Digested Cases in Crim Pro

DIGESTED CASES ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
G.R. No. 123263 December 16, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, Branch 32,
and ISAH V. RED
FACTS:
Private respondent, Isah V. Red, was charged with the crime of libel
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Thereafter, Red filed a motion
to quash the information on the ground that the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged. The Regional Trial Court granted the
motion and remanded the case to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.
The prosecution, citing the provision of Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code filed a manifestation and motion to remand praying that the case be
returned to the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of libel falls on the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court.
HELD:
Yes, the crime of libel falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court.
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides that:
“The criminal action and civil action for damages in case of written defamation,
as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with
the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides
at the time of the commission of the offense…”
Republic Act 7691, placing the exclusive and original jurisdiction of
offenses punishable by not more than six years of imprisonment under the
Municipal Trial Court did superseded Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code,
as there is no manifest legislative purpose to do so or an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exist between them.
1
G.R. No. 115115 July 18, 1995

CONRAD AND COMPANY, INC.
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FITRITE INC., and
VICTORIA BISCUITS CO., INC.
FACTS:
Private respondents, FITRITE Inc. and Victoria Biscuits Co., Inc., are
engaged in the business of manufacturing, selling and distributing biscuits and
cookies bearing the trademark “SUNSHINE” in the Philippines. Petitioner,
CONRAD AND COMPANU, Inc. is engaged in the business of importing,
selling and distributing biscuits and cookies in the Philippines.
Private respondents were granted the trademark “SUNSHINE” to be
used on biscuits and cookies by the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer (BPTTT). For quite some time, the trademark
“SUNSHINE” has been used by the private respondents in the concept of an
owner on its biscuits and cookies.
Meanwhile, petitioner was designated as the exclusive importer and
dealer of the products of “Sunshine Biscuits, Inc.” for sale in the Philippines.
Private respondents then filed a case before the Regional Trial Court,
seeking for remedies against infringement under Sec. 23 of Republic Act No.
166, as amended, as well as of the remedies against unfair competition under
Sec. 29 of the same statue.
Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint invoking, among
others, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable in the case at
bar.
HELD:
No, the doctrine finds no merit in the case at bar.
While an application for the administrative cancellation of a registered
trademark falls under the exclusive cognizance of BPTTT, an action, however,
for infringement or unfair competition, as well as the remedy for injunction and
relief for damages, is explicitly and unquestionably within the competence and
jurisdiction of ordinary courts.
An application with BPTTT for an administrative cancellation of a
registered trade mark cannot per se have the effect of restraining or preventing
the courts from the exercise of their lawfully conferred jurisdiction. A contrary
rule would unduly expand the doctrine of primary jurisdiction which, simply
expressed, would merely behoove regular courts, in controversies involving
specialized disputes, to defer to the findings of resolutions of administrative
tribunals on certain technical matters.
2
G.R. No. 169004 September 15, 2010

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and ROLANDO PLAZA
FACTS:
Private respondent, Rolando Plaza, is a member of the Sanguniang
Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu with a salary grade 25. He was charged in the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, or
the Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash
advances he received.
Private respondent then questioned the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over the offense charged. Private respondent contends that he
should not fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as he does not belong
the salary grade 27 and that his violation is not among those enumerated by law
to be cognizable by the Sandiganbayan even if the offender is below salary
grade 27.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of the
Auditing Code of the Philippines committed by a public official below salary
grade 27.
HELD:
Yes, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of the Auditing
Code of the Philippines committed by a public official below salary grade 27.
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at
the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the
offense. The case having been instituted on March 25, 2004 the provisions of
Republic Act No. 8249 shall govern.
Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
enumerated by RA No. 8249. Among those enumerated are members if the
Sangunuiang Panlungsod. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same
law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
3
G.R. No. L-14595 May 31, 1960

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
HONORABLE GREGORIO MONTEJO, Judge, Court of First Instance,
Zamboanga City and Basilan City, MAYOR LEROY S. BROWN, DETECTIVE
JOAQUIN R. POLLISCO, PATROLMAN GRACIANO
LACERNA aliasDODONG, PATROLMAN MOHAMAD HASBI, SPECIAL
POLICEMAN DIONISIO DINGLASA, SPECIAL POLICEMAN
HADJARATIL, SPECIAL POLICEMAN ALO, and JOHN DOES
FACTS:
A sub-police station was established upon the orders of Mayor Leroy S.
Brown in sitio Tipo-Tipo, district of Lamitan, City of Basilan. Said sub-station
was composed regular and special policemen all armed with pistols and high
power guns. It was alleged that criminal complaints were entertained in the said
sub-station and that defendant Joaquin R. Pollisco acted as investigating officer
and exercised authority to order the apprehension of persons and their detention
in the camp, for days or weeks, without due process of law and without bringing
them to the proper court.
On June 4, 1958, Yokan Awalin Tebag was arrested upon orders of
Mayor Brown without any warrant or complaint filed in court. Tebag was
allegedly maltreated while being taken into the sub-station and was again
mauled at the sub-station, said torture resulted to Tebag’s death.
The private respondents were then charged with the crime of murder
before the Court of First Instance of the cities of Zamboanga and Basilan.
Senator Roseller Lim entered his appearance for the private respondents.
The prosecution is questioning said appearance due to the constitutional
prohibition for senators and members of the House of Representatives to appear
as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
Government is accused of an offense committed in relation of his office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime charged is committed in relation to the offices of the
private respondents.
HELD:
Yes, a mere perusal of the amended information therein readily elicits
an affirmative answer. It is alleged in said amended information that "Leroy S.
Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police
patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and ... special
policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns"
and then "established a camp ... at Tipo-Tipo," which is under his "command,
... supervision and control," where his codefendants were stationed, entertained
criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well as
assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of law
and without bringing them to the proper court, and that, in line with this set-up
established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders,
4
his codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag, who died in

consequence thereof.
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an
element of the crime of murder in abstract, as committed by the main
respondents herein, according to the amended information, the offense therein
charged is intimately connected with their respective offices and was
perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular,
of their official functions. Indeed, they had no personal motive to commit the
crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid
offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his
instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.
5
G.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995

vs.
HON. DEMOSTHENES L. MAGALLANES, as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 54, Bacolod City, and P/COL. NICOLAS M. TORRES,
P/INSP. ADONIS C. ABETO, PO MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, PO JOSE
PAHAYUPAN, PO VICENTE CANUDAY, JR., JEANETTE YANSON-
DUMANCAS, CHARLES DUMANCAS, DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y
MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN
DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, CESAR PECHA,
and EDGAR HILADO
FACTS:
Two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder were filed in
the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City against fourteen persons, five of whom
are members of the Philippine National Police. The two cases was consolidated.
While the trial was on going, the prosecution file a motion for the
transmittal of the case to the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the trial court
has no jurisdiction over the cases because the offense charged were committed
in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crimes charged falls under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
HELD:
No, the case is no longer cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
Ordinarily, jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent legislative
enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. It remains with the court until
the case is finally terminated. Hence, the Sandiganbayan or the courts, as the
case may be, cannot be divested of jurisdiction over cases filed before them by
reason of R.A. No. 7975. They retain their jurisdiction until the end of the
litigation.
In the instant case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction
over the subject criminal cases, as the informations were filed not before it but
before the Regional Trial Court. Even if we labor under the foregoing
assumption that the informations in the subject cases do charge the respondent
PNP officers with offenses committed in relation to their office so that
jurisdiction thereof would fall under the Sandiganbayan, and assuming further
that the informations had already been filed with the said tribunal but hearing
thereon has not begun yet, the Sandiganbayan can no longer proceed to hear the
cases in view of the express provision of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975. That
section provides that upon the effectivity of the Act, all criminal cases in which
trial has not yet begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper
courts. Hence, cases which were previously cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
under P.D. No. 1606, as amended, but are already under the jurisdiction of the
courts by virtue of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7975, shall be
6
referred to the latter courts if hearing thereon has not yet been commenced in
the Sandiganbayan.
It would, therefore, be a futile exercise to transfer the cases to the
Sandiganbayan because the same would anyway be transferred again to the
Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 7 of the new law in relation to Section
2 thereof.
7
G.R. No. L-64548 July 7, 1986

ROLANDO P. BARTOLOME
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. L-64559 July 7, 1986
ELINO CORONEL Y SANTOS
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Rolando P. Bartolome and Elino Coronel Y Santon were charged with
the crime of Falsification of Official document as defined and penalized under
paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. It was alleged that the two
conspired to make it appear on the CS Personal Data Sheet that Bartolome has
taken and passed the Career Service Professional Qualifying Examination with
a rating of 73.35% and that he was a 4th year AB student at the Far Eastern
University.
The charges were filed in the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the offense charged falls under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
HELD:
No, the offense is not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
Under Section 4 of P.D. 1606, which created this special court:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379; (b) Crime
committed by public officers and employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, embraced in Title VI I of the
Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and (c)
Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including
those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to
their office. (Emphasis supplied).
A careful reading of Republic Act No. 3019 and Republic Act No. 1379
will reveal that nowhere in either statute is falsification of an official document
mentioned, even tangentially or by implication.
Title VII, Book Two, of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes
a wide range of offenses committed by public officers, from knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204 to abuses against chastity in
Article 245, but falsification of an official document is not included. This is
punished in Article 171 under Title IV, Book Two, on Crimes against Public
Interest.
8
G.R. No. 85328 July 4, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
BIENVENIDO LEOPARTE, alias "EMBEN,"
FACTS:
Bienvenido Leoparte was charged and convicted with the complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape by the Regional Trial Court of Lucena. It
was alleged in the information that the accused, Leoparte, pulled the victim,
Marinel Idea, while she was on her way home and traversing the railroad tracks.
The accused then dragged her to the nearby banana plantation where the accused
satisfied his carnal desires against the victim’s will. Thereafter, the accused
brought the victim to his sister’s home where he again had carnal knowledge
with the victim.
The following day, the accused brought the victim to his uncle’s home
and again succeeded to have carnal knowledge with the victim against her will.
After two day, the accused the brought the victim to the house of his parents
where he again successfully satisfied his lascivious desires against the victim.
All the incidents took place with the accused purporting that he and the victim
had eloped and were planning to get married.
Issues:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
Yes, The Regional Trial Court has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over
the case.
Article 344 was not enacted for the specific purpose of benefiting the
accused. When it is said that the requirement in Article 344 that a complaint of
the offended party or her relatives is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the
complaint that starts the prosecutor proceeding. It is not the complaint which
confers jurisdiction on the court to try the case. The court's jurisdiction is vested
in it by the Judiciary Law. Such condition has been imposed out of
consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer
the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial.
The overriding consideration in determining the issue of whether or not
the condition precedent prescribed in Article 344 has been complied with is the
intent of the aggrieved party to seek judicial redress for the affront
committed. In the case at bar, the active cooperation of the offended party in
the prosecution of the case, as witness, clearly indicates said intent.
9
G.R. No. 192565February 28, 2012

UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES AND DESI TOMAS
vs.
FACTS:
Desi Tomas was charged with perjury for making a false narration in a
Certificate against Forum Shopping. It was alleged that Tomas stated under
oath that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action
or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency aside from
that which is filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for the
collection of sum of money with prayer of writ of replevin filed against Eddie
and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe.
Tomas filed a motion to quash arguing that the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Makati City does not have jurisdiction over the case as, though it was
notarized in Makati, the Certificate against Forum Shopping was used or
submitted before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City has
jurisdiction over the case at bar.
HELD:
Yes, the Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction to try and decide the
case at bar.
Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly
shown when she made the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum
Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the
material statements she subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati
City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the
perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting
the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati
City, not Pasay City.
10
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON
vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO
FACTS:
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño,
SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu,
SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez for the deaths of Vicente
Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC
of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of
reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that
time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review
where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April
2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C.
Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet
dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente
Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for
murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the
sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge
Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2
Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete
preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the
warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan
noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent
motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the accused.
HELD:
Yes, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the
court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases
involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court
even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law.
However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for
bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
11
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule
applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no
requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases best
illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not
in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under
the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the
application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of
jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
12
G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994

DIOSDADO JOSE ALLADO and ROBERTO L. MENDOZA
vs.
HON. ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Br. 62, Regional Trial Court,
Makati, Metro Manila, and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-CRIME COMMISSION
FACTS:
Petitioners, Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, were both
implicated as the masterminds of the kidnapping and murder of Eugen
Alexander Van Twist.
An information for the said crime was filed against the petitioners
primarily on the strength of a sworn statement by Escolastico Umbal, who
admitted that he was among those who kidnapped and killed the victim upon
the orders of the petitioners. Thereafter, respondent judge, Roberto C. Diokno,
ordered the arrest of the petitioners and no bail was recommended.
Petitioners, contending that their arrests was effected whimsically as
there is no probable cause, questioned their arrests.
ISSUE:
Whether or not probable cause is present to warrant the order of arrest
against the petitioners.
HELD:
No, probable cause do not exist to merit the order of arrest against the
petitioners.
For sure, the credibility of Umbal is badly battered. Certainly, his bare
allegations, even if the State invokes its inherent right to prosecute, are
insufficient to justify sending two lawyers to jail, or anybody for that matter.
More importantly, the PACC operatives who applied for a warrant to search the
dwellings of Santiago never implicated petitioners. In fact they claimed that
according to Umbal, it was Santiago, and not petitioners, who masterminded the
whole affair. While there may be bits of evidence against petitioners' co-
accused, i.e., referring to those seized from the dwellings of Santiago, these do
not in the least prove petitioners' complicity in the crime charged. Based on the
evidence thus far submitted there is nothing indeed, much less is there probable
cause, to incriminate petitioners. For them to stand trial and be deprived in the
meantime of their liberty, however brief, the law appropriately exacts much
more to sustain a warrant for their arrest — facts and circumstances strong
enough in themselves to support the belief that they are guilty of a crime that in
fact happened. Quite obviously, this has not been met.
13
G.R. No. L-4567 May 30, 1983

EMILIANO A. FRANCISCO and HARRY B. BERNARDINO
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
A complaint for intriguing against honor was filed against petitioners,
Francisco and Bernardino on February 6, 1966 before the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. The acts constituting the complaint was allegedly
perpetrated against Dr. Patrocinio Angeles on December 26, 1965.
On May 3, 1966, an information charging the petitioners with the crime
of grave oral defamation was filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The information was amended upon the order of the court on October 8, 1966
amending the offense charged to slander.
The Court of First Instance of Rizal convicted the petitioners with the
offense charged, the Court of Appeals modified the conviction finding the
petitioners only guilty of simple slander.
On appeal, the petitioners raised the defense of prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime has prescribed.
HELD:
No, the crime has not prescribed.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents, and shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence
to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable
to him."
Interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court in People vs.
Tayco held that the complaint or information referred to in Article 91 is that
which is filed in the proper court and not the denuncia or accusation lodged by
the offended party in the Fiscal's Office. This is so, according to the court,
because under this rule it is so provided that the period shall commence to run
again when the proceedings initiated by the filing of the complaint or
information terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, adding
that the proceedings in the Office of the Fiscal cannot end there in the acquittal
or conviction of the accused.
14
G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998

ISABELITA REODICA
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
A complaint charging petitioner, Isabelita Reodica, with the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property and slight physical injuries
was filed before the Fiscal’s office on October 20, 1987.
On January 13, 1988, an information was filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati charging the petitioner for the abovementioned offense. The
Regional Trial Court found the victim guilty as charged, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
On appeal, the petitioner raised the defense of prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription has set in.
HELD:
We cannot apply Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which
provides that in cases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, “the prosecution
commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC,
RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or
investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said
cases may be commenced only by information.” However, this Section cannot
be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of
a complaint or information directly with said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of
substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights. Hence, in case of conflict between the
Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal
Code, the latter prevails.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised
Penal Code, Article 91 thereof and the rulings
in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for
the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with
the fiscal’s office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled
pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner’s
defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the information in this case.
15
G.R. No. 152662 June 13, 2012

vs.
MA. THERESA PANGILINAN
FACTS:
Virginia Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg.22 against the respondent, Pangilinan on September 16,
1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
On December 5, 1997, a civil case was commenced by Pangilinan
against Malolos for accounting, recovery of commercial documents,
enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance before the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City.
Five days thereafter or on December 10, 1997, Pangilinan filed a
“Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question” before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency
of the civil action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The City
Prosecutor approved the petition upon the recommendation of the assistant City
Prosecutor on March 2, 1998.
Malolos appealed the decision of the City Prosecutor to the Department
of Justice. On January 5, 1999, reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor
and ordered the filing of informations on violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.22.
Said cases were filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City on
November 18, 1999.
Pangilinan filed an “Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to
Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest” before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon
City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of
prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription has set in.
HELD:
No, the action has not prescribed.
Act No. 3326 entitled “An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations
of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription
Shall Begin,” as amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely,
the law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx;
(b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one
month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment.
16
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted

against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment
of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its
violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the
aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be
tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
17
G.R. No. 127845 March 10, 2000

vs.
LODRIGO BAYYA
FACTS:
Respondent, Lodrigo Bayya was charged and convicted with the crime
of incestuous rape as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659 before the Regional Trial Court
in Ilagan, Isabela.
On Appeal, respondent challenged the penalty of death against him on
the grounds that the information charging of the offense did not made any
mention of Republic Act 7659 and that he was only charged using Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, hence, the penalty should be that which is provided
for in the Revised Penal Code and not as provided for in Republic Act 7659. As
such, in convicting him under the provisions of Republic Act 7659, a
transgression of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a transgression of the respondent’s right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
HELD:
Yes, the respondent may only be convicted of the charges under the
information indicting him and nothing more.
In the case under scrutiny, the information does not allege the minority
of the victim, Rosie S. Bayya, although the same was proven during the trial as
borne by the records. The omission is not merely formal in nature since
doctrinally, an accused cannot be held liable for more than what he is indicted
for. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be,
but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, not charged in the Complaint
or information on which he is tried or therein necessarily included. He has a
right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before
he is put on trial. To convict an accused of an offense higher than that charged
in the Complaint or information on which he is tried would constitute
unauthorized denial of that right.
18
G.R. No. 169888 November 11, 2008

RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., City Mayor, Lucena City
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, 4th Division, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Criminal and administrative charges were filed against petitioner Ramon
Y. Talaga Jr. before the Office of the Ombudsman. It was alleged, that the
petitioner, in his capacity as mayor, has unlawfully granted favors to a third
party with respect to the operation of bingo games in the city, to the damage and
prejudice of the complainants. The administrative complaint was dismissed but
the criminal case was retained by the Ombudsman.
Three criminal information charging the petitioner of violation of
Republic Act No. 3019 was recommended by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor. Only one information was sustained by the Sandiganbayan, the
criminal information for giving unwarranted benefits to Jose Sy Bang by
approving an ordinance granting him a local franchise to operate bingo games
in the city. However, said information was reverted back to the Ombudsman for
the conduct of further preliminary investigation.
Thereafter, an information charging the petitioner and the City
Councilors for the aforementioned offense, alleging that the parties conspired
to perpetrate the crime. The City Councilors moved for the motion to be quashed
as the information does not constitute an offense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there exist a valid information under which the petitioner
stands charged.
HELD:
Yes, the information is valid.
The test in Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court is whether the crime
is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to appraise the
accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison d'etre of
the rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.
Based on the foregoing test, the Information sufficiently apprises
petitioner of the charges against him. The Information charged the petitioner of
evident bad faith and manifest partiality when as Mayor of Lucena City,
petitioner, in conspiracy with the City Council, gave unwarranted benefits to
Jose Sy Bang. Moreover, it states the specific act which constituted the giving
of unwarranted benefits, namely, granting unto the said Jose Sy Bang a local
franchise to operate a bingo business in Lucena City in violation of existing
laws. These allegations are clear enough for a layman to understand.
19
G.R. No. 130492 January 31, 2001

vs.
SALVADOR ARROJADO
FACTS:
The accused, Salvador Arrojado, and the victim, Mary Ann Arrojado
was living in the same roof along with the victim’s father. The accused was
helping in taking care of the victim’s father.
One day, the accused went to the house of his cousin, Erlinda Arrojado
Magdaluyo, and reported that the victim has committed suicide. Erlinda along
with his husband and father went to the victim’s house and there they saw the
already lifeless body of the victim.
Upon examination, it was revealed that the victim suffered multiple stab
wounds all over her body, negating the theory of suicide.
On hearing, several witnesses testified on the strained relationship
between the victim and the accused. The accused was found guilty of murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength, though not alleged in the information, may be appreciated in the case.
HELD:
No, an aggravating circumstance to be appreciated must be alleged in
the information.
The murder in this case took place after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659
on December 31, 1993 which increased the penalty for murder from reclusion
temporal maximum to death to reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence and in
accordance with Art. 63(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court should
have imposed the penalty of death on accused-appellant. However, on
December 1, 2000, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect,
requiring that every complaint or information state not only the qualifying but
also the aggravating circumstances. This provision may be given retroactive
effect in the light of the well settled rule that “statutes regulating the procedure
of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to
that extent.” The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence not having
been alleged in the information, the same therefore could not be appreciated to
raise accused-appellant’s sentence to death.
20
G.R. No. 188106 November 25, 2009

vs.
ANTONIO DALISAY Y DESTRESA
FACTS:
Antonio Dalisay was charged and convicted with the crime of rape
perpetrated against the 16 years old daughter of his live in partner.
It was alleged that even prior to the commission of rape, the accused was
already repeatedly molesting the victim by inserting his fingers in her genitalia.
An information charging the accused of the crime of rape in relation to
Republic Act 7610 was then instituted before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. The Regional Trial Court convicted the accused for the crime of
qualified rape. The Court of Appeals only found the accused guilty of the crime
of simple rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the special qualifying circumstance of minority, though
not alleged in the information, may be appreciated in the case at bar.
HELD:
No, the special qualifying circumstance of minority may not be
appreciated as it is not alleged in the information charging the accused of the
crime.
While it has been proven that appellant was the common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim and the child was a minor at the time of the incident, the
Court cannot convict appellant of qualified rape because the special qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship were not sufficiently alleged in the
information. To recall, the information here erroneously alleged that appellant
was the stepfather of the victim. Proven during the trial, however, was that
appellant was not married to the victim’s mother, but was only the common-law
spouse of the latter. Following settled jurisprudence, appellant is liable only of
simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua.
21
G.R. No. 103102 March 6, 1992

CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR.
vs.
HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Petitioner, Tehankee, Jr. was charged with the crime of frustrated
murder for the act of shooting Maureen Navarro Hultman on the head, which
would have caused her death if not for the timely medical intervention.
Trial ensued. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was
allowed to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However,
before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died.
The prosecution then filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file
an amended information. The amended information was filed, however, the
petitioner refused to be arraigned on the said amended information for lack of
preliminary investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial
amendment, without preliminary investigation, after the prosecution has rested
on the original information, may legally and validly be admitted.
HELD:
Yes, the amendment is legal and valid.
Amendments are allowed after arraignment and during the trial but only
as to matters of form and provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of
the accused. An objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed
against herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense
originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation,
that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied to
aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. Under the
circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the amended information for
murder is, at most, an amendment as to form which is allowed even during the
trial of the case. It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment
was involved and introduced in the second information, a preliminary
investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the accused. The filing
of the amended information without the requisite preliminary investigation does
not violate petitioner's right to be secured against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected from an open and public accusation
of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
22
G.R. No. 165751 April 12, 2005

DATU GUIMID P. MATALAM
vs.
THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
An information charging the petitioner of violation of Section 3 € of
Republic Act No. 3019 as amended was filed before the Sandiganbayan. Said
violation was for his alleged refusal to pay the back wages ordered by the
Civil Service Commission.
After reinvestigation, an amended information was filed by the public
prosecutor, Matalam, objected to the filing of the amended information and filed
a motion to dismiss alleging that the amended information charges an entirely
new cause of action, that is, the alleged willful, unlawful and illegal dismissal
from the service of the complaining witnesses. Also, the petitioner assails that
admitting said information without a preliminary investigation would amount
to a violation of his right to due process.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment to the information is substantial as to
warrant the conduct of a new preliminary investigation.
HELD:
Yes, the amendment was indeed substantial.
The recital of facts constituting the offense charged was definitely
altered. In the original information, the prohibited act allegedly committed by
petitioner was the illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of
the private complainants, while in the amended information, it is the illegal
dismissal from the service of the private complainants. However, it cannot be
denied that the alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay monetary claims
is related to, and arose from, the alleged illegal dismissal from the service of the
private complainants.
If petitioner is not to be given a new preliminary investigation for the
amended charge, his right will definitely be prejudiced because he will be
denied his right to present evidence to show or rebut evidence regarding the
element of evident bad faith and manifest partiality on the alleged dismissal. He
will be denied due process.
A component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary
investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused before
trial. To deny their claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive
them of the full measure of their right to due process.
23
G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010

JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE
vs.
HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON.
EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS
FACTS:
Petitioner, Leviste, was originally charged with the crime of homicide
for the death Rafael de las Alas before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
After re-examination and re-investigation of the records of the case, the
prosecution amended the information to reflect that the petitioner is already
charged with the crime of murder and no longer for homicide.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment of the information is substantial as to
warrant the conduct of a new preliminary investigation.
HELD:
Yes, the amendment was substantial. However, there is no need for a
new preliminary investigation as the conduct of re-investigation is of the same
nature.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is
whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be
available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant
might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in
the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature
of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause
surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had
each been held to be one of form and not of substance.
Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is required,
the fact that what was conducted in the present case was a reinvestigation does
not invalidate the substantial amendment of the Information. There is no
substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation
since both are conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of
determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. What is essential is that petitioner was
placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder after the claimed
circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion.
24
G.R. No. 121211 April 30, 2003

vs.
RONETO DEGAMO alias “Roy”
FACTS:
Accused, Degamo, was charged and convicted for the crime for rape
before the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City. The Trial Court imposed upon
the accused the supreme penalty of death as the Trial Court appreciated the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling and night time.
Also, the penalty of death was imposed due to the qualifying
circumstance of that by reason of the incident of rape, the victim has become
insane. However, said circumstance was only presented on the amended
information submitted after the accused has already been arraigned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment to include the circumstance “that the
victim has become insane by reason of the incident of rape is substantial.
HELD:
No, the amendment is not substantial.
The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is
not prejudiced by such amendment is whether or not a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be equally available after the
amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the accused might
have would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other;
if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of
substance
Tested against the foregoing guidelines, the subject amendment is
clearly not one of substance as it falls under all of the formal amendments
enumerated in the Teehankee case. The insertion of the phrase that the victim
has become insane by reason or on occasion of the rape in the Information
merely raised the penalty that may be imposed in case of conviction and does
not charge another offense different from that charged in the original
Information. Whatever defense appellant may have raised under the original
information for rape committed with a deadly weapon equally applies to rape
committed with a deadly weapon where the victim has become insane by reason
or on occasion of the rape. The amendment did not adversely affect any
substantial right of appellant. Therefore, the trial court correctly allowed the
amendment.
25
G.R. No. 171271 August 31, 2006

vs.
ELBERTO TUBONGBANUA y PAHILANGA
FACTS:
Accused, Tubongbanua, was charged and convicted with the crime of
murder for the death of Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho by the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City.
The conviction was based on the amended information which included
the aggravating circumstance of dwelling and with insult or in disregard of the
respect due to the offended party on account of her rank, age or sex.
The Court of Appeals did not appreciate the aggravating circumstances
of dwelling and insult to rank, sex and age of the victim because these
circumstances were included as amendments to the information after the
presentation by the prosecution of its evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment constitutes a substantial one so as to
invalidate the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to rank, sex or
age of the victim.
HELD:
No, the amendments are not substantial.
The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is
not prejudiced by such amendment is whether or not a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be equally available after the
amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the accused might
have would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other;
if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of
substance.
Tested against these guidelines, the insertion of the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age,
or sex of the victim is clearly a formal, not a substantial, amendment. These
amendments do not have the effect of charging another offense different or
distinct from the charge of murder as contained in the original information. They
relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event
of conviction. The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of
appellant. Besides, appellant never objected to the presentation of evidence to
prove the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or in disregard of
the respect due to the offended party on account of rank, age or sex. Without
any objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived
26
G.R. No. 151785 December 10, 2007

SUSAN FRONDA-BAGGAO
vs.
FACTS:
Four separate informations for illegal recruitment were filed against
petitioner, Baggao, before the Regional Trial Court of Bangued.
The prosecution filed a motion to amend the informations praying that
the separate informations for illegal recruitment be amended so that there
would only be one information for illegal recruitment in large scale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment is valid.
HELD:
Yes, the amendment is valid.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information
may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal
amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of
the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or
information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to
the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in
resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,
especially the offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made
in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be placed
in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.
Simply stated, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial
amendment of the complaint or information may be made without leave of
court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but
with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the
accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the
same is beneficial to the accused.
27
G.R. No. 160451 February 9, 2007

EDUARDO G. RICARZE
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CALTEX
PHILIPPINES, INC., PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
BANK (PCIBANK)
FACTS:
Two informations for estafa through falsification of commercial
document was filed against petitioner, Ricarze, before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City.
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIBank), unknown to the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, credited the amount being questioned in the
criminal cases of estafa.
On pre-trial, the petitioner questioned the appearance of PCIBank. The
petitioner averred that unless the Informations were amended to change the
private complainant to PCIB, his right as accused would be prejudiced.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the substitution of Caltex by PCIBank as private
complainant is tantamount to substantial amendment.
HELD:
No, there is no substantial amendment.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is
whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be
available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant
might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in
the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature
of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause
surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had
each been held to be one of form and not of substance.
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private
complaint is not a substantial amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis
of the charge in both Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to petitioner.
The documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks remained the same,
and all such evidence was available to petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he
cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the substitution.
28
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his
capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING
FACTS:
Two complaints for adultery were filed against petitioner, Pilapil, before
the City Fiscal of Manila, for allegedly having an affair with a certain William
Chia and another man named Jesus Chua while her marriage with Geiling was
still subsisting.
Pilapil contested said charges stating that Geiling no longer qualify as
an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree in Germany before
filing the criminal charges for adultery.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Geiling is an offended spouse with capacity or legal
representation to initiate an action for adultery.
HELD:
The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse, and nobody else. The offended spouse assumes a more
predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom,
is a matter exclusively within his power and option. This policy was adopted
out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the
outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to
institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status,
capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal
action. It presupposes, therefore, that the marital relationship is still subsisting
at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
In view of the valid divorce obtained by Geiling in his country, its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as Geiling is concerned in
view of the nationality principle in civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Geiling, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended
spouse at the time he filed suit.
29
G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010

HERALD BLACK DACASIN
vs.
SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN
FACTS:
Herald, an American, and Sharon, Filipino, were married in Manila on
April of 1994. In June 1999, Sharon was able to obtain a divorce decree from
the Circuit Court of Lake County, Illinois. The Illinois Circuit Court also
granted sole custody of their child to Sharon.
In 2002, both parties instituted a contract agreeing to a joint custody over
their child.
In 2004, Herald filed a case against Sharon alleging that Sharon had
exercised sole custody over their child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
Yes, the Regional Trial Court can take cognizance of the case.
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to
enforce the Agreement which is void.
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner
filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation. An action for specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to
enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions.
Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.
30
G.R. No. L-38308 December 26, 1984

MILAGROS DONIO-TEVES and MANUEL MORENO
vs.
HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., as Presiding Judge, Branch III, Court of
First Instance, Negros Oriental, PABLO E. CABAHUG, as City Fiscal of
Dumaguete, and JULIAN L. TEVES
FACTS:
Milagros Donio-Teves and Manuel Moreno are accused of and charged
with adultery. Thecriminal action was initiated by a letter-complaint thumb
marked and sworn to by complainant Julian Teves, the husband of petitioner
Milagros Donio-Teves. During the preliminary investigation, Julian Teves filed
a new letter-complaint attaching his affidavit. Before the scheduled
arraignment, Milagros Donio-Teves filed a Motion to Quash challenging
the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance over the offense charged, the
persons of both accused, and the authority of respondent City Fiscal of
Dumaguete to file the information. The motion was denied by the CFI. During
the pendency of the case, complainant Julian Teves died.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the complainant in adultery while the case
is pending a ground to dismiss the case.
HELD:
In adultery and concubinage cases, the death of the offended party is not
a ground for the extinguishment of the criminal liability, whether partial or total,
of the offending spouse. The participation of the offended party is essential not
for the maintenance of the criminal action but solely for the initiation thereof.
The moment the offended party initiates the action, the law will be applied in
full force beyond the control of, and in spite of the complainant, his death
notwithstanding.
31
G.R. No. 190847 April 13, 2011

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS
vs.
PETER SHERMAN, MICHAEL WHELAN, TEODOR B. LINGAN, ATTY.
OFELIA B. CAJIGAL and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS
FACTS:
A criminal action for violation of the provisions of the Tariff and
Custom Code of the Philippines, as amended and Republic Act 7916 was filed
against private respondents for alleged non-payment of duties or taxes for the
shipment of bet slips and thermal papers.
The State Prosecutor found probable cause and filed an information
against the private respondents before the Court of Tax Appeals.
The Secretary of Department of Justice reversed the determination of
probable cause and ordered the withdrawal of the information. Hence, the State
Prosecutor withdrew the information.
The Bureau of Customs then filed, in its own, a motion for
reconsideration before the Court of Tax Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Bureau of Customs can commence the action without
the participation of the State Prosecutor.
HELD:
No, the public prosecutor has power of direction and control over
prosecution of criminal cases.
It is well-settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive
department of the government whose principal power and responsibility is to
insure that laws are faithfully executed. Corollary to this power is the right to
prosecute violators. Thus, all criminal actions commenced by complaint or
information are prosecuted under the direction and control of public
prosecutors. In the prosecution of special laws, however, the exigencies of
public service sometimes require the designation of special prosecutors from
different government agencies to assist the public prosecutor; but this
designation does not detract from the public prosecutor having control and
supervision over the case.
32
G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002

AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO
vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA
FACTS:
The parties in this case were involved in a vehicular accident. As a result,
Casupanan filed a civil case against Laroya for Quasi-delict and Laroya filed a
criminal case against the former for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was already in its
Preliminary investigation stage. Laroya filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
of forum shopping considering the own going criminal case, which was granted.
Casupanan filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the civil case
is a separate civil action which can proceed independently from the criminal
case.
ISSUE:
Whether or nor an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless
imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate
civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal
case?
HELD:
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the
criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without
reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the
prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil
Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the
civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before
the commencement of the criminal action.
The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each
other.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke
Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail
of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action.
33
G.R. No. 174238 July 7, 2009

ANITA CHENG
vs.
SPOUSES WILLIAM SY AND TESSIE SY
FACTS:
Two cases of estafa was filed by petitioner, Cheng, against the
respondents, Spouses Sy, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Petitioner then filed two more criminal cases for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 against the respondents based on the same facts contained in
the criminal charge of estafa.
The criminal charge for estafa was dismissed for failure to prove the
elements thereof, however, no pronouncement as to the civil liability was made.
The cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are likewise dismissed, no
pronouncement as the civil liability was also made.
Petitioner then filed a civil action for collection of sum of money with
damages based on the same checks that are the subject of the charges of estafa
and Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the charges of estafa and Batas
Pambansa Blg.22 bars the institution of a civil actions arising from the criminal
charges.
HELD:
Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP
Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the
checks. It should be stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the separate
filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the reservation of a
separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil case after the
criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate
proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal
case. Even then, the Rules encourages the consolidation of the civil and criminal
cases. Thus, where petitioner’s rights may be fully adjudicated in the
proceedings before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate
action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted on account of res judicata,
for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In view of this
special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil
Code is not applicable.
34
G.R. No. 175091 July 13, 2011

P/CHIEF INSPECTOR FERNANDO BILLEDO,
SPO3 RODRIGO DOMINGO, PO3 JORGE LOPEZ, FERDINAND CRUZ,
and MARIANO CRUZ,
vs.
WILHELMINA WAGAN, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Branch III, Pasay City, ALBERTO MINA, NILO JAY MINA AND
FERDINAND CAASI
FACTS:
Private respondents were charged for violating a city ordinance that
prohibits the drinking of liquor in public places.
Thereafter, the private respondents filed a civil case against the
petitioners, criminal complaints were also filed against the petitioners before the
City Prosecutor Office and the Office of the Ombudsman for unlawful arrest
and violation of Republic Act No. 7348.
Both of the criminal actions against the petitioners were dismissed,
however, the civil action proceeded with the trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil case is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
HELD:
Yes, the civil case falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court.
The subject civil case does not fall within the purview of Section 4 of
R.A. No. 8249 as the latter part of this provision contemplates only two
(2) situations. First, a criminal action has been instituted before
the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts after the requisite preliminary
investigation, and the corresponding civil liability must be simultaneously
instituted with it. Second, the civil case, filed ahead of the criminal case, is still
pending upon the filing of the criminal action, in which case, the civil case
should be transferred to the court trying the criminal case for consolidation and
joint determination. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 finds no application in this case.
No criminal action has been filed before the Sandiganbayan or any appropriate
court. Thus, there is no appropriate court to which the subject civil case can be
transferred or consolidated as mandated by the said provision .It is also illogical
to consider the civil case as abandoned simply because the criminal cases
against petitioners were dismissed at the preliminary stage. A reading of the
latter part of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8294 suggests that the civil case will only be
considered abandoned if there is a pending criminal case and the civil case was
not transferred to the court trying the criminal case for joint determination. The
criminal charges against petitioners might have been dismissed at the
preliminary stage for lack of probable cause, but it does not mean that the civil
case instituted prior to the filing of the criminal complaints is already baseless
as the complainants can prove their cause of action in the civil case by mere
preponderance of evidence.
35
G.R. Nos. 155531-34 July 29, 2005

MARY ANN RODRIGUEZ
vs.
HON. THELMA A. PONFERRADA, in her OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY BRANCH 104; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and GLADYS NOCOM
FACTS:
Petitioner Rodriguez was charged with estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. On hearing of the criminal charge of estafa, the respondent
judge allowed the appearance of a private prosecutor to try the civil aspect of
the offense charged. The petitioner opposed said appearance alleging that the
private prosecutor’s appearance is barred as the civil aspect of the case is already
deemed instituted in the criminal charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent is allowed to collect civil damages in
both the estafa and Batas Pambansa Blg.22 cases as to warrant the appearance
of a private prosecutor in the case of estafa.
HELD:
No. Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing check
may give rise to two distinct criminal offenses: Estafa and violation of BP 22.
However, the recovery of the single civil liability arising from the single act of
issuing a bouncing check in either criminal case bars the recovery of the same
civil liability in the other criminal action. While the law allows two
simultaneous civil remedies for the offended party, it authorizes recovery in
only one.
36
G.R. No. 175851 July 04, 2012

EMILIA LIM
vs.
MINDANAO WINES & LIQUOR GALLERIA, A SINGLE
PROPRIETORSHIP BUSINESS OUTFIT OWNED BY EVELYN S.
VALDEVIESO
FACTS:
Mindanao Wines and Liquor Galleria (Mindanao Wines) delivered
several cases of liquors to H & E Commercial owned by Emilia Lim who issued
four checks worth P25,000.00 each. Two of these checks bounced for the
reasons ‘ACCOUNT CLOSED’ and ‘DRAWN AGAINSTINSUFFICIENT
FUNDS’. Mindanao Wines demanded from H & E Commercial the payment
of their value through two separate letters but the demands went unheeded
prompting Mindanao Wines to file before the MTCC for violations of BP 22.
Emilia Lim was acquitted but was made to pay civil the two amounts of checks
plus interest and cost of filing fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 case
includes the dismissal of the civil aspect.
HELD:
No, Acquittal from a crime does not necessarily mean absolution from
civil liability. Even if the Court treats the subject dismissal as one based
on insufficiency of evidence as Emilia wants to put it, the same is still
tantamount to a dismissal based on reasonable doubt. The MTCC dismissed the
criminal cases because one essential element of BP 22 was missing, i.e., the fact
of the bank’s dishonor. The evidence was insufficient to prove said element of
the crime as no proof of dishonor of the checks was presented by the
prosecution. This, however, only means that the trial court cannot convict
Emilia of the crime since the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases.
Conversely, the lack of such proof of dishonor does not mean that Emilia
has no existing debt with Mindanao Wines, a civil aspect which is proven
by another quantum of evidence, a mere preponderance of evidence."
Preponderance of evidence is defined as the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous
with the term ‘greater weight of the evidence’ or ‘greater weight of the credible
evidence’. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto."
37
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA
FACTS:
The accused, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova, was charged and convicted
with the crime of rape by the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City. Pending
appeal, the accused suffered a cardio respiratory arrest resulting to his demise.
The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal and required
the Solicitor General to submit his comment with regards to the civil aspect of
the case.
The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People vs Sendaydiego,
opined that the civil liability of the accused still exists despite his death, thus,
the case should proceed for the determination of the civil liability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil liability of the accused arising from the
offense charged is extinguished upon the death of the accused pending appeal.
HELD:
Yes. The death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes the civil
liability arising from the offense charged.
In pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final
determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution
of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the
demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot
survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts
which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable
consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the
criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated
under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate
civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding.
38
G.R. No. L-50691 December 5, 1994

EUSEBIO V. FONACIER, ROGELIO RAMOS, JOSEPH GONZALES and
FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN presided by HONORABLE MANUEL
PAMARAN, BERNARDO P. FERNANDEZ and ROMEO ESCAREAL, and the
TANODBAYAN CHIEF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR JUAN A. SISON and
PROSECUTORS RODOLFO AQUINO and MANUEL HERRERA
FACTS:
In April 1979, Fonacier, et. al, being public officers, entered into a fixed
and pre-arranged contract in the name of the Government requiring their
participation and approval with Francisco T. del Moral, a private contractor, for
the delivery of Five Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty (5,550) cubic meters of
aggregate subbase. No delivery was ever made after payment of Ninety Six
Thousand Six Hundred and Three Pesos (P96,603.00) through falsified
vouchers supported by falsified, spurious, irregularly prepared and questionable
documents and without the requisite delivery receipts and tally sheets approved
by the accused public officers.
On October 8, 1980, Del Moral died. Counsel for Del Moral filed a
motion to dismiss the petition for review on certiorari on the ground that Del
Moral died during the pendency of the case. The Solicitor General commented
"petitioner's appeal should only be dismissed insofar as his criminal liability is
concerned."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused extinguishes the criminal and
civil liability of the accused.
HELD:
On 29 January 1981, the Court dismissed the petition only with regard
to Del Moral's criminal liability. The death of Del Moral has extinguished the
civil liability based on ex delicto. In the recent case of People vs. Rogelio
Bayotas y Cordova, G.R. 102007, promulgated on 02 September 1994, the
Court have ruled, and might now reiterate, that —
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from
and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission: a) Law, b) Contracts, c) Quasi-contracts, d) .Delict, e) Quasi-delicts
39
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action

for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against
the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source
of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file
this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution
of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil
Code, which should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of
right by prescription.
40
G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL
vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed
an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On 7 February 2005, petitioner
received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City
for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity. On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an
urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since
the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element
in parricide, the outcome of the civil case would have a bearing in the criminal
case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City. The RTC Quezon City
held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. Petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals. However, The
Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the
crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolution of the action of annulment of marriage is
a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case of
frustrated parricide.
HELD:
No, there is no prejudicial question in the case at bar.
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
that elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed. In the case at bar, the civil case
for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to
the filing of the criminal action. The relationship between the offender and the
victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any person
“who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or
any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.” However, the issue in the
41
annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the

criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and
the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The
issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed
the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide,
the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would
have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of
the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married.
The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have no effect on the alleged
crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short,
even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner
could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
42
G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC.
vs.
CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI
FACTS:
Petitioner, Dreamwork, instituted a criminal case for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 against private respondent, Janiola, before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Las Pinas. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a criminal
information for the said offense before the Metropolitan Trial Court on February
2, 2005.
On September 20, 2006, spouses Janiola instituted a civil complaint for
the rescission of an alleged construction agreement that they entered into with
the petitioner. The checks, subject of the criminal case of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.
The private respondent then filed a motion to suspend the trial in the
criminal case alleging that the civil case of rescission poses a prejudicial
question that needs to be resolved first before a determination on the criminal
case may be had.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a prejudicial question in the case at bar.
HELD:
No, the action for rescission does not pose a prejudicial question on the
criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede
the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can
be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely
connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the
criminal action.
43
GR. No. 101236 January 30, 1992

JULIANA P. YAP
vs.
MARTIN PARAS and ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR., Judge of the 3rd
MTC of Glan Malapatan, South Cotabato,
FACTS:
Private respondent, Paras, sold his share in the intestate estate of their
parents to his sister, Juliana P. Yap. Nineteen years thereafter, Paras sold the
same property to Santiago Saya-ang.
When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa
against Paras and Saya-ang with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
General Santos City. On the same date, she filed a complaint for the
nullification of the said sale with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos
City.
After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminal
complaint for estafa against Paras with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Glan-Malapatan, South Cotabato, presided by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.
On April 17, 1991, before arraignment of the accused, the trial
judge motu proprio issued an order dismissing the criminal case on the ground
that the criminal action for estafa is a prejudicial question to a civil action for
nullity of an alleged double sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there exist a prejudicial question in the case presented.
HELD:
No, the criminal action for estafa is not and cannot be a prejudicial
question to a civil action for nullity of double sale.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
congnizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question
must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and
resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question
based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to
cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the
civil action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts
upon which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the
issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the accused.
It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the continuation of
the criminal action, not the criminal action that is prejudicial to the civil action.
44
G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987

MARIO FL. CRESPO
vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL
COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO
BAUTISTA, ET AL.
FACTS:
An information for Estafa was filed by the Fiscal against Crespo in the
Criminal Circuit Court of Lucena. When the case was set for arraignment,
Crespo filed a Motion To Defer Arraingment on the ground that there was a
pending Petition for Review with the Department of Justice. Said Motion was
denied by Judge Mogul. Crespo’s Motion For Reconsideration also having been
denied, he filed a TRO with the CA, which granted the same. Thereafter, the
CA granted Crespo’s Writ of Injucntion and perpetually restrained Judge Mogul
from having Crespo arrainged until the Sec. of Justice finally made his decision
and ordered the Fiscal to move for dismissal of the case. The Fiscal then filed a
Motion attaching the Secretary’s Resolution calling for the dismissal of the
case. Judge Mogul denied the Motion and set Crespo’s arraignment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court may refuse to grant a Motion to Dismiss
filed by the Fiscal under orders from the Secretary of Justice and still insist on
the arraignment of the accused.
HELD:
Yes, it is within the power of the trial court to refuse to grant a motion
to dismiss filed by the fiscal.
Once an information is filed in court, the court’s prior permission must
be secured if fiscal wants to reinvestigate the case. While it is true that it is
through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the
existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case, the
filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining
whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is
terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. The Court is
the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination
of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence.
45
G.R. No. L-60962 July 11, 1986

vs.
ROLANDO MONTEVERDE y CONE alias "EDUARDO MASCARIAS
FACTS:
Rolando Monteverde along with his co-accused Reynaldo Codera Jr.
were charged and convicted with the crime of robbery with rape and meted out
the ultimate penalty of death.
On appeal, Monteverde raised the following issues; 1) a) the medical
certificate does not show signs of physical injuries and spermatozoa; (2) said
medical certificate and even his co-accused's confession are inadmissible
against him, for being hearsay; (3) recidivism cannot be considered against him
because it was not alleged in the information; and (4) the lower court's
proceedings are void because the amended information does not contain a
certification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused can still assail the lack of preliminary
investigation even after plea and conviction.
HELD:
No, a valid plea on arraignment is tantamount to a waiver of the right of
the accused to preliminary investigation.
While generally, a preliminary investigation is mandatory and a
certification that such investigation was held is required, still this rule does not
apply if the issue is raised only after conviction. Thus, it has been held that after
a plea of not guilty to the information, an accused is deemed to have foregone
the right of preliminary investigation and to have abandoned the right to
question any irregularity that surrounds it.
46
G.R. No. L-14732 January 28, 1961

vs.
JOSEFINO G. SELFAISON, NEMESIO DALISAY, DOMINGO URETA and
BERNARDO BAUTISTA
FACTS:
Appellants Josefino G. Selfaison, Nemesio Dalisay, Domingo Ureta and
Bernardo Bautista — in company with Arsenio Amacio, Reynaldo Bautista,
Domingo Salde and Amrafil Dalisay who were alleged to be still at large were
accused in an amended information of the crime of robbery with rape in the
Court of First Instance of Capiz. After trial, Josefino G. Selfaison was found
guilty and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
the complainants, Angelita Sinag and Angelina Maghibon, the amounts of
P212.50 and P110, respectively, and to pay one-fourth of the cost. The other
three accused namely, Nemesio Dalisay, Domingo Ureta, and Bernardo
Bautista, were found guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor to 17 years, 4 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal, plus proportionate costs. From the judgment of
conviction, the four named accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but in
view of the penalty imposed, that court certified the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were deprived of their right to preliminary
investigation.
HELD:
No, the claim of denial of the right to preliminary investigation is not
supported by any facts.
Nothing appears affirmatively on the record that such preliminary
investigation has not been had. On the other hand, it is presumed that the inferior
court proceeded in accordance with law. (People vs. Silos and Bagano, G.R. No.
L-5158, March 28, 1952.) At any rate, appellants appear to have waived such
right, because immediately after their arrest, they filed bonds for their release
and subsequently proceeded to trial, without previously claiming that they did
not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation.
47
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992

ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding
Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
An information was filed charging herein petitioner Rolito Go for
murder before the Regional Trial Court of Metro Manila. Petitioner voluntarily
presented himself together with his two lawyers to the police upon obtaining
knowledge of being hunted by the latter. However, he was immediately detained
and denied his right of a preliminary investigation unless he executes a waiver
of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Thereafter,
petitioner posted bail for his conditional release.
No preliminary investigation before the filing of the information
charging Go for murder was conducted. The prosecutor ratiocinates that Go has
already waived his right to preliminary investigation when he posted bail.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation.
HELD:
No, the petitioner did not waive his right to preliminary investigation.
The right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the
accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a pleas at arraignment.
The facts of the case show that petitioner insisted on his right to preliminary
investigation before his arraignment and he, through his counsel denied
answering questions before the court unless they were afforded the proper
preliminary investigation. For the above reasons, the petition was granted and
the ruling of the appellate court was set aside and nullified. The Supreme Court
however, contrary to petitioner’s allegation, declared that failure to accord the
right to preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the information
charging the latter of the crime of murder.
48
G.R. No. 134744 January 16, 2001

GIAN PAULO VILLAFLOR
vs.
DINDO VIVAR y GOZON
FACTS:
Respondent, Vivar, was initially charged with the crime of slight
physical injuries for the mauling of petitioner Villaflor. Said charge was
withdrawn when it was later discovered that the injuries sustained was more
serious than they had appeared at first. A case of serious physical injuries was
then filed against respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City. A case of grave threat was also filed against the respondent.
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the information on grave threat was
filed by the respondent contending that crime should be absorbed in the charge
of physical injuries as such threats were made in connection with the same
mauling incident. The motion was denied by the MTC.
Respondent then went to the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City
by way of certiorari. The Regional Trial Court granted the motion to quash
because the cases were filed without the requisite preliminary investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed due to the absence of
HELD:
No, absence of preliminary investigation does not warrant a dismissal
of a criminal action.
Preliminary investigation is "an inquiry or proceeding to determine
whether sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial." A component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary
investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused before
trial. To deny their claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive
them of the full measure of their right to due process.
However, the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. Neither does it affect
the jurisdiction of the court or constitute a ground for quashing the information.
The trial court, instead of dismissing the information, should hold in abeyance
the proceedings and order the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary
investigation.
49
G.R. No. 130644 March 13, 1998

THE MINOR FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, Represented in this Suit by
his mother, MARGARITA G. Present: LARRANAGA
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPPINES
FACTS:
Petitioner Larranaga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention before the RTC of Cebu City. He was arrested and was
detained without the filing of the necessary Information and warrant of arrest.
The petitioner alleged that he must be released and be subject to a preliminary
investigation.
However pending the resolution of the Court for the petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with writs of preliminary and mandatory
injunction filed by the petitioner, the RTC judge issued a warrant of arrest
against the petitioner.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to preliminary
investigation.
2) Whether or not the petitioner should be released from detention
pending the investigation.
HELD:
1) Yes. Our ruling is not altered by the fact that petitioner has been
arraigned on October 14, 1997. The rule is that the right to preliminary
investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time
of entering a
plea at arraignment. Petitioner, in this case, has been actively andconsistently
demanding a regular preliminary investigation even before
hewas charged in court. Also, petitioner refused to enter a plea during thearrai
gnment because there was a pending case in this Court regarding
hisright to avail of a regular preliminary investigation. Clearly, the acts of petit
ioner and his counsel are inconsistent with a waiver. Preliminaryinvestigation
is part of procedural due process. It cannot be waived unless the waiver appears
to be clear and informed.
2) No. The filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of arrest
against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at
least
deny him the right to be released because of such defect.The originalwarrantle
ss arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the
Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of thepetiti
oner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993 against him
and the other accused in connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to
be sure, but it was nonetheless legal
50
G.R. Nos. 138859-60 February 22, 2001

ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP
vs.
The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division)
FACTS:
Acting on an Affidavit-Complaint filed by a certain Erlinda Fadri,
the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an order dated
September 19, 1995,
naming the following as respondents: benjamin Arao, Fredireck Winters,
Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay and the city jail warden
of Pagadian City. The order also required respondents, within ten days from
receipt thereof, to submit their counter-
affidavits and other pieces of controverting evidence.
The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao issued a Resolution dated
January 15, 1998 recommending the prosecution of the forenamed
respondents for violation of Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code andSection
3-a in relation to Section 3-e of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended.
Significantly, the name of Petitioner Alvarez A. Yusop was included as one
of the persons to be prosecuted, although he was not one of the originalrespon
dents mentioned in the Order of September 19, 1995.
OmbudsmanAniano A. Desierto approved the recommendation. Accordingly, t
woInformations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. They were docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 24524 (violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019) and
24525(unlawful arrest under Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code).
On April 16, 1998, an Order of Arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case No. 24524. Petitioner, however, posted a bail bond before the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City on May 20 of the same year. On
thesame day, he filed a "Motion to Remand Case to the Ombudsman -
Mindanao for Preliminary Investigation."
In Resolution dated June 8, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion
of petitioner for his alleged failure to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the
anti-graft court. On August 8, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss,
grounded again on the lack of preliminary investigation. In an Order dated
September 22, 1998,
the Sandiganbayan resolved not to take action on the Motion, becausepetitione
r had not yet submitted himself to its jurisdiction insofar as Criminal Case No.
24525 was concerned. On the scheduled arraignment on February 15, 1999,
petitioner reiterated his claim that he had not been accorded preliminary
investigation. In its two assailed Orders, the Sandigabayan rejected his claim
and proceeded with the arraignment
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan may proceed with the arraignment
without preliminary investigation.
2) Whether or not the filing of a bond constitute a waiver of preliminary
investigation.
51
HELD:
1) Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 cannot justify the evasion of the
requirement set forth in the Rules of Court for conducting preliminary
investigation. The law does not sanction such interpretation, for it deals merely
with the finality of orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman -- not the deprivation of the substantive right to a
preliminary investigation. Moreover, petitioner cannot be bound by theOmbud
sman's January 15, 1998 Resolution, which recommended the filing of charges.
He was not a party to the case and was not accorded any right to present
evidence on his behalf.
2) In Go v. Court of Appeals,
this Court held that "the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the
accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment."
Conversely, if the accused does invoke it before arraignment, as the petitioner
did in this case, the right is not waived. Neither did the filing of a bail bond
constitute a waiver of petitioner's right to preliminary investigation.
Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure,"[a]n application for or admission to bail; shall not bar the accused
from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued
therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a
preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them
before entering his plea.
The right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal
or technical. To deny it to petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of
his right to due process.
52
G.R. No. 109036 July 5, 1995

BARTOLOME F. MERCADO
vs.
The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH DIVISION, The Honorable
CESAR C. PERALEJO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
98, Quezon City and the Honorable CITY PROSECUTOR of Quezon City
FACTS:
Petitioner, Mercado, was charged with a violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg.22 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Petitioner moved to defer his arraignment on the ground that he was not
notified of the preliminary investigation. He claimed that the private
complainant deliberately provided a wrong address in the issuance of the
subpoena to him. He was thus prevented from submitting his counter-affidavit,
which if considered, would have prevented the filing of the criminal case against
him.
The City Prosecutor denied the claim of petitioner, stating that the
subpoena was sent to the residence of the petitioner and that the same was
returned unserved. The prosecutor also avers that the presence of the accused
was not a requisite to the validity of the preliminary investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is denied of his right to preliminary
investigation.
HELD:
No, Petitioner was not denied of his right to a preliminary investigation.
It is uncontroverted that a subpoena was sent to his given address but it was
returned unserved. Petitioner did not dispute that the address appearing in the
official receipt of his cash bond was his address.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is for the investigating
prosecutor to determine if a crime has been committed. A review of the evidence
is thus necessary to establish probable cause and if the evidence so warrants, the
investigating prosecutor is duty bound to file the corresponding information
(Cruz, Jr. v. People, 233 SCRA 439 [1994]). It was ruled that preliminary
investigations can be conducted ex-parte if the respondent cannot be
subpoenaed or does not appear after due notice (New Rules on Criminal
Procedure, Rule 112, Section 3(d); Cf. Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 120 SCRA
659 [1983]).
53
G.R. No. 110315 January 16, 1998

RENATO CUDIA
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, The HON.CARLOS D. RUSTIA, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch LVI, Angeles City
FACTS:
Petitioner, Cudia, was arrested in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the alleged
possession of unlicensed revolver. He was the brought to Angeles City where
he was detained. A preliminary investigation was conducted, consequently, an
information charging the petitioner of illegal possession of fire arms was filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City.
On pre-trial, the judge called the attention of the parties to the fact that
the crime was committed in Mabalacat and not in Angeles City.
Another information charging the same offense was filed against the
respondent, this time by the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga. Thereafter, the
City Prosecutor of Angeles moved for the dismissal of the earlier case stating
that the case is within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor.
The petitioner the filed a motion to quash on the ground of violation to
his right against double jeopardy.
HELD:
Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is with merit.
HELD:
The Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who
should prepare informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but
outside Angeles City. An information must be prepared and presented by the
prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not
acquire jurisdiction. Although failure to file a motion to quash the information
is a waiver of all objections to it insofar as formal objections to pleadings are
concerned, questions relating to want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage
of the proceedings. Moreover, since the complaint or information was
insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance that conviction
upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the
accused cannot be pleaded as prior jeopardy, and will not be a bar to a second
prosecution
54
G.R. No. 116623 March 23, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HONORABLE ALFREDO GUSTILO
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ESAM GADI y ABDULLAH
FACTS:
The private respondent, Esam Gadi, was apprehended at the Manila
National Airport and subsequently detained for possession of marijuana. A
criminal case for violation of the provisions of Dangerous Drug Act was then
filed against the private respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City.
Private respondent, though admitting that it is beyond the fide day period
prescribed by law, filed a motion for reinvestigation alleging that the gravity of
the offense charged against him warranted the motion and that period prescribed
by law to file the motion is not mandatory.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is entitled to reinvestigation (preliminary
investigation)
HELD:
No, the period to ask for a reinvestigation has already lapsed.
The period for filing a motion for preliminary investigation after an
information has been filed against an accused who was arrested without a
warrant has been characterized as mandatory by the Court. In People vs.
Figueroa, the .Supreme Court applied Section 15, Rule 112 of the old Rules,
which is substantially reproduced in Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The Court held that Section 15 of old Rule 112 granted the
accused the right to ask for preliminary investigation within a period of five (5)
days from the time he learned of the filing of the information. As the accused in
that case did not exercise his right within the five-day period, his motion for
"reinvestigation" was denied.
Clearly, Section 7 of Rule 112 of the present Rules gives the accused the
right to ask for a preliminary investigation; but it does not give him the right to
do so after the lapse of the five-day period. This is in accord with the intent of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure to make preliminary investigation simple and
speedy. The Supreme Court, elaborating on the rationale of the rules on
preliminary investigation
55
G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010

JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE
vs.
HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON.
EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS
FACTS:
Petitioner, Leviste, was originally charged with the crime of homicide
for the death Rafael de las Alas before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
After re-examination and re-investigation of the records of the case, the
prosecution amended the information to reflect that the petitioner is already
charged with the crime of murder and no longer for homicide.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a reinvestigation is availing in the case at bar.
HELD:
Yes, the amendment was substantial. However, there is no need for a
new preliminary investigation as the conduct of re-investigation is of the same
nature.
Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is required,
the fact that what was conducted in the present case was a reinvestigation does
not invalidate the substantial amendment of the Information. There is no
substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation
since both are conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of
determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. What is essential is that petitioner was
placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder after the claimed
circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion.
56
G.R. No. 132422 March 30, 2004

FILADAMS PHARMA, INC.
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO FERIA
FACTS:
A complaint charging the private respondent, Feria, for estafa before the
assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City was filed by petitioner, Filadams. Said
complaint was dismissed for lack of cause of action. The petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was likewise dismissed.
The petitioner then appealed the same to the Secretary of Justice. The
Secretary of Justice arrived at the same conclusion and dismissed the appeal.
The petitioner then raised the same issue to the Court of Appeals, but also to no
avail.
ISSUES:
1) What is the nature of the conduct of preliminary investigation of the
prosecutor?
2) Are the acts (appeals) resorted to by the petitioner valid?
HELD:
1) The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-
making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often
the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with
a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is
not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts,
ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
2) With our ruling in Bautista that the Office of the Prosecutor was not
covered by the appellate process under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, what then
was petitioner's remedy from the resolution of the Assistant Prosecutor
dismissing his complaint? Based on the 1993 Revised Rules on Appeals from
Resolutions in Preliminary Investigations or Reinvestigations — now the 2000
NPSRule on Appeals — the petitioner could appeal to the Secretary of
Justice. In this case, the petitioner did appeal to the Secretary of Justice but his
appeal was dismissed. His motion for reconsideration was also dismissed. Since
there was no more appeal or other remedy available in the ordinary course of
law, the petitioner correctly filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
57
G.R. No. 147932 January 25, 2006

LAILA G. DE OCAMPO
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, MAGDALENA B.
DACARRA, and ERLINDA P. ORAYAN
FACTS:
Ronald Dacarra, Magdalena’s nine-year-old son, complained of
dizziness upon arriving home. When asked, Magdalena found out that Laila G.
De Ocampo, Ronald’s teacher, banged his head against that of his
classmate. Due to continuous vomiting, Magdalena brought Ronald to the
hospital where he underwent an x-ray. She was informed that Ronald’s head
had a fracture. He died after 5 days from the incident, which led Magdalena to
charge De Ocampo with homicide. During the inquest proceedings, the
Assistant City Prosecutor ruled that there is no concrete evidence to show proof
that the banging of the heads of the two victims could be the actual and
proximate cause of the death of Ronald, further reasoning that the vehicular
accident which happened two years ago may be the cause of Ronald’s head
injury. Subsequently, the case was referred to another Assistant City Prosecutor
for preliminary investigation. De Ocampo invoked the disposition of the inquest
prosecutor which found insufficient evidence to support the charges against her.
She reiterated that the head-banging incident was not the proximate cause of
Ronald’s death but the vehicular accident where he was involved. After the
preliminary investigation, the prosecutor found probable cause against De
Ocampo for the offense charged.
De Ocampo thereafter filed a petition for review with the DOJ where
she contended that the investigating prosecutor erred in concluding that her
alleged act of banging Ronald and Lorendo’s heads was the cause of Ronald’s
injury. She also asserted that she was denied due process during the preliminary
investigation when the prosecutor did not conduct a clarificatory hearing and
when said prosecutor unilaterally obtained a copy of the autopsy report from the
PNP Crime Laboratory. The DOJ Secretary, however, denied the petition for
review and held that Ronald’s injury was the direct and natural result of
petitioner’s act of banging Ronald and Lorendo’s heads. The Secretary also
rejected De Ocampo’s claim that she is innocent as held by the inquest
prosecutor because he inquest prosecutor did not dismiss the case but merely
recommended her release for further investigation since the case was not proper
for inquest and the evidence was then insufficient. Her motion for
reconsideration having been denied, De Ocampo filed this present petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not De Ocampo was denied due process during the
58
HELD:
Petitioner was not denied due process during the preliminary
investigation. A clarificatory hearing is not indispensable during preliminary
investigation. Rather than being mandatory, a clarificatory hearing is optional
on the part of the investigating officer as evidenced by the use of the term "may"
in Section 3(e) of Rule 112. On the issue of the prosecutor’s obtaining of the
autopsy report, the Rules on preliminary investigation do not forbid the
investigating prosecutor from obtaining it. Neither is there a law requiring the
investigating prosecutor to notify the parties before securing a copy of the
autopsy report. The autopsy report, which states the causes of Ronald’s death,
can either absolve or condemn the petitioner. Unfortunately for petitioner, the
investigating prosecutor found that the autopsy report bolstered complainants’
allegations.
Asserting her innocence, petitioner continues to invoke the disposition
of the inquest prosecutor finding insufficient evidence for the charges against
her. As correctly ruled by the DOJ Secretary, the inquest prosecutor did not
dismiss the case but merely recommended it for further investigation since it
was not proper for inquest and the evidence was then insufficient. Moreover,
petitioner’s active participation in the preliminary investigation without
questioning the propriety of such proceedings indicates petitioner’s agreement
with the recommendation of the inquest prosecutor for the further investigation
of the case.
The instant petition was denied and the Court affirms the Resolutions of
the Secretary of Justice.
59
G.R. No. 119990 June 21, 2004

REMBERTO C. KARA-AN
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ,
HON. ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, JR., HON. RAUL ARNAU
FACTS:
Kara-an wrote to Senator Ernesto Maceda imputing certain criminal acts
to "the clique of six" in the Board of Directors of the Al-Amanah Islamic
Investment Bank of the Philippines. Kara-an claimed that "the clique of six"
granted a loan of P250,000 to Compressed Air Machineries & Equipment
Corporation (CAMEC) without a valid collateral. Kara-an also claimed that the
"clique of six" approved the real estate mortgage on CAMEC’s loan without
requiring the cancellation of a prior subsisting mortgage and without securing
the written consent of the first mortgagee in violation of law. Kara-an thus
asserted that the "clique of six" is liable for entering into a contract which is
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, which is punishable
under RA 3019.
Senator Maceda endorsed Kara-an’s letter to Ombudsman Conrado M.
Vasquez for appropriate investigation. The Ombudsman dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit on the ground that Kar-an, as officer-in-charge of
the Makati Branch of the Islamic Bank, was the one directly responsible in
screening the qualifications of the various applicants for loan hence Kara-an
filed a Motion for Reconsideration or Reinvestigation. In said motion denied
that he was the officer-in-charge of the Islamic Bank’s Makati Branch
responsible for screening loan applications in 1986. His Motion for
Reconsideration having been denied, he filed this petition for review on
certiorari where he contends that the Ombudsman’s failure to conduct the
preliminary investigation is a breach of constitutional, statutory and
administrative mandates.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman’s failure to conduct the appropriate
investigation is a breach of constitutional, statutory and administrative
mandates.
HELD:
No, the Ombudsman does not have to conduct a preliminary
investigation upon receipt of a complaint. The Ombudsman has discretion to
determine whether a preliminary investigation is proper. Should the
investigating officer find the complaint devoid of merit, then he may
recommend its outright dismissal. Since the Ombudsman can dismiss a
complaint outright for lack of merit, it necessarily follows that he can also
dismiss the complaint for lack of merit after the respondent’s comment to the
complaint.
The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be
followed by the trial proper. The occasion is not for the full and exhaustive
60
display of the parties’ evidence but for the presentation of such evidence only
as may engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty of the offense. The Resolution of the
Ombudsman denying the Motion for Reconsideration is affirmed.
61
G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998

TERESITA G. FABIAN
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as ombudsman; HON. JESUS F.
GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR
V. AGUSTIN
FACTS:
Teresita G. Fabian, major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation, a company engaged in construction
business, had an affair with Nestor V. Agustin, the incumbent District Engineer
of Metro Manila. During their affair, Agustin gifted PROMAT with public
works contracts. When their relationship soured, Fabian filed an administrative
case in the Ombudsman against Agustin for violation of Section 19 of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 36 of the Civil Service Decree.
Consequently, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding
private respondents guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from
the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. Ombudsman Desierto
approved the aforesaid resolution with modifications, by changing the penalty
to suspension of one year without pay. Agustin moved for reconsideration but
Desierto inhibited himself when he discovered that the former's new counsel
had been his "classmate and close associate." The case was transferred to
Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who exonerated private respondents
from the administrative charges.
ISSUE:
Whether or not recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to appeal
for the decision in an administrative proceeding of the Ombudsman is proper.
HELD:
No, under the present Rule 45 appeals may be brought through a petition
for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts.
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now
required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review,
under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely
formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for
quasi-judicial agencies.
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and
effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize
an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
62
G.R. No. 131445 May 27, 2004

AMADO G. PEREZ (DECEASED) REPRESENTED BY HIS WIDOW
GUILLERMA T. PEREZ, et al.
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, MAYOR IGNACIO R. BUNYE, CARLOS
G. DOMINGUEZ, et al.
FACTS:
Petitioners, members of the Kilusang Bayan ng mga Magtitinda ng
Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (KBMBPM), instituted two
complaints at the Office of the Ombudsman against several respondents, one of
whom was then Mayor Ignacio R. Bunye, for violation of RA 3019 (also known
as the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”). Bunye and others allegedly
destroyed the doors of the KBMBPM office while serving on petitioners the
Take-Over Order of the KBMBPM management issued by then Agriculture
Secretary Carlos G. Dominguez. In disposing of said complaints, the Office of
the Ombudsman issued a resolution excluding respondent Bunye from the
criminal indictment. The petitioners assailed the exclusion in the Court of
Appeals through an original petition for certiorari and mandamus but the CA
dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction in accordance with Section 27 of RA 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989). The CA likewise denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioners now file this appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, contending
that the Ombudsman acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion when it dismissed the charges against Bunye. Respondents
counter that the preliminary investigation yielded insufficient evidence to
charge Bunye of the offense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the charges
against Bunye.
HELD:
A preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of
the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be
adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a
matter of law, to order an acquittal. Hence, if the Ombudsman, using
professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such
findings, unless clothed with grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the functions
of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it. In much the same way,
the courts will be swamped with cases if they will have to review the exercise
of discretion on the part of fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time the latter
decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.
63
G.R. No. 171188 June 19, 2009

vs.
JESSIE B. CASTILLO and FELICITO R. MEJIA
FACTS:
Cesar Sarino is one of the registered owners of a piece of land located
in front of SM Bacoor, Cavite. The property is being subleased to several
stallholders. Felicito R. Mejia, Municipal Building Official of Bacoor, sent to
the stallholders Notices of Violation4 of the National Building Code on the
grounds that the structures they were occupying were erected without building
permits and occupied by them without the necessary certificates of occupancy
having been first secured. Because of stallholders’ repeated failure to comply, a
task force from the Municipal Hall closed the stalls through the installation of
galvanized iron fences.
Lessees Aquino and Samoy filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a
complaint against Castillo and Mejia for violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). The Office of the Ombudsman, however, dismissed the
case, for lack of probable cause, ruling that the respondent local officials acted
in good faith in effecting the closure of the stalls. Another complaint was filed
by Sarino against Castillo and Mejia in the Office of the Ombudsman,
containing the same allegations as the previous complaint filed by Aquino and
Samoy. The Office of the Ombudsman now found probable cause hence the
Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed an Information
against respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 before
the Sandiganbayan which declared that probable cause exists and thus directed
the issuance of the corresponding warrants of arrest and hold departure orders.
Castillo and Mejia then filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause which was denied by the SB. However, upon motion for reconsideration,
the SB reversed its ruling and dismissed the case, holding that there is no
probable cause that warrants the filing of the present criminal case is a mere
rehash of the previously dismissed criminal case filed by complainant’s lessees
against respondents.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration,
but it was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in overturning the
Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause resulting in the dismissal of the
case against respondents.
HELD:
Yes, corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be compelled to issue
a warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing
so, the judge in turn should not override the public prosecutor’s determination
of probable cause to hold an accused for trial on the ground that the evidence
64
presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient. It

must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor
exercises a wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal case
should be filed in court, and that courts must respect the exercise of such
discretion when the information filed against the person charged is valid on its
face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to
the public prosecutor.
Absent a finding that an information is invalid on its face or that the
prosecutor committed manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, a judge’s
determination of probable cause is limited only to the judicial kind or for the
purpose of deciding whether the arrest warrants should be issued against the
accused. The SB’s challenged Resolutions are reversed and the case remanded
to the SB.
65
G.R. No. 70748 October 21, 1985

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
LAURENTE C. ILAGAN, et al.,
vs.
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Minister of National Defense, et al.
FACTS:
Attorneys Laurente Ilagan, Antonio Arellano, and Marcos Risonar were
arrested and detained in Camp Catitipan solely on the basis of a Mission Order
signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander of the Ministry of
National Defense. They filed a petition for Habeas Corpus, on the ground that
the arrests were illegal and violative of the Constitution, contending that arrests
may not be made solely on the basis of Mission Orders. On the other hand,
respondents asserted that the attorneys were arrested on the basis of a Decree
issued by the President, that the detained attorneys played active roles in
organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
National Democratic Front and that the Writ of habeas corpus is suspended as
to them by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A. The Court resolved to order the
temporary release of the detained attorneys on the recognizance of retired Chief
Justice Concepcion and retired Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes as their counsel.
Respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's
Order of Release reiterating that the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
has the effect of ousting the Court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, further
arguing that the detained attorneys "were arrested for specific acts of rebellion
and economic sabotage as well as for their leadership in the CPP." Respondents
also aver that an Information for Rebellion was already filed against the
attorneys in the Davao RTC, hence the petition for Habeas Corpus is already
moot and academic. Petitioners countered by contending that since the detained
attorneys were not given the benefit of preliminary investigation, they were
denied their constitutional right to due process and, consequently, the
Information for Rebellion filed against them is void. Respondents maintain that
a preliminary investigation was unnecessary since the detained attorneys were
lawfully arrested without a warrant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absence of a preliminary investigation renders the
Information filed in RTC Davao void.
HELD:
No, although the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure states that no
Information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed
without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, exceptions to
this rule are provided for in Section 7 of Rule 112. Consequently, the
Information filed by the City Fiscal before the Regional Trial Court of the City
of Davao fell within the exception.
Paragraphs (a) and (b) refer to cases when a suspect is caught
in flagrante delicto or immediately thereafter, while paragraph (c) refers to
66
escaping prisoners. As to whether the detained attorneys fall under either of the
first two instances enumerated is a question of fact, which will need the
presentation of evidence and is more properly within the province of the trial
Court. The question of absence of a proper preliminary investigation is also
better inquired into by the Court below. This Court has held that the trial Court
is called upon "not to dismiss the information but hold the case in abeyance and
conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. The
petition for Habeas Corpus is dismissed for having become moot and academic.
Petitioners are now detained by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City.
67
GR NOS 117952-53 FEBRUARY 14, 2001

vs.
DANILO DE GUZMAN
FACTS:
The two offenders were brought to the police station for questioning and
detention. The police officers were without warrants of arrest or search warrants at
the time of the arrests and seizure of evidence. As the operation was conducted
largely during nighttime, the police officers were unable to secure the necessary
warrants for fear of leaving the place of surveillance. The two were charged with
Unlawful Possession of Firearms and violation of Dangerous Drugs Act in the
RTC. On arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to both charges but the RTC convicted
him on the two offenses. De Guzman appealed from said decision, hence this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest done is valid even without conducting a
preliminary investigation beforehand.
HELD:
A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the police officers’ manner
of conducting the accused-appellant’s arrest was not tainted with any
constitutional infirmity. Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court provides
that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. In this jurisdiction, the mere
possession of a firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition is a
criminal offense under PD No. 1866.
This is a valid warrantless arrest because despite word from their fellow
officer, SPO1 Cuevas, that he saw accused-appellant sniff “shabu”, they resisted
the first impulse to storm the rented cottage which could have caused them to
seriously disregard constitutional safeguards. Instead, the police officers
waited for the needed opening to validly arrest the accused. To their minds, it
would be the arrival of drug buyers. As the situation would have it, the arrest
was necessitated by the presence of accused-appellant with a gun obviously
tucked in his pants. The decision of the RTC is therefore affirmed.
68
G.R. NO. 104879 MAY 6, 1994

ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, et al
FACTS:
Petitioners then filed a motion to quash a search warrant issued against
him for alleged violation of Presidential Decree 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunitions), contending that the same was acquired from a
court that does not have territorial jurisdiction over the offense. Quezon City
Judge Velasco, however, upheld the validity of the warrant, opining that the
same falls under the category of Writs and Processes, within the contemplation
of paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, and can be served not
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the
judicial region of the issuing court (National Capital Judicial Region). The CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court, hence petitioners filed this present
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant issued by Judge Fineza of Kalookan
RTC is valid.
HELD:
Yes, the search warrant is valid. It is incorrect to say that only
the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal case can issue the search
warrant, as would be the consequence of petitioners' position that only
the branch of the court with jurisdiction over the place to be searched can issue
a warrant to search the same. It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that
where a criminal case is pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the assigned
branch thereof, has primary jurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and where
no such criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawful
substitutes in the areas and for the offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19
shall have primary jurisdiction.
It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities
or the prosecutorial agencies to unerringly determine where they should apply
for a search warrant in view of the uncertainties and possibilities as to the
ultimate venue of a case under the foregoing rules. The petition is denied and
the decision of the CA is affirmed.
69
G.R. No. 124346 June 8, 2004

YOLLY TEODOSIO y BLANCAFLOR
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Chief Inspector Federico Laciste ordered a team from the PNP Regional
Office Intelligence Unit to conduct a buy-bust operation on Teodosio who was
suspected of peddling shabu hence, the team and their informer proceeded to
the Teodosio’s house in Pasay at about midnight. SPO1 Jeffrey Inciong and the
informer entered the open gate of appellant’s compound and walked to his
apartment while the rest of the team observed and waited outside. After the
exchange of the money earlier treated with ultraviolet powder and the shabu,
Inciong gave the signal to the other police officers and they arrested Teodosio.
In the RTC, Teodosio insisted that the warrantless arrest was not valid because
the police officers framed him up for possession of shabu after the search in his
apartment produced no illegal drugs and that it should be invalidated because
the police officers failed to obtain a warrant even though they had several days
for such purpose. The RTC and the CA found him guilty, hence this petition for
review of the Court of Appeal’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted was illegal.
HELD:
No, the warrantless arrest was legal. Frame-up, a usual defense of those
accused in drug-related cases, is viewed by the Court with disfavor since it is an
allegation that can be made with ease. For this claim to prosper, the defense
must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that
the arresting policemen performed their duties in a regular and proper manner.
On the argument that the officers had four days to secure a warrant but
did not get one, the evidence was that the four-day period was not enough to
establish probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. All that the police
authorities knew about appellant was the information gathered from the
informer and their surveillance of the area. Furthermore, no warrant was
needed considering that the mission was not a search but an entrapment. An
arrest made after an entrapment does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is
considered a valid warrantless arrest pursuant to Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the
Rules of Court. Any search resulting from a lawful warrantless arrest is valid
because the accused committed a crime in flagrante delicto, that is, the person
arrested (appellant in this case) committed a crime in the presence of the
arresting officers.
70
G.R Nos. 117145-50 & 117447 March 28, 2000

vs.
LEONIDA MERIS y PADILLA
FACTS:
Napoleon Ramos, Nadal, Conseja and Bombarda were told by Meris
that she knew someone who could help them secure employment in Hongkong
in exchange for P15,000.00 each as their placement fee. When they went to
Manila, they stayed in the house of Julie Micua who assured them of their
overseas job, upon their payment of money. Two months after their
downpayment, Ramos became suspicious and later realized that Meris and
Micua are fake recruiters so the six of them went to Manila and filed criminal
complaints for estafa and illegal recruitment against the accused, which led to
her immediate arrest. Meris contended that she was also a victim of Micua and,
more importantly, that the warrantless arrest conducted against her was illegal.
Both the RTC and the CA ruled in favor of petitioners, hence Meris filed this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest made was illegal.
HELD:
No, the warrantless arrest was legal.
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by arrest or
voluntary appearance in court. The record amply demonstrates that accused-
appellant voluntarily appeared in court at her arraignments, entered a plea of
"not guilty" to all the charges against her, and later actively participated in the
trial. Hence, granting arguendo that accused-appellant’s arrest was defective,
such is deemed cured upon her voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court. It should be stressed that the question of legality of an arrest affects only
the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. Consequently, if
objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is
not sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid judgment. The
technicality cannot render the subsequent proceedings void and deprive the
State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to the
culpability of the accused
71
G.R. No. 107741 October 18, 1996

FRANCISCO BERNARTE, et al.,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
FACTS:
A writ of preliminary injunction ordering the petitioners to desist and
refrain from occupying their portions of the disputed lands pending litigation
was issued by the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga in its capacity as a Special
Agrarian Court. The Court then deputized the Philippine National Police of
Lubao and Guagua, Pampanga to issue the said writ.
After some time, the petitioners were able to garner a writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board,
and by virtue of such, the petitioners resumed occupation and cultivation of the
disputed land.
Thereafter, several policemen were dispatched in the area to enforce the
earlier writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court. The
policemen then arrested the petitioners for their refusal to vacate the area and
subsequently charged them with resistance and/or disobedience to the lawful
order of persons in authority.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest of the petitioners that was effected without a
warrant was valid.
HELD:
Yes, the warrantless arrest was valid. At the time when the arrest was
effected, the RTC has not been declared as without jurisdiction over the
Agrarian case and therefore, the said writ of preliminary injunction it issued is
in order. Following this, since at the time the petitioners were arrested, the PNP
team was enforcing a lawful order of the same RTC and in seriously resisting
the same the appellants intimidated the PNP team committing the alleged crime
of Direct Assault upon an Agent of a Person in Authority, a warrant was not
necessary for their arrest.
Moreover, the petition for Habeas Corpus was not the proper remedy.
Once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question
his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His
remedy then is the quashal of the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly
issued. The reason for the issuance of the writ even becomes more unavailing
when the person detained files a bond for his temporary release.
72
G.R. No. L-31665 August 6, 1975

LEONARDO ALMEDA
vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ
FACTS:
Leonardo Almeda was charged, together with five others, with the crime
of qualified theft of a motor vehicle in the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig,
Rizal, presided by Judge Onofre Villauz. The amount of the bond recommended
for the provisional release of Almeda was P15,000, and this was approved by
the respondent judge with a direction that it be posted entirely in cash. At the
hearing, Almeda asked the trial court to allow him to post a surety bond in lieu
of the cash bond required of him but such request was denied.
Because of this, Almeda filed the present special civil action for
certiorari with preliminary injunction against respondent Judge Villaluz.
Almeda contends that the judge has no authority to require that the bond be
strictly in cash.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge may require that the bond to be posted entirely
in cash.
HELD:
No, the judge does not have the authority to require such. The condition
that the accused may have provisional liberty only upon his posting of a cash
bond is abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter.
The sole purpose of bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when
required by the court, and there should be no suggestion of penalty on the part
of the accused nor revenue on the part of the government. The allowance of a
cash bond in lieu of sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction only because our
rules expressly provide for it. Were this not the case, the posting of bail by
depositing cash with the court cannot be countenanced because, strictly
speaking, the very nature of bail presupposes the attendance of sureties to whom
the body of the prisoner can be delivered. And even where cash bail is allowed,
the option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the
accused. The trial court may not reject otherwise acceptable sureties and insist
that the accused obtain his provisional liberty only thru a cash bond.
The order of the judge denying the motion of the petitioner Almeda that
he be allowed to post a surety bond instead of a cash bond is set aside, without
prejudice to increasing the amount of the bail bond and/or the imposition of
such conditions as the respondent judge might consider desirable and proper for
the purpose of insuring the attendance of the petitioner at the trial.
73
A.M. No.MTJ-97-1139 October 16, 1997

ROBERTO ESPIRITU
vs.
JUDGE EDUARDO JOVELLANOS, respondent.
FACTS:
While Roberto Espiritu was with a group of people, Weny Dumlao
approached him and fired at him three times, which resulted to his wounds. On
the basis of this and his companion’s affidavits, SPO II Eduardo R. Yadao filed
a criminal complaint for frustrated murder in MCTC Pangasinan. After
conducting a preliminary examination, Judge Jovellanos ordered the arrest of
Dumlao and fixed the amount of bail for his provisional liberty at P20,000.00,
which was later reduced to P10,000.00, stating that Dumlao’s father had asked
for the reduction. Later, the Judge ordered “any peace officer under whose
custody [Dumlao] may be found” to release the latter in view of the fact that
Dumlao had posted bail for P10,000.00. Thereafter, the Judge also ordered
Dumlao to be released due to the fact that Dumlao had filed a case against
Roberto Espiritu and others as a result of the same incident, charging Espiritu
and his companions with a case for attempted murder and illegal possession of
firearm. Espiritu sought a review in the Department of Justice, but his petition
was denied for having been filed late hence he filed the complaint in this present
case, alleging irregularities committed by respondent judge in the granting of
bail and the conduct of the preliminary investigation of his complaint against
Dumlao.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the granting of bail while Dumlao was not in the custody
of the court and its reduction proper.
HELD:
Judge Jovellano correctly granted bail to Dumlao because he may be
considered to be under constructive custody at the time when he submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court when he personally asked respondent
judge to admit him to bail and reduce its amount. We held that the accused was
in the constructive custody of the law when he moved for admission to bail
through his lawyers (1) by filing the application for bail with the trial court, (2)
by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts, and (3) by
unequivocably recognizing the jurisdiction of said court.
74
G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas
but was convicted by the RTC for homicide and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to
12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He appealed his
conviction to the Court of Appeals and, while the appeal was pending, he filed
an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced
age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of
flight on his part. However, the CA denied his petition for bail, ruling that
Leviste failed to show that he suffers from an ailment of such gravity that his
continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his
life in danger and that the court made a preliminary evaluation of petitioner’s
case and made a prima facie determination that there was no reason substantial
enough to overturn the evidence of petitioner’s guilt.
Leviste now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his
application for bail via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. His theory is that,
where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more
than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section
5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
ISSUE:
In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by
the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the
discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should
automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
HELD:
No, Leviste’s stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of
procedural and substantive rules.
Any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the
perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the
appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not
the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in
resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of
discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first
scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may
consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice;
on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
75
On the other hand, if the appellant’s case falls within the second
scenario, the appellate court’s stringent discretion requires that the exercise
thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence
of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is
so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to
deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances
is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will
simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.
Given these, the petition is dismissed.
76
G.R. No. 141529 June 6, 2001

FRANCISCO YAP, JR., a.k.a. EDWIN YAP
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Yap was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under
the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings but the motion was denied
by the trial court. When the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of
Appeals, petitioner filed with the said court a Motion to Fix Bail, invoking the
last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Asked
to comment on this motion, the Solicitor General opined that petitioner may be
allowed to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be required to secure
“a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is
a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is
rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the
court and private complainant.” Yap however contended that the P5,500,000
proposed bail was violative of his right against excessive bail. The CA upheld
the recommendation of the Solicitor General and maintained the conditions and
the P5,500,000 bail. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, he filed
this present petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the conditions set forth unduly restrict his
constitutional liberty of abode and travel; and
(2) whether or not the P5.5M bail is violative of his right against
excessive bail.
HELD:
(1) No, the right to change abode and travel within the Philippines,
being invoked by petitioner, are not absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the
1987 Constitution provides exemptions to the rule, such as “…national security,
public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.” The order of the
Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of
Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which
is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the
Court requires his presence.
(2) Yes the amount is too much. Section 9 of Rule 114 provides the
factors to be considered when fixing the amount of bail. Although it cannot be
controverted that the Court of Appeals, despite the possibility of flight still
wielded its discretion to grant petitioner bail, the setting of bail in the amount
of P5,500,000.00 is unjustified as having no legal nor factual basis. Guided by
the penalty imposed by the lower court and the weight of the evidence against
petitioner, we believe that the amount of P200,000.00 is more reasonable.
77
G.R. No. 129670 February 1, 2000

MANOLET O. LAVIDES
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ROSALINA L. LUNA PISON,
Judge Presiding over Branch 107, RTC, Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Manolet Lavides was arrested without a warrant as a result of an
entrapment conducted by the police. It appears that the parents of complainant
Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16years old,
had been contacted by Lavides for an assignation that night at his room at the
Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first
time the police received reports of petitioner’s activities. He was charged with
violation of RA 7610. Lavides filed a Motion, contending that the warrantless
arrest made was illegal and that he should be allowed to post bail as a matter of
right. Later, nine more Informations for child abuse were filed against Lavides.
No bail was recommended but he still filed separate applications for bail in the
nine cases.
The trial court issued an order resolving the Motion of Lavides, ruling
that he is allowed to post bail, under the conditions that: a) The accused shall
not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases; b) In the
event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically
cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and
the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia; c) The hold-departure Order of this
Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be
made only after the arraignment to enable this Court to immediately acquire
jurisdiction over the accused. He thereafter filed a motion to quash the
Informations against him and to suspend his arraignment. The court however
denied said motion so he was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to
the charges against him. The court then ordered him released upon posting bail
bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the Order.
He filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, assailing the trial court’s
denial of his motion to quash and the conditions set forth in its order. The CA
declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid but declined to pass upon the validity of
condition (d) on the ground that the issue had become moot and academic since
Lavides has already been arraigned. He then filed this present petition in the SC,
contending that the CA erred in not declaring condition (d) as a void condition
and that his arraignment should be also considered void because it was held
pursuant to a invalid condition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the condition is void and the arraignment is invalid.
HELD:
The condition is void. Bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the
accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is
78
quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the
accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the
arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the
proceedings, such as arraignment. To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his
arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a
motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be
resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so
that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly
undermine the accused’s constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint
or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.
79
A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2018 August 3, 2007

Office of the Solicitor General
vs.
Judge Antonio de Castro
FACTS:
Gao Yuan, a national of the People’s Republic of China, and her
husband James Mahshi, a U.S. national, and their two young children were on
their way to a vacation in Canada when Philippine immigration officers
arrested Gao Yuan and prevented her from boarding her flight. Her arrest was
by virtue of an order issued by Bureau of Immigration (BI)
Commissioner Alipio Fernandez, Jr., which, in turn, was a response to a letter
from the Consul General of the PROC which alleged that Gao Yuan was a
fugitive from justice and charged with embezzlement by Chinese police and
requested her arrest and deportation to China. Gao Yuan was detained at the BI
Detention Center. Mahshi filed before the RTC the petition for writ of Habeas
Corpus with Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. On the same day, Executive Judge Eugenio enjoined the
Commissioner from initiating any deportation proceeding against Gao Yuan.
Thereafter, Judge de Castro promulgated an Order of Release directing
Commissioner Fernandez to immediately discharge the custody of Gao Yuan,
she having filed her cash bond in the amount of P250,000.00.
The RTC then took custody of Gao Yuan and clarified that it was only
a provisional release for the duration of the TRO subject to certain
conditions: the posting of an additional cash bond of P100,000.00; (2) her
movements were to be monitored by the court; (3) the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against her should she try to hide; and (4) the signing by Gao Yuan and
her husband of an undertaking that she will come to court at any given time she
is called. Respondent based the provisional release on humanitarian reasons,
considering that Gao Yuan was merely wanted as a witness in a case in the
PROC and she is a nursing mother to a 17-month old child. Commissioner
Fernandez then was compelled to file a Notice of Appeal upon Gao Yuan’s
release from the BI’s custody. The OSG contends that Gao Yuan’s release on
bail is illegal since such falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Immigration and not in the regular courts pursuant to Section 37(e) of C.A. No.
613.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has the authority to release an alien on bail
while the case is pending.
HELD:
No, the RTC has no authority because the power to grant bail in
deportation proceedings is vested in the BI. When an alien is detained by the
BID pursuant to an order of deportation, RTCs have no power to release said
alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings, because there is no law
authorizing it.
80
It should be noted too that Section 37 (9) (e) of the Philippine

Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, provides that “[a]ny alien under arrest in
a deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under such other
conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration.” . The
exercise by the Commissioner of such power is discretionary. So too, the
determination of the propriety of allowing the temporary release on bail of the
alien, subject to deportation under the Immigration Act, as well as the conditions
of such release falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner, not
the courts of justice. The reason for this is that the courts do not administer
immigration laws. The power of the Commissioner to grant bail in deportation
proceedings should be exercised when the alien is still under investigation, and
not after the order of deportation has been issued by the BI.
81
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ
FACTS:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British
Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of
Accused and Convicted Persons." Said agreement took effect on June 20, 1997.
Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the
offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of
the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces
seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the
common law of Hong Kong. Subsequently, warrants of arrest were issued
against him. The DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a
request for the provisional arrest of private respondent so the NBI filed with the
RTC of Manila an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
In a petition for extradition filed by Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region against Muñoz, the latter has already filed a petition for bail which was
denied by Judge Bernardo, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail
in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." In a
motion for reconsideration, his petition for bail was granted by respondent
Judge Olalia, thus he was allowed to post a P750,000.00 bail. Petitioner filed an
urgent motion to vacate the Order allowing Munoz to post bail but it was denied
by Judge Olalia, hence the instant petition where the petitioner alleged that the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the
Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to
bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings .For his part, private
respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights
extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process
resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an extraditee is allowed to post bail.
HELD:
Yes. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to
an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing
a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. Records show
that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained
incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his
admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years
without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended
period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty.
82
In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the

extradition court to grant him bail.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented
evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be
remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be
granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence.
83
G.R. No. 157977 February 27, 2006

EDUARDO TOLENTINO RODRIGUEZ and IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ
vs.
HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA–BRANCH 17, et al.
FACTS:
The case stemmed from the petition for extradition filed on March 12,
2001 by the US Government through the DOJ against the petitioners. Petitioners
applied for bail which the Regional Trial Court granted. The bail was set for one
million pesos for each. Petitioners then posted cash bonds. The US government
moved for reconsideration of the grant of bail, but the motion was denied by the
trial court. Unsatisfied, the US government filed a petition for certiorari with
the Supreme Court. Thereafter, the Court directed the trial court to resolve the
matter of bail so in compliance with the Court’s directive, the RTC, without
prior notice and hearing, cancelled the cash bond of the petitioners and ordered
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners filed a very urgent motion for the
reconsideration of the cancellation of their bail which was denied, hence this
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a prior notice and hearing is required before the
cancellation of bail in extradition cases cancelled.
HELD:
Yes. However, the issue has become moot and academic insofar as
petitioner Eduardo Rodriguez is concerned as he is now in the USA facing the
charges against him. But co-petitioner Imelda Gener Rodriguez is here and
stands on a different footing. We agree that her bail should be restored.
The policy is that a prospective extraditee is arrested and detained to
avoid his flight from justice. On the extraditee lies the burden of showing that
he will not flee once bail is granted. If after his arrest and if the trial court finds
that he is no flight risk, it grants him bail. The grant of the bail, presupposes that
the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to prove her right to be on bail,
that she is no flight risk, and is entitled to provisional release.
Under these premises, and with the trial court’s knowledge that in this
case, co-petitioner has offered to go on voluntary extradition; that she and her
husband had posted a cash bond of P1 million each; that her husband had
already gone on voluntary extradition and is presently in the USA undergoing
trial; that the passport of co-petitioner is already in the possession of the
authorities; that she never attempted to flee; that there is an existing hold-
departure order against her; and that she is now in her sixties, sickly and under
medical treatment, we believe that the benefits of continued temporary liberty
on bail should not be revoked and their grant of bail should not be cancelled,
without the co-petitioner being given notice and without her being heard why
her temporary liberty should not be discontinued.
84
G.R. No. 135012 September 7, 2004

ANITA ESTEBAN
vs.
HON. REYNALDO A. ALHAMBRA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, San Jose City, and GERARDO ESTEBAN
FACTS:
Gerardo Esteban is the accused in four criminal cases. In each case,
his sister-in-law, Anita Esteban, petitioner herein, posted cash bail
of P20,000.00 in each case for his temporary liberty. However, while out on
bail and during the pendency of the four criminal cases, Gerardo was once
again charged with another crime for which he was arrested and detained.
“Fed up with Gerardo’s actuation,” Esteban refused to post another bail and
instead, she filed with the trial court an application for the cancellation of
the cash bonds she posted in the four criminal cases and alleged that she is
“terminating the cash bail by surrendering the accused who is now in jail as
certified to by the City Jail Warden.” The Judge denied her application, as
well as the motion for reconsideration, hence she filed this petition for
certiorari. She contends that by surrendering the accused who is now in jail,
her application for cancellation of bail in the four criminal cases is allowed
under Section 19, now Section 22, Rule 114.
ISSUE:
Whether or not she may avail of the right to cancel bail as provided
under Sec. 22 of Rule 114.
HELD:
No, petitioner’s submission is misplaced. Section 22, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides: Sec. 22.
Cancellation of bail. – Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to
the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof
of his death. The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of
the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction. In
all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the
bail.
The first paragraph of Section 22 contemplates of a situation where,
among others, the surety or bondsman surrenders the accused to the court that
ordered the latter’s arrest. Thereafter, the court, upon application by the surety
or bondsman, cancels the bail bond. We hold that the cash bail cannot be
cancelled. Petitioner did not surrender the accused who was charged in the four
criminal cases to the trial court. The accused was arrested and detained because
he was charged in a subsequent criminal case. A cash bond may be posted either
by the accused or by any person in his behalf. However, as far as the State is
concerned, the money deposited is regarded as the money of the
accused. Consequently, it can be applied in payment of any fine and costs that
may be imposed by the court.
85
G.R. No. 131909 February 18, 1999

vs.
HON. ALFREDO CABRAL, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30, Camarines Sur
and RODERICK ODIAMAR
FACTS:
Roderick Odiamar was charged with rape upon the complaint of Cecille
Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporary liberty, accused-respondent filed a
motion praying that he be released on bail which Buenafe opposed by presenting
real, documentary and testimonial evidence. The lower court, however, granted
the motion for bail, stating that the evidence against Odiamar was not strong.
Believing that respondent was not entitled to bail as the evidence against him
was strong, the prosecution filed two motions to recall the bail, which was later
dismissed by the court. The dismissal prompted Buenafe to file a petition before
the Court of Appeals with prayer for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction. This petition, like its predecessors, was also denied. Still
convinced by the merit of its case, Buenafe filed the instant petition with the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC is correct in allowing Odiamar to post bail even
though he is charged with the crime of rape.
HELD:
Yes, Judge Cabral erred when he allowed respondent to post bail. In this
case, accused-respondent was being charged with rape qualified by the use of a
deadly weapon punishable by reclusion perpetua to death and, as such, bail is
discretionary and not a matter of right. The test is not whether the evidence
establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt but rather whether it shows
evident guilt or a great presumption of guilt. The court is ministerially bound
to decide which circumstances and factors are present which would show
evident guilt or presumption of guilt as defined above.
This Court has observed that the lower court’s order failed to mention
and include some significant factors and circumstances which, to the mind of
this Court are strong, clear and convincing. First, it excluded the testimony of
Dr. Belmonte about her psychiatric examination of the victim as well as her
findings that the latter manifested “psychotic signs and symptoms such as
unusual fear, sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts, psychomotor retardation, poverty
of thought content as well as depressive signs and symptom.” The lower court
cannot exercise judicial discretion as to what pieces of evidence should be
included in the summary. While conceding that some prosecution evidence
were enumerated, said enumeration was incomplete. An incomplete
enumeration or selective inclusion of pieces of evidence for the prosecution in
the order cannot be considered a summary, for a summary is necessarily a
reasonable recital of any evidence presented by the prosecution. A “summary”
that is incomplete is not a summary at all.
86
G.R. Nos. 99289-90 January 27, 1993

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
vs.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA,
Special Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA
FACTS:
An Information was filed against Defensor-Santiago with the
Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Consequently, order of arrest was issued in said case against her by
Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail for
the release of the accused fixed at P15,000.00. . On even date, Santiago filed an
"Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf
of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago," which prays that the bail bond she is posting
in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted and states that she be considered
as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of the SB for purposes of the
required trial and other proceedings,". So the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution authorizing petitioner to post a cash bond for her provisional liberty
without need for her physical appearance. She then filed with this Court a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeking to
enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila from
proceeding with her cases. One year later, the Court rendered a decision
dismissing the petition for certiorari and lifting and setting aside the temporary
restraining order previously issued. Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan issued a
hold departure order against her by reason of her announcement, which was
widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would be leaving
for the US to accept a fellowship offered by the John F. Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University. Santiago now filed this instant petition,
arguing that the Sandiganbayan never acquired jurisdiction over her person
considering that she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily
surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she
never personally appeared before said court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over her when she posted
her bail.
HELD:
Yes. The Court finds and so holds that petitioner is deemed to have
voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court upon the
filing of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail
Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein she expressly
sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the
jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other
proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the
amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be
87
considered as having placed herself under the custody" of said court. Petitioner
cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is
effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized
the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the
aforestated pleadings she filed therein.
Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that she did not
personally appear before respondent court to file her cash bond, thereby
rendering the same ineffectual. Suffice it to say that in this case, it was petitioner
herself, in her motion for the acceptance of the cash bond, who requested
respondent court to dispense with her personal appearance until she shall have
recovered sufficiently from her vehicular accident. It is distressing that
petitioner should now turn around and fault respondent court for taking a
compassionate stand on the matter and accommodating her own request for
acceptance of the cash bond posted in her absence.
88
G.R. No. 115132 August 9, 1995

IMELDA R. MARCOS
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and the PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Imelda Marcos, former First Lady and widow of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, is the defendant in several criminal cases for violations of
the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) pending before the
Sandiganbayan and in the regular courts. In two of these cases, petitioner was
found guilty and was sentenced imprisonment. After conviction, she filed a
"Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad" to seek diagnostic tests and treatment by
practitioners of oriental medicine in China allegedly because of "a serious and
life threatening medical condition" but the same was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. She then filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Permission to
Travel Abroad" to undergo diagnosis and treatment in China, which was now
supported by several medical reports that were prepared by her doctor Roberto
Anastacio. Mrs. Marcos contended that she needs to travel to US and Europe
for treatment of several heart diseases because the tests were not available
here. Garchitorena, the presiding justice, contacted Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil,
Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine Heart Center, to verify if the treatment for
Mrs. Marcos’ illness was not really available here but the same was contradicted
by Dr. Patacsil. The Office of the Special Prosecutor therefore opposed the
motions, contending that the absolute necessity to go abroad was not
demonstrated by Mrs. Marcos. On the other hand, the Presidential Commission
on Good Government filed a manifestation interposing no objection to
petitioner's motions "primarily on humanitarian grounds provided that the
accused comply with the terms and conditions for travel as may be imposed" by
respondent court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the granting of the motion to travel abroad is a matter of
right of the accused or a matter of discretion by the court.
HELD:
Yes, the granting of such motion is based on the discretion of the court.
The court ruled that petitioner failed to prove the necessity for a trip abroad. It
should be emphasized that considering the fact that she is facing charges before
the courts in several cases, in two of which she was convicted although the
decision is still pending reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute
right to leave the country and the burden was on her to prove that because of
danger to health if not to her life there was necessity to seek medical treatment
in foreign countries.
89
G.R. No. 138859-60 February 22, 2001

ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), respondent.
FACTS:
Acting on an Affidavit-Complaint filed by a certain Erlinda Fadri, the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an Order naming Benjamin Arao,
Frederick Winters, Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay and the city
jail warden of Pagadian City as respondents. The Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao recommended the prosecution of “the aforenamed respondents” for
violation of Article 269 of the RPC. Significantly, the name of Alvarez A.
Yusop, herein petitioner, was included as one of the persons to be prosecuted,
although he was not one of the original respondents mentioned in the Order of
the Ombudsman. An Order of Arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan but it
was learned later that he has already posted a bail bond before the Regional Trial
Court of Dipolog City. Yusop thereafter filed a “Motion To Remand Case To
The Ombudsman - Mindanao For Preliminary Investigation” but the same was
denied by the SB for his alleged failure to submit himself to the jurisdiction of
the anti-graft court and that his filing of bail bond constitutes a waiver of his
right to preliminary investigation. He then filed a Motion to Dismiss because he
was not accorded a preliminary investigation but it was still denied by the court
under the same reason, hence this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of a bail bond constitutes waiver of petitioner’s
right to preliminary investigation.
HELD:
No, the filing of a bail bond does not constitute a waiver of petitioner’s
right to preliminary investigation. Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[a]n application for or admission to bail shall not
bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the
warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the
absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that
he raises them before entering his plea. x x x.” We stress that the right to
preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or technical. To
deny it to petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his right to due
process. Hence, preliminary investigation with regard to him must be
conducted.
90
G.R. No. 70746-47 September 1, 1992

BIENVENIDO O. MARCOS
vs.
HON. FERNANDO S. RUIZ, RTC JUDGE, 7TH JUDICIAL REGION,
TAGBILARAN CITY, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
After conducting the appropriate preliminary investigation, Acting
Assistant City Fiscal Lorenzo A. Lopena of the City of Tagbilaran filedwith the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol two informations against Marcos for violating
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. In the arraignment, Marcos appeared but asked for a
resetting on the ground that his lawyer had just withdrawn and he had to look for
another lawyer. The court granted his request and the arraignment was reset. It turned
out, however, that petitioner settled his obligation with Oculam, the
complainant in the criminal case, who executed a subscribed Affidavit of
Desistance in favor of petitioner.
When the cases were called, neither the petitioner nor his counsel
appeared so arraignment was rescheduled. At the next arraignment, he was
arraigned ex parte where he automatically entered a plea of not guilty. The
prosecution then presented its evidence ex-parte and rested its case. After this,
the court then rendered a decision against the petitioner, asserting that his
absence means that he will no longer present evidence. Thereafter, the trial court
received an urgent motion for the resetting of the hearing filed by the petitioner
which explained the non-appearance but the same does not contain a notice of
hearing to the Prosecuting Fiscal so it was denied. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was denied his rights during the course of the
trial.
HELD:
No, petitioner was not denied of his rights during the trial. Considering
that he had been arraigned, petitioner was not required to appear at all the trials.
Section 1 (c) of Rule 115 states that while it may be true that he has the right to
be present at every stage of the proceedings, i.e. from the arraignment to the
promulgation of judgment, he can also validly waive his presence to be present
after the arraignment.
On the other hand, petitioner was denied his right to be heard when the
respondent Judge capriciously and arbitrarily considered that the case was
already submitted for decision after the prosecution rested its case. The Judge
blatantly disregarded Section 1(c) of Rule 115 when he considered the accused’s
non-appearance during the first day of trial as a waiver of his right for the
succeeding trial dates, when such should be construed to mean that he only
waived his right to be present during that day of trial.
91
G.R. No. 127772 March 22, 2001

ROBERTO P.ALMARIO
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORP.
FACTS:
Petitioner is one of the accused in a case for estafa thru falsification of
public document and another for estafa, with respondent RCBC as the offended
party in both cases. The When the case was already scheduled for trial, the
hearings were cancelled because the Presiding Judge of RTC Makati was
elevated to the Supreme Court and no trial judge was immediately
appointed/detailed thereto. The hearing set for June 21, 1995, was postponed
for lack of proof of notice to all the accused and their counsel. The hearing on
July 17, 1995, upon request of private prosecutor, and without objection on the
part of petitioner’s counsel, postponed to July 24, 1995. However, for lack of
proof of service of notice upon petitioner’s three co-accused, the hearing set for
July 24, 1995, was likewise cancelled and the cases were reset for trial on
September 8 and 25, 1995. On September 8, 1995, private complainant failed
to appear despite due notice hence, upon motion of petitioner’s counsel,
respondent court moved that the case against Almario be dismissed for failure
to prosecute and considering that accused is entitled to a speedy trial. However,
upon motion of the private prosecutor the RTC set aside the previous Order that
dismissed Almario’s case. He filed for a motion for reconsideration but the same
was denied. In the CA, his appeal was likewise dismissed for lack of merit,
hence this appeal by certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s rights to speedy trial and against double
jeopardy were violated.
HELD:
The right of the accused to speedy trial and against double jeopardy had
not been violated. It has been held that the right to speedy trial may only be
availed of when the trial was burdened by unreasonable delays but the fact that
there was no unreasonable delay of the proceedings is apparent from the
chronology of the hearings with the reasons for their postponements or transfers.
Petitioner could not refute the appellate court's findings that petitioner's right to
speedy trial had not been violated. As both the trial and appellate courts have
taken pains to demonstrate, there was no unreasonable, vexatious and
oppressive delay in the trial. Hence, there was no violation of petitioner's right
to speedy trial as there were no unjustified postponements which had prolonged
the trial for unreasonable lengths of time.
92
G.R. NOS. 115236-37 JANUARY 16, 2003

vs.
BRYAN FERDINAND DY y LA MADRID and GIOVAN
BERNARDINO y GARCIA
FACTS:
Bryan Ferdinand Dy and Giovan Bernardino filed separate motions for
reconsideration of the decision of the Supreme Court which affirmed the
judgement of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 5, finding them guilty of rape
and acts of lasciviousness. In his Motion, Giovani Bernardino alleges that the
right to be arraigned is not among the rights that are susceptible to waiver or
estopped, thus the lack of arraignment cannot be deemed cured by their
participation in the trial. He further contends that because of the absence of
arraignment, the courts have not acquired jurisdiction over them, hence the
decision rendered against them was not valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to be arraigned may be waived or stopped.
HELD:
Yes. The allegation that there was no valid arraignment is misleading
and betrays a lack of comprehension regarding the procedural requirements of
arraignment in the context of the constitutional right of an accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
In one of the Court’s decisions, it was held that the right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation may not be waived. Indeed, the
defense may waive their right to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of
“not guilty” in their behalf. However, it becomes altogether a different matter if
the accused themselves refuse to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them. The defense cannot hold hostage the court by their
refusal to the reading of the complaint or information.
93
G.R. No. L-80845 March 14, 1994

vs.
HON. ERNESTO M. MENDOZA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 10, and JUAN MAGALOP y SALVACION
FACTS:
The storeroom of the Bukidnon National School of Home Industries
(BNSHI) in Maramag, Bukidnon, was ransacked. The value of the missing
articles was estimated at P15,298.15. The responsibility for the robbery with
force upon things was laid on accused Juan Magalop y Salvacion, Petronilo
Fernandez y Cano and Ricarte Dahilan alias Ricky. At the arraignment,
Magalop pleaded "guilty" while Fernandez pleaded "not guilty." The
arraignment of Dahilan was deferred as he was "not mentally well." Instead of
pronouncing judgment on Magalop who already pleaded guilty, the RTC
conducted the trial, which led the prosecution to present its witnesses and
evidence. The defense having opted to waive its right to present evidence, the
case was submitted for decision. In the decision, respondent Judge acquitted
accused Fernandez as well as Magalop who earlier pleaded guilty to the charge.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now
before us contending that the decision denying reconsideration are "purely
capricious and arbitrary, made for no proper reason at all and rendered without
legal authority whatsoever, thereby amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or
grave abuse of discretion, and curtailed the power of the state to punish
criminals."
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mangalop’s plea of guilt immediately convicts him of
the crime charged.
HELD:
Yes, the essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt
freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge and understanding of the precise
nature of the crime charged in the information as well as the consequences of
his plea. It is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense
charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge and leaves
the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the
circumstances. Thus, under the 1985 New Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, when the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense, the court may
receive evidence from the parties to determine the penalty to be imposed.
This rule is at most directory. It will certainly be a clear abuse of
discretion on the part of the judge to persist in holding the accused bound to his
admission of guilt and sentencing him accordingly when the totality of the
evidence points to his acquittal. There is no rule which provides that simply
because the accused pleaded guilty to the charge that his conviction
automatically follows. Additional evidence independent of the plea may be
considered to convince the judge that it was intelligently made.
94
G.R. Nos. L-30527-28 March 29, 1974

vs.
PANFILO PADERNAL
FACTS:
Panfilo Padernal was charged by the Prosecutor with the crime of
homicide. During the arraignment, Padernal pleaded guilty. The trial ensued for
the determination of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense but,
after the testimony of Padernal, it was proved that he may invoke complete self-
defense hence the trial judge ordered that a plea of not guilty be entered by the
accused, even though the arraignment has long been done. The trial on the
merits ensued and a decision acquitting accused Panfilo Padernal of the crime
of homicide with which he was charged “on the ground of reasonable doubt”
was reached by the court. On the other hand, Fiscal Alvero verbally moved for
a reconsideration alleging that the accused has entered a plea of guilty which is
“sufficient to sustain conviction of the offense charged in the Information
without the introduction of further evidence, the accused himself has supplied
the necessary proof of his guilt and which closes the right of the accused to
defend himself and leaves the Court with no alternative but to impose the
penalty prescribed by law.” The oral motion for reconsideration was denied, as
well as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration, hence Fiscal Alvera filed
this appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant may still be acquitted even though he already
plead guilty during the arraignment.
HELD:
Yes, in People v. Balisacan, L-26376, August 31, 1966, this Court ruled
that where the accused pleads guilty and proceeds, in a hearing to prove
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense, to state facts constituting
full and complete self-defense, the trial judge should declare his plea of guilty
thereby withdrawn, order that a plea of not guilty be entered and proceed to trial
on the merits. For failure, in the Balisacan case, to follow this procedure, We
ruled therein that there was deprivation of day in court against the prosecution.
An acquittal on the merits thus made without the requisite trial providing
sufficient opportunity to the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt
of the accused, was held improper.
95
G.R. Nos. 163972-77 March 28, 2008

JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Daan, together with Kuizon, were charged with three counts of
malversation of public fund before the Sandiganbayan. In addition to the charge
for malversation, the accused were also indicted for three counts of falsification
of public document by a public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of
“not guilty” and substitute the same with a plea of “guilty”, provided, the
mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender
will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not
acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of “not guilty”
to the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee
with a plea of “guilty”, but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public
document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases,
the accused offered to substitute their plea of “not guilty” thereto with a plea of
“guilty”, but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render
accounts.
The prosecution found as acceptable the plea bargaining proposals of
the accused. The Sandiganbayan, however, denied petitioner’s Motion to Plea
Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on the ground
that petitioner and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would
redound to the benefit of the public.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plea bargaining offer of the petitioner should be
granted.
HELD:
Yes, the plea bargaining offer should be granted.
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites
upon which plea bargaining may be made, i.e., that it should be with the consent
of the offended party and the prosecutor, and that the plea of guilt should be to
a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules
however use word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise
of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such
plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter
offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of
bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting
petitioner's plea offer. However, subsequent events and higher interests of
justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The
present case calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction -
96
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete

justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of
power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are
incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent
and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously
expressed by different courts and of its power of control and supervision over
the proceedings of lower courts, in order to afford equal justice to petitioner.
97
G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012

EMILIO A. GONZALES III
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 196232 September 4, 2012
WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT
vs.
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
FACTS:
Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged
Major General Carlos F. Garcia and others with Plunder and Money Laundering
before the Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan denied Major
General Garcia's urgent petition for bail holding that strong prosecution
evidence militated against the grant of bail. However, the government,
represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit and her
prosecutorial staff sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining
Agreement entered into with the accused which was agreed upon by the SB.
Outraged by this deal, the House of Representatives' Committee on Justice
conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public
hearings, the Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution
No. 3, recommending to the President the dismissal of Barreras-Sulit from the
service and the filing of appropriate charges against her Deputies and for having
committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust. The Office of the President initiated a
case against Barreras-Sulit but she asserts that the propriety of taking and
continuing to take administrative disciplinary proceeding against her must
depend on the final disposition by the Sandiganbayan of the PLEBARA,
explaining that if the Sandiganbayan would uphold the PLEBARA, there would
no longer be any cause of complaint against her; if not, then the situation
becomes ripe for the determination of her failings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the President may validly conduct the
administrative disciplinary proceedings while the disposition on the PLEBARA
is still pending.
HELS:
Yes, the Office of the President may initiate the proceedings. The
incidents that have taken place subsequent to the submission in court of the
PLEBARA shows that the PLEBARA has been practically approved, and that
the only thing which remains to be done by the Sandiganbayan is to promulgate
a judgment imposing the proper sentence on the accused Major General Garcia
based on his new pleas to lesser offenses.
The approval or disapproval of the PLEBARA by the Sandiganbayan is
of no consequence to an administrative finding of liability against petitioner
Barreras-Sulit. While the court's determination of the propriety of a plea bargain
98
is on the basis of the existing prosecution evidence on record, the disciplinary

authority's determination of the prosecutor's administrative liability is based on
whether the plea bargain is consistent with the conscientious consideration of
the government's best interest and the diligent and efficient performance by the
prosecution of its public duty to prosecute crimes against the State.
Consequently, the disciplining authority's finding of ineptitude, neglect or
willfulness on the part of the prosecution, more particularly petitioner Special
Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, in failing to pursue or build a strong case for the
government or, in this case, entering into an agreement which the government
finds "grossly disadvantageous," could result in administrative liability,
notwithstanding court approval of the plea bargaining agreement entered into.
99
G.R. No. 173588 April 22, 2009

ARIEL M. LOS BAÑOS, on behalf of P/Supt. Victor Arevalo, SPO2 Marcial
Olympia, SPO1 Rocky Mercene and PO1 Raul Adlawan, and in his personal
capacity
vs.
JOEL R. PEDRO
FACTS:
The Boac election officer filed a criminal complaint against Pedro for
violating the election gun ban, i.e., for carrying a firearm outside of his
residence or place of business without any authority from the Comelec. Pedro
filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the RTC granted but the
same did not materialize because Pedro filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash,
arguing that the Information “contains averments which, if true, would
constitute a legal excuse or justification” and attached a Comelec Certification
which shows that he was “exempted” from the gun ban. By virtue of this, the
RTC quashed the Information and ordered the police and the prosecutors to
return the seized articles to Pedro. Private prosecutor Ariel Los Baños,
representing the checkpoint team, moved to reopen the case, as Pedro’s
Comelec Certification was a falsification, and the prosecution was deprived of
due process when the judge quashed the information without a hearing. Pedro
moved for the reconsideration of the RTC’s order primarily based on Section 8
of Rule 117, arguing that the dismissal had become permanent. The trial court,
for its part, rejected the position that Section 8, Rule 117 applies, and explained
that this provision refers to situations where both the prosecution and the
accused mutually consented to the dismissal of the case, or where the
prosecution or the offended party failed to object to the dismissal of the case,
and not to a situation where the information was quashed upon motion of the
accused and over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedro’s
arraignment date. Pedro filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTC’s mandated reopening
which initially denied the petition but granted the same after a Motion for
Reconsideration. Prosecutor Los Banos now filed this petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion to quash is considered a provisional
dismissal, which became permanent one year from the prosecutor’s receipt of
the order.
HELD:
No, an examination of the whole Rule 117 tells us that a dismissal based
on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal are far different from one
another as concepts, in their features, and legal consequences. While the
provision on provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117 (entitled Motion to
Quash), it does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional
dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies.
100
The RTC grossly erred in its initial ruling that a quashal of the
Information was in order. Pedro, on the other hand, also misappreciated the true
nature, function, and utility of a motion to quash. As a consequence, a valid
Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned
and stand trial.
101
G.R. No. 164170 April 16, 2009

MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA y ABDUL, ISAGANI ABDUL y SIACOR, and
SARAH LANGCO y ANGLI
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, P/C INSP. MICHAEL ANGELO BERNARDO MARTIN,
P/INSP. ALLANJING ESTRADA MEDINA, PO3 ARNOLD RAMOS ASIS,
PO2 PEDRO SANTOS GUTIERREZ, PO2 IGNACIO DE PAZ, and PO2
ANTONIO SEBASTIAN BERIDA, JR.
FACTS:
Private respondents were charged with the crime of kidnapping for
ransom. However, the accused moved for the quashal of the Information on the
ground that the officer who filed the Information has no authority do so because
it should be the Office of the Ombudsman who filed the same. The trial court
denied the motion to quash on the ground that under the ruling in People v.
Mapalao, an accused who is at large is not entitled to bail or other relief. The
trial court also held that the jurisdiction and power of the Ombudsman under
Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 (RA 6770), as well as Administrative
Order No. 8 of the Office of the Ombudsman, are not exclusive but shared or
concurrent with the regular prosecutors. Thus, the authority of the Department
of Justice to investigate, file the information and prosecute the case could no
longer be questioned. In a Resolution, then Secretary of Justice Hernando B.
Perez reversed the ruling of State Prosecutor Velasco and ordered the latter to
cause the withdrawal or dismissal of the Information for kidnapping for ransom.
The Secretary of Justice ruled that the incident complained of was a bungled
buy-bust operation, not kidnapping for ransom. Petitioners then filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, which was denied by then Secretary of Justice Simeon A.
Datumanong. Petitioners thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals but the same was also denied, hence this petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioners must be under the custody of the law prior
to the filing of a motion to quash; and
(2) Whether or not a motion to quash on the ground that it is the
Ombudsman who has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
(1) No, there is nothing in the Rules governing a motion to quash which
requires that the accused should be under the custody of the law prior to the
filing of a motion to quash on the ground that the officer filing the information
had no authority to do so. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication
of reliefs other than an application for bail. However, while the accused are not
yet under the custody of the law, any question on the jurisdiction over the person
of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading
seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when the accused invokes the
special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
102
(2) No, the accused’s motion to quash, on the ground of lack of authority
of the filing officer, would have never prospered because as discussed earlier,
the Ombudsman’s power to investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized
agencies of the government.
103
G.R. No. 152644 February 10, 2006

JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ
vs.
FACTS:
Petitioners are officers of Marcopper Mining Corp., engaged in mining
in the province of Marinduque.
The Department of Justiced charged petitioners with violation of the
Water Code of the Philippines, the National Pollution Control Decree,
Philippine Mining Act and RPC for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property by reason of the discharge millions of tons of tailings into the rivers
due to their mining operation. Petitioners moved to quash the information on
grounds that these were “duplicitous” as DOJ charged more than one offense
for a single act and that the Informations contain allegations which constitute
legal excuse or justification.
The MTC ruled that as far as the 3 laws are concerned, only the
Information for violation of Philippine Mining Act should be maintained. Thus,
the Informations for violation of Anti-Pollution Law and the Water Code should
be dismissed because the elements constituting the aforesaid violations are
absorbed by the same elements which constitute violation of the Philippine
Mining Act. The RTC reversed the said decision and ruled that there can be no
absorption by one offense of the three other offenses, as the acts penalized by
these laws are separate and distinct from each other. This was affirmed by the
CA.
ISSUE:
Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be
quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property should stand.
HELD:
No, duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information
charges more than one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure clearly states. Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in single information is a
ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such
Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. Here,
however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each
Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke
duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone,
the petition deserves outright denial.
104
G.R. Nos. 107964-66 February 1, 1999

THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES represented by the PANEL OF
PROSECUTORS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
vs.
HON. DAVID G. NITAFAN, Presiding Judge, Branch 52, Regional Trial Court
of Manila, and IMELDA R. MARCOS
FACTS:
Three criminal informations for violation of Section 4 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 were filed against Imelda Marcos in the RTC of Pasig. The
petitioners asked for the consolidation of the three informations, hence the
remaining one was re-raffled and re-assigned to Branch 52-Manila presided by
public respondent Judge Nitafan. Thereafter, without any action or filing any
motion to quash the informations coming from Marcos, respondent judge issued
an order requiring petitioners to show cause why the case should not be
dismissed on the ground that it violates private respondent’s right against ex
post facto law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a judge can motu proprio initiate the dismissal and
subsequently dismissed a criminal information or complaint without any motion
to that effect being filed by the accused based on the alleged violation of the
latter’s right against ex post facto law and double jeopardy.
HELD:
No, it is clear from Section 1 that the right to file a motion to quash
belongs only to the accused. There is nothing in the rules which authorizes the
court or judge to motu proprio initiate a motion to quash if no such motion was
filed by the accused. A motion contemplates an initial action originating from
the accused. It is the latter who is in the best position to know on what ground/s
he will based his objection to the information. Otherwise, if the judge initiates
the motion to quash, then he is not only pre-judging the case of the prosecution
but also takes side with the accused. This would violate the right to a hearing
before an independent and impartial tribunal. Such independence and
impartiality cannot be expected from a magistrate, such as herein respondent
judge, who in his show cause orders, orders dismissing the charges and order
denying the motions for reconsideration stated and even expounded in a lengthy
disquisition with citation of authorities, the grounds and justifications to support
his action. Certainly, in compliance with the orders, the prosecution has no
choice but to present arguments contradicting that of respondent
judge. Obviously, however, it cannot be expected from respondent judge to
overturn the reasons he relied upon in his different orders without contradicting
himself. To allow a judge to initiate such motion even under the guise of a show
cause order would result in a situation where a magistrate who is supposed to
be neutral, in effect, acts as counsel for the accused and judge as well. A
combination of these two personalities in one person is violative of due process
which is a fundamental right not only of the accused but also of the prosecution.
105
G.R. No. 164682 September 14, 2011

JOEL GALZOTE
vs.
JONATHAN BRIONES and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
The prosecution filed an Information for robbery in an uninhabited place
against Galzote before the Metropolitan Trial Court. Galzote thereafter moved
to quash the said information by alleging that it was patently irregular and fatally
flawed in form and in substance. He contends that the information did not allege
conspiracy and questions why his alleged co-conspirator had been convicted of
the lesser offense of malicious mischief in another case. The MeTC denied the
petitioner’s motion to quash, as well as his motion for reconsideration. Galzote
elevated the case to the RTC via a petition for certiorari. The petition, however,
was denied by the court. Thereafter, he filed another petition for certiorari
before the CA but the case was likewise dismissed. He now filed this present
petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner’s motion to quash the information against
him was proper; and
(2) Whether or not certiorari is the right mode of appeal regarding the
denial of petitioner’s motion to quash.
HELD:
(1) No. The ground used by the petitioner in his motion to quash
(i.e., that his co-conspirator had been convicted of an offense lesser than the
crime of robbery) is not among the exclusive grounds enumerated under
Section 3, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
that warrant the quashal of a criminal information. A facial examination of the
criminal information against the petitioner shows it to be valid and regular on
its face considering its conformity with the guidelines under Section 6, Rule 110
of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Under the circumstances, the criminal information is sufficient in
form and substance for it states: (a) the name of the petitioner as the
accused; (b) the offense of robbery as the designated offense committed; (c) the
manner on how the offense of robbery was committed and the petitioner’s
participation were alleged with particularity; and (d) the date and the place of
the commission of the robbery were also stated therein. Thus, as the RTC
correctly ruled, the petitioner can be properly tried under the allegations of the
information.
(2) No, we find no compelling reason to justify a resort to a petition
for certiorari against the orders of the MeTC as the petitioner
failed to show that the factual circumstances of his case fall under any of
the above exceptional circumstances. The MeTC in fact did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion as its denial of the motion to quash was consistent
with the existing rules and applicable jurisprudence.
106
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE
FACTS:
Jason Ivler was charged with the separate offenses of (1) reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and (2) reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and damage to property, before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City. During the arraignment, Ivler pleaded guilty on the charge
of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and was meted out
the penalty of public censure. Thereafter, Ivler, invoking his right against double
jeopardy, moved to quash the charge of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property filed against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy
was proper.
HELD:
Yes, the motion to quash is proper. The accused’s negative
constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the
same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid information.
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses, hence the motion
to quash is valid.
107
G.R. No. 143591 May 5, 2010

TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., et al.
vs.
MAGDALENO M. PEÑA and HON. MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge
Designate of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bago City
FACTS:
The Government Prosecutor filed four informations charging Borlongan
and others of four counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents.
Petitioners then moved to quash the four (4) Informatiosn filed on the ground,
among others, that "they were denied due process because of the non-
observance of the proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in
the Rules of Court. Specifically, they claimed that they were not afforded the
right to submit their counter-affidavit. They then argued that since no such
counter-affidavit and supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners,
the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the
respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention of the Rules.
Petitioners further prayed that the information be quashed for lack of probable
cause. Lastly, petitioners posited that the criminal case should have been
suspended on the ground that the issue being threshed out in the civil case is a
prejudicial question." The court denied the omnibus motion primarily on the
ground that preliminary investigation was not available in the instant case —
which fell within the jurisdiction of the MTCC so the petitioners resorted to the
filing of a special civil action for Certiorari in the CA but the same was also
dismissed, hence this present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion to quash filed by petitioners was proper.
HELD:
Yes, the motion to quash should have been granted by the trial court. It
is evident that in the affidavit-complaint, specifically in paragraph 1, respondent
merely introduced and identified “the board of the bank, namely, Teodoro
Borlongan, Jr., Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin De Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric
Lee, Ben Lim, Jr., Corazon Bejasa and Arturo Manuel, Sr.” However, in the
accusatory portion of the complaint which is paragraph number 9, Mr. Ben Lim,
Jr. was not included among those charged with the crime of use of falsified
documents under Article 172, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The
omission indicates that respondent did not intend to criminally implicate Mr.
Ben Lim, Jr., even as he was acknowledged to be a member of the board.
The City Prosecutor should have cautiously reviewed the complaint to
determine whether there were inconsistencies which ought to have been brought
to the attention of the respondent or, on his own, considered for due
evaluation. It is a big mistake to bring a man to trial for a crime he did not
commit.
108
G.R. No. 153176 March 29, 2004

vs.
HON. ZEIDA AURORA B. GARFIN, In her capacity as Presiding Judge of
RTC, Branch 19, of the City of Naga and SERAFIN SABALLEGUE
FACTS:
Saballegue was charged with violation of Section 22(a) in relation to
Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of Republic Act No. 8282, otherwise known as the
“Social Security Act,” in an information. Said information contains a
certification signed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino. Saballegue
pleaded not guilty so the case was set for pre-trial but, three days later, filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the information was filed without the prior
written authority or approval of the city prosecutor as required under Section 4,
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss
or to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The State Prosecutor thereafter
filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that Saballegue has waived his right
to file a motion to quash when he pleaded to the information but said motion
was denied by the RTC. Hence this petition for certiorari and mandamus under
Rule 65by the People through Regional State Prosecutor Santiago Turingan and
State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused waived his right to quash the information
when he pleaded to the information.
HELD:
No. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for lack of
authority of the filing officer as among the grounds for a motion to quash and
the waiver of these grounds. Similar to the 1985 Rules, the Revised Rules
enumerate the exceptions from the waiver, namely: (a) that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense; (b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged; (c) that the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished; and (d) that the accused has been previously convicted or
acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent. Apparently, the want of
jurisdiction under the Rules refers to jurisdiction over the offense and the
person, and not over the case.
In the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating
State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases or a prior written
approval of the information by the provincial or city prosecutor, the information
was filed by an officer without authority to file the same. As this infirmity in
the information constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, the
respondent judge did not err in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
109
G.R. No. 139615 May 28, 2004

vs.
AMADEO TIRA and CONNIE TIRA
FACTS:
After surveillance and confirmation that drug activities were being
conducted in the residence of the respondents, the police officials applied for a
search warrant. Armed with the warrant, the policemen went to the residence of
Tira and found drug paraphernalia. After Connie’s arrest, she filed a motion to
quash search warrant, alleging that the police officers who applied for the said
warrant did not have any personal knowledge of the reported illegal activities.
The motion to quash, however, was denied by the RTC hence they were charged
for violation of possession of marijuana and shabu, two offenses, in only one
Information. They were both found guilty, hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the dismissal of the motion to quash the warrant was
proper; and
(2) Whether or not the information that charged them with two offenses
valid.
HELD:
(1) Yes, the dismissal of the motion was proper. As can be gleaned from
the facts, Judge Gayapa issued the search warrant after conducting searching
questions, and in consideration of the affidavit of witness Enrique Milad.
(2) The information is not valid because it charges two separate
crimes: (a) possession of regulated drugs under Section 16, in relation to
Section 20, of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, for their possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug; and, (b) violation of Section
8, in relation to Section 20 of the law, for their possession of marijuana, a
prohibited drug. However, although only one Information was filed against the
appellants, nevertheless, they could be tried and convicted for the crimes alleged
therein and proved by the prosecution.
Strictly speaking, the Information is defective because it charges two
crimes and the appellants should have filed a motion to quash the Information
under Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court before their
arraignment. They failed to do so. Hence, under Rule 120, Section 3 of the said
rule, the appellants may be convicted of the crimes charged. The said Rule
provides:
SEC. 3. Judgment for two or more offenses. - When two or more
offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails
to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as
are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense,
setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense.
They are therefore found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the two offenses.
110
G.R. No. 130026 May 31, 2000

vs.
ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO
FACTS:
Two informations were filed against respondent, Magat, charging him
with the crime of incestuous perpetrated against his daughter, Ann Fideli M.
Magat At the arraignment, Magat pleaded guilty but bargained for a lesser
penalty for each case. Complainant's mother, Ofelia Limpoco Magat, and the
public prosecutor agreed with the plea bargain, so he was sentenced to ten years
imprisonment for each case. After three months, however, the cases were
revived at the instance of Magat’s daughter and wife on the ground that the
penalty imposed was "too light." As a consequence, Magat was re-arraigned on
both Informations where he entered a plea of not guilty. Three months
thereafter, when the trial started, Magat entered anew a plea of guilty therefore,
he was sentenced to death for each case. Because of the sentence of death, the
SC had this automatic review of the case wherein Magat contends that the re-
arraignment violated his right against double jeopardy because the case has
already been decided and he has already been sentenced to ten years
imprisonment for each case by the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the re-arraignment violates his right against double
jeopardy.
HELD:
No. The order of the trial court convicting the accused-appellant on his
own plea of guilt is void ab initio on the ground that accused-appellant's plea is
not the plea bargaining contemplated and allowed by law and the rules of
procedure. The only instance where a plea bargaining is allowed under the Rules
is when an accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense.
It must be emphasized that accused-appellant did not plead to a lesser
offense but pleaded guilty to the rape charges and only bargained for a lesser
penalty. In short, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General, he did not plea
bargain but made conditions on the penalty to be imposed. This is erroneous
because by pleading guilty to the offense charged, accused-appellant should be
sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded. In effect, the judgment rendered
by the trial court which was based on a void plea bargaining is also void ab
initio and cannot be considered to have attained finality for the simple reason
that avoid judgment has no legality from its inception. Thus, since the judgment
of conviction rendered against accused-appellant is void, double jeopardy will
not lie.
111
G.R. No. 108028 July 30, 1996

vs.
CRISTINA M. HERNANDEZ
FACTS:
Respondent, Hernandez, purporting herself as the general manager of
Philippine-Thai, a recruitment and placement company, was charged with the
crime of illegal recruitment committed in large scale. The trial court convicted
respondent as charged.
On appeal, respondent claimed that the prosecution failed to prove one
of the essential elements of the offense charged, that she is not licensed or does
not have authority to engage in the business of placement and recruitment. The
prosecution, however, avers that the said element was already admitted by the
respondent during the pre-trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4 of Rule 118 -- requiring an agreement or
admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference to be reduced in
writing and signed by the accused and his counsel before the same may be
used in evidence against the accused -- equally applies to a stipulation of facts
made during trial.
HELD:
No, said rules do not apply on stipulation of facts made during trial.
A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense
counsel during trial in open court is automatically reduced into writing and
contained in the official transcript of the proceedings had in court. The
conformity of the accused in the form of his signature affixed thereto is
unnecessary in view of the fact that: "x x x an attorney who is employed to
manage a party's conduct of a lawsuit x x x has prima facie authority to make
relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, x x x which
unless allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive.". In fact, "judicial admissions
are frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of record, who is, for the
purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are made x
x x for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, x x x they bind the
client, whether made during, or even after, the trial."
The foregoing find basis in the general rule that a client is bound by the
acts of his counsel who represents him. For all intents and purposes, the acts of
a lawyer in the defense of a case are the acts of his client. The rule extends even
to the mistakes and negligence committed by the lawyer except only when such
mistakes would result in serious injustice to the client. No cogent reason exists
to make such exception in this case. It is worth noting that Atty. Ulep,
appellant's counsel in the lower court, agreed to the stipulation of facts proposed
by the prosecution not out of mistake nor inadvertence, but obviously because
the said stipulation of facts was also in conformity to defense's theory of the
case. It may be recalled that throughout the entire duration of the trial, appellant
112
staunchly denied ever having engaged in the recruitment business either in her
personal capacity or through Philippine-Thai. Therefore, it was but logical to
admit that the POEA records show that neither she nor Philippine-Thai was
licensed or authorized to recruit workers.
It is true that the rights of an accused during trial are given paramount
importance in our laws on criminal procedure. Among the fundamental rights
of the accused is the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him. But the right of confrontation guaranteed and secured to the accused is a
personal privilege which may be waived. Thus, in the case of U.S. vs. Anastasio,
this Court deemed as a waiver of the right of confrontation, the admission by
the accused that witnesses if present would testify to certain facts stated in the
affidavit of the prosecution.
In the same vein, it may be said that such an admission is a waiver of
the right of an accused to present evidence on his behalf. Although the right to
present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself for the
protection of the accused, this right may be waived expressly or impliedly. This
is in consonance with the doctrine of waiver which recognizes that "x x x
everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule
made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private
capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any
public right, and without detriment to the community at large."
The abovementioned doctrine is squarely applicable to the case at
bar. Appellant was never prevented from presenting evidence contrary to the
stipulation of facts. If appellant believed that the testimony of the Chief
Licensing Officer of the POEA would be beneficial to her case, then it is the
defense who should have presented him. Her continuous failure to do so during
trial was a waiver of her right to present the pertinent evidence to contradict the
stipulation of facts and establish her defense
113
G. R. No. 146854 April 28, 2004

vs.
PASCUAL BALBARONA
FACTS:
Pascual Balbarona was charged of raping Odette M. Balbarona, his
daughter before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del Norte, Branch 2. During
arraignment, Balbarona pleaded not guilty to the accusation. The prosecution
and defense subsequently entered into a stipulation of facts4 where it was
admitted that the victim, Odette M. Balbarona, was appellant’s daughter and
was fifteen at the time of the alleged rape; and that appellant was then living
with the victim and his two other daughters. Balbarona was convicted by the
RTC and to suffer the supreme penalty of death because of the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of minority of the victim and the offender is a parent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not stipulation of facts in pre-trial, which was admitted by
the accused, can serve as evidence of minority of the victim.
HELD:
While the above-quoted information alleged the concurrence of the
victim’s minority and her relationship to appellant as his daughter, the
jurisprudentially required evidence to prove such circumstance is utterly
lacking. Except for the bare testimonies of the parties, no birth certificate exists
in the records to prove that the victim was fifteen (15) years old at the time she
was raped by appellant. And yet there was no showing that her birth certificate
was lost or destroyed or was unavailable without the prosecution’s fault. Thus,
substitutionary evidence – the victim’s and appellant’s testimonies – was
inadmissible. Much reliance is had on the stipulation of facts embodied in the
trial court’s June 22, 2000 Pre-trial Order whereby appellant admitted to the
victim being his daughter and her being fifteen (15) years old at the time of the
rape incident. This Court in People v. Sitao rejected stipulation of facts as a
specie of evidence to prove the qualifying circumstances of rape: Neither can a
stipulation of the parties with respect to the victim’s age be considered sufficient
proof of minority. Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase its penalty
to death cannot be the subject of stipulation. An accused cannot be condemned
to suffer the extreme penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or his own
admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the seriousness of the penalty of
death.
114
G.R. No. 148000 February 27, 2003

vs.
HON. JUDGE PATERNO V. TAC-AN (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
RTC, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 84, Batangas City) and MARIO N.
AUSTRIA
FACTS:
On February 22, 2000, an Information was filed by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Batangas City against Mario N. Austria for falsification of public
official document.
The trial court set the arraignment of the accused and the initial pre-trial
on August 1, 2000. Apparently, only three out of eleven witnesses were notified
of said arraignment and pre-trial. The trial court dismissed the case for failure
of said witnesses to appear before it. The public prosecutor asserted that only
three were subpoenaed by the trial court. He argued further that the dismissal of
the case was not authorized under Republic Act No. 8493. However the Court
of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absence of witnesses during the pre-trial will amount
to the dismissal of the case.
HELD:
Under R.A. 8493, the absence during pre-trial of any witness for the
prosecution listed in the Information, whether or not said witness is the offended
party or the complaining witness is not a valid ground for the dismissal of a
criminal case. Although under the law, pre-trial is mandatory in criminal cases,
the presence of the private complainant or the complaining witness is however
not required. Even the presence of the accused is not required unless directed
by the trial court. It is enough that the accused is represented by his counsel.
Indeed, even if none of the witnesses listed in the information for the
State appeared for the pre-trial, the same can and should proceed. After all, the
public prosecutor appeared for the State. The public prosecutor is vested with
authority to consider those matters catalogued in Section 2 of R.A. 8493.
115
G.R. No. 142848 June 30, 2006

EUGENE C. YU
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
TAGAYTAY CITY, BRANCH 18, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
JOSE M. VELASCO, SEC. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, RODOLFO OCHOA
and REYNALDO DE LOS SANTOS A.K.A. "Engine,"
FACTS:
Atty. Eugene Tan, former President of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) and his driver Eduardo Constantino were abducted by Pedro
Lim, Bonifacio Roxas, Sgt. Edgar Allan Abalon, Mariano Hizon, Eugenio
Hizon in Alabang, Muntinlupa, and brought somewhere in Cavite where they
were both shot to death. It was alleged that it was a military operation against
communist rebels. An information was then filed against the said perpetrators
but after investigation, the following individuals were included namely, Eugene
C. Yu, and Patricia Lim-Yu as responsible for the commission of the offense.
And the prosecution filed a “Petition to Discharge as State Witnesses and
Exclude from the Information accused Ochoa and de los Santos which was
granted by the Court but contested by Eugene Yu for lack of evidence
supporting such decision invoking Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure is the one applicable despite the provision of Republic Act No. 6981
in the case at bar.
HELD:
The discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Republic Act
No. 6981 is only one of the modes for a participant in the commission of a crime
to be a state witness. Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, is another mode of discharge. The immunity provided under
Republic Act No. 6981 is granted by the DOJ while the other is granted by the
court. On the other hand, in the discharge of an accused under Republic Act No.
6981, only compliance with the requirement of Section 14, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is required but not the requirement of Rule
119, Section 17. An amendment of the information made before plea which
excludes some or one of the accused must be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court in
compliance with Section 14, Rule 110. And the prosecution of crimes appertains
to the executive department of government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary
component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their
violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of
discretion – the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise
116
of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by

prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for
Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the power
to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be
granted immunity from prosecution.
117
G.R. No. 140690 June 19, 2001

vs.
HON. NAZAR U. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 18 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, and SPO1 Reynaldo Lim de la
Victoria
FACTS:
An Information charging the offense of Multiple Murder for the killing
of members of the Bucag family in Gingoog City was filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Gingoog City. Venue of the case was moved to Cagayan de Oro
City by virtue of Administrative Order No. 87-2-244. Thus, the case was
transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18,
presided by respondent Judge Nazar U. Chaves. Only Felipe Galarion was tried
and convicted. All the other accused were at large.
Two years later, Felizardo Roxas, was identified as another member of
the group. Amended information was filed on to implead Roxas as a co-accused.
He engaged the services of private respondent Miguel Paderanga as his counsel.
Roxas was given the opportunity to adduce evidence in support of his defense,
a preliminary investigation was conducted. In his counter-affidavit, Roxas
implicated Atty. Paderanga as the mastermind of the killings. Consequently, the
amended information was again amended to include private respondent
Paderanga as one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 86-39.
Trial of the case ensued. At the hearing, the prosecution called Roxas as
its first witness. Paderanga objected to the presentation of Roxas’ testimony on
the ground that the presentation of Roxas’ testimony will violate his right
against self-incrimination. The trial court ruled further that before Roxas can be
presented as a witness for the prosecution, he must first be discharged as a state
witness. Otherwise put, the prosecution cannot present Roxas as a hostile
witness. On June 3, 1993 the trial court issued an order denying the
prosecution’s motion for reconsideration but setting the motion for the
discharge of Roxas as state witness for hearing and granted the private
respondent’s motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
prosecution’s petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus for lack of
merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution may present the testimony of Felizardo
Roxas as hostile witness.
HELD:
This is error. Clearly, the Order dated June 3, 1993 was interlocutory; it
did not finally dispose of the case on its merits. As such, the Order cannot be
the proper subject of appeal. It may, however, be assailed in a special civil action
for certiorari. Under the Rules of Court then governing, the petition for certiorari
may be filed within a reasonable period.
118
It is true that an accused cannot be made a hostile witness for the

prosecution, for to do so would compel him to be a witness against himself.
However, he may testify against a co-defendant where he has agreed to do so,
with full knowledge of his right and the consequences of his acts. It is not
necessary that the court discharges him first as state witness. There is nothing
in the rules that says so. There is a difference between testifying as state witness
and testifying as a co-accused. In the first, the proposed state witness has to
qualify as a witness for the state, after which he is discharged as an accused and
exempted from prosecution. In the second, the witness remains an accused and
can be made liable should he be found guilty of the criminal offense. The trial
court must determine with certainty, lest their right against self-incrimination
be violated.
119
G.R. No. 165496 February 12, 2007

HUN HYUNG PARK
vs.
EUNG WON CHOI
FACTS:
Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of BP 22,otherwise known
as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing PNB Check No. 0077133 postdated
August28, 1999 in the amount of P1,875,000 which was dishonored for having
been drawn against insufficient funds. He pleaded not guilty.- After the
prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File
Demurrer to Evidence to which he attached his Demurrer, asserting that the
prosecution failed to prove that he received the notice of dishonor, hence, the
presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not
arise.- (2/27/03) The MeTC of Makati, Branch 65 granted the demurrer and
dismissed the case. The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was denied.-
Park appealed the civil aspect of the case to the RTC of Makati, contending that
the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect. The RTC
held that while the evidence presented wasinsufficient to prove Choi’s criminal
liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. It accordingly granted
Park’s appeal and ordered Choi to pay himP1,875,000 with legal interest.- Upon
Choi’s motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside its decision and
ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC “for further proceedings, so that
Choi may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case.” Park’s motion for
reconsideration of the remand of the case having been denied, he elevated the
case to the CA which dismissed his petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent has a right to present evidence on the civil
aspect of the case in view of his demurrer.
HELD:
Yes. In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the
accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer.
Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the case because there
is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such
aspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the
criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect,
for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficient to prove the crime beyond
reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish
civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.
On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof
beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the same evidence is
insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the
demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceed. The
only recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the
dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that the act or omission
120
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination,
trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue.- In the instant case,
the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Choi
did not assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby recognized that there is basis
for a remand.
Park posits that Choi waived his right to present evidence on the civil
aspect of the case (1) when the grant of the demurrer was reversed on appeal,
citing Section 1 of Rule 33, and (2) when respondent orally opposed petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration pleading that proceedings with respect to the civil
aspect of the case continue.- Petitioner’s citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is
incorrect. Where a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its
territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues
that the law requires it to resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case being the
civil liability of the accused arising from the crime, the governing law is the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure which pertains
to a civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit
121
G.R. No. 132081 November 26, 2002

JOEL M. SANVICENTE
vs.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with homicide for the killing of Dennis Wong.
At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
Petitioner begged leave to file a demurrer to evidence, which was
granted by the trial court. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion To Dismiss
(On Demurrer to Evidence), based on the following grounds: (1) the lack of
positive identification of the accused is a fatal omission warranting dismissal;
(2) prosecution’s evidence are totally hearsay/incompetent.
The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case together with
the civil aspect for insufficiency of evidence. The prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied.
The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
but to no avail. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution may appeal the trial court’s resolution
granting demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all the charges against him
without violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.
HELD:
Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
as amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without
leave of court. In resolving accused’s demurrer to evidence, the court is merely
required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain
the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in
the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. Significantly, once the court grants
the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of
the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.
This constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case
made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a
plea of double jeopardy.
122
G.R. No. 72670 September 12, 1986

SATURNINA GALMAN, et. al.
vs.
SANDIGAYNBAYAN, et. al.
FACTS:
A number of members of the Philippine Military were charged for the
assassination of Former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. The fact finding
committee created to determine what really occurred during that faithful day
rejected the military’s version that Aquino was killed by a lone gunman,
Galman. The investigation of the board revealed that only the soldiers in the
staircase with Aquino could have shot him.
Criminal charges were filed before the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan, allegedy operating under the control of President Marcos
acquitted all the accused of the crime charged.
The private respondents is now questioning the charges against them
arising from the same offense that were already decided by the Sandiganbayan
alleging that the continuance of the proceedings would amount to a violation of
their right against double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.
HELD:
None, Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This
criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public
respondents at the secret Malacañang conference (and revealed only after fifteen
months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent
Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason
to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and
duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the
people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our
judicial system is at stake.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a
void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy
attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it
no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims
flowing out of it are void.
123
G.R. No. 128587 March 16, 2007

vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Branch 18, RTC, Manila, and LAWRENCE WANG Y CHEN
FACTS:
Three separate informations filed against Lawrence C. Wang for
Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, Violation of the COMELEC Gun Ban,
and Illegal Possession of Firearms. During his arraignment, accused Wang
refused to enter a plea to all the Informations and instead interposed a continuing
objection to the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police operatives.
Thus, the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not Guilty" be entered for him.
Thereafter, joint trial of the three consolidated cases followed.
On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion,
accused Wang was granted 25 days from said date within which to file his
intended Demurrer to Evidence. Then, the prosecution filed a Manifestation to
the effect that it had rested its case only in so far as the charge for Violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act is concerned, and not as regards the other two cases.
Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence, praying for his acquittal
and the dismissal of the three cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and
search warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecution’s evidence against
him. Herein respondent judge granted Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence and
acquitted him of all charges for lack of evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the
merits and will amount to an acquittal.
HELD:
An order granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is a resolution of
the case on the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further
prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy hence; the finality-of-acquittal rule is stressed.
The exception to this rule is when the prosecution was denied due process of
law. Such was not present in this case.
Petitioner also used the wrong remedy before the Supreme Court; hence
this petition is outrightly dismissible. The Court cannot reverse the assailed
dismissal order of the trial court by appeal without violating private
respondent’s right against double jeopardy.
124
G.R. No. 169641 September 10, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICHARD O. SARCIA
FACTS:
Sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doña Tomasa, Municipality of
Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste design,
and by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with [AAA], who was then
6 years of age, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-appellant, with the
assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.8 Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued. The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the victim
AAA; her minor cousin; her father; and Dr. Joana Manatlao, the Municipal
Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. The defense presented the accused-
appellant himself, who vehemently denied committing the crimes imputed to
him and Manuel Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court at
Guinobatan, Albay. On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision
finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape and imposed the
penalty penalty of DEATH, and to pay the victim, [AAA], the amount of (1)
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages, and (3)
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court gravely erred in not acquitting the
accused Richard Sarcia.
HELD:
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to
minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of
their testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence
and the positive identification of the accused. Slight contradictions in fact even
serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that their
testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even
improbabilities, unusual, for there is no person with perfect faculties or senses.
The date is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of
the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of
commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated.
125
G.R. No. 186227 July 20, 2011

vs.
ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA
FACTS:
Mantalaba a 17-year old drug pusher was arrested after a buy-bust
operation. He was found guilty of violation of RA9165. It must be noted that
RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision
on this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor.
The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D.
603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-
SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, the laws that were
applicable at the time of the promulgation of judgment, because the imposable
penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death. It
may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of
his sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its
retroactive application. The CA also did not suspend the sentence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mantalaba is entitled to suspended sentence.
HELD:
Mantalaba, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no
longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his
suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and academic. It is highly
noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when this case was under its
jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that the
appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA
9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having
been elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the sentence of the
appellant because he was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the
same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of
the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603
126
G.R. No. 185960 January 25, 2012

MARINO B. ICDANG
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Marino B. Icdang, Regional Director of the Office for Southern Cultural
Communities (OSCC) Region XII in Cotabato City, was charged with the crime
of Malversation of Public Funds and for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
SB’s Second Division rendered its decision convicting petitioner of
malversation and acquitting him from violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019.
Petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated when his
counsel failed to assist him during the promulgation of the judgment. He faults
the Sandiganbayan for proceeding with the promulgation despite the petitioner
not then being assisted by his counsel, and being a layman he is not familiar
with court processes and procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right of the accused to due process was violated when
his counsel failed to assist him during the promulgation of the judgment.
HELD:
No. The right of the accused to due process was not violated. There is
nothing in the rules that requires the presence of counsel for the promulgation
of the judgment of conviction to be valid. While notice must be served on both
accused and his counsel, the latter’s absence during the promulgation of
judgment would not affect the validity of the promulgation. Indeed, no
substantial right of the accused on the merits was prejudiced by such absence of
his counsel when the sentence was pronounced
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, provides:
SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment. -- The judgment is promulgated by
reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it
was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment
may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the
judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the clerk of court.
127
G.R. No. L-24529 February 17, 1968

EDUARDO JIMENEZ
vs. 
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and JUDGE PEDRO NAVARRO, Court of
First Instance of Rizal
FACTS:
Eduardo Jimenez, together with others, was charged with homicide in
an information before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The case was heard
and tried before Judge Eulogio Mencias. The decision prepared and signed by
Judge Mencias was delivered to the clerk of court on January 16, 1965. On the
same date the clerk of court issued and served notice on the petitioner to appear
in court on January 21, 1965 for the promulgation of the sentence. In view that
January 21 was declared by the President a special holiday, the promulgation of
the decision could not be carried out on that day. On January 21, 1965, Judge
Eulogio Mencias had reached the age of 70 and was retired on that day from the
bench. Respondent Judge Pedro Navarro was immediately designated to take
the place of Judge Mencias. The former judge ordered that the sentence be
promulgated on January 29, 1965, but for some reason, it was postponed to
March 1, 1965.
Jimenez filed a motion to set aside decision and promulgation thereof,
on the following grounds: (a) "That the case was heard and tried by the Hon.
Eulogio Mencias and judgment was rendered by him before he retired on
January 21, 1965, having reached the age of 70 years"; and (b) "That said
judgment cannot be validly promulgated since it is no longer the official act of
a judge, either de jure or de facto."
ISSUE:
Whether or not judgment may validly be promulgated despite the fact
that the judge who rendered it is no longer the judge at the time of its
promulgation.
HELD:
No. The decision of the judge may be promulgated even without his
presence, as long as he is still a judge of that court (Luna v. Rodriguez, 37, Phil.
186; Garchitorena v. Criscini 37 Phil. 675; Barredo v. Commission on
Elections, 45 O.G. 4457; People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-9111-9113,
Aug. 28, 1956; People v. So, G.R. No. L-8732, July 30, 1957).
In the present case, what we have is not merely physical absence of the
judge who penned the decision, but the cessation of termination of his
incumbency as such judge. In the case of People v. Bonifacio So y Ortega, (G.R.
No. L-8732) this Court ruled:
It is well-settled that to be binding a judgment must be duly signed, and
promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who signed it.
In criminal proceedings the Rules are more explicit. They require the
judgment to be promulgated by reading the judgment or sentence in the presence
128
of the defendant and the judge of the court who has rendered it; and although it
is true that it may be read by the clerk "when the judge is absent or outside the
province," it is implied that it may be read, provided he is still the judge therein.
Here, in the present case, when the notice for the promulgation of the
decision was sent out, the judge who signed the decision was no longer the judge
of the court, and no copy of the judgment of acquittal was delivered to the
appellants. With more reasons, therefore, is there no judgment validly entered
in this case.
129
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1417 May 27, 2004

PETER BEJARASCO, JR. and ISABELITA BEJARASCO
vs. 
JUDGE ALFREDO D. BUENCONSEJO, Municipal Trial Court, Dalaguete,
Cebu, SECUNDINO PIEDAD, Clerk of Court, and LEONISA GONZALES,
Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court, Argao, Cebu
FACTS:
The complainants were charged with grave threats and grave oral
defamation before the MTC of Dalaguete, Cebu. According to the
complainants, the respondent judge inhibited himself from the said cases on the
ground of delicadeza and that Executive Judge Epifanio Llanos of the Regional
Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, Branch 26, designated Judge Palmacio Calderon of
the MTC of Argao, Cebu, to hear and try the said cases. Judge Calderon
conducted continuous and simultaneous trials, and the cases were submitted for
decision on June 29, 1999. Unfortunately, Judge Calderon died on December
31, 1999 without having rendered judgment on the said cases.
The complainants were surprise to receive a notice from the MTC of
Argao Cebu, that their cases had been set for promulgation on May 15, 2000 by
the respondent judge, who was then designated as presiding judge of the said
court.
The complainants’ counsel argued that the respondent judge could not
promulgate the decision since he had earlier inhibited himself from trying the
said cases, and that the judge who actually heard the case had already died. The
respondent judge, however, ignored these arguments and proceeded with the
promulgation of the Decision convicting the complainants.
The complainants filed a petition for certiorari and while it was pending,
investigated the signatures of the late Judge Calderon in his decisions with the
PNP Crime Laboratory. It was found out that the signatures were forged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment is valid considering the decision
promulgated was penned by another judge.
HELD:
A judgment, to be valid, must have been personally and directly
prepared by the judge, and duly signed by him. Corollary, a decision or
resolution of the court becomes such, for all legal intents and purposes, only
from the moment of its promulgation. Promulgation of judgment, in turn,
signifies that on the date it was made, the judge or judges who signed the
decision continued to support it. If at the time of the promulgation, a judge or
member of a collegiate court has already vacated his office, his vote is
automatically withdrawn. In criminal cases, promulgation of judgment is made
by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which
it was rendered. Judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court only when
the judge is absent or outside the province or city.
It is clear then, that a judge who takes over the sala of another judge who
130
died during office cannot validly promulgate a decision penned by the latter. In
fact, decisions promulgated after the judge who penned the same had been
appointed to and qualified in another office are null and void. To be binding, a
judgment must be duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the
judge whose signature appears thereon. In single courts like the regional trial
courts and the municipal trial courts, a decision may no longer be promulgated
after the ponente has vacated his office.
Granting arguendo that the decision in the criminal cases was indeed
signed by the late Judge Calderon, respondent Judge Buenconsejo had no
authority to promulgate the decision. Judge Calderon ceased to be the judge of
that court, thus, the judgment which he signed cannot be promulgated by
another judge. Any judgment or decision is valid and binding only if both [were]
penned and promulgated by the judge during his incumbency.
Considering that the full records of the case were available for perusal,
another judge could pen the decision even if he did not hear the case in its
entirety. However, since Judge Buenconsejo previously inhibited himself from
hearing the criminal cases, he should have referred the matter to his Executive
Judge and assigned another judge to render judgment thereon.
131
G.R. No. 182748 December 13, 2011

ARNEL COLINARES
vs. 
FACTS:
RTC rendered judgment finding Arnel guilty of frustrated homicide but
since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to
six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), seeking conviction for the
lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty
imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision but deleted the
award for lost income in the absence of evidence to support it.
Assuming Arnel committed only the lesser crime of attempted homicide
with its imposable penalty of imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum,
he could still apply for probation upon remand of the case to the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he may still apply for probation having appealed from
the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.
HELD:
Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he
having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated
homicide.
Probation is a mere privilege granted by the state only to qualified
convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: “That
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.” Since Arnel appealed
his conviction for frustrated homicide, he should be deemed permanently
disqualified from applying for probation.
It is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals “from the
judgment of conviction” is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of
probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted
out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court,
now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme
Court.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and
imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum,
he would have had the right to apply for probation. No one could say with
certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC done right
by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the
penalty he got was not probationable.
132
G.R. No. L-38581 March 31, 1976

LORENZO JOSE
vs. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Lorenzo Jose was convicted of illegal possession of explosives and
seeks a new trial which was denied to him by the CFI of Pampanga and
respondent CA.
Petitioner filed a motion praying that the case be reopened to permit him
to present, pursuant to a reservation he had made in the course of the trial, a
permit to possess the handgrenade in question. Trial Court denied the motion.
When elevated to the CA, the Appellate Court also denied the same.
Petitioner cites certain peculiar circumstances obtaining in the case
before the Supreme Court which may be classified as exceptional enough to
warrant a new trial if only to afford him an opportunity to establish his
innocence of the crime charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a new trial may grant on the ground of newly discovered
evidence.
HELD:
It is indeed an established rule that for a new trial to be granted on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that (a) the evidence
was discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the
evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and
(d) it must go to the merits as ought to produce a different result if admitted.
The Court held that the circumstances presented by petitioner justify a
reopening of petitioner's case to afford him the opportunity of producing
exculpating exculpating evidence. An outright acquittal from this Court which
petitioner seeks as an alternative relief is not As correctly stressed by the
Solicitor General, the People is to be given the chance of examining the
documentary sought to be produced, and of cross-examining the persons who
executed the same, as well as the accused himself, now petitioner, on his
explanation for the non-production of the of the evidence during the trial.
133
G.R. Nos. 96027-28 March 08, 2005

BRIG. GEN. LUTHER A. CUSTODIO HYPERLINK, CAPT. ROMEO M.
BAUTISTA, 2nd LT. JESUS D. CASTRO, SGT. CLARO L. LAT, SGT.
ARNULFO B. DE MESA, C1C ROGELIO B. MORENO, C1C MARIO E.
LAZAGA, SGT. FILOMENO D. MIRANDA, SGT. ROLANDO C. DE
GUZMAN, SGT. ERNESTO M. MATEO, SGT. RODOLFO M.
DESOLONG, A1C CORDOVA G. ESTELO, MSGT. PABLO S. MARTINEZ,
SGT. RUBEN AQUINO, SGT. ARNULFO ARTATES, A1C FELIZARDO
TARAN
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Petitioners were members of the military who acted as Senator
Aquino’s security detail upon his arrival in Manila from his three-year sojourn
in the United States. They were charged, together with several other members
of the military, before the Sandiganbayan for the killing of Senator Aquino
who was fatally shot as he was coming down from the aircraft of China
Airlines at the Manila International Airport. Petitioners were also indicted for
the killing of Rolando Galman who was also gunned down at the airport
tarmac.
The Sandiganbayan acquitted all the accused which includes the
petitioners in its decision on December 2, 1985, however the proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan were later found by the Supreme Court to be a
sham trial thus nullified said proceedings, as well as the judgment of acquittal,
and ordered a re-trial of the cases.
A re-trial ensued before the Sandiganbayan. In its decision dated
September 28, 1990, the Sandiganbayan, while acquitting the other accused,
found the petitioners guilty as principals of the crime of murder of Senator
Aquino and Rolando Galman. The judgment became final after the Supreme
Court denied petitioners’ petition for review of the Sandiganbayan decision for
failure to show reversible error in the questioned decision, as well as their
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to allow the re-opening of the
cases and the holding of a third trial to determine the circumstances
surrounding the death of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman
invoking the existence of newly discovered pieces of evidence that were not
available during the second trial which could have altered the judgment of the
Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not new-trial be granted because of newly discovered
evidence.
HELD:
Before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, it must be shown (1) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (2)
that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even
134
with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight
that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. If the alleged newly
discovered evidence could have been very well presented during the trial with
the exercise of reasonable diligence, the same cannot be considered newly
discovered.
The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence is whether the proferred evidence is in fact a “newly
discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due
diligence.” The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two
aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and
a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered. It is to the
latter that the requirement of due diligence has relevance. We have held that in
order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as newly
discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when
the evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came
to the knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is essential is that the
offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such
evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.
The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether
the movant has exercised due diligence depends upon the particular
circumstances of each case. Nonetheless; it has been observed that the phrase is
often equated with “reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the defendant.”
In other words, the concept of due diligence has both a time component and
a good faith component. The movant for a new trial must not only act in a
timely fashion in gathering evidence in support of the motion; he must act
reasonably and in good faith as well. Due diligence contemplates that the
defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence, in light of
the totality of the circumstances and the facts known to him.
Applying the foregoing tests, we find that petitioners’ purported
evidence does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that would justify the
re-opening of the case and the holding of a third trial.
The report of the forensic group may not be considered as newly
discovered evidence as petitioners failed to show that it was impossible for them
to secure an independent forensic study of the physical evidence during the trial
of the double murder case. It appears from their report that the forensic group
used the same physical and testimonial evidence proffered during the trial, but
made their own analysis and interpretation of said evidence.
The report of the forensic group essentially reiterates the theory
presented by the defense during the trial of the double murder case. Clearly,
the report is not newly discovered, but rather recently sought, which is not
allowed by the Rules. If at all, it only serves to discredit the version of the
prosecution which had already been weighed and assessed, and thereafter
upheld by the Sandiganbayan.
135
G.R. No. 128986 June 21, 1999

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CASAN MAQUILING
FACTS:
Iligan City Fiscal Ulysses V. Lagcao charged Respondent Casan
Maquiling with homicide and frustrated homicide. Acting on the petition of the
private complainants, the Department of Justice subsequently directed the
upgrading of the charge of homicide to murder. To both charges, Respondent
Maquiling, assisted by Counsel de Parte Moises Dalisay Jr., entered a plea of
not guilty upon his arraignment on June 5, 1989.
The trial court convicted private respondent of homicide and serious
physical injuries.
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals accepted the claim of
self-defense. The appellate court also noted various “flaws and inconsistencies”
in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, in effect strengthening the
version set forth by the accused. It held, to the mind of the court, the
discrepancies as to the manner the accused killed the deceased are material.
Irreconcilable and unexplained contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution
cast doubt on the guilt of the accused and such contradictory statements will not
sustain a judgment of conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal made by the Solicitor General placed the
accused in double jeopardy and whether or not it is valid if it does.
HELD:
Although the rule states that any party may appeal from a final judgment
or order, the right of the people to appeal is expressly made subject to the
proviso that such an appeal should not place the accused in double jeopardy.
Consistently with this principle, it has been held that the constitutional mandate
that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense
prohibits not only a subsequent prosecution in a new and independent cause but
also extends to an appeal in the same case by the prosecution after jeopardy had
attached, thereby in effect viewing such appeal as presenting a new and separate
jeopardy repugnant to the fundamental law’s provision against double jeopardy.
Ordinarily, the judicial recourse of an aggrieved party is to appeal the
trial court's judgment to the Court of Appeals and thereafter, to the Supreme
Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In such
cases, this tribunal is limited to the determination of whether the lower court
committed reversible errors or, in other words, mistakes of judgment. A direct
review by the Supreme Court is the normal recourse of the accused, where the
penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.
136
G.R. No. 103275 June 15, 1994

vs.
HONORABLE RODOLFO M. BELLAFLOR, Assisting Judge, Branch 28,
Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City, and REUBEN ALBAÑO
FACTS:
Ruben Albano was charged with the crime of arson. Upon arraignment,
private respondent pleaded "not guilty". Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued
and the parties rested their case before Judge Fortun.
Judge Fortun promulgated his decision convicting Albano of the crime
of arson. Albano moved for the reconsideration of the said decision and was
granted and thus acquitted of the crime charged. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied. Private respondent argues that the
resolution acquitting him of the offense charged has become final and executory
and a reconsideration thereof would place him under double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal by the petitioner will place the accused in
double jeopardy and thus invalidates the appeal.
HELD:
Generally, protection against double jeopardy is not available where the
dismissal of the case was effected at the instance of the accused. And there are
only two instances where double jeopardy will attach notwithstanding the fact
the case was dismissed with the express consent of the accused. The first is
where the ground for the dismissal is insufficiency of the evidence for the
prosecution and the second is where the criminal proceedings have been
unreasonably prolonged in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial
(People v. Quizada, 160 SCRA 516 [1988]). None exists in the case at bar.
Admittedly, private respondent had moved for the dismissal of the
criminal case filed against him and therefore, the protective mantle of double
jeopardy does not cover him.
Secondly, private respondent cannot successfully seek refuge in the
assailed resolution of respondent judge. For one thing, it was an empty judgment
of acquittal — a bare adjudication that private respondent is not guilty of the
offense charged anchored on the mere supposition that the decision rendered by
Judge Fortun was a nullity. Indeed, respondent judge acquitted private
respondent without expressing the facts and the law on which it is based, as
required by Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
137
G.R. No. 43659 December 21, 1990

vs.
HON. FELICIDAD CARANDANG VILLALON and FEDERICO DE
GUZMAN
FACTS:
The case at bar is a special civil action for Certiorari assailing the order
rendered by Judge Villalon, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid order of dismissal.
Based on the Court' s records, about the antecedent facts which resulted
to the order issued by the respondent judge, complainant Mariano Carrera and
his brother, Severo Carrera, are co-owners of a parcel of land located at Barrio
Buenlag, Binmaley, Pangasinan.
Complainants, allegedly executed a special power of attorney before
Notary Public Jaime B. Arzadon, Jr., naming private respondent Federico de
Guzman as his lawful attorney-in-fact. private respondent mortgaged the parcel
of land with the People's Bank and Trust Company in Dagupan City using the
said special power of attorney, and was able to obtain the amount of P8,500.00
as a loan from the mortgagee bank. Both the special power of attorney and the
mortgage contract were duly registered in the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan.
On March 29, 1974, Criminal Case No. D-868 for estafa thru
falsification of a public document was filed against private respondent. A
motion to dismiss was filed and later on granted by the respondent judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal by the prosecution is barred by reason of
double jeopardy.
HELD:
The bar of double jeopardy is not involved in the present recourse. As
enunciated in People vs. City Court of Manila, etc., et al.:"As a general rule, the
dismissal or termination of the case after arraignment and plea of the defendant
to a valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the complaint
or information (Section 9, Rule 113).
However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of
the criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1)
the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, of the
defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration
of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed
upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found
incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant."
138
G.R. No. 170979 February 9, 2011

JUDITH YU
vs.
HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, Branch 105, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
The petitioner, Judith Yu, was charged and convicted with the crime of
estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Fourteen days after her
conviction, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial before the Regional Trial
Court, alleging that she has discovered new and material evidence that will
exculpate her from the crime of estafa. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the
petition for lack of merit.
Thereafter, using the ruling on Neypes vs Court of Appeals, petitioner
filed a notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court alleging that she had a
fresh period of 15 days to perfect her appeal upon receipt of the Regional Trial
Court’s denial of her motion for new trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the fresh period rule is applicable in the case at bar.
HELD:
The raison d’être for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal
period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-
day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no
longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the
balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s
pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period
for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
139
G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005

DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO
VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRSOF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE,
CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO,
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES,
Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro
FACTS:
Neypes et. al. filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of
land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before
the Regional Trial Court, Oriental Mindoro, against respondents.
In the course of the proceedings the parties filed various motions with
the trial court. The court dismissed the petitioners’ complaint on February 12,
1998 and petitioners allegedly received a copy thereof on March 3, 1998 and on
the 15th day thereafter, March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On
July 1, 1998, the trial court dismissed the motion for reconsideration and was
received by the petitioners on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998,
petitioners filed a notice of appeal.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding
that it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31,
1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in
an order dated September 3, 1998.
Petitioners argued that the 15-day period to appeal started to run only on
July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial
court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of
appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within
the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed
the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned
from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing their complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners filed their notice of appeal on time.
HELD:
The petitioners filed their notice on time. The appeal is within the 15
day period from notice of final judgment or final order appealed from within
which the appeal should be filed.
Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of

judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15th day
of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice
of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to
the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period.
140
It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of
appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners, however,
argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from
receipt of the “final order” or the order dismissing their motion for
reconsideration.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for
a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
The Court thus holds that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of
appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date
of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration).
141
G.R. No. 141986 July 11, 2002

NEPLUM, INC.
vs.
EVELYN V. ORBESO
FACTS:
The trial court promulgated its judgment acquitting Neplum of the crime
of estafa on October 29, 1999.
On 12 November 1999, the petitioner, through the private prosecutor,
received its copy of the Judgment. On 29 November 1999, petitioner filed a motion
for Reconsideration (Civil Aspect) of the Judgment, considering that 27 November
1999 was a Saturday, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration on 29
November 1999.
On 28 January 2000, a Friday, petitioner received its copy of the 24 January
2000 Order of the Trial Court denying for lack of merit petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. On 31 January 2000, a Monday, petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal from the Judgment. On the same day, petitioner filed by registered mail its
28 January 2000 Amended Notice of Appeal.
On 17 February 2000, the Trial Court issued its Challenged Order, which
petitioner received through the private prosecutor on 22 February 2000, denying
due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice of Appeal. It
accepted respondent’s arguments that the Judgment from which the appeal was
being taken had become final, because the Notice of Appeal and the Amended
Notice of Appeal were filed beyond the reglementary period. The 15-day period
was counted by the trial court from the promulgation of the Decision sought to be
reviewed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 15-day period to be counted from the promulgation
of the decision to the accused or from the time a copy thereof is served on the
offended party.
HELD:
It is from the time the offended party had actual or constructive
knowledge of the judgment, whether it be during its promulgation or as a
consequence of the service of the notice of the decision.
Section 6, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
provides:
“SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen
(15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from.
This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion
for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the
motion shall have been served upon the accused or his counsel.”
The italicized portion of the provision uses the conjunctive “or” in
providing for the reckoning period within which an appeal must be taken. It
shall be counted from the promulgation or the notice of the judgment or order.
It is petitioner’s assertion that “the parties would always need a written
reference or a copy of the judgment x x x to intelligently examine and consider
142
the judgment from which an appeal will be taken.” Thus, it concludes that the
15-day period for filing a notice of appeal must be counted from the time the
losing party actually receives a copy of the decision or order. Petitioner
ratiocinates that it “could not be expected to capture or memorize all the material
details of the judgment during the promulgation thereof.” It likewise poses the
question: “why require all proceedings in court to be recorded in writing if the
parties thereto would not be allowed the benefit of utilizing these written
[documents]?”
We clarify. Had it been the accused who appealed, we could have easily
ruled that the reckoning period for filing an appeal be counted from the
promulgation of the judgment. In People v. Tamani, the Court was confronted
with the question of when to count the period within which the accused must
appeal the criminal conviction. Answered the Court:
“The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from
February 25, 1963, when a copy of the decision was allegedly served on
appellant’s counsel by registered mail is not well-taken. The word
‘promulgation’ in section 6 should be construed as referring to ‘judgment’,
while the word ‘notice’ should be construed as referring to ‘order’.”
The interpretation in that case was very clear. The period for appeal was
to be counted from the date of promulgation of the decision. Text writers are in
agreement with this interpretation.
In an earlier case, this Court explained the same interpretation in this
wise:
“It may, therefore, be stated that one who desires to appeal in a criminal
case must file a notice to that effect within fifteen days from the date the
decision is announced or promulgated to the defendant. And this can be done
by the court either by announcing the judgment in open court as was done in
this case, or by promulgating the judgment in the manner set forth in [S]ection
6, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.”
Clear as those interpretations may have been, they cannot be applied to
the case at bar, because in those instances it was the accused who appealed,
while here we are confronted with the offended party’s appeal of the civil aspect
only. Thus, the question arises whether the accused-appellant’s period for
appeal, as construed in the cited cases, is the same as that for the private
offended party. The Court answer in the negative.
143
G.R. No. 125306 December 11, 2000

vs.
CAFGU FRANCISCO BALTAR, JR., CAFGU PRIMO VILLANUEVA alias
“ESPOK” and ROLLY BALTAR, CAFGU PRIMO VILLANUEVA alias
“ESPOK”,
FACTS:
The trial court determined that the three accused, Baltar, Villanueva and
Baltar, acted in conspiracy in the killing of Mariano Celino, Jr.
From said decision, only Primo Villanueva has appealed. He prays for
the reversal of said judgment,
In this appeal, Primo Villanueva contends that the trial court erred in
finding that he conspired with Rolly Baltar and Francisco Baltar, Jr. when the
latter shot and killed Mariano Celino, Jr.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused who did not appeal may be benefited by the
judgment of the appellate court.
HELD:
The accused who did not appeal may be benefited by the judgment of
the appellate court insofar as it is favorable and applicable to him.
In view of this conclusion that the crime committed and proved is
homicide only and not murder, the SC discuss its consequences with respect to
the criminal liability of the two other accused, namely Francisco Baltar, Jr. and
Rolly Baltar, who did not interpose an appeal. Previously, the sentence imposed
upon the accused who did not appeal became final, while that of his co-accused
who appealed was stayed. For it had been held that decisions of the appellate
court did not in any way affect the sentence imposed upon the accused who did
not appeal, even if the appellants were subsequently acquitted or their sentences
increased or reduced. Not having appealed, it was previously held that the
appellate court did not have jurisdiction over his case.
144
G.R. No. 147524 June 20, 2006

SEGUNDO S. LIM
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR., Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City, THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and CIRSE "CHOY" TORRALBA
FACTS:
Petitioner Lim and co-accused Boy "BG" Guingguing were convicted
of libel in the RTC. A petition for review was filed by Lim but was denied.
Meanwhile, Guingguing also filed a petition for review. The Court
promulgated a judgment of acquittal in favor of Guingguing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner should benefit from Guingguing’s
acquittal.
HELD:
Court applied to the accused, who appealed from their judgment of
conviction whose conviction became final and executor, the favorable judgment
in favor of their co-accused. The Court notes that the Decision dated September
30, 2005 in G.R. No. 128959 stated, "the verdict of guilt with respect to Lim
[herein petitioner] had already become final and executory." In any event, the
Court cannot see why a different treatment should be given to petitioner, given
that the judgment is favorable to him and considering further that the Court’s
finding in its Decision dated September 30, 2005 specifically stated that "the
publication of the subject advertisement by petitioner and Lim cannot be
deemed by this Court to have been done with actual malice."
The nature of appeal throws open all contents of the case. Insofar as it
has become favorable to those who did not appeal, it shall affect them. But if
the judgment obtained in the appeal is not favorable to those who did not appeal,
it shall not affect them.
145
G.R. Nos. 131799-801 February 23, 2004

vs.
FELICIANO ULIT y TAMPOY
FACTS:
Feliciano Ulit had sexual intercourse with his 10-year old niece in
numerous occasions. During arraignment, he pleaded not guilty so the
presentation of evidence started. After the prosecution rested its case, Ulit
changed his plea of not guilty to guilty and manifested that he would no longer
adduce any evidence in his defense because the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes charged. The RTC found him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of death for each count of rape. Ulit did not appeal
from the decision so in view of the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty,
the said cases were brought to this Court on automatic appeal. Ulit’s sole
contention is that the trial court erred in sentencing him with a death penalty
despite his admission of guilt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an automatic appeal to the SC is limited to the assigned
errors that the accused presented.
HELD:
No. The appeal in a criminal case is a review de novo and the court is
not limited to the assigned errors. An appeal thus opens the whole case for
review, and the appellate tribunal may consider and correct errors though
unassigned and even reverse the decision of the trial court on the grounds other
than those the parties raised as errors.
Given this, even if Ulit only assigned one error, the Court ruled on other
issues regarding the case, such as: the validity of the change of his plea from
not guilty to guilty; the strength of the evidence of the prosecution regarding the
alleged rapes; the sufficiency of evidence adduced by the prosecution; and the
guilt of Ulit in the two crimes of rape.
146
G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.
vs.
FACTS:
Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of

the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical
injuries and damage to property. Evidently, the judgment against accused had
become final and executory. Accused has jumped bail and remained at large. It
is worth to mention that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes
the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also
admittedly hired and provided by petitioner filed a notice of appeal which was
denied by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense

of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently
of the accused.
HELD:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment

meted out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality
of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of
asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil
liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the
employer are carried in one single decision that has become final and executory.
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states
thus:
"Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will
be placed in double jeopardy."
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal
case, but the government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be
placed in double jeopardy. Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the
ground that the accused should have been given a more severe penalty. On the
other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment with respect to
their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to appeal the judgment
of conviction, the offended parties should have the same right to appeal as much
of the judgment as is prejudicial to them. As to when a judgment of conviction
attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
147
"A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set
aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the
death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period
for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to
appeal, or has applied for probation."
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to
surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his
appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and
executory.
148
G.R. No. 159116 September 30, 2009

SPS. NESTOR and FELICIDAD DADIZON
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPS. DOMINADOR and ELSA MOCORRO
FACTS:
The Mocorros spouses filed a case in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Naval, Biliran against the Dadizons to recover a parcel of land with an area
of 78 square meters and to cancel the latter's tax declaration.
Because of a judgment unfavorable to them, the Dadizons filed a notice
of appeal. The Mocorros moved to dismiss the Dadizons' appeal on the ground
that the mode of appeal they had adopted was erroneous. Agreeing with the
Mocorros, the CA dismissed the Dadizons' appeal through its resolution dated
February 26, 2003.11 The CA denied the Dadizons' motion for reconsideration
on June 30, 2003.
Hence, the Dadizons have come to the Supreme Court to assail the
dismissal of their appeal and the denial of their motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the mode appeal of the Dadizon’s was erroneous.
HELD:
The mode of appeal from the decision of the RTC via a notice of appeal
adopted by the Dadizons was undoubtedly wrong. They should have filed a
Petition for Review in accordance with Rule 42, Rules of Court, which was the
correct mode of appeal, considering that the RTC had rendered the decision in
question in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
149
G.R. No. 169519 July 17, 2009

IRENORIO B. BALABA
vs.
FACTS:
Irenorio Balaba was the assistant Municipal Treasurer of Guidulman,
Bohol. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged Balaba with Malversation
of Funds. On 9 December 2002, the trial court found Balaba guilty.
On 14 January 2003, Balaba filed his Notice of Appeal, where he
indicated that he would file his appeal before the Court of Appeals.
In its 15 December 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed
Balaba’s appeal. The Court of Appeals declared that it had no jurisdiction to
act on the appeal because the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over the case.
On 27 January 2005, Balaba filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
asked that he be allowed to pursue his appeal before the proper court, the
Sandiganbayan. Balaba claims that it was due to inadvertence that the notice of
appeal was filed before the Court of Appeals instead of the
Sandiganbayan. Balaba adds that his appeal was dismissed on purely technical
grounds. Balaba asks the Court to relax the rules to afford him an opportunity
to correct the error and fully ventilate his appeal on the merits. The Court of
Appeals denied Balaba’s motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal
instead of certifying the case to the proper court.
HELD:
Upon Balaba’s conviction by the trial court, his remedy should have
been an appeal to the Sandiganbayan. RA 8249 states that
the Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments, resolutions or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the
exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
herein provided.
In Melencion v. Sandiganbayan “An appeal erroneously taken to the
Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be
dismissed outright.”
In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal
only after the expiration of the period to appeal. The trial court promulgated its
Decision on 9 December 2002. Balaba filed his notice of appeal on 14 January
2003. The Court of Appeals issued the Decision declaring its lack of
jurisdiction on 15 December 2004. Balaba tried to correct the error only on 27
January 2005, clearly beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the decision of
the trial court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when
it dismissed Balaba’s appeal because of lack of jurisdiction.
150
G.R. No. 173990 October 27, 2009

EDGARDO V. ESTARIJA
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL,
and EDWARD RANADA
FACTS:
An Information was filed before the RTC of Davao City against Estarija,
then Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports Authority, for violating Section 3,
paragraph b of Republic Act No. 3019 and the RTC rendered a decision
convicting Estarija of the crime charged and imposing upon him a straight
penalty of seven years. Estarija filed his notice of appeal before the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the findings of RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the notice of appeal is correctly appealed before the
Court of Appeals.
HELD:
Paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249 reads: In cases
where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or
military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts
whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate
jurisdiction as herein provided. It is manifest from the above provision that the
decisions of the Regional Trial Court -- convicting an accused who occupies a
position lower than that with salary grade 27 or those not otherwise covered by
the enumeration of certain public officers in Section 4 of Presidential Decree
No. 1606 as amended by Republic Act No. 8249 are to be appealed exclusively
to the Sandiganbayan. Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal
is not a natural right or a part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege
and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of the law. The party who seeks to avail himself of the same must comply with
the requirements of the rules, failing in which the right to appeal is lost. In the
instant case, instead of appealing his conviction to the Sandiganbayan, Estarija
erroneously filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, in utter disregard of
paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249. This fatal flaw committed
by Estarija did not toll the running of the period for him to perfect his appeal to
the Sandiganbayan. Because of Estarija’s failure to perfect his appeal to the
Sandiganbayan within the period granted therefor, the Decision of the RTC
convicting him of violating Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019 has thus
become final and executory.
151
G.R. No. 188630 February 23, 2011

FILOMENA L. VILLANUEVA
vs.
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Petra Martinez filed a civil action for collection of sum of money before
the Regional Trial Court against Armando Villanueva, the husband of the
Assistant Regional Director of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)
Filomena Villanueva. The trial court declared Armnado in default and ordered
him to pay the amount of P 1, 107, 210.90 plus fine and interest. Armando filed
a petition for prohibition before the Court of Appeals alleging that he should not
be made to pay said loan as the same had long been fully paid as shown by an
official receipt evidencing his payment. The CA nullified the RTC decision on
the ground that the obligation has been settled.
Martinez filed an administrative case with the Office of the Ombudsman
charging petitioner Filomena Villanueva with violation of Sec. 7 (d) in relation
to Sec. 11 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees (R.A No. 6713). The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding
petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct and imposed the penalty of dismissal with
forfeiture of benefits and disqualification for re-employment in the government
service. The Ombudsman also denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The petitioner then filed a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals. The Court found merits in the petition and reversed and set aside the
assailed decision of the Ombudsman. Martinez filed a motion for
reconsideration while the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene
and for Reconsideration to which the Court of appeals denied both motions.
Aside from those cases, a criminal case was filed against the petitioner
for violation of Sec. 2 (d) of R.A No. 6713 before the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Claveria Cagayan (MCTC). MCTC promulgated its decision
convicting petitioner and imposing penalty of 5 years imprisonment and
disqualification to hold office. Petitioner appealed the MCTC decision to the
RTC of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan but the RTC affirmed the MCTC decision.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation and
Motion contending that the Sandiganbayan had exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over the petition. The petitioner argued that the issue of jurisdiction could not
be raised for the first time before the CA in view of the failure of the Provincial
Prosecutor to bring out the same when she appealed the MCTC Decision to the
RTC. She claimed to have availed of the remedy provided under Rule 122 of
the Rules of Court in good faith. The CA agreed with the OSG and the CA
dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the Solicitor General has the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over the petition.
152
HELD:
In this case, the CA was correct in dismissing the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. Section 2 of Rule 50 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court provides,
among others, that “an appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall
not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.” This
has been the consistent holding of the Court.
Records also bear out that the earlier civil case against Armando, the
petitioner’s husband, was also finally resolved in his favor since the obligation
had already been settled. This civil case is also intertwined with the
administrative and criminal cases filed against petitioner. Thus, it appears that
the filing of the criminal case against petitioner was merely an afterthought
considering that the civil case against her husband and the administrative case
against her were resolved in the couple’s favor.
Dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is not encouraged. The
rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense,
for they have been adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice.
Judicial action must be guided by the principle that a party-litigant should be
given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense
rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. When
a rigid application of the rules tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation.
With the dismissal of the administrative case against the petitioner, it is
in the interest of substantial justice that the criminal case against her should be
reviewed on the merits by the proper tribunal following the appropriate
procedures under the rules. Our legal culture requires the presentation of proof
beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be convicted of any crime and
deprived of his life, liberty or even property, not merely substantial evidence. It
is not enough that the evidence establishes a strong suspicion or a probability of
guilt. The primary consideration is whether the guilt of an accused has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
153
G.R. No. 144590 February 7, 2003

vs.
ROMEO F. PARADEZA
FACTS:
On June 7, 2000, the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69,
was found the appellant, Romeo F. Paradeza guilty of rape and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellant then filed his notice of
appeal anchored on the sole assignment of error that the Court a quo gravely
erred in finding the accused- appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
However, the Public Attorney’s Office, as counsel for appellant, filed a
motion to withdraw his appeal. The Brief for the appellant was filed on June 1,
2001, and the Brief for the appellee was filed on November 20, 2001. The Office
of the Solicitor General, in its comment seeking stiffer penalties, pointed out
that since the appellee as well as the appellant already filed briefs, under the
Rules of Court, the approval of appellant’s motion to withdraw his appeal is
now a matter of discretion on the part of the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court could grant the motion to withdraw the appeal
filed by accused-appellant.
HELD:
An appeal is a "resort to a superior (i.e. appellate) court to review the
decision of an inferior (i.e. trial) court or administrative agency." As a statutory
remedy to correct errors which might have been committed by the lower court,
the object of an appeal is simply and solely the protection of the accused. The
right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and is not a natural right or part of
the due process. Like any other right or privilege, it may be waived.
A person accused and convicted of an offense may withdraw his appeal
not only because he is guilty as charged. It could be due to his prior erroneous
perception of the applicable provision of law, or of the decision itself. He may
feel that to seek a pardon might be the better and faster remedy. Regardless of
his reasons, in our view, he is within his rights to seek the withdrawal of his
appeal. This option should not be closed to herein accused-appellant except for
clearly important substantial reasons of law and policy.
Appellant in withdrawing his appeal has accepted and recognized that
the trial court’s judgment of conviction and his sentence thereunder is
conclusive upon him. His exercise of the option to withdraw appeal before the
case is submitted for this Court’s decision, but fully cognizant of its legal
consequences at this stage of the case, not only saves the Court precious time
and resources. It also opens soonest the path for the reformation of the contrite
offender, pursuant to the ideal of a just and compassionate society envisioned
in our fundamental law. Considering the particular circumstances of this case,
this Court is not without justifiable reasons to act favorably on his motion.
154
G.R. No. 158802 November 17, 2004

IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA
(detained at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City)
JUNE DE VILLA
vs.
THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS
FACTS:
Reynaldo De Villa was charged with the crime of rape by his niece
Aileen Mendoza. The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of qualified rape, and sentenced him to death, to indemnify
the victim in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay the costs of the suit and to support
the child, Leahlyn Mendoza. An automatic review was made, the RTC finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusión perpetua. Reynaldo is currently serving his sentence at the
New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.
Three years after the promulgation of judgment, June De Villa, the son
of Reynaldo was informed during the pendency of the automatic review of
petitioner's case, of which he was unaware that there was a scientific test that
could determine paternity and that DNA testing could resolve the issue of
paternity. Hence he sought the conduct of a blood type test and DNA test but it
was denied. Convict filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration for the test but
was again denied.
June DE villa, was undaunted by these challenges. He then gathered thru
some help, samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa and
transported them to the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the National Science
Research Institute (NSRI). The identities of the donors of the samples, save for
the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to the DNA
Analysis Laboratory.
After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on
March 21, 2003, which showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any
of the children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match
between the pertinent genetic markers in petitioner's sample and those of any of
the other samples, including Leahlyn's
ISSUE:
Whether or not the presentation of newly-discovered evidence be
allowed through a petition to grant new trial.
HELD:
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be
granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was
discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the
evidence is of such weight that that, if admitted, it would probably change the
155
judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence

in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to
secure it.
Although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the trial,
the court nonetheless find that it does not meet the criteria for "newly-
discovered evidence" that would merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving
paternity could have been discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of
reasonable diligence.
Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence
presented by petitioner and his counsel, the court is not convinced that Reynaldo
de Villa is entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, even if it is conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father
of Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen
Mendoza's testimony and positive identification as its bases. The Solicitor
General reiterates, and correctly so, that the pregnancy of the victim has never
been an element of the crime of rape. Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed
to conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be discharged.
Although petitioner claims that conviction was based solely on a finding of
paternity of the child Leahlyn, this is not the case. Our conviction was based on
the clear and convincing testimonial evidence of the victim, which, given
credence by the trial court, was affirmed on appeal.
156
G.R. No. 126170 August 27, 1998

vs.
EMMA MAQUILAN
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Emma Maquilan was found guilty of drug-pushing
in violation of R.A. No. 6425 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Accused-appellant filed a notice of appeal as a result of which the
records of the case were forwarded to this Court. However, before the Court
could act on the appeal, accused-appellant moved to withdraw her appeal, as
she was going to file a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to
seek her release from confinement.
The Solicitor General was ordered by the Supreme Court to comment
on said withdrawal and required accused-appellant’s counsel, Atty. de Guzman
to confer with her and to determine whether in filing the motion was done
voluntarily. The Solicitor General stated he had no objection to the motion.
Atty. de Guzman informed the Court that accused-appellant had been
released from prison by virtue of an order of the Regional Trial Court issued in
a habeas corpus case.
Subsequently, the Court required Judge Laviña of the Regional Trial
Court to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for granting
the petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus , considering that the
appeal in this case was still pending.
ISSUE:
May an accused-appellant file for habeas corpus after withdrawal of
their appeal but, without waiting for the resolution of their motion?
HELD:
The release of accused-appellant constitutes unlawful interference with
the proceedings of this Court and is only somewhat mitigated by the fact that
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City appears to have been misled by accused-
appellant as to the status of the decision in Criminal Case No. S-2191. The trial
court’s order granting release on habeas corpus, based as it is on the erroneous
assumption that the decision in the criminal case had become final, is void. The
trial court had no jurisdiction to issue the order in question.
This case is analogous to People v. Bacang. There accused-appellants
moved for the withdrawal of their appeal but, without waiting for the resolution
of their motion, they applied for and were granted pardon by the President and
released from confinement. Quoting People v. Salle,Jr., this Court ruled:
We now declare that the “conviction by final judgment” limitation under
Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon,
whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal
from his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if one is made,
should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun
157
unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities

of the Government concerned must require proof from the accused that he has
not appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such
proof may be in the form of a certification issued by the trial court or the
appellate court, as the case may be. The acceptance of the pardon shall not
operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused
by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal
of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively
liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the
pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement.
Accordingly, the Court in that case denied the accused-appellants’
motion to withdraw their appeal and ordered their rearrest. Those responsible
for their release were cited for contempt.
What was said in Bacang applies mutatis mutandis to this case. The
use of the high prerogative writ as a post-conviction remedy presupposes a final
judgment by virue of which accused is detained for the service of his
sentence. As a matter of fact, however, that is not the case here as accused-
appellant’s appeal is still pending.
158
G.R. No. 151876 June 21, 2005

SUSAN GO and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA
FACTS:
Fernando Dimagiba issued to Susan Go thirteen checks which, when
presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due dates, were
dishonored for the reason “account closed.” Subqequently, Dimagiba was
prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22 (An Act Penalizing the Making
or Drawing and Issuance of a Check Without Sufficient Funds or Credit and for
Other Purposes, approved on April 3, 1979). He was found guilty by the MTCC,
was sentenced three months imprisonment, and was ordered to pay the offended
party the amount he owed plus interest. On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed
a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ
of Execution, praying for the recall of the Order of Arrest and the modification
of the final decision. Citing SC-AC No. 12-2000, he pointed out that the penalty
of fine only, instead of imprisonment also, should have been imposed on him.
The MTCC denied the motion for reconsideration; Dimagiba was arrested and
imprisoned for the service of his sentence. On October 9, 2001, Dimagiba filed
with the RTC of Baguio city a petition for writ of habeas corpus which was
granted by the said court after hearing the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper
remedy.
HELD:
No. The respondent had previously sought the modification of his
sentence in a Motion for Reconsideration and in a Motion for the Partial Quashal
of the Writ of Execution. The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC
Order denying these motions. His petition for writ of habeas corpus was clearly
an attempt to reopen a case that had already become final and executory, an
action deplorably amounting to forum shopping.
159
G.R 80812 September 2, 1992

LUZ TAN
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
A criminal charge for illegal recruitment was filed against petitioner,
Tan. She pleaded “not guilty” during arraignment. The prosecution then
presented all its witnesses. The defense wasn’t able to present its witness despite
several schedules of hearing. Consequently, the trial court declared petitioner to
have lost her right to present evidence and the case was deemed submitted for
decision. On May 28, 1986, the trial court found the petitioner guilty as charged.
Petitioner then filed for a Notice of Appeal with the CA and when she could not
file her brief within the 30-day reglamentary period, she moved and was granted
a 90-day extension until August 12, 1987. On August 4, 1987, petitioner filed
an Urgent Manifestation and motion praying that the period for the filing of
Appellant’s Brief be suspended, and that she be given five days (until August
9, 1987) to file a Motion for New Trial. The CA, on August 18, 1987, denied
aforesaid Manifestation but granted the filing of a Motion for New Trial
provided that the decision of the trial court had not yet become final on account
of petitioner’s failure to file her brief. Luz Tan filed a Motion for New Trial on
August 24, 1987 which motion was denied by the court. Then, petitioner filed a
motion for leave to admit Appellant’s Brief. This was denied on October 7,
1987.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in dismissing the case for
an error in the procedure in the Court of Appeals.
HELD:
The petition is devoid of merit. Petitioner’s filing of the Motion for New
Trial did not suspend the period for filing appellant’s brief which was due to
expire on August 12, 1987. Such assumption is not supported by the Rules of
Court or any other authority. When Tan filed her Motion for New Trial, she did
not take any step to file her brief, but simply waited for the resolution of said
motion, such being subsequently denied. Petitioner was grossly negligent and
had no one to blame but herself in losing her right to appeal since “the right to
appeal is a statutory right and the party who seeks to avail the same must comply
with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost,
as in the case at bar.
160
PERTINENT LAWS ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Sec. 32, BP 129, as amended by RA 7691

SC Adm. Circular No. 09-94
Adm. Circular No. 104 – 96
Jurisdiction of Metropolitan/Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Trial Courts in

Cities
1. All civil cases, the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, and all probate
proceedings, where the value of personal property, estate or amount of demand does
not exceed Php 200,000. exclusive of interest, damages, litigation and other expenses
(in Metro Manila, the amount should be Php 400,000.)
2. All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer (ejectment)
3. All civil cases which involve title to or possession of real property or any interest
therein where the assessed value does not exceed Php 20,000. (in Metro Manila Php
50,000.) exclusive of interest, damages, litigation and other expenses
4. Civil cases under the rules on summary procedure
5. All offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six years, regardless of the
fine or other imposable accessory or other penalties including the civil liability (in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, the MTC has
exclusive original jurisdiction)
6. Petitions for issuances of original certificates of titles

Jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts
A. Exclusive original jurisdiction

1. All civil cases in which the subject of litigation cannot be estimated in monetary
terms
2. All civil cases which involve title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property exceeds Php 20,000. (in Metro
Manila exceeding Php 50,000.) Exceptions: forcible entry and unlawful detainer of
lands and buildings
3. All actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim
exceeds Php 100,000 (in Metro Manila, over Php 200,000)
4. All probate matters, both testate and intestate where the gross value of the estate
exceeds Php 100,000 (in Metro Manila, the value must exceed Php 200,000.)
5. All actions involving the marriage contract and marital relations (annulment, legal
separation, support, etc)
161
6. All cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
quasi-judicial body
7. All civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) and the Court of
Agrarian Relations
8. All other cases in which the demand or the value of personal property, exclusive of
interest, damages, litigation and other costs, exceeds Php 200,000. (in Metro Manila,
the value must exceed Php 400,000.)
9. Intra-corporate disputes (formerly under the SEC); intellectual property cases

B. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the lower courts
(MTCs) in their respective territorial jurisdictions
C. Concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against all lower courts; habeas
corpus and quo warranto
Note: Republic Act 8369, approved on October 28, 1997, established the Family
Court, with jurisdiction over adoption, guardianship, custody of children, support,
acknowledgment, complaints for annulment or nullity of marriage, criminal cases
where one or more of the accused is below 18 years of age, domestic violence against
women and children, etc.
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
A. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas

corpus, quo warranto and auxiliary writs and processes
B. Exclusive jurisdiction over actions for the annulment of judgments rendered by

the Regional Trial Courts
C. Concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus filed against the RTCs, the Civil Service Commission, the
Court of Tax Appeals, the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, commissions and
other quasi-judicial bodies or agencies.
D. Concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court and RTCsover petitions for
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus filed against lower courts and quasi-judicial
bodies; petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.
E. Appellate jurisdiction over ordinary appeals from RTCs, except in cases

exclusively appealable to the Supreme Court; petitions for review from the RTCs in
all cases appealed to it from the lower courts; petitions for review from the Civil
Service Commission, the Court of Tax Appeals and the other quasi-judicial bodies or
agencies (e.g. National Labor Relations Commission)
162
Note: The Sandiganbayan handles cases of government officials and employees

with salary grades 27 and above.
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
A. Original exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or

mandamus filed against the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, the
Commission on Elections, Commission on Audit, and the Department of Labor and
Employment
B. Concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus filed against the Regional Trial Courts, the Civil Service
Commission, the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, the Court of Tax Appeals,
Securities and Exchange Commission, other quasi-judicial bodies
C. Concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Courts over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed against the lower
courts and certain quasi-judicial bodies; petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto
D. Concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs over actions against ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls
E. Appellate jurisdiction over petitions for review on certiorari from the CA,
Sandiganbayan and RTCs on questions of law only; criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed by the trial court is either death or reclusion perpetua (“life
imprisonment”) on questions of fact and law.
ACT NO. 3326

AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS
PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO
PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such
acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules:
(a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not
more than one month, or both;
(b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one
month, but less than two years;
(c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more,
but less than six years; and
(d) after twelve years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six
years or more, except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty
years. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two
months.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation
of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and
163
the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons
not constituting jeopardy.
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing
violations of the law not included in the Penal Code.
Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
SEC 6.; SEC 10. A.M No. 06-11-5-SC – RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE
Sec. 6. Post-conviction DNA Testing. – Post-conviction DNA testing may be

available, without need of prior court order, to the prosecution or any person convicted
by final and executory judgment provided that (a) a biological sample exists, (b) such
sample is relevant to the case, and (c) the testing would probably result in the reversal
or modification of the judgment of conviction.
Sec. 10. Post-conviction DNA Testing – Remedy if the Results Are Favorable to the
Convict. – The convict or the prosecution may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in the court of origin if the results of the post-conviction DNA testing are favorable to
the convict. In the case the court, after due hearing finds the petition to be meritorious,
if shall reverse or modify the judgment of conviction and order the release of the
convict, unless continued detention is justified for a lawful cause.
A similar petition may be filed either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, or
with any member of said courts, which may conduct a hearing thereon or remand the
petition to the court of origin and issue the appropriate orders.
164

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DIGESTED CASES ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

G.R. No. 123263 December 16, 1996

G.R. No. 115115 July 18, 1995

G.R. No. 169004 September 15, 2010

G.R. No. L-14595 May 31, 1960

his codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag, who died in

G.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995

G.R. No. L-64548 July 7, 1986

G.R. No. 85328 July 4, 1990

G.R. No. 192565February 28, 2012

G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006

G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994

G.R. No. L-4567 May 30, 1983

G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998

G.R. No. 152662 June 13, 2012

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted

G.R. No. 127845 March 10, 2000

G.R. No. 169888 November 11, 2008

G.R. No. 130492 January 31, 2001

G.R. No. 188106 November 25, 2009

G.R. No. 103102 March 6, 1992

G.R. No. 165751 April 12, 2005

G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010

G.R. No. 121211 April 30, 2003

G.R. No. 171271 August 31, 2006

G.R. No. 151785 December 10, 2007

G.R. No. 160451 February 9, 2007

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010

G.R. No. L-38308 December 26, 1984

G.R. No. 190847 April 13, 2011

G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002

G.R. No. 174238 July 7, 2009

G.R. No. 175091 July 13, 2011

G.R. Nos. 155531-34 July 29, 2005

G.R. No. 175851 July 04, 2012

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

G.R. No. L-50691 December 5, 1994

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action

G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010

annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the

G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009

GR. No. 101236 January 30, 1992

G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987

G.R. No. L-60962 July 11, 1986

G.R. No. L-14732 January 28, 1961

G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992

G.R. No. 134744 January 16, 2001

G.R. No. 130644 March 13, 1998

G.R. Nos. 138859-60 February 22, 2001

G.R. No. 109036 July 5, 1995

G.R. No. 110315 January 16, 1998

G.R. No. 116623 March 23, 1995

G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010

G.R. No. 132422 March 30, 2004

G.R. No. 147932 January 25, 2006

G.R. No. 119990 June 21, 2004

G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998

G.R. No. 131445 May 27, 2004

G.R. No. 171188 June 19, 2009

presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient. It

G.R. No. 70748 October 21, 1985

GR NOS 117952-53 FEBRUARY 14, 2001