Professional Documents
Culture Documents
G. V. C. NAIDU*
Abstract Key Words
The global centre of gravity is shifting to India, East Asia, Look East policy, India-
East Asia, due to its remarkable economic U.S., India-China.
dynamism, but the rise of new power centres and
their assertive attitudes also brings huge security
challenges. India is renewing its age-old links
with East Asia; after a long hiatus it is looking
to East Asia once again to engage with it more Introduction
purposely. Compelled by political and economic
imperatives, New Delhi launched the ‘Look Until as recently as a decade ago, most
East’ policy in the early 1990s, which, despite its
slow take-off, has evolved into a comprehensive
assessments of East Asia1 tended to ignore
engagement underpinned by several political- India as a factor in regional economic
institutional mechanisms, strong economic or security affairs, but that has changed
association through a variety of comprehensive
remarkably, and today there is hardly any
cooperation agreements, and robust defence
links and security cooperation. As a result, discourse that fails to make reference to
India has now become an inalienable part of India. This fundamental shift has come
the evolving East Asian economic and security about in part due to the ‘Look East’
order. While India closely collaborates with
the U.S., Japan and a few ASEAN countries policy which New Delhi launched in the
in the management of regional security, India’s early 1990s in the aftermath of the Cold
relations with China are undergoing major War, driven by economic imperatives
changes as they become increasingly complex.
and political expediency. The success
story of India’s engagement with East
Asia would not have been as dramatic
if it were not for the fact that the East
* G. V. C. Naidu is Professor and Head of Asian region itself has been witnessing
the Centre for South, Central and Southeast unprecedented developments whereby
Asian & Southwest Pacific Studies, School
of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru many countries found it useful to involve
University, New Delhi. India in regional affairs. While the
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PERCEPTIONS, Spring 2013, Volume XVIII, Number 1, pp. 53-74.
G. V. C. Naidu
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India and East Asia: The Look East Policy
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G. V. C. Naidu
firstly, with the success of China’s famous Japan is saddled with a runaway public
‘four modernisations’ program, launched debt, which by 2012 was nearly two and
in the late 1970s, and then with India’s a half times the economy, as well as an
recent emergence consequent upon ageing and declining population. It is
the liberalisation of its economy in the a laggard compared to the rest of the
early 1990s. With this, the Pacific once region; however, it would be imprudent
again hogged the limelight, and now to underestimate its strengths: aside
the Indian Ocean region’s economic and from huge personal financial assets at
geostrategic significance is increasing around US $17 trillion (as of December
because of its huge resources (notably 2012), it is the third largest economy,
oil and gas), which are fuelling the with a GDP of over US $5 trillion. More
phenomenal growth in East Asia, and the importantly, it is still a leader in several
rising economic opportunities present in niche advanced technologies.
the Indian Ocean rim region.
Today three out of four of the world’s Unlike in the past, when their
largest economies are located in East
fortunes were dependent on
Asia. By several estimates China is likely
the U.S. and Western Europe
to become the largest economy by 2035-
because of heavy reliance on
40, and India is already the third largest
their markets, the East Asian
in PPP terms. By 2008, China had
countries are coming of age
emerged as the largest manufacturing
nation, surpassing the U.S., and is now
economically.
the largest trading nation in the world.
Despite considerable slowdown in the Others, such as South Korea, Singapore,
last couple of decades, Japan continues Hong Kong and Taiwan, have emerged as
to be an economic powerhouse. The major capital surplus countries, and their
Asian economic tigers, followed by economic roles are rapidly expanding.
Southeast Asia and China, were the Of the nearly US $7 trillion total foreign
biggest beneficiaries of Japanese aid, exchange reserves held by the East Asian
investments and technologies. However, countries, the above four countries alone
ever since its asset bubble burst in the have nearly US $1.5 trillion. In addition,
early 1990s, the Japanese economy has virtually the entire ASEAN region is
gone into a tailspin, battered relentlessly faring exceptionally well economically.
by the twin problems of deflation and of Though a latecomer, Vietnam too has
growth at a snail’s pace. On top of this joined the league of high performers,
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India and East Asia: The Look East Policy
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G. V. C. Naidu
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India and East Asia: The Look East Policy
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G. V. C. Naidu
Another dimension of the East Asian issue (2003), ASEAN Defence Ministers
security is security multilateralism. It was Meeting Plus Eight4 (2010). Even the
originally conceived and proposed by East Asia Summit (2005) purported to
Japan to replicate the European example, deal with security issues. The jury is still
the Conference on Security Cooperation out as to whether these can play a role in
in Europe, to deal with post-Cold War shaping the regional security.
uncertainties in Asia. Whereas Tokyo
had its own vested interest to enhance India and East Asia in the
its political role in East Asia through a
multilateral framework, many countries,
Aftermath of the Cold War
including ASEAN and China, initially
It is against the above backdrop that
had reservations for different reasons.
India’s evolving policies and relations
However, the unexpected closure of
must be assessed. In some aspects, India
U.S. military bases in the Philippines
was eager to renew its relations with East
in 1992, and the contest in the South
Asia in the early 1990s; however, it had
China Sea becoming heated with China
beginning to assert its claims aggressively, always enjoyed vibrant and enduring
prompted ASEAN to revisit the issue of relations for several centuries before the
a regional platform to discuss security onset of colonialism, which not only
issues. It eventually took shape in the disrupted these links but in fact severed
form of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) them, as they were unsuitable for colonial
launched in 1993. A major objective was masters who wanted to have exclusive
to engage China in the ASEAN strategy monopoly. As is evident from a flood of
of ‘enmeshment’ through multilateral scholarly works that came at the height
institutions. By 1995, ASEAN put of India’s independence movement,
out an ambitious Concept Paper awareness of India’s strong influence was
that laid down a roadmap, beginning acute; there was not a single country in
with confidence-building measures, the entire East Asian region that was
followed by preventive diplomacy not influenced by India in one way or
initiatives, intended finally to emerge another. This played a key role among
as a conflict resolution mechanism. enlightened Indian nationalist leaders,
Despite considerable initial enthusiasm, especially from the early 20th century, in
over the years it has failed to live up to generating interest about developments
its expectations. A few others have also in the region. That could be said to be
been created, such as the Six-Party Talks the beginning of the first phase of India
to address the North Korean nuclear looking east.
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India and East Asia: The Look East Policy
India’s interest in East Asia was the Bandung Conference) in April 1955.
reflected in a series of events that took As a result, India’s initial foreign policy
place from the late 1940s onwards. The was heavily influenced by developments
most prominent was the convening of in East Asia. This could be considered
the famed Asian Relations Conference another phase of the Look East policy.
in New Delhi in March 1947, before Unfortunately, with the Cold War
India formally gained independence taking deeper roots, engulfing virtually
later in August the same year. It was the entire region, India’s role began to
the first ever attempt to bring together diminish. Compelled by a series of wars
Asian countries on a platform to express from the early 1960s onwards that it had
solidarity with each other and to evolve to fight with China (1962) and Pakistan
a common strategy to fight colonialism (1965 and 1971), India had to abandon
and imperialism. As part of this approach, its earlier activist policy. While India was
India had also organised a special busy strengthening its defence forces,
conference on Indonesia in January 1949 leading eventually to the signing of a
in support of its fight against the Dutch Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union
colonialists. Prime Minister Nehru in 1971, the pro and anti-communist
also extended strong support to other divide was nearly total in East Asia.
independence movements, especially in But for a short while India came under
Vietnam, and enthusiastically welcomed scrutiny due to its recognition of the
the emergence of the People’s Republic regime that Vietnam propped up after
of China under the communist party its military intervened to remove the
leadership. India also contributed troops dreaded Pol Pot in the 1970s (the only
for UN peacekeeping operations in non-communist country to do so), and
Korea. Because of its neutral position and India’s marginalisation from regional
political standing in the newly unfolding affairs, both politically and economically,
Cold War atmosphere and its active was nearly total. The image persisted
participation in East Asian regional that it belonged to the Soviet camp and
affairs, India was made the Chairman of that its economic policies were inimical
the International Control Commission, to most countries in East Asia, which
which was set up under the 1954 Geneva promoted foreign direct investments,
Accord to ensure the smooth transfer of liberal economic policies, export
power in Vietnam. India’s pro-active promotion, etc., and was fairly deep
policy was most visible in the convening seated, corroborated by the fact that
of the Afro-Asian Conference (also called even China shed its socialist path to join
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G. V. C. Naidu
others, whereas India remained stuck three-year lease) and advanced Kilo-class
with what was called the ‘Hindu rate of submarines, along with a variety of surface
growth’. combatants from the Soviet Union and
through indigenous production. The
expansion of base facilities at Port Blair,
Economic exigencies and called Fortress Andaman (FORTAN),
political compulsions later in the Bay of Bengal close to the crucial
became added incentives to Malacca Strait, lent further credence to
look at East Asia afresh. concerns in Southeast Asia and beyond.
Indonesia even protested against these
plans and criticism of the Indian Navy
India, however, shot into prominence
became increasingly strident towards the
in the 1980s for entirely different reasons
late 1980s.5
due to the rapid expansion of its navy.
Since this took place mostly, although A series of events, such as the end of
not entirely, owing to generous Soviet the Cold War, the establishment of a new
support, many drew two inferences. government under the leadership of P.V.
One was that the Indian Navy was Narasimha Rao, and the opening up of an
being equipped with power projection economy that had been limping, served
capabilities and that Southeast Asia to put in place a new policy framework.
would be a prime target, and secondly, Although Rao has been credited with
that India in concert with the Soviet the Look East policy, one can trace the
Union and Vietnam would try to roots of this policy to the initiatives the
checkmate Chinese and American Indian Navy took in the late 1980s to
re-establish links with its counterparts
influences in Southeast Asia, especially
in Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia
in view of the ongoing Cambodian
and Malaysia. Economic exigencies and
conflict, particularly after the Soviet
political compulsions later became added
Union gained a foothold at the Cam
incentives to look at East Asia afresh.
Ranh Bay naval base in Vietnam.
Concerns remained in respect to India
True, the Indian Navy underwent competing for influence with China and
a major spurt in its capabilities in the Japan, once it became clear that both
1980s, which included the acquisition of superpowers, which had maintained
a second aircraft carrier from the U.K., huge military presences in Southeast Asia,
HDW diesel-electric submarines from were winding down their bases. Under
Germany, a nuclear submarine (on a these circumstances, refurbishing India’s
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India and East Asia: The Look East Policy
image as a responsible major power, and had begun to digest the implications
in particular convincing ASEAN that it of China’s rise, not just as an economic
had greater stakes in peace and stability power but also as a military power. These
than in extending its influence to fill the developments enabled ASEAN to re-
so-called power vacuum in the region, evaluate their attitude toward India, a
assumed the utmost priority. big country with formidable military
might, but with a benign image of
India was a potential never interfering or intervening in the
countervailing force against region in any way, unlike the other great
a fast-rising China, which powers. For many, India was a potential
could also offer huge economic countervailing force against a fast-rising
opportunities once its market China, which could also offer huge
reforms took roots in the same economic opportunities once its market
way as in China. reforms took roots in the same way as in
China.
A series of developments between 1992
Meanwhile, the Indian Navy took
and 1995 had a dramatic impact on
the lead in assuaging Southeast Asian
India’s relations with East Asia. Among
concerns about its modernisation by
them, three were notable. Firstly, the
initiating a series of measures to build
sudden military withdrawal by the U.S.
confidence- primarily joint exercises
and Soviet Union created considerable
and invitations to senior naval officers
anxiety about the future of regional
to the Andaman facility for first-hand
security at a time when both China and
assessment. This had a major impact on
Japan were looking for ways to enhance
East Asian security perceptions of India.
their roles. Secondly, the dispute over
These simple initial steps later on turned
islands in the South China Sea shot into
out to be a major dimension of foreign
prominence as conflict intensified over
their sovereignty. In particular, Beijing’s policy toward East Asia, as explained
passing of the Law on the Territorial Sea below.
in February 1992, stipulating China’s
absolute sovereignty over both the India and East Asia: The
Paracels and the Spratly islands began to Look East Policy
ring alarm bells that led ASEAN to issue
the Declaration on the South China India’s much celebrated Look East
Sea in 1992. Thirdly, many countries policy was never articulated officially;
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G. V. C. Naidu
there were no pronouncements nor any for economic and security purposes.
white papers issued. While the Indian Invariably ASEAN played a prominent
Navy was taking its own initiatives, role in all of these. Secondly, concerned
compelled by the 1991 foreign exchange about its future, ASEAN was finding
crisis, the newly established government ways to remain a significant player in
under Prime Minister Rao had little regional political affairs. For India,
option but to resort to drastic measures befriending ASEAN was the best way to
by freeing the economy from the earlier enhance its engagement with East Asia.
socialist shackles. As part of the drive to Thus, for the first time, Prime Minister
attract investments, Japan was one of Rao sketched some details about the
the first countries that India turned to, Look East policy in his famous speech
not only for it to help bail it out of acute India and the Asia-Pacific: Forging a New
shortage of foreign exchange reserves, but Relationship in Singapore, 1994. It was
also to invest liberally in the same way as only in the 1995 Annual Report of the
it did in the rest of East Asia. From New Indian Ministry of External Affairs that
Delhi’s point of view, the expression ‘Look
the Japanese response In the initial phase of India’s East policy’ was used
was disappointing Look East policy, much of the for the first time. It is
as it failed to show emphasis was on establishing thus pretty obvious
much enthusiasm. institutional links with that New Delhi did
New Delhi then ASEAN and other ASEAN-led not have much clue
turned its attention mechanisms. as to what it was
to Southeast Asia, a looking for, except
region with which its for the broad goal of
ties had historically been cordial. It soon increased interactions with East Asia.
became obvious that in order for India to In the initial phase of India’s Look
be involved in regional affairs at a time East policy, much of the emphasis
when profound changes were occurring was on establishing institutional links
in East Asia, it was imperative to evolve with ASEAN and other ASEAN-led
an ASEAN-centric policy. It was aimed mechanisms. Concurrently, taking
at serving two objectives: firstly, India measures to qualitatively improve
could never become a factor in regional bilateral relations with select countries
affairs unless it secured membership in such as Singapore, Malaysia, South
several of the multilateral frameworks Korea and Thailand. These resulted in
which had started sprouting both India becoming a Sectoral Dialogue
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India and East Asia: The Look East Policy
Partner with ASEAN in 1992 (limited setting off a major spurt in economic
to certain economic sectors), which was relations. India’s trade with East Asia,
later elevated to full Dialogue Partnership which constituted 30.42 % (US $242
in 1995. India was also offered ASEAN billion of total trade volume of US $795
Regional Forum (ARF) membership in billion) in 2011-12,7 has been growing
1996. As relations consolidated, India the fastest compared to any other region,
and ASEAN became summit partners in with major investors from East Asia,
2002. Despite Chinese objections, when especially countries such as Japan, South
the East Asian Summit was launched in Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, etc.
2005, India could no longer be ignored.6
A distinct feature of India’s political India has also entered into
engagement with East Asia is that, as Comprehensive Economic
with ASEAN, a variety of institutional Partnership or Comprehensive
arrangements have been created to Economic Cooperation
ensure that interactions constantly take Agreements with Singapore,
place at various levels and relations get South Korea, Malaysia and
strengthened continuously. Thailand and is negotiating
similar agreements with most
Economic Links other countries of East Asia.
On the economic front, India was
no match either for Japan or China, Although a relatively late entrant,
and many countries were disappointed Japan is emerging as India’s crucial
with the pace of economic reforms, economic partner. India has been the
the extensive bureaucratic red tape and largest recipient of Japanese ODA
poor infrastructure. Despite concerted (despite substantial cuts in overseas aid,
efforts, economic interactions remained in the Indian case it has been steadily
sluggish in the initial phase. The 1997- increasing) since 2005. Japan is also
98 financial crisis, which snowballed involved in several mega-projects such as
into a major economic crisis afflicting the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor,
most countries of East Asia, was a the Rail Freight Corridors between
setback for India’s attempts. By the early Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata, and the
2000s, India’s growth story became well Chennai and Bangalore Corridor,
known, and by then East Asian countries entailing hundreds of billions of dollars
also had recovered from the crisis, in investments and technology transfer.
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G. V. C. Naidu
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India and East Asia: The Look East Policy
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G. V. C. Naidu
(twice a year); the annual Foreign Office disputed border, and a strong conviction
Consultation; the annual Comprehensive that China’s unstinting support has
Security Dialogue at the level of the Joint emboldened Pakistan to wage wars on
Secretary, the Ministry of External Affairs India (not to mention the generous
(MEA) and the Ministry of Defence support to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
(MoD) of India/the Director General, program) and has supported terrorist
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and activities, are serious issues that have
the Ministry of Defense (MoD) of Japan; affected bilateral relations. For China,
the Maritime Security Dialogue; and India has been
the annual Track 1.5 working hand in
Strategic Dialogue. India-China relations are glove with the U.S.,
India has emerged broadening, from the earlier Japan and a few
as the second most limited border problem and other countries bent
important strategic Pakistan to a vast array of issues, on containing China
partner for Japan especially those spanning the and undermining its
after the U.S. New vast Indian Ocean and East interests. Yet, there
Delhi’s intensified Asian regions. is no question that
strategic interaction bilateral relations
with East Asia is are witnessing
an indication of its rising aspirations, an unprecedented transformation:
growing stakes and attempts to play a they are becoming increasingly more
suitable role in the region. complex and multifaceted. Economic
links are booming and there are a
India, China and East Asia number of issues that have emerged as
areas of common interest. Both share
The discourse on India and East Asia is and cooperate on evolving common
incomplete without a reference to China, positions in talks over climate change
the most important power, with which and WTO, as emerging economies both
India has a different kind of relationship seek to promote cooperation as members
than with the other countries in the of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India,
region. Almost as large, and aspiring China and South Africa), and have been
to emerge as strong as China, India strongly supporting regional multilateral
has nearly matching military strength institutions, from the Shanghai
but lags behind in economic strength. Cooperation Organisation to the East
The 1962 war, nearly 95,000 km2 of Asia Summit. Their competition,
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India and East Asia: The Look East Policy
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G. V. C. Naidu
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India and East Asia: The Look East Policy
common understanding and undertake major task, especially for large countries
some common initiatives in the coming requiring close cooperation.
years in close concert with Japan and a
few other Southeast Asian nations.
Despite growing economic in-
terdependence, security chal-
India and Emerging East
lenges are mounting, as recent
Asian Security Architecture events suggest.
The above discussion clearly
demonstrates the profound changes At the same time, much current
occurring in East Asia, in particular anxiety about regional security is born of
that its security is now in the midst of the fact that there is no classic balance
a fundamental shift. Despite growing of power. China continues to harbour
economic interdependence, security ambitions to emerge as a predominant
challenges are mounting, as recent events power in East Asia, whereas others want
suggest. China’s belligerent attitude and
a regional multipolarity. That is also
growing assertive actions with respect to
what India wants so that it can remain as
those of its territorial claims which are
one of the major players in the region in
disputed by others, predominantly in the
shaping its future economic and security
East and South China Seas, seem to have
triggered newer attempts to find ways order, where its stakes will continue to
to deal with China. The paranoid and grow enormously. Now that Washington
isolated North Korean regime continues has announced its ‘return to Asia’ policy
to be a security nightmare with its and a military ‘rebalancing’ strategy,
perseverance in stockpiling weapons of one can expect a realignment of forces.
mass destruction and ballistic missiles. China has interpreted them as attempts
The dangers posed by innumerable to contain it, and thus relations among
threats in the non-traditional security great powers will be a critical element in
domain in East Asia are clear and present. evolving regional security.
Southeast Asia is seen as the second front
in the fight against terrorism. East Asia Whither the role of regional
is most prone to natural disasters- the multilateralism is a pending question.
2004 tsunami and the 2011 Fukushima Can mechanisms meant to promote
earthquake, followed by a tsunami and economic cooperation become so vital
a nuclear accident, are best known- that countries will be forced not to
and hence, disaster management is a become aggressive and find peaceful
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G. V. C. Naidu
ways to resolve disputes, moderate great their rapidly rising interests and stakes,
power rivalry, and ensure that clashes of the contest will intensify in the maritime
interests will not result in conflicts? In sphere. Russia is the other major power,
any case, the security related multilateral despite its drastically diminished role,
frameworks, such as the ARF and Six- that is striving to carve a niche role
Party Talks, have failed to make much through increased defence and energy
headway so far, as they are beset with links. Hence, the relations that govern
many problems. Hence, whether there them will be a principal determinant of
is a need to create a more credible regional economic and security order.
security framework is another issue to be
debated. As a result, India’s role in the
emerging balance of power in East Asia Given the slowdown in the
has become very significant. U.S. and the problems the EU
countries are facing, New Delhi
Conclusion has no option but to hitch its
economic wagon to the dynamic
Until the late 1990s, India was out of East Asian region.
East Asia’s radar; however, it is now an
indispensable part of it. Moreover, it is However, for the foreseeable future
increasingly seen to be a key player in the the spotlight will be firmly on China,
emerging regional security architecture. whose inexorable rise both as economic
For the first time in history, three and military power is unparalleled, and
regional powers- China, Japan and India- its assertive actions will be aimed at
are emerging almost simultaneously as continuously enlarging its strategic space.
major actors. Undoubtedly the U.S. is (In the coming years the same could
the dominant and influential power, become true of India.) The ramifications
but there are uncertainties over its status of this are visible in growing tensions
and ability to influence developments between China and Japan on the one
in a significant way. The recent ‘pivot to hand, and between China and the U.S.
Asia’ and reordering of its overseas force on the other. It will be a challenge for
deployments signify its vital interests, the rest of the region to ensure that
but it will have to take into account the current transition is peaceful and
the rise of China and the growing that China does not precipitate things.
aspirations of other major actors. Even Added to the above are Japan’s quest for
as China and India begin to exercise a greater security role, and India’s strong
their sea power commensurately with forays into East Asia. Consequently, a
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India and East Asia: The Look East Policy
new security and economic architecture of the Look East policy. India is learning
is in the making. the art of applying military strength to
advance diplomatic goals in the region.
India has taken full advantage It has taken full advantage of the current
of the current political flux and political flux and security fluidity and its
security fluidity and its record record of non-intervention as a benign
of non-intervention as a benign power to position itself as a key player.
power to position itself as a key In fact, most of New Delhi’s Strategic
player. Partnership agreements are with East
Asian countries; in particular, the one
India has evolved a multi-pronged
with Japan is emerging as a key facet.
strategy under the rubric of the Look
Similarly, India’s security cooperation
East policy. It has created a variety of
institutional mechanisms both at the with Indonesia and Vietnam is also
multilateral and bilateral levels with strengthening. Rapidly increasingly
select countries to ensure that relations cooperation between India and the U.S.
remain strong. Although not comparable along with Japan in the management of
to China or Japan, its economic links are regional security is a crucial development
growing, with East Asia a critical region.
for the regional balance of power. As
Given the slowdown in the U.S. and the
far as China is concerned, one can
problems the EU countries are facing,
New Delhi has no option but to hitch see the presence of both competitive
its economic wagon to the dynamic and cooperative elements India-
East Asian region. That is reflected China relations; however, the bilateral
in the large number of free trade and relationship is more mature now and
comprehensive economic cooperation both seem to be conscious of the danger
agreements that it has entered into, and
of crossing the red lines. In the final
its enthusiastic support for the proposed
RCEP proposal, despite concerns about analysis, even as global affairs in the
its implications for its manufacturing coming years are going to be dominated
industry. by developments in East Asia, India’s
Perhaps India’s defense diplomacy relations with the region are poised
towards East Asia is a major, but less to progress rapidly as it becomes an
known, dimension of the successful story undeniable part of the region’s destiny.
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G. V. C. Naidu
Endnotes
1 East Asia here includes India, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia.
2 According to Kissinger, one of the three revolutions the world is witnessing is the “… shift
in the centre of gravity of international affairs from Atlantic to Pacific and Indian Oceans”,
see, Henry A. Kissinger, “The Three Revolutions”, Washington Post, 27 April 2008.
3 Jayant Menon, “How to Multilateralise Asian Regionalism”, East Asia Forum, at http://www.
eastasiaforum.org/2013/01/06/how-to-multilateralise-asian-regionalism/, [last visited 20
January 2013].
4 The eight being Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea and the
United States.
5 For details, see, G.V.C. Naidu, Indian Navy and Southeast Asia, New Delhi, IDSA and
Knowledge World, 2000.
6 India commemorated two decades of its dialogue partnership and a decade of summit
partnership with ASEAN by convening a summit meeting with the Association’s heads of
state in Delhi in December 2012.
7 Computed from Trade Data Bank of Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of
India.
8 “India-ASEAN Conclude Free Trade Agreement in Services, Investments”, Economic
Times, at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-12-20/news/35933727_1_
commemorative-summit-services-and-investments-asean-today [last visited 22 December
2012].
9 http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=100517854 [last visited 19 July 2011].
10 It was Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who, for the first time, talked about the growing interface
and interdependence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans: ‘We are now at a point at which the
Confluence of the Two Seas is coming into being. The Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now
bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity.’ PM Shinzo Abe’s
Address to the Indian Parliament, 22 August 2007.
11 The Trilateral was re-launched in 2011.
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