CASE #1
true compromise is reached.
G.R. No. 167261 March 2, 2007
ROSARIA LUPITAN PANG-ET, Petitioner,
vs.CATHERINE MANACNES-DAO-AS, Heir of
LEONCIO MANACNES and FLORENTINA
MANACNES, Respondent.
Facts:
Under dispute is the effectivity and validity of the
Arbitration Award issued by the Barangay Lupon of
Dagdag which dealt with an action for recovery of
possession of real property situated in Sitio Abatan,
Barrio Dagdag, Sagada originally filed by petitioner
Pang-et against spouses Manacnes in the MCTC.
During the pendency of the case in the MCTC, said court
remanded the matter to the Lupon for arbitration. In the
initial hearing before the Lupon, the spouses Manacnes
declined to sign the Arbitration Agreement and were
adamant that the proceedings before the MCTC must
continue. Thereafter, the Lupon issued a certificate to file
action. However, the MCTC once again remanded the
matter for conciliation by the Lupon and ordering the
Lupon to render an Arbitration Award thereon.
The one who signed the Award on respondents’ part
was respondent spouses’ daughter.
Petitioner Pang-et filed with the Lupon a Motion for
Execution of the said Arbitration Award. However, the
heir of the Manacnes spouses argues that the
Agreement for Arbitration and the Arbitration Award are
void, the Agreement for Arbitration not having been
personally signed by the spouses Manacnes, and the
Arbitration Award having been written in English – a
language not understood by the parties.
Issue:
Is the Arbitration Award now sought to be enforced
effective?
Ruling:
It must be stressed that the object of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law is the amicable settlement of
disputes through conciliation proceedings voluntarily and
freely entered into by the parties. Through this
mechanism, the parties are encouraged to settle their
disputes without enduring the rigors of court litigation.
Nonetheless, the disputing parties are not compelled to
settle their controversy during the barangay proceedings
before the Lupon or the Pangkat, as they are free to
instead find recourse in the courts in the event that no
The key in achieving the objectives of an effective
amicable settlement under the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law is the free and voluntary agreement
of the parties to submit the dispute for adjudication either
by the Lupon or the Pangkat, whose award or decision
shall be binding upon them with the force and effect of a
final judgment of a court. Absent this voluntary
submission by the parties to submit their dispute to
arbitration under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law,
there cannot be a binding settlement arrived at
effectively resolving the case.
What is compulsory under the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law is that there be a confrontation
between the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the
Pangkat and that a certification be issued that no
conciliation or settlement has been reached, as attested
to by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, before a case
falling within the authority of the Lupon may be instituted
in court or any other government office for
adjudication. In other words, the only necessary pre-
condition before any case falling within the authority of
the Lupon or the Pangkat may be filed before a court is
that there has been personal confrontation between the
parties but despite earnest efforts to conciliate, there
was a failure to amicably settle the dispute.
The parties may only be compelled to appear before the
Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for the necessary
confrontation, but not to enter into any amicable
settlement, or in the case at bar, to sign the Agreement
for Arbitration. Thus, when the Manacnes spouses
personally appeared during the initial hearing before the
Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, they had already complied
with the agreement during the pre-trial to submit the
case for conciliation proceedings.
Furthermore, the MCTC should not have persisted in
ordering the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa to render an
arbitration award upon the refusal of the spouses
Manacnes to submit the case for arbitration since such
arbitration award will not bind the spouses. As reflected
in Section 413 of the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, in order that a party may be bound
by an arbitration award, said party must have agreed in
writing that they shall abide by the arbitration award of
the Lupon or the Pangkat. Like in any other contract,
parties who have not signed an agreement to arbitrate
will not be bound by said agreement since it is axiomatic
that a contract cannot be binding upon and cannot be
enforced against one who is not a party to it. In view of
the fact that upon verification by the Pangkat Chairman,
in order to settle the issue of whether or not they intend Issue:
to submit the matter for arbitration, the spouses
Manacnes refused to affix their signature or thumb mark Whether or not the termination of respondents is proper
on the Agreement for Arbitration Form, the Manacnes in accordance with the provisions of the Local
spouses cannot be bound by the Agreement for Government Code
Arbitration and the ensuing arbitration award since they
Ruling:
never became privy to any agreement submitting the
case for arbitration by the Pangkat. The following provisions of the Local Government
Code; viz:
CASE #2
Sec. 389. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, and
G.R. No. 132413 August 27, 1999
Function. — . . .
RAMON ALQUIZOLA, SR., MARISSA C. DOROMAL
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance,
and ADELO SECO, petitioners, vs.GALLARDO
the purpose of which is the general welfare of the
OCOL, CAMILO P. PENACO, SATURNINO
barangay and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of
MENDOZA, RAFAEL R. ARDIENTE, VICENTE C.
this Code, the punong barangay shall: x x x xx
CASERES, RICARDO B. ZOSA III and SIRAD M.
x xxx
UMPA, respondents.
(5) Upon approval by a majority of all the members of
Facts:
the sangguniang barangay, appoint or replace the
Petitioner Ramon Alquizola, Sr., won the post of Punong barangay treasurer, the barangay secretary, and other
Barangay of Barangay Tubod, Iligan City, in the 12th appointive barangay officials;
May 1997 barangay elections. Respondents Gallardo
The Code explicitly vests on the punong barangay, upon
Cool, Camilo Penaco, Saturnino Mendoza, Rafael
approval by a majority of all the members of the
Ardiente, Vicente Caseres, Ricardo Zosa. III, and Sirad
sangguniang barangay, the power to appoint or replace
Umpa were appointees of the former punong barangay
the barangay treasurer, the barangay secretary, and
of Barangay Tubod, the first two occupying the positions
other appointive barangay officials. This provision is
of barangay treasurer and barangay secretary,
reinforced, in the case of the secretary and the treasurer,
respectively, with the rest being barangay utility workers.
by the provisions of Section 394 and Section 395 of the
After the elections, petitioner Alquizola terminated the Local Government Code; to wit:
services of respondents and appointed his co-
Sec. 394. Barangay Secretary: Appointment,
petitioners, Marissa Doromal and Adelo Seco,
Qualifications, Powers and Duties. — (a) The barangay
respectively, as barangay treasurer and as barangay
secretary shall be appointed by the punong barangay
secretary. In consonance with Section 394 and Section
with the concurrence of the majority of all the
395 of the Local Government Code, he submitted both
sangguniang barangay members. The appointment of
appointments to the Sangguniang Barangay for
the barangay secretary shall not be subject to attestation
approval. The Sanggunian rejected the appointments.
by the Civil Service Commission.
Following the action taken by the Sangguniang
Sec. 395. Barangay Treasurer: Appointment,
Barangay, respondents filed a complaint for quo
Qualifications, Powers and Duties. — (a) The barangay
warranto, mandamus and prohibition with the Regional
treasurer shall be appointed by the punong barangay
Trial Court of Lanao Del Norte to enjoin petitioner from
with the concurrence of the majority of all the
terminating the services of the former. The trial court
sangguniang barangay members. The appointment of
found in favor of respondents and ordered petitioner
the barangay treasurer shall not be subject to attestation
Ramon Alquizola, Sr., to cease and desist from
by the Civil Service Commission.
dismissing respondents on the ground that their
dismissal had been effected without the corresponding Verily, the power of appointment is to be exercised
approval of the Sangguniang Barangay. It held that conjointly by the punong barangay and a majority of all
Section 389(b) (5) limited the power of a barangay the members of the sangguniang barangay. Without
captain to remove appointive barangay officials by such conjoint action, neither an appointment nor a
requiring an approval of such act by a majority of the replacement can be effectual.
Sangguniang Barangay.
Applying the rule that the power to appoint includes the
power to remove, one that the Court finds no cogent
reason to now depart from, the questioned dismissal
from office of the barangay officials by the punong
barangay without the concurrence of the majority of all
the members of the Sangguniang Barangay cannot be
legally justified.
CASE #3
G.R. No. 223405, February 20, 2019
CARLOS L. REYNES, PETITIONER, v. OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), LUCRESIA M.
AMORES, AND MARIBEL HONTIVEROS,
RESPONDENTS.
Facts:
Petitioner Reynes, manager of a resort in Brgy.
Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City, filed a complaint for Illegal
Exaction against respondent Barangay Captain Amores
and Barangay Kagawad Hontiveros.
In an Affidavit-Complaint, Reynes alleged that Barangay
Captain Amores collected increased monthly garbage
collection fees from P1, 000 to P2, 000, even without
any ordinance or statute, or any other regulation
authorizing its collection, and despite the City of Lapu-
Lapu already collecting its own garbage fees.
Reynes questioned the increase, but Amores never gave
an explanation in response. Later, Amores issued the
cessation of the collection of the resort’s garbage.
Issue:
Whether probable cause exists to prosecute for illegal
exactions
Ruling:
Article 213. Frauds against the public treasury and
similar offenses. — The penalty of prision correccional in
its medium period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 10,000 pesos, or
both, shall be imposed upon any public officer who:
....
2. Being entrusted with the collection of taxes, licenses,
fees and other imposts, shall be guilty of any of the
following acts or omissions:
(a) Demanding, directly or indirectly, the payment of
sums different from or larger than those authorized
by law.
(b) Failing voluntarily to issue a receipt, as provided by
law, for any sum of money collected by him
officially.
(c) Collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by way
of payment or otherwise, things or objects of a
nature different from that provided by law.
From this, liability under Article 213(2) ensues when the
following elements are demonstrated:
First, that the offender is a public officer who is
"entrusted with the collection of taxes, licenses, fees and
other imposts."
Second, that he or she engages in any of the three (3)
specified acts or omissions under Article 213(2):
"[d]emanding, directly or indirectly, the payment of sums
different from or larger than those authorized by law[;
f]ailing voluntarily to issue a receipt, as provided by law,
for any sum of money collected by him officially[; or
c]ollecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by way of
payment or otherwise, things or objects of a nature
different from that provided by law."
As punong barangay, private respondent Amores was
chief executive of a local government unit. She was
head of Barangay Marigondon, administered it, and
oversaw the discharge of all its functions. She was
tasked with "[e]nforc[ing] all laws and ordinances which
are applicable within the barangay[;] [m]aintain[ing]
public order[;] [and] [p]romot[ing] the general welfare of
the barangay[.]" More on point, it was her duty to
"[e]nforce laws and regulations relating to pollution
control and protection of the environment[,] [and]
[e]nsure the delivery of basic services as mandated
under Section 17 of [the Local Government]
Code." Among these basic services are "[s]ervices and
facilities related to general hygiene and sanitation,
beautification, and solid waste collection[.]”
Private respondent Amores' engagement with solid
waste management was official, direct, and unequivocal.
This involvement spanned all dimensions of solid waste
management, including the marshaling of resources,
financial or otherwise. Her functions were sufficiently
broad as to encompass facilitating the levying of charges
for services rendered by the Barangay. It is then not
difficult to see, precisely as petitioner asserts, how
private respondent Amores could have used her office
as an artifice for "[d]emanding ... the payment of sums
different from or larger than those authorized by law."
One might indulge private respondent Amores'
seemingly inevitable exoneration by pointing to Section
395(e) of the Local Government Code and noting how
the barangay treasurer is tasked with "[c]ollect[ing] and
issu[ing] official receipts for taxes, fees, contributions,
monies, materials, and all other resources accruing to
the barangay[.]" However, it is improper to conveniently
negate her possible culpability by the veneer of
detachment just because she held a position different
from, or superior to, that of a barangay treasurer. Private
respondent Amores cannot evade liability by feigning
incidental, ancillary, or tangential involvement, and
pointing to subalterns as the persons who actually
effected the assailed collections.
This is not the first case where this Court has considered
the situation of a treasurer obliviously acting as the
surrogate of a local chief executive who may have
insisted on inordinate collections. In Ongsuco v.
Malones, this Court noted that such a treasurer acts as a
local chief executive's mere "alter ego."
This is also not the first instance that this Court has
considered the potential liability for illegal exactions of a
public officer, whose functions do not explicitly include
the collection of fees and charges. Young v.
Mapayo83 concerned a Regional Trial Court judge who
was accused of "demanding and receiving [P10,000.00]
for the solemnization of [a] marriage."84 Fully aware that
the actual collection of fees was not a function
performed by a judge, this Court, nevertheless, stated
that "[t]he first charge, if proven, would constitute illegal
exaction."
CASE #4
January 11, 2016 G.R. No. 188213
NATIVIDAD C. CRUZ and BENJAMIN DELA
CRUZ, Petitioners, vs. PANDACAN HIKER'S CLUB,
INC., Represented by its President, PRISCILA
ILAO, Respondent
Facts:
Petitioner Natividad C. Cruz (Cruz) was Punong
Barangay or Chairperson of Barangay 848, Zone 92,
City of Manila. On November 10, 2006, around five
o'clock in the afternoon, and along Central Street,
Pandacan, Manila, within the vicinity of her barangay,
she allegedly confronted persons playing basketball.
Then, she allegedly gave an order to the other
petitioner, Barangay Tanod Benjamin dela Cruz (Dela
Cruz), to destroy the basketball ring by cutting it up with
a hacksaw which Dela Cruz promptly complied with,
thus, rendering the said basketball court unusable.
The acts of petitioners prompted the filing of a Complaint
(for Malicious Mischief, Grave Misconduct, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Abuse
of Authority) before the Prosecutor's Office and the
Office of the Ombudsman by the group that claims to be
the basketball court's owners, herein respondents
Pandacan Hiker's Club, Inc. (PHC) and its president
Priscila Ilao (Ilao). In the complaint, they alleged that
PHC is the group that had donated, administered and
operated the subject basketball court for the Pandacan
community until its alleged destruction by petitioners.
In answer to the complaint, Cruz alleged that the
basketball court affected the peace in the barangay and
was the subject of many complaints from residents
asking for its closure.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts of Barangay Chairperson Cruz is
proper
Ruling:
It is held that the administrative offense of conduct
prejudicial to the interest of the service is committed
when the questioned conduct tarnished the image and
integrity of the officer's public office; the conduct need
not be related or connected to the public officer's official
functions for the said officer to be meted the
corresponding penalty.27 The basis for such liability is
Republic Act No. 6713, or the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, particularly Section 4 (c) thereof, which
ordains that public officials and employees shall at all
times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from
doing acts contrary to public safety and public interest.
For these reasons, in the case at bar, We agree with the
appellate court that the petitioners’ actions, though well-
intentioned, were improper and done in excess of what
was required by the situation and fell short of the
aforementioned standards of behavior for public officials.
It is clear from the records that petitioners indeed cut or
sawed in half the subject basketball ring, which resulted
in the destruction of the said equipment and rendered it
completely unusable.30 Petitioners also moved
instantaneously and did not deliberate nor consult with
the Sangguniang Barangay prior to committing the
subject acts; neither did they involve any police or law
enforcement agent in their actions. They acted while
tempers were running high as petitioner Cruz, the
Barangay Chairperson, became incensed at the removal
of the steel bar and padlock that was earlier used to
close access to the ring and at the inability or refusal of
respondents' group to return the said steel bar and
padlock to her as she had ordered.
The destructive acts of petitioners, however, find no
legal sanction. This Court has ruled time and again that
no public official is above the law.
Prevailing jurisprudence holds that unless a nuisance is
a nuisance per se, it may not be summarily abated. A
nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate
safety of persons and property, which may be summarily
abated under the undefined law of necessity.
A basketball ring, by itself, poses no immediate harm or
danger to anyone but is merely an object of recreation.
Neither is it, by its nature, injurious to rights of property,
of health or of comfort of the community and, thus, it
may not be abated as a nuisance without the benefit of a
judicial hearing.40
But even if it is assumed, ex gratia argumenti, that the
basketball ring was a nuisance per se, but without
posing any immediate harm or threat that required
instantaneous action, the destruction or abatement
performed by petitioners failed to observe the proper
procedure for such an action which puts the said act into
legal question.
Under Article 700 of the Civil Code, the abatement,
including one without judicial proceedings, of a public
nuisance is the responsibility of the district health officer.
Under Article 702 of the Code, the district health officer
is also the official who shall determine whether or not
abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the best
remedy against a public nuisance. The two articles do
not mention that the chief executive of the local
government, like the Punong Barangay, is authorized as
the official who can determine the propriety of a
summary abatement.
Petitioners could cite no barangay nor city ordinance that
would have justified their summary abatement through
the exercise of police powers found in the said clause.
No barangay nor city ordinance was violated; neither
was there one which specifically declared the said
basketball ring as a nuisance per se that may be
summarily abated. Though it has been held that a
nuisance per se may be abated via an ordinance,
without judicial proceedings,41 We add that, in the case
at bar, petitioners were required to justify their
abatement via such an ordinance because the power
they claim to have exercised – the police power under
the general welfare clause – is a power exercised by the
government mainly through its legislative, and not the
executive, branch. The prevailing jurisprudence is that
local government units such as the provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays exercise police power
through their respective legislative bodies.
The general welfare clause provides for the exercise of
police power for the attainment or maintenance of the
general welfare of the community. The power, however,
is exercised by the government through its legislative
branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and
other constitutional and civil rights.
Flowing from this delegated police power of local
governments, a local government unit like Barangay
848, Zone 92 in which petitioners were public officials,
exercises police power through its legislative body, in
this case, its Sangguniang Barangay.
Clearly, the complete destruction of the basketball ring
by the petitioners is justified neither by law or ordinance
nor even by equity or necessity, which makes the act
illegal and petitioners liable.
Although the Court bestows sympathy to the numerous
constituents who allegedly complained against the
basketball court to petitioners, it cannot legally agree
with the methods employed by the said officials. Their
good intentions do not justify the destruction of private
property without a legal warrant, because the promotion
of the general welfare is not antithetical to the
preservation of the rule of law.
CASE #5
New Sun Valley v. Sangguniang Barangay, G.R. No.
156686, July 27, 2011
Facts:
The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley
issued a Resolution directing the New Sun Valley
Homeowners Association to Open Rosemallow and
Aster Streets to vehicular and pedestrian traffic. New
Sun Valley residents, contended that when they bought
their residential properties, they also paid proportionately
for the roads and the park in then subdivision. They have
therefore an existing equity on these roads. To open the
roads to public use is a violation of the rights and
interests to a secure, peaceful and healthful
environment. Further, they claimed that a "Barangay
Resolution" cannot validly cause the opening of the
subject roads because under the law, an "ordinance" is
required to effect such an act.
Issue:
Whether or not the claim of New Sun Valley that a
"Barangay Resolution" cannot validly cause the opening
of the subject roads because under the law, an
"ordinance" is required to effect such an act, is correct.

Ruling:

No. New Sun Valley is incorrect.

The requirement under Sec. 21 of the passage of an

ordinance by a local government unit to effect the
opening of a local road, can have no applicability to the
instant case since the subdivision road lots sought to be
opened to decongest traffic in the area - namely
Rosemallow and Aster Streets – have already been
donated by the Sun Valley Subdivision to, and the titles
thereto already issued in the name of, the City
Government of Parañaque since the year 1964. Having
been already donated or turned over to the City
Government of Parañaque, the road lots in question
have since then taken the nature of public roads which
are withdrawn from the commerce of man, and hence
placed beyond the private rights or claims of herein
Appellant. Accordingly, NSV was not in the lawful
exercise of its predicated rights when it built obstructing
structures closing the road lots in question to vehicular
traffic for the use of the general Public. Consequently,
defendant’s act of passing the disputed barangay
resolution, the implementation of which is sought to be
restrained by Appellant, had for its purpose not the
opening of a private road but may be considered merely
as a directive or reminder to the Appellant to cause the
opening of a public road which should rightfully be open
for use to the general public.