#1

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-59329 July 19, 1985
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (DYRE) petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. JOSE P. DANS, JR., MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION & COMMUNICATIONS, THE HON.
CEFERINO S. CARREON, COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL TELECOM., COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE which had been
summarily closed on grounds of national security.
The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere allegation that the radio
station was used to incite people to sedition. it alleged that no hearing was held and not a bit of proof was submitted
to establish a factual basis for the closure. The petitioner was not informed beforehand why administrative action
which closed the radio station was taken against it. No action was taken by the respondents to entertain a motion
seeking the reconsideration of the closure action. The petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech. It
appears from the records that the respondents' general charge of "inciting people to commit acts of sedition" arose
from the petitioner's shift towards what it stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of programs
geared towards public affairs.
On March 25, 1985, before the Court could promulgate a decision squarely passing upon all the issues raised, the
petitioner through its president, Mr. Rene G. Espina suddenly filed a motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition.
The petitioner alleged:
1. Petitioner Eastern Broadcasting Corporation has already sold its radio broadcasting station in
favor of Manuel B. Pastrana as well as its rights and interest in the radio station DYRE in Cebu
including its right to operate and its equipment;
2. Respondent National Telecommunications Commission has expressed its willingness to grant to
the said new owner Manuel B. Pastrana the requisite license and franchise to operate the said radio
station and to approve the sale of the radio transmitter of said station DYRE;
3. In view of the foregoing, petitioner has no longer any interest in said case, and the new owner,
Manuel B. Pastrana is likewise not interested in pursuing the case any further.
The case, therefore, has become moot and academic. However, for the guidance of inferior courts and
administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions, the Court issues the following guidelines:
(1) The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by this Court in Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635) should be followed before a broadcast station may be closed or its operations
curtailed. 1
(2) It is necessary to reiterate that while there is no controlling and precise definition of due process, it furnishes
an unavoidable standard to which government action must conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or
property, in each appropriate case, may be valid (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City
Mayor, 20 SCRA 849).
(3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and
expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger
rule — that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent, In his Constitution of the
Philippines (2nd Edition, pp. 569-570) Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando cites at least nine of our decisions which
apply the test — (Primicias v. Fugoso [80 Phil. 71], American Bible Society v. City of Manila [101 Phil.
386], Cabansag v. Fernandez [102 Phil. 152], Vera v. Arca [28 SCRA 351], Navarro v. Villegas [31 SCRA
931], Imbong v. Ferrer [35 SCRA 28], Badoy v. Commission on Elections [35 SCRA 285], People v. Ferrer [48
SCRA 382], and the Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. [51
SCRA 189]. More recently, the clear and present danger test was applied in J.B.L. Reyes in behalf of the Anti-Bases
Coalition v. Bagatsing [125 SCRA 553].
(4) The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation
applicable to all utterances in all forums.
Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users. A broadcast
corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government regulation or for the rights
of others.
All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily,
however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded
to newspaper and print media.
The American Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation (438 U.S. 726), confronted with
a patently offensive and indecent regular radio program, explained why radio broadcasting, more than other forms of
communications, receives the most limited protection from the free expression clause. First, broadcast media have
established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens, Material presented over the airwaves confronts
the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children.
Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material available to children, but the
same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly tuning in and out.
Similar considerations apply in the area of national security.
The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos, Newspapers
and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast
and regular transportation. Even here, there are low income masses who find the cost of books, newspapers, and
magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities.
On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming universal. Their
message may be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or
unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast over the
airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different
I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to
monitor or predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work,
the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate analyze, and reject the utterance.
(5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of broadcast media into
account. The supervision of radio stations-whether by government or through self-regulation by the industry itself
calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling.
The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it.
Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the
same time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio and television would have little reason for existence if
broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they are the most
convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on public issues, they also deserve special
protection.
(6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. In the 1918
case of United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) this Court was already stressing that.
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public
affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free
speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may
suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear
conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official
acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted.
(7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of
expression clauses of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the case having become moot and academic, the petitioner's motion to withdraw or dismiss the
petition is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Relova, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur in the result (the case having become moot and academic).
Aquino, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

I concur in the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez, Jr., notable for its reiteration of the clear and present danger principle
as the standard of limitation on free speech and press, as decided by a unanimous court in J.B.L. Reyes v.
Bagatsing. 1
As may be gleaned from the voting of the Justices, the majority favors the view that even if a case were moot and
academic, a statement of the governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not
only of the parties but of others similarly situated. There are three Justices, however, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr. and
de la Fuente, who would strictly adhere to the concept that the case being moot and academic, the appropriate
disposition is that of simply dismissing the action. That is to abide by the teaching of orthodox learning. The
Philippines, however, has deviated from such a strict view. Nor is this approach of recent vintage. As early
as Alejandrino v. Quezon 2 decided in 1924, this Court, notwithstanding the absence of jurisdiction, expressed
through Justice Malcolm what principle of law should govern. Similarly in Osmena, Jr. v. Pendatun, 3 notwithstanding
well-founded doubts as to jurisdiction and a finding that the case should be dismissed for being moot and academic,
this Court, through the then Justice, later Chief Justice Bengzon, passed upon the legal question raised. In that
sense, the Philippines has followed an approach distinct from that of the United States, notwithstanding the
influence of American Constitutional law on our legal system.
Also let me state for the record that the original opinion prepared by Justice Gutierrez, Jr. could not have been
released in April after the petitioner on March 25, 1985 "filed a motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition." After that
date, some members of the Court wanted the matter discussed anew as to its appropriate disposition. That is the
explanation why such an opinion was never sent to the Office of the Chief Justice. Nor is it to be forgotten that even
if a decision signed by all the other members were thus submitted. the practice traditionally followed is for whoever
is Chief Justice to take a few days for the expression of his views if minded to do so.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

Prefatory Statement: As stated in the resolution penned by Mr. Justice Gutierrez, the release in early April of this
year of the Court's decision declaring null and void respondent commission's challenged summary order for closure
of petitioner's radio station ("definitely attended by complete absence of any hearing before or after the closure
itself") and granting the petition for issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction for the reopening of the station, was
overtaken by petitioner's "suddenly filed" motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition.
Initially, Mr. Justice Gutierrez was for applying the Salonga a formula and releasing nevertheless his sixteen-page extended opinion and
decision on the merits. He was of the view, fully shared by me, b that "(T)he need for guiding principles on constitutionalism is particularly keen in critical times and
in periods of transition. There is then a tendency to be impulsive in the exercise of power. The use of illegal shortcuts and the breakdown of traditional restraints
and discipline, unfortunately, is most pronounced in troubled times. It becomes necessary for the Court to emphasize the importance of adherence to the
mandates of the Constitution. The efforts, no matter how well meaning, to quell a rebellion or to stave off economic disaster cannot succeed if they transgress
basic rights and, therefore, alienate our people." But since such approach did not gain the concurrence of the majority, he has replaced his original ponencia with
the abbreviated Resolution (of a little over four pages) now released, which carries the required majority and issues guidelines "for the guidance of inferior courts
and administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions."
While withdrawal of the petition for loss of interest on petitioner's part may be granted, still the Court should
unequivocally set forth the guiding and controlling precepts or doctrines in pursuance of its symbolic function of
educating bench and bar as in Salonga on the protection and preservation of basic constitutional rights. As stated in
my separate concurring opinion, infra, public respondents' summary closure of petitioner's radio station failed to
observe the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of press and media
clauses of the Constitution, as well as the basic clear and present danger test. As stated by the now Chief Justice
in De la Camara vs. Enage,' c the fact that the case has become moot "should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and
unmistakable ... for the guidance of lower court judges [and other public officers] the controlling and authoritative doctrines that should be observed," so that full
respect may be accorded to basic constitutional rights.
My separate concurring opinion which follows hereinafter was prepared and scheduled for promulgation on or about
April 9, 1985 upon its return on said date to the ponente, Mr. Justice Gutierrez, for transmittal to the Office of the
Chief Justice for the purpose. But this was overtaken by the filing of petitioner's motion for withdrawal or dismissal of
the petition. Hence, my said concurring opinion should be read in such time context (in the same manner as in the
1974 martial law cases of Aquino, Jr. and Diokno vs. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 309, September 17, 1974, wherein the
promulgation of the decision and separate opinions originally schedule for September 12, 1974 was deferred to the
following week with the intervening release from detention of Senator Jose W Diokno).
xxx xxx xxx
The main opinion reaffirms in language unmistakable that broadcast media (radio and television) while subject to
government licensing (for allocation of the use of airwaves and frequencies) and regulation (considering their
pervasive presence and instant impact) are equally protected by the preferred freedoms of speech and of the press
and by the rudimentary requirements of due process against arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and property; that
the basic standard for restricting or punishing the exercise of these preferred freedoms is the clear and present
danger test — danger of a serious and imminent evil sought to be prevented; that the summary closure in October,
1980 of petitioner's radio station ("definitely attended by complete absence of any hearing before or after the closure
itself ") violated its constitutional rights and must therefore be declared null and void, and consequently, the writ of
mandatory injunction for the reopening of the station, as prayed for, must issue.
Congratulations are due the ponente Justice Hugo Gutierrez, Jr. who secured the Court's near-unanimous
concurrence in the recent case of Salonga vs. Pano 1 which went back to the fundamentals and stressed, in
discharge of the Court's "symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by
constitutional guarantees" that "(I)nfinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal
procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from
unwarranted and vexatious prosecution. The integrity of a democratic society is corrupted if a person is carelessly
included in the trial of around forty persons when on the very face of the record no evidence linking him to the
alleged conspiracy exists," that " ... if there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for
attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought — not free thought for those who agree with us but
freedom for the thought that we hate;" that "freedom of expression is a 'preferred' right and therefore stands on a
higher level than substantive economic or other liberties," that "this must be so because the lessons of history, both
political and legal, illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other
form of freedom. Protection is especially mandated for political discussions. This Court is particularly concerned
when allegations are made that restraints have been imposed upon mere criticisms of government and public
officials. Political discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal
indictments;" that there must be tolerance of political hyperbole since "debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide open and it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials," that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or prescribe advocacy of the use of force or of law in violation except where such advocacy
is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action;" that
"political discussion even among those opposed to the present administration is within the protective clause of
freedom of speech and expression. The same cannot be construed as subversive activities per se or as evidence of
membership in a subversive organization" in the absence of proof that "such discussion was in furtherance of any
plan to overthrow the government through illegal means;" that, "respondent court should have taken these factors
into consideration before concluding that a prima facie case exists against the petitioner. Evidence must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances;" and that "judge or fiscal, therefore,
should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this
would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the
judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should
continue to be so."
The same ponente has now likewise obtained the Court's near-unanimous approval of the decision at bar, 2 which
restates basic and established constitutional principles under the Rule of Law that public officials do not possess
absolute power to summarily close down a broadcasting station nor to arbitrarily deny its application for renewal of
license; that their broad and peremptory regulatory powers "must be exercised with punctilious regard for the due
process clause" which in the words of the Chief Justice signifies "freedom from arbitrariness [and] is the
embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play; 3 that radio and television which "would have little reason for existence
if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances" deserve the special protection
of the preferred right of free press and speech; that comment on and criticism of public officials in the conduct of
public affairs is not to be taken as "inciting to sedition or subversive acts" — that to curb or to punish the exercise of
such preferred right of comment and criticism there must exist the clear and present danger of a substantive and
grave evil that the State has a clear right to prevent, and hence, there must be a clear showing to this effect of "the
words used and when and how they were used;" that since the 1918 case of U.S. vs. Bustos, 4 the Court has taught
that "the interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision
of its probe relieves the abcesses of officialdom; " that the guarantee of free speech is a safety valve "allowing
parties the opportunity to give vent to their views, even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion" which is
grounded on "faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind"
and "serves to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication;" 5 and that
through the rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, "the citizens can participate not merely in the
periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well
as in the discipline of abusive public officers" and that since "the threat of sanctions may deter the exercise [of these
'delicate and vulnerable ... and supremely precious freedoms'] almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions, they 'need breathing space to survive' permitting government regulation only 'with narrow specificity. 6
The late Justice Jose Abad Santos, martyr of the Japanese occupation, left us over half a century ago the legacy of
his dissent against what he deemed were unjustified "invasions on the part of the government and its employees of
the sanctities of a man's home and the privacies of life" in People vs. Rubio 7 that the "commendable zeal (of internal
revenue agents) if allowed to override constitutional limitations would become 'obnoxious to fundamental principles
of liberty.' And if we are to be saved from the sad experiences of some countries which have constitutions only in
name, we must insist that governmental authority be exercised within constitutional limits; for, after all, what matters
is not so much what the people write in their constitutions as the spirit in which they observe their provisions."
In the same vein, the late Chief Justice Ricardo Paras in the landmark case of Primicias vs. Fugoso 8 enjoined all to
abide by the teaching of the 1907 sedition case of U. S. vs. Apurado 9 that instances of "disorderly conduct by
individual members of a crowd [be not seized] as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and
tumultuous rising against the authorities," for "if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such
disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and
tumultous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would
become a delusion and snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most
peaceable manner would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if
the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of
disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor."
Indeed, as I stressed in my dissenting opinion in the recent case of German vs. Barangan, 10 to require the citizen at
every step to assert his rights and to go to court is to render illusory his rights. All concerned, the governors as well
as the governed, must observe what they have written in their constitution in their very spirit and intent, so that as
written by Justice Makasiar in the PBM case 11 "the Bill of Rights [might not turn out to be] a useless attempt to limit
the power of government and cease to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the
influential and powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise."
The Court's decision makes short shrift of respondents' procedural arguments that non-renewal of petitioner's
license has made the petition "moot and academic" (brushed aside as "an afterthought or substitute for the
respondents' original position that the closure was due to national security") and that mandamus would not lie to
compel the reopening of the radio station brought about by their inaction on petitioner's timely application for
renewal of the license. It serves notice that in the exercise of the judicial power vested in it by the Constitution, it will
issue the equitable writs of certiorari and mandamus to do substantial justice and restore the status quo. In this
case, the summary closure of petitioner's radio station in 1980 having been declared null and void and no valid
ground for non-renewal of its license having been shown, it is as if the said license has been duly extended up to the
end of the current term or year. It is expected that respondents will forthwith return the crystal of the transmitter and
place no further obstacle to the prompt reopening of the radio station so that petitioner may pick up the broken
pieces and rightfully resume its operations (after almost five years of closure) in accordance with the judgment at
bar.

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

The petitioner has filed a motion to withdraw its petition for the reasons stated in its motion. The Court has granted
the motion but this circumstance should not deter the Court from educating those who wield power which if
exercised arbitrarily will make a mockery of the Bill of Rights.
The closure of the petitioner's radio station on grounds of national security without elaboration of the grounds and
without hearing deserves to be condemned in no uncertain terms for it is manifest that due process was not
observed. If there is an Idea which should be impressed in the minds of those who wield power it is that power must
be used in a reasonable manner. Arbitrariness must be eschewed. The main opinion, that of Justice Teehankee and
the case of Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 [1940], should be made required reading
materials for public officials who huff and puff with power making themselves not merely obnoxious but dangerous
as well.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
I concur in the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez, Jr., notable for its reiteration of the clear and present danger principle
as the standard of limitation on free speech and press, as decided by a unanimous court in J.B.L. Reyes v.
Bagatsing. 1
As may be gleaned from the voting of the Justices, the majority favors the view that even if a case were moot and
academic, a statement of the governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not
only of the parties but of others similarly situated. There are three Justices, however, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr. and
de la Fuente, who would strictly adhere to the concept that the case being moot and academic, the appropriate
disposition is that of simply dismissing the action. That is to abide by the teaching of orthodox learning. The
Philippines, however, has deviated from such a strict view. Nor is this approach of recent vintage. As early
as Alejandrino v. Quezon 2 decided in 1924, this Court, notwithstanding the absence of jurisdiction, expressed
through Justice Malcolm what principle of law should govern. Similarly in Osmena, Jr. v. Pendatun, 3 notwithstanding
well-founded doubts as to jurisdiction and a finding that the case should be dismissed for being moot and academic,
this Court, through the then Justice, later Chief Justice Bengzon, passed upon the legal question raised. In that
sense, the Philippines has followed an approach distinct from that of the United States, notwithstanding the
influence of American Constitutional law on our legal system.
Also let me state for the record that the original opinion prepared by Justice Gutierrez, Jr. could not have been
released in April after the petitioner on March 25, 1985 "filed a motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition." After that
date, some members of the Court wanted the matter discussed anew as to its appropriate disposition. That is the
explanation why such an opinion was never sent to the Office of the Chief Justice. Nor is it to be forgotten that even
if a decision signed by all the other members were thus submitted. the practice traditionally followed is for whoever
is Chief Justice to take a few days for the expression of his views if minded to do so.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

Prefatory Statement: As stated in the resolution penned by Mr. Justice Gutierrez, the release in early April of this
year of the Court's decision declaring null and void respondent commission's challenged summary order for closure
of petitioner's radio station ("definitely attended by complete absence of any hearing before or after the closure
itself") and granting the petition for issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction for the reopening of the station, was
overtaken by petitioner's "suddenly filed" motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition.
Initially, Mr. Justice Gutierrez was for applying the Salonga a formula and releasing nevertheless his sixteen-page extended opinion and
decision on the merits. He was of the view, fully shared by me, b that "(T)he need for guiding principles on constitutionalism is particularly keen in critical times and
in periods of transition. There is then a tendency to be impulsive in the exercise of power. The use of illegal shortcuts and the breakdown of traditional restraints
and discipline, unfortunately, is most pronounced in troubled times. It becomes necessary for the Court to emphasize the importance of adherence to the
mandates of the Constitution. The efforts, no matter how well meaning, to quell a rebellion or to stave off economic disaster cannot succeed if they transgress
basic rights and, therefore, alienate our people." But since such approach did not gain the concurrence of the majority, he has replaced his original ponencia with
the abbreviated Resolution (of a little over four pages) now released, which carries the required majority and issues guidelines "for the guidance of inferior courts
and administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions."
While withdrawal of the petition for loss of interest on petitioner's part may be granted, still the Court should
unequivocally set forth the guiding and controlling precepts or doctrines in pursuance of its symbolic function of
educating bench and bar as in Salonga on the protection and preservation of basic constitutional rights. As stated in
my separate concurring opinion, infra, public respondents' summary closure of petitioner's radio station failed to
observe the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of press and media
clauses of the Constitution, as well as the basic clear and present danger test. As stated by the now Chief Justice
in De la Camara vs. Enage,' c the fact that the case has become moot "should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and
unmistakable ... for the guidance of lower court judges [and other public officers] the controlling and authoritative doctrines that should be observed," so that full
respect may be accorded to basic constitutional rights.
My separate concurring opinion which follows hereinafter was prepared and scheduled for promulgation on or about
April 9, 1985 upon its return on said date to the ponente, Mr. Justice Gutierrez, for transmittal to the Office of the
Chief Justice for the purpose. But this was overtaken by the filing of petitioner's motion for withdrawal or dismissal of
the petition. Hence, my said concurring opinion should be read in such time context (in the same manner as in the
1974 martial law cases of Aquino, Jr. and Diokno vs. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 309, September 17, 1974, wherein the
promulgation of the decision and separate opinions originally schedule for September 12, 1974 was deferred to the
following week with the intervening release from detention of Senator Jose W Diokno).
xxx xxx xxx
The main opinion reaffirms in language unmistakable that broadcast media (radio and television) while subject to
government licensing (for allocation of the use of airwaves and frequencies) and regulation (considering their
pervasive presence and instant impact) are equally protected by the preferred freedoms of speech and of the press
and by the rudimentary requirements of due process against arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and property; that
the basic standard for restricting or punishing the exercise of these preferred freedoms is the clear and present
danger test — danger of a serious and imminent evil sought to be prevented; that the summary closure in October,
1980 of petitioner's radio station ("definitely attended by complete absence of any hearing before or after the closure
itself ") violated its constitutional rights and must therefore be declared null and void, and consequently, the writ of
mandatory injunction for the reopening of the station, as prayed for, must issue.
Congratulations are due the ponente Justice Hugo Gutierrez, Jr. who secured the Court's near-unanimous
concurrence in the recent case of Salonga vs. Pano 1 which went back to the fundamentals and stressed, in
discharge of the Court's "symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by
constitutional guarantees" that "(I)nfinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal
procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from
unwarranted and vexatious prosecution. The integrity of a democratic society is corrupted if a person is carelessly
included in the trial of around forty persons when on the very face of the record no evidence linking him to the
alleged conspiracy exists," that " ... if there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for
attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought — not free thought for those who agree with us but
freedom for the thought that we hate;" that "freedom of expression is a 'preferred' right and therefore stands on a
higher level than substantive economic or other liberties," that "this must be so because the lessons of history, both
political and legal, illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other
form of freedom. Protection is especially mandated for political discussions. This Court is particularly concerned
when allegations are made that restraints have been imposed upon mere criticisms of government and public
officials. Political discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal
indictments;" that there must be tolerance of political hyperbole since "debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide open and it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials," that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or prescribe advocacy of the use of force or of law in violation except where such advocacy
is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action;" that
"political discussion even among those opposed to the present administration is within the protective clause of
freedom of speech and expression. The same cannot be construed as subversive activities per se or as evidence of
membership in a subversive organization" in the absence of proof that "such discussion was in furtherance of any
plan to overthrow the government through illegal means;" that, "respondent court should have taken these factors
into consideration before concluding that a prima facie case exists against the petitioner. Evidence must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances;" and that "judge or fiscal, therefore,
should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this
would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the
judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should
continue to be so."
The same ponente has now likewise obtained the Court's near-unanimous approval of the decision at bar, 2 which
restates basic and established constitutional principles under the Rule of Law that public officials do not possess
absolute power to summarily close down a broadcasting station nor to arbitrarily deny its application for renewal of
license; that their broad and peremptory regulatory powers "must be exercised with punctilious regard for the due
process clause" which in the words of the Chief Justice signifies "freedom from arbitrariness [and] is the
embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play; 3 that radio and television which "would have little reason for existence
if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances" deserve the special protection
of the preferred right of free press and speech; that comment on and criticism of public officials in the conduct of
public affairs is not to be taken as "inciting to sedition or subversive acts" — that to curb or to punish the exercise of
such preferred right of comment and criticism there must exist the clear and present danger of a substantive and
grave evil that the State has a clear right to prevent, and hence, there must be a clear showing to this effect of "the
words used and when and how they were used;" that since the 1918 case of U.S. vs. Bustos, 4 the Court has taught
that "the interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision
of its probe relieves the abcesses of officialdom; " that the guarantee of free speech is a safety valve "allowing
parties the opportunity to give vent to their views, even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion" which is
grounded on "faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind"
and "serves to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication; " 5 and that
through the rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, "the citizens can participate not merely in the
periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well
as in the discipline of abusive public officers" and that since "the threat of sanctions may deter the exercise [of these
'delicate and vulnerable ... and supremely precious freedoms'] almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions, they 'need breathing space to survive' permitting government regulation only 'with narrow specificity. 6
The late Justice Jose Abad Santos, martyr of the Japanese occupation, left us over half a century ago the legacy of
his dissent against what he deemed were unjustified "invasions on the part of the government and its employees of
the sanctities of a man's home and the privacies of life" in People vs. Rubio 7 that the "commendable zeal (of internal
revenue agents) if allowed to override constitutional limitations would become 'obnoxious to fundamental principles
of liberty.' And if we are to be saved from the sad experiences of some countries which have constitutions only in
name, we must insist that governmental authority be exercised within constitutional limits; for, after all, what matters
is not so much what the people write in their constitutions as the spirit in which they observe their provisions."
In the same vein, the late Chief Justice Ricardo Paras in the landmark case of Primicias vs. Fugoso 8 enjoined all to
abide by the teaching of the 1907 sedition case of U. S. vs. Apurado 9 that instances of "disorderly conduct by
individual members of a crowd [be not seized] as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and
tumultuous rising against the authorities," for "if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such
disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and
tumultous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would
become a delusion and snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most
peaceable manner would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if
the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of
disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor."
Indeed, as I stressed in my dissenting opinion in the recent case of German vs. Barangan, 10 to require the citizen at
every step to assert his rights and to go to court is to render illusory his rights. All concerned, the governors as well
as the governed, must observe what they have written in their constitution in their very spirit and intent, so that as
written by Justice Makasiar in the PBM case 11 "the Bill of Rights [might not turn out to be] a useless attempt to limit
the power of government and cease to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the
influential and powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise."
The Court's decision makes short shrift of respondents' procedural arguments that non-renewal of petitioner's
license has made the petition "moot and academic" (brushed aside as "an afterthought or substitute for the
respondents' original position that the closure was due to national security") and that mandamus would not lie to
compel the reopening of the radio station brought about by their inaction on petitioner's timely application for
renewal of the license. It serves notice that in the exercise of the judicial power vested in it by the Constitution, it will
issue the equitable writs of certiorari and mandamus to do substantial justice and restore the status quo. In this
case, the summary closure of petitioner's radio station in 1980 having been declared null and void and no valid
ground for non-renewal of its license having been shown, it is as if the said license has been duly extended up to the
end of the current term or year. It is expected that respondents will forthwith return the crystal of the transmitter and
place no further obstacle to the prompt reopening of the radio station so that petitioner may pick up the broken
pieces and rightfully resume its operations (after almost five years of closure) in accordance with the judgment at
bar.

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

The petitioner has filed a motion to withdraw its petition for the reasons stated in its motion. The Court has granted
the motion but this circumstance should not deter the Court from educating those who wield power which if
exercised arbitrarily will make a mockery of the Bill of Rights.
The closure of the petitioner's radio station on grounds of national security without elaboration of the grounds and
without hearing deserves to be condemned in no uncertain terms for it is manifest that due process was not
observed. If there is an Idea which should be impressed in the minds of those who wield power it is that power must
be used in a reasonable manner. Arbitrariness must be eschewed. The main opinion, that of Justice Teehankee and
the case of Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 [1940], should be made required reading
materials for public officials who huff and puff with power making themselves not merely obnoxious but dangerous
as well.

#2
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978
MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner,
vs.
HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.
Angel C. Cruz, Gregorio A. Ejercito, Felix C. Chaves & Jose Laureta for petitioner.
Sotero H. Laurel for respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review tile decision dated September 17, 1968 of respondent Judge Francisco Arca
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, in Civil Case No. 72797, the dispositive portion of winch reads.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents,
declaring Ordinance No. 6 37 of the City of Manila null and void. The preliminary injunction is made
permanent. No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, September 17, 1968.
(SGD.) FRANCISCO
ARCA
Judge1
The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and
signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968. 2
City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:
AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED IN
ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT
 FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES. 3
Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any
position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first
securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons
employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both
the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and
members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three (3) months to six (6) months or
fine of not less than P100.00 but not more than P200.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, upon conviction. 5
On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition with the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a
judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. 6
In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as his grounds for wanting the ordinance declared
null and void:
1) As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila, Ordinance No. 6537 is
discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation;
2) As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations,
imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and
that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the
fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers:
3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of
their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.7
On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on September 17, 1968 rendered
judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction. 8
Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge, then Mayor Antonio J. Villegas filed the present petition on
March 27, 1969. Petitioner assigned the following as errors allegedly committed by respondent Judge in the latter's
decision of September 17,1968: 9
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN
RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE CARDINAL RULE OF UNIFORMITY OF
TAXATION.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN
RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE AGAINST UNDUE
DESIGNATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN
RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION.
Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null and void on the ground that it
violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or
revenue measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an exercise of the police
power of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure in nature.
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal purpose is
regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an
employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval
or disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second part which
requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or
justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of
the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial
differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of
the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of
P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or
whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion.
It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide
or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for
its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to
grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited
delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful. 10
In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization Board, 11 where a law granted a government agency
power to determine the allocation of wheat flour among importers, the Supreme Court ruled against the
interpretation of uncontrolled power as it vested in the administrative officer an arbitrary discretion to be exercised
without a policy, rule, or standard from which it can be measured or controlled.
It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso 12 that the authority and discretion to grant and refuse permits of all classes
conferred upon the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila is not uncontrolled discretion but legal
discretion to be exercised within the limits of the law.
Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in
the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance.
The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or
refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of
livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an
alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of
livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both
aliens and citizens. 13
The trial court did not commit the errors assigned.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Santos and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Castro, C.J., Antonio and Aquino, Fernando, JJ., concur in the result.
Concepcion, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Fernandez which affirms the lower court's judgment declaring
Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila null and void for the reason that the employment of aliens within the
country is a matter of national policy and regulation, which properly pertain to the national government officials and
agencies concerned and not to local governments, such as the City of Manila, which after all are mere creations of
the national government.
The national policy on the matter has been determined in the statutes enacted by the legislature, viz, the various
Philippine nationalization laws which on the whole recognize the right of aliens to obtain gainful employment in the
country with the exception of certain specific fields and areas. Such national policies may not be interfered with,
thwarted or in any manner negated by any local government or its officials since they are not separate from and
independent of the national government.
As stated by the Court in the early case of Phil. Coop. Livestock Ass'n. vs. Earnshaw, 59 Phil. 129: "The City of
Manila is a subordinate body to the Insular (National Government ...). When the Insular (National) Government
adopts a policy, a municipality is without legal authority to nullify and set at naught the action of the superior
authority." Indeed, "not only must all municipal powers be exercised within the limits of the organic laws, but they
must be consistent with the general law and public policy of the particular state ..." (I McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations, 2nd sec. 367, P. 1011).
With more reason are such national policies binding on local governments when they involve our foreign relations
with other countries and their nationals who have been lawfully admitted here, since in such matters the views and
decisions of the Chief of State and of the legislature must prevail over those of subordinate and local governments
and officials who have no authority whatever to take official acts to the contrary.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Fernandez which affirms the lower court's judgment declaring
Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila null and void for the reason that the employment of aliens within the
country is a matter of national policy and regulation, which properly pertain to the national government officials and
agencies concerned and not to local governments, such as the City of Manila, which after all are mere creations of
the national government.
The national policy on the matter has been determined in the statutes enacted by the legislature, viz, the various
Philippine nationalization laws which on the whole recognize the right of aliens to obtain gainful employment in the
country with the exception of certain specific fields and areas. Such national policies may not be interfered with,
thwarted or in any manner negated by any local government or its officials since they are not separate from and
independent of the national government.
As stated by the Court in the early case of Phil. Coop. Livestock Ass'n. vs. Earnshaw, 59 Phil. 129: "The City of
Manila is a subordinate body to the Insular (National Government ...). When the Insular (National) Government
adopts a policy, a municipality is without legal authority to nullify and set at naught the action of the superior
authority." Indeed, "not only must all municipal powers be exercised within the limits of the organic laws, but they
must be consistent with the general law and public policy of the particular state ..." (I McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations, 2nd sec. 367, P. 1011).
With more reason are such national policies binding on local governments when they involve our foreign relations
with other countries and their nationals who have been lawfully admitted here, since in such matters the views and
decisions of the Chief of State and of the legislature must prevail over those of subordinate and local governments
and officials who have no authority whatever to take official acts to the contrary.

#3
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991
SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in making that determination, the
HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar
are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the
HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes
the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the 1987 Constitution,
the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred (Angara v.
Electoral Commission, supra at p. 162). The exercise of power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had originally
remained in the legislature." (id., at p. 175) Earlier this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by
Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete; (Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil.
886 [1919]) Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral
Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the Legislature and the
Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution. (p. 401)
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action
taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power
granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of
this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." (pp. 403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants of power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the judgments of the
Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction,
. . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration
of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has
to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral
Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not venture into the perilous
area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches of the Government, It comes in only when it has
to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the
Constitution calls for remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review
the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted
within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has
gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a
showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET
alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is
apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the
tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their functions independent organs — independent of
Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139
[1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers, must permit this
exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may exist as it exists
today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in
the Constitution, however, that makes the HRET because of its composition any less independent from the Court or
its constitutional functions any less exclusive. The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on
how many legislative members of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test remains the same-manifest
grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET
which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines
from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from
the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial
administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to
Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish an enduring
relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values
and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino,
Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and
shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the
meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where
he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on
February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as
final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization
was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was finishing his
elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other
Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was burned to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in place of their ruined
house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang was their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in
order to acquire his secondary and college education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted their second house in
Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still another house, this time a 16-door apartment building, two
doors of which were reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the
Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in
Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status
as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed
the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly
declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be
aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and
correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their family business decided to
be of greater service to his province and ran for public office. Hence, when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in
the elections for representative in the second district of Northern Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in Congress. Even if the
total votes of the two petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead the two by more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
 3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship
after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that
date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women.
There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it under the
1973 Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the provision of the
1935 Constitution whether the election was done before or after January 17, 1973. (Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and Human Rights
has more or less decided to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born citizen as provided in section 4
of the 1973 Constitution by adding that persons who have elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935
Constitution shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding Officer?
Fr. Bernas: yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well written book, he said that
the decision was designed merely to accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and that the definition on
natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now it seems that the Reverend Father Bernas is going against this
intention by supporting the amendment?
Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in my thinking. (Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his election of Philippine citizenship makes
him not only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him to run for Congress. . .
Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it to the body to approve
that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as unfair that the Filipino
citizen who was born a day before January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a natural-born citizen.
(Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973
1av vphi1

when we were under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-
born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens but not
natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective from February 3,
1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the literal meaning of its
language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter
would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at
which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v.
Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any constitution is not to be construed
narrowly or pedantically for the prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not
mathematical formulas having their essence in their form but are organic living institutions, the significance
of which is vital not formal. . . . (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an
alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and
an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws,
conferred the status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father
were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident of time or
result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and,
therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either
before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to correct the
inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil
at the time had it not been for the curative provisions. (See Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to
this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children
born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the
unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural
born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have
divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed
a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969,
election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been
a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage
and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact
pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship (p. 52; emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the
Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as they
were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and no racial
distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization when the
child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government agency. His
profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting a license. He has participated in political
exercises as a Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show
that he does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to show
that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's
parentage. They should know him better than any member of this Court will ever know him. They voted by
overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress. Because of his acts since childhood, they have
considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For
those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less
binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification,
voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves
formal manifestations of choice for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful
because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he
turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only have been
superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed that "when
protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the
Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this country.
Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as
such." (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature
taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his death and
at this very late date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not be done. In our
jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v.
Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against
the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity
to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have long been
muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he could not use beyond where his mortal remains now lie to
defend himself were this matter to be made a central issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our function is to
determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the
respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The
citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he
came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not
have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign
nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which
he could possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave abuse of discretion.
The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and
by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full
blood brother of the respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the Batasang Pambansa, and the
respondent HRET, such a difference could only be characterized as error. There would be no basis to call the HRET
decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April
1899 and then residing in said islands and their children born subsequent thereto were conferred the status of a
Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy. (Emphasis
supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once established is considered
to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of
Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895. Correspondingly, a
certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the
Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the turn of the 19th
century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his business and acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of
the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines. The fact that he
died in China, during one of his visits in said country, was of no moment. This will not change the fact that he
already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish
subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under the Monarchy of
Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as one who
has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) A priori,
there can be no other logical conclusion but to educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions
of section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private respondent was a natural-born
Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to prove it were not in compliance with
the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private respondent failed to present the original of the
documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the proceedings of the body which the aforesaid
resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions to the best evidence
rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee Report No. 12, the
minutes of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by Atty. Nolledo,
Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P Law Center,
in their respective testimonies given before the HRET to the effect that there is no governmental agency which is the
official custodian of the records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN,
January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of the 1971
Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify to such execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty.
Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law does not require the degree of proof to be of
sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown that after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be found.
(see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 [1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established, the contents of the
questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection of witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in the Committee Report, the
former member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when he was presented as a witness in the
hearing of the protest against the private respondent, categorically stated that he saw the disputed documents
presented during the hearing of the election protest against the brother of the private respondent. (TSN, February 1,
1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional Convention, states that he
was presiding officer of the plenary session which deliberated on the report on the election protest against Delegate
Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of delegates present. Among them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr.
Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could have presented any one of the long list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's
having been declared a natural-born citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the contents of the
documents presented by the private respondent. They merely relied on the procedural objections respecting the
admissibility of the evidence presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member of that body. The
HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member
of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on the controversies over which they were sole judges. Decisions
were arrived at only after a full presentation of all relevant factors which the parties wished to present. Even
assuming that we disagree with their conclusions, we cannot declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of
discretion. We have to keep clear the line between error and grave abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term "residence" has been
understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987
Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications
of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an
attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the
legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned,
the proposed section merely provides, among others, and a resident thereof, that is, in the district, for a
period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973
Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol.
11, July 22, 1986. p. 87)
xxx xxx xxx
 Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the
same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual
residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence
rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the
Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we
have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence.
(Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which regarded it as
having the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one
intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent
residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words,
domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar.
Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even
up to the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established that after the fire that gutted
their house in 1961, another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment was built by
their family, two doors of which were reserved as their family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p.
8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot,
therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's parents. Upon the demise of
his parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof
(as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case
of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should have a house in
order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house
or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to
a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and
residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in
order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a
voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil.
294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and later to
practice his profession, There was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the
periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an interracial evolution. Throughout
our history, there has been a continuing influx of Malays, Chinese, Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and other
nationalities. This racial diversity gives strength to our country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a person, for there is none. To mention
a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee was part Chinese, and of
course our own President, Corazon Aquino is also part Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we are proud were
ethnically more Chinese than the private respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which one must
forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an interpretation,
have to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the very affluent backed by
influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt
process of clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical traps of
the judicial process were able to acquire citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a
more positive, affirmative, and meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane,
more indubitable and less technical approach to citizenship problems is essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and
a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Gancayco, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I dissent.
These separate petitions for certiorari and mandamus seek to annul the decision* of respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the tribunal) dated 6 November 1989 which declared
private respondent Jose L. Ong, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a legal resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar, and the resolution of the tribunal dated 22 February 1990 denying petitioners' motions for reconsideration.
In G.R. Nos. 92191-92, petitioner Co also prays that the Court declare private respondent Ong not qualified to be a
Member of the House of Representatives and to declare him (petitioner Co) who allegedly obtained the highest
number of votes among the qualified candidates, the duly elected representative of the second legislative district of
Northern Samar. In G.R. Nos. 92202-03, petitioner Balanquit prays that the Court declare private respondent Ong
and Co (petitioner in G.R. Nos. 92191-92) not qualified for membership in the House of Representatives and to
proclaim him (Balanguit) as the duly elected representative of said district.
Petitioners Antonio Y. Co, Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. and private respondent Jose Ong Chuan, Jr. were among the
candidates for the position of Representative or Congressman for the second district of Northern Samar during the
11 May 1987 congressional elections. Private respondent was proclaimed duly-elected on 18 May 1987 with a
plurality of some sixteen thousand (16,000) votes over petitioner Co who obtained the next highest number of votes.
Petitioners Co and Balanquit then filed separate election protests against private respondent with the tribunal,
docketed as HRET Cases Nos. 13 and 15 respectively. Both protests raised almost the same issues and were thus
considered and decided jointly by the tribunal.
The issues raised before the tribunal were the following:
1. Whether or not protestee (meaning, Ong) is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines in contemplation of
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof; and
2. Whether or not protestee was a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar, in contemplation of Section 6,
Article VI of the same Constitution, for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
congressional elections of May 1987.
The respondent tribunal in its decision dated 6 November 1989 held that respondent Jose L. Ong is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and was a legal resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for the required period prior to the
May 1987 congressional elections. He was, therefore, declared qualified to continue in office as Member of the
House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, representing the second legislative district of Northern
Samar.
The factual antecedents taken from the consolidated proceedings in the tribunal are the following:
1. The Protestee (Ong) was born on June 19, 1948 to the legal spouses Ong Chuan also known as Jose
Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao. His place of birth is Laoang which is now one of the municipalities
comprising the province of Northern Samar (Republic Act No. 6132 approved on August 24, 1970 and the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution).
2. On the other hand, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China and arrived in Manila on December 16, 1915.
(Exhibit zz) Subsequently thereafter, he took up residence in Laoang, Samar.
3. On February 4, 1932, he married Agrifina E. Lao. Their wedding was celebrated according to the rites and
practices of the Roman Catholic Church in the Municipality of Laoang (Exh. E).
4. At the time of her marriage to Jose Ong Chuan, Agrifina E. Lao was a natural-born Filipino citizen, both
her parents at the time of her birth being Filipino citizens. (Exhibits E & I)
5. On February 15, 1954, Jose Ong Chuan, desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship, filed his petition for
naturalization with the Court of First Instance of Samar, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law.
 6. On April 28, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Samar rendered a decision approving the application of
Jose Ong Chuan for naturalization and declaring said petitioner a Filipino citizen "with all the rights and
privileges and duties, liabilities and obligations inherent to Filipino citizens. (Exh. E)
7. On May 15, 1957, the same Court issued an order:
(1) declaring the decision of this Court of April 28, 1955 final and executory;
(2) directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization in favor of the
applicant Ong Chuan who prefers to take his oath and register his name as Jose Ong Chuan.
Petitioner may take his oath as Filipino citizen under Ms new christian name, Jose Ong Chuan. (Exh.
F)
8. On the same day, Jose Ong Chuan having taken the corresponding oath of allegiance to the Constitution
and the Government of the Philippines as prescribed by Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, was
issued the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization. (Exh. G)
9. On November 10, 1970, Emil L. Ong, a full-brother of the protestee and a son born on July 25, 1937 at
Laoang, Samar to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao, was elected delegate from Northern
Samar to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
10. By protestee's own -testimony, it was established that he had attended grade school in Laoang.
Thereafter, he went to Manila where he finished his secondary as well as his college education. While later
employed in Manila, protestee however went home to Laoang whenever he had the opportunity to do so,
which invariably would be as frequent as twice to four times a year.
11. Protestee also showed that being a native and legal resident of Laoang, he registered as a voter therein
and correspondingly voted in said municipality in the 1984 and 1986 elections.
12. Again in December 1986, during the general registration of all voters in the country, Protestee re-
registered as a voter in Precinct No. 4 of Barangay Tumaguinting in Laoang. In his voter's affidavit,
Protestee indicated that he is a resident of Laoang since birth. (Exh. 7)1
Petitioners' motions for reconsideration of the tribunal's decision having been denied, petitioners filed the present
petitions.
In their comments, the respondents first raise the issue of the Court's jurisdiction to review the decision of the House
Electoral Tribunal, considering the constitutional provision vesting upon said tribunal the power and authority to act
as the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.2
On the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the present controversy, I believe that, contrary to the respondents'
contentions, the Court has the jurisdiction and competence to review the questioned decision of the tribunal and to
decide the present controversy.
Article VIII, Section I of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the tribunal as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. But as early as 1938, it was held in Morrero vs.
Bocar,3 construing Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which provided that ". . . The Electoral Commission
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly," that:
The judgment rendered by the (electoral) commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference, except, in any event, "upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident
use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law." (Barry vs. US ex rel. Cunningham, 279
US 597; 73 Law. ed., 867; Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 35 Off. Gaz., 23.)
And then under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, this Court is duty-
bound to determine whether or not, in an actual controversy, there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more than perceived irregularities in the conduct of a
congressional election or a disputed appreciation of ballots, in which cases, it may be contended with great legal
force and persuasion that the decision of the electoral tribunal should be final and conclusive, for it is, by
constitutional directive, made the sole judge of contests relating to such matters. The present controversy, however,
involves no less than a determination of whether the qualifications for membership in the House of
Representatives, as prescribed by the Constitution, have been met. Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably remiss
in the performance of its duties, as mandated by the Constitution, were it to allow a person, not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the House of Representatives, solely because the House Electoral
Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a case, the tribunal would have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to require the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial review.
Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of private respondent for the office of Member of the House of
Representatives, are here controverted by petitioners who, at the same time, claim that they are entitled to the office
illegally held by private respondent. From this additional direction, where one asserts an earnestly perceived right
that in turn is vigorously resisted by another, there is clearly a justiciable controversy proper for this Court to
consider and decide.
Nor can it be said that the Court, in reviewing the decision of the tribunal, asserts supremacy over it in contravention
of the time-honored principle of constitutional separation of powers. The Court in this instance simply performs a
function entrusted and assigned to it by the Constitution of interpreting, in a justiciable controversy, the pertinent
provisions of the Constitution with finality.
It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or statutory)
interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the three branches of the government, almost always in
situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action that stems ultimately from some legitimate
area of governmental power (the Supreme Court in Modern Role, C.B. Sevisher, 1958, p. 36).4
Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest and concern to determine whether or not private
respondent is qualified to hold so important and high a public office which is specifically reserved by the Constitution
only to natural-born Filipino citizens.
After a careful consideration of the issues and the evidence, it is my considered opinion that the respondent tribunal
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its questioned decision
and resolution, for reasons to be presently stated.
The Constitution5 requires that a Member of the House of Representatives must be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and,
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines natural-born (Filipino) citizens as:
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph (3), Section I hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizen,
Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority.
The Court in this case is faced with the duty of interpreting the above-quoted constitutional provisions. The first
sentence of Section 2 of Article IV states the basic definition of a natural-born Filipino citizen. Does private
respondent fall within said definition?
To the respondent tribunal,
Protestee may even be declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines under the first sentence of Sec. 2 of
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution because he did not have "to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship." It bears to repeat that on 15 May 1957, while still a minor of 9 years he already
became a Filipino citizen by declaration of law. Since his mother was a natural-born citizen at the time of her
marriage, protestee had an inchoate right to Philippine citizenship at the moment of his birth and,
consequently the declaration by virtue of Sec. 15 of CA 473 that he was a Filipino citizen retroacted to the
moment of his birth without his having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such Philippine citizenship.6
I regret that I am neither convinced nor persuaded by such kaleidoscopic ratiocination. The records show that
private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese citizen, and Agrifina E.
Lao, a natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern Samar. In other words, at birth, private respondent was a
Chinese citizen (not a natural-born Filipino citizen) because his father was then a Chinese citizen (not a naturalized
Filipino citizen). Under the 1935 Constitution which was enforced at the time of private respondent's birth on 19
June 1948, only those whose fathers were citizens of the Philippines were considered Filipino citizens. Those whose
mothers were citizens of the Philippines had to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in
order to be considered Filipino citizens.7
Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a natural-born citizen, in relation to the 1935 Constitution,
private respondent is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the Chinese
citizenship of his father at the time of his birth, although from birth, private respondent had the right to elect
Philippine citizenship, the citizenship of his mother, but only upon his reaching the age of majority.
While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. 473) minor children of a naturalized citizen (father),
who were born in the Philippines prior to the naturalization of the parent automatically become Filipino citizens,8 this
does not alter the fact that private respondent was not born to a Filipino father, and the operation of Section 15 of
CA 473 did not confer upon him the status of a natural-born citizen merely because he did not have to perform any
act to acquire or perfect his status as a Filipino citizen.
But even assuming arguendo that private respondent could be considered a natural-born citizen by virtue of the
operation of CA 473, petitioners however contend that the naturalization of private respondent's father was invalid
and void from the beginning, and, therefore, private respondent is not even a Filipino citizen.
Respondent tribunal in its questioned decision ruled that only a direct proceeding for nullity of naturalization as a
Filipino citizen is permissible, and, therefore, a collateral attack on Ong Chuan's naturalization is barred in an
electoral contest which does not even involve him (Ong Chuan).
Private respondent, for his part, avers in his Comment that the challenge against Ong Chuan's naturalization must
emanate from the Government and must be made in a proper/appropriate and direct proceeding for de-
naturalization directed against the proper party, who in such case is Ong Chuan, and also during his lifetime.
A judgment in a naturalization proceeding is not, however, afforded the character of impregnability under the
principle of res judicata.9 Section 18 of CA 473 provides that a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled upon
motion made in the proper proceeding by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial
fiscal.
In Republic vs. Go Bon Lee,10 this Court held that:
An alien friend is offered under certain conditions the privilege of citizenship. He may accept the offer and
become a citizen upon compliance with the prescribed conditions, but not otherwise. His claim is of favor,
not of right. He can only become a citizen upon and after a strict compliance with the acts of Congress. An
applicant for this high privilege is bound, therefore, to conform to the terms upon which alone the right he
seeks can be conferred. It is his province, and he is bound, to see that the jurisdictional facts upon which the
grant is predicated actually exist and if they do not he takes nothing by this paper grant.
xxx xxx xxx
Congress having limited this privilege to a specified class of persons, no other person is entitled to such
privilege, nor to a certificate purporting to grant it, and any such certificate issued to a person not so entitled
to receive it must be treated as a mere nullity, which confers no legal rights as against the government, from
which it has been obtained without warrant of law.
"Naturalization is not a right, but a privilege of the most discriminating as well as delicate and exacting nature,
affecting public interest of the highest order, and which may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions prescribed
by law therefor."11
Considering the legal implications of the allegation made by the petitioners that the naturalization of private
respondent's father Ong Chuan, is a nullity, the Court should make a ruling on the validity of said naturalization
proceedings. This course of action becomes all the more inevitable and justified in the present case where, to repeat
for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public office.12
It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the citizenship of private respondent is derived from his father. If his
father's Filipino citizenship is void from the beginning, then there is nothing from which private respondent can
derive his own claimed Filipino citizenship. For a spring cannot rise higher than its source. And to allow private
respondent to avail of the privileges of Filipino citizenship by virtue of a void naturalization of his father, would
constitute or at least sanction a continuing offense against the Constitution.
The records show that private respondent's father, Jose Ong Chuan, took the oath of allegiance to the Constitution
and the Philippine Government, as prescribed by Section 12 of CA 473 on the same day (15 May 1957) that the CFI
issued its order directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization and for the
applicant to take the oath of allegiance.
However, it is settled that an order granting a petition to take the requisite oath of allegiance of one who has
previously obtained a decision favorable to his application for naturalization, is appealable. It is, therefore, improper
and illegal to authorize the taking of said oath upon the issuance of said order and before the expiration of the
reglementary period to perfect any appeal from said order.13
In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic,14 this Court held that:
Administration of the oath of allegiance on the same day as issuance of order granting citizenship is irregular
and makes the proceedings so taken null and void. (Republic vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 [1982]; citing the case
of Ong So vs. Republic of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 1381).
It would appear from the foregoing discussion that the naturalization of Jose Ong Chuan (private respondent's
father) was null and void. It follows that the private respondent did not acquire any legal rights from the void
naturalization of his father and thus he cannot himself be considered a Filipino citizen, more so, a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
But assuming that the CFI order of 15 May 1957 directing the clerk of court to issue the certificate of naturalization
to Ong Chuan and for the latter to take the oath of allegiance was final and not appealable, the resulting
naturalization of Ong Chuan effected, as previously stated, an automatic naturalization of private respondent, then a
minor, as a Filipino citizen on 15 May 1957, but not his acquisition or perfection of the status of a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
Let us now look into the question of whether or not private respondent acquired the status of a natural-born Filipino
citizen by reason of the undisputed fact that his mother was a natural-born Filipino citizen. This in turn leads us to an
examination of the second sentence in Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It expands, in a manner of
speaking, in relation to Section 1, paragraph (3) of the same Article IV, the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen to
those who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. The right or privilege of election is
available, however, only to those born to Filipino mothers under the 1935 Constitution, and before the 1973
Constitution took effect on 17 January 1973.
The petitioners contend that the respondent tribunal acted in excess of its jurisdiction or gravely abused its
discretion as to exceed its jurisdiction in "distorting" the conferment by the 1987 Constitution of the status of
"natural-born" Filipino citizen on those who elect Philippine citizenship — all in its strained effort, according to
petitioners, to support private respondent's qualification to be a Member of the House of Representatives.15
Petitioners argue that the clear, unambiguous wording of section 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
contemplates that only the legitimate children of Filipino mothers with alien father, born before 17 January 1973 and
who would reach the age of majority (and thus elect Philippine citizenship) after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution are entitled to the status of natural-born Filipino citizen.16
The respondent tribunal in resolving the issue of the constitutional provisions' interpretation, found reason to refer to
the interpellations made during the 1986 Constitutional Commission. It said:
That the benevolent provisions of Sections 2 and 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution was (sic)
intended by its (sic) framers to be endowed, without distinction, to all Filipinos by election pursuant to the
1935 Constitution is more than persuasively established by the extensive interpellations and debate on the
issue as borne by the official records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.17
Although I find the distinction as to when election of Philippine citizenship was made irrelevant to the case at bar,
since private respondent, contrary to the conclusion of the respondent tribunal, did not elect Philippine citizenship,
as provided by law, I still consider it necessary to settle the controversy regarding the meaning of the constitutional
provisions in question.
I agree with respondent tribunal that the debates, interpellations petitions and opinions expressed in the 1986
Constitutional Commission may be resorted to in ascertaining the meaning of somewhat elusive and even nebulous
constitutional provisions. Thus —
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction
that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The
primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose
of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the
people in ratifying the constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.18
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 2, Article IV in relation to Section 1(3)
of the same Article, appear to negate the contention of petitioners that only those born to Filipino mothers before 17
January 1973 and who would elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, are to be
considered natural-born Filipino citizens.
During the free-wheeling discussions on citizenship, Commissioner Treñas specifically asked Commissioner Bernas
regarding the provisions in question, thus:
MR. TRENAS: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and Human
Rights has more or less decided to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born Filipino citizen as
provided in Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution, by adding that persons who have elected Philippine
citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be considered natural-born. Am I right, Mr. Presiding Officer?
FR BERNAS: Yes.
MR. TRENAS: And does the Commissioner think that tills addition to Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution
would be contrary to the spirit of that section?
FR BERNAS: Yes, we are quite aware that it is contrary to the letter really. But whether it is contrary to the
spirit is something that has been debated before and is being debated even now. We will recall that during
the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the status of natural-born citizenship of one of the delegates, Mr. Ang,
was challenged precisely because he was a citizen by election. Finally, the 1971 Constitutional Convention
considered him a natural-born citizen, one of the requirements to be a Member of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. The reason behind that decision was that a person under his circumstances already had the
inchoate right to be a citizen by the fact that the mother was a Filipino. And as a matter of fact, the 1971
Constitutional Convention formalized that recognition by adopting paragraph 2 of Section 1 of the 1971
Constitution. So, the entire purpose of this proviso is simply to perhaps remedy whatever injustice there may
be so that these people born before January 17, 1973 who are not naturalized and people who are not
 natural born but who are in the same situation as we are considered natural-born citizens. So, the intention
of the Committee in proposing this is to equalize their status.19
When asked to clarify the provision on natural-born citizens, Commissioner Bernas replied to Commissioner Azcuna
thus:
MR. AZCUNA: With respect to the proviso in Section 4, would this refer only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it under the
1935 Constitution?
FR BERNAS: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the provision of the
1935 Constitution, whether the election was done before or after 17 January 1973.20
And during the period of amendments. Commissioner Rodrigo explained the purpose of what now appear as
Section 2 and Section 1, paragraph (3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
MR. RODRIGO: The purpose of that proviso is to remedy an inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973,
when we were under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-
born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and, if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens, yet, but not
natural-born Filipino citizens.
The 1973 Constitution equalized the status of those born of Filipino mothers and those born of Filipino fathers. So
that from January 17, 1973 when the 1973 Constitution took effect, those born of Filipino mothers but of alien
fathers are natural-born Filipino citizens. Also, those who are born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers are natural-
born Filipino citizens.
If the 1973 Constitution equalized the status of a child born of a Filipino mother and that born of a Filipino father,
why do we not give a chance to a child born before January 17, 1973, if and when he elects Philippine citizenship, to
be in the same status as one born of a Filipino father — namely, natural-born citizen.
Another thing I stated is equalizing the status of a father and a mother vis-a-vis the child. I would like to state also
that we showed equalize the status of a child born of a Filipino mother the day before January 17, 1973 and a child
born also of a Filipino mother on January 17 or 24 hours later. A child born of a Filipino mother but an alien father
one day before January 17, 1973 is a Filipino citizen, if he elects Philippine citizenship, but he is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen. However, the other child who luckily was born 24 hours later — maybe because of parto laborioso —
is a natural-born Filipino citizen.21
It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino citizen
was to equalize the position of Filipino fathers and Filipino mothers as to their children becoming natural-born
Filipino citizens. In other words, after 17 January 1973, effectivity date of the 1973 Constitution, all those born of
Filipino fathers (with alien spouse) or Filipino mothers (with alien spouse) are natural-born Filipino citizens. But
those born to Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973 must still elect Philippine citizenship upon their reaching the
age of majority, in order to be deemed natural-born Filipino citizens. The election, which is related to the attainment
of the age of majority, may be made before or after 17 January 1973. This interpretation appears to be in
consonance with the fundamental purpose of the Constitution which is to protect and enhance the people's
individual interests,22 and to foster equality among them.
Since private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 (or before 17 January 1973) to a Filipino mother (with an alien
spouse) and should have elected Philippine citizenship on 19 June 1969 (when he attained the age of majority), or
soon thereafter, in order to have the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen under the 1987 Constitution, the vital
question is: did private respondent really elect Philippine citizenship? As earlier stated, I believe that private
respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship, contrary to the ruling of the respondent tribunal.
The respondent tribunal, on this issue, ruled as follows:
Where a person born to a Filipino mother and an alien father had exercised the right of suffrage when he
came of age, the same constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. (Florencio vs. Mallare)
[sic] The acts of the petitioner in registering as a voter, participating in elections and campaigning for certain
candidates were held by the Supreme Court as sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship.
Accordingly, even without complying with the formal requisites for election, the petitioner's Filipino
citizenship was judicially upheld.23
I find the above ruling of the respondent tribunal to be patently erroneous and clearly untenable, as to amount to
grave abuse of discretion. For it is settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that election of Philippine citizenship must be
made in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625. Sections 1 and 224 of the Act mandate that the option to elect
Philippine citizenship must be effected expressly not impliedly.
The respondent tribunal cites In re: Florencio Mallare25 which held that Esteban Mallare's exercise of the right of
suffrage when he came of age, constituted a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal as authority for the doctrine of implied election of Philippine citizenship, is not
applicable to the case at bar. The respondent tribunal failed to consider that Esteban Mallare reached the age of
majority in 1924, or seventeen (17) years before CA 625 was approved and, more importantly, eleven (11) years
before the 1935 Constitution (which granted the right of election) took effect.
To quote Mr. Justice Fernandez in Mallare:
Indeed, it would be unfair to expect the presentation of a formal deed to that effect considering that prior to
the enactment of Commonwealth Act 625 on June 7, 1941, no particular proceeding was required to
exercise the option to elect Philippine citizenship, granted to the proper party by Section 1, subsection 4,
Article IV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution.26
Moreover, Esteban Mallare was held to be a Filipino citizen because he was an illegitimate (natural) child of a
Filipino mother and thus followed her citizenship. I therefore agree with the petitioners' submission that,
in citing the Mallare case, the respondent tribunal had engaged in an obiter dictum.
The respondent tribunal also erred in ruling that by operation of CA 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, providing
for private respondent's acquisition of Filipino citizenship by reason of the naturalization of his father, the law itself
had already elected Philippine citizenship for him. For, assuming arguendo that the naturalization of private
respondent's father was valid, and that there was no further need for private respondent to elect Philippine
citizenship (as he had automatically become a Filipino citizen) yet, this did not mean that the operation of the
Revised Naturalization Law amounted to an election by him of Philippine citizenship as contemplated by the
Constitution. Besides, election of Philippine citizenship derived from one's Filipino mother, is made upon reaching
the age of majority, not during one's minority.
There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that private respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority in 1969 or within a reasonable time thereafter as required by CA 625. Consequently, he cannot
be deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen under Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.
Based on all the foregoing considerations and premises, I am constrained to state that private respondent is not a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in relation to
Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof, and hence is disqualified or ineligible to be a Member of the House of
Representatives.
At this point, I find it no longer necessary to rule on the issue of required residence, inasmuch as the Constitution
requires that a Member of the House of Representatives must be both a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident
for at least one (1) year in the district in which he shall be elected.
The next question that comes up is whether or not either of the petitioners can replace private respondent as the
Representative of the second legislative district of Northern Samar in the House of Representatives.
I agree with respondent tribunal that neither of the petitioners may take the place of private respondent in the House
of Representatives representing the second district of Northern Samar. The ruling of this Court in Ramon L. Labo,
Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal,27 is controlling. There we held
that Luis L. Lardizabal, who filed the quo warranto petition, could not replace Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as mayor of Baguio
City for the simple reason that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was
obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City for mayor of that City.
A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not qualified for the office is, in effect, a quo warranto proceeding even
if it is labelled an election protest.28 It is a proceeding to unseat the ineligible person from office but not necessarily to
install the protestant in his place.29
The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate in an
election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such a
case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity.30
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have the highest number of votes
cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no
one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676).
As early as 1912, this Court has already declared that the candidate who lost in an election cannot be
proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate who won is found ineligible for the office to which he
was elected. This was the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) —
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the election is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to
hold such an office. . . . If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of
canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor,
the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest,
as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. . . .31
The recognition of Emil L. Ong by the 1971 Constitutional Convention as a natural-born Filipino citizen, in
relation to the present case.
Private respondent, as previously stated, is a full brother of Emil L. Ong, both of them having the same father and
mother.
Private respondent, relying on a resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention32 to the effect that Emil L. Ong was
a natural-born Filipino citizen, alleged before the House Electoral Tribunal that, by analogy, he is himself a natural-
born Filipino citizen. This submission, while initially impressive, is, as will now be shown, flawed and not supported
by the evidence. Not even the majority decision of the electoral tribunal adopted the same as the basis of its
decision in favor of private respondent. The tribunal, in reference to this submission, said:
Be that as it may and in the light of the Tribunal's disposition of protestee's citizenship based on an entirely
different set of circumstances, apart from the indisputable fact that the matters attempted to be brought in
issue in connection therewith are too far removed in point of time and relevance from the decisive events
relied upon by the Tribunal, we view these two issues as being already inconsequential.33
The electoral tribunal (majority) instead chose to predicate its decision on the alleged citizenship by naturalization of
private respondent's father (Ong Chuan) and on the alleged election of Philippine citizenship by private respondent.
Emil L. Ong, was elected delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Electoral protests, numbers EP-07 and
EP-08, were filed by Leonardo D. Galing and Gualberto D. Luto against Emil L. Ong, contesting his citizenship
qualification. The Committee on Election Protests Credentials of the 1971 Contitution Convention heard the protests
and submitted to the Convention a report dated 4 September 1972, the dispositive portion of which stated:
It appearing that protestee's grandfather was himself a Filipino citizen under the provisions of the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, thus conferring upon protestee's own father, Ong
Chuan, Philippine citizenship at birth, the conclusion is inescapable that protestee himself is a natural-born
citizen, and is therefore qualified to hold the office of delegate to the Constitutional Convention.34
On 28 November 1972, during a plenary session of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the election protests filed
against Emil L. Ong were dismissed, following the report of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials.35
It is evident, up to this point, that the action of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong is, to
say the least, inconclusive to the case at bar, because —
a) the 1971 Constitutional Convention decision in the Emil L. Ong case involved the 1935 Constitution; the
present case, on the other hand involves the 1987 Constitution:
b) the 1935 Constitution contained no specific definition of a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines; the
1987 Constitution contains a precise and specific definition of a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines in
Sec. 2, Art. IV thereof and private respondent does not qualify under such definition in the 1987 Constitution;
c) the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong was a decision of a political
body, not a court of law. And, even if we have to take such a decision as a decision of a quasi-judicial body
(i.e., a political body exercising quasi-judicial functions), said decision in the Emil L. Ong case can not have
the category or character of res judicata in the present judicial controversy, because between the two (2)
cases, there is no identity of parties (one involves Emil L. Ong, while the other involves private respondent)
and, more importantly, there is no identity of causes of action because the first involves the 1935
Constitution while the second involves the 1987 Constitution.
But even laying aside the foregoing reasons based on procedural rules and logic, the evidence submitted before the
electoral tribunal and, therefore, also before this Court, does not support the allegations made by Emil L. Ong before
the 1971 Constitutional Convention and inferentially adopted by private respondent in the present controversy. This
leads us to an interesting inquiry and finding.
The 1971 Constitutional Convention in holding that Emil L. Ong was a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines under
the 1935 Constitution laid stress on the "fact" — and this appears crucial and central to its decision — that Emil L.
Ong's grandfather, Ong Te became a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and, therefore, his
descendants like Emil L. Ong (and therefore, also private respondent) became natural-born Filipinos. The 1971
Constitutional Convention said:
Ong Te Emil Ong's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing in the Philippines on April 11, 1899 and was
therefore one of the many who became ipso facto citizens of the Philippines under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly declared that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who
continued to reside therein and who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 as well as their children born
subsequent thereto, "shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands." (Section 4,
Philippine Bill of 1902).36
The "test" then, following the premises of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, is whether or not Ong Te private
respondent's and Emil L. Ong's grandfather was "an inhabitant of the Philippines who continued to reside therein
and was a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899." If he met these requirements of the Philippine Bill of 1902, then, Ong
Te was a Filipino citizen; otherwise, he was not a Filipino citizen.
Petitioners (protestants) submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibits W, X, Y, Z
,AA, BB, CC, DD and EE which are copies of entries in the "Registro de Chinos" from years 1896 to 1897 which
show that Ong Te was not listed as an inhabitant of Samar where he is claimed to have been a resident. Petitioners
(protestants) also submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibit V, a certification of
the Chief of the Archives Division, Records and Management and Archives Office, stating that the name of Ong Te
does not appear in the "Registro Central de Chinos" for the province of Samar for 1895. These exhibits prove or at
least, as petitioners validly argue, tend to prove that Ong Te was NOT a resident of Samar close to 11 April 1899
and, therefore, could not continue residing in Samar, Philippines after 11 April 1899, contrary to private respondent's
pretense. In the face of these proofs or evidence, private respondent FAILED TO PRESENT ANY REBUTTAL OR
COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE, except the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L.
Ong, previously discussed.
It is not surprising then that, as previously noted, the majority decision of the House Electoral Tribunal skirted any
reliance on the alleged ipso facto Filipino citizenship of Ong Te under the Philippine Bill of 1902. It is equally not
surprising that Ong Chuan, the son of Ong Te and father or private respondent, did not even attempt to claim
Filipino citizenship by reason of Ong Te's alleged Filipino citizenship under the Philippine Bill of 1902 but instead
applied for Philippine citizenship through naturalization.
Nor can it be contended by the private respondent that the House Electoral Tribunal should no longer have reviewed
the factual question or issue of Ong Te's citizenship in the light of the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention finding him (Ong Te to have become a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902. The tribunal had
to look into the question because the finding that Ong Te had become a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of
1902 was the central core of said 1971 resolution but as held in Lee vs. Commissioners of Immigration:37
. . . Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding Court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion
may demand.
Which finally brings us to the resolution of this Court in Emil L. Ong vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 67201, 8 May
1984. In connection with said resolution, it is contended by private respondent that the resolution of the 1971
1âwphi1

Constitutional Convention in the Emil L. Ong case was elevated to this Court on a question involving Emil L. Ong's
disqualification to run for membership in the Batasang Pambansa and that, according to private respondent, this
Court allowed the use of the Committee Report to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
To fully appreciate the implications of such contention, it would help to look into the circumstances of the case
brought before this Court in relation to the Court's action or disposition. Emil L. Ong and Edilberto Del Valle were
both candidates for the Batasang Pambansa in the 14 May 1984 election. Valle filed a petition for disqualification
with the Commission on Election on 29 March 1984 docketed as SPC No. 84-69 contending that Ong is not a
natural-born citizen. Ong filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the judgment of the 1971
Constitutional Convention on his status as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines bars the petitioner from raising
the Identical issue before the COMELEC. (G.R. No. 67201, Rollo, p. 94) The motion was denied by the COMELEC,
thus, prompting Emil L. Ong to file with this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 67201.
In a resolution dated 8 May 1984, this Court resolved to issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent
COMELEC from holding any further hearing on the disqualification case entitled "Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil
Ong (SPC No. 84-69) except to dismiss the same. (G.R. Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 335)
This Court, in explaining its action, held that:
Acting on the prayer of the petitioner for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and considering that
at the hearing this morning, it was brought out that the 1971 Constitutional Convention, at its session of
November 28, 1972, after considering the Report of its Committee on Election Protests and Credentials,
found that the protest questioning the citizenship of the protestee (the petitioner herein) was groundless and
dismissed Election Protests Nos. EP 07 and EP 08 filed against said petitioner (p. 237, Rollo), the
authenticity of the Minutes of said session as well as of the said Committee's Report having been duly
admitted in evidence without objection and bears out, for now, without need for a full hearing, that petitioner
is a natural-born citizen, the Court Resolved to ISSUE, effective immediately, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
enjoining respondent COMELEC from holding any further hearing on the disqualification case
entitled Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil Ong (SPC No. 84-69) scheduled at 3:00 o'clock this afternoon, or any
other day, except to dismiss the same. This is without prejudice to any appropriate action that private
respondent may wish to take after the elections. (emphasis supplied)
It is thus clear that the resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 67201 was rendered without the benefit of a hearing on
the merits either by the Court or by the COMELEC and merely on the basis of a Committee's Report to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and that this Court (and this is quite significant) did not foreclose any appropriate action
that Del Valle (therein petitioner) may wish to take after the elections.
It is thus abundantly clear also that to this Court, the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention recognizing
Emil L. Ong as a natural-born citizen under the 1935 Constitution did not foreclose a future or further proceeding in
regard to the same question and that, consequently, there is no vested right of Emil L. Ong to such recognition. How
much more when the Constitution involved is not the 1935 Constitution but the 1987 Constitution whose provisions
were never considered in all such proceedings because the 1987 Constitution was still inexistent.
A final word. It is regrettable that one (as private respondent) who unquestionably obtained the highest number of
votes for the elective position of Representative (Congressman) to the House of Representatives for the second
district of Northern Samar, would have had to cease in office by virtue of this Court's decision, if the full membership
of the Court had participated in this case, with the result that the legislative district would cease to have, in the
interim, a representative in the House of Representatives. But the fundamental consideration in cases of this nature
is the Constitution and only the Constitution. It has to be assumed, therefore, that when the electorate in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar cast the majority of their votes for private respondent, they assumed and
believed that he was fully eligible and qualified for the office because he is a natural-born Filipino citizen. That
erroneous assumption and belief can not prevail over, but must yield to the majesty of the Constitution.
This is a sad day for the Constitution. As I see it, the Constitution mandates that members of the House of
Representatives should be "natural-born citizens of the Philippines". The voting majority of the present Court says,
"Filipino citizens will do." This is bad enough. What is worse is, the same voting majority, in effect, says, "even aliens
will do as well."
WHEREFORE, my vote is clear: to declare private respondent Jose L. Ong Chua, Jr., as he clearly is, NOT a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and therefore NOT QUALIFIED to be a Member of the House of
Representatives, Congress of the Philippines.
Narvasa, J., Paras, J. and Regalado, J., dissenting.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority.
(1)
I wish to point out first that the question of citizenship is a question of fact, and as a rule, the Supreme Court leaves
facts to the tribunal that determined them. I am quite agreed that the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the membership in the House, as follows:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.1
is the best judge of facts and this Court can not substitute its judgment because it thinks it knows better.
In the case of Aratuc v. Commission on Elections,2 it was held that this Court can not review the errors of the
Commission on Elections (then the "sole judge" of all election contests) — in the sense of reviewing facts and
unearthing mistakes — and that this Court's jurisdiction is to see simply whether or not it is guilty of a grave abuse of
discretion. It is true that the new Constitution has conferred expanded powers on the Court,3 but as the Charter
states, our authority is "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."4 It is not to review facts.
"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as whimsical exercise of power amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or
otherwise, to denial of due process of law.5
I find none of that here.
As the majority indicates, Jose Ong's citizenship is a matter of opinion with which men may differ, but certainly, it is
quite another thing to say that the respondent Tribunal has gravely abused its discretion because the majority has
begged to differ. It does not form part of the duty of the Court to remedy all imagined wrongs committed by the
Government.
The respondent Tribunal has spoken. According to the Tribunal, Jose Ong is a Filipino citizen and consequently, is
possessed of the qualifications to be a member of the House. As the sole judge, precisely, of this question, the
Court can not be more popish than the pope.
(2)
I can not say, in the second place, that the Decision in question stands exactly on indefensible grounds. It is to be
noted that Jose Ong had relied on the Report dated September 4, 1972 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
Committee6 on Election Protests and Credentials, in which the Committees upheld the citizenship, and sustained the
qualification to sit as Delegate, of Emil Ong, Jose Ong's full blood brother. According to the Report, Ong Te the
Ongs' grandfather, was already a Filipino citizen having complied with the requirements on Filipinization by existing
laws for which his successors need not have elected Filipino citizenship. I quote:
xxx xxx xxx
There is merit in protestee's claim. There can hardly be any doubt that Ong Te protestees's grandfather, was
a Spanish subject residing in the Philippines on April 11, 1899, and was therefore one of the many who
 became ipso facto citizens of the Philippines under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law
expressly declared that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who continued to reside therein and who
were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, as well as their children born subsequent thereto, "shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands" (Sec. 4, Philippine Bill of 1902). Excepted from the
operation of this rule were Spanish subjects who shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown
of Spain in accordance with the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. But under the Treaty of Paris, only
Spanish subjects who were natives of Peninsular Spain had the privilege of preserving their Spanish
nationality.7
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted, protestee's grandfather established residence in the Philippines in 1895, as shown by
the Registro Central de Chinos. He was also issued a certificate of registration. He established a business
here, and later acquired real property. Although he went back to China for brief visits, he invariably came
back. He even brought his eldest son, Ong Chuan, to live in the Philippines when the latter was only 10
years old. And Ong Chuan was admitted into the country because, as duly noted on his landing certificate,
his father, Ong Te had been duly enrolled under CR 16009-36755 — i.e., as a permanent resident. Indeed,
even when Ong Te went back to China in the 1920's for another visit, he left his son, Ong Chuan, who was
then still a minor, in the Philippines — obviously because he had long considered the Philippines his home.
The domicile he established in 1895 is presumed to have continued up to, and beyond, April 11, 1899, for,
as already adverted to, a domicile once acquired is not lost until a new one is gained. The only conclusion
then can thus be drawn is that Ong Te was duly domiciled in the Philippines as of April 11, 1899, within the
meaning of par. 4, Art. 17, of the Civil Code of 1889 — and was, consequently, a Spanish subject, he
qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.8
It is true that Ong Chuan, the Ong brothers' father, subsequently sought naturalization in the belief that he was, all
along, a Chinese citizen, but as the Report held:
Protestants, however, make capital of the fact that both Ong Te and his son, Ong Chuan (protestee's father),
appear to have been registered as Chinese citizens even long after the turn of the century. Worse, Ong
Chuan himself believed the was alien, to the extent of having to seek admission as a Pilipino citizen through
naturalization proceedings. The point, to our mind, is neither crucial nor substantial. Ong's status as a citizen
is a matter of law, rather than of personal belief. It is what the law provides, and not what one thinks his
status to be, which determines whether one is a citizen of a particular state or not. Mere mistake or
misapprehension as to one's citizenship, it has been held, is not a sufficient cause or reason for forfeiture of
Philippine citizenship; it does not even constitute estoppel (Palanca vs. Republic, 80 Phil. 578, 584). Too,
estoppel applies only to questions of fact and not of law (Tanada v. Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957).9
It is to be noted that the Report was unanimously approved by the Committee, and on November 28, 1972,
approved without any objection by the Convention in plenary session.10
I am not, of course, to be mistaken as acting as mouthpiece of Emil Ong, but in all candor, I speak from experience,
because when the Convention approved the Report in question, I was one of its vice-presidents and the presiding
officer.
It is to be noted finally, that the matter was elevated to this Court (on a question involving Emil Ong's qualification to
sit as member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa)11 in which this Court allowed the use of the Committee Report.
Faced with such positive acts of the Government, I submit that the question of the Ong's citizenship is a settled
matter. Let it rest.
It is true that Electoral Protest Nos. EP-07 and EP-08 of the Convention as well as G.R. No. 67201 of this Court,
involved Emil Ong and not his brother; I submit, however, that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
I also submit that the fundamental question is whether or not we will overturn the unanimous ruling of 267 delegates,
indeed, also of this Court.

Padilla J.: dissenting

* With the concurrence of Congressmen Mario L. Tagarao, David A. Ponce De Leon, Simeon E. Garcia,
Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. and Jose E. Calingasan; Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz,
Florentino P. Feliciano and Congressman Antonio H. Cerilles dissented.
#4
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-59234 September 30, 1982
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE TRANSPORTATION
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND
TRANSPORTATION, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order" filed by the Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation, seeks to
declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42, dated October 10, 1977, of the Board of Transportation, and
Memorandum Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, of the Bureau of Land Transportation.
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab
operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and
to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo
Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public
convenience.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which
reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of
Old and Dilapidated Taxis
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only safe and comfortable units are used
as public conveyances;
WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has, time and again, complained against,
and condemned, the continued operation of old and dilapidated taxis;
WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort, convenience, and safety,
a program of phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis should be adopted;
 WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of Transportation, the latter believes that
in six years of operation, a taxi operator has not only covered the cost of his taxis, but has made
reasonable profit for his investments;
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Board hereby declares that no car beyond six years
shall be operated as taxi, and in implementation of the same hereby promulgates the following rules
and regulations:
1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are ordered withdrawn from public
service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cards
for 1978, only taxis of Model 1972 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for
operation;
2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered withdrawn from public service and
thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cars for 1979,
only taxis of Model 1973 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for operation; and
every year thereafter, there shall be a six-year lifetime of taxi, to wit:
1980 — Model 1974
1981 — Model 1975, etc.
All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby ordered withdrawn from public
service as of the last day of registration of each particular year and their respective plates shall be
surrendered directly to the Board of Transportation for subsequent turnover to the Land
Transportation Commission.
For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein shall immediately be
effective in Metro-Manila. Its implementation outside Metro- Manila shall be carried out only after the
project has been implemented in Metro-Manila and only after the date has been determined by the
Board. 1
Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing
Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT,
all within the National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to
be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. To quote said Circular:
Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 77-42, taxi units with year models over six (6) years old are
now banned from operating as public utilities in Metro Manila. As such the units involved should be
considered as automatically dropped as public utilities and, therefore, do not require any further
dropping order from the BOT.
Henceforth, taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old shall
be refused registration. The following schedule of phase-out is herewith prescribed for the guidance
of all concerned:
Year Model Automatic
Phase-Out
Year

1980

1974 1981

1975 1982

1976 1983

1977

etc. etc.
Strict compliance here is desired. 2
In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979;
those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981.
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC
No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of
taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of
registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion", praying for an early
hearing of their petition. The case was heard on February 20, 1981. Petitioners presented testimonial and
documentary evidence, offered the same, and manifested that they would submit additional documentary proofs.
Said proofs were submitted on March 27, 1981 attached to petitioners' pleading entitled, "Manifestation,
Presentation of Additional Evidence and Submission of the Case for Resolution." 3
On November 28, 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide
Main Petition" praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than December 10, 1981 to enable them, in case of
denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975
model cabs are phased-out on January 1, 1982.
Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the
records of the case could not be located.
On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted wherein the following queries were posed for
consideration by this Court:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner
required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners' constitutional right to
procedural due process?
B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by
Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed
memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and
standard?
On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:
Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power
4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or
service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor
vehicles.
Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise of its powers:
Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. — In the exercise of the powers granted in the preceding section, the
Board shag proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry.
Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may require the cooperation
and assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary, particularly the
Highway Patrol Group, the support agencies within the Department of Public Works, Transportation
and Communications, or any other government office or agency that may be able to furnish useful
information or data in the formulation of the Board of any policy, plan or program in the
implementation of this Decree.
The Board may also can conferences, require the submission of position papers or other documents,
information, or data by operators or other persons that may be affected by the implementation of this
Decree, or employ any other suitable means of inquiry.
In support of their submission that they were denied procedural due process, petitioners contend that they were not
caged upon to submit their position papers, nor were they ever summoned to attend any conference prior to the
issuance of the questioned BOT Circular.
It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide range of
choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not
mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from
operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide
discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due
process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry
prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. operators of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the
data and information that may be desired by the BOT.
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither violative of procedural due process.
As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307 (1972):
Pevious notice and hearing as elements of due process, are constitutionally required for the
protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place
in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or
event which has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of general rules or
regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the
law provides otherwise. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive because the
roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and,
therefore, their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at the time of registration. As public
contend, however, it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the
fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption.
A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six
years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully
depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and
no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation
practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and
absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met.
On Equal Protection of the Law:
Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal protection of the law because the same is
being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be
pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. To
repeat the pertinent portion:
For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein shall immediately be
effective in Metro Manila. Its implementation outside Metro Manila shall be carried out only after the
project has been implemented in Metro Manila and only after the date has been determined by the
Board. 4
In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that implementation of the Circulars in Cebu City is already being effected, with
the BOT in the process of conducting studies regarding the operation of taxicabs in other cities.
The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those
of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of common knowledge.
Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement
of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety
and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its
police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. 5 It may also regulate
property rights. 6 In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
interests are disregarded". 7
In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it need only be
recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to
things or persons Identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided
classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. 8 What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal
means so that all persons under Identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege
conferred and the liabilities imposed. 9 The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.
Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. To declare
a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear, categorical and undeniable. 10
WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, CJ., Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez,
Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee and Aquino, JJ., concur in the result.

#5
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979
LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
in his capacity as Minister of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as Minister Of
Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as
Minister of Public Highways, respondents.
Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor Amado D. Aquino
for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:
The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles is assailed in this
prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process and, insofar as the rules and
regulations for its implementation are concerned, for transgressing the fundamental principle of non- delegation of
legislative power. The Letter of Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite standing, as
being arbitrary and oppressive. A temporary restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F. Edu, Land
Transportation Commissioner Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National Defense; Alfredo L. Juinio, Minister of Public
Works, Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar Aquino, Minister of Public Highways; were to answer.
That they did in a pleading submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 2 Impressed with a highly persuasive
quality, it makes devoid clear that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification The Letter of
Instruction on is a valid police power measure. Nor could the implementing rules and regulations issued by
respondent Edu be considered as amounting to an exercise of legislative power. Accordingly, the petition must be
dismissed.
The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on December 2,
1974, reads in full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal or serious accidents in land
transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles along streets or highways without any
appropriate early warning device to signal approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed
by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968
Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said
Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the
enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; [Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E.
Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the interest of safety on all streets and highways, including expressways or
limited access roads, do hereby direct: 1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in
their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized
plates in red and yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle
is stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or more on any street or highway, including expressways or
limited access roads, the owner, user or driver thereof shall cause the warning device mentioned herein to be
installed at least four meters away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked. 3. The Land
Transportation Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as herein described, to
be prepared and issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers, charging for each
piece not more than 15 % of the acquisition cost. He shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are
appropriate to effectively implement this order. 4. All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take such
measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry into effect then instruction. 3 Thereafter, on November 15, 1976,
it was amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 in this wise. "Paragraph 3 of Letter of Instruction No. 229 is hereby
amended to read as follows: 3. The Land transportation Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle owner to
procure from any and present at the registration of his vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized early warning device, as d
bed of any brand or make chosen by mid motor vehicle . The Land Transportation Commissioner shall also
promulgate such rule and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order.'" 4 There was issued
accordingly, by respondent Edu, the implementing rules and regulations on December 10, 1976. 5 They were not
enforced as President Marcos on January 25, 1977, ordered a six-month period of suspension insofar as the
installation of early warning device as a pre-registration requirement for motor vehicle was concerned. 6 Then on
June 30, 1978, another Letter of Instruction 7 the lifting of such suspension and directed the immediate
implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended. 8 It was not until August 29, 1978 that respondent Edu
issued Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance of Letter of Instruction No. 716, dated June 30,
1978, the implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended by Letter of Instructions No. 479, requiring
the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicle, the following rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1.
LTC Administrative Order No. 1, dated December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented provided that the device may
come from whatever source and that it shall have substantially complied with the EWD specifications contained in
Section 2 of said administrative order; 2. In order to insure that every motor vehicle , except motorcycles, is
equipped with the device, a pair of serially numbered stickers, to be issued free of charge by this Commission, shall
be attached to each EWD. The EWD. serial number shall be indicated on the registration certificate and official
receipt of payment of current registration fees of the motor vehicle concerned. All Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda
in conflict herewith are hereby superseded, This Order shall take effect immediately. 9 It was for immediate
implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of Public Works, transportation, and Communications. 10
Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly
equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as
an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as
well as the implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation
Commission," 11 alleged that said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, "clearly violates the provisions and
delegation of police power, [sic] * * *: " For him they are "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay
unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society." 12 He contended that they are
"infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public;" 13 are "one-sided,
onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at
the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P
56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14 are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New
Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical
alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of EWD's." 15 He therefore prayed for a
judgment both the assailed Letters of Instructions and Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional and for a
restraining order in the meanwhile.
A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-49112 (Leovillo C. Agustin v.
Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.) — Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments
adduced in the petition for prohibition with writ of p prohibitory and/or mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to
(require) the respondents to file an answer thereto within ton (10) days from notice and not to move to dismiss the
petition. The Court further Resolved to [issue] a [temporary restraining order] effective as of this date and continuing
until otherwise ordered by this Court.16
Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then on November 15,
1978, he Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting the factual allegations and stating that they lacked
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car," they
"specifically deny the allegations and stating they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle Car, 17 they specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs X and XI
(including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the effect that Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended by
Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land transportation Commission Administrative Order No. 1 and
its Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional provisions on due process of law, equal protection of law
and undue delegation of police power, and that the same are likewise oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided,
onerous, immoral unreasonable and illegal the truth being that said allegations are without legal and factual basis
and for the reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this Answer."18 Unlike petitioner who
contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany of grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of
constitutional litigation, the Answer, in demonstrating that the assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of
the police power and implementing rules and regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the charge that there
was unlawful delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion captioned Special and Affirmative Defenses, a
citation of what respondents believed to be the authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They
are Calalang v. Williams, 19 Morfe v. Mutuc, 20 and Edu v. Ericta. 21 Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna
Conventions of the United Nations on road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was a signatory
and which was duly ratified. 22 Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in detail, in language calm and
dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accusation of petitioner that the assailed Letter of Instruction and
the implementing rules and regulations cannot survive the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its highly-persuasive
quality cannot be denied.
This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly joined. As noted at the
outset, it is far from meritorious and must be dismissed.
1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner
and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a
category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the
latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally
Identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision as "nothing more or less than
the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty" 23 was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v.
Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams,
Identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to we the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.' Shortly after independence in
1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as 'the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the
people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as 'that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and
welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the
totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful at. tribute of government. It is, to
quote Justice Malcolm anew, 'the most essential, insistent, and at least table powers, I extending as Justice Holmes
aptly pointed out 'to all the great public needs.' Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even
to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that
were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is
critical or urgent changes with the time.' The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to communal peace, safety,
good order, and welfare." 24
2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the particular police
power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for
this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an
indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector
Law, 25 an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a
statute, the purpose of which was: "To promote safe transit upon, and. avoid obstruction on roads and streets
designated as national roads * * *. 26 As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, 27 with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the
imperative demands of public safety.
3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations
becomes even more apparent considering his failure to lay the necessary factual foundation to rebut the
presumption of validity. So it was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of
Manila. 28 The rationale was clearly set forth in an excerpt from a decision of Justice Branders of the American
Supreme Court, quoted in the opinion: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of
the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is
unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition
the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of
some factual foundation of record in overthrowing the statute. 29
4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption of validity. As was
pointed out in his Answer "The President certainly had in his possession the necessary statistical information and
data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and such factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's
naked assertion that early warning devices 'are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents'
because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved
rear-end collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on record. As
aptly stated by this Honorable Court: Further: "It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of
validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face,
which is not the case here"' * * *. But even as g the verity of petitioner's statistics, is that not reason enough to
require the installation of early warning devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could mean the death
of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths that could likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with stalled
vehicles?" 30 It is quite manifest then that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction is encased in the armor of prior,
careful study by the Executive Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to
give sanction to conjectural claims that exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a pleader's well known
penchant for exaggeration.
5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of Instruction was exposed in
the Answer of the Solicitor General thus: "Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy,
nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said
motor vehicles,' 2) "battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles," 3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on front and
rear bumpers of motor vehicles," or 4) "well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * * because: Being
universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse
conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who
sees a reflectorized rectangular early seaming device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will
conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is
a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other
hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not
immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an
emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of
the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision. 31
6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer of the Solicitor
General "There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in Administrative Order
No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the early warning device prescribed thereby. All
that is required is for motor vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this
early warning device in question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of
industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this early warning
device so long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid down in said letter of instruction and
administrative order. Accordingly the early warning device requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous,
immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires at
the expense of car owners' as petitioner so sweepingly concludes * * *. Petitioner's fear that with the early warning
device requirement 'a more subtle racket may be committed by those called upon to enforce it * * * is an unfounded
speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous officials may try to enforce said requirement in an unreasonable manner or
to an unreasonable degree, does not render the same illegal or immoral where, as in the instant case, the
challenged Letter of Instruction No. 229 and implementing order disclose none of the constitutional defects alleged
against it.32
7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of power, the
justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say negative, view he entertains as to its
wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest, is distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It
bears repeating "that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of wisdom justice
or expediency of legislation.' As expressed by Justice Tuason: 'It is not the province of the courts to supervise
legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a
legislative concern.' There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor. 'As long as
laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or
not they are wise or salutary. For they, according to Justice Labrador, 'are not supposed to override legitimate policy
and * * * never inquire into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action
taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers
has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a
sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a
coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to
be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to
maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged
provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on is wisdom cannot be sustained. 33
8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is equally without any
support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint himself with authoritative
pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to make such an assertion. An exempt from the
aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must
be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose
may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above
guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the
former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically.
It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the
legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the
roads.' This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long
after the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself
to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
"subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments.' He
continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing
tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the
courts.' Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-
legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed." 34
9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this consideration. The
petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed
by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968
Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said
Vionna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the
enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; * * * " 35 It cannot be disputed then
that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land * * *." 36 The 1968 Vienna Convention
on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment
to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is,
moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.
10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not even elicit any attempt
on the Part of Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and categorical why such a casual observation
should be taken seriously. In no case is there a more appropriate occasion for insistence on what was referred to as
"the general rule" in Santiago v. Far Eastern Broadcasting Co., 37 namely, "that the constitutionality of a law wig not
be considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued." 38 "Equal protection" is
not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect that success will
crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.
WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is immediately executory. No
costs.
Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera,
concur.
Makasiar, J, reserves the right to file a separate opinion.
Aquino J., took no part.
Concepcion J., is on leave.
Castro, C.J., certifies that Justice Concepcion concurs in their decision.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I dissent from the majority's peremptory dismissal of the petition and lifting of the restraining order issued on
October 19, 1978 against the blanket enforcement of the requirement that all motor vehicles be equipped with the
so-called early warning device, without even hearing the parties in oral argument as generally required by the Court
in original cases of far-reaching consequence such as the case at bar.
Lack of time presents my filing an extended dissent. I only wish to state that the petition advances grave and serious
grounds of assailing "the rules and regulations issued by the Land Transportation Commission under Administrative
Order No. 1 and Memorandum Circular No. 32 [which] do not reflect the real intent, noble objectives and spirit of
Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended by Letter of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716, because it is oppressive,
unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New
Society," because of the following considerations, inter alia:
1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles with built-in and more effective
and efficient E.W.D.'S such as "a) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 1)) battery-powered
blinking lights inside motor vehicles, c) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles....... to
purchase the E.W.D. specified in the challenged administrative order, whose effectivity and utility have yet to be
demonstrated.
2. The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid refutation has been made of
petitioner's assertion that the "E.W.D.'s are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents. Statistics
shows that of the 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that occurred in 1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-end
collisions," as to require the purchase and installation of the questioned E.W.D. for almost 900,000 vehicles
throughout the country;
3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering, and petitioner's assertion that "as of 1975,
there were at least 865,037 motor vehicles all over the country requiring E.W.D.'S and at the minimum price of
1156.00 per set, this would mean a consumer outlay of P 48,451,872.00, or close to P 50 million for the questioned
E.W.D.'S "stands unchallenged;
4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less burdensome alternative road safety
devices for stalled vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as the common petroleum lamps "kinke" which can be
placed just as effectively in front of stalled vehicles on the highways; and
5. There is no imperative need for imposing such a bet requirement on all vehicles. The respondents have not
shown that they have availed of the powers and prerogatives vested in their offices such as ridding the country of
dilapidated trucks and vehicles which are the main cause of the deplorable -highway accidents due to stoned
vehicles, establishing an honest and foolproof system of examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers so as to
ban the reckless and irresponsible and a sustained education campaign to instill safe driving habits and attitudes
that can be carried out for much less than the P 50 million burden that would be imposed by the challenged order.
I do feel that a greater "degree of receptivity and sympathy" could be extended to the petitioner for his civic
mindedness in having filed the present petition g as capricious and unreasonable the "all pervading police power" of
the State instead of throwing the case out of court and leaving the wrong impression that the exercise of police
power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty and property of any person is no longer subject to judicial inquiry.

# Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the majority's peremptory dismissal of the petition and lifting of the restraining order issued on
October 19, 1978 against the blanket enforcement of the requirement that all motor vehicles be equipped with the
so-called early warning device, without even hearing the parties in oral argument as generally required by the Court
in original cases of far-reaching consequence such as the case at bar.
Lack of time presents my filing an extended dissent. I only wish to state that the petition advances grave and serious
grounds of assailing "the rules and regulations issued by the Land Transportation Commission under Administrative
Order No. 1 and Memorandum Circular No. 32 [which] do not reflect the real intent, noble objectives and spirit of
Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended by Letter of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716, because it is oppressive,
unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New
Society," because of the following considerations, inter alia:
1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles with built-in and more effective
and efficient E.W.D.'S such as "a) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 1)) battery-powered
blinking lights inside motor vehicles, c) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles....... to
purchase the E.W.D. specified in the challenged administrative order, whose effectivity and utility have yet to be
demonstrated.
2. The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid refutation has been made of
petitioner's assertion that the "E.W.D.'s are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents. Statistics
shows that of the 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that occurred in 1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-end
collisions," as to require the purchase and installation of the questioned E.W.D. for almost 900,000 vehicles
throughout the country;
3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering, and petitioner's assertion that "as of 1975,
there were at least 865,037 motor vehicles all over the country requiring E.W.D.'S and at the minimum price of
1156.00 per set, this would mean a consumer outlay of P 48,451,872.00, or close to P 50 million for the questioned
E.W.D.'S "stands unchallenged;
4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less burdensome alternative road safety
devices for stalled vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as the common petroleum lamps "kinke" which can be
placed just as effectively in front of stalled vehicles on the highways; and
5. There is no imperative need for imposing such a bet requirement on all vehicles. The respondents have not
shown that they have availed of the powers and prerogatives vested in their offices such as ridding the country of
dilapidated trucks and vehicles which are the main cause of the deplorable -highway accidents due to stoned
vehicles, establishing an honest and foolproof system of examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers so as to
ban the reckless and irresponsible and a sustained education campaign to instill safe driving habits and attitudes
that can be carried out for much less than the P 50 million burden that would be imposed by the challenged order.
I do feel that a greater "degree of receptivity and sympathy" could be extended to the petitioner for his civic
mindedness in having filed the present petition g as capricious and unreasonable the "all pervading police power" of
the State instead of throwing the case out of court and leaving the wrong impression that the exercise of police
power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty and property of any person is no longer subject to judicial inquiry.