill but only to maltreat the drunk napola who might have been
making a nuisance of himself
 He realized the fearful consequence of his felonious act, he allowed Napola to
secure medical treatment at the municipal dispensary
- Since the mitigating circumstance offset the aggravating circumstance, TC correctly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of the penalty for murder. Trial Court
decision AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE vs. INOCENCIO GONZALEZ, JR. G.R. No. 139542 June 21, 2001

FACTS: After their vehicles almost collided with each other, Andres and Appellant had an altercation.
Thereafter, Andres went back inside to his car when he was blocked by the appellant’s son who said,
"Anong problema mo sa erpat ko." Andres testified that he felt threatened and so he immediately boarded
his vehicle, sat at the driver’s seat, closed the door, and partially opened the car window just wide enough
to talk back to appellant’s son, Dino. In the meantime, appellant, thinking that Andres was going to get
something from his car, took a gun. However, he was pushed by his daughter-in-law which made him lost
his balance and accidentally fired the gun hitting Andres’ wife, and two sons.Appellant was charged and
convicted of Murder, Double Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder in the RTC.
The appellant seeks a reversal and prays that judgment be rendered exempting him from criminal and
civil liabilities contending that he had no intention to shoot Noel Andres much less his wife nor the
children. He lost his balance when his daughter Trisha approached and pushed him backwards to stop him
from joining Dino and Noel Andres but the appellant tried to free his right hand holding the gun and it
accidentally fired.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was treachery attendant in the crime.

RULING: No. Treachery under par.16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the deliberate
employment of means, methods or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend directly
and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
intended victim might raise. For treachery to be appreciated two elements must concur: 1) the
employment of means of execution that would ensure the safety of the accused from retaliatory acts of
the intended victim and leaving the latter without an opportunity to defend himself and 2) the means
employed were deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. I affirm the recommendation of the
Solicitor-General that the shooting was not attended by treachery and accordingly the crime committed
for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide and not murder.

SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION
PEOPLE VS PAGAL G.R. No. L-32040 October 25, 1977

FACTS: The accused, Pedro Pagal and Jose Torcelino were charged with the robbery with homicide, with
generic aggravating circumstances of nighttime, evident premeditation, in disregard of the respect due
the offended party, and with abuse of confidence. When the case was called for arraignment, the accused
entered a plea of guilty but they were allowed afterwards to prove the mitigating circumstances of
sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the act, and that
of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to produce passion and obfuscation.

RTC: After considering the 4 aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstance of only plea of guilt,
found them guilty of the crime charged, sentencing them with the penalty of death.

The case was elevated to the SC by virtue of the mandatory review on account of the penalty of death
imposed on the accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in not appreciating in favor of the accused the mitigating
circumstances of (1) sufficient provocation and (2) passion or obfuscation.

RULING: No. As a rule, two or more mitigating circumstances arising from the same act cannot be
considered as separate and distinct circumstances but should be treated as one. In this case, the
mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation cannot be considered because the alleged provocation
which caused the obfuscation arose from the same incident, which is the alleged maltreatment and/or ill-
treatment caused by the victims towards the accused-appellants.

As to the circumstance of passion and obfuscation, it cannot be treated as mitigating if the crime involved
was planned and calmly meditated before its execution, such as in this case of robbery where the
appellants are expected to have carefully planned its execution. The maltreatment that appellants claim
the victim to have committed against them occurred much earlier than the date of the commission of the
crime. Provocation in order to be a mitigating circumstance must be sufficient and immediately preceding
the act.
People v Leonor GR. No. 125053 March 25, 1999

Facts:
 Dr. Tarlengco (the victim) was in her clinic when Leonor entered and inquired the cost of tooth
extraction; after answering, Leonor left and said that he would come back
 Leonor came back a few minutes later and while Dr. Tarlengco was preparing the materials for
tooth extraction, Leoner barged in and asked for money, stabbed the victim, grabbed her watch
and ran away
 Reynato Baquilod (security guard, one of the witnesses) heard the victim asking for help. After
knowing what happened through the brief statement of Dr. Tarlengco, Baquilod left and chased
Leonor. Upon catching up on Leonor he asked him why he did what he did; Leonor answered “Sir,
hindi ko naman po gusto to. Ginawa ko lang dahil kailangan ng pamilya ko”
 Mr. Tarlengco (father of the victim, one of the witnesses) got a chance to talk to his daughter
while she was still struggling in the hospital; she briefly shared what happened to her father

Defense version:
o Leonor went inside the clinic and asked for the price of tooth extraction. Dr. Tarlengco
answered that its 150 per tooth; Leonor negotiated that it be 100 per tooth but Dr.
Tarlegco allegedly declined
o Leonor said that he will just look for another clinic but thereafter, the victim agreed to
charge the extraction 100 per tooth. Leonor was made to sit on the dental chair and
before injecting anesthesia, Dr. Tarlengco changed her mind and decided that the price
should still become 150 pe tooth/
o Leonor pushed away the dentist’s hand and that angered her. As Leonor was making his
way out, Dr. Tarlengco cursed and pushed him and thereafter, the victim blacked out and
stabbed the victim
 Leonor contends that the crime should only be homicide for he did not rob the victim and that he
be granted the mitigating circumstance that there was sufficient provocation by the offended
party immediately preceding the offense
 However, the court affirmed that there was robbery for he was found in possession of the
properties of the victim; both the watch and the amount of money was recovered from him
Issue: Whether or not Leonor should be granted the mitigating circumstance he prayed for.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the decision of Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque in Criminal Case
No. 95-212 is hereby MODIFIED. As modified, accused-appellant CHRISTOPHER CAA LEONOR is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of robbery with homicide, and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim, Dr. Teresa Tarlengco, P50,000
as indemnity for death; P44,318 as actual damages; P50,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 as attorneys
fees, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
No. The provocation sufficient to mitigate an offense must be proportionate to the gravity of the
retaliatory act. Following the statement of the accused, he claims that a push and bad words justify the
retaliation with a knife. Such claim is underserving of belief and does not entitle him the benefit of the
mitigating circumstance.
IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A WRONG

People vs. Benito G.R. No. L- 32042 December 17, 1976

FACTS:
 Benito was a former employee of the Civil Service Commission at its main office and was
assigned as Clerk 2 in the Administrative Division from Nov. 1963 continuously up to Nov. 1965
when he was suspended for "DISHONESTY"

 After two months, he was reinstated but was criminally charged for QUALIFIED THEFT,
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS, ESTAFA and FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS and
administratively charged for "DISHONESTY" culminating in his dismissal from the Civil Service on
February 1966.

 October 21, 1965 the victim Moncayo, as an administrative officer, reported to the
Commissioner of Civil Service that Benito admitted having malversed an amount between
P4,000 and P5,000 from his sales of examination fee stamps.

 At eleven o'clock in the morning of December 12, 1969 Moncayo, allegedly made upon seeing
Benito in the compound of the Civil Service Commission near the canteen: "Nagiistambay pala
dito and magnanakaw."; or, as Benito testified, Moncayo said: "Hindi ko alam na itong Civil
Service pala ay istambayan ng magnanakaw."

 At about 5:25 p.m. of that same day, Dec. 12, 1969, the suspect shot the victim eight (8) times
on the head and different parts of the body at closer range which consequently caused the
latter's death on the spot inside his car.

 Benito contends that there’s mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense since
Moncayo insulted him when he remarked that a thief was loitering in the premises of the Civil
Service Commission.
NOTE: Benito was later on acquitted of the crime that Moncayo alleged he had committed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defamatory remark by the victim may give rise to the mitigating circumstance of
vindication of a wrong?

RULING:
No. Office of the Solicitor General said that the defamatory remark was not specifically directed at
Benito. SC said that even assuming that Moncayo's remark was directed at Benito, Benito "had more
than sufficient time to suppress his emotion over said remark if he ever did resent it.” The six-hour
interval between the alleged grave offense committed by Moncayo against Benito and the assassination
was more than sufficient to enable Benito to recover his serenity. But instead of using that time to
regain his composure, he evolved the plan of liquidating Moncayo after office hours. Benito literally
ambushed Moncayo just a few minutes after the victim had left the office. He acted with treachery and
evident premeditation in perpetrating the cold-blooded murder. Also, SC said that the facts of the case
strongly suggest that what really impelled Benito to assassinate Moncayo was not the latter's alleged
defamatory remark but the refusal of Moncayo to change his report so as to favor Benito. Benito did not
act primarily to vindicate an alleged grave offense to himself but mainly to chastise Moncayo for having
exposed the alleged anomalies or defraudation committed by Benito and for obstinately refusing to
change his report. Because according also to Benito’s testimony, he saw Moncayo three hours later after
the remark or at two o'clock in the afternoon and inquired from him about his case and Moncayo said
that he had already submitted his report and he could not do anything more about Benito's case. SC
denied his petition.

UNITED STATES VS AMPAR G.R. No. L-12883 November 26, 1917

FACTS: A fiesta was in progress in the barrio of Mababoy municipality in San Carlos, province of Negros
Occidental. Clemente Ampar went to the kitchen and asked Modesto Patobo for some delicacy.
Patobo’s answer was “there is no more come here and I will roast a pig out of you.” Because of this, It
provoked Mr. Ampar, which later led to the assault. Ampar struck Patobo on the head win an AX,
causing the latter’s death.

ISSUE: Whether or not Patobo’s remarks constitutes as a grave offense?

RULING: The Court penalized the defendant (AMPAR) correctly by giving him the benefit of a mitigating
circumstance due to his old age and also what Patobo did on insulting Ampar in front of many people is
a serious matter to the defendant being of old age.

Mitigating circumstances; Immediate vindication of a grave offense

G.R. No. 96444 June 23, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEANDRO PAJARES y FLORENTINO, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
 This is an appeal from the decision * of the Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Branch VIII, Manila dated
October 25, 1990 in Criminal Case No. 85-40579 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Leandro
Pajares y Florentino" convicting herein appellant Pajares of the crime of Murder.
 Appellant was charged with the crimes of murder and frustrated homicide in two separate
informations:
CRIM. CASE NO. 85-40579: CRIM. CASE NO. 85-40580
 MURDER
That on or about the 11th day of October,
1985, at night time, purposely sought to
insure and better accomplish his criminal
design, in the City of Manila. Philippines, the
said accused, conspiring and confederating
together with five (5) others whose true
names, real Identities, and present
whereabouts are still unknown and helping
one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to
kill, evident premeditation, and treachery,
attack, assault. and use personal violence
upon one DIOSDADO VIOJAN Y SABAYAN, by
then and there mauling him and hitting him
with a baseball bat at the back of the head,
a vital part of the body, thereby inflicting
upon the said DIOSDADO VIOJAN Y
SABAYAN a club wound on the head which
was the direct and immediate cause of his
death.
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE
That on or about the 11th day of October, 1985, at
night time, purposely sought to insure and better
accomplish his criminal design, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together with five (5) others whose
true names, real identities, and present whereabouts
are still unknown, and helping one another, with
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and use personal
violence upon one RENATO PEREZ Y RUIDERA, by
mauling and hitting him with a baseball bat at the
back, a vital part of the body, thereby inflicting upon
him a club wound at the back which is necessarily
mortal and fatal, thus performing all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of
homicide, as a consequence, but nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of
the will of the accused, that is, because of the timely
and able medical attendance rendered upon the said
RENATO PEREZ RUIDERA which prevented his death.

 Appellant Pajares pleaded not guilty to both charges. Upon the petition of herein appellant that the
two (2) cases be consolidated, a joint trial ensued.
 The prosecution presented several witnesses, but their main arguments were taken from the
testimony of Renato Perez, who is the same victim in the Frustrated Homicide case:
 He testified that at about 11:30 p.m. on October 11, 1985, he and the deceased Diosdado Viojan
were on their way to a store located at Gomez St., Paco, Manila to buy something.
 They were walking abreast with each other, the deceased was at his right side and was a bit ahead
of him, when appellant Pajares suddenly appeared from behind and hit Viojan with a baseball bat at
the back of his head.
 The latter ran a short distance and fell down near the store of one Alex Blas. When Perez tried to
help Viojan he, too, was attacked by Pajares with the baseball bat hitting him at the back below the
left shoulder.
 He then grappled with the appellant for the possession of the baseball bat but the latter's
companions, namely: Rudy Dokling, Popoy, Inggo and Lauro Duado mauled him until he lost
consciousness. He was brought to the Philippine General Hospital by Eugene Panibit and Joselito
Perez where he was treated for the injuries he sustained
 He identified in court the baseball bat used by Pajares
 Appellant Leandro Pajares y Florentino denied the allegations of the prosecution.
 He asserts that he knew the deceased Diosdado Viojan by the name Dado, having met him once at
the store, and Renato Perez by the name Balat. At the time of the incident, he was inside the store
of Alex Blas with about eight (8) other People watching television.
 Hence, he did not see who hit Diosdado Viojan and Renato Perez. After the commotion, upon the
advise of Alex Blas, he went home and slept.
 At about 3:30 in the morning of October 12, 1985, he was arrested inside their house. Without
asking any question, he went with the arresting officers to the police station (TSN, Hearing of August
1, 1988, pp. 72-76).
 RTC JUDGMENT: found accused appellant guilty of the crimes charged against him:
CRIM. CASE NO. 85-40579:
The Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and
penalized by Art. 248, par, 1, Rev. Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstance to consider,
hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA with the accessory penalties of
the law; to pay Arlene Viojan and her child the sum of: P30,000,00; P12,000.00 as funeral expenses;
P15,000.00 as moral damages; and P10,000.00 as litigation expenses and attorney's fees; and finally the
costs of the suit.
CRIM. CASE NO. 85-40580:
The Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Slight Physical Injuries as
defined in par. 1, Art. 266 and penalized by Art. 27, both of the Rev. Penal Code, hereby sentencing him
to an imprisonment of ONE (1) MONTH; and to pay the cost of suit.
 Hence this appeal.
 APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:
 Appellant Pajares asserts that the trial court gravely erred in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua upon him. He avers that such a penalty is tantamount to a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment which is prohibited by the Constitution.
 Appellant points out that hours before the clubbing incident, Roberto Pajares, appellant's younger
brother, was mauled by the group of Diosdado Viojan as cited by the lower court referring to the
entry in the Police Blotter and the sworn statement of Roberto Pajares.
 The mauling of the latter is a big insult and truly offending to the appellant and his family. Hence,
the clubbing of Diosdado Viojan by herein appellant was a vindication of the grave offense
committed against his family. a mitigating circumstance under paragraph 5 of Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code.
 Considering further that the appellant was just nineteen (19) years old at the time he committed the
offense the penalty imposed by the court a quo should have been seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day (Brief for the Appellant, Rollo, pp. 52-58).

ISSUE: WON the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication can be applied in favor of the
appellant
HELD: NO.
 Appellant's sole defense is alibi. According to him, he was inside the store of Alex Blas, watching
television, when the incident occurred, Alex Blas even advised him to go home so as not to be
involved in the incident. However, the latter was not presented to corroborate appellant's
testimony.
 Alibi is the weakest defense an accused can concoct. In order to prosper, it must be so convincing as
to preclude any doubt that the accused could have been physically present at the place of the crime
or its vicinity at the time of the commission (People v. Lacao, Sr., G.R. No. 94320, September 4. 1991
(201 SCRA 317]).
 In the case at bar, appellant was within the vicinity of the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission.
 Furthermore, appellant was Positively identified by Renato Perez as the perpetrator of the crime. In
the face of the clear and positive testimony of the prosecution witness regarding the participation of
the accused in the crime, the accused's alibi dwindles into nothingness.
 The Positive identification of the accused by the witness as the perpetrator of the crime cannot be
overcome by the mere denial of the accused. Such positive identification of the accused that he
killed the victim establishes the guilt of the accused beyond moral certainty (People v
Arroyo, supra).
 The trial court correctly ruled that the crime was attended by treachery. There is treachery, the law
says, when the offender adopts means, methods or forms in the execution of the felony which
ensure its commission without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make (People v. Cuyo, G.R. No. 76211, April 30, 1991 [196 SCRA 447]).
 As found by the trial court, appellant Pajares hit Diosdado Viojan with a baseball bat from behind
without any warning thereby precluding any possible retaliation from the victim.
RE IMMEDIATE VINDICATION
 Having established the guilt of herein appellant. the next question is whether or not the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense can be appreciated in his favor. While it
may be true that appellant's brother Roberto Pajares was mauled by the companions of the
deceased at about 11:30 a.m. of October 11, 1985 as show in the entry in the Police Blotter (Exhibits
"A" to "A-3", Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579. pp. 30-33) and by appellant's brother
himself (Exhibits "G", "Q" and "A" Nos. 7-9, Ibid., p. 219), it must be emphasized that there is a
lapse of about ten (10) hours between said incident and the killing of Diosdado Viojan.
 Such interval of time was more than sufficient to enable appellant to recover his serenity (People
v. Benito, G.R. No. L-32042, December 17, 1976 [74 SCRA 271]). Hence, the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be appreciated in his favor.
 DISPOSITIVE: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with
modification that the indemnity is increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with the policy of this
Court on the matter.

PASSION OR OBFUSCATION

G.R. No. 4971 September 23, 1909

THE UNITED STATES vs. AUGUSTUS HICKS
FACTS:
CFI- Moro Province convicted Augustus Hicks of murder and sentenced him to the penalty of death, to
be executed according to the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to
pay the costs. The case has been submitted to SC for review.
 From September, 1902, to November, 1907, Augustus Hicks, an Afro-American, and Agustina Sola,
a Christian Moro woman, illicitly lived together in the municipality of Parang, Cotabato, Moro
Province. Trouble arose between them in the last-mentioned month of 1907. Agustina left Hick's
house and went to live with her brother-in-law, Luis Corrales. A few days later she contracted new
relations with another negro (LOL) named Corporal Wallace Current.

 December 21, 1907 at about 7:30 p. m., - Augustus Hicks together with a soldier named Lloyd
Nickens called at said house, and from the sala called out to his old mistress who was in her room
with Corporal Current, and after conversing with her in the Moro dialect for a few minutes, asked
the corporal to come out of said room; in response thereto the corporal appeared at the door of
the room, and after a short conversation, Current approached Hicks and they shook hands, when
Hicks asked him the following question: "Did I not tell you to leave this woman alone?," to which
Current replied: "That is all right, she told me that she did not want to live with you any longer, but
if she wishes, she may quit me, and you can live with her." The accused then replied: "God damn, I
have made up my mind;" and as Corporal Current saw that Hicks, when, he said this, was drawing a
 revolver from his trousers' pocket, he caught him by the hand, but the latter, snatching his hand
roughly away, said: "Don't do that," whereupon Current jumped into the room, hiding himself
behind the partition, just as Hicks drew his revolver and fired at Agustina Sola who was close by in
the sala of the house. The bullet struck her in the left side of the breast; she fell to the ground, and
died in a little more than an hour later.

 Upon hearing the shot Edward Robinson, who was also in the house, went to render assistance and
wrested the weapon from the hand of the accused. Hicks immediately fled from the house and
gave himself up to the chief of police of the town, H. L. Martin, asking him to lock him up in jail;
and, when a few minutes later a policeman came running in and reported that Hicks had fired a
shot at Agustina, the said chief of police caused Hicks to be arrested. The latter, when once in jail,
threw eight revolver cartridges out of the window; these were picked up by a policeman who
reported the occurrence and delivered the cartridges to his chief.
HICKS’ VERSION:
 When he (Hicks) withdrew his hand from that of Current, who had seized him, he fell backward but
managed to support himself on his two hands, and when he got up again Current threatened him
with a revolver thrust into his face; whereupon he also drew his revolver, just as Edward Robinson
caught him from behind, when his revolver went off, the bullet striking Augustina.
ISSUE:
Whether or not judgment of should be affirmed (?)
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
The above-stated facts, which have been fully proven in the present case, constitute the
crime of murder, with two aggravating circumstances: treachery and premeditation (plus the
fact that srime was committed in the home of the deceased).
Treachery. Augustina was suddenly and roughly attacked and unexpectedly fired upon with a 45-caliber
revolver, at close, if not point blank range, while the injured woman was unarmed and unprepared. It is
logically inferred that means, manners, and forms were employed in the attack directly and specially
insured the consummation of the crime without such risk to Hicks as might have been offered by the
Augustina who, owing to the suddenness of the attack, was doubtless unable to flee from the place
where she was standing, or even escape or divert the weapon.
Premeditation.
1. According to the testimony of Charles Gatchery and Eugenio R. Whited, Hicks asked leave from the
former to be absent from the canteen where he was working on the morning of the day when the affray
occurred, alleging that his mind was unsettled and that he feared getting into trouble.
2. It is also shown by the fact that Whited, who was in Hicks' house about noon upon the latter's
invitation, and while both where drinking gin, and while the revolver, the instrument of the crime, was
lying on the table on which were also several loaded cartridges, heard the accused repeatedly say,
referring to the deceased, that her time had come, adding that he would rather see her dead than in the
arms of another man.
3. On the day after the crime the police found on a table in the cuprit's house several loaded cartridges,
a bottle of oil and a piece of cloth used undoubtedly for cleaning the revolver.
No mitigating circumstances present, not even loss of reason and self-control produced by jealousy as
alleged by the defense, inasmuch as the only causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the
loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious,
unworthy, and immoral passions.
Judgment affirmed. with costs, provided, however, that the death penalty shall be executed according
to the law in force, and that in the event of a pardon being granted, the culprit shall suffer the accessory
penalties of article 53 of the Penal Code unless the same be expressly remitted in the pardon.

U.S. V. DELA CRUZ March 29, 1912 G.R. No. L-7094

The accused, in the heat of passion, killed his former lover upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal
communication with a mutual acquaintance. The accused was entitled to the mitigating circumstance
because in this case, the impulse upon which defendant acted and which naturally "produced passion
and obfuscation" was not that the woman declined to have illicit relations with him but the sudden
revelation that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another.
SUMMARY:
Defendant, in the heat of passion, killed his querida (concubine or lover) upon catching her red-handed
in the arms of another. Trial court convicted defendant of homicide and sentenced him to 14 years 8
months 1 day of reclusion temporal. Supreme Court found extenuating/mitigating circumstances in the
commission of the act of homicide therefore reducing defendant’s sentence to 12 years 1 day of
reclusion temporal.
FACTS
Defendant (De la Cruz), in the heat of passion, killed his querida when he caught her red-handed in
carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance.
2. Trial court found defendant guilty of homicide without any extenuating circumstances present.
Defendant was sentenced to 14 years 8 months 1 day of reclusion temporal (medium degree of penalty
prescribed by the code).

ISSUES: 1. WoN there is an extenuating/mitigating circumstance present - YES

RULING: 1. YES. There is an extenuating circumstance present in the case. The Court is of the opinion
that the defendant acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and
obfuscation when he caught his querida in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance.
The Court mentioned the view taken by the Supreme Court of Spain regarding a case with similar state
of facts: A man who kills a woman (his lover) for having caught her in her underclothes with another
man and afterwards shoots himself inflicting a serious wound should be responsible for the act but with
extenuating circumstance considered because he acted as such due to strong emotion which impelled
him to perform the criminal act. The situation presents a sufficient impulse in the natural and ordinary
course to produce the violent passion and obfuscation which the law regards as a special reason for
extenuation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO GELAVER, G.R. No. 95357 June 9, 1993
Facts:
The prosecution presented Randy Mamon, who testified that at 7:00 a.m. of March 24,
1988, he heard shouts coming from the house of Tessie Lampedario in Barangay Poblacion,
Municipality of Sto. Niño, South Cotabato. He saw the appellant and a woman having a heated
argument. Thereafter, appellant held the neck of the victim, dragged her and with a knife on his
right hand, stabbed the latter three times on the breast. Appellant then went out of the gate
and fled in the direction of the public market of Sto Niño. (TSN, June 27, 1988, pp. 7-10)
Appellant Eduardo Gelaver admitted killing his wife but claimed that he did so after
catching her having carnal act with her paramour. Appellants version of the killing was that
when his wife saw him, she pushed her paramour aside. Her paramour immediately stood up,
took a knife placed on top of the bedside table and attacked appellant. The latter was able to
wrest possession of the knife and then used it against the paramour, who evaded the thrusts of
the appellant by hiding behind the victim. Thus, it was the victim who received the stab
intended for the paramour.
As to why he continued to stab his wife, appellant said that his mind had been
"dimmed" or overpowered by passion and obfuscation by the sight of his wife having carnal act
with her paramour.
Issue: Whether or not the accused guilty of the crime parricide?
Held:
Yes. Appellant's claim that on the day prior to his killing of the victim, his daughter
Sheryl had confided to him that her mother was living with a paramour at the house in front of
the Sto. Niño Catholic Church was belied by Sheryl herself. In her testimony, she stated that she
did not know the house where the crime was committed and she had not gone to that place.
She further testified that she had not seen her mother in any other house except that of her
grandfather's. (TSN, January 17, 1989, p. 5)
If there was a naked man with the victim, he would have had no time to get dressed
because he was then under attack by appellant. There would then have been the spectacle of a
man in the nude running in the streets.
People of the Philippines vs. Gonzales, Jr.
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
Inocencio Gonzales, Jr., accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 139542 June 21, 2001

FACTS:
On October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m., the families of Noel Andres and herein accused-appellant were
both on their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. At the intersection point, the cars they were
driving almost collided. Later on, when Andres found an opportunity, he cut Gonzalez off, disembarked
from his car and went over to Gonzales’. Altercation then ensued. Meanwhile, Dino Gonzalez, son of
Inocencio, entered the scene in defense of his father. Fearing that his son was in danger, Gonzalez took
out the gun which was already in his car compartment. Upon seeing his father, Gonzalez’s daughter,
Trisha, hugged her father and in the process held his hand holding the gun. The appellant tried to free
his hand and with Trisha’s substantial body weight pushing against him the appellant lost his balance
and the gun accidentally fired. Feliber Andres, Noel’s wife, was shot to death while their son, Kenneth
and nephew Kevin were wounded.
The trial court found the accused guilty of the complex crime of murder and two counts of frustrated
murder and accordingly sentenced him to death. Accused were also ordered to pay for civil liabilities to
the heirs of Mrs. Andres, and the parents of Kevin Valdez.
Hence, an automatic review or this case.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it found treachery was present in the
commission of the crime.
2. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to appreciate voluntary
surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong be considered as mitigating circumstances.

RULINGS:
1. It has been consistently held by this court that chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes
committed at the spur of the moment or that were preceded by heated altercations are generally not
attended by treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ a treacherous mode
of attack. Thus, the sudden attack made by the accused due to his infuriation by reason of the victim’s
provocation was held to be without treachery. Sudden attacks made by the accused preceded by curses
and insults by the victim or acts taunting the accused to retaliate or the rebellious or aggressive
behavior of the victim were held to be without treachery as the victim was sufficiently forewarned of
reprisal. For the rules on treachery to apply the sudden attack must have been preconceived by the
accused, unexpected by the victim and without provocation on the part of the latter. We affirm the
recommendation of the Solicitor-General that the shooting was not attended by treachery and
accordingly the crime committed for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide and not murder.

2. The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense of
a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, pleaded by the defense, were not convincingly
proved and none can be considered in the imposition of penalties. The testimony of prosecution witness
contradicts the appellant’s pretense of voluntary surrender.

The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not obtaining.

Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong committed and that the
provocation must be commensurate to the crime committed. The sufficiency of provocation
varies according to the circumstances of the case. The aggressive behavior of Noel Andres
towards the appellant and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient
provocation to shoot at the complainant’s vehicle.

The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a
relative is also unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing and shouting at the appellant
and his son do not amount to an unlawful aggression against them, Dino Gonzalez.

Finally, the plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong is likewise devoid of merit. This mitigating circumstance is obtaining
when there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the accused to commit a
wrong and the resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed
and the injury sustained by the victim. The appellant’s use of a gun, although not deliberately
sought nor employed in the shooting, should have reasonably placed the appellant on guard of
the possible consequences of his act. The use of a gun is sufficient to produce the resulting
crimes committed.

People v. Bates (G.R. No. 139907)

Facts:
Around 2:00 in the afternoon of November 28, 1995, Edgar Fuentes, Simon Fuentes and Jose Boholst
left Barangay Esperanza, Ormoc City to deliver copra to a certain Fely Rodado at Barangay Green
Valley, Ormoc City. After delivering copra around 5:00 in the afternoon, the three men headed back to
Barangay Esperanza. While they were along a trail leading to the house of Carlito Bates, the latter
suddenly emerged from the thick banana plantation surrounding the trail, aiming his firearm at Jose
Boholst who was then walking ahead of his companions. Jose grabbed Carlito’s right hand and elbow
and tried to wrest possession of the firearm. While the two were grappling for possession,
the gun fired, hitting Carlito who immediately fell to the ground. At that instant, Marcelo Bates and his
son Marcelo Bates, Jr., brother and nephew of Carlito, respectively, emerged from the banana
plantation each brandishing a bolo. They immediately attacked Jose hacking him several times. Jose fell
to the ground and rolled but Marcelo and his son kept on hacking him. Marcelo, then, turned to Simon
and Edgar and shouted “huwes de kutsilyo”. Upon hearing the same, Simon and Edgar ran. Upholding
the prosecution evidence, the trial court rendered its Judgment, finding Marcelo Bates guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.

Issue:
Whether or not Marcelo could validly invoke the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation?

Decision:
Passion and obfuscation may not be properly appreciated in favor of appellant. To be
considered as a mitigating circumstance, passion or obfuscation must arise from lawful
sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge or from anger and resentment. In the
present case, clearly, Marcelo was infuriated upon seeing is brother, Carlito, shot by Jose.
However, a distinction must be made between the first time that Marcelo hacked Jose and the
second time that the former hacked the latter. When Marcelo hacked Jose right after seeing the
latter shoot at Carlito, and if appellant refrained from doing anything else after that, he could
have validly invoked the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. But when, upon
seeing his brother Carlito dead, Marcelo went back to Jose, who by then was already prostrate
on the ground and hardly moving, hacking Jose again was a clear case of someone acting out of
anger in the spirit of revenge.

Voluntary surrender or plea of guilt

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. FRANCISCO DE LA CRUZ, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-45284 December 29, 1936
AVANCEÑA, C.J.

FACTS:
1. Francisco de la Cruz, Fernando Legaspi and three other persons whose identities are still unknown,
confederating together and helping one another and with intent of gain, attack, assault and use
personal violence upon one Yu Wan and afterwards took, stole and carried away with him twenty-
six (P26) pesos in cash.

2. That the said accused Francisco de la Cruz is a habitual delinquent under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, he having been previously convicted once of the crime of theft and twice of
the crime of estafa, by virtue of final judgments rendered by competent courts, having been last
convicted on July 24, 1933.

3. Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty.

4. During the trial and after two witnesses for the prosecution had testified, the accused withdrew
their plea of not guilty, substituting it by that of guilty.
5. The facts charged constitute the crime of robbery defined in article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code and punished by the penalty of prision correccional to prision mayor in its medium
period.

6. The court sentenced Francisco de la Cruz to six months and one day of prision correccional and,
considering him a habitual delinquent, sentenced him furthermore to the additional penalty of six
years and one day of prision mayor. Francisco de la Cruz appealed for this sentence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Dela Cruz may avail of plea of guilt as a mitigating circumstance? No.

RULING: AFFIRMED.
Wherefore, eliminating the additional penalty by reason of habitual delinquency, considering the
presence of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime without any mitigating
circumstance, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant is sentenced to the
penalty of from six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six years, ten months and one day
of prision mayor, as maximum, affirming the appealed sentence in all other respects, with the
costs.
RATIO DECIDENDI
1. Dela Cruz’s plea of guilty does not constitute a mitigating circumstance under article 13,
subsection 7, of the Revised Penal Code, which requires that this plea be spontaneous and that it
be made prior to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution.

2. It is clear that these benefits are not deserved by the accused who submits to the law only after
the presentation of some evidence for the prosecution, believing that in the end the trial will
result in his conviction by virtue thereof.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILLIE AMAGUIN, GILDO AMAGUIN AND CELSO
AMAGUIN, accused.
January 10, 1994
(Accused) brothers Willie, Gildo and Celso, all surnamed Amaguin, being charged with the murder of the
Oro brothers Pacifico and Diosdado.
Facts: On their way to the plaza, Pacifico (deceased) was called by accused Celso Amaguin. After the
refusal of the deceased, the accused, Celso, with a butcher's knife in hand, rushed towards Pacifico.
Gildo, Celso's younger brother, followed with a knife and slingshot.
Celso hacked Pacifico. Gildo then stabbed Diosdado with a knife. Thereafter, Willie, the eldest of the
Amaguin brothers, appeared with a handgun and successively shot the brothers Pacifico, Diosdado and
the fleeing Danilo.
Diosdado, own kneeling, gasping for breath and pleading for his life, was again shot by Willie who next
fired anew at Pacifico. Meanwhile, Gildo and Celso repeatedly stabbed Pacifico who already lying
prostrate and defenseless.
*Other survivors also gave their respective versions.
The defense however maintains that it was the Oro brothers who started the fight. Accused Gildo
Amaguin recounted that Pacifico with five others went to their house and approached his brother Celso
and there deceased together with his companions initiated a fight.
Nenita Amaguin, mother of the accused brothers, affirmed that her son Celso was indeed troublesome,
but added that Willie had no prior violations against the law.
After a joint trial and finding the version of the prosecution to be more credible, the CIF of Iloilo found
Gildo Amaguin, guilty of murder and Willie Amaguin as accomplice.
Issue: Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender be appreciated in favor of the
accused?
Ruling: Yes. While it may have taken both Willie and Gildo a week before turning themselves in, the fact
is, they voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities before arrest could be effected. For voluntary
surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following elements must be present: (a)
the offender has not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority; and (c) the surrender must be voluntary. All these requisites appear to have attended their
surrender.

People v. Dawaton (G.R. No. 146247)

TOPIC: CONFESSION OF GUILT

FACTS:
Edgar Dawaton was found guilty by the trial court of murder qualified by treachery and
was sentenced to death. On 20 September 1998, Leonidas Lavares and several companions,
including Dawaton were drinking in the house of the accused’s uncle. Already drunk, Leonidas
Lavares decided to sleep while the accused and his companions continued drinking. Dawaton
awakened Lavares by stabbing him at the base of the neck. Dawaton continued stabbing Lavares
until the victim died. Dawaton then ran away to the house of his other relative, where he was
later on arrested by the police.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty of death imposed by the trial court upon the accused was
correct?

RULING/ RATIO:
No. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in not considering the alternative
circumstance of intoxication in favor of the accused. “Under Art. 15 of The Revised Penal Code,
intoxication of the offender shall be considered as a mitigating circumstance when the offender
commits a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan
to commit said felony. Otherwise, when habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance. The allegation that the accused was drunk when he committed the
crime was corroborated by the prosecution witnesses. The accused and his drinking companions
had consumed four (4) bottles of gin at the house of Esmeraldo Cortez, each one drinking at
least a bottle. It was also attested that while the four (4) shared another bottle of gin at the
house of Amado Dawaton, it was the accused who drank most of its contents.” The Court
further stated that “Under Art. 63, par. 3, of The Revised Penal Code, in all cases in which the law
prescribes a penalty composed of two (2) indivisible penalties, such as in this case, when the
commission of the act is attended by a mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Since no aggravating circumstance attended
the killing but there existed the mitigating circumstance of intoxication, the accused should be
sentenced only to the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.”

Illness
[G.R. Nos. L-13219-20. August 31, 1960.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. REMIGIO CRUZ, Defendant-Appellant. Honorio V. Garcia for Appellant.

Facts:

 On December 28, 1946, Abelardo Formigones caused his wife, Julia Agricola, lethal
injury with a bolo. Having done so, he then carried his wife to the living room and lay
down beside her. This was how he was found by the people summoned by his eldest
daughter, who witnessed the stabbing. He pleaded guilty to the Court of the First
Instance in Camarines Sur citing jealousy as his motive for he believed his wife was being
intimate with his brother. He received the sentence of reclusion perpetua and the
Solicitor General filed for an appeal on the grounds that he is an imbecile.

Issues:
 WoN the defendant is an imbecile

 WoN the questioned imbecilic nature of the defendant can affect his punishment.

Held and Ratio:

 No, the defendant is not an imbecile, evidenced by his previous sixteen years of sanity in
his marriage. Though he has procured the sympathies of the court with the
circumstances of his situation.

 No, the defendant is still charged with reclusion perpetua. The two mitigating
circumstances, his diminished will power and his act of passion driven by jealousy (Art.
13 of Revised Penal Code) has been considered by the court but he is credited with one-
half of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone.

 Decision: Judgment affirmed but this case should be brought to the attention of the
Chief Executive who, in his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower
to reclusion perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner he
sees fit.

G.R. No. 130654 July 28, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO BASIN JAVIER, accused-appellant.

Facts:
 Dec 1954: Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier was married to Florentina Laceste. They
begot 10 children. On June ’96, after 41 yrs of marriage, Javier admitted killing his wife.

 Testimonies of SPO1 Rotelio Pacho, a desk investigator, and Consolacion Javier Panit &
Alma Javier, daughters of the sps:

 Between 2–3am, Consolacion, who lived 10-15m. away, heard her mom shouting,
“your father is going to kill me!” (translated from local dialect). She ran outside & met
her sister Alma who was weeping & informed her of their parents’ quarrel. Together,
they went to their brother Manuel’s house, about 70-80m. away from their parents’
house.

 Upon reaching the latter, Manuel, who entered first, found the lifeless body of his mother
in their bedroom and his father, wounded in the abdomen.

 Their father, Eduardo, confessed to son Manuel that he killed his wife and thereafter
stabbed himself.

 April 1997: RTC held Javier guilty of the crime of parricide and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of death, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
PhP50K as moral damages and PhP21,730 as actual expenses.

 In his appeal, Javier claims he killed his wife because he was suffering from insomnia for
a month and at the time of the killing, his mind went totally blank and he did not know
what he was doing. He claims that he was insane then.

Issues and Ratio:

 Whether or not accused-appellant Javier can claim mitigating circumstances of

illness and of passion and obfuscation-No to both. On illness, since Javier has already
admitted to the killing, it is incumbent upon him to prove the claimed mitigating
circumstance.
 OSG found no sufficient evidence or medical finding to support his claim. For the
mitigating circumstance of illness of the offender to be appreciated, the law requires
Illness must diminish the exercise of the willpower of the offender, and
For the circumstance of passion and obfuscation of the offender to be appreciated, the
law requires the presence of the ff requisites:

1. There should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of
mind, and

2. Such act w/c produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission
of the crime by a considerable length of time, during w/c the perpetrator
might recover his moral equanimity.

 The defense never presented any medical record of the accused nor was a
psychiatrist presented to validate the defense of insanity. None of the
elements-requisites were proved to bepresent & in his testimony, Javier even
stated that he was not jealous of his wife. Equally important, the defense, during the
trial, never alleged the above-claimed mitigating circumstances of illness &
passion & obfuscation, thus weakening the case of accused-appellant. The
alleged mitigating circumstances are mere afterthought to whittle (to shape) down his
criminal liability.

 .Whether or not he should be sentence to suffer a lower penalty - Yes. The crime of
parricide, not being a capital crime per se is not punishable by mandatory death penalty
but by the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death two indivisible penalties.
The application of the lesser of greater penalty depends on the presence of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Thus, in the absence of any aggravating
or mitigating circumstance for the accused, the lesser penalty ofreclusion perpetua
should be imposed.

Held:
 Appealed decision affirmed w/ modification. Javier to suffer reclusion
perpetua and PhP50K imposed as civil indemnity instead of moral damages. There is
passional obfuscation when the crime is committee due to an uncontrollable burst of
passion so provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus
so powerful as to overcome reason.

Taking advantage of Public Office

G.R. No. L-38297 October 23, 1982

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO CAPALAC, defendant-appellant.

Facts
  Moises Capalac the brother of accused Mario Capalac (a police officer), was stabbed
byJimmy Magaso

 Following this incident, in the cockpit of Iligan, Jimmy was trying to escapewhen he was
confronted by the Moises’ brothers (Mario and Jesus 1) and 2 other companions

 The attempt of Jimmy to board a jeep was unsuccessful; he having alighted after two
shots werefired in succession. Knowing that he was completely at the mercy of the two
brothers, he raisedhis hands as a sign of surrender, but they were not appeased.

 He was pistol-whipped by Mario, and after having fallen in the ground, was stabbed on
the chest 3-4 times by Jesus. He died on the way to the hospital.Mario was convicted of
 murder, as qualified by evident premeditation and treachery. Thelower Court also found
that he took advantage of his position as a police officer. He was sentenced to death.

Mario appealed, thus this review.

Issues/Held:

1. Whether or not there is an aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of

publicoffice/position – NO

2. Whether or not there was a Conspiracy - YES

 b. Treachery –YES
 c. Evident premeditation –NO
 d. Mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication–YES

Ratio:

 The mere fact that appellant Mario is a member of the police force did not by itself
justifythe aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public office/position. He
actedlike a brother (of Moises), instinctively reacting to what was undoubtedly a
viciousassault on his kin. He pistol-whipped the deceased because he had a pistol with
him.It came in handy and he acted accordingly. That he was a policeman is of
norelevance in assessing his criminal responsibility.

 There was conspiracy since the two brothers, as well as their 2 companions,apparently
had one purpose in mind, to avenge the stabbing of Moises. They all actedin concert.b.
There was treachery since the crime was committed to insure that Jimmy would die.His
situation was hopeless. Any defense he could have put up would be futile andunavailing.
There was also no risk to the aggressors since two other companionsassisted
 them.c.There is no evident premeditation. The brothers were prompted by their desire
toavenge Moises. They went after Jimmy, assaulted him, and relied on the weapons

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

CIC LORETO GAPASIN, PC NICANOR SALUDARES, LORENZO SORIANO, alias "Olit", AMOR
SALUDARES, FRANK SALUDARES, BEL SALUDARES, and NICK SALUDARES, accused, CIC
LORETO GAPASIN, accused-appellant.

Facts:

According to prosecution witness Alberto Carrido, he and Rodrigo Ballad left the house
of Enteng Teppang at about 2 PM of Oct 6 ’79 after a “pamisa” for Teppang’s deceased father.

Jerry Calpito followed them. When they reached the point of the road facing the house of Nick
Saludares, Calpito was shot by appellant C1C Loreto Gapasin with an armalite rifle.

When Calpito fell on the ground, appellant fired more shots at him. Thereafter, accused Amor
Saludares planted a .22 caliber revolver on the left hand of Calpito. Faustina Calpito ran to help
her fallen husband. Calpito died due to 4 bullet wounds, w/c as
his body was autopsied by Dr Layugan, were on his right arm, right front portion of the head,
right and left rib.

Appellant invoked self-defense saying that he was issued a mission order to

investigate a report re the presence of unidentified armed men in Barrio San Jose,
Isabela. He was informed that Jerry Calpito had an unlicensed firearm.

He positioned himself in the yard of Nicanor Saludares at the night of the “pamisa” only to see
Calpito.

However, when Calpito was about 3 meters away from him, Gapasin asked what was bulging in
his waist. Calpito took a step backward, drew his firearm from the waist and fired twice at
appellant. He missed because appellant dropped to the ground simultaneously firing
his armalite.

Issue:

 Whether or not the action of the accused can be considered in Article 11 as Justifying
circumstances
HELD:

 TC correctly ruled that the crime of murder under A248 RPCwas committed. Treachery
attended the commission of the crime.

 The 2 conditions to constitute treachery were present, to wit:

(1) employment of the means of execution that gives the person who is
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate;
& (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
Appellant deliberately executed the act in such a way that Calpito was unaware &
helpless. This can be gathered from his act of waiting for the victim behind the hollow-
block fence of Saludares & shooting the victim from his right side. Evident
premeditation, as a generic aggravating circumstance, was proven by the act
was preceded by his cool thought & reflection.

 3 other generic aggravating circumstances:

(1) ignominy, ruled out because autopsy indicated no other injuries w/c could show that
the victim was kicked by assailants,
(2) abuse of superior strength, w/c was absorbed by treachery, and
(3) taking advantage of public position.

 As a member of the Philippine Constabulary, appellant committed the crime w/ an

armalite w/c was issued to him when he received the mission order. Voluntary
surrender may be considered but this is offset by the aggravating circumstance of taking
adv of public position. Thus, only the generic aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation may be appreciated against the appellant.

 The correct penalty would have been death acdg to A248 & 64 RPC were it not for
the fact that such penalty is constitutionally abhorrent. The proper penalty is
reclusion perpetua. Affirmed

RECIDIVISM

People v. Baldera
86 SCRA 370

FACTS
Pedro Baldera was found guilty of robbery in band with homicide and serious and less serious
physical injuries. He was sentenced to death.
Dec. 23, 1947, 4am: A Casa Manila bus left Batangas, bound for Manila. It was held-up by a group
of 5-6 men, one of them was Baldera.

Baldera, who was armed with a .45 caliber pistol, fired a shot, followed by a hail of bullets from
different directions. After firing had ceased, Baldera got on the bus and took the passengers’
money, threatening them with his gun. He got off the bus and ordered the bus to proceed.

The driver headed for the municipal building of San Juan and reported the incident to the
authorities. Wounded passengers were taken to the hospital. One passenger died the following
day.

Shortly after the commission of the crime, Baldera was arrested in Batangas for theft of a radio.
His features matched descriptions by the passengers.

He made a written confession, admitting his participation in the crime as the one who, armed
with a pistol, boarded the bus and through intimidation, took the passengers’ money.

Later on, testifying in his own defense, he denied participation, claiming he spent the night in a
house of prostitution in Batangas, where he was employed by the prostitutes for drawing water.

4 people were prosecuted and tried for the crime. Case was dismissed for 2 of the accused, but
Baldera and Miguel Blay were found guilty.
-Baldera: death
-Blay: life imprisonment

ISSUES/HELD/RATIO
1. Whether or not Baldera’s confession is admissible—Yes. Baldera’s confession was allegedly
made for him to be given protection from his co-accused, and to use him as a government
witness. But he later on said the confession was taken through force and intimidation. The
latter was not proved. But his confession still stands. Where one of several co-defendants turns
state's evidence on a promise of immunity, but later retracts and fails to keep his part of the
agreement, his confession made under such promise may then be used against him.

2. Whether or not Baldera’s alibi stands—No. His prostitute alibi cannot stand against the clear
and positive testimony of one of the passengers, Ponciano Villena, who has not shown to have
any motive for falsely testifying against him.

3. Whether or not the following aggravating circumstances are present:

a. Crime committed is robbery in band and robbery was perpetrated by attacking a vehicle—
Yes. Shortly after the commission of the crime, Baldera was arrested in Batangas for theft of a
radio. His features matched descriptions by the passengers. The fact that there were more than
3 armed men in the group that held up the bus appears in Baldera’s own confession and is
established by the uncontradicted testimony of one of the government witnesses.

He made a written confession, admitting his participation in the crime as the one who, armed
with a pistol, boarded the bus and though intimidation, took the passengers’ money. But this is
immaterial because in the crime of robbery with homicide it is not essential that the robbery be
in band, but it may count as an aggravation in the imposition of the penalty.

Later on, testifying in his own defense, he denied participation, claiming he spent the night in a
house of prostitution in Batangas, where he was employed by the prostitutes for drawing
water. Even if it is not taken into account, there remains the other aggravating circumstance
that the robbery was perpetrated by attacking a vehicle, which is not offset by any mitigating
circumstance.

Whether or not the lower court erred in holding against the accused the circumstance of
recidivism by reason of his previous conviction for theft —Yes.

b. RECIDIVISM by reason of Baldera’s previous conviction for theft—No. A recidivist is one who,
at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of
another crime also punishable in the RPC. (Art 14 RPC)

No recidivism because Baldera’s crime of theft was committed on or about December 30, 1947
while the offense now charged took place 7 days before that date.

SENTENCE REDUCED TO LIFE

IMPRISONMENT

EVIDENT PREMEDITATION

U.S. v. MANALINDE
G.R. L-No. 5292
August 28, 1909

FACTS
On the afternoon of January 19, 1909, Juan Igual, a Spaniard, was inflicted with a kris, a wound
on his head coming from the back by the accused Moro Manalinde. A Ricardo Doroteo heard a
cry and he saw Igual lying on the ground.

Meanwhile Manalinde, approached a Chinaman named Choa, and attacked him with the same
weapon, inflicting a severe wound in the left shoulder, on account of which he fell to the ground.
The aggressor had entered the town carrying his weapon wrapped up in banana leaves, in the
meantime escaped by running away from the town. Both wounded men, the Chinaman and the
Spaniard, were taken to the hospital, where the former died within an hour, the record not
stating the result of the wound inflicted on the Spaniard Juan Igual.

Manalinde was charged with Murder. When he was arrested he pleaded guilty and confessed
that he had perpetrated the crime herein mentioned, stating that his wife had died about one
hundred days before and that he had come from his home in Catumaldu by order of the Datto
Rajamudah Mupuck, who had directed him to go juramentado in Cotabato in order to kill
somebody, because the said Mupuck had certain grievances to avenge against a lieutenant and
a sergeant, the said datto further stating that if he, Manalinde, was successful in the matter, he
would give him a pretty woman on his return, but that in case he was captured he was to say that
he performed the killing by order of Maticayo, Datto Piang, Tambal and Inug.

ISSUES
Are there aggravating circumstances in the crime?

HELD
Yes, promise of reward and premeditation are present, which in the present case are held to be
generic, since the crime has already been qualified as committed with the treachery, because the
accused confessed that he voluntarily obeyed the order given him by Datto Mupuck to go
juramentado and kill someone in the town of Cotabato, with the promise that if he escaped
punishment he would be rewarded with a pretty woman.

Promise of Reward - Upon complying with the order the accused undoubtedly acted of his own
volition and with the knowledge that he would inflict irreparable injury on some of his fellow-
beings, depriving them of life without any reason whatever, well knowing that he was about to
commit a most serious deed which the laws in force in this country and the constituted
authorities could by no means permit. The accused knew perfectly well that he might be caught
and punished in the act of committing them.

Premeditation - the accused, upon accepting the order and undertaking the journey in order to
comply therewith, deliberately considered and carefully and thoughtfully meditated over the
nature and the consequences of the acts which, under orders received from the said datto, he
was about to carry out, and to that end provided himself with a weapon, concealing it by
wrapping it up, and started on a journey of a day and a night for the sole purpose of taking the
life of two unfortunate persons whom he did not know, and with whom he had never had any
trouble; nor did there exist any reason which, to a certain extent, might warrant his perverse
deed.

No mitigating circumstances.
PEOPLE VS. ILAOA
233 SCRA 231
G.R. No. 94308
June 16, 1994

DOCTRINE
● Number of wounds alone is not the criterion for the appreciation of cruelty as an aggravating
circumstance. Neither can it be inferred from the mere fact that the victim’s dead body was
dismembered.

● To warrant a conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence, three requisites must

concur:
(a) there must be more than one circumstance;
(b) the circumstances from which the inferences are derived are proven; and,
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond
reasonable doubt.

SUMMARY
The deceased Nestor de Loyola was found decapitated with 43 stab wounds on the chest, burns
all over the body, and the head 2 feet away. Brothers Ruben and Rogelio was charged by the
Regional Trial Court with murder with the attendant circumstances of evident premeditation,
abuse of superior strength and cruelty, and imposed upon them the penalty of “life
imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed that Ruben Ilaoa was guilty, but acquitted his brother
Rogelio Ilaoa for insufficiency of evidence. The SC also charged them not with murder but only
homicide, based on the evidence.

FACTS
● The deceased Nestor de Loyola was seen at 11pm of November 1987, in a drinking session
with his compadre Ruben Ilaoa together with Julius Eliginio, Edwin Tapang and a certain “Nang
Kwang” outside Ruben’s apartment.

● The drunken voices of Ruben and Nestor engaged in an apparent argument were later on
heard. Nestor was then seen being kicked and mauled by Ruben and his brother Rodel, Julius
Eliginio and Edwin Tapang. Nestor was crying all the while, “Pare, aray, aray!” Afterwards, Nestor,
who appeared drunk, was seen being “dragged” into Ruben Ilaoa’s apartment. Nestor was heard
saying, “Pare, bakit ninyo ako ginaganito, hirap na hirap na ako!”
● Ruben Ilaoa and Julius Eliginio borrowed Alex Villamil’s tricycle at about two o’clock the
following morning allegedly for the purpose of bringing to the hospital a neighbor who was about
to give birth. Ruben was seen driving the tricycle alone, with a sack which looked as though it
contained a human body, placed in the sidecar. The tricycle was returned an hour later to Alex
who noticed bloodstains on the floor. The latter thought that they were those of the pregnant
woman.

● Blood was found on Ruben’s shirt when he was asked to lift it during the investigation by
the police. Moreover, Ruben’s hair near his right forehead was found partly burned and his shoes
were splattered with blood. Susan Ocampo, Ruben’s livein partner, was likewise seen in the early
morning of 5 November 1987 sweeping what appeared to be blood at the entrance of their
apartment.

● Pfc. Reynaldo P. Angeles was dispatched in the early morning of 5 November 1987 to Tinio
St., Sta. Maria Phase I, Balibago, Angeles City, where the decapitated body of a man, later
identified through his voter’s identification card as Nestor de Loyola, was found in a grassy
portion thereof. Apart from the decapitation, the deceased bore forty-three (43) stab wounds in
the chest as well as slight burns all over the body. The head was found some two (2) feet away
from the corpse.

● June 15, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City found Ruben and Rogelio guilty of
murder with the attendant circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength
and cruelty, and imposed upon them the penalty of “life imprisonment.”

ISSUE/RATIO
● Whether or not Ruben and Rogelio Ilaoa are guilty? -- YES, only for Ruben. Rogelio Ilaoa is
acquitted.

1. The RTC relied solely on the testimony that Rogelio helped his brother Ruben drag the victim
inside Ruben’s apartment where the victim was last seen alive. Apart from such testimony, there
is nothing else to link Rogelio to the killing. Such circumstance cannot be the basis of Rogelio’s
conviction.

● Whether or not they should be charged with murder with the attendant circumstances of
evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and cruelty? -- No. The Supreme Court charged
Ruben with homicide and said that the attendant circumstances, namely, abuse of superior
strength, cruelty and evident premeditation, were not sufficiently proved to be appreciated
against appellant.

1. Abuse of Superior Strength: there was no evidence whatsoever that appellant was physically
superior to the victim and that the former took advantage of such superior physical strength to
overcome the latter’s resistance to consummate the offense.
2. Cruelty: The fact that the victim’s decapitated body (bearing 43 stab wounds, 24 of which were
fatal) was found dumped in the street is not sufficient for a finding of cruelty where there is no
showing that appellant Ruben Ilaoa, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer
slowly and painfully and inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral pain. Number of
wounds alone is not the criterion for the appreciation of cruelty as an aggravating circumstance.
Neither can it be inferred from the mere fact that the victim’s dead body was dismembered.

3. Evident Premeditation: There is nothing in the records to show that appellant, prior to the
night in question, resolved to kill the victim, nor is there proof to show that such killing was the
result of meditation, calculation or resolution on his part. On the contrary, the evidence tends to
show that the series of circumstances which culminated in the killing constitutes an unbroken
chain of events with no interval of time separating them for calculation and meditation.

RULING
WHEREFORE, the judgment finding accused RUBEN E. ILAOA guilty beyond reasonable doubt is
AFFIRMED but only for homicide, instead of murder. Consequently, he is sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of prision
mayor medium, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of reclusion
temporal medium as maximum. In addition, accused-appellant RUBEN E. ILAOA is ordered to pay
the heirs of Nestor de Loyola P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and, as fixed by the court a quo,
P46,765.00 as actual damages, P10,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation, and P10,000.00 for moral damages.
Accused-appellant ROGELIO E. ILAOA, however, is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for obvious
insufficiency of evidence.

CRAFT, FRAUD, DISGUISE

PEOPLE VS. EMPACIS

G.R. No. 95756
May 14, 1993

FACTS
At about 9PM of Sept 16, 1986, as victim Fidel Saromines and his Wife Camila were about to close
their small store in Cebu, 2 men, Romualdo Langomez and Crisologo Empacis, came and asked to
buy some sardines and rice. After they finished eating, Langomez told Fidel to sell him some
cigarettes. He then announced a hold-up and ordered Fidel to give up his money. The latter
started to hand him PhP12K but suddenly decided to fight to keep it. A struggle followed in the
course of w/c Langomez stabbed Fidel about 3x. Empacis joined in and w/ his own knife also
stabbed Fidel. At this time, gunshots were heard outside the house. It was only when Peter,
Fidel’s 13-yr old son, saw his father fighting for his life and rushed to his father’s defense w/ a
pinuti (a long bolo) striking Empacis and inflicting 2 wounds on him did the 2 men flee. Fidel died
from the fatal injuries, w/c penetrated his lungs and heart. Empacis went to the clinic of Dr
Eustaquio for the treatment of his wounds inflicted by Peter. He told the doctor that he was
assaulted w/o warning by a young man near the Papan Market.
The next day, police officers went looking for a man who might have been treated for wounds
from a bladed weapon. They came to Dr Eustaquio’s clinic who told them about Empacis. He was
found at the public market taking breakfast & there they arrested him. He admitted going to the
store of Fidel but denied having joined Langomez in his attack. He asserts that he tried to stop
him but the latter succeeded in stabbing Fidel. He further alleges that he was brought by his
neighbors to the clinic. The other 2 men, who were accused of firing the gun from outside, denied
any participation in the crime. They were both absolved by the court. Langomez disappeared &
could not be found.
The Court finds the accused Crisologo Empacis guilty of robbery with homicide as defined and
penalized under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, and considering the attendance of the
four generic aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime, craft or fraud and superior
strength, not offset by any mitigating or extenuating circumstance, hereby sentences the said
accused Crisologo Empacis to the supreme penalty of death.

ISSUE
Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of craft, fraud or disguise be appreciated in the
case.

HELD
The aggravating circumstance of craft or fraud 23 was properly appreciated against Empacis. He
and Romualdo pretended to be bona fide customers of the victim's store and on his pretext
gained entry into the latter's store and later, into another part of his dwelling. This Court has held
stratagems and ruses of this sort to constitute the aggravating circumstance of fraud or craft, e.g:
where the accused:

a) pretended to be constabulary soldiers and by that ploy gained entry into the residence of their
prey whom they thereafter robbed and killed;

b) pretended to be needful of medical treatment, and through this artifice, entered the house of
the victim whom they thereupon robbed and killed;

c) pretended to be wayfarers who had lost their way and by this means gained entry into a house,
in which they then perpetrated the crime of robbery with homicide;

d) pretended to be customer wanting to buy a bottle of wine;

e) pretended to be co-passengers of the victim in a public utility vehicle;

f) posed as customers wishing to buy cigarettes; and as being thristy, asking for drink of water.

PEOPLE VS BERMAS

FACTS
• Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape wherein the victim was his own
15-years old daughter.

• Evidence was adduced during trial by the parties at the conclusion of which the lower
court, presided over by Hon. Amelita G. Tolentino, rendered its decision, dated 02 May 1995,
finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and sentencing him to suffer the extreme
penalty of death which at that time was in force hence an automatic review by the Supreme
Court was in order.
• In a 61-page brief, defense counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva (in collaboration with
the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force), detailed several errors allegedly committed by the court
including the fact the accused was denied his constitutional right to due process specifically the
right to effective and vigilant counsel.

• In the case at hand, 3 different counsels were assigned to handle the case of the accused
but all 3 were negligent in handling the case. The first could not give justice to the accused, the
second vanished in the middle of the ongoing trial and the third was reluctant and uninspired to
handle the case with zeal.

RTC:
Accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape.

CA:
Not Applicable (Automatic review by the SC due to imposition of Death Penalty).

ISSUE
WON accused was deprived of his constitutional right to due process.

RULING
• Yes. In convicting an accused, it is not enough that proof beyond reasonable doubt has
been adduced; it is also essential that the accused has been duly afforded his fundamental rights.

• The constitutional mandate is reflected in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedures which
declares in Section 1, Rule 115, thereof, that it is a right of the accused at the trial to be present
in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings from the arraignment to the
promulgation of the judgment.
• The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or
the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the
accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the
cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the
lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of
the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the
fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence.

• The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of
his sworn duty of fidelity to his client.

• Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple
perfunctory representation.

SC:
Case is remanded to a court a quo for trial on the basis of the complaint, under which he was
arraigned. Atty. Ricardo A. Fernandez, Jr. of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force is appointed
counsel de officio for the appellant.

ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH

PEOPLE V. BIGCAS
G.R. No. 94534
JULY 2, 1992
Bigcas and Butron were found guilty of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

FACTS
Appellant Butron strike Ambrocio Palapar two times with a piece of wood on the latter's back. In
his attempt to flee from his aggressor, Palapar passed beside witness Doydoy who was then
trying to hide himself and his son behind the bushes. Palapar was chased by appellant Bigcas
who, upon catching up with the former stabbed him twice with a bolo at the back. The chase
continued until Bigcas was able to stab the victim again at the back of the latter's right knee. The
victim fell on the ground, after which he uttered, "Long, stop because I will die of these wounds."
Butron shouted at him saying, "I will kill you, Boyax." He then approached Palapar and hit him
twice with a piece of wood on the right jaw. Bigcas, on his part, stabbed the supine victim several
times. Thereafter, both appellants left the victim, with Butron telling Bigcas. "You own the killing
and these two bolos and I will be with you anywhere."

Butron claims it was self-defense as drunk Palapar attacked him first.

RULING
They are only guilty of homicide. The witnesses for the prosecution not only testified in a
straightforward manner but the substance of their testimonies inspire credence and are
confirmed by the physical evidence. As for Self-Defense, Butron himself admitted that he was
able to wrench the alleged weapon away from Palapar. Thereafter, the victim fled, signifying
thereby his intention not to fight and, any supposed unlawful aggression had already ceased. But,
instead of letting the victim go, appellants pursued Palapar, immobilized him and stabbed him to
death. A comparison of the wounds sustained by appellant Butron and those inflicted, on the
victim, clearly and undoubtedly belie appellant's pretension of self-defense.

The trial court's holding that treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance
against appellants is correct, since there is no evidence that in the commission of the crime they
deliberately adopted means, methods or forms considered in law as treacherous.

Nocturnity neither facilitated the commission of the crime nor was it purposely sought by
appellants in order to afford impunity.

The crime was not committed by appellants with abuse or by taking advantage of superior
strength. The two eyewitnesses, Doydoy and Calape testified only on the fight when it was
already in progress but not as to the actuations of the parties proximately and immediately
before the altercation. For this qualifying circumstance to be considered, it is not sufficient that
there be superiority in number or strength; it is necessary that the accused must have cooperated
and intended to use or secure advantage from such superior strength.

Bigcas and Butron did act in a concerted manner in bringing about the death of victim Palapar.
This indicates the existence of conspiracy between them. Conspiracy already exists the moment
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it, unlike the qualifying circumstances of treachery and taking advantage of superior
strength which require at least some prior deliberation and adoption of a specific mode of
commission.