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    Test of Bombing Equipment B-29 7 April 1945

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    Test of Bombing Equipment B-29 7 April 1945

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
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    79 views62 pages

    Test of Bombing Equipment B-29

    Uploaded by

    Max
    Test of Bombing Equipment B-29 7 April 1945

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    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
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    SECRET REPORT of THE ARMY AIR FORCES BOARD ORLANDO, FLORIDA TESTS CONDUCTED BY AAF PROVING GROUND COMMAND EGLIN FIELD, FLORIDA SUBJECT TEST OF BOMBING EQUIPMENT INSTALLED IN B-29 TYPE AIRPLANE PROJECT No 3784C452.1 DATE COPY No. gt 7 April 1945 SECRET FOR INFORMATION ONI ‘SECRET WAR DEPARTVENT HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY ATR FORCES WASHINGTON D.C. 29 APR Lol. SUBJECT: Suitability Tests 0: Executive Director Army Air Forces Board Orlando, Florida 1. Request urgent priority to be given the following B-29 operational tests in the order listed: a, Maximum range and performance data. b. Bombing. ©. Defensive armament capabilities at medium and high altitudes. 2. It is anticipated that the B29 will operate at an altitude of 30,000 feet while in the target area, ‘Twelve (12) to 18 ship formations will be employed for these high altitude daylight. precision attacks. Night and through-the-overcast bombing are also contemplated. Maximim bombing and ammunition loads commensurate with the target range is desirable at all tines, 3, In view of impending operations three model missions are being laid out. A representative of this Headquarters will deliver these at Eglin Field prior to Saturday, 6 May. It is requested that the performance of these missions be completed as soon as possible upon the arrival of the mission data. 4, With respect to the above tests, it is desired that upon completion of projects or portions thereto, all the immediately available data will be forwarded this office. By command of General ARNOLD: /s/ William F. Wekee WILLIAM F. UeKEE Colonel, Air Corps (0: Proving Ground Conmand Acting, Asst Chief of Air Staff, Eglin Field, Florida Operations, Commitments & Requirenents Incl. a. SECRET AAP Ba, Proj. No. 737840452.1 OFFICIAL: (GUSTAV A. NSUBERG Lt. Colonel, AGD Recorder SEF By Authority of CG APPGe HEADQUARTERS 3/8/45 ARMY AIR FORCES PROVING GROUND COMMAND Date “Initial EGLIN FIELD, FLORIDA FIWAL REPORT on TEST OF BO:BING EQUIPMENT INSTALLED IN B-29 TYPE AIRPLANE Serial Nos: _6-44-2-18 Now of Pages: 13 Date-22 March 1945 AAP Board Project No, — $7840452.1 pb te ba Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Commandings Incl b. Opa To determine the suitability of the bombing equip- ment as installed in the 8-29 type airplane. 2. INTRODUCTION: a, The original bombing equipment installed in the B-29 type airplane is described in the "Program for Test of Operational Suitability of B-29 Airplane," attached as Inclosure 2, Certain items of the bombing equipment were modified and service tested. Later production models of the airplene include the all-electric bomb release system. (Results of the tests on both the original equipment and the all-electric relesse system are included in this report.) by During the first missions of the test, it was found that the bomb bay door mechanism did not function properly on salvo releases, The force of the airstream on the forward bomb bay doors would not allow them to fall open as intended when the salvo release mechanism was used. A spring-loaded device was tried without success. Complete results of tests of this installation were submitted in S. Ty No. 6=44-2-4C, AAF Board Project No. E 3590, "Test of Snap Opening Doors on B-29 Airplani An entirely new system of bomb bay door operating mechanism was then installed, The new system was pneumatically operated and electrically con- trolled. A complete description of this system, as well as results of its service test, was submitted in the "Preliminary Report on Pneumatic Homb Doors and Modified Bomb Sight in B-29 Airplane, A.C. No. 42-6376," S. T, No, 6-44-2-la, AAP Board Project No, (l-5) 285, dated 8 September 1044, attached as Inclosure 5, c. During the service test of the pnoumatically- operated bomb bay doors, unusually large circular errors of individually released bombs were obtained, An investigation revealed that bombs dropped from certain stations and racks were unstabilized in flight, This condition is discussed in the "Preliminary Report of the Turbulence Effect in the Bomb Bay of the B-29 Airplane," S, T, No. 6=44-2-la, AAP Board Project No, F 4036, submitted on 16 October 1944, and attached as Inclosure 6, Further investigation is being made by the ATSC, d. A new production model of a 8-29 type airplane No. of Pages: Page Now: e_ AAP Bd. Proj. Now? FS784 SECRET with an all-electric bomb release system was received by this command. The all-electric system operates on 24-volt direct current and incorporates the A-4 release used with the standard B-7, D-6 and D-7 type shackles, Selection of bombs to be dropped is made from four rack-selector switches on the electrical control panel which is mounted on the left side of the bombardier's compartment, This panel also contains switches for control of bomb bay door position, nose fuze arming, and indicator lights. Emergency salvo switches are located in the bonbardier's compartment, on the pilot's aisle stand and in the aft pressure cabin, Tail fuzes are automatically "armed" for normal releases and safe" for salvo, A schedule of missions covering a functional test of this equipment is attached as Inclosure 3. -It is concluded that: 3. CONCLISTONS. as The part-electrical, part-mechantcal bomb releese system, using the A-2 release, is adversely affected in flight by témperature and structural changes, resulting In bomb releese malfunctions, b, The all-electric bonb release system, using the A-4 release, will operate satisfactorily with recommended modifications. cs No emergency mechanical salvo is included with the A-4 release system, a. The provision for manual release of bombs from the A-4 electrical release is unsatisfactory because of the difficulty encountered in entering and moving about in the bomb bay during flight when the bomb doors are open, e. The present defroster system will not prevent tne formation of frost on the glass panels in the nose section at high altitude (25,000' and above), f, With visibility in the nose section impaired by the formation of frost, it 1s difficult to "level" the airplane for the bombing run; formation bombing becomes azardous. 4, RECOMMENDATIONS,--It 1s recommended that: a, With the following modifications, the A-4 all-electric bomb release system be standardized for service use: Nos of Pages: __13 Page Noe: z AAP Bd. Proje Nos? F784 (1) The Cannon plugs connecting the forward bomb racks of the rear bay to the release circuits be relocated to eliminate inter- ference with the bomb hoisting equipment, (2) The salvo and normal circuits be connected to bomb racks through separate Cannon plugs. (3) A manual salvo system be incorporated to provide an emergency release in the event of failure of the electrical system, b, The indicator light circuits be rewired so thet the lights may be turned "ON" during bomb release without resulting in a partial salvo, es A bomb bay door position-indicator light be provided on the pilot's instrument panel. a, The vented-tube defroster system be modified to provide'a larger volume of warm air for defrosting opera ons, @. The bombardier's oxygen supply be relocated to eliminate obstruction of the bomb control panel by the oxygen hoses f. The bombardier's communication jack-box be re~ located so as to be more accessible. . An investigation be made as to the suitability of the oi] in the "dashpot" with a view to increasing the sensitivity of the A.F.C.E, at high altitude, hy Airplanes which incorporate the part-electric: part mechanical bomb release system be modified to prevent interference between the bomb hoist yoke and bomb rack control linkages. 5. RECORD OF TEST: a. The test was conducted in accordance with the "progrem for Test of Operational Suitability of B-29 Airplane," attached as Inclosure 2, The schedule of missions for a functional test of the all-electric bomb release system is attached as Inclosure 3, Nos of Peges: Page Now + AAF Bd, Proj. Noe? F 3784 b, Investigations are being continued on related subjects, Results will be furnished upon completion of the tests, The projects which this commend are as follow: (2) (3) (4) (5) e currently being conducted at "yultiple Suspension of Bombs in the B-29 Airplane," AAF Board Project tio. F 3755 (S. Te NO. 6-44=2-1b). "Bombing Accuracy of AN/APQ-13 as Compared to Norden Equipment in B-29 Airplane, (S. T. Noe 1-44-86). "Mine Dropping from B-29 Aircraft," AAP Board Project No. F 3829 (S, T, Now 6-44-2-1c). "yenual Release for All-Flectric Bomb Releese System," AAF Board Project No. F 4011 (8. 7, No, 1-44-64), Nyodified Sequence of Bomb Release in B-29 Aircraft," AAF Board Project No, P 4267 (S. Te Now 1-45-1), DISCUSSION: a. Ground Check. qa) (2) ‘The ‘installation and location of all bombing equipment were checked. After a preliminary adjustment of the release mechanism, the airplene equipped with the part-electrical, part-mechanical system was loaded with 500-1, Mé4 inert bombs, These bombs were released on the ground over a sand pit, Releases were made selectively, and in siow and fast train. With the bomb doors open, bombs were re- leased by means of the mechanical salvo control. Careful adjustment of the linkage rods was necessary since one of the racks released its bombs before the salvo handle was fully into the salvo position. It wes noted that the interlocking mechanism, which prevents salvo release of the bombs No. of Page: 13 Page No Tr AAP Bd, Proj. Nos? P5764 be (3) ‘SECRET before the bomb doors are fully open, had been removed, Investigation revealed that the ection of e snubber cylinder incorporated in the door mechanism pre- vented the doors from falling open of their own weight, Other difficulties were encountered in actual flight, and will be discussed later, ‘Te bomb hoisting equipment operated satisfactorily, Two instances of bomb release failure were caused by inter ference between borb release mechanism and hoisting equipment. These malfunctions are discussed fully in paragraph 6f. (3) and (5). Preliminary Flight Checks qa) (2) The airplane, loaded vi th 20 100=1b. N30 inert bombs in the rear bomb bay, was flown to an altitude of 51,000 feet. All bombs were relessed electrically. Five bombs were released individually, five in slow train, five in fast train, and five bombs were dropped by using the togcle switch at the radar station, All releases were satisfactory. After all bombs had been released, an attempt was made to open the bomb bay doors by means of the pilot's emergency Ivo control. The rear bomb doors opened slowly but not fully, Since the inter- locking mechenism had been removed, an actyal salvo would have allowed the bombs to atrike the doors even though their release was deleyed until further opening had ceased, The front bomb doors remained com- pletely closed, but could be forced open approximately six inches by standing on them. As soon as the additional weight was removed, the doors returned to the closed position. It is believed that this was caused by ‘the high pressure underneath the strean- Nos of Pages: 9 Page Now AAP Bd, Proj. Wor Free SECRET ce. Bomb q) SECRET Lined fuselage, The pneumatic bomb door installation corrects this condition. All succeeding missions were conducted with the pneumatic system installed. Sight and Stabilizer. ‘The K-9 bomb sight and stabilizer is satis fectorily located and installed. The P.D,I, 13 conveniently located on the pilot's instrument panel. 4 C-1 Automatic Pilote qa) The automatic flight control equipment was checked for proper functioning. At low and medium altitudes, no difficulty was experienced with this equipment. At high altitude (30,000 feet and above), it was difficult to adjust the automatic pilot for level flight, There was a noticeable tendency for the airplane to "yaw" and "hunt". With sensitivity con- trols adjusted to maximum and the "dashpot" turned ail the way up, response to correc- tions applied was slow, This merits a study of the equipment to improve the operation of the "dashpot" and the follow- up system, since these factors are critical in precision bombing at high altitude. e. Bombardier's Accessory Equipment. qa) The instrunents provided for the bombardier are satisfactory end well located. In- stallation of @ true air speed indicator and a repeater-scope for e radio altimeter would facilitate solving the bombing problem, especially at high altitude, Control panels are accessible for the normal position, The bombardier's oxygen ~upply is 80 located that when the ox. gen mask is worn, the hose is directly in .-ont of the Dombardier's instrument pael md across the toggle switch, The communication jack- No. of Pages: _13 Page AAP Bd, Proj. Now: F 8784 SECRET (2) (3) ‘SECRET box is installed on the extreme right side of the compartnent; relocation in a more accessible place would facilitate operation, ‘he airplane was flown on a night mission to check the equipment for operation under conditions of darimess, The flight was coordinated with a battery of two search- lights. Lighting in the bombardier's com- partment was found to be adequate, Although the flight altitude was only 11,000 feet, the searchlight glare was inconsequential as far as bonb sight operation was con- cerned, unless the bomb run was in suck a direction as to place the lights within 10 to 18 degrees to either side of the heading. Under these conditions the bomb sight cross- heirs could not be seen, No difficulty was experienced by the pilot in maintaining level flight by instruments while in the searchlight pattern. At high altitude it was found that vision in the bonberdier's compartment was greatly impatred by the formation of frost on the glass although defroster fans were in opere- Eon. ‘The sighting panel was clear, but ell upper panels were covered with frost. An airplane with the tubular-type defroster system (Boeing Change S21) was also checited at high altitude, As in the case of the fan-type defroster system, all panels in the bonberdier's compartment were frosted except the loner center window. This formation of frost also restricts the pilot's vision, making formation flying im- possible, ‘The diagram on Page 4, Inclosure 4, shows the effect of altitude and engine power settings on frosting conditions. It is believed that the tubuler-type defroster system would be more satisfactory than the fan-type, provided a greater volune of warm air’ were forced through the tube vents. No. of Pages: __15 Page Now: AAP Bd, Proj. Now Was S04 SECRET f. (4) Bomb qQ) (2) ‘SECRET The indicator light panel installed with the all-electric bomb release system is so wired that lights cannot be turned "ON" during bomb release, If indicator lights are turned "ON" while bonbs are being re- leased, a partial salvo will result. A system which will instantly warn the bonberdier of a release failure is desirable, An indieator light panel which is operative during bomb release would provide this information, The panel should include « rheostat to control the indicator light intensity. Rack Equipment. Using the airplane with the pneumatic bomb door installation, and the A-2 release system, 100-1b., 500-1b.,/1000-1b,, 2000-1b. and 4000-16, bombs were released by means of the various salvo controls as listed under Phase I of the Schedule of Missions in the Test Program, No failure to release occurred. A malfunction of the arming mechanism of the A-2 release occurred on the salvo of 500-1, bombs, The arming lever fell, causing the arming wire to be withdrawn from the tail fuze and allowing the bomb to be dropped armed, ‘The arming wire in the tail fuze of another boab, although released properly from the shackle, hung by the swivel in the angle formed by the inter- section of the shackle and the side of the A-2 release of a lower station, The wire was withdrawn from the fuze and the bomb fell in an armed condition, All bombs re- leased in salvo were equipped with nose fuzes as well as tail fuzes, No malfunctions of nose-arming control units occurred, Several malfunctions occurred on missions listed under Phase III of the Test Program of the A-2 part-electrical, part-mechanical bomb release system, This phase covers both individual and train releases of all size bombs, Malfunctions were not confined Nos of Pages: __13 Page Nos: AAF Bd, Proj. Now? F 5784 ‘SECRET (3) ‘SECRET to any particular method of release or toe particuler size bomb. In almost every instance of release failure the solenoid plunger of the A-2 release was slightly bent. This prevented full travel of the plunger which activates the release mechanism, After the solenoid is de~ener- gized, the deformation of the plunger pre- vents its return to the original position. when an attempt is made to salvo the bombs, the arming lever of the release unit which has failed will trip and allow the bomb to be dropped with the tail fuze "armed". All other bonbs released by the salvo mechanism will normally be dropped with the tail, fuze “gafe". The solenoid plunger is bent be- cause of slight maladjustments of the link- age rods which control the cam bars mounted on the bomb racks, Even though a ground check may indicate proper rack control ad- justment, extreme changes in temperature and the bending of structural members in flight will cause slight variations in the adjustment of bomb rack controls. If ad- justments have been made just within operat- ing limits, the changes due to temperature and structural variations may prevent one or more rack controls from moving into proper position when control handles are moved from "lock" to "select". Failure to releasé the bomb and damage to the solenoid plunger of the release unit may result, Careful ad- justment of control linkages to insure the widest possible range of operating limits will reduce failures. Another type of bomb release failure with ‘tne A-2 part-electrical, part-mechanical system was caused by the yoke of the bomb hoist assembly. This yoke, which is not rigidly installed, swings back and forth and becomes lodged against a bell crank in the linkage rod assembly, This prevents movement of the cam bar so that racks can not be put into either the "select" or the No. of Pages: _13 Page No.t 7 AAT Bd. "Proj. No.? F S764 (4) (5) ‘SECRET "salvo" position, A small cable, attached to the yoke and fastened to the support of the benter bomb reci:s, will prevent the yoke from swinging ond from jamminy the release system. Shotographs attached on Paze 1, Inclosure 4, show how the release syste: is jarmed and show the installation vf tho cable to eliminate this condition. Soue bowd release malfunctions of the A-2 release, particularly those at high altitude, are caused by failure of the arning lever trip-stud to cau the release lever latch sufficiently. Although clearances are apperently within limits specified in 7.0. 11-5-72, the release lover latch wil] wear @ groove in the trip-stud, A check vith a feeler-gage will not revenl this excessive wear; that portion of the trip-stud which is adjacent to the release lever latch when the unit is cocked, is rotated approximately 90° from that portion of the stud which caus the release lever when the release is tripved, Low temperatures encountered at high altitudes will cause slight shrinknges of these parts, increasing the clearences. If there is insufficient cam action, the release lever will not trip, Bomb release failure, which occurred in the Ae4 all-electric bomb releese system, was traced to faulty Cannon plug connections, Because of Interference, the Cannon plug of the release circuit must be removed from the forward boab racks of the rear bomb bay when hoisting equipment is installed, on the nission on which the release failure occurred, €11 bomb stations were checked defore take-off and were found to be satis~ factory. During loading operations, it was necessary to remove the Cannon plug of the release ciroult, After losding was comple te, the Cannon pluge were re-installed. Further (round checking was imposeible with bomb stations loaded, After the release Moe of Pages: _L Page Now: a AAP Bd, Proj. Nos: FS784 SECRET (6) ‘SECRET melfunction, a ground check reveeled a poor connection in the Cannon plug. Since the salvo circuit is connected throngh the seme plug, bombs could not be released except by entering the bomb bay and by tripping the release manuslly. Relocation of the Cannon plug connection, to eliminate the necessity of removal for installation of hoisting equipment, and separate connections to the bomb racks for the normal relesse circuit and the salvo circuit, should decrease the chances for malfunctions of this type. Photographs on Pages 2 and 3, Inclosure 4, show the original position of the Cannon plug connection and © suggested position which elSminstes interference with the hoisting equipment installation, The only means provided with the A-4 electrical release system for manual re- lease of bombs is by entering the donb bay and tripping each release unit with a screwdriver or a similar tool. With the bonb bay doors open, the blest of air in the bomb bay is of such intensity as to prevent freedom of movement necessary to reach all bomb stations, In the event the cabins were under pressure when an emergency manual release became necessary, entrance to the bomb bay would be impossible until the cabins were depressurized. Miscellaneous. q) The loading snd release of multiple~ ‘suspended demolition bonbs and of clusters of fragmentation bombs have not yet been tested for safety and for proper functioning of equipment under these conditions. A complete report on multiple loading of all types of demolition, incendiary and frag- mentation bombs will be made by this Command fas soon as higher priority tests will permit. No. of Peyes: __13 Page Nos: ar AAP Bd, Proj. n0-: F 3784 SECRET SECRET rncLosu Inclosure 1 - Test Historical Data. Inelosure 2 - Test Program. Inclosure 3 - Supplementary Schedule of Missions. Inelosure 4 - Photographs. Tnelosure 5 - lst Preliminary Report. Inelosure 6 - 2nd Preliminary Report. Wo. of Pages? 13 Page Nos: —i12- AAP Bd. Proj. Now? F S764 SECRET Pe eemaginy Ist Lt., Ain Corps/ Project Officer. Concurred in: «4 epee’ let Its, Air’ Corps, Fost Gtfteers Approved ty: sx00p prMLioS WITH A i ig : Ia & Tmoyaypur__ CM *at-006-0z_O6T mprarpur__em *at-906-02_06T Terpparpur__€Mm *at-006-02 _06T Weds STOOP Aye BU SOS Inclosure No, MAP Bd. Proj, uoqntquo foq vod vous oowoToy enoyaypur zwaeroz _o6t ~rusdo-eoop Aye POE eTOy Wyaq ~_£quo eq preatos woss osvoToy TenpyATpUT _evBEN “aT-ooT~oe _O6T__.ooofoT__ “panoTs Upeued eicop pawasos-£Tuo £eq svOs wos asEoTOH TenprATUL _zvaOH “at-ooT-ox _O6T__soofot___E axeg Tied wosy_uyesy quog oy Jo eeveTey _UTEIy pareds OT ZVBEM ‘AT-COT-O7 _O6T __sooofoT__z -éuq PIBIOS WOT YET GOT Or “pesoTo Joop quod qaTA vq aves woss uFEsa quod OZ *T UTesy peowds COT zVBEM *AI-OOT-OY O6T —s000'0T._—ST * € z T voBanyo Suyyods uyrm 3uoUT aquoq TTY“ HutON SNvIaITY 6c-@ NI GONTINGUNL XYE AMOR ALYOTISHANT OL SNOTSSTN THHOTETGY 40 FINgTHOS SECRET ‘TABLED ‘TABLE OF CIRCULAR ERAORS Mission 1 ‘With Bomb Doors Left Open ‘With Bomb Doors Snap Opened 286! ios 105+ 166" ot vgs U6 2085" Avg. 127" b. With Bomb Doors Left, Open With Bomb Doors Snap Opened 405" 385" 463" 350" 2B! 235 367" 20" ei Tos 3a T6.OT avg. 328" Mission 2 “With Bonb Doors Left Open ‘With Bomb Doors Snap Opened 600" 540" gud 048 Tsalr avg. 390 ves 286! be ‘With Bomb Doors Left Open ‘With Bomb Doors Snap Opened 430" asst Bue" Be 4° 36l" 292 292" 4 ira TL90" avg, 298" Toov" wore: 1. Different Bombardiers on "a" and "b" sections of each mission, 22 All circular errors converted to 105 ail trail setting. 3. AL missions run at 10,000 feet altitude and 190 aph IAS. Inelosure No.t 2 Page No. i MAF Ba. Proj. Not (ic5) 285 ‘TABLE LL Results of iission to Determine Minimum and Optima Altitude for Us ‘iligh Altitude" Setting on Boab Sight Door Opening Control. of RELEASE MJ. ALTITUDE L.A.S. 1 Se DOOR CONTROL DISC MILS OF BOMB REL. SETTING = SPEED TRAIL YES NO 1 10,000! 190 230 High 200 10 2 9,000! 190 226 High mw 7 & 3 8,000" 190 m2 High 267 8 X x 4 6,000" 190 aly High 263.9 85 x 5 6,000" 190 2a High 263.9 85 x 6 6,000" 190 2a Low 26.9 85 x 7 7,000! 190 ae High 243.3 89 x a 7,000" 190 28 Low 243.3 a9 x 9 7,000! 190218 High 3.3 89 x 10 7,000! 190 218 Low 23.389 x n 7,000' 190 218 Low 23.3 89 x 2 7,000! 190 218 High 23.3 a9 x 2B 7,000! 190 as High 23.389 x us 6,000! 190 2h High 263.9 85 x 15 2,000" 190 202 Lom 460.0 55 x 6 7,000" 190218 High 2u3.3 89 X a7 7,000! 190218 High 23.3 89k Inclosure Wo. _2 Page No.: fF a Pro] Woot (HeE28s HEADQUARTERS, 20/7/4 _WES__ ARMY AIR FORCES PROVING GROUND COMMAND Date Initial — -BGLIN FIELD, FLORIDA PRELIMINARY REPORT TURBULENCE EFFECT IN BOMB BAY OF B-29 AIRPLANE Serial Now! _6-bij-2-1 No. of Pages: _5 Date: 18 October 1944 MF Doane Progeet So Tos /s/ Co Bs OVERACKER, Col. £.0. GRANDISON GARDNER, Brigadier General, U.S. Aray, Commanding. 1. gbypoTs To deteraine the effect of the air flow in the bomb bay of the B-29 airplane on the stabilility characteristics of various bosbs. 2. dumovuction: a, During the preliminery phase of this service test, a bond sight aodifieation and a pneuaatic door installation were tested. Missions were flown to detersine the effect of these installations on bombing accuracy. Unusually large circular errors were encountered and the con- sequent investigation as to their causes led to the discovery that boabe Felensed from particular stations and racks were unstable in flight. F. It was decided, after observing a nusber of individual re~ Leases of 19842 practice bombs, that the instability of the bombs in flight was caused by the attitide of the bombs as they cleared the boab bays and entered the air streaa. A schedule of missions, attached as Inclosure 1, was set up to investigate thia phenomenon. ec In order to facilitate interpretation of bombing data and understanding of the physical layout, a sketch of the bonb bay of the B-29 airplane showing the sequence of bosb release is attached as In- closure 2. 3+ covcustons a. The air flow in the bomb bays of the B-29 airplane is such as to affect adversely the flight characteristics of sone bons. It 1s concluded that: >. The air flow distribution in B-29 bomb Lays does not affect impact patterns of train releases of general purpose boabs encugh to cause serious consideration in combat operations cs The air flow distribution in the boab-bay adversely affects flight characteristics of the 138A2 practice bomb. When loaded on rear racks of both fore and aft bonb bays, this munition is unsuitable for training purposes where bombing accuracy is desired. 4. Ina "fastest train" release of bonbs smaller than the 500-1b. size, there is a possibility of bombs dropped from the rear racks of the forward bomb bay striking bonbs released from the rear bon bay so as to function the nose fuze after it has armed. The chances of bombs striking together are increased with multiple suspension, In salvo releast together below the airplane ) there is a possibility of boabs striking Inclosure No. 6 No. of Pages! 5 Page o.t 1 ‘MF Bd, Proj. No.: 4036 ‘SECRET 4 ROQOMMENDATIONS.--It ie recomended that: a, Affected commands be notified of th conditions and further investigation be mde if dened necessary. by The possibility of changing the sequence of release to reduce the chances of bombs striking each other imuediately below the airplane be investigated. (See paragraph 63.) Cs Armed salvo releases of bombs not be made unless bonbs are equipped with a fuze which will not arm until the boabs have dropped a safe distance below the airplano, 5. RECORD OF Tat This test was conducted as outlined in the Schetule of Missions, attached as Inclosure 1. Additional missions were scheduled in order to check resulta obtained.” Details of all releases are discussed below. 6. pascussioNs a. A train of eighteen 100-1b. IGEA2 practice bombs was released from the rear boab bay with forward boa doors closed. The intervaloneter ‘was set for a 100 foot ground spacing. Bobs from all stations of the rear racks of the aft bomb bay entered the air strean nose down and sere unstable from the instant of releas sive trail was observed. Bombs dropped from the front racks ft boa bay did not appear to be greatly affected. Pictures of the release are shown as Inclosure 3, Page 1. ‘he ground pattern, with points of impact marked in the order’ of release, is shown as Inclosure 4, Page 1. bs A train of twenty 100-1b. 1G8A2 practice bosbs was released from the forward bomb bay. Photographs on Page 2, Inclosure 3, show that bonbs released from the front stations of the formard bomb bay are not greatly affected by distribution of air flow within the boab bays. Boabs from the rear stations of the forward bonb bay entered the air strean nose down and were unstable from the instant of release. ground pattern, showing inpact points nuabered according to sequence of release, is attached as Inclosure 4, Page 2. cs A twenty bomb train of 100-1b. 1G8A2 practice bonbs was re- Leased from the rear bomb bay with forward bomb doors open. Photographs fon Page 5, Inclosure 3, and a ground pattern on Page 3, Inclosure 4, show that bosbs from the loner stations of the rear racks are unstable and that their flight path is adversely affected. Inclosure No, 6 Wo. of Pages: 3 Page Now? 2 MF Bd. Proje Now? POS d, A train of forty 100-1b, ID8A2 practice bonbs was released with the intervalometer set for 100 foot ground spacing. Unstable boabs were observed to fall from the rear racks of both fore and aft boab bay: Bosbs dropped from the rear racke of the forward bosb bay were the ms! erratic in flight. These bombs trailed to such an extent that they crossed ‘through the train from the rear bomb bay innediately below the airplane. Photographs on Page 4, Inclosure 3, show details of the release, es Individual releases of 100-1b, IB8A2 practice bombs were nade at 10,000 feet altitude and 190 mph IAS. Releases were made from rear boab bay with forward doors closed and from the forward bor bay with the doors open. Range errors were consistently short; they were greatest for vombs dropped from rear racks of either bomb bay. f. A train of twenty 500-1b. M43 G.P, bombs was released fron the rear bosb bay with forward bos doors cli ‘The effects of the air flow in the bonb bay appeared to have dampened out with use of the heavier borb. Twenty 500-1b M3 bombs were released individually fron the rear bay with forward doors closed. At 10,000 feet altitude and 190 ph IAS, the average circular error ws 110 feet. 8+ Twenty 500-2b. M43 bombs were released in train from the for- yard boab bay, Boubs released from the rear racks dropped from the boab bay with the nose slightly down but stabilized 200 to 00 feet below the airplane. It was impossible to obtein impact patterns with points of Anpact numbered in the order of release. The bombs were numbered on the fing, waich broke up on impact. Photographs of the release are shown on Page’5, Inclowure 3. he A train of forty 500-1, M43 bombs was released. Boabs re~ Leased froa the rear bomb bay with the formard doors open were not noticeably affected. Bosbs dropped from the rear racks of the forward bomb bay fell nose down but stabilized after dropping 200 to 500 f ‘The trail of the unstable bombs was not excessive enough to cause then to cross the train of bosbs from the rear boab bay as long from the airplane was possible, 1, Forty 100-1b. 160 G.P, bosbs were released in train. ‘The un- stabilized effect was not so extreme as that observed when 100-Ib. WG8A2 practice bombs were released. Photographs on Page 7, Inclosure 3, show un- stable bonbs in various altitudes. A photograph of the inpact pattern is included. J+_ An analysis of the individual missions described above shows that, with’ fornard bomb doors closed and releases made from the rear boab BaF pas Props Wo EE SECRET SECRET bay, the bombs from the rear racks are adversely affected. With both fore ‘and aft bomb doors open and releases made from both boab bays, boabs dropped from the rear racks of the forward bosb bay are most erratic in flight. ‘This results in these particular bombs trailing to such an extent as to cross the train of boabs dropped from the rear bay. With the inter- alonoter set on "fastest train,” there is a possibility of boabs from the rear racks of the forsard bay striking boabs dropped from the rear bay. If the sequence of release were changed so that eech quadrant of racks released successively instead of releasing alternately from each bos bay, the chances of boabs striking together imediately below the airplane ‘would be reduced. yore made using 100-1b., 500-1b., 1000-1b., 2000-1b. and 4000-1b, bombs. Impacts between the 100-1b. bosbs and impacts between the 500-1b. bonbs occurred from 50 to 500 feet below the airplane. Impacts betwoen the 100-1b. boabs ocurred nearest the airplane and were more severe than iar .cts between 500-1b. boabs. During a "oafe" salvo release of 500-1b. clusters of fragnentation bombs, a malfunction of ‘the release mechaniea occurred. One cluster from each bomb bay was re- leased in an arned condition. A bomb from the opened cluster dropped from the forward bay struck an unopened cluster. Detonation occurred and slight danage was sustained by the airplane. 7. BoLosuRES® Inclosure 1 - Schedule of Missions, Inclosure 2 - Sketch of Bomb Bay. Inclosure 3 - Photograyhe. Inclosure 4 - Inpact Patterns. Inclesure 5 - Historical Data. Jpologure tot 6 No. of Page Page tort MAE 84, Prog. Now? EGOR6 SECRET Prepared byt fafa Ha GHEREY He He CHERKY, Ast Lt., Air’ Corp: Project Officer. Concurred int _/s/ Cs De BECNEL C.D, BECNEL, lat Lt., Air Corps, Test Officer, Flight Test Section. 7 J AC Be HANES, Lt. Col., Air Corps, Chief, Boabing Project. Section. Approved by: ep als t/ Ls B. COATS, Colonel, Air’ Corps, Chief, Testing Branch. Approved byt Japa Be GUERUGaER *t/ CyB. OVERACKER, Colonel, Air Corps, Director, Proof Division. Inclosure No, No. of Pay Page No, 5 MAP BA, "Prog. Now? FAO +t — sekeq w0q Mm *aI-005-07 _O6T__,000‘OT, ot

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