『経済研究』（明治学院大学）第 153 号　2017 年

Infant industry argument for trade protection and

Japanese automotive industrial policy

Toshihiro ATSUMI
Faculty of Economics
Meiji Gakuin University

1．Introduction

　　　The infant industry argument for trade protection has a long history. In this research note, I
review the Japanese experience on the development of the nation’s postwar era automotive industry
from 1945 to the 1970s. Although the focus is on policy, I offer data that may be relevant to examine
whether the Japanese experience can be considered as a case for the infant industry argument for
trade protection.

2．The infant industry argument for trade protection

　　　The original ideas behind infant industry trade protection are found in the writings of John
Stuart Mill, a nineteenth century English philosopher and economist, who argued that providing tem-
porary protection to an infant (undeveloped) industry can be beneficial because it allows the industry
space to gain competitiveness and become more efficient, and thus eventually stand on its own and
compete against foreign products without the protection. The idea has been attractive to authorities
in developing countries wishing to catch up with the more industrialized countries.
　　　Suppose that there is no domestic supply of automobiles because production costs are too high
compared to world price. Automobiles, therefore, are all imported. Now suppose that the government
decides to take on a protection policy and imposes a tariff on imported automobiles. Then the domes-
tic price that the consumers face will rise. If the tariff makes the corresponding rise in the domestic

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 『経済研究』（明治学院大学）第 153 号

price high enough, it will promote domestic supply. As is well known, however, this leads to losses in
consumer welfare that outweighs the sum of producer surplus gain and tariff revenue. The net loss
is the dead weight loss. If the protection takes the form of import quotas, there will be no tariff reve-
nues, and importers earn rents instead. As in the tariff case, however, by harming consumers, impos-
ing quotas on imports also leads to dead weight losses, which can be worse when resources are used
to capture rents. This is the standard argument about the consequences of such trade protection.
　　　The infant industry argument, however, goes on to say that, during protection, the domestic
producers gain experience and efficiency over time through the production of automobiles such that
its supply curve shifts outward. Then the quota/tariff protection can be lifted to eliminate the dead
weight losses, and in addition, domestic supply implies some producer surplus. Theoretically, protec-
tion policy can be justified if the producer surplus generated later outweighs the dead weight losses
during protection.

3．Postwar development of the Japanese automobile industry

3.1　Background and initial status

　　　Before the Second World War, Japan gained some experience in automobiles through the pro-
duction of military trucks and other commercial vehicles such as buses. Production of passenger ve-
hicles was limited. After the war began, companies such as Toyota, which had started passenger car
production, were ordered by the government to concentrate on military and commercial vehicle pro-
duction instead.
　　　Automobile imports to Japan immediately after the war were mostly for the Occupation Army
and related personnel. This was because of a regulation with such a restriction that was in place un-
til 1952. The route for Japanese to obtain cars was to purchase used cars from them, although de-
mand was limited because of the poor economic situation of most Japanese.
　　　The supply of passenger cars in 1951 is estimated as follows. The total supply to the Japanese
was 5,248 vehicles, of which 3,598 were domestically produced. The remaining 1,650 were supplied as
used cars that the Occupation Army had sold to the Japanese. The Occupation Army was basically
exempt from foreign currency control and tariffs (described in the next subsection) and imported
3,981 passenger cars that year, in addition to the cars that they brought in themselves. Therefore,
the amount of passenger cars imported to Japan exceeded domestic production.

3.2　Policies taken by MITI

Policies until the 1950 s

　　　Japanese imports in the aftermath of the Second World War were tightly controlled by the

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 Infant industry argument for trade protection and Japanese automotive industrial policy

government due to the nation’s low foreign currency reserves. It was considered that automobile im-
ports were wasting Japan’s monetary reserves at a time when the authorities were desperate to pre-
serve them. Government approval of foreign currency allocation was required in order for the pri-
vate sector to import goods from abroad. This effectively put a cap on imports. Specifically, foreign
currency quotas for automobile imports were set every six months; these are shown in table 1 and
figure 1. As indicated in figure 1, it was not until the 1960s that the cap was gradually lifted.

Table 1.　Foreign currency allocation to automotive imports (unit: $1,000)

Knocked-down Motorcycles and
Cars (CBU) Repair parts Total
parts (CKD) repair parts
1949    600    ―    ―  ―    600
1950   9,380    ―    ―  ―   9,380
1951   8,750    ―    ―  ―   8,750
1952 12,665    ― 1,170  ― 13,835
1953 13,735    ― 4,094  ― 17,829
1954    612 1,971 4,729 105   7,417
1955    922 3,672 3,890  ―   8,484
1956   1,500 3,372 2,618 282   7,772
1957   1,818 1,784   480 321   4,403
1958   1,553 2,392    ― 401   4,346
1959   2,236 2,400    ― 422   5,058
1960   5,125 2,785    ― 528   8,438
1961   8,226    ―    ―  ―   8,226
1962 12,560    ―    ―  ― 12,560
Source: Keizaihyoronsha, various years

Figure 1.　Foreign currency allocation to automobile imports (unit: $1,000)

50,000

40,000

30,000

20,000

10,000

0
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

　Source: JAMA statistical yearbook, various years

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 『経済研究』（明治学院大学）第 153 号

　　　In addition to the foreign currency quota, tariffs were imposed on automotive imports, includ-
ing parts. For example, 40% and 30% tariffs were levied on passenger vehicles and engines, respec-
tively.

Liberalization process of the automotive sector

　　　In 1962, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) set up a passenger
vehicle policy committee, and formally began to consider trade liberalization in the automotive sec-
tor. In December 1962, the committee concluded that auto imports should be liberalized by the end
of fiscal 1964 (March 1965), and preparations would be necessary to improve the international com-
petitiveness of the Japanese passenger vehicle industry. Such preparations included establishing do-
mestic passenger vehicle production and strengthening the sales and distribution system of the in-
dustry.
　　　MITI, in response to the committeeʼs recommendations, advised Japanese automakers to re-
duce passenger car prices. It also announced that the foreign currency allocation system for auto im-
ports will be modified so that currency would be allocated upon request, rather than under a fixed
quota system for the first and the second halves of every year. In addition, MITI announced that
concessional government loans would be offered to Japanese automakers that planned to merge with
other Japanese manufacturers to increase production scales.
　　　Further, in September 1964, MITI requested the Japanese auto manufacturers to 1) cooperate
with domestic companies, and refrain from forming alliances with foreign companies and from bring-
ing in foreign capital, and 2) price car parts properly, and cooperate with each other to enable mass
production of parts.
　　　Also in 1964, as previously announced, the foreign currency quota on automotive imports was
increased drastically, which meant that the Japanese passenger vehicle market was essentially liber-
alized, in the sense that the general public could import as many automobiles as they could afford.
Sakurauchi, the Minister of MITI at the time, announced that the passenger vehicle market of Japan
would be liberalized on September 1, 1965. After a one month delay, passenger vehicle import was
liberalized on October 1, 1965 by the abolition of the quota system.
　　　It should be noted that, at this point, liberalization only affected assembled passenger vehicles,
and import restrictions on engines, major engine components, engine and chassis assemblies, and
used passenger vehicles were still in place via the foreign currency allocation system. The govern-
ment and most industry leaders were mistrustful about foreign direct investment in Japan or the as-
sembly of knocked-down parts in Japan by foreign manufacturers. By restricting imports of essential
parts, including those for engines, MITI and the industry protected its market from foreign invest-
ment in assembly factories. Not everyone in the industry was supporting the policy of blocking for-

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eign investments, however. For example, Soichiro Honda, the founder of Honda Motor Co., was con-
cerned that Japanese protection of its automotive sector would lead to their losing business
opportunities abroad. Foreign investment in automobile production was not liberalized until April
1971.
　　　It is also noteworthy that the liberalization in 1965 did not mean zero tariffs: the abovemen-
tioned 40% and 30% tariffs on imported assembled passenger cars and engines still remained. The
first reduction of the 40% tariff, to 36%, occurred in 1968. After several subsequent reductions, in No-
vember 1972, the tariff on passenger car imports was reduced from 8% to 6.4%. Finally, in December
1977, the Japanese government announced that prior to the settlement of the GATT Tokyo round, it
would abolish the tariff on passenger car imports, which it did, effective March 1978. It was from this
point on that automobile imports in Japan became free of both quotas and tariffs. (Important policy
changes described above are summarized in chronological order in table 2.)

MITI’s blueprint of the Japanese automotive industry and challenges from abroad
The blueprint
　　　The basic intension of MITI can be understood as a kind of a blueprint. The blueprint on the
development of the Japanese automobile industry consisted of the following: 1) promoting domestic
(passenger) car production by protecting its market, 2) encouraging mergers of Japanese manufactur-
ers to gain economies of scale, and 3) liberalizing imports in a stepwise manner, while blocking for-
eign investments.

Background of the blueprint

　　　In the background of the blueprint were 1) the idea that MITI took it for granted that they
could control domestic companies, and 2) acquisitions of European manufacturers by the U.S. Big 3,
namely, Ford, General Motors and Chrysler.
　　　The first point can be observed in the attitude of MITI when it requested the Japanese manu-
factures to merge and increase production scales to reduce costs in the early 1960s. MITI was plan-
ning to reduce the number of automobile manufacturers. The fact that these requests were made
suggests that MITI had the idea that they had the authority and power to influence the companies
in the automotive sector.
　　　The second point seems to have contributed to strengthening economic nationalism seen in
the attitudes of most stakeholders on the Japanese side, and fostered a policy rejecting foreign invest-
ment in Japan, which is in stark contrast to the policies today that encourage inward investment.
GM had acquired a German manufacturer, OPEL, Ford had subsidiaries in Europe, and a French car
manufacturer, Simca, was acquired by Chrysler. Having seen the acquisitions of European automo-

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bile manufacturers by the U.S. counterparts, MITI and the Japanese manufacturers became cautious
about the same thing happening in Japan. This seems to have led MITI to postpone as long as possi-
ble foreign investment liberalization of the Japanese automotive sector.

Foreign pressures that affected MITI’s Policy

　　　Foreign pressures came from two levels. One was from international organizations, and the
other was mainly from the United States. Japan joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) in 1955 . In 1964 it joined the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) and accepted Article 8 obligations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These meant
that Japan had to liberalize trade and investment, as part of the obligations of the industrialized
economies. The international obligations gave MITI and the stakeholders of the automobile industry
the understanding that their home market protection and rejection of foreign investment into Japan
could not continue forever. Hence, both the industry and the government recognized the need to
prepare for the coming inevitable liberalization of the auto market.
　　　From around the 1960s, with the improved competitiveness and the resultant increase of ex-
ports of the Japanese passenger cars, particularly in the smaller segment of the market, foreign pres-
sure on lifting protection got stronger. In addition to meeting international obligations, MITI’s blue-
print faced challenges from individual countries abroad, particularly from the United States. The
Japan-U.S. automotive talks were held in December 1967 and January 1968; at these talks, the U.S.
representatives requested Japan to 1) reduce tariffs on large passenger cars, 2) liberalize imports of
engines and major components, 3 ) reduce domestic taxes on automobiles, and 4 ) liberalize capital
transactions. MITI was pressurized in these meetings to widen the scope of liberalization of its auto-
motive sector.

Tentative summary of MITI’s blueprint and policy implementation

　　　The MITI policy actually observed, as summarized above, was the product of compromises
made between the blueprint and the foreign pressures. The decisions to liberalize were also the re-
sults of the changes in the international status of Japan. It can be understood that, confronted with
foreign pressure at various levels, the Japanese government was obliged to remove the remaining
protections, rather than it making strategic decisions on its own to liberalize. (The core policies and
their results are summarized in table3. The players that influenced MITI’s automotive policies are
summarized also in the Appendix.)
　　　The reconstruction/development of the Japanese economy and the rise of Japanese automo-
bile manufacturing themselves also affected policy through confidence-building within Japan. As will
be shown in the next section, by the late 1960s, increased Japanese exports began contributing to Ja-

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Table 2.　Policy and events in the Japanese automotive sector, 1945-1981

year Import policy Investment policy International

quota tariff
1945 foreign currency allocation passenger cars: 40% engines: 30% not permitted
1946 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
1947 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
1948 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
1949 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
1950 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
1951 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
1952 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
1953 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
1954 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
1955 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ joined GATT
1956 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
1957 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
1958 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
1959 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
1960 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
liberalization of
1961 truck and ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
bus imports
1962 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
1963 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
joined OECD,
accepted IMF Ar-
ticle8 obligations,
1964 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
GATT Kennedy
Round
(until 1967)
liberalization of
1965 passenger abolished ↓ ↓ ↓
car imports
1966 ― ↓ ↓ ↓
foreign investment
1967 ― ↓ ↓ liberalization of
motorcycles
1968 ― 36% ↓ ↓
1969 ― ↓ ↓ ↓
1970 ― 34% to 20% ↓ ↓
foreign invest-
ment
1971 ― 10% 15%
liberalization of
automobiles
1972 ― 8% to 6.4% 12% ↓
GATT Tokyo round
1973 ― ↓ 6% ↓
(Until 1979)
1974 ― ↓ ↓ ↓
1975 ― ↓ ↓ ↓
1976 ― ↓ ↓ ↓
1977 ― ↓ ↓ ↓
1978 ― 0% ↓ ↓
1979 ― ↓ ↓ ↓
1980 ― ↓ 5.3% ↓
1981 ― ↓ 0% ↓

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Table 3.　Tentative summary of MITI’s blueprint and policy implementation

Blueprint
1) Promote domestic production by blocking imports
via quota/tariff
2) Strengthen the industry by promoting mergers and
acquisitions among domestic automobile manufac-
turers, thereby reducing the number of manufac-
turers to gain scale economies
3) Liberalize imports in a stepwise manner, while
blocking investments from abroad
Policy Implementation
Quotas imposed until the first half of the 1960s; tar-
iffs levied until 1978
Totally failed; the industry did not respond as MITI
intended (few mergers took place)
Realized almost exactly as planned; imports gradu-
ally liberalized and investment liberalization de-
layed until April 1971

pan’s rise as the second largest automobile manufacturing country. The confidence gained may well
have led to a change in the stakeholder mentality and an understanding that protection was no lon-
ger necessary. However, it must be stressed that many stakeholders in the Japanese auto industry
remained wary of foreign investment in the domestic market, even in this era.

3.3　From imports to the rise of domestic production and exports

　　　How did the automobile industry perform in the postwar era? The overall picture can be seen
by comparing the changes in production, exports, and imports over time. According to table 4 and
figure 2 , production started from around 1950, took off in the 1960 s, and grew rapidly in the late
1960s, exceeded 2 million passenger cars per year. This growth continued in the 1970s, except for
during the Oil Shock year of 1974, and exceeded 7 million passenger cars in 1980.
　　　Exports can be considered a sign that an industry is becoming competitive in the international
market, and thus a sign of “graduation” from the infant stage. The first passenger car export to the
United States by Toyota was seen in 1958 when the company exported its car named Crown. How-
ever, the initial attempt ended in failure. Kobayashi (2011) explains that, in this this era, the best cars
from Japan still did not match the quality levels of foreign cars. Indeed, according to the data it is
only from the late 1960s that automobile exports from Japan started to pick up. In 1969, 560 thousand
passenger cars, that is, roughly a fifth of passenger cars produced in Japan, were exported abroad.
Exports kept increasing along with production increases, and in 1980 almost 4 million passenger cars
were exported, which means that more than half of passenger cars produced in Japan were sold
overseas.
　　　Import data are shown separately in figure 3, as its scale is so tiny compared to production
and exports. Imports were kept low through the 1950s, and only started increasing in the 1970s. De-
spite the liberalization of imports, the highest figure recorded until 1980 was 64 thousand in 1979. Ja-
pan did liberalize trade and investment of its automotive sector, but the apparent imbalance between

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 Infant industry argument for trade protection and Japanese automotive industrial policy

Table 4.　Production and exports of Japanese automobiles (unit: number of cars)

production export
passenger cars trucks buses total passenger cars
1945 0 1,461 0 1,461 ―
1946 0 14,914 7 14,921 ―
1947 110 11,106 104 11,320 1
1948 381 19,211 775 20,367 1
1949 1,070 25,560 2,070 28,700 15
1950 1,594 26,501 3,502 31,597 308
1951 3,611 30,817 4,062 38,490 93
1952 4,837 29,960 4,169 38,966 2
1953 8,789 36,147 4,842 49,778 0
1954 14,472 49,852 5,749 70,073 1
1955 20,268 43,857 4,807 68,932 2
1956 32,056 72,958 6,052 111,066 46
1957 47,121 126,820 8,036 181,977 410
1958 50,643 130,066 7,594 188,303 2,357
1959 78,598 177,485 6,731 262,814 4,884
1960 165,094 308,020 8,437 481,551 7,013
1961 249,508 553,390 10,981 813,879 11,531
1962 268,784 710,716 11,206 990,706 16,011
1963 407,830 862,781 12,920 1,283,531 31,447
1964 579,660 1,109,142 13,673 1,702,475 66,965
1965 696,176 1,160,090 19,348 1,875,614 100,716
1966 877,656 1,387,858 20,885 2,286,399 153,090
1967 1,375,755 1,743,368 27,363 3,146,486 223,491
1968 2,055,821 1,991,407 38,598 4,085,826 406,250
1969 2,611,499 2,021,591 41,842 4,674,932 560,431
1970 3,178,708 2,063,883 46,566 5,289,157 725,586
1971 3,717,858 2,058,320 34,596 5,810,774 1,299,351
1972 4,022,289 2,238,340 33,809 6,294,438 1,407,340
1973 4,470,550 2,570,916 41,291 7,082,757 1,450,884
1974 3,931,842 2,574,179 45,819 6,551,840 1,727,396
1975 4,567,854 2,337,632 36,105 6,941,591 1,827,286
1976 5,027,792 2,771,516 42,139 7,841,447 2,538,919
1977 5,431,045 3,034,981 48,496 8,514,522 2,958,879
1978 5,975,968 3,237,066 56,119 9,269,153 3,042,237
1979 6,175,771 3,397,214 62,561 9,635,546 3,101,990
1980 7,038,108 3,913,188 91,588 11,042,884 3,947,160
Source: JAMA statistical yearbook, various years

exports and imports gave rise to another issue, that is, trade frictions, particularly with the United
States.

4．Price/cost data

　　　The following two questions should be asked in order to evaluate infant industry protection
policies: 1) What kind of protection took place and for how long? 2) Did costs go down during protec-

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Figure 2.　Production and export of passenger cars, 1950-1969 (unit: num-

ber of cars)

2,500,000

2,000,000

1,500,000

1,000,000

500,000

0
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
production export
　Source: JAMA statistical yearbook, various years

Figure 3.　Passenger car imports, 1955-1980 (unit: number of cars)

70,000
64,808

60,000
54,517

50,000 46,285
45,480
42,218
40,416 41,395
40,000 36,922

30,000
24,759

19,080 18,551
20,000
15,244 14,352 15,000 15,748
12,185 12,881
9,339
10,000
5,311 6,684 6,179 5,450 5,994 5,646
3,540 4,310

0
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
　Source: ‌JAMA statistical yearbook, various years

tion? The first question has been mostly answered in the previous section. Data relevant to the sec-
ond question are presented in this section.
　　　Data provided by Keizaihyoronsha ( 1965 ) show that in 1965 the retail price of Volkswagen
1200cc passenger car (VW1200) in Japan exceeded that of the Nissan Bluebird passenger car. The
Volkswagens were priced at 900 thousand Yen (although their Yen converted retail prices were 344

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 Infant industry argument for trade protection and Japanese automotive industrial policy

thousand Yen in Germany), while the Nissans were 583 thousand Yen. The retail price of VW1200
was much higher in Japan than it was in Germany not only because of transportation and other
trade costs but also because of the 40% tariff imposed on imported cars. The cost composition esti-
mate of VW 1200 is shown in figure 4 : Its free on board (FOB) price is estimated as 460 thousand
Yen, and freight to Japan and insurance cost 7 thousand Yen. On top of this, a 40% import tariff (18
thousand Yen) and 15 % sales tax ( 7 thousand Yen) were added, and finally 12 thousand Yen was
needed for accessories and margins for importers/dealers.
　　　The data suggest two things:
1) ‌Protection was effective. If it were not for the 40% tariff, Volkswagen 1200cc passenger car could
have been sold at 720 thousand Yen. Considering the likely quality difference between European
and Japanese cars at the time, the Volkswagens would have been much more competitive in the
Japanese market.
2) ‌The FOB price of VW1200 is estimated to have been around 460 thousand Yen. This suggests that
at around 1965, Japanese passenger cars (Nissan Bluebird in this case) still could not compete well
in the international market.
　　　Although the above international comparison suggests that the production costs of Japanese
passenger cars were still relatively high in the mid-1960s, there is evidence that the costs did go
down when a longer time period is examined. According to Yamazawa (1986), Nissan Bluebird was
priced at 595 thousand Yen in 1959 and it was 619 thousand Yen in 1976, which is a 3.8% rise. During

Figure 4.　Cost composition of VW1200 in Japan, 1965 (unit: ten thousand Yen)
90
Accessories and
importer/dealer margin, 12
80
Sales tax, 7
70

Import tariff, 18
60

50 Freight and insurance, 7

40

30
FOB price, 46
20

10

0
　　Source: Author’s calculation based on Keizaihyoronsha (1965)

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the same period, overall consumer prices rose by 230%. This implies that the relative price of the car
decreased by 31.5%. Indeed, therefore, passenger cars had become much more affordable to the Japa-
nese public.

5．Concluding comments

　　　Brazil started protecting its computer industry in 1977. Both imports and foreign firms’ activi-
ty in the country were blocked in order to promote Brazilian computer production. This policy was
kept in place until the 1990s. Luzio and Greenstein (1995) studied the case to find that the Brazilian
computer industry never caught up to the industry leaders. Instead, made-in-Brazil computers re-
mained more expensive than those available in the international market, and the adopted protection-
ist policy ended up generating net welfare losses in Brazil.
　　　The outcome of the Japanese case of automobiles is clearly different from that of the Brazilian
computer industry case. The Japanese automobile industry did develop and automobiles did become
much more affordable to the consumers. Given the observed protection policy and the development
of the Japanese automobile industry, the bottom line shows that it is possible that the Japanese policy
of protection worked for the development of its auto industry. The causal relation remains unknown
since there could be other reasons, for instance, the economic development and rise of Japanese in-
come that increased the demand for automobiles.
　　　The mid-1960s marked an important stage not only in the change in Japan’s international posi-
tion but also in the change of the automotive policy from protection to liberalization. The liberaliza-
tion process was very well synchronized with the development of the Japanese automobile industry,
and importantly it was not too delayed. Foreign currency quotas were abolished in 1965, when Japa-
nese cars were still somewhat lagging behind European cars in terms of cost and quality. It may be
said that the slightly early liberalization had a disciplining impact on Japanese manufacturers. At the
same time, however, if it were not for the foreign pressures to liberalize, the whole process could
have been much more delayed. The delay could have imposed larger dead weight losses on Japanese
society.
　　　Numerous Asian governments, including those of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, and China, have adopted more or less similar automotive sector protection policies. It is of in-
terest to study how the policies and their outcomes compare with those of the Japanese experience.

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Appendix
Figure A1.　Institutions and agents involved in the policymaking of Japan’s postwar au-
tomobile industry

International organizations OECD, GATT and IMF

Foreign government United States

Foreign automobile manufacturers Big3: Ford, GM and Chrysler

Japanese government MITI

Toyota, Nissan/Prince, Mitsubishi, Isuzu,

Japanese automobile manufacturers Suzuki, Subaru, Honda, Toyo (Mazda),
Daihatsu

Japanese consumers

Note: observed relations potential/indirect relations

Acknowledgement

　　　I appreciate the financial support from a Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (16H06548) from
the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.

References

Luzio, Eduardo and Shane Greenstein. 1995. “Measuring the Performance of a Protected Infant Industry: The
Case of Brazilian Microcomputers” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 77, No. 4, pp. 622-633.
Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association. Jidoshatokeinenpo (Automobile statistical yearbook), various years.
Keizaihyoronsha. Nihon no jidoshakogyo (The automobile industry of Japan), various years.
Kobayashi, Shotaro. 2011. Nihonjidoshashakaishi (Social history of Japanese Automobiles). Tokyo: Kodansha.
Yamazawa, Ippei. 1986. Kokusaikeizaigaku (International Economics). Tokyo: Toyokeizaishinposha.

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