I.

COMMON CARRIERS CARRIAGE OF GOOD

Bascos vs. Court of Appeals

Civil Law; Common Carriers defined.—Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as “(a)
person, corporation or firm, or association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers
or goods or both, by land, water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public.” The test
to determine a common carrier is “whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by
the carrier which he has held out to the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent
of the business transacted.” In this case, petitioner herself has made the admission that she was in the
trucking business, offering her trucks to those with cargo to move. Judicial admissions are conclusive and
no evidence is required to prove the same.

Same; Same; No distinction between person offering service on regular basis and one offering service on
occasional basis.—But petitioner argues that there was only a contract of lease because they offer their
services only to a select group of people and because the private respondents, plaintiffs in the lower court,
did not object to the presentation of affidavits by petitioner where the transaction was referred to as a
lease contract. Regarding the first contention, the holding of the Court in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals
is instructive. In referring to Article 1732 of the Civil Code, it held thus: “The above article makes no
distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and
one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as a “sideline”). Article 1732 also
carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on
a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.
Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the “general public,” i.e.,
the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow
segment of the general population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making such
distinctions.”

Same; Same; Obligation of carrier to observe extraordinary diligence; Presumption of negligence; -

Accordingly, they are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost,
destroyed or deteriorated. There are very few instances when the presumption of negligence does not
attach and these instances are enumerated in Article 1734. In those cases where the presumption is
applied, the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in order to overcome
the presumption.

Same; Same; Same; Liability arising from hijacking.—To exculpate the carrier from liability arising from
hijacking, he must prove that the robbers or the hijackers acted with grave or irresistible threat, violence,
or force. This is in accordance with Article 1745 of the Civil Code which provides: “Art. 1745. Any of the
following or similar stipulations shall be considered unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public policy: x
x x x x x (6) That the common carrier’s liability for acts committed by thieves, or of robbers who do not act
with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force, is dispensed with or diminished.”
Calvo vs. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc.

Common Carriers; Customs Brokers; A customs broker is a common carrier—the concept of “common
carrier” under Article 1732 of the Civil Code may be seen to coincide nearly with the notion of “public
service,” under the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416) which at least partially supplements
the law on common carriers set forth in the Civil Code.

“Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business
of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering
their services to the public.” The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity . . . Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise
offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering
its services to the “general public,” i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services
or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population.

Same; Same; There is greater reason for holding a person who is a customs broker to be a common carrier
because the transportation of goods is an integral part of her business.—There is greater reason for
holding petitioner to be a common

Art. 1733 of the Civil Code provides: Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons
of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the
safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. . . . In
Compania Maritima v. Court of Appeals, the meaning of “extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
goods” was explained thus: The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for
shipment requires the common carrier to know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding damage
to, or destruction of the goods entrusted to it for sale, carriage and delivery. It requires common carriers
to render service with the greatest skill and foresight and “to use all reasonable means to ascertain the
nature and characteristic of goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and
stowage, including such methods as their nature requires.”

Same; Same; To prove the exercise of extraordinary diligence, a customs broker must do more than merely
show the possibility that some other party could be responsible for the damage.—

Same; Same; If the improper packing or the defects in the container are known to the carrier or his
employees or apparent upon ordinary observation, but he nevertheless accepts the same without protest
or exception notwithstanding such condition, he is not relieved of liability for damage resulting therefrom

De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals

Common Carriers; Definition of; Art. 1732 of the Civil Code makes no distinctions between a person or
enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.—

Same; Same; Same; Same; A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability
under the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers.—

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The hijacking of the carriers truck does not fall within any of the five (5)
categories of exempting causes in Art. 1734

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Art. 1745(6), a common carrier is held responsible even for acts
of strangers like thieves or robbers except where such thieves or robbers acted “with grave or irresistible
threat, violence or force.”—

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of
travel and of transport of goods and are not liable for fortuitous events; Case at bar.— In these
circumstances, we hold that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the
control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event.

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Commercial Laws; Carriage of Goods by Sea Act; Carriers; Damages; Common carriers are bound to
observe extra-ordinary vigilance over goods x x x according to all circumstances of each case.—

Same; Same; Same; Same.—A common carrier is required to exercise the highest degree of care in the
discharge of its business.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Carrier who failed to establish any caso fortuito, the presumption by law of
fault or negligence on the part of the carrier applies

Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom

Motor Vehicle Law; Petitioner held liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was
the registered owner of the tractor at the time of the accident on July 17, 1994; Regardless of sales made
of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are
concerned; In contemplation of law, the owner I operator of record is the employer of the driver, the
actual operator and employer being considered as merely its agent.

FGU Insurance Corporation vs. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking

Transportation; Common Carriers; A trucking company which is an exclusive contractor and hauler of
another company, rendering or offering its services to no other individual or entity, cannot be considered
a common carrier - . The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, providing
space for those who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee. Given accepted
standards, GPS scarcely falls within the term “common carrier.”

Same; Res Ipsa Loquitur; Requisites; Words and Phrases; Res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law
and, as such, it does not create an independent ground of liability—instead, it is regarded as a mode of
proof, and relieves the plaintiff of the burden of producing specific proof of negligence.—

First Philippine Industrial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

Carriers; A “common carrier” is one who holds himself out to the public as engaged in the business of
transporting persons or property from place to place, for compensation, offering his services to the public
generally

The test for determining whether a party is a common carrier of goods is: 1. He must be engaged in the
business of carrying goods for others as a public employment, and must hold himself out as ready to
engage in the transportation of goods for person generally as a business and not as a casual occupation;
2. He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business is confined; 3. He must undertake
to carry by the method by which his business is conducted and over his established roads; and 4. The
transportation must be for hire.

The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a common
carrier.—

Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Contracts; Common Carriers; Damages; The law imposes duties and liabilities upon common carriers for
the safety and protection of those who utilize their services and the law cannot allow a common carrier
to render such duties and liabilities merely facultative by simply failing to obtain the necessary permits
and authorizations - To exempt private respondent from the liabilities of a common carrier because he
has not secured the necessary certificate of public convenience, would be offensive to sound public policy;
that would be to reward private respondent precisely for failing to comply with applicable statutory
requirements. The business of a common carrier impinges directly and intimately upon the safety and
well being and property of those members of the general community who happen to deal with such
carrier.

Same; For a vessel to be seaworthy, it must be adequately equipped for the voyage and manned with a
sufficient number of competent officers and crew.

Same; Since it was remiss in the performance of its duties, LOADSTAR cannot hide behind the “limited
liability” doctrine to escape responsibility for the loss of the vessel and its cargo. . The doctrine of limited
liability does not apply where there was negligence on the part of the vessel owner or agent.
Maritime Company of the Phils. vs. Court of Appeals

Carriage of Goods by Sea Act; Ship Agent; Facts established preponderantly demonstrate the character of
Maritime Co. as ship agent under the Code of Commerce.— These facts preponderantly demonstrate the
character of Maritime Co. as ship agent under the Code of Commerce, a ship agent, according to that
Code, being “the person entrusted with provisioning or representing the vessel in the port in which it may
be found.”

Contention that Acme Electrical Manufacturing, Manila is not the consignee of the goods described in the
bill of lading unacceptable. - Tcontention is in the first place belied by the bill of lading which states that
if the goods are “consigned to the Shipper’s Order” and the bill is so consigned: “to the order of China
Banking Corporation, Manila, or assigns” the “Acme Electrical Manufacturing, Manila,” shall be notified.
This shows, in the context of the other documents hereafter adverted to, that Acme was the importer and
China Banking Corporation the financing agency. The contention is also confuted by the Commercial
Invoice of the shipper which recites that it was “by order and for account of Messrs.

The provision of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act are merely suppletory to Articles 1753 and 1756 of the
Civil Code.

Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation vs. Transport Venture, Inc.

Fortuitous Events; The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be
occasioned solely by the violence of nature—human intervention is to be excluded from creating or
entering into the cause of the mischief.—In order, to be considered a fortuitous event, however, (1) the
cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his
obligation, must be independent of human will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which
constitute the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen it must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence
must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in any manner; and (4) the
obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.

Customs Brokers; It is settled that under a given set of facts, a customs broker may be regarded as a
common carrier.— . The contention, therefore, of petitioner that it is not a common carrier but a customs
broker whose principal function is to prepare the correct customs declaration and proper shipping
documents as required by law is bereft of merit. It suffices that petitioner undertakes to deliver the goods
for pecuniary consideration. And in Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc., this Court held that as the
transportation of goods is an integral part of a customs broker, the customs broker is also a common
carrier. For to declare otherwise “would be to deprive those with whom [it] contracts the protection which
the law affords them notwithstanding the fact that the obligation to carry goods for [its] customers, is
part and parcel of petitioner’s business.”

In the case of TVI, while a private carrier is under no duty to observe extraordinary diligence, it is still
required to observe ordinary diligence.

Same; A man of ordinary prudence would not leave a heavily loaded barge floating for a considerable
number of hours, at a precarious time, and in the open sea, knowing that the barge does not have any
power of its own and is totally defenseless from the ravages of the sea.—TVI’s failure to promptly provide
a tugboat did not only increase the risk that might have been reasonably anticipated during the shipside
operation, but was the proximate cause of the loss.

Parties to a contract of carriage may, however, agree upon a definition of delivery that extends the
services rendered by the carrier. In the case at bar, Bill of Lading No. 2 covering the shipment provides
that delivery be made “to the port of discharge or so near thereto as she may safely get, always afloat.”
The delivery of the goods to the consignee was not from “pier to pier” but from the shipside of “M/V
Alexander Saveliev” and into barges, for which reason the consignee contracted the services of petitioner.
Since Black Sea had constructively delivered the cargoes to Little Giant, through petitioner, it had
discharged its duty.

II. CARRIAGE OF GOODS

Citadel Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

The duty of the consignee is to prove merely that the goods were lost. Thereafter, the burden is shifted
to the carrier to prove that it has exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. And, its
extraordinary responsibility lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of,
and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by
the carrier to the consignee or to the person who has the right to receive them.

Failure to prove that the loss of goods was occasioned by an excepted cause, carrier is liable

Same; Same; Stipulation limiting liability of carrier, binding. - It is clearly and expressly provided under
Clause 6 of the aforementioned bills of lading issued by the CARRIER that its liability is limited to $2.00 per
kilo. Basic is the rule, long since enshrined as a statutory provision, that a stipulation limiting the liability
of the carrier to the value of the goods appearing in the bill of lading, unless the shipper or owner declares
a greater value, is binding. Further, a contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or
shipper for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the
circumstances, and has been fairly and freely agreed upon.

Compania Maritima vs. Court of Appeals

It is incumbent upon the common carrier to prove that the loss, deterioration or destruction was due to
accident inconsistent with its liability

Same; Petitioner seems to have overlooked the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers in
the vigilance over the goods transported by them.—In the instant case, We are not persuaded by the
proferred explanation of petitioner alleged to be the proximate cause of the fall of the payloader while it
was being unloaded at the Cagayan de Oro City pier. Petitioner seems to have overlooked the
extraordinary diligence required of common carriers in the vigilance over the goods transported by them
by virtue of the nature of their business, which is impressed with a special public duty.

Duration of the responsibility of common carriers to observe extraordinary diligence.—Under Article 1736
of the Civil Code, the responsibility to observe extraordinary diligence commences and lasts from the time
the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation
until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person
who has the right to receive them without prejudice to the provisions of Article 1738.

Same; It cannot be reasonably concluded that the damage caused to the payloader was due to the alleged
misrepresentation of private respondent conception as to the correct and accurate weight of the
payloader.— As found by the respondent Court of Appeals, the fact is that petitioner used a 5-ton capacity
lifting apparatus to lift and unload a visibly heavy cargo like a payloader. Private respondent has, likewise,
sufficiently established the laxity and carelessness of petitioner’s crew in their methods of ascertaining
the weight of heavy cargoes offered for shipment before loading and unloading them, as is customary
among careful persons.

Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Marine Insurance; Common Carriers; While the payment by the insurer for the insured value of the lost
cargo operates as a waiver of the insurer’s right to enforce the term of the implied warranty against the
assured under the marine insurance policy, the same cannot be validly interpreted as an automatic
admission of the vessel’s seaworthiness by the insurer as to foreclose recourse against the common
carrier for any liability under the contractual obligation as such common carrier.

Certificates tending to show that at the time of dry-docking and inspection by the Philippine Coast Guard,
the vessel was fit for voyage do not necessarily take into account the actual condition of the vessel at the
time of the commencement of the voyage.

Exoneration of the vessel’s officers and crew by the Board of Marine Inquiry merely concerns their
respective administrative liabilities—it does not in any way operate to absolve the common carrier from
its civil liability arising from its failure to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods it
was transporting and for the negligent acts or omissions of its employees, the determination of which
properly belongs to the courts.

EVERETT STEAMSHIP CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

It is required that the stipulation limiting the common carrier's liability for loss must be "reasonable and
just under the circumstances, and has been freely and fairly agreed upon."

The stipulations in the case at bar are, to our mind, reasonable and just. In the bill of lading, the carrier
made it clear that its liability would only be up to One Hundred Thousand (Y100,000.00) Yen. However,
the shipper, Maruman Trading, had the option to declare a higher valuation if the value of its cargo was
higher than the limited liability of the carrier. Considering that the shipper did not declare a higher
valuation, it had itself to blame for not complying with the stipulations.
The bill of lading in question confirms petitioner's contention. To defeat the carrier's limited liability, the
aforecited Clause 18 of the bill of lading requires that the shipper should have declared in writing a
higher valuation of its goods before receipt thereof by the carrier and insert the said declaration in the
bill of lading, with extra freight paid. These requirements in the bill of lading were never complied with
by the shipper, hence, the liability of the carrier under the limited liability clause stands. The commercial
Invoice No. MTM-941 does not in itself sufficiently and convincingly show that petitioner has knowledge
of the value of the cargo as contended by private respondent. No other evidence was proffered by
private respondent to support is contention. Thus, we are convinced that petitioner should be liable for
the full value of the lost cargo.

Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals

By the said act of delivery, the scraps were unconditionally placed in the possession and control of the
common carrier, and upon their receipt by the carrier for transportation, the contract of carriage was
deemed perfected. Consequently, the petitioner-carrier’s extraordinary responsibility for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods commenced, Pursuant to Art. 1736, such extraordinary
responsibility would cease only upon the delivery, actual or constructive, by the carrier to the consignee,
or to the person who has a right to receive them. The fact that part of the shipment had not been loaded
on board the lighter did not impair the said contract of transportation as the goods remained in the
custody and control of the carrier, albeit still unloaded.

There is no incompatibility between the Civil Code provisions on common carriers and Articles 361 and
362 of the Code of Commerce which were the basis for this Court’s ruling in Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Ynchausti & Co. and which the petitioner invokes in this petition. For Art. 1735 of the Civil Code,
conversely stated, means that the shipper will suffer the losses and deterioration arising from the causes
enumerated in Art. 1734; and in these instances, the burden of proving that damages were caused by the
fault or negligence of the carrier rests upon him. However, the carrier must first establish that the loss or
deterioration was occasioned by one of the excepted causes or was due to an unforeseen event or to
force majeure.

Lu Do & Lu Ym Corp. vs. Binamira

CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; LlABILITY OF CARRIERS WHILE THE GOODS ARE IN THE CUSTODY OF CUSTOMS
AUTHORITIES.—While delivery of the cargo to the customs authorities is not delivery to the consignee, or
"to the person who has a right to receive them", contemplated in Article 1736 of the New Civil Code,
because in such case the goods are still in the hands of the Government and the owner cannot exercise
dominion over them, however the parties may agree to limit the liability of the carrier considering that
the goods have still to go through the inspection of the customs authorities before they are actually turned
over to the consignee. This is a situation where the carrier loses control of the goods because of a custom
regulation and it is unfair that it be made responsible for any loss or damage that may be caused to the
goods during the interregnum.

Maersk Line vs. Court of Appeals

Common Carriers; In the absence of an undertaking by a common carrier to deliver at a given date or time,
delivery of shipment or cargo should at least be made within a reasonable time.

A delay in delivery of gelatin capsules for use in pharmaceutical products for a period of two (2) months
and seven (7) days considered beyond the realm of reasonableness;

Failure of the petitioner to explain cause of delay in the delivery of subject shipment makes it liable for
breach of contract of carriage through gross negligence amounting to bad faith, entitling respondent’s
recovery of moral damages.

Philippine American General Insurance Company vs. PKS Shipping Company

An issue whether a carrier is private or common on the basis of the facts found by a trial court or the
appellate court can be a valid and reviewable question of law.

Article 1732 of the Civil Code carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise
offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis, and neither does it distinguish between a carrier offering its
services to the ‘general public,’ i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or
solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population.

Much of the distinction between a “common or public carrier” and a “private or special carrier” lies in the
character of the business, such that if the undertaking is an isolated transaction, not a part of the business
or occupation, and the carrier does not hold itself out to carry the goods for the general public or to a
limited clientele, although involving the carriage of goods for a fee, the person or corporation providing
such service could very well be just a private carrier; The concept of a common carrier does not change
merely because individual contracts are executed or entered into with patrons of the carrier—such
restrictive interpretation would make it easy for a common carrier to escape liability by the simple
expedient of entering into those distinct agreements with clients.

Sarkies Tours Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Lliability “lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by
the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the
person who has a right to receive them.
Sea-Land Service, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Liability of a common carrier under a contract of carriage is governed by the laws of the country of
destination

The liability of petitioner Sea-Land to the respondent consignee is governed primarily by the Civil Code,
and as ordained by the said Code, suppletorily, in all matters not determined thereby, by the Code of
Commerce and special laws. One of these suppletory special laws is the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, U.S.
Public Act No. 521 which was made applicable to all contracts for the carriage of goods by sea to and from
Philippine ports in foreign trade

A stipulation that the common carrier's liability is limited to the value of goods appearing in the bill of
lading, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value in binding. Art 1759-c.c. A contract fixing the
sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods
is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances and has been fairly and freely agreed upon.

Private respondent, by making claim for loss on the basis of the bill of lading, to all intents and purposes
accepted said bill. Having done so, he—"x x x becomes bound by all stipulations contained therein
whether on the front or the back thereof. Respondent cannot elude its provisions simply because they
prejudice him and take advantage of those that are beneficial. Secondly, the fact that respondent shipped
his goods on board the ship of petitioner and paid the corresponding freight thereon shows that he
impliedly accepted the bill of lading which was issued in connection with the shipment in question, and
so it may be said that the same is binding upon him as if it had been actually signed by him or by any other
person in his behalf.

Servando vs. Philippine Steam Navigation Co.

Agreement on limitation of liability of carrier, binding upon the parties; Reason; Contracts of adhesion not
entirely prohibited. - "While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket (Exh. '12'), he
is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. 'Such provisions have been held to be a part of the
contract of carriage, and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge
or assent to the regulation.' It is what is known as a contract of 'adhesion', in regards which it has been
said that contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other,
as the plane ticket in the case at bar, are contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the
contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent."

Exemption from liability; Fortuitous event or force majeure, concept and nature of; Obligor exempt from
liability for non-performance of obligation due to a fortuitous event; Burning of customs warehouse, a
fortuitous event; Case at bar.

In the case at bar, the burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened
independently of the will of the appellant. The latter could not have foreseen the event.

Absence of delay of carrier in the performance of its obligation and negligence of its employees exempt
carrier from liability for loss of goods due to fire
Southern Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Under Article 361 of the Code of Commerce, the defendant-carrier, in order to free itself from liability,
was only obliged to prove that the damages suffered by the goods were "by virtue of the nature or defect
of the articles." Under the provisions of Article 362, the plaintiff, in order to hold the defendant liable,
was obliged to prove that the damages to the goods by virtue of their nature, occurred on account of its
negligence or because the defendant did not take the precaution adopted by careful persons.

Carrier not relieved from liability if improper packing of goods was apparent.

Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

The failure of a common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its vessel involved in a contract of
carriage is a clear breach of its duty prescribed in Article 1755 of the Civil Code.

Code of Commerce; Where the delay in a contracted voyage is incurred after the commencement of such
voyage, Article 698 of the Code of Commerce, not Article 1169 of the Civil Code, applies.

Where the common carrier fails to observe extraordinary diligence resulting in delay or interruption of
the voyage, it shall be liable for any pecuniary loss or loss of profits which the passengers may suffer by
reason thereof.

III. CARRIAGE OF GOODS