The Battle So far we have used the following sources: Florange’s Mémoires, checked with those of Martin du Bellay; Guichardin’s account: the correspondence of Frangais 1, Bonnivet, Lautrec and Montmorency; accounts given by Bouchet, a confident of La Trémoille; Reinhard Thoms’ studies and the archives of the Duke of Gonzaga. When we come to the actual battle, we are faced by an extraordinary prolifera- tion of reports. Documents, genuine or otherwise; statements by ‘eye- witnesses’ who most of the time saw little or nothing; all combine to confuse still further the details of a conflict that was itself confused. For six months or more after 24th February 1525, everyone who could hold a pen, a brush or a weaver's shuttle gave his account of the Battle of Pavia. The news even spread through Turkey to China. ‘The engagement that brought about the capture of the French king ‘was not a tactical battle that can be studied from that angle. It was just a chance skirmish, like many another that took place under the walls of Pavia after Binasco. It was not ‘planned’, though Imperial supporters sometimes try to make believe it was, Fortunately the ‘witnesses’ were simply captains of some importance, just capable of telling what they did themselves. The clerks who tried to bring logic and reasoning into it, writing in their little note-books after it was all over, were doubtless patriotic but can easily be shown to be wrong. Modern accounts are equally open to doubt, for they are full of picturesque but unauthentic details that are misleading and must be eliminated. For instance, Mignet speaks of ‘a clear, cold February morning’, but though the first breach in the Mirabello wall was made at midnight, battle was not joined until 5a.m. By 8.30 the king was already a prisoner, Bergers’ calendar shows that on the night of 24th February 1525, the moon was full, but Frundsberg says it was 1 Rivalité de Frangois ler et de Charles Quint, tl, p.49. 134The Battle 135 ‘a black night’ and we know for certain it was dark because the Imperial troops had to wear white shirts over their. armour to be visible to one another. If, in spite of the full moon, the night was so dark, it must have been overcast. In actual fact, these broad, low- lying plains around the Po and Ticino were blanketed by dense fog, as they still are at this time of year, fog that does not lift during the mornings. It obscured the whole battle, which explains why so many Swiss were drowned in the Ticino. There was no frost and the ground was soft, consequently the French artillery could not play a decisive part. Which brings us to another ‘picturesque detail’ of Mignet’s. He says that ‘Frangois came down from his fortified camp to the heather of the park’.? The whole area is, {and always has been) as flat as the palm of one’s hand, as I well know from the days I spent there, study- ing the movements of every section of both armies. There is not the slightest eminence from which Frangois could have ‘descended’, unless Mignet is referring to those earthworks thrown up around the ducal farmyard, which were only a few feet high. As for the ‘heather’, there is none, for this grows in dry soil. The waters of the Naviglio, the Olona and the Vernavola, plus a hundred little canals, made the whole park a swamp. In 1517, 1520 and again in 1522, the Dukes of Milan used forced labour ‘to clear the park of ferns rushes and other aquatic plants’, No wonder, since there was no frost, the cannon could not be brought into action! They would have been bogged down as quickly as the four guns the Imperial forces tried to haul into place at the start of the battle and had to abandon ‘in quag- mires’ In the same place Mignet speaks of ‘a little valley’, which he says, ‘sheltered the Imperial troops’. This ‘valley’ appears in earlier versions and was mentioned by Mézeray, the French histor- iographer, in his Abrégé chronologique de I’Histoire de France (1673). In fact there is not, and never has been, a ‘vailey’ anywhere on this battle ground, but some of the rivers and canals have raised banks. It was behind one of these that the Imperial infantry took cover. The battle began in complete obscurity and ended in dense fog; there was no ‘heather’ and no ‘clear, cold, February morning’. It remains to classify our sources and say a word about each: 1, The Mémoires of Florange: These have been used only so far as 2 Op, cit, tA, p50. 3 Mignet, op. cit., 1, p.52.136 Battle of Pavia they concern what happened in his immediate vicinity. The rest is mere invention. 2. The Mémoires of Martin du Bellay. He devotes only a page and ahalf* to the battle itself. He gives only general indications, but these are of special interest when they run counter to what the chroniclers of the Imperial army call ‘the facts’, 3. The Mémoires of Sebastian Moreau, general referendary of the Duke of Milan. Never a clear-thinker, he was completely lost over this nocturnal battle and merely produced a whole catalogue of inexactitudes. 4. Mémoires of Blaise de Montluc. Either he did not see what went on around him, or he did not want to talk about it. He makes the excuse that everyone else has already given an account of the battle, so he is not ‘going to waste paper on it’. His comments are about the wounded, but as a witness he must be treated with caution. 5. The biography of Schertlin de Burtenbach. He saw very little, but what he did see is interesting. He expresses himself clumsily, which makes his account the more ‘convincing; otherwise, why express it at all? 6. The Mémoires of La Trémoille. But he was killed in the battle and the account was drafted by his confident, Bouchet. It is mainly a list of the dead and wounded. 7. Report of the Abbé of Najera, war treasurer of the Imperial army. He was not present at the battle and speaks from hearsay. His informants were still pursuing the fugitives, amazed and intoxicated by the glory of their achievement. Furthermore, he was writing to Charles V, which did not predispose him to objectivity. He places considerable importance on the sortie made by Antonio de Leyva, but we shall see that the king was taken prisoner long before that happened. His report is valuable concerning the flight and drowning of the Swiss, and also gives precise information® as to the number of cannon captured from the French, He describes the condition of the ground where the Imperial artillery was bogged down, and it is from him that we know there was no frost. 8. The account by the Ambassador of the Republic of Sienna, His profession leads him to place undue emphasis on minor, unimportant facts when doing so is to his advantage. He dwells mainly on prepara- tions for the battle, when in fact there were none. He talked with 4 Pages 117-118 of these Mémoires, (edition 1582). 5 Ct ps3.The Battle 137 Lannoy, Pescara, Bourbon, Frandsberg and others, thus learning of plans they had in mind, but quite different and sometimes even con- trary actions took place in the battle itself, which the ambassador did not see. He was at Lardirago, but this fact did not hinder him from giving a detailed report of the capture of the king, at which, he says, he was present. (But if we take.notice of all the ‘eye-witness’ accounts ‘of that event there must have been a thousand men who made the capture and at least another ten thousand standing by. The ambas- sador is merely one more.) 9. Account by Poliziano: very short, but giving valuable indica- tions as to the time the battle lasted. (An hour or so, like a football match). 10. Report by Giacomo de Nocera: he muddles everything, move- ments and their effect. His only concern is to prove that the contin- gents from Naples fought well. On reading him one doubts it; in any case they arrived late, 11. Account by Capino da Capo. A wealth of detail that cannot be checked for accuracy. Some of these statements seem plausible, compared with what is known from other sources and borne out by an examination of the places concerned. His account is confused. as the battle was, but he questioned a great many who were there and reports many feats of arms. 12. The letter from Luzascho. He blames the Swiss, but his inform- ant is the king himself, and the king knows nothing. For a quarter of an hour before being taken prisoner he believed he was victorious; When his enemies pressed around him he struck at them crying: “What's the matter? What’s going on?” 13, Report by Auguste Huber. He questioned an obscure soldier, and gives very important information on the artillery action. He re- stores the credit of the Swiss troops and speaks of the fog that dis- organized their movements and led to their disaster by drowning in the Ticino at a moment when they thought they were countering the sortie by Antonio de Leyva. Huber also confirms how brief the battle was: ‘less than an hour’. 14, Letter from Charles Quint. Like everyone else who was miles away, he is amazed by the extraordinary number of dead. 15. Report by Lannoy: He lists the victorious captains. Like all Rolls of Honour, it contains the names of men who did nothing much, but who were seen busily running to and fro. —16. Account by Ramazotto, Clarity and precision concerning one138 Battle of Pavia part of the battle, with special reference to the German lansquenets and the Swiss of the French army. 17. Account of the battle by the Marquis of Pescara. One expects a great deal from him, for he is intelligent and there is much he could tell if he wishes, yet one doubts whether he will be subjective. He does not mention Antonio de Leyva’s sortie, which played an important role during the second half of the battle. On the other hand. he relates, with a wealth of amazing details, the ‘exploits’ of his nephew, the Marquis del Vasto. For him, nothing else has any importance. ‘Yet his head was the cleverest in the whole Imperial army and he could have given the best account. Instead, it is superficial, cautious, specifically devised to produce certain reactions from Charles V. 18. Frundsberg’s account. He was in command of the Imperial lansquenets, and his report is the clearest and most honest. It is as clumsily phrased as Burtenbach’s and, like his, tells the truth, for he lacks the ability to express a lie. That is obvious. 19, Account by Wintzerer. This completes the Jast-mentioned, with slight differences, just enough to high-light the details. 20. The chronicle of Antonio Grumello. Very valuable on every- thing to do with the breach in the park wall and the withdrawal formations of the Jansquenet contingents, also the troops of the Marquis del Vasto. For the rest, it is ill-informed. All modern accounts of the battle can come only from the sources listed above. With so many documents it is clearly possible (without laying oneself open to a charge of ‘invention’) to change white into black simply by substituting some details for others, or stressing certain movements at the expense of others. Which has been done. Tf we take Pescara’s account, Pavia becomes strictly a Spanish victory; if we follow Frundsberg’s, it is two-thirds German; but we should then be forgetting Burtenbach and Wintzerer, for whom it is a triumph of luck. In short, one cannot be certain of finding out the truth even by searching for it. ‘There is perhaps one way of approaching the problem—by check- ing all the evidence on the actual scene of action, When we are told, for example, that the French forces charged, and we know where they started, what road they took, where they halted, wheeled, and what line they followed then, one must follow their movements on the terrain itself, and similarly every other movement in the battle. In this way, we shall several times find Pescara falsifying the facts in favour of his nephew, notably in respect of this march against theThe Battle 139 castle of Mirabello. Pescara writes to Charles V, who does not even know where Pavia is, (nor does he need to, since he works through intermediaries) and tells him of a ‘flank attack’ by Vasto. At the relevant time, Vasto was floundering in the bogs where he lost all his cannon, and did not reach Mirabello until four days after Fran- gois had left it, By then the French flank was miles away. In this particular case, however, Pescara’s nepotism had a touch of self- interest, When he had the first breach made in the wall. he had no thought of a flank attack or even of a battle. All he intended was to get into Mirabello and thence send fresh troops into Pavia. Chance decreed otherwise, so he thought of changing his initial idea into ‘an attack on the French flank’ and giving the credit to his nephew. It really is vitally important to explore the terrain step by step! ‘The Mirabello park is bordered to the south by the walls of Pavia itself, facing the castle and the citadel; to the east by the road that now runs from the Casina San Spirito and the hamlet of Saa Paolo (two of the five abbeys) to Due Porte, between the Casa dei Levrieri and the Torre del Gallo; to the north by the network of roads running from Lardirago to the Charterhouse of Pavia; and to the west by the ‘Naviglio, (the canal beside the present road from Pavia to Milan), which, in 1525, ran along the western forts of the citadel and filled the moats; it ran through the king’s camp at San Lanfranco and joined the Ticino upstream from the town. The park wall was extremely solid and imposing, broken only by fortified entrances with draw-bridges; one at the Casa dei Levrieri, on the east side; another, or a few others, at the eastern corner, at Due Porte and Porta Chiossa; another on the north side at Porta Pescarina; two ‘on the side of the Charterhouse, one beside the Naviglio, where an unmetalled road forks off to San Genesio. On this road, before one comes to the level crossing, stands the Casina Repentita, which will be mentioned later, The whole area of the former park is now a huge forest of poplars, flourishing in the water-logged ground, but originally Mirabello was not entirely covered by these trees. Thanks to Leandro Alberti,® we know where the wooded parts were, a most important matter if we are to understand the movements of the battle, for clumps of trees hid the approach or withdrawal of troops and the ground was firmer there than in the open spaces. One of these clumps, almost a forest, ran along the eastern wall, concealing any enemy approach to the 6 Descrizione di tutta Halia, Venice, 1551.140 Battle of Pavia Torre del Gallo, where Francois’s cannon-butts were, and facilitat- ing an attack on the chateau itself. This is partly the reason why the king left the castle on the 20th, four days before the battle. The Imperial forces did not, however, make use of this wood, Like all the other woods except one, it consisted of poplar trees, not the ‘Italian’ poplar cultivated there today, but the older, more massive black poplar and elder, which foster a dense undergrowth. (A party of Vasto’s troops will stagger round for two hours in the southern corner of this wood.) Another of these woods is even more interesting for us. It bestrode the wall itself near the Porto Pescarina, and on the outside extended as far as the Casina San Giovannino. Inside the walls it enclosed more than 500 yards of the course of the Vernavola and at that point was more than a mile wide, decreasing at other places to 500 yards or tess, over a length of more than two and a half miles. The ground was drier here and the trees were oaks, pines, sycamores, with pop- lars edging the banks of the river. There was practically no under- growth except for a few bushes, and it was under cover of this wood that the Imperial army made its way into the park, (We are accepting the version of Capino da. Capo, who states that the northern wall was breached, in preference to the opinion of Konrad Habler, who suggests that it was the eastern wall. Breaches on that side would have given access either to the dense wood where, a little later, the Marquis del Vasto’s left wing came to grief, or to the swamps that extended towards the Casa del Levrieri. We know from other sources that on the evening of 24th February the Marquis of Pescara aband- ‘oned his position at the Casa dei Levricri and withdrew his troops towards Lardirago, only a mile and a half from the oak and pine wood, There is a strong probability that the park wall was breached at the place known nowadays as the Porta Pescarina. Demolition is easier when one has only to widen an existing opening. The approach ‘on this side was protected by woods, the pioneers had the cover of the trees, and the road allowed easy access. Far to the north was a third wooded region, extending from Borga- rello to the wall adjoining the Charterhouse and separated from the ‘one mentioned earlier by an open space more than a mile wide and less marshy than elsewhere, Here the heavy cavalry were encamped, and at about 800 yards from the edge of the wood was the king's lodging, now a large farm known as the Casina Repentita, where he spent the night of 24th February, before the wall was breached. TheThe Baitle 141 unmetalled road that, beyond the level-crossing, leads straight to- wards San Genesio, 300 yards north of the Porta Pescarino, shows almost perfectly the line of attack taken by the Imperial army. ‘So we come to the fourth and last wooded area, the largest of all, two or three miles long, one and a half miles wide in some places, less in others, extending from a few hundred yards south of the Casina Repentita all along the western wall as far as the walls of Pavia. It has much the same type of trees as the wood by the eastern wall, but the undergrowth is thicker and the ground more marshy. Still, it was brought into service by Alencon and Bonnivet, who cleared part of the undergrowth and raised a few earthworks, though it was the worst place in the whole park for any military manoeuvres. This is where the French contingents camped after they fled from San Lanfranco. Considering now the stretches of open ground, one of them began mid-way along the northern wall, between Due Porte and the Porta- Pescarina, its eastern edge bounded for a couple of miles by the first impenetrable wood: its western edge, from Porta Pescarina to the castle approaches, ran alongside the second wood and the bank of the Vernavola. As soon as the wall was breached, the second wood and this open ground were occupied by Imperial troops while their spear-head, commanded by del Vasto, dashed on towards the castle, the sole objective of this action. Those in the open, in particular Vasto’s left wing, had to run the gauntlet of heavy fire from the can- nons at Torre del Gallo; they fell back in disorder towards the second wood which had served the rest of the army as an approach route to Mirabello. This repulse deflected the army from its objective and changed its direction from a line running north to south, towards Pavia, to a line running east and west, towards Casina Repentita and the French flank. ‘The second open space began at the corner of the third wood, against the north wall between Porta Pescarina and the Charter- house, and also extended in the direction of Pavia, the last third of its length being swamp. In its first third was the king’s pavilion, (where he stayed when he left the castle), and the mews for his fal- cons, (which later became the large farm called the Casina Repen- tita). For the zest, it was bordered on the east by the second wood, full of the Imperial army, and on the west by the fourth wood, pene- trated with considerable difficulty by Alencon, Bonnivet; La Tré- moille, La Palisse and Trivulce, Across this second open space, on the142 Battle of Pavia right bank of the Vernavola, galloped the French men-at-arms with the king at their head. Their charge, north-west to south-east, scatter- ed the Jansquenets firing at them from the Torre del Gallo, and this first part of the battle seemed a victory for Frangois I. One can well understand his amazement when he suddenly found himself alone and lost in the midst of his enemies. We shall need to follow the course of events in detail to discover how far this was due to chance, the terrain and military action. First, though, a few words are necessary as to what troops were actually there, especially since the sources named earlier do not always agree as to the strength of either army. Everything depends on what the narrator wants to prove, and which side he is defending. There can be no question, for instance, of accepting the figures put forward by Reissner (Histoire de Georges et de Gaspard de Frunds- berg, Frankfurt, 1568) who speaks of Frangois's army as being 60,000 or even 100,000 men. On the other hand, we can to some extent believe the war-treasurer, the Abbé of Najera, who, on 19th January, wrote to Charles V reporting that the Imperial army con- sisted of 13,000 Germans, 6,000 Spaniards, 3,000 Italians, 1,500 light horse and 800 lances of men-at-arms. (Each ‘lance’ consisted of six mounted men, so that this force of men-at-arms was 4,800 strong). ‘Thus the total fighting strength of the Imperial army was about 28,000 men, while they were still at Lodi. But between 19th January and 24th February it was decimated by poor food, disorganized supplies, diseases of every kind, plague in particular, and the hard- ships of the campaign due to cold, rain and mud. There were also losses sustained at every skirmish, desertions by those who thought themselves ill-paid and others who had no such excuse to offer. The Marquis of Pescara tactfully puts their effective strength finally at 20,000, but that is lower than in fact it was. We must not forget that hhe made this count after the victory, and no one can resist the temptation to magnify the odds. Reisner, who just now was boosting, Frangois’s army to 100,000, minimized the Imperial army to 16,000; Schertlin de Burtenbach put it at 18,000; Pescara went as far as 20,000; but in reality there must have been 25,000 men at least. It is much more difficult to determine the strength of the French army, primarily because the sources giving the figures are all on the Imperial side, then because so many modifications took place during the siege, and finally because the king himself did not know, for several captains gave him erroneous information. After the battle theThe Battle 143 king told Lannoy that he had 8,000 Swiss, 5,000 Germans, 7,000 French foot-soldiers and 6,000 Italians, (Cf. Lannoy’s letter to Marg- uerite of Austria, 25th February 1525), but these figures were out of date and bore no relation to the actual facts. ‘The Abbé of Najera (of the Imperial camp) estimates the French army as between 30,000 and 35,000 men: 24,000 to 26,000 infantry, including Swiss, lansquenets, arquebusiers and adventurers, 3,000 Jight cavalry and 12,000 mounted men-at-arms. But this seems an exaggeration. In November, the French army was certainly between 40,000 and 43,000 strong, but the Duke of Albany took 9,400 men with him to Naples. In December, the Milan garrison had 6,000 men, Jeaving Francois with 28,000. True, he was reinforced by Giovanni dei Medici and his 2,500 picked men, but on the eve of the battle these lost their leader. Moreover, the French army suffered more than the Imperial troops from losses due to illness, desertions, skirmishes and hardship; -by 19th February, five days before the battle, 2,000 Grisons (according to Sanudo), 5,000 (according to Schwartzenau) and 6,000 (says du Bellay) had left the army and gone home. So we arrive at a figure of 23,000 to 24,000 men. These mercenary fighters, (among them the Swiss), very sensitive to money and to impending political changes, can be wiped out as quickly as chalk from a blackboard by rumours, bribery, craft or phantom fears. In this respect the French army is incomparably weaker than the Imperial forces. The Abbé of Najera himself writes to Charles V: ‘The French infantry totals about 24,000 to 26,000 men, but not 10,000 of them are as staunch as ours’. Bourbon and Pescara, though not as ‘modern’ as their master, Charles V, are far from being knights of the Middle Ages; Bourbon, after being in- spired by hatred for so long, is now busy shaping his future career; Pescara, caustic by temperament, is a man of many moods, but open to reason, while the King of France still trusts in his own courage and his strong right arm. There are other psychological errors, too, ‘on the French side. Florange tries to retain by force the Swiss who are anxious to desert, and so plays into the enemy’s hands. Gian- jacopo dei Medici, in the service of the Sforza family, has seized by guile and ambush the fortress of Chiavenna, the gateway to the Grison country, so all the Grisons decamp in a body ‘to defend their homeland’. What better excuse could they have? For some days, now. Bourbon, Lannoy and Pescara have been trying to find a way out of their present deadlock. Their army is so144 Battle of Pavia placed that it can no longer stay where it is, nor can it move. They have talked of attacking the French, but they know it will be a tough job and one which they are reluctant to undertake. Still, they have 80 imprudently, so rashly, harangued their troops about the coming contest that they are obliged to do something, and something import- ant, otherwise there is a grave risk that their men will feel disil- Jusioned and will desert. Besides, soldiers cost money and time is running short, So they decide to do something, but they certainly did not envisage the ‘Battle of Pavia’. After careful thought, they decide to try the following manoeuvre: they would break into Mirabello park, (an enterprise to thrill their hot-headed troops since it was the headquarters of the king himself). Once inside the park they would take the castle, (though they are well aware that the king left it four or five days ago), and then bring fresh reinforcements, supplies of food and powder to Pavia. Tf, after that, they were forced to retire they would at least have justified their sortie from Lodi; if they were able to hold Mirabello castle the siege would be broken and they could talk of victory. That was the full extent of their hopes. Having decided on this plan, the next point to settle was just where the wall should be breached. As we have secn (at Marscilles and at Pavia) there are rules for such matters; to be of practical use a breach must be at least fifteen yards wide at its base to admit an attacking army. From the camp of Casa dei Levrieri, Lannoy, Bour- bon and Pescara can see the coveted castle barely two miles away. To anyone unfamiliar with the bogs ia the park it would seem that the simplest way is to breach the eastern walll, not, perhaps, directly in front of the Casa dei Levrieri, since then one would be under fire from the Torre del Gallo, but a little higher, at the Casina Fornetta, for instance, (according to Konrad Hibler). But the Spanish gencrals well know what the park is like in this damp, foggy February weather. On 19th February, Captain Oswald and a small force of Guasta- dores’, (Spanish pioneers), inspect the wall and discover what we have called the second wood, the one bordering the fortified perimeter as far as the Porta Pescarina. On the 20th and 22nd, two volunteer patrols explore the wood. On the second occasion, 2 few scouts man- age to climb the unguarded wall and penetrate as far as the southern corner of the wood. Four of them are killed by Montluc’s Gascons, but three others escape and bring back valuable information; theThe Batile 145 undergrowth has been cleared, the ground is dry and firm, The Imperial leaders wait another two days in case this reconnaissance may have raised an alarm, but the ‘Guastadores’, watching from the Porta Pescarina, report that all is quiet. The decision is made to breach the wall at this spot. Tradition says three breaches were made, but there is no clear evidence on the point. Possibly there ‘was only one. ‘On the evening of the 24th February, the Imperial troops take up their positions for what they regard as the ‘Mirabello skirmish’. First, they move out of the camp at the Casa dei Levrieri and move back to- wards Lardirago, leaving a few units in the camp to draw enemy fire and to reply to it, so masking the main movement. The troops inside Pavia are warned: as soon as the wall is breached and the action is about to begin, three shots will be fired from the Casa dei Levrieri At this signal the garrison will rush from the besieged town and try to make contact with the Imperial forces at the Castle of Mirabello. Since the night is very dark, both groups of attackers will wear white shirts over their armour, or large squares of white material sewn to their doublets. These precautions, these movements in the darkness, have made a strong appeal to the imagination of the chroniclers of the period. The most romantic of them, beyond all doubt, is Osnaya, who, writ- ing nineteen years later, presents the night as something out of the Castle of Udolpho, with gigantic bowmen. ‘trumpets of Death’, (though the strictest silence was enjoined), and ‘the groans of dying souls’, (especially in a ridiculously theatrical dialogue between Pes- cara and his nephew, del Vasto. He even says Frundsberg was muff- Jed up in a monk’s habit worn over his armour, though why the good German captain should adopt such a disguise, who can say? But those white shirts clearly show that the action was intended merely as a night assault, since they were the standard device for such an occasion. The Imperial commanders expected it would be all over by the morning, ‘but’, says Florange, ‘they started four hours too late, which caused battle to be joined,’ It is now ten o'clock at night and the Tmperial army is ostensibly retreating along the Porta Pescarina road towards Lardirago. The French scouts are disturbed by these sounds in the darkness. The troops left behind in the Casa dei Levrieri to mislead the French in the Torre del Gallo fire away with such excessive zeal that a message is sent back from the Lardirago road ordering them to make less346 Battle of Pavia noise. As the fusillade dies down, one of d’Alengon’s licutenants, Charles Tiercelin, Lord of Roche du Maine, creeps up to the wall and hears, from the other side, the sound of guns being dismantled, horses being whipped up, so he tries to find out more and climbs over the wall. But as he comes back into the park on the north-west side he is bogged down in a swamp beside a little stream called the Carona and has to retrace his steps, after listening to the sounds of retreat towards Lardirago. Less than a mile to the north of Tiecelin’s little sortie, the ‘Guasta- dores’ are at the foot of the solid brick wall. It is harder than marble, and for two hours they try to break through it without making too much noise, but by midnight they realize they cannot succeed. Time is pressing, the whole army is there, stamping about in its white shirts, so they decide to strike with all their force, no matter how much noise it makes. The uproar rouses all the restless spirits in the French camp: Tiercelin, Florange and two of his men-at-arms, the Lord of Isselstain and the Lord of Gisse, All four try to find out what the uproar means, Tiercelin on his own side, the three others in the direc- tion of the wood. The alarm is sounded in the king’s camp; Florange, now at the head of two Swiss contingents, rides here and there through the darkness and fog, but as yct no one knows what danger threatens or from whence it comes. The king arms himself and orders his men-at-arms to do likewise—always a lengthy procedure. Word is sent to the Swiss still holding the five abbeys; Florange musters the others, (about 4,000); light artillery is moved, but without any knowledge of what direction it should face. Fires are lit, but serve only to thicken the dense fog hanging over the park. Three cannon shots are fired from the Imperial side—the signal for the Pavia garrison to begin their sortie. It is now six in the morn- ing; the night is still dark; the fog grows thicker. Through the breach pass swift troops entrusted to the Marquis del Vesto; their aim: to dash to Mirabello, in spite of exposing their flank to the French horse and artillery; another proof that they were not secking a battle, but simply to win a quick trick. They totalled 2,000, but sources differ as to who they were. According to Frundsberg, Wintzerer and ‘the Marquis of Pescara, they were Germans and Spaniards; the ambassador of Sienna says there were 1,000 Italians; Capino da Capo says ‘Italians and 600 Spaniards’, while Giacomo de Nocera saw only ‘Neapolitans’. The only thing certain is that they were all chosen for their speed and-mobility and their equipment was the lightestThe Battle 147 possible; they were all armed with ‘hand guns’, (Wintzerer), even the Jansquenets among them (Soltan). They crossed the park at top speed, while the ‘Guastadores’ went on enlarging the breach with sledge- hammers, and riders and cannon were entering the park. Charles Tiercelin and Florange are both in a position to ‘plaster’ del Vasto. The former, with his light cavalry, is intercepted by Spanish cavalry and the combat between these mounted men grows fiercer and more widespread as Imperial contingents come pouring through the breach in ever-increasing numbers. Del Vasto cuts through the edge of this fight, comes out at the corner of the wood. ‘and charges across the open ground towards the castle, only a couple of miles ahead. If, at this moment, Florange had wheeled a hundred yards to the left, his interception could have been decisive; but the Swiss he is leading decide on playing their own game. The great speciality of the Swiss is always to hurl themselves instantly at enemy artillery, no matter what the situation may be, and at this moment they hear iron cannon wheels crunching through the rubble of the wall. We know, looking back, that del Vasto is riding to take the castle of Mirabello, but Florange knows nothing of this. He thinks a major battle is opening, and in a battle Mirabello is of no importance what- ever. He naturally concludes that the Spanish army is taking up a position north-west to south-east, to make a frontal attack on the king’s camp. So instead of wheeling to the left he rides on to the right, towards the sounds of artillery that are drawing his Swiss forward asa carrot draws a donkey. This manocuvre brings him into contact with Tiercelin, who has already been reinforced by d’Alencon and Bonnivet’s fifty men-at- arms, still at grips with the light and heavy cavalry of the Viceroy of Naples. The arrival of Florange and his Swiss throws the cavalry into disorder. Florange has had four medium-sized culverins hauled across the firm ground of the clearing, and as they are fired the flashes reveal the rest of the Imperial men-at-arms and Spanish artillery ‘emerging from a spinney, the breached wall behind them. The Swiss attack this disordered group with their pikes and at last gain posses- sion of the artillery, but it is a paltry prize—sixteen guns and prac- tically no ammunition. It is now nearly seven o'clock and day has dawned, but the fight is still hidden by fog. Lannoy's men-at-arms break away and flee to the west (and the second wood) or eastward towards the first,148 Battle of Pavia impenetrable wood; the light cavalry is cut to pieces. Del Vasto has taken Mirabello, which was defended only by a small party of men- at-arms who slip away under his very nose to join the large con- tingent at Casina Repentita. Del Vasto, says Jahns, ‘massacred horribly’ all those he found asleep at Mirabello: strolling pedlars, scullions, camp followers, jews, usurers, looters, gypsies, etc. According to Jahns, the Marquis del Vasto finds himself immed- iately afterwards in front of the walls of Pavia, but the facts are very different. A mile and a quarter south of Mirabello, directly facing Pavia, the open ground in the bend of the Vernavola has been flooded by the recent rains and the general humidity. This explains why the besieged, who left Pavia on hearing the signal cannon-shots, have not yet arrived to make contact with del Vasto as arranged, On leay- ing the town they had to make first for the five abbeys, because only on that side was there a firm, dry track where they could move or fight, (The present road from Pavia to Porta Pescarina was, in 1525, an earthen dyke raised to prevent the Torre del Gallo side of the park being flooded by the Vernavola and a hundred other streams.) But we know that at San Spirito and San Paolo, two of the five abbeys, the Swiss troops of Francois I have been warned and are fully on the alert, We shall see the new element, almost a foreign corps, which this detour will introduce as the battle unfolds. ‘When Del Vasto has finished massacring the little world at Mira- bello, he rides on to complete his purpose and introduce fresh troops ‘into Pavia, but finding himself alone at the rendezvous he wonders what to do, Day has come, but the early light merely thickens the fog in the park. Close by, to the north-west, he hears a great tumult and incessant cannon fire. It can only be French; he does not yet know that the Spanish guns have been captured, but he knows there were only sixteen of them whereas he now hears a great number. Soon, from that direction, come the remnants of Frundsberg’s lansquenets, Lannoy’s men-at-arms and Bourbon’s adventurers, swept head over heels by the general rout. (In a moment we shall see what has been happening in the north-west, near the Casina Repentita.) The stam- pede carries del Vasto towards the south-east and the Torre del Gallo, closer, if he did but know it, to Antonio de Leyva’s troops on their sortie from Pavia, who are now at grips with the Swiss. Del Vasto and the other fugitives are joined by the whole band of Imper- ial men-at-arms who fied eastwards after Florange’s attack and found they could not penetrate the first wood. All together they comeThe Battle 149 under fire from the heavy calibre guns of Torre del Gallo, shooting point-blank at the mass of men coming towards them out of the fog. Let us return to the king, While Florange was capturing the paltry Spanish artillery and del Vasto was taking Mirabello, the breach (or breaches) have been steadily widened until now the rest of the Imper- ial army can enter the park. (For the better understanding of what follows, we must stress that there was no liaison whatever between the various sections of the fighting army. Each man, especially the great lords, fighting ‘for pleasure’, was battling on his own account under the inspiration of the moment. This was particularly true of the French army; the Imperial troops were rather more ‘modern’, or at least their leaders were). If we accept the theory that three breaches were made, the cavalry came through the one to the extreme right of the attacking force, the Jansquenets through the middle one, and the Spaniards through the one to the left. (Adherents of this theory are generally agreed that the middle and the right-hand one were close together and on the site of the present Porta Pescarina). If we decide there was one breach only, the cavalry came through first and spread out to form the right wing, then the /ansquenets, who formed the centre, and finally the Spaniards who formed the left wing. So much for theory. In practice, these manoeuvres were made in darkness, fog and utter confusion. We have already seen how the attacks by Florange and Tiercelin disorganized the Imperial cavalry, who by chance and guided by the noise took a line south-east to north-west (This is what made Habler state that the Imperial army was deployed along this line), One may well be amazed that such a demolition, which took four hours and made a great deal of noise, did not bring out French forces strong enough to prevent this passage of troops. In the first place, all the evidence shows that vigilance had been relaxed. Originally there were regular patrols along the walls, but they soon became careless and infrequent, Frangois put his trust in the thickness of this fortifi- cation and he was not far wrong, since the ‘Guastadores’ took from midnight until four or five in the morning to break through. Francois could have taken advantage of this delay to prepare for batile, but, (and this is the second point), the French army was widely scattered, as we have seen. Finally, the French did not believe a battle was planned, and they were right. The Imperial army intended no more than a skirmish, and if the wall had not been so solid that it held up the Imperial project for four or five hours, all that would have150 Battle of Pavia happened was the capture of Mirabello and the introduction of fresh troops and supplies into Pavia. Unintentionally and unknowingly, (though he is given full credit for it later), del Vasto’s attack on the Castle has cut the French army in two. To the east are the 500 Swiss of the five abbeys, the cannon of Torre del Gallo, Florange’s Swiss who have just captured the Im- perial cannon and the troops led by Tiercelin, The last two groups have no idea what to do next, for they dashed out in the heat of alarm and are now in no position to receive orders. Florange’s 4,000 Swiss are barely half-equipped. To the west is the king, at the Casina Repentita; close by, on his left, are his own men-at-arms; on his right are the troops of Bonnivet, Trivulce, La Palisse and Le Tré- moille, A mile and a quarter to the south, on the far side of the Vernavola marshes, are Giovanni dei Medici’s troops (without their Jeader) and the Duke of Alengon’s men, stationed there to hold back the frequent sorties from Pavia. There is no liaison whatever between these separate elements and their leaders have to take things into their own hands, which in any case, alas!, they are only too glad to do. To recapitulate: the first platoon of Imperial light cavalry has been scattered by Tiercelin; the Jansquenets pulling the cannon make little resistance to Florange’s attack, for their orders from Pescara are to make for Mirabello at top speed and the cannon are only an encumbrance. The Imperial troops extend along a line north-east to south-west, the Spaniards leading, lansquenets in the centre and the cavalry in the rear. Once they Jeave the shelter of the second wood they are forced to file in front of the French artillery threatening their flank: the classical situation of a doomed army. They have allowed this to happen because their eyes are fixed solely on Mirabello. Had they realized their ‘skirmish’ would develop into a full-scale battle they would have held their first position by the breach facing the king’s camp, the cavalry would have gone through in the lead and the lansquenets would not have been so quick to leave their cannon. When Francois left Mirabello on 19th February, he took with him the heavy artillery he had stationed there. They had to make a long detour to the south to avoid the marshes but they arrived safely at the Casina Repentita without encountering the slightest opposition. ‘When the alarm was first raised, at one o'clock in the morning, this artillery was made ready to fire in whatever direction proved neces- sary, but it could not move its position because of the sodden ground.The Battle { When, at seven o'clock, the growing light enabled the gunners to see the Imperial army, they at once opened fire on its unprotected flank. ‘We have conflicting reports as to what happened then. Reinhard Thom, interpreting comments made by Frundsberg and Pescara, says this artillery ‘did little harm’, but du Bellay, Moreau and even the ambassador of Sienna held a very different opinion. Du Bellay says: ‘Shot after shot made great gaps in their battalions, so that-all you could see-was arms and heads flying through the air’; Moreau is also most impressed by these flying arms and heads, for he repeats that same phrase, adding ‘pieces of armour’ as well. Jahns affirms that ‘in an incredibly short time the allies, (ie. the Imperial army), lost a thousand men; Reinhard Thom, writing more than three hundred years later, disputes this figure and puts the number of dead at only six hundred. One can well imagine the deadly effect of the French artillery firing at point-blank range into that disordered mass of men! ‘Two companies of foot soldiers under the Duke of Alencon and the Lord of Brion, flanked by German Jansquenets sérving France, charg- ed a band of German Jansquenets in the service of Spain and drove them back until they broke rank and fied to the second wood. All these events move the French king to rashness. He still believes this is just a skirmish; the massacre of enemy troops by his cannon, the sight of these /ansquenets fleeing in disorder, everything convinces him that the action is turning to his advantage. This is why he com- mits the error of crossing in front of his own guns, thus compelling them to cease fire. He thinks their work is over. Such moments are what ‘knights at war’ dream of! He cannot be satisfied by merely watching these ‘flying arms and heads’; he (and all his lords with him) are burning to take a hand in the fighting. He has no idea that the two armies are even now taking up their positions facing cach other. By now the whole Spanish army has poured through the breaches, but the scattered French contingents are arriving only one at a time. Frangois’s position is already critical, though he does not know it yet; the Imperial leaders do not know it either; the battle would not have lasted another hour and a half if they had had any idea of their advantages. This failure to grasp the true position stems from the fact that the Imperial troops are still following their plan to take Mira- bello, and the French, though still not clear as to their enemies’ inten- tion, think the skirmish is now over. ‘We quote Jihns because he so clearly understands the psychology of the king and all the lords: ‘The king was much put out by the idea152 Battle of Pavia that the artillery would have all the honour of the battle, and he did not want to miss the chance of breaking a lance; he could no longer restrain his ardour for the fight.” So the king charges the enemy at the head of his men-at-arms. All his lords ride with him, and in a moment we shall find their names in the list of dead. This is a charge by heavy cavalry clad in weighty armour, the type of combat the French prefer. At this moment the Marquis sees clearly what to do. He knows he will be driven back, but the plan is none the less clear. He recalls del Vasto and his 3,000 men at top speed from Mirabello; orders Lannoy to bring up his cavalry from the rear and urges Bourbon to press forward. (Bour- bon is still at Porta Pescarina but inside the park, rallying his light- cavalry and lansquenets after their dispersal by Florange and Tier- celin). ‘The Imperial heavy and light cavalry are no match for the French. Lannoy prepares his troops for the shock of the encounter but he has little confidence. He makes the sign of the cross and cries: (we are told) ‘There is no hope left except in God. Follow me and do as I do’. So he rides forth as if at a tourney, side by side with Civita Sant'Angelo and his light cavalry, to charge the French who scatter them like dead leaves. The French massed troops are a thousand tons heavier than Lannoy’s, and inspired by having in their midst the finest jousting champions in the world. The king fells and kills Sant’Angelo with his own hand; the light cavalry are crushed; Lannoy’s heavy horsemen are driven back more than 500 yards behind the point they started from and are there slashed to pieces with lances and swords; a troop of pikemen and arquebusiers, find- ing themselves in the path of the French, flee madly in all directions, throwing aside their weapons to speed their flight. The king says to Maréchal de Foix, who is beside him: ‘Monsieur de Lescun, now I really am the Duke of Milan’, and he calls a halt to give the horses a breather. He thinks it is all over and that he has won. It is eight o'clock; the fog is still thick and it is difficult to see more than a few yards, By its charge, the French heavy cavalry has been largely cut off from the support of the infantry and the main body of the army. Its hardihood( and its present halt) are justified if it thinks it is engaged in a mere skirmish. In a battle, where, even at that period, there is always a touch of strategy, if only inspired by the needs of the moment, their action is imprudent in the extreme. Had. they goneThe Battle 153 on, followed by the foot-soldiers, they could have driven the whole Imperial army back into the northern corner of the park. But the idea ofa battle is not in their.minds, so a halt is called at the very moment when Pescara has dropped the idea of a skirmish and is planning a battle. For the past hour, the lansquenets and arquebusiers of the Imper- jal army, (under Frundsberg and Marc Sith), have been at grips with Florange’s Swiss, (only a small section of the whole Swiss contingent, 2,500 out of 11,000; the rest are still at the five abbeys). Tiercelin’s light horse are still wheeling about in the open ground between the first and second wood, pestered by the French light cavalry and the Swiss who are snapping at their heels like mastiffs. Finding them- selves under fire from the cannon of Torre del Gallo, they fall back towards the west, trying in the fog to find shelter in the second wood, which they already know is firm enough to support them. This move- ment brings them up against the heavy French cavalry who are enjoying their halt and congratulating themselves. Though the accounts we have were mostly written after the event and adapted to suit various purposes, both German and Span- ish sources clearly reveal Lannoy’s. despair, Frundsberg’s stupified amazement, Sith’s despondency, Bourbon’s mad rage and Pescara’s anxiety, The first has been overthrown with such vigour that he dreads another such encounter; the others, ever since they entered the breach, have been singly and jointly under attack from every side and are wondering what to do. When the Marquis of Pescara sees the fleeing arquebusiers emerg- ing from the fog, he seizes fortune by the short hairs and lets inspira- tion guide him. He realizes that with 1,500 or 2,000 arquebusiers, protected not only by the second wood but by the marshy banks of the Vernavola, which the French heavy cavalry cannot cross, his best course is to attack, He immediately launches an attack by his arque- busiers against the left flank of the French heavy cavalry, who are not only halted but immobilized. He calls up del Vasto’s troops from Mirabello; bugle calls convey fresh orders through the fog; the lansquenets of Marc Sith and Frundsberg, rallied by these trumpets form up under Bourbon’s command and confront Frangois in serried. ranks, while del Vasto’s troops charge at his right flank, ‘The king’s artillery, in position a hundred yards or so away, blast the Imperial forces until these batteries, under the command of Galiot de Genouille, are suddenly compelled to hold their fire because154 Batile of Pavia French troops intervene. Frangois of Lorraine, the Duke of Suffolk and Richard de la Poole, forming the right wing of the French army, bring their German contingents to attack the Imperial lansquenets. Now the royal artillery cannot move, because it is surrounded by ‘bogs, so it has to stay where it is, while Marc Sith and the Spaniards ambushed in the second wood attack it on one flank, and Frunds- berg tackles the other flank; the Germans in the service of France are driven back, though they are so determined to prove they are stronger than the Swiss that they let themselves be killed where they stand rather than retreat further. Frangois of Lortaine, already twice wounded by arquebus fire, is finished off by a halbert on the edge of the wood; Suffolk. following him in his attempt to cut through the strong position of the Spanish arquebusiers, is slit open by a pike and for some minutes the opposing forces battle to and fro over his torn body. While the right wing of the French army was being destroyed in this way, the heavy cavalry in the centre was struggling against a tragic fate. They are all encumbered by their heavy armour. Every- thing that gives them an advantage when they charge—the weight of their arms, the bulk of their horses, the length of their lances, is an embarrassment if they have to fight on one particular spot. Now they are at grips with seven or eight thousand light fusiliers wheeling in among them from right and left, shooting at point-blank range; they are also under fire from ‘forked arquebuses’, (the machine guns of those days), that have been set up in the second wood. Horses crash to the ground, dragging their riders with them, Once down, these warriors cannot get to their feet, being so heavily encased in steel, and the Spaniards kill them with ease, sliding knives through the joints in their armour, or even lifting the iron flaps that protect their thighs and thrusting in the muzzle of an arquebus so that the man is blown to pieces like a lobster inside its shell. That is how La Trémoille is killed; next morning, when the dead are being buried, the body of this old warrior is found so riddled with iron splinters that fragments of flesh have to be hooked out with a sword-hilt. The kindly La Palisse dies in the same action. He falls from his horse but is kept upright by the piles of dead around him and stands swinging his sword until four or five churls overthrow him and drag him along feet first, bleeding like a pig from their knife thrusts through the crevices of his neck-piece. Louis d’Ars, close beside the king, is dazed when a shot carries away part of his helmet, and fallsThe Battle 155 from his horse. Instantly both legs and arms are broken by trampl- ing feet, and though his friends, the king among them, defend him with their swords he is finally ripped up by so many pikes all at once that his body bounces through the French ranks like a grass-hopper. ‘The Sienna ambassador says: “seized by heroic intoxication, the French aristocracy met death with joy’, but there was no ‘heroic intoxication’ about it. These cavaliers were simply obeying the rules of the game. Nothing else entered their heads. It was as much a part of their code as the bowler hat and rolled umbrella of someone ‘in the city’ today. ‘The din of all this clashing ironmongery, the smell of blood, the smoke of gunpowder, the flash of swords whistling around their ears, maddens the horses. They are enormous creatures, themselves clad in armour that hangs to their knees. When one of these huge animals rears, half a ton of flesh and steel comes crashing back. The Bastard of Savoy, grand-master of France, is overthrown by one such en- counter and stifled to death inside his armour; next day, when he is dragged from under a great heap of dead, his body is taken from that armour intact, but blue as a drowned man, his eyes starting from his head and his tongue protruding as if he had been hanged. Saint- Sevrin, master of the king’s horse, is hit by a back-stroke from a friend’s sword; the top of his helmet flies in pieces; bare-headed, already dead but still in the saddle, he is borne at random here and there as the battle eddies round him. He is riddled by more than a hundred shots that tear gaping holes in his body but do not dislodge him. His eyes are staring, his stiff gorget holds his head upright, and the sight of him terrifies the Spanish arquebusiers; they scream at the miracle uxtil the moment when he at last falls. M. de Chaumont, chef d’armes to the d’Amboise family; M. de Bussy, Count of Ton- nerre; M. d'lsselstain, the Bastard of Luppé are all slain like wild boars torn by packs of hounds. M. de Lescun, Marshal of France, will die next day, having lain in agony for twenty-four hours with his belly ripped oven. The king fights like a lion, crying: ‘What? What's the matter? What's happening?” The Jansquenets of Frundsberg and Sith, having crushed the French right, have now seized the cannon. Florange, after his exploit in the eastern comer of the park, is urging on his little troop of Swiss to support the French men-at-arms, At once their Swiss captains Hannequin, de Fribourg and d’Isepart are killed, together with two French noblemen, Conchy and Silly. The Swiss have no156 Battle of Pavia arequebusiers with them. From the start they were not equipped for a battle. Now they can take part only in hand to hand combats and are powerless to make a tactical assault on the Spanish fusiliers protected by the second wood. Furthermore, a rout sets in among the men-at-arms; they overturn and trample their own reinforcements, carrying all before them in a retreat that sweeps the remnants of the French back towards Mirabello. But nothing actually decisive has yet occurred. The king still has the 8,000 Swiss from the five abbeys, who have not yet joined the battle. But these troops are two and a half miles outside the park and the only way they can get in is through the gate called Le Portone, opposite the redoubt San Stefano in the Pavia ramparts. While the events already described were taking place, Antonio de Leyva has Jed 9,000 men out of the besieged town, (a mixed force of lansquenets, arquebusiers and dismounted cavalrymen), and has seized Le Por- tone. Another point is that the Swiss have before them no wide, firm, flat open space on which to display their ‘impetuous courage’ in organized ‘squares’; nothing but streams, bogs and fog-masked swamps where they flounder along in disorder. Leyva has sent half of his troops to help the Spanish arquebusiers against the French gendarmerie, With the remainder, now inspired by that special enthusiasm which evokes new powers in armies that feel victory is within their grasp, he attacks the bewildered Swiss. Contrary to what one might expect of mountaineers, presumably used to difficulties and loneliness, these Swiss, (being mercenaries), detest bad weather and single combat. Their spirit is already broken by the mud, where their great bodies cannot keep a foothold, and the fog, which hides most of their comrades from them, Hard pressed ‘by what soon becomes almost the whole of the Imperial army, (for the action against the French gendarmerie is practically finished and the king, to whom we shall return, has no more than fifty men-at- arms around him), the Swiss give way on every side. They do not betray the king, as is sometimes said. They are themselves betrayed by the absence of any reason for persevering. Frundsberg, seeing the decision in the balance, surrounds them with his German lansquen- ets. Now between the Swiss and German lansquenets there is keen competition on commercial grounds; the Germans are demand- ing a higher rate of pay than the Swiss, who, until now, have cut such a dash. 15,000 of them come out of the fog to massacre theirThe Battle 157 competitors without mercy. Such fugitives as escape their blows fall back towards the south and the Ticino, trying to find in the fog the boat-bridge made by the'French at the start of the siege. But the Duke of Alengon, who has already withdrawn across the bridge, bas had it destroyed behind him. Frundsberg says that 10,000 men were drowned in the river, swollen by the rain of the past weck and the sudden thaw of the earlier snow. Wintzerer speaks of 9,000 drowned; Jahns exaggerates the figure to 15,000. In reality, 400 men-at-arms and 4,000 foot-soldiers succeeded in crossing the flood and linking up with the rear-guard of the Duke of Alengon (intact but in full flight), and 6,000 Swiss met their death in the Ticino. The king and fifty of his knights, (among them M. de Sainte- Mesmes, the Vicomte de Lavedan, M. de Chavigay, La Roche du Maine, Gabriel de Lignac and the lieutenants of princes already killed), faced the hail of bullets and charged the wood that sheltered the arquebusiers, defending themselves desperately without falling back. The stream of fugitives had swept them towards Mirabello, though they pressed against the current and did their utmost to rally those who fled, But now they were surrounded by more than 20,000 men who, certain of victory, were fighting at their ease for the plea- sure it gave them. Report says that Bonnivet, seeing his king and old friend attacked by ‘knifemen’ and trying to drive them off with sword and dagger, threw himself into the mélée with his vizor raised, seeking to be killed. So he was killed, playing his part like a noble lord, with what we should call ‘great courage’, which was only current custom. His flank was pierced by three pikes, but he felt no pain, nor any emotion as the blood spurted from his body. (He did not see it). He went on striking with his sword, breaking shoulders and heads, until his spirit lost consciousness and he fell on his horse’s neck and was borne back to the old French camp, to be discovered two days later among the dead, ‘The king's horse is struck by more than twenty arquebus shots, all in the forehead, But Frangois, whose physical strength is phen- omenal, is one of the few men who can rise to his feet after being unseated, in spite of his armour. It is one of his customary ‘feats’, Jong practised, and he does so now. He is wounded in the cheek, (his helmet being half shorn away), and in his sword arm, but he fights ‘on. No one has called on him to surrender. He is so closely hemmed in by Spaniards who have recognized him and mean to kill him,158 Battle of Pavia that their bullets merely kill other Spaniards. He and his arquebus- ders clear a space around him; he is threatened by pikes, but his armour is more finely tempered than Bonnivet’s and the blades scarcely damage his cuirass. He drives off two attacks from the reat by adventurers, killing them all, but the third attack brings him crashing to the ground. Instantly he is surrounded by a rabble of twenty or thirty ‘knife- men’; some want to kill him; others want to tear off his armour to prove they were among those who killed him. Both groups get in each other's way. The uproar has brought up Lannoy who charges into this pack of hounds, striking with his sword and shouting his name, He can hardly be heard, but his rearing, plunging horse clears a space and the king is freed, staggering to his feet half naked. ‘There is no solemn handing-over of his sword, as shown in pic- tures in history books. The Spaniards clamour for their prey, and Lannoy is forced to beat off his own men to defend the king; the two men fall back, step by step, Lannoy striving to shield the king with his own body, until they come to a little willow hedge. Documents recount the capture of the king in a hundred different ways. The details we have given have been obtained by comparing the varying accounts and eliminating obvious inventions. For ex- ample, du Bellay says that Francois was defended by the Lord of Pompérant, instead of Lannoy.. We have already met Pompérant, during Bourbon’s flight, He was the one whose valet Bourbon pre- tended to be when he succeeded in crossing the Rhone and reaching Besangon. This Lord of Pompérant was a hothead who had just killed the Lord of Chissay at Amboise: that is why he was so eager to go with Bourbon. He did not stay long in the Imperial camp, being dissatisfied with the payment he received. He returned to the king's camp and, on 20th November 1524, he was at Binasco with the French troops, writing a letter to Bonnivet demanding more money. He was known for what he was, and the lack of attention given to his complaints decided him to return to the Imperial side. But there, too, he was mistrusted, and on the day of the battle he was acting merely as a subaltern and never left Bourbon’s side. Now, when the king is taken prisoner, near Mirabello, Bourbon, having followed Sith’s lansquen- ets, is with the French batteries that have just been captured, 500 yards north of the Casina Repentita and more than a mile and a quarter from the spot where Francois is at bay. When the king isThe Battle 159 taken, Bourbon is informed and Pompérant comes riding up with him, no doubt, but by then it is all over. Tf we are to believe the sources already mentioned, contradictory though they are, the king was captured by a cobbler from Segovia, a poor lansquenet from Augsburg, named Orderic, Emilio Olgiati of Pérouse, a Benedictine from no one knows where, except that the ambassador from Siena claims him as a fellow countryman; and a few hundred Spaniards, nameless and undistinguished, who for more than twenty years proclaim to any who would listen: ‘It was I who captured the king’. But one thing is certain; the hatred of the king that inspired the Spanish arquebusiers, their firm intention of killing him, and how extremely difficult it was to make them let go, All the sources confirm this, though one can hardly imagine a cobbler from Segovia and the others mentioned above having sufficient authority to snatch the king from the mob that was trying to tear him to pieces, when we see the Viceroy of Naples himself barely capable of doing 80. For, without the arrival of his Neapolitans, who came to his rescue in response to his shouts, Lannoy could hardly have saved the king, Fortunately, there was a clamp of beet-root under the willow hedge, and the king hid inside it. The struggle between the Neapolitans and the Spanish arquebusiers lasted for several minutes, during which four men were killed, but when it was over the king emerged from the clamp, three parts naked and covered with blood. ‘Sire,’ said Lannoy, ‘are you severely wounded’? ‘No,’ the king replied. “Hardly at all” It is half past eight in the morning. The fog has thickened again. The battle has lasted a little over an hour.