Election Methods

Plurality method: the candidate with a plurality of votes wins.

Plurality-with-elimination method: Eliminate the candidate with the fewest first place votes. Keep doing this until some candidate has a majority.

Borda count method: Assign points for the position each candidate finishes on each ballot; 0 points for last place, 1 for second-to-last place, 2 for third-
to-last, etc. Whoever receives the most of these Borda points is the winner.

Method of pairwise comparisons: Compare each candidate to each other; whichever of the two candidates was more preferred by the voters gets one
point. Add up the points for all of the comparisons. The candidate with the most points is the winner.

Plurality Method. In this method, the choice with the most first-preference votes is declared the winne

Elimination

In an instant run-off, or plurality with elimination, the candidate with the fewest first place votes is eliminated from the results with his or her votes going
to the second choice candidate for those voters. This process is continued until there are only two candidates remaining - one with the most votes; this is
called a majority (having more than 50% of the votes is a majority).

In our example, Taylor received the fewest number of votes so he will be eliminated. The column that shows Taylor as first will shift up, with each
candidate moving one closer to the top. In each column, Taylor is removed and all candidates below will shift up to accommodate the space. Notice how
the first two columns of results now match with Brown being the first choice and Smith, Jones and Rowe following. We can combine these columns to
indicate that 39 voters preferred this order.

Round 3 of the elimination would remove Smith from the preference schedule because he received the fewest number of first place votes. Here is the
preference schedule after eliminating Smith.

At this point, we can see that Brown has 39 first place votes, Rowe has a total of 39 first place votes and Jones has only 22 first place votes. In the final
round of elimination, Jones will be removed.

The final preference schedule will look like this.

The Plurality with Elimination Method: The candidate with

Instant Runoff Voting

Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), also called Plurality with Elimination, is a modification of the plurality method that attempts to address the issue of insincere
voting. In IRV, voting is done with preference ballots, and a preference schedule is generated. The choice with the least first-place votes is then
eliminated from the election, and any votes for that candidate are redistributed to the voters’ next choice. This continues until a choice has a majority
(over 50%).

This is similar to the idea of holding runoff elections, but since every voter’s order of preference is recorded on the ballot, the runoff can be computed
without requiring a second costly election.

This voting method is used in several political elections around the world, including election of members of the Australian House of Representatives, and
was used for county positions in Pierce County, Washington until it was eliminated by voters in 2009. A version of IRV is used by the International
Olympic Committee to select host nations.

EXAMPLE

Consider the preference schedule below, in which a company’s advertising team is voting on five different advertising slogans, called A, B, C, D, and E
here for simplicity.
Initial votes

3 4 4 6 2 1

1st choice B C B D B E

2nd choice C A D C E A

3rd choice A D C A A D

4th choice D B A E C B

5th choice E E E B D C

If this was a plurality election, note that B would be the winner with 9 first-choice votes, compared to 6 for D, 4 for C, and 1 for E.
There are total of 3+4+4+6+2+1 = 20 votes. A majority would be 11 votes. No one yet has a majority, so we proceed to elimination rounds.
Round 1: We make our first elimination. Choice A has the fewest first-place votes, so we remove that choice

3 4 4 6 2 1

1st choice B C B D B E
2nd choice C D C E

3rd choice D C D

4th choice D B E C B

5th choice E E E B D C

We then shift everyone’s choices up to fill the gaps. There is still no choice with a majority, so we eliminate again.

3 4 4 6 2 1

1st choice B C B D B E

2nd choice C D D C E D

3rd choice D B C E C B

4th choice E E E B D C

Round 2: We make our second elimination. Choice E has the fewest first-place votes, so we remove that choice, shifting everyone’s options to fill the
gaps.

3 4 4 6 2 1

1st choice B C B D B D

2nd choice C D D C C B

3rd choice D B C B D C

Notice that the first and fifth columns have the same preferences now, we can condense those down to one column.

5 4 4 6 1

1st choice B C B D D

2nd choice C D D C B
3rd choice D B C B C

Now B has 9 first-choice votes, C has 4 votes, and D has 7 votes. Still no majority, so we eliminate again.
Round 3: We make our third elimination. C has the fewest votes.

5 4 4 6 1

1st choice B D B D D

2nd choice D B D B B

Condensing this down:

9 11

1st choice B D

2nd choice D B

D has now gained a majority, and is declared the winner under IRV.
The method of pairwise comparisons

The text presents one version of the method of pairwise comparisons. We present a different one here, just to keep you on your toes.

This method of pairwise comparisons is like a "round-robin tournament". For each pair of candidates (there are C(N,2) of them), we calculate how many
voters prefer each. The candidate of the pair whom most voters prefer is awarded one point, and the loser get 0 points. If there is a tie, each candidate
gets half a point. At the end, the candidate with the most points wins.

The advantage of this method is that it satisfies the Condorcet criterion, which all the others violate. On the other hand, let's see what happens for our
Math Anxiety Club election:

Number of voters 14 10 8 4 1
1st choice A C D B C
2nd choice B B C D D
3rd choice C D B C B
4th choice D A A A A
Calculate that:

In A vs. B, 14 prefer A and 23 prefer B, so B gets 1 point.

In A vs. C, (14 to 23) C wins
In A vs. D, (14 to 23) D wins
In B vs. C, (18 to 19) C wins
In B vs. D, (28 to 9) B wins
In C vs. D, (25 to 12) C wins

The final score is: 0 for A, 2 for B, 3 for C and 1 for D.

So C (Carmen) wins this way!

Problems -- The independence of irrelevant alternatives and the ability to produce a winner

In the following election:

Number of voters 5 3 5 3 2 4
1st choice A A C D D B
2nd choice B D E C C E
3rd choice C B D B B A
4th choice D C A E A C
5th choice E E B A E D

Who wins?

But who wins if B, C and D drop out of the race?

Number of voters 10 12
1st choice A E
2nd choice E A

So the result is dependent on whether (and which) losing candidates are in the race. So the following principle is violated:

Basic assumption: Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives -- If a candidate X wins an election, and then one or more other candidates are removed,
but otherwise no votes are changed then X should still win the election.

Fairness Criteria

 1 (Majority Criterion)If a candidate gets a majority (>50%) of the first place votes, he/she should be winner.
 2 (Condorcet Criterion): winning candidate should also be winner of pairwise comparisons.
 3 (Monotonicity Criterion): Suppose X is the winner and suppose that in another election some voters are able to rank X higher, with no
change for the other candidates, then X should still win.
 4 (Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion): Suppose X is the winner, if one or more losing candidates drop from the race, X should still be the
winner.
 (5 (Pareto Condition): if everyone prefers candidate 1 over candidate 2, then candidate 2 should not be among the winners of the
election.This is subsumed by the Condorcet Criterion.)

Theorem : Plurality Voting, Single Runoff, Sequential Runoff, Borda Count and the Condorcet Method satisfy the Monotonicity Criterion.

Example 1 again:

First A B C D E E
Second D E B C B C
Third E D E E D D
Fourth C C D B C B
Fifth B A A A A A
 18 12 10 9 4 2

The plurality winner is A.

o Is the Majority Criterion satisfied?

o Is the Condorcet Criterion satisfied?
o Is the Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion satisfied? I.e. can you find a losing candidate X, such that when we drop X, this would change
the plurality outcome?

The single runoff winner is B.

o Is the Majority Criterion satisfied?

o Is the Condorcet Criterion satisfied?
o Is the Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion satisfied?

The sequential runoff winner is C.

o Is the Majority Criterion satisfied?

o Is the Condorcet Criterion satisfied?
o Is the Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion satisfied?

The Borda count winner is D.

o Is the Condorcet Criterion satisfied?

o Is the Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion satisfied?

The Condorcet winner is E.

o Is the Majority Criterion satisfied?

o Is the Condorcet Criterion satisfied?
o \Is the Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion satisfied?