622926

Visa Requirements, Carrier Sanctions, 'Safe Third Countries' and 'Readmission': The
Development of an Asylum 'Buffer Zone' in Europe

Author(s): Sarah Collinson
Source: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1996), pp. 76-
90
Published by: The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/622926
Accessed: 15-08-2019 00:06 UTC
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76
Visa requirements, carrier sanctions, 'safe

third countries' and 'readmission': the
development of an asylum 'buffer zon

Europe
Sarah Collinson
This paper explores the development of a so-called asylum 'buffer zone'

eastern frontiers of the west European region as a result of the Schengen
EFTA member states' introduction of more restrictive asylum policies durin
half of the 1990s. Restrictive policies in western Europe are forcing central
European states into a 'buffer role', obliging them to absorb asylum-seeke
to gain entry into western Europe and/or restrict asylum-seekers' access
borders of potential 'receiving' states. In addition to examining the mech
which this 'buffer zone' is developing and questioning what it might mea
future asylum trends and policies in Europe, the paper considers the wid
questions raised by this development in relation to the changing geopolit
landscape of Europe, particularly in relation to the changing political and
relations between western, central and eastern Europe and the former So
key words Europe refugee asylum flows buffer zones geopolitics

migration control
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James' Square, London SW1Y
revised manuscript received 2 October 1995
neighbours
Since the events of 1989, migration has been at the and nothing captured this state
affairs
centre of international political concern in more clearly than the arrival of asylum
Europe.
Indeed, for western Europe, there wasseekers at its doors.
no more
potent a symbol of the end of the cold war It was the
than not long after the collapse of the Berlin
exodus of over a million people from the
Wall, east
therefore, that politicians and publics in west-
ern Europe
which accompanied the collapse of the Berlin Wall.began to express increasing concern
Hardly more than a year later, the new over
and the perceived threat of mass uncontrolled
appar-
migration
ently threatening disorder in the east following from eastern Europe and the former
the
demise of communism was heralded by Soviet
the Union,
sud- as well as from poorer countries to
den flight of Albanians to Greece and the south.
Italy. The Migration - previously a matter of 'low
subsequent disintegration of the Soviet politics',
Union and to be dealt with by labour ministries and
outbreak of hostilities in Yugoslavia addedthe like
to -awas suddenly elevated to the level of
growing sense of unease in western Europe, 'high' politics
par- and security. This reflected broader
ticularly when the conflict in the Balkans changes
beganin the European security agenda. The
producing refugee flows across the borders national into
security interests of the states and societies
nearby west European states. The collapse of western
of theEurope were no longer to be subordi-
iron curtain meant that western Europe nated to the
could no higher interest of defence against a
longer isolate itself from the troubles of common and clearly identifiable politico-military
its eastern
Trans Inst Br Geogr NS 21 76-90 1996

ISSN 0020-2754 ? Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers) 1996
The geopolitics of international migration in Europe 77
enemy. Europe was no longer threatened
Western by faces
Europe therefore the
potential for war between two superpowers. The
major questions about the nature of the larger regional
new perceived threats facing western Europe fol-
environment in which the EU, whatever its configur-
lowing the breakdown of the cold war bipolar
ation, will have to operate.4
system - including migration, refugee flows, illegal
arms transfers, terrorism, organized crime
The sensitivity and of the migration
and prominence
drug trafficking - are of a fundamentally issue on the European political and security agen-
different
nature and reflect a shift in the nexus of the das is explained primarily by the particular way in
security agenda away from military security which the issue has developed as a simultaneous
dilem-
mas between states, towards broader and more reflection and component of the geopolitical trans-
diverse security concerns within states. As argued formations taking place on the European continent
in the aftermath of the cold war. Thus, for example,
by Hassner, 'individual, social and national insecur-
ity, the preoccupation with law and order, jobsthe mass exodus which accompanied the collapse
and the nation' have become combined into 'one of the Berlin Wall not only reflected the disintegra-
complex syndrome in which external threats and
tion of the eastern bloc but also forced the pace of
internal doubts are hard to disentangle'.1 that disintegration. The population displacements
caused by the conflict in the Balkans not only
The emergence of this new climate of insecurity
was thus intimately related to the fragmentation
reflect of
the demise of the former Yugoslavia but also
the eastern bloc. West European governments had an integral - as well as tragic - compo-
represent
to develop new strategies rapidly in order to
nent
tackle
of whatever political configuration emerges in
its place. The free movement of people within the
an enormous range of problems - many seemingly
intractable - connected with political and economic
Schengen area and EU is a provision designed not
only to
reform in the region. According to Barry Buzan, symbolize regional economic and political
the
rapid collapse of Soviet power left theintegration
EU by but also to form an essential compo-
default as the core focus for order and stability
nent of a functioning single market. And, in the
throughout Europe.2 Yet western Europe wascontext of relations between west, central
changing
already facing serious problems of its own and eastern Europe, international migration-
- linked
principally to a deepening economic recession whether - of refugees or voluntary migrants - not
which undermined the confidence of governments only reflects the breakdown of the previous east-
and publics alike, and which threatened west increas-
division of the continent and the emergence
ingly to derail the accelerating processes of of aecon-
new, more dynamic, geopolitical configuration
omic and political integration among thebut EUisand
also playing a part in shaping that new
EFTA member states. Thus, the redefinition of configuration.
'Europe' as a geopolitical concept - as a region It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that west-
no longer divided into two 'hermetically sealed ern Europe's perceived vulnerability to instability
blocs'3 - and the concomitant redefinition of rela- to the east and south is felt most keenly in terms of
tions between western Europe and its eastern and its perceived vulnerability to uncontrolled popu-
southern neighbours has taken place at a time lation of movements. Control over the admission of
considerable confusion and uncertainty in the west aliens has historically been viewed as inherent in
of the continent, as well as in the east. the very nature of sovereignty. At a time of consid-
It can be argued that the bipolar system of the erable economic uncertainty and when national
cold-war era has been replaced by a patternsovereignty of is under assault from all manner of
interstate relations structured principally along global and transnational economic, political and
core-periphery lines, in terms both of east-west cultural
and forces, there is a heightened potential for
north-south relations. According to this picture, societies
the to see their identity and security as threat-
EU or western Europe as a whole is clearly within ened. The spectacle of large numbers of migrants
the core. However, as Buzan observes, the evading immigration rules provides a dramatic
example of the erosion of state sovereignty. More-
over, the fact that the majority of these migrants
certainty and security of that position ... is moderated
would have been excluded had the state been
by its location next to both the disintegrating Soviet
empire (hung precariously between centre and periph-better able to control their movement means that
ery) and the volatile relations of the Middle East. in all probability, they are perceived as a threat and
78 Russell King et al.
deemed 'unwanted' by
other, the more immediate concern to protect stab-
society. ility and prosperity
Since immigrants within the west European
the 'outside
regionbrought
itself, implying a primary concern wit
to protect
regarded aswesternaEurope direct chal
from any potential instability
identity ofwhichthe might develop in the former eastern bloc
'nation-st
Heisler andregion.
Zig The resulting confusion or diffidence in
Layton-H
west European policy has left the central and east
capacity of social, econom
European countries in something of a security and
trative institutions to integr
grants ... power vacuum, caught
affects the precariously between, to
stabilit
the ability the
of west,
receiving engaged
a group of prosperous states state in
their own troubled process of integration and, to
They argue, the east such challen
(former Soviet Union) and south (former
are Yugoslavia), a zonelikely
particularly of great and growing political
to be
long-term and economic instability.6
economic problem
deep The current
political ambiguous geopolitical status of the
polarisation o
central and east European countries, particularly
Whether the threat is m
Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak
in the west European c
Republics - the so-called 'Visegrad Four' - is
unwanted or uncontrolle
clearly reflected in the policy regime emerging
to be seen as a potential t
among west, central and east European states to
stability of society has m
control international migration, more especially in
responses in western Eur
the emerging regime governing asylum and refu-
almost exclusively along
gee policies. Policy developments during the first
Thus, responding to incr
half of the 1990s have reflected a concern among
tion from both the south
west European states to establish a control regime
early 1990s and fearful o
extending beyond the boundaries of the Schengen,
for massive uncontrolled
EU and EEA groupings. To some extent, responsi-
by growing instability i
bility for developing this regime was seen to fall to
west European governm
institutions, such as the Council of Europe and the
strengthening their exte
Organization for Security and Cooperation in
ing all other immigratio
Europe (OSCE, previously CSCE), with represen-
their disposal.
tation already extended to central and eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union. However,
Central and eastern Europe and the governments in western Europe have been con-
cerned to introduce a stronger regime than could
geopolitics of migration control
be achieved through cooperation in existing inter-
This overwhelmingly defensive posture towards governmental fora, at least as regards controlling
immigration in western Europe - a posture based migratory flows across their external borders.
primarily on immediate domestic political con- The first states to be involved in such a regime
cerns - is affecting neighbouring central and east were those already associated with the EU on the
European states in ways which both reflect and basis of the Europe agreements (Visegrad states)
contribute to the ambiguity and uncertainty which and others identified as primary sources of
characterizes current relations between the west'unwanted' migration to western Europe, such as
Romania and Bulgaria. The Europe agreements
European states and their neighbours to the east.
At the heart of this problem is the difficulty themselves reflect the ambiguous position of the
encountered by west European governmentscentral in European countries vis-?i-vis the movement
of persons and control over migration. These states
attempting to marry, on the one hand, the concern
to export stability and prosperity eastwards are essentially migrant-source countries in respect
through the support of economic and political of the EU, and thus the agreements - while con-
transition in the former eastern bloc countries taining
and, provisions related to their association with
potentially, through the extension of EU member-the EU's labour markets (provisions allowing for
ship and NATO security guarantees, and, onmovementthe for the purposes of self-employment)-
and reflects
contain only very weak provisions for thethose
fact that,seek-
as noted above, today's
European security
ing employment.7 Although clearly excluded agendafrom
differs in important
the free-movement provisions associated
ways from with
traditional security configurations con-
cerned more
Schengen, EU or EEA membership, the exclusively
nationals withofproblems of political
and military rivalry
the Visegrad states have, nevertheless, and confrontation between
relatively
privileged access to Schengenstates.and EU member
In the context of this discussion, the term
states because visas are not 'buffer
required oftotheir
zone' is used denote an identifiable
nationals for visits of less than three months. The
geographical zone 'protecting', by non-militar
countries of central Europe can thus be seenmeans,
to be a group of powerful and essentially stab
in a 'probationary' or transitional position as from a perceived non-military security thre
states
regards movements of their nationals and deriving
estab- from a proximate region of economic an
lishment rights in western Europe. political instability. It thus denotes the age-old id
This transitional status has come at a price,
of seeking to secure borders by extending the
however, since these countries are also seen by
depth.1?
west European governments as important partners Thus, just as the buffer states of old were under-
for controlling migration, whether it be the mi-
stood to perform their role by separating rival
gration of their own nationals or that of migrants powersin and absorbing the shocks of rivalry and
transit from other countries further east or else- confrontation when it occurred, so it is argued here
where in the world. Yet, because these states that, in the non-military context of migration and
remain outside the Schengen, EU and EEA 'clubs' refugee flows, central and east European countries
with their concomitant - and increasingly inte- can be seen to be buffering western Europe both by
grated - mechanisms for joint immigration control; providing an additional control zone protecting or
because they lack the kind of institutional anddistancing western Europe from actual or potential
financial resources which are available to western refugee movements or other kinds of migration
governments for controlling their borders; from and more unstable or less prosperous areas fur-
because of their geographical position (proximity ther east or south and by absorbing asylum-seekers
to actual or potential migrant-source countries andinother migrants who would otherwise be des-
the former Soviet space), this controlling role is for western Europe. The process and mech-
tined
predominantly one of acting as migration or anisms asy- by which this is taking place are discussed
lum 'buffer states' protecting western Europe, as in the context of refugee flows and asylum
below
opposed to acting as equal partners in the (west) policy.
European migration-control regime with its equal
benefits.
Asylum and refugee policy in western
It should be clear that the concept of 'buffer' is
not applied here in the traditional sense of a small
Europe
independent state or group of states lying between Against a growing potential for interethnic conflict,
two or more larger rival military powers.8 Perhaps civil war and generalized political instability in the
it is no coincidence that a term previously used toformer eastern bloc and in countries to the 'south',
describe the geopolitical status of east-centralrefugee movements have been pinpointed increas-
Europe during the interwar period (when theingly as the primary migration challenge facing
region was seen as a politico-military buffer Europe in the years to come. Indeed, a ten-fold
between Germany and Russia) should be applied increase in the number of asylum applications was
to the region once again.9 Moreover, to the extentwitnessed in western Europe between the early
that NATO is reluctant to extend membership to 1980s and 1990s, reaching a peak of some 700 000
countries in central and eastern Europe for fear of in 1992.11 This escalation in asylum inflows (much
provoking Russia, there could be a case for arguing of it from eastern Europe after 1989), coupled with
that the region is caught once again in a morethe mass displacement of population caused by the
traditional form of 'buffer' politics (between NATOoutbreak of conflict in the former Yugoslavia, trig-
and Russia), following the retreat of Russiangered a policy crisis in western Europe in the early
(Soviet) domination and the expansion of west1990s. Asylum systems came under sudden
European interest and involvement in the region.and enormous pressure at a time of worsening
Yet the term is used here in a rather different sense economic recession and political uncertainty in
western Europe,
This when
provision re
were anxious moves to limit to all
devel k
Moreover, EU member states.
the prevailing p
its emphasisVisaon asylum
requirements are given greater effect byfo
state-sanctioned persecutio
their frequent combination with carrier sanctions,
case determinations
according to which airlines and other-carriers
appe are
equipped to fined
cope with
for bringing into large
a country any person who
of refugeeslacks
fleeing condit
a visa or other requisite documentation for
interethnic entry. Indeed, carrier sanctions arecivil
violence, included as a w
Set against a of global
provision popu
both the Schengen Implementing Con-
million vention and the draft External
refugees and Borders Convention,
dis
world, the and have been progressively incorporated
numbers arrivi into
appear modest. Nevertheles
national legislation in western Europe over recent
European governments to
years.12 Carrier sanctions are designed essentially t
proved crucial, not
to prevent the arrival least
of asylum-seekers who might be
policy developments
attempt to travel direct from theirelsewcountry or
central and region
eastern
of origin to a country inEurope.
western Europe to
has been put into
apply for formula
asylum. They therefore apply principally
matic or comprehensive
to asylum-seekers who might attempt to travel by m
with air. This refugee
today's policy appears to have resultedpro
in a
governments decline in the number ofsought
have asylum applications made pr
pressure on atexisting
airports and can therefore be asylum
described as a
ing and qualified success from the point ofproce
accelerating view of the
policies which
governments restrict
in question.13 wo
access to theirIndeed, territory
visa requirements and carrier sanctions
or
It is the have played an important
policies falling part in restricting the
with
- specificallynumbersthe three
of refugees arriving in western Europepr
cussed from Bosnia-Herzegovina,
below, namely for the majority
visa of r
with carrier sanctions,
governments in western Europe have imposed th a
policy and visa
'readmission'
requirement for Bosnian nationals in response a
can be seen to rising refugee
to beoutflows pushingsince the outbreak of t
eastern hostilities there. As inmost
Europe other cases, the 'contain-dire
asylum ment' of refugee
'buffer flows out of the former Yugoslavia
states'.
is supported by the argument made by govern-
ments that refugees should, if possible, stay in the
Visa requirements and
nearest 'safe areas' to their homes, as outlined in c
the 'Conclusion on certain common standards
It is now common practi
states to relating to the reception
impose visa of particularly
requir vulnerable
particular groups from former
states Yugoslav states' reached by
generatin
the way in EU governments
this in June 1993. On theby
respect ground, the
i
ments for containment policy is supported
nationals of bySri the creation
L
1980s of the so-called a
following 'UN protected
rise zones'
in withint
applications Bosnia-Herzegovina people
from itself. ori
tries. The Considerable numbers
practice isof refugees
now from thes
on European former Union
Yugoslavia have been granted
whichprotection in
states that western Europe, most commonly on the basis of
'temporary protection' rather than full refugee
in the event of an emergen
status. Some countries - such as Germany, host to
country posing a threat of a su
from that
between 350 000 and 400 000 refugees from the
country into the C
may .. former Yugoslavia
introduce [rather - have receivedthan
far higher
ment for numbers than others, such
nationals as the UK, host to th
from under
(emphasis 10 000. Nevertheless, far fewer refugees from the
added)
Balkan conflict have reached western Europe
in the country, most than
from the former Yugoslavia,
would have been the case had visa Romaniarequirements
and Bulgaria.'18 Whether owing to these
not been imposed and, indeed, many
states' continuingof involvement
those in the Bosnian con-
flict, the fragile
fleeing the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina managed naturetoof asylum institutions or
more passports.
do so only by travelling on Croatian general political Inanda economic instability and
lack of resources
1993 report to the Executive Committee of to cope with large displaced
the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees
populations, the situation of refugees - particularly
(UNHCR), Amnesty International thoseexpressed
from Bosnia - has been far from secure in
con-
these countries.
cern about the emphasis placed by governments on
the belief that refugees should find Following the lead of
protection inwestern Europe, other
governments
the territories of former Yugoslavia - a policy have borne
imposed visas and other
out in practice, the report argued,restrictions on the entry of nationals of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Poland and the Czech Republic, for
because almost all EC member states, and many
example,
other European states, impose visa introduced mandatory
requirements on visa restrictions
nationals of Bosnia-Herzegovina. for Bosnian nationals in July 1993 and January 1994
respectively; Bulgaria recommends that Bosnians
It was argued that, despite reassurances
apply for a visa from EU
to secure entry; and Hungary, the
ministers vis-a-vis the flexible Slovak
application of visa
Republic and Slovenia require Bosnian
and entry controls for some people from
nationals the former
to produce proof - such as a visa from a
Yugoslavia, Amnesty International continued
third country allowing to
for onward travel or a
receive reports indicating verified letter of guarantee from a national or
a clear reluctance on the part of ECinstitution
and other of thegovern-
country concerned - that they will
ments to admit and grant protection nottoapply for asylum or intend to stay after entry.
asylum-seekers
from former Yugoslavia arriving atIn its 1993
their report to the UNHCR Executive
borders.14
Committee, Amnesty International argued that
The impact on central and eastern Europe

it appears they have done so, at least in part, because
they feared receiving a disproportionate number of
Largely as a result of restrictiverefugees
visa as policies in borders elsewhere in
a result of closed
western Europe, far larger numbers of people dis-
Europe.19
placed by the Bosnian conflict have become con-
In a clear articulation of the pressure felt by these
centrated in neighbouring 'frontline' states than
would otherwise have been the case. Thus, for new 'receiving' states, the Hungarian correspond-
ent to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
example, Croatia's population of refugees and dis-
and Development's (OECD) 1993 SOPEMI report
placed persons was reported to have reached 12.5
argued that
per cent of the total population in February 1994,15
including up to 200000 refugees from Bosnia-Restrictive western policy leaves Hungary unable to
act independently on the international scene. Because
Herzegovina among the 400 000 or so displaced
persons in the country.16' This may be contrasted of war and ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia,
several unforeseen decisions have had to be made ...
with the situation in Germany, where foreigners
Thus, amid mounting tension the government decided
(including immigrant workers and their descend-
to move towards more harmonised, selective admis-
ants) are estimated to represent around 8 per cent
sion. At the end of 1992, new legislation concerning
of the total population. Similarly, Serbia is host to
aliens, immigrants, residence permit holders, minori-
between 400 000 and 500 000 refugees from bothties, refugees and asylum seekers was passed. A
Croatia and Bosnia; Slovenia and Macedonia are million aliens who did not meet the conditions for
each reported to have taken in around 30 000, theentry have been expelled. The movements towards
majority from Bosnia-Herzegovina; Hungary is Hungary are still growing, mostly from Romania and
the former Yugoslavia ... In the light of the current
host to some 130 000;17 and in the Czech Republic,
where the number of registered asylum-seekers andburdens faced in Hungary, fewer opportunities for
humanitarian admissions will occur.20
refugees remains comparatively low (in the region
of 4000), the International Organisation for Mi-
Thus, not only are such states 'buffering' western
gration (IOM) estimated in 1994 that 140 000 orEurope by absorbing refugee and other migrant
more undocumented 'transit' migrants are present
populations which would otherwise be directed
there but, byThe introducing
statistical data on these new migration flows th
controls overare scarce and unreliable, particularly because the
refugees' entry
ing and strengthening
greater part remains undocumented.23 Neverthe- the
ments' policies of
less, the broad spectrum containm
of nationalities involved
movements,points thereby provid
to a complex pattern of migration deriving
trol zone from a wide range of source
between the regions. Mostrefuge
mi-
and potential destination
gration affecting the central and east European
Europe. countries is intraregional (dominated by mi-
Indeed, all governments in central and eastern gration from the former Yugoslavia, Romania and
Europe have introduced - or are in the process of Bulgaria, and including movements of the Roma
introducing - stricter controls over immigration population) but an important proportion concerns
and asylum entries. Thus, for example, Hungary nationals of former Soviet countries (including
introduced a new law in 1993 which stipulates inter migrants from Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, Moldova,
alia that foreigners must show adequate financial Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) and, increas-
means for their stay. In the Czech Republic, the ingly, the middle east and Asia (including Turkey,
Refugee Act was amended in January 1994 to Iran, Bangladesh, India, Vietnam and China), and
speed up asylum procedure in cases where the Africa (e.g. Somalia, Liberia and Angola).24 Many
application is deemed 'manifestly unfounded' and, such migrants rely on exploitative traffickers to
as of September 1995, the Czech border police will assist their transit.
be authorized to refuse entry to foreigners without Despite the introduction of more restrictive rules
sufficient funds for their stay. And, in addition to and procedures, immigration controls are not as
work on a draft bill on the entry and residence developed in central and eastern Europe as in the
conditions of foreigners, new rules in Poland EU member states and other west European
hold that those with no right to remain in Poland countries. Thus asylum-seekers and other migrants
and who do not comply voluntarily with an continue to reach the borders of countries such as
expulsion order may be detained pending their Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Sweden from
deportation.21 their eastern neighbours. Indeed, of the 90 per cent
This process was sparked off not only by arrivals or so of Germany's asylum-seekers who arrive via
of asylum-seekers from the former Yugoslavia but neighbouring countries, the majority enter from
also by more general changes in these countries' Poland and the Czech Republic.25 In 1993, for
migration status as they found themselves host to example, there were 43 302 illegal border crossings
increasing numbers of asylum-seekers and other detected in the Czech Republic, most involving
migrants transiting through - or attempting to migrants trying to enter Germany, and, in 1994,
transit through - to western Europe from countries 14 300 migrants were caught trying to cross into
further east or south. Moreover, while continuing Germany from Poland.26
to 'send' migrants to western Europe, these coun- In these cases, visa regimes and carrier sanctions
tries have also become 'receiving' states in their provide no asylum 'buffer' for western Europe
own right vis-a-vis poorer countries to the east and since, according to UNHCR Executive Committee
south, a process linked to the increasing difficulty conclusions, once an asylum-seeker arrives at the
faced by migrants trying to gain access to countries frontier asking for protection, these states are
in western Europe. Poland and the Czech Republic bound by Article 33 of the 1951 UN Convention
are most affected in both respects, due to their long relating to the status of refuges which stipulates
land-borders with Germany and their higher wage that
levels relative to other countries in the region.

Hungary and Bulgaria also receive transit migrants No Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in
seeking to reach Austria and Greece respectively. any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on
Following a reinforcement of the Austro-
account of his race, nationality, political opinion or
Hungarian border, the Slovak Republic has been
membership of a particular group [the principle of
targeted increasingly by migrants as a potential non-refoulement].
route into Germany. And the Baltic States have
become an important transit point for migrants Although the 1951 Convention creates no direct
trying to reach the Nordic countries.22 obligation for states to admit asylum-seekers at the
and the Benelux
frontier or to grant asylum, Article 33 countries).28
does create At the time of writ-
ing, theto
an obligation for signatory states Dublin Convention
examine had yet to enter into
asy-
lum applications if necessary toforce
ensureand, although the Schengen Convention
that refoule-
officially
ment does not take place. In order entered into
to relieve force in March 1995, it had
further
the 'load' placed on their asylum systems
yet to be fully implementedby due to French hesi-
asylum-seekers arriving via neighbouring
tation and
over the suppression of border controls.
other 'transit' countries, governments Nevertheless, some in of
western
their provisions have been
Europe have therefore moved practised since as early
to introduce twoas 1993 (the year that
further measures: the 'safe third Germany amendedrule
country' its asylum
and laws), as asylum-
readmission arrangements. seekers These are measures
frequently returned are from one member
clearly - if not explicitly - designed state to another
to push on the grounds that s/he should
neigh-
bouring countries in central have and eastern
applied Europe
for asylum in the first EU member
further into the role of asylum state'buffer
entered. This has caused
states' by concern among
transferring responsibility for examining
human-rights asylum
and refugee-support organizations
requests and by facilitating expulsions since, without theof Dublin
undocu-Convention (or Schengen
mented migrants and rejectedConvention) asylum-seekers
in force, thereback
is no multi-lateral legal
to the asylum 'transit' states. instrument providing safeguards for individual
asylum-seekers or binding states to take responsi-
bility for examining asylum requests. The Dublin
The 'safe third country' rule
Convention is designed to resolve the problem of
There is some confusion in the terms used to 'refugees in orbit' (i.e. refugees for whom no state
denote the so-called 'safe third country' policy; is willing to take responsibility). Ironically, how-
other terms used include 'first host country', ever, in the absence of multilaterally accepted
'host
third country' and 'safe first country'. As noted criteria
byand legally binding provisions for deter-
the UNHCR, all these terms denote the rather mining which state should deal with an asylum-
straightforward idea of 'protection elsewhere'.27 seeker's claim, the application of a 'Dublin'-type
At the London meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on mechanism carries the danger that asylum-seekers
Immigration in November/December 1992, EU will be shunted from one state to another and, in
ministers agreed to a resolution on 'host thirdsome cases, returned to the country from which
countries', which refers to claims in cases where they originally fled (refoulement) as has been
the asylum-seeker has passed through, or spent reported in a number of cases.29
time in, another country where s/he could have National legislation has been amended through-
been expected to seek protection. It holds that, if out western Europe to incorporate, or to allow for
there is such a 'host third country' or 'safe third the incorporation of, the provisions of the Dublin
country', 'the application for refugee status may Convention and/or the Schengen Convention and
not be examined and the asylum applicant may be 'safe third country' provisions into individual
sent to that country'. This is not a legal agreement countries' asylum policies. In both France and
but it carries considerable political weight and the Germany, this necessitated constitutional amend-
assumption when it was introduced was that its ments as both countries had a right of asylum
provisions would be incorporated into nationalwritten into their constitutions, albeit a more
legislation. limited right in the French case. Because of its
The 'safe third country' notion was already symbolic importance, this proved a complex, pro-
becoming an accepted principle for determining tracted and, at times, explosive political process in
responsibility for examining asylum claims among Germany but the government's determination and
the EU member states as it forms the central success in seeing it through is testimony to the
building block of the so-called 'Dublin Convention' importance attached to measures designed to
- 'Convention Determining the State Responsible reduce the number of asylum-seekers applying for
for Examining Applications for Asylum' - signed protection in that country. Germany's new, more
by the EU member states in 1990. The provisions of
restrictive, asylum law entered into force in July
the Dublin Convention are echoed in the Schengen 1993 and includes among its provisions the ruling,
Implementing Convention signed the same year echoing
by the EU ministers' 1992 resolution, that
the five original Schengen states (France, Germany asylum-seekers entering Germany from a 'safe
third country' should
the house has not yet been built' and arguing that n
German the rule can only be meaningful
asylum procedur if there is first
returned a Europe-wide consensus on the criteria for the to
immediately
they entered. recognition of refugees.32
All Germany's neighbours have been deemed The question of standards is an important one,
'safe' for such returns. Therefore, theoretically, all particularly because the logical outcome of the
of the 90 per cent or so of asylum-seekers who 'safe third country' rule is an intensification of the
hitherto arrived via a neighbouring state can be burden of refugee protection on first asylum or
rejected on the grounds that they have passed asylum 'transit' countries in central and eastern
through a 'safe third country' where they had an Europe, where resources are considerably more
opportunity to apply for asylum. During the limited and refugee-protection institutions consid-
twelve months following the introduction of the erably more fragile. In its most recent communi-
new law, asylum applications in Germany dropped cation to the European Parliament and Council of
by 66 per cent on the levels of the preceding twelve Ministers, the European Commission noted that
months.30 Given the fact that Germany continues
the application of the principle of third host countries
to receive far higher numbers of asylum appli- to countries of transit will affect in particular the
cations than its EU partners, this decrease cannot neighbouring countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
be attributed to the return of asylum-seekers to
other EU member states. Indeed, one might say observing that
that Germany has acted, and continues to act, as the implementation of asylum policies poses severe
an asylum 'buffer' for other west European states. budgetary and operational problems for these
The fall in numbers is explained primarily by the countries.33
German authorities' ability, under the new legis-
Indeed, it has been argued repeatedly by
lation, to return asylum-seekers to 'safe' transit
refugee-support organizations that, in the light of
countries, and 'safe' countries of origin, in central
tighter refugee laws in Germany and elsewhere in
and eastern Europe.
Europe, central and east European states need
The majority of states now have similar legis-
urgent support from western Europe, both finan-
lation that allows for the return of asylum-seekers
cial and institutional, to strengthen systems of
to countries outside the principal west European
refugee protection and help these countries cope
groupings. Thus, transit or the 'mere possibility to
with the added burden of asylum applications
seek protection' in a third country is being used as
which will inevitably result from restricted access
a basis for refusing asylum in western Europe.
to asylum in western Europe.34
Furthermore, this is taking place in the absence of a
Unwilling, or unable, to take in greater and
multilateral legal instrument to regulate the prac-
greater numbers of asylum-seekers, such countries
tice. While some progress has been made on the
have followed the west European lead by attempt-
formulation of a parallel Dublin Convention to
ing to 'pass the buck' progressively east or south,
involve non-EU member states in western Europe
potentially resulting in a chain of deportations
(plus Canada and the United States), no clear
statement has been made to the effect that such an from one country to the next. As argued by
instrument will, or is intended to be, extended toAmnesty International:
the countries of central and eastern Europe. Even a if individual countries or small groups of countries
framework for reaching common positions on the take measures to restrict the number of refugees and
conditions of protection and treatment of asylum- asylum-seekers reaching their territory, to return
seekers in 'host third countries' among the EU asylum-seekers to so-called 'safe countries', and to
member states has yet to be fully developed. Nor is revise or reinterpret established international stand-
there any requirement in the resolution that the ards designed to enhance refugee protection and
international solidarity, then other states may feel
'host third country' agrees to readmit the asylum-
compelled to follow their example and the entire
seeker.3' At a conference convened by the Catholic
system is put in jeopardy.3
Academy in Stuttgart-Hohenheim in September
1994, a judge of the Germany federal constitutionalOf course, it is not long before the chain of 'safe'
court is reported to have criticized the rule on 'safereturns becomes exhausted. Large numbers of the
third countries', comparing it to 'a roof for which 4000 or so refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina who
entered Sweden on Croatian passports,UNHCRfor report,
exam-agreements of this sort 'could
ple, were returned to Croatia by potentially enhance the international protection of
the Swedish
authorities in 1994 on the basis thatrefugees by leading
they could findto the orderly handling of
asylum applications'.
protection there. These returns continued despiteThe report argues, however,
information from the UNHCR, the that Swedish Refu-
'an analysis of current readmission agree-
ments indicates
gee Council, Amnesty International and other that such agreements are not
humanitarian organizations that aoriginally
number meant
of for
thethis purpose' and, indeed, that
expelled Bosnians had been returned to do
they Bosnia by take into account the special
not generally
the Croatian authorities. The Croatian authorities
situation of asylum-seekers, in particular the responsi-
indicated that those repatriated would not be
bility of States to afford them access to fair procedures
registered as refugees in Croatia and, in October
for the determination of refugee status and the grant-
1994, the representative of the Croatian immi-ing of asylum and in this way to ensure that refugees
gration authorities confirmed that Croatia could
are not subject, directly or indirectly, to refoulement.37
not guarantee that all rejected asylum-seekers
The purpose of these agreements is, indeed, to
returned from Sweden would be allowed to stay in
facilitate deportations, which can otherwise prove
Croatia, stating that those expelled from Sweden
a very costly, lengthy and complex process, par-
must return to Bosnia 'if they come from the ticularly when the government of the state to
liberated areas ... and from areas where no battles
which individuals are being deported does not
are taking place' and adding that 'however much it
cooperate with the returning state. Although these
would like to, [Croatia] cannot take care of all the
agreements may not take into account the special
Bosnian refugees'.36 needs of asylum-seekers, a primary motivation for
Without adequate legal safeguards or inter- the agreements with central and east European
national agreements on standards to be applied, states has been the concern to facilitate the return
and without an adequate system of burden-sharing of asylum-seekers to countries of origin and transit.
and/or adequate financial and institutional sup- Not surprisingly, therefore, it was the German
port for the countries most affected, the inevitable
government which led the way, seeking a whole
outcome is an increase in the numbers of refugeesseries of bilateral agreements, starting with
being returned to their country of origin withoutRomania in September 1992, Bulgaria in November
their cases being given a fair hearing in a potential
1992, Poland in May 1993 and the Czech Republic
country of asylum. As with visa restrictions, in theNovember 1994. In the words of the Schengen-
'safe third country' rule results initially in countries
Poland agreement, these agreements oblige each
outside western Europe absorbing many of the signatory state to
asylum-seekers who might otherwise have been
the responsibility of governments in western
readmit to its territory, on the request of another party,
Europe. The end result is a strengthening of the without formalities, any person who does not fulfil (or
restrictions applied by these countries themselves, who no longer fulfils) the conditions of entry or
residence prevailing on the territory of the requesting
ultimately leading to an eastwards expansion of
party.
the west European control regime and, possibly,
the virtual closing off of asylum channelsSuch in arrangements have proliferated rapidly in
Europe, in the east as well as the west. recent years, leading to a complex 'web' of agree-
ments linking states throughout the region. Thus,
for example, Switzerland has sought agreements
'Readmission' agreements
with Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria; Austria has
Although there is, as yet, no overarching multi- concluded agreements with Hungary, the Czech
lateral agreement regulating 'safe country' returnsand Slovak Republics and Slovenia; and France
between west and east European states, the Schen- with Romania.
gen states and Poland reached a so-called 'readmis- Some of these agreements relate primarily to the
sion agreement' in March 1992 which was soon return of nationals of one of the signatory states,
followed by the negotiation of a whole seriesoften of in return for reciprocal visa-free movement.
bilateral agreements designed to facilitate returnsThus, for example, the agreement reached between
of rejected asylum-seekers and irregular migrants Poland and the Schengen states, as well as the
from one state to another. As observed in a recent majority of agreements concluded between the
Czech Republic democratic societiesand and adequate social
west con-
concerned with the return of Polish and Czech ditions; [and] a liberal trade policy'41 - the 1993
nationals to Poland and CzechoslovakiaAction Plan places the emphasis firmly on
respec-
tively, thus facilitating visa-free access of readmission.
Poles and It states that
Czechs to the west European states concerned.
[a]s regards incorporation of asylum and immigration
Meanwhile, agreements with Romania and policy objectives in external relations... principles be
Bulgaria have been sought principally as a means adopted which must appear in bilateral and multi-
of reducing the load of Romanian and Bulgarian lateral readmission agreements [and] a link be estab-
asylum-seekers on asylum systems in west lished where appropriate between Europe association
European states.38 and cooperation agreements concluded by the Com-
Other agreements cover returns both of nation- munity and its Member States and the practices of
als of the countries in question and foreign third countries regarding readmission.42
nationals - including asylum-seekers and 'irregu- The central and east European states have been
lar' migrants - who have travelled to one state via willing to enter into these agreements because their
the other. These agreements are therefore designed economic and political relations with western
inter alia to facilitate 'safe third country' returns of Europe depend on their cooperation in matters
asylum-seekers. This is the case, for example, with connected with migration, including relations in
the agreements reached between Austria and terms of their nationals' visa-free access to western
Hungary, between Austria and the Czech and Europe as visitors, businessmen and workers.
Slovak Republics, and between Germany and the Moreover, the formalization of return or 're-
Czech Republic.39 Others, such as the agreements admission' arrangements with countries in western
sought by the Swiss government with Hungary, Europe has been seen to have advantages because
Bulgaria and Romania, have been intended inter these arrangements might regulate what is an
alia to facilitate the transit of rejected asylum- inevitable development and because many include
seekers directly back to their country of origin. provisions for financial and institutional assistance
Switzerland sought agreements with these three to improve these states' capacity to control im-
countries to allow for the transit of rejected migration and cope with increasing numbers of
ethnic Albanian asylum-seekers to Kosovo after asylum applications.
Macedonia decided to stop the transit of Kosovo However, so as to protect themselves from the
Albanians across its territory in late 1993. Serbianincrease in numbers of asylum-seekers and other
unwillingness to readmit asylum-seekers from migrant populations that these agreements are
Kosovo led to the suspension of deportations from expected to bring about, governments in central
Switzerland, Austria and Sweden in December and eastern Europe have sought readmission
1994.40 agreements of their own with countries further
The importance attached to the readmission east or south. Thus, at the time of writing, Poland
agreements by the west European governments had concluded readmission agreements with the
was reflected in the 'Plan of Action' and 'Priority Czech and Slovak Republics, Bulgaria, Hungary,
Work Programme' in the areas of justice and home Romania, Croatia and Ukraine, and was working
affairs adopted by EU ministers at the first Justice on agreements with Belarus, Russia and the Baltic
and Home Affairs Council in December 1993. Both states: the Czech Republic had concluded agree-
documents list readmission as an area of priorityments
as with the Slovak Republic, Romania and
regards asylum and immigration policy. Ministers Hungary (as well as Poland); Hungary (after an
also adopted a recommendation 'concerning a
agreement with Austria) with Romania, the Slovak
framework text of a readmission agreement Republic, Ukraine and Slovenia (as well as with the
between an EU member state and a third country'. Czech Republic and Poland).43 These agreements
Indeed, in contrast to the EU's Declaration on are to a large extent dependent on one another.
Hence, the Czech Republic was unwilling to take
principles governing external aspects of migration
policy issued at the Edinburgh European Council back deportees from Germany until agreements
had been secured with Romania, Bulgaria and
in December 1992 - which called, among other
things, for policies to promote 'the preservationSlovakia (which depended on a new border agree-
of peace and termination of armed conflicts;ment between the Czech and Slovak Republics);
full respect for human rights; the creation of and the Slovak Republic was unwilling to
implement an agreement with andthe
restrict entries Republic
Czech of asylum-seekers. Thus,
until it had reached agreements togetherwith
with visa
Hungary,
regulations, carrier sanctions
Ukraine and Romania. and the application of the 'safe third country' rule
Standing alone, a number of problemsinseem western Europe, they are already proving effec-
likely to beset these agreements in terms of tive for 'buffering' countries in western Europe
their
application on the ground. For example, once froman increasing numbers of asylum applications.
Principally as a result of the mechanisms discussed
asylum-seeker or immigrant has entered a country,
here
it is often very difficult to prove which country - and despite continuing increases in refugee
that
person entered from, how long they have been populations
in worldwide - asylum applications in
the receiving state and what the identity and, in Europe have fallen significantly from the
western
many cases, the nationality of that person is. Even
peak of 700 000 in 1992 to 550 000 in 1993, 320 000
where return is secured, there may be little inguar-
1994 and to just over 100 000 in the first half of
antee of adequate follow-up to ensure that1995.45those
deported do not get a second (or third, or fourth, or
fifth) attempt at crossing the border (as has proved
Conclusion
a problem in the case of returns from Germany to
Poland). The secondary readmission agreements As noted in the introduction, the prominence o
between central and east European countries, such
international migration on the European politic
as that between Poland and the Czech Republic,and security agendas is explained in large part b
may go some way to resolving this problem as they
the peculiar way in which the phenomenon both
should facilitate regulated transit back towards the
reflects and affects the geopolitical landscape a
country of origin. However, these have not anyyet
one time. During the cold war, the restricti
been fully tested and reliance on them assumes a
of people's movement from east to west not on
level of control over land borders which has not
captured, in the most graphic way possible, th
been achieved even by Germany. bipolar division of the European continent but tha
Moreover, the financial costs of supporting a
division itself depended on the maintenance of
higher level of regulation in this area are likely to restrictions. Although initially instituted
those
be very high. It is worth noting, for example,protect
that, their labour markets, the eastern bloc gov
according to information from the German Federal
ernments came to look on emigration control
Interior Ministry, the cost of expelling foreigners by
essential for protecting the ideological foundation
air from Germany was expected to reach some of their socialist regimes. In the post-cold war era
DM18 million in 1995.44 One is therefore led to
the increased movement of people within th
question whether the pay-off in terms of detection
former eastern bloc and between east and west
and deportation levels would be in any wayprovides
pro- a potent illustration of the breakdown of
portional to the costs of the system. Moreover,
theifold
a east-west division. It reflects the lack of
tighter system were to be brought into operation, a
political integration and the instability of the new
further question of burden-sharing would system
arise. (in the form of increased refugee flows)46
Which countries would be responsible for bearing
but it also represents a central component of the
the costs? While countries such as Germany,
economic, political, social and cultural reinte-
Austria and Switzerland can afford to offer finan-
gration of the two sides of the continent. Yet the
cial 'sweeteners' to encourage neighbouring coun- imposition of new restrictions on east-west move-
tries to enter into readmission agreements, it is not
ment, this time by the governments of western
entirely clear how countries such as Poland and theEurope, also captures the limits to east-west
Slovak Republic are to encourage their neighbours integration. As Anthony Richmond observes:
to participate fully in a potentially very costly
readmission system. The 'buffer' countries often we recognise the existence of an interdependent global
economy in which information, goods, services, and
lack the resources to ship deportees home.
money move relatively freely in what has been
Nevertheless, these agreements are alreadydescribed as a 'borderless world' ... [Yet while the]
proving effective in facilitating 'safe third country'goal of the so-called interlinked economy ... may be
returns of asylum-seekers and in putting pressurefree movement of labour across borders ... this is far
on governments in central and eastern Europefrom having been achieved. On the contrary, immi-
further to strengthen their immigration controlsgration doors are closing and freedom of movement is
limited
for refugees and
little to alter their 'buffer' status, othe
in the present
communities,
situation it such
may be possible as the
for the central E
facilitating movement
European states, and perhaps for within
some east
severely restricting
access to it.
European states, to transform their status to
The states become members
of central of the 'protected' west, no doubt
and ea
course, creating migration or asylum
becoming 'buffers' of their
progressi
the west European econom
eastern and/or southern neighbours in the process.
but at present In the meantime,
their it is to be hoped integr
that their
bufferstage,
transitionary status will have the moreas
positive feature
demo of
tainty representing a communication
surrounding bridge or cultural,fut
their
EU and NATO. economic andThis political crossroads between east
transit
clearly reflected and west. However, this in, will happen only if their aff
and
of these states economic andvis-a-vis
political stability is not severely mi
control. Although trade
disrupted by the very forces (including migration) an
political barriers from which they are between protecting western Europe w
progressively (i.e. if theirbroken
asylum or migration 'buffer' status downdoes
European security guarant
not become more akin to a conflict-prone 'shatter-
extended tobelt').49central
For it should not be forgotten and that, if e
countries' international migration constitutes a threatwith
integration to west-
seen to be ern Europe, it must constitute an
complete even greater
only wh
move and workthreat to the much asless freely stable and prosperous w
EU areas as countries ofcitizens
EU central and eastern Europe. do to
come only when Fortunately for these they countries, however, the
them
in pushing 'threatening' aspect
the of migration is prone to exag-
migration 'f
wards or geration and, at least in the west European so
southwards, setting, th
'buffered' has proved itselfunwanted
from to be an issue played out more in im
way that they terms of threat perception than actual threats to
themselves b
today. stability. Thus, while no less important in geo-
Because of the symbolic importance of migration political terms, the 'protective' mechanisms set up
controls for defining 'insiders' and 'outsiders' in to restrict unwanted migration are in many ways
terms of national (or regional) identities, the posi- more significant at the level of perception than in
tion of the migration 'frontier' or 'buffer' in Europe terms of the reality on the ground. As Major-
can be seen as being of fundamental importance General J H Marshall-Cornwall observed in his
for defining where the (stable) 'west' ends and the treatise on 'Geographic disarmament', published
less stable 'east' begins in perceptions of the new in 1935,
and changing European geopolitical order. John
O'Loughlin and Herman van der Wusten note that, Security is a mental state, not so much based on
while the border between the eastern bloc and rest deductive reasoning as inspired by faith and confi-
dence... We sleep more securely in a country cottage
of Europe was frozen by the cold war, there was no
surrounded by a garden than if that cottage gave
doubt as to the location of the western frontier of
directly on to the main road. The garden wall may be
western Europe. The situation today, however, istotally ineffective as an obstacle; possibly we do not
less clear-cut and much more dynamic: we noweven lock the gate at night; but we are surrounded
talk again of 'central' Europe, a geopolitical con-
with a zone of space, and that zone, though it cannot
cept which more or less disappeared from viewphysically guarantee security, yet psychologically
after the Second World War.48 Although central- imparts it. Transpose the garden wall into a national
eastern Europe was seen as a buffer between twofrontier and the same effect is produced ... We have
replaced the 'razor's edge' of sharp contact by a
great European powers during the interwar period,
blunter insulating zone. In future we must think of
the region can now be seen to be treated byfrontiers, not as lines, but as zones, which, in effect,
western Europe as a buffer between relative order they are.so
and stability in the west and chaos and conflict to
the east and south of the continent. But whereas, It is, perhaps, to be hoped that the new asylum
during the interwar period, these states could do and migration 'frontier' or 'buffer zone' emerging
workers
in central and eastern Europe serves the arepurpose
lawfully employed
of in the EU; and
access to the
pacifying worries in western Europe labour market
about the for legally resident
spouses and
perceived vulnerability to unwanted children of a legally employed worker
immigration
for the duration of the worker's authorized employ-
without succeeding to the point where borders are
ment. See Guild E 1992 Protecting migrants' rights:
sealed off and pressures build up to unmanageable
application of EC agreements with third countries
levels in the'new asylum or migration 'buffer'
CCME Briefing Paper no. 10, Churches Committee
states on western Europe's borders. The
for Migrants burden
in Europe, Brussels.
of migration control in Europe now
8. As defined rests on the
by Mathison T 1971 The functions of
receiving states. As they exercise
small this control,
states in the strategies of great powers Scandina-
receiving governments should not lose sight
vian University of cited in Greenfeld
Books, Oslo,
what is at stake. The world is still divided into Partem M 1983 The buffer system in international
relations Journal of Conflict Resolution 27 1 (March
states but the borders between states are 'soft': they
remain open for emigration and, despite the intro- 1983) 4. See also Marshall-Cornwall J H 1935 Geo-
graphic disarmament: a study of regional demilitariz-
duction of more restrictive migration policies, par-
ation Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute
tially open for immigration. This is fundamental to
the liberal western vision of the world and thus of International Affairs, London, especially Chapter
IV; and see Chay J and Ross T E eds 1986 Buffer
might be expected to be central to the valuesstates
of in world politics Westview Press (Westview
democracy and respect for human rights which Special
the Studies in International Relations), Boulder,
west professes to see take root in the former eastern
CO, and London.
bloc. A world in which people can move to 9.work,
Chay and Ross 1986 Buffer states in world politics op.
form families or, when forced to, seek protection
cit.
should be one of the great achievements of

10. See Marshall-Cornwall 1935 Geographic disarma-
modernity and, as such, safeguarded. ment op. cit., especially Chapter I.
11. Figure provided by the Intergovernmental Consul-
tations on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies
Notes in Europe, North America and Australia (June
1995), quoted in Migration News Sheet 148/95-07
1. Hassner P 1993 Culture and society The Inter-
(July 1995) 10.
national Spectator 26 1 151, quoted in Buzan B 1993
12. At the time of writing, the Schengen Implementing
Introduction: the changing security agenda in
Convention had officially entered into force (March
Europe in Waever O Buzan B Kelstrup M Lemaitre
1995) but had not been fully implemented due to
P eds Identity, migration and the new security agenda in
France's reimposition of controls on the borders
Europe Pinter Publishers, London 3.
with its Schengen neighbours; and the External
2. Buzan B 1993 Introduction op. cit. 8.
Borders Convention remained unsigned owing
3. Williams C H and Williams S 1993 Issues of peace
principally to a dispute between the United King-
and security in contemporary Europe in Williams C
dom and Spain over the status of Gibraltar.
H ed. The political geography of the new world order
For further discussion of these conventions, see
Belhaven Press, London and New York 102.
Collinson S 1994 Europe and international migration
4. Buzan B 1993 Introduction op. cit. 12-13.
2nd edn. Pinter Publishers for the Royal Institute of
5. Heisler M O and Layton-Henry Z 1993 Migration International Affairs, London 120-32.
and the links between social and societal security in
13. Cour Bodtcher A and Hughes A 1991 The effects of
Waever O Buzan B Kelstrup M Lemaitre P eds
legislation imposing fines on airlines for transport-
Identity, migration and the new security agenda in
ing undocumented passengers in Danish Refugee
Europe Pinter Publishers, London 162.
Council and Danish Center of Human Rights The
6. Hudak V 1993 East-central Europe and the Czech
effects of carrier sanctions on the asylum system Danish
and Slovak Republics in a new security environ-
Refugee Council, Copenhagen 11-12.
ment in Kipp J W ed. Central European security
14. Amnesty International 1993 Refugee protection at
concerns: bridge, buffer or barrier? Frank Cass, London
121-3. risk. Amnesty International's recommendations to the
44th session of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR
7. In contrast to the free-movement provisions for
AI Index POL 33/06/93 (September 1993) Amnesty
states joining the European economic area. The
International (International Secretariat), London 10.
Europe agreements contain no right of access for
15. Migration News Sheet 131/94-02 (February 1994).
workers from the Association countries but guaran-
16. Migration News Sheet 139/94-10 (October 1994).
tee protection from discrimination as regards work-
ing conditions, remuneration or dismissal when 17. See Le Monde Diplomatique 10 January 1994.
18. International
1994), 138/94-09 (SeptemberOrganis
1994), 139/94-10
Transit (October 1994) and 140/94-11
migration in (November
the 1994). Cze
19. Amnesty 37. UNHCR 1994 Readmission agreements, 'protection
International
risk op. cit. 10. elsewhere' and asylum policy Paper presented to
20. OECD, Continuous Reporting System on the Committee of Permanent Representatives at the
Migration (SOPEMI) 1994 Trends in international Permanent Representation of Germany to the
migration: annual report 1993 OECD, Paris 133. European Union UNHCR, Geneva 1.
21. Migration News Sheet 145/95-04 (April 1995) 38. Readmission agreements reported to the Inter-
and
150/95-09 (September 1995); and OECD, Continu- governmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugee
ous Reporting System on Migration (SOPEMI) and Migration Policies in Europe, North America
1995 Trends in international migration: annual report and Australia in Migration News Sheet 148/95-07
1994 OECD, Paris. (July 1995) 7.
22. OECD (SOPEMI) 1995 Trends in international 39. Ibid.
migration 1994 op. cit. 59. 40. Migration News Sheet 142/95-01 (January 1995)
41. Council of Ministers 1992 Declaration on Prin-
23. Ibid., 58 and 152-5.
24. Ibid. See also International Organisation for Mi- ciples Governing External Aspects of Migratio
gration 1994 Transit migration in the Czech Republic; Policy in Conclusions of the Presidency SN 456/1/9
Transit migration in Poland; Transit migration in REV 1 Edinburgh, December.
42. EU Council of Ministers document 10655/93 JAI
Bulgaria; and Transit migration in Ukraine IOM,
11.
Geneva.
25. Le Monde Diplomatique 10 January 1994.

43. Readmission Agreements Reported to the Inter-
governmental Consultations op. cit. Migration News
26. International Organisation for Migration 1994
Sheet 148/95-07 (July 1995); OECD 1995 Trends in
Transit migration in the Czech Republic op. cit.; and
international migration 1994 op. cit.; and Migration
Migration News Sheet 145/95-04 (April 1995).
News Sheet various issues.
27. UNHCR November 1994 Fair and expeditious asy-
44. Migration News Sheet 145/95-04 (April 1995). Note
lum procedures Paper presented to the Committee
that much of this cost is borne by the airlines
of Permanent Representatives at the Permanent
concerned, as is stipulated under carrier liability
Representation of Germany to the European Union rules.
UNHCR, Geneva 3.
45. Figures from the Intergovernmental Consultations
28. Subsequently joined by Italy, Spain, Portugal and
on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies in
Greece in the early 1990s and by Austria in 1995.
Europe, North America and Australia (June 1995),
29. See, for example, The Guardian 26 July 1993.
reported in Migration News Sheet 148/95-07 (July
30. Migration News Sheet 137/94-08 (August 1994). 1995) 10.
31. Amnesty International 1993 Refugee protection at 46. Richmond A H 1994 Global apartheid: refugees,
risk op. cit. 4-5. racism, and the new world order Oxford University
32. Migration News Sheet 139/94-10 (October 1994). Press, Toronto, New York and Oxford 106.
33. Commission of the European Communities 1994 47. Ibid.
Communication from the Commission to the Council and 48. O'Loughlin J and van der Wusten H eds 1993 Th
the European Parliament on immigration and asylum new political geography of eastern Europe in The
policies COM(94) 23 final, EC Commission, Brussels new political geography of eastern Europe Belhaven
27.
Press, London and New York 1.
34. See, for example, The Guardian 26 May 1994. 49. For a discussion of this concept, see Hensel P R an
35. Amnesty International 1993 Refugee protection at Diehl P F 1994 Testing empirical propositions about
risk op. cit. 1. shatterbelts, 1945-76 Political Geography 13 1 33-51.
36. See The Independent 7 April 1994; The Guardian 13 50. Marshall-Cornwall 1935 Geographic disarmamen
July 1994; Migration News Sheet 137/94-08 (August op. cit. 175.

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Visa Requirements, Carrier Sanctions, 'Safe Third Countries' and 'Readmission': The

Development of an Asylum 'Buffer Zone' in Europe

The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers) is

Visa requirements, carrier sanctions, 'safe

development of an asylum 'buffer zon

This paper explores the development of a so-called asylum 'buffer zone'

key words Europe refugee asylum flows buffer zones geopolitics

revised manuscript received 2 October 1995

Trans Inst Br Geogr NS 21 76-90 1996

The impact on central and eastern Europe

levels relative to other countries in the region.

should be one of the great achievements of

25. Le Monde Diplomatique 10 January 1994.

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